

Approaching Iraq 2002 in the Light of Three Previous Army Interagency Experiences: Germany 1944-48, Japan 1944-48, and Vietnam 1962-73

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for the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute Symposium
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, September 17, 2008

This Symposium is about “The U.S. Army and the Interagency Process.”

The war in Iraq is among other things a matter of the Army and the interagency process. The theme of my paper is that if the senior U.S. military four-stars who were responsible in 2002 and 2003 for the Iraq effort had been students of Army history they would have understood the full dimensions of what the Army was getting into. And they would have been in a good position to stand their ground with a Secretary of Defense who, not understanding that situation, forced on them a faulty plan for the invasion of Iraq.

I will use three historical examples -- Germany 1944-48, Japan 1944-48, and Vietnam 1962-73-- to make my case. My primary sources are, for Germany “The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-46,” by Earl F. Ziemke; for Japan, a 1949 PhD thesis at Syracuse University "The Occupation of Japan: A Study in Organization and Administration," by a later distinguished scholar, Ralph J.D. Braibanti; and, for Vietnam, my own experience and “Pacification; The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds,” by Richard A. Hunt.

United States planning for and conduct of the 1941-1945 war against Germany and Japan took place in an organizational structure quite different from that of Iraq 2002. There was no Department of Defense, simply a War, and a Navy, Department. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were an ad hoc planning and directing arrangement, using existing very senior officers, created to parallel that of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee. Detailed planning and orders for execution were accomplished by the Army and Navy staffs, including the Army’s Air Staff. Unity of command in overseas theaters was achieved simply by double-hatting. For example, in Europe, General Eisenhower was the commander of all U.S. Army forces, including their logistics, and also supreme commander of the allied (including U.S.) forces. He had two separate staffs.

It was not until late in 1943 that it was finally decided that the Army in the field would be responsible for post-hostilities governance of occupied territory. But in 1940, as war clouds began to gather, the Army War College prepared a draft military government manual (civil affairs and military government are related but distinct no-

tions; think of military government as “civil affairs conducted on enemy territory,” and civil affairs as “military government conducted in friendly territory”). At the same time, a War College committee prepared a manuscript on the administration of enemy territory.

Uncertain about which of its staff sections should have the responsibility, the Army General Staff wrestled with the problem. Within six months after Pearl Harbor an Army School of Military Government was up and running at the University of Virginia at Charlottesville, VA. Soon the Army had established a Military Government Division in the newly created Office of the Provost Marshal General.

In mid-1942 various civilian agencies of the government began to take note of what the Army was doing. As operational planning took place for the November 1942 invasion of North Africa, free-wheeling discussions began in the high levels as to how civil affairs/ military government were to be handled in that theater. At the direction of Assistant Secretary of War Robert Patterson, the Provost Marshal General and the Charlottesville school came up with a “Synopsis” of the matter. It said that:

- o In the first phase, military necessity would govern and US armed forces would be responsible for civil affairs/military government.
- o In the second phase, a civilian authority would probably supplant the military, but until then government of occupied territory would be in Army hands.

The announced gist of the Synopsis was “to assert and maintain War Department leadership in military government and at the same time invite and employ a wide cooperation with other departments and agencies of the government.”

Accompanied by a letter from Secretary of War Stimson, this Synopsis was widely distributed in the government. In October 1942 it was brought before a full meeting of President Roosevelt’s cabinet.

There, quoting from Ziemke, “Several members, who apparently would have liked larger roles for themselves and their departments, voiced suspicions; and the Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes expressed outright alarm at what he saw as a germ of imperialism. The President seemed to think it was good idea but had doubts about the (Charlottesville school’s) faculty.”

That day the President wrote a memo to Secretary Stimson which said that the matter was something that should first have been taken up with him , that governing civilian

territory was predominately a civilian task which required “absolutely first class men.”

Again, from Ziemke: “...the President’s memo converted an interdepartmental squabble into a monumental misunderstanding and a dire threat to principle of unity of command. The Army doctrine that made the theater commander the military governor at least until hostilities ended was apparently unknown to the President and could not be fitted into his concept of military government... (He) considered civil administration, no matter where it was conducted, a civilian responsibility and was totally unimpressed by the argument of military necessity.”

