Korea, 1976-1978 -- A Memoir

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April, 1998

Appendices

These below are the Appendices to my original Memoir.
I have marked with an X those retained in this digitized copy.

Appendices

X Appendix A, Hollingsworth clippings. (one)

Appendix B, Korean language script, Caper Crown I.

Appendix C, paper for Mitre, December 1978

Appendix D, speech at Seoul Correspondents Club

Appendix E, 21 August messages from North Korea

X Appendix F, An Analysis of the North Korean Threat

Appendix G, Article, "Is the Defense of Korea a Worthy Cause"

Appendix H, Remarks at Senior Communicators Conference

Appendix I, Washington Post story of May 19, 1977.

Appendix J, Backchannel from General Rogers on "Speaking Up/Speaking Out."

Appendix K, Eighth Army "Troop Topics" of June 1977

Appendix L, Backchannel to General Vessey wth proposed message.

Appendix M, General Rogers' letter of July 28, 1977.

Appendix N, Remarks at Council on Foreign Relations.

Appendix O, Address at Korean Military Academy

Appendix P, Remarks at Private Meeting with Corps Commanders

X Appendix Q, Testimony before the Investigations Subcommittee of the HASC.

X Appendix R, House Subcommittee Report

X Appendix S, Letter from Congressman Stratton

Appendix T, Biography of the Author

'Tiger in the Forest'

← Wall St. Journal
Jan 13, '76

U.S. General Envisions 'A Short, Violent War' If Korean Reds Attack

Hollingsworth's Personality And Strategy Draw Fire; Plan Is Called Unrealistic

Is His Reputation Deterrent?

By NORMAN PEARLSTINE
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

HILL 229, South Korea—The South Koreans call him Ho Lim Soo, "the dignified tiger in the forest." But Lt. Gen. James F. (Holly) Hollingsworth more closely resembles a tough old tomcat, showing the scars of bloody battles but still lusting for a last good fight.

Raising a finger, the 57-year-old Texan points north from this fortified guard post to a broad valley and the enemy beyond. "This is my killing zone," he says with a slow grin and a slight Southern drawl. "If the Communists attack, they have to bring their tanks through here. And when they do, I am going to murder them."

Coming from others, the general's tough talk might be dismissed as mere military bombast. But "Holly is one of those generals who is totally committed to mayhem," says a senior staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and his words should be taken seriously.

Gen. Hollingsworth commands the 183,000-man U.S.-South Korea I Corps Group, one of the world's largest combat armies. He must defend the central part of the 151-mile-long demilitarized zone (DMZ)—including the most likely invasion routes—and the 6.5 million citizens of Seoul, the South Korean capital less than 30 miles south of here. With the fall of South Vietnam, the Korean peninsula has again become the most threatened area in Asia, making that command much more important.

As the Communists were completing their take-over of Indochina, all of Korea began to talk of war. North Korea's President, Kim Il-sung, made a well-publicized trip to China, ostensibly seeking support for "reunification" of the peninsula under Communist control and for removal of the 40,000 U.S. troops still in South Korea.

American officials, from President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger down, responded with promises to keep U.S. troops in South Korea indefinitely and to send the South Koreans more and better weapons. It doesn't now appear that a new Korean war is imminent—China apparently gave little support to North Korea—but these new tensions have prompted Gen. Hollingsworth to review his plans for meeting any North Korean attack.

Recognizing that Vietnam ended America's appetite for long Asian ground wars, Gen. Hollingsworth says he has prepared for "a short, violent war." Relying on heavy artillery, already in place along the DMZ, and on massive air support, including B-52 bombers now on Guam, he claims he can end any war in nine days.

Four Days to Tidy Up

"We'll need five days and five nights of real violence," the short, sturdily built general says. "Our firepower will have a tremendous impact on their ground troops, breaking their will to fight in addition to killing them." After that, "we'll need four more days to tidy up the battlefield."

The general's command includes 11 South Korean divisions and one American division, the U.S. 2nd Infantry. Although that division is based only 15 miles from the DMZ, Gen. Hollingsworth says it wouldn't be used in such a short war but instead would be withdrawn from the border area and would be held in reserve. "They wouldn't get a scratch on them," he says.

(American troops, including Gen. Hollingsworth, are here under terms of a U.S.-South Korean mutual defense treaty that obligates the U.S. to defend South Korea if it is attacked by North Korea.)

Gen. Hollingsworth is convinced his short-war plan would work, but there are others who hold such sanguine promises suspect. One U.S. military official says privately that there isn't enough artillery in place to sustain the violent conflict the General envisions. Japanese defense analysts think it would be at least several months before South Korean and U.S. troops could end a war with the North.

Pressure on Powers

If so, pressure might build on China and the Soviet Union to enter the conflict and on the U.S. to increase its troop commitments. Ultimately, the U.S. might also feel compelled to use nuclear weapons. The Defense Department has acknowledged that there are nuclear weapons in South Korea, and American officials concede they might be used if Seoul itself was near collapse.

Other critics say that Gen. Hollingsworth's preoccupation with violence is excessive, even for a military man, and question whether his aggressiveness is appropriate for Korea or anywhere else in today's world. The general learned to fight during World War II, when the public and the politicians glorified destruction of the enemy. A protege of Gen. George S. Patton, he emerged from that war with five Purple Hearts, a clutch of other medals and the reputation of having killed more than 150 enemy soldiers in hand-to-hand and close-fire combat.