Taken somewhat aback, Secretary Stimson sought to avoid precipitating a Presidential decision that could force the Army out of military government and create intolerable command problems in a theater of operations. Rather than respond to the President in writing, he made an oral report of the objectives of the Army school at cabinet the following week, disclaiming the Army’s desire to control occupied areas after the war ended.

On November 8, just two days later, U.S. and British forces landed in Algeria and Morocco, and matters became very real. Assuming that administration in French North Africa could be left entirely to local authorities, the President had assigned policy formulation and execution to the State Department and provision of relief supplies to the Lend-Lease Administration. But soon, again per Ziemke, “Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower (theater commander)... protested that until North Africa... was secure, everything done there directly affected the military situation. His chief civil administrator, Minister Robert D. Murphy, could not be a member of the theater staff and at the same time be independently responsible to the State Department.”

Ziemke: “The Chief of Staff, General Marshall, agreed and on 28 November informed Eisenhower that Murphy would not function independently and the State Department would not assume control of civil matters until the military situation permitted. The Secretary of State, Marshall said, was in complete agreement...”

“Marshall had rescued the principle of military necessity... (T)he North African campaign, in its first weeks, had set a pattern for civil affairs and military government that would persist throughout the war... Thirty thousand tons of civilian supplies were needed every month... and both the military and civilian agencies agreed that on the drive into Tunisia the Army would have to assume complete responsibility for civilian relief.”

By February 1943 it had become evident that a more substantial arrangement for managing civil affairs/military government was needed in the War Department. The Civil Affairs Division, with Major General John H. Hilldring its director, was established on 1 March.

General Hilldring was to report directly to the Secretary of War on “all matters except those of a military nature” and to represent the Secretary of War to outside agencies. For the future, War Department officials contemplated placing full responsibility for civil affairs in the staff of the theater commander “until such time as the military situation will allow other arrangements,” and the Civil Affairs Division was charged with making certain that all plans to occupy enemy or enemy-controlled territory included detailed planning for civil affairs.”

On April 10, 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed the Civil Affairs Division as “the logical staff to handle civil affairs in nearly all occupied territory.” (Presumably an element of the Department of the Navy staff would handle civil affairs in some small part of occupied territory.)

Where would the people with the necessary expertise for the wide range of military government tasks come from? General Hilldring’s solution was to staff the Charlottesville school, and a second school established at Fort Oglethorpe, GA, with expertise from other agencies or with people brought in from their civilian pursuits. He would meet in-theater needs, which were forecast into many thousands, by training officers and by direct commission of civilian expertise, including some into field grade. And he did just that.

The issue of when the Army would relinquish management of civil affairs was yet to be resolved. In March 1943 the President placed former New York governor Herbert Lehman’s Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation in charge of planning and administering U.S. civil relief in liberated areas. The President remained convinced that civil affairs was a civilian job, and in June 1943 he proposed to put an Assistant Secretary of State in charge of a committee that would give central direction to all economic operations in liberated areas, with a subordinate in each theater, nominally responsible to the theater commander, who would receive his orders from the State Department.

The invasion of Sicily that summer demonstrated that divided command in the field would not work. The army commander on the scene had both the resources and the ability to direct operations; a civilian did not. In November 1943 the President wrote Secretary Stimson: “...it is quite apparent that if prompt results are to be obtained the

Army will have to assume the initial burden... until civilian agencies are prepared to carry out the longer range program.”

So that is how it turned out in World War II for the “U.S. Army and the Interagency Process” with respect to civil affairs and military government. In Washington the War Department was a key agency, but not necessarily dominant, in policy making; other agencies of the government had interests and much to offer. But in the field the theater commander’s responsibility for executing CA/MG, within policy, prevailed in war and continued with little outside participation for a time even after hostilities ceased.

In December 1943, General Eisenhower was named Supreme Commander; SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) would be his staff. An interim planning staff had been busy; that month it published a Standard Policy and Procedure for Combined Civil Affairs Operations in Northwest Europe, which assigned full control of and responsibility for civil affairs and military government to the military commanders, from the Supreme Commander on down. Well before Normandy, a G-5 Section, SHAEF, under a British lieutenant general, began to function.

In England the U.S. structure for CA/MG had already been forming. A Civil Affairs Center at Shrivenham and another at Manchester would receive and further train the hundreds, then thousands, of officers and enlisted men gathered into the army, trained, and sent from the United States. They would form these people into self-sustaining CA/MG detachments of various sizes which were then assigned to every command level, from army group to division. At each level a G-5 section would direct their activities. Large or small, a detachment would carry out the essential CA/MG actions -- government, public safety, public health, public welfare, utilities, communications, labor, transportation, resources, industry, commerce, agriculture, legal, fiscal, supply, and information.

The expertise for these tasks came largely from men brought in from civilian life, many of them directly commissioned as captains or at ranks as high as colonel. Thousands of others were trained from scratch by the U.S. Army. Ziemke tells in rich detail how these teams received their direction and then operated as the Allies entered German territory.

As the end of the war came into sight, authorities at the highest level began to discuss how to bring a civilian into Germany’s postwar government, possibly as General Eisenhower’s deputy; Eisenhower was willing, and even had his own civilian candidate. The War Department’s choice for that job was Major General Lucius D. Clay, the highly regarded director of the military production program,. Clay, supported by

President Roosevelt, was nominated for his third star. In April 1945 he reported for duty as Deputy Military Governor in headquarters, ETOUSA (United States Army European Theater of Operations), Eisenhower's "other hat."

In July 1945, SHAEF dissolved. The unified command USFET (US Forces European Theater), headquarters in Frankfurt, Eisenhower in command, came into being. The Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) was created, with General Clay in charge. Clay began to reduce its military strength, to bring civilians in, and to bring about the orderly transfer of government to German control.

In March 1947 Clay, now a four-star general, became theater commander and military governor. In 1949 he was replaced by John J. McCloy, named the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.

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The occupation of Japan was markedly different from that of Germany.

On August 10, 1945, the Japanese made their first offer of surrender. On September 1 the Eighth U.S. Army began to enter Japan unopposed. The next day General Douglas MacArthur, as the allies-designated Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) received the surrender aboard the USS Missouri. The substance of an Initial Post-Surrender Policy (approved by the President on September 6) was provided to him on August 29. That policy read:

"Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and control of Japan which will satisfy the principal Allied Powers, in the event of any difference of opinion among them, the policies of the United States will prevail."

As SCAP MacArthur was nominally responsible to the 13-member (including the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and China) Far Eastern Commission in Washington, DC. However, the FEC, which established an Allied Control Council in Tokyo, did not meet until February 1946 and had minimal influence on policy formulation.

Major General Courtney Whitney, in his book "MacArthur; His Rendevous with History," tells of MacArthur "pacing up and down the aisle of his C-54" as he dictated enroute to Japan. The "...notes I took formed the policy under which we would work..."

First destroy the military power. .Then build the structure of representative government . .Enfranchise the women. .Free the political prisoners. .Liberate the farmers. . Establish a free labor movement. .Encourage a free economy. .Abolish police oppression. .Develop a free and responsible press. .Liberalize education. .Decentralize the political powers. .”

MacArthur went right to work. Until September 2, 1945, his one headquarters in Manila, SWPA (Southwest Pacific Area), was a U.S. unified warfighting command; it also served MacArthur in his role as commander of U.S. Army Forces Pacific, including Sixth and Eighth Armies and other Army engineer, logistical, and administrative commands. On that date, GHQ SWPA became GHQ SCAP, responsible for the occupation of Japan. If MacArthur was to carry out his program, he must bring in substantial new expertise for management of occupation affairs, and his headquarters must adjust its working methods.