During the Vietnam war, however, violence *per se* was less accepted by the public, and many military men, including Gen. Hollingsworth, saw their reputations tarnished. Gen. Hollingsworth served in Vietnam in 1966-67 and 1971-72; people who knew him there say he fought valiantly, especially at An Loc, where he earned another Purple Heart blunting a heavy North Vietnamese attack. But he is best remembered as the subject of a London Sunday Times article titled "The General Goes Zapping Charlie Cong." That article typed him as an insensitive Texas redneck whose primary pleasure was shooting up the countryside from his personal helicopter—"Killin' Cong," as he was quoted as saying, and anything else that moved.

A-1

sworth after the piece was published. Largely because of it, some government officials in Washington still refer to him as an "unguided missile" or a "hip shooter."

The general says he was portrayed unfairly in Vietnam and insists he was only doing "what I have done throughout my military career—saving as many lives as possible while destroying the enemy." He now speaks of Vietnam as a "long, drawn-out, unfortunate affair that people tired of," and defends his conduct there as necessary.

Gen. Hollingsworth's defenders, including some top officials in the American embassy in Seoul, say the "hip shooter" image is overdrawn. They also assert his reputation for violence may now serve as an important deterrent to North Korean aggression along the DMZ. "Holly is the only general in the world who tells the enemy exactly what his plans are," says another American military official in Korea, "but that has probably kept the North Koreans from miscalculating when evaluating our defenses."

An embassy official who knows him well says that despite the wild image, he follows orders and is easier to work with than other, less flamboyant American military brass in South Korea. "He's no dummy," adds another embassy staffer who says the general reads voraciously about politics, international relations and sociology.

Gen. Hollingsworth is credited with improving the preparedness and morale of South Korean and U.S. troops during the two and a half years he has headed I Corps. Soon after he arrived he junked his predecessors' defense strategy—which called for retreat in the face of attack, followed by a slow counterattack—because it would have exposed Seoul to North Korea's long-range guns, setting the stage for a long conflict. "That was unacceptable," the general says. "Instead, we decided we couldn't give up an inch of South Korean soil."

Line Advanced

To make the new strategy work, the main defense line has been advanced to the DMZ from points about two miles behind the zone; mines have been planted along the DMZ to help blunt a tank attack; and guard posts like this one on Hill 229 have been fortified with new monitoring equipment. (Though the DMZ is demilitarized, troops are permitted inside it in limited numbers. There are a few guard posts inside the DMZ; Hill 229, however, is right on the line separating the southern part of the zone from the rest of South Korea.)

Gen. Hollingsworth has also revamped his troops' training programs. Recognizing that winter is the most likely time for invasion—the rice fields are frozen, providing easier access for North Korea's tanks—he has stepped up cold-weather maneuvers. There is also more night training, and helicopter units have been given extensive "pinnacle landing" instruction so that they can drop troops atop mountains that would otherwise have to be climbed. Gen. Hollingsworth says the entire I Corps Group can now be mobilized in one to two hours.

The general's presence has encouraged South Korea's own military leaders. Some South Korean generals under his command not only imitate his bantam walk but also mimic his lectures to troops about the honor that accompanies killing the enemy.

Other South Koreans say they are impressed that Gen. Hollingsworth spends so much time along the DMZ and at I Corps headquarters near here. The general took no leave last year, and even though his wife lives in Seoul he spent every night at his headquarters or in the field. "Gen. Hollingsworth has said he is willing to die for us, and we believe him," says one South Korean military official.

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT

On July 4, 1972, following an unprecedented political meeting with the Republic of Korea, north Korea pledged to work together with the south for the peaceful unification of the peninsula. Rather than working towards this goal, however, north Korea intensified the buildup of its military forces -- with strongest emphasis on offensive capabilities -- in pursuit of the longstanding objective of unifying the peninsula under communist control.

Along with its military preparations, the north has worked assiduously in the international arena, seeking to obtain the withdrawal of U.S. Forces and to undermine the status and credibility of the ROK government. At the same time, the north has been attempting to cultivate dissension and develop a subversive base within the Republic. These secondary efforts are clearly designed to weaken ROK defenses and unity so as to facilitate a forcible takeover by north Korea.

It is inescapable that (1) withdrawal of U.S. Forces is essential to the north Korean goal of unifying Korea on its terms and (2) the use of force is intrinsic to accomplishing this domination. Thus a basic familiarity with the military capability of the north is critical to an understanding of the prospects for war and peace on the Korean peninsula.

With over one-half million men in its regular Armed Forces - the third largest military force in the communist world - plus reserve forces totaling 2.5 million, and a growing inventory of modern weapons and equipment in all three services, north Korea possesses a formidable military capability. Its Army consists of 440,000 regular troops, organized into 25 combat divisions (20 Infantry, 3 motorized, and 2 armored), 4 separate infantry brigades, 5 separate armored regiments, and 6 to 8 light Infantry brigades. The Army is equipped with 1950 tanks, 3000 field artillery pieces and 5500 anti-aircraft weapons, 1300 multi-rocket launchers