The solution, arrived at in the next six months, was to create within a single headquarters two interconnected staffs, one for Japan’s governance and one for military matters. General MacArthur, as SCAP, would be the ultimate authority for the former function. As concurrently commander of the U.S. Far East Command (and directly commanding the U.S. Army element of FEC), he would be the ultimate authority for the latter. Depending on the issue involved, the same officer would often serve on one staff or the other, his paperwork arriving for decision at the appropriate authority, or MacArthur himself. (I am told by my neighbor in Washington, Lieutenant General Edward L. Rowny, U.S. Army, Retired, who served on MacArthur’s staff in those days, that this was indeed how it worked, and very well.)

On September 6, 1945, General MacArthur received these instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

“The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with the Japanese do not rest on a contractual basis, but on unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.”

Dr. Braibanti, in his Syracuse University doctoral dissertation gives many examples of how General MacArthur used this authority with great skill to bring about the transformation of Japan, including its adoption of a new Constitution.

MacArthur decided right away to leave in place the Japanese structure of government with its prefectures and subordinate echelons. Annex 8, 28 August 1945, of Operating Instructions No 4, 15 August 1945, provided that MacArthur would “issue all necessary instructions to the Japanese Emperor or to the Imperial Government and every opportunity would be given the Government and the Japanese people to carry out such instruction without further compulsion. If necessary, however, (he) will issue appropriate orders to (U.S.) Army and Corps commanders... to secure compliance with (SCAP) instructions.”

Eighth Army deployed a total of 46 military government teams, one team at each prefecture, each team with its subordinate detachments. As was the case in Europe, each team encompassed the full range of governmental functions.. Operating for the most part under I Corps at Kyoto and IX Corps at Sendai and their assigned division and supervised by army, corps and division G-5s, this was the field structure that, along with the Tokyo SCAP establishment, carried out the occupation of Japan.

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In 1962 President Kennedy’s ordered increase in the U.S. advisory effort and troop support began to arrive in Vietnam. In 1973 the last U.S. troops were withdrawn and the Congress forbade any further U.S. military involvement. Throughout those years, U.S. authorities sought the right recipe for civil-military action through which the Government of Vietnam (GVN) could take back the countryside from the communist Viet Cong.

I grappled with this problem myself, in 1963-64 when I was senior advisor to the 21st ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) Infantry Division in charge of a four province area in the deepest regions of Vietnam’s Delta, its headquarters in Bac Lieu. President Diem had recently launched his ultra-ambitious strategic hamlets program, which called for fortifying hamlets, and occasionally for moving people into new hamlets. But the strategic hamlet program had tried to do too much too fast and was in a shambles.

The fundamental reality was that out there in the countryside there were two governments competing for the loyalties and control of the same population. One was the GVN, the official government of Vietnam, with its province chiefs, district chiefs, and village and hamlet chiefs, its tax collectors, its armed forces down to civil guard companies, self-defense corps platoons, and hamlet militia, its schools and information machinery and so on. The other was the Viet Cong with its own structure of province and district and other chiefs, its own tax collectors, its own schools, entertainers, and propaganda squads, and its own armed forces down to the hamlet militia, farmers by

day and fighters by night. The VC side had its own doctrine, that of revolutionary war, and in the countryside it was winning.

I decided that our advisory team would work with the division commander and his four province chiefs to develop a doctrine of our own that would reverse the situation and win back the countryside. I was fortunate in having two very good colleagues, Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Montague, a deputy senior advisor, and Richard Holbrooke, later famous but then a brand new foreign service officer who was working in my area as a U.S. Aid representative.

Working with a grizzled old major on the division staff, among other Vietnamese officers who spoke pretty good English, we developed the “oil spot” concept. Major Yi, who gave the concept its name, told us that it was how the French had operated in Algeria.

Pacification by “oil spot” meant that we would start at the fringe of an area under GVN control and, using a civil-military organization and civil-military action, we would patiently pacify one contested hamlet at a time. We were rather successful; when I left Vietnam in April 1964 we had a division school in operation and systematic hamlet pacification underway in each province. (Those interested in the details can read about it in my article, “Pacification Operations in the ARVN 21st Infantry Division,” ARMY magazine, March 1966, and also in pages 108-116 of “Strange Ground; Americans in Vietnam 1945-1975, An Oral History,” by Harry Maurer, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1989.)

The 21st ARVN Division initiative was not replicated elsewhere. It was later melded into a joint GVN-MACV (Military Assistance Command Vietnam) program called *Hop Tac* (Victory), the execution of which then suffered from faulty management and, with coup after coup, from government disarray. As ARVN and local province forces were increasingly buffeted by the growing Viet Cong, by mid-1965 the Republic of Vietnam was losing the war.

President Johnson then committed U.S. Marines, an Army air cavalry division and two airborne brigades to save the situation. Embarking on a “strategy of attrition,” General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV (Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam), asked for more. In July the President announced that he would send 44 combat battalions to Vietnam, increasing the U.S. military presence to 125,000; it would triple by end-1966. President Johnson, meanwhile, was casting about for ways to improve the progress of pacification. Various avenues were explored; none satisfied him.

On March 26, 1966, the President (per Richard Hunt) “appointed Robert W. Komer as special assistant for supervising pacification support from the White House... Komer’s powers were substantial. He was authorized to draw support from the secretaries of state, defense, treasury, agriculture, and health, education, and welfare, from the administrator of AID and from the directors of CIA and USIA... The President made it clear that... Komer ‘will have access to me at all times’...

“Komer handpicked a small group of people experienced in pacification to work for him. Lieut. Col. Robert Montague was his executive officer... (also) Richard Holbrooke of State... Komer set out to solve problems, prodding officials in Washington and Saigon... earned the nickname ‘Blowtorch.’”

In September 1967, having just taken command of the 2d Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, which had been alerted to deploy by air to Vietnam in December, I visited Vietnam with the division commander in an orientation party. In Saigon I spent an evening with Robert Komer, who was living out the consequences of his appointment eighteen months earlier. Since May Komer had been there as Deputy COMUSMACV for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS), with the rank of ambassador and with authority to manage all U.S. participation in the GVN-U.S. pacification effort. Bob Montague was his executive assistant.

Bob Montague and Dick Holbrooke, both brilliant men, had with their accomplished colleagues in Washington created CORDS -- a Cadillac version of the Model T pacification machinery that the three of us had built in Bac Lieu three years before. (When President Nguyen Van Thieu in 1968 set up the GVN’s Central Pacification and Development Council [CPDC] with a staff that reported to the Prime Minister and kept close ties with CORDS, he appointed our old 21st ARVN Division commander, Major General (then colonel) Cao Hao Hon, to take charge of it.)

Hunt: “CORDS unique feature was to incorporate civilians into a... single chain of command that consolidated control of all pacification support. (Komer) exercised command of all pacification personnel from Saigon to the provinces (and down into the districts)... CORDS interleaved civilian and military personnel throughout its hierarchy... Of the province senior advisors roughly half were civilians, and half were military, although the less secure provinces and districts tended to have a military head... Civilians wrote the performance reports of their military subordinates, and army officers evaluated the Foreign Service officers under them... The CORDS staff, called MACCORDS... functioned as a regular staff section under the MACV chief of staff...

“General Westmoreland... transferred the responsibility for advising and supporting the RF/PF (Regional Force companies and Popular Force platoons commanded by the province chief in his capacity as sector commander) from the J-3 (Operations) section in MACV to a directorate within CORDS. No single change was more important to the eventual course of pacification. It allowed CORDS to increase substantially the number of advisors and at last gave the pacification program access to forces that could provide sustained local security.”

Commanding the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, north of Hue during and after Tet 1968, I watched province and district chiefs and their RF/PF units weather the intense fighting of that period, supported by their advisors and the CORDS structure and by the ARVN 1st Infantry Division and by my brigade. The system rebounded. When in March 1970 I returned to Vietnam’s Delta as senior advisor to the Commander, ARVN IV Corps/ Military Region 4, pacification was thriving and CORDS was going strong. (My “Senior Officer Debriefing Report” of 14 January 1972, Hq, Delta Regional Assistance Command, is at <http://www.virtualarchive.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/>. Click on “search the virtual Vietnam Archive” and enter 2122201001.)

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Thirty years later as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander, U.S. Central Command, were addressing the Iraq situation, Vietnam was a distant memory and CORDS had been forgotten.

From my January 15, 2007, paper “Planning and Early Execution of the War in Iraq: An Assessment of Military Participation” (<http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/ForArmyWarCollege.pdf>)

(see original also, http://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/cushman/cushman-p07-1.pdf
At CENTCOM there was little post-hostilities planning; Mr. Rumsfeld’s key principals had told General Franks to “leave Phase IV [the post-Hussein-defeat phase] to us.” Mr. Rumsfeld himself waved off help offered by the State Department. ARCENT set up a post-hostilities planning cell, but not until Secretary Rumsfeld named retired Army lieutenant general Jay Garner to take charge of an Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance two months before the invasion did real planning begin. Garner would in effect work for the Secretary of Defense, creating divided in-theater command. Hastily collecting a staff, he deployed to Kuwait just days before D-Day.

As operations began, plans for constituting key ministries of an Iraqi post-Hussein national government and for putting in place provincial governments were essen-

tially unformed. Provisions ensuring that there would be an Iraqi army and police force did not exist. The troops were not told what to do when the Iraqi Army was defeated. Post-hostilities operational concepts were not developed and made known. Psyops plans and capabilities were rudimentary at best. Gaping holes remained.

Rumsfeld had disregarded, if he had even known about, the World War II precedent that put the theater commander in charge of military government in war and immediately afterward. We know the rest of the sad story.

In 2003 I had written an article for the November U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Its title: “President Bush Deserved Better.” Excerpts:

On 8 September, a somber President George W. Bush told the nation that accomplishing his goals in Iraq would take a lot more money and a lot more time than the public had been led to believe. He deserved better from his military...

(W)hile Secretary Rumsfeld and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be held primarily accountable for the second phase ineptness and the resulting problems, I also hold General Franks accountable. The Rumsfeld-Franks partnership extolled by Secretary Rumsfeld during the major combat phase had failed thereafter—and at a huge cost...

Only in January 2003 did Secretary Rumsfeld appoint retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner as head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance to deal with postwar Iraq. It was late already, but that month, General Franks should have said something like this to Army General John Abizaid, his newly arrived and highly capable Arabic-speaking deputy commander:

“The postwar planning effort is not going well. If it falls short, I will be responsible. So I am going to tell Secretary Rumsfeld that you will plan the second phase, which will begin seamlessly as soon as we defeat Saddam Hussein's army. As my deputy, you will take over General Garner's operation and become the temporary military governor of Iraq. Get busy planning for a military-civilian operation, basing your organization on the solution applied by General Creighton Abrams that was successful—but too late—in the Vietnam War.

“We will find a civilian to play the part of Robert Komer, who first headed the Civil Operations Rural Development Support effort in Vietnam. You will make your own estimate of post-victory conditions, which will be chaotic. Here is one idea I want you to consider. There are 18 provinces in Iraq. Organize 18 province teams under three regions, one of which will be Baghdad and vicinity. I will get

the Army War College to name 18 smart students to do full-time planning and to stand by to move to their province seats with their teams, complete with communications and local security from U.S. troops.

"Next week, I will move you and a small planning staff to Carlisle Barracks, near Washington, D.C., for convenient interagency planning. Start gathering data on Iraq and doing research on former occupations of countries. Be ready to brief me on your concept by mid-February. I will fight for sufficient resources."

I ended the article with "General Franks should have acted along these lines and insisted that Secretary Rumsfeld accept his approach. Think of the difference it would have made."

In 2002-2003 the Joint Chiefs of Staff missed an opportunity to remind the Secretary of Defense of the Army's experience in the 1945-46 occupations of Germany and Japan and in civil-military action in Vietnam.

When Mr. Rumsfeld assigned the immediate post-hostilities responsibility to a civilian agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have said to him, "Sir, this has to be the theater commander's responsibility; only he has the required means. We learned that in World War II."

On Point II, just published by the US. Army Combined Arms Center, relates in some 300 pages of matter-of-fact detail the devastating consequences, beginning in May 2003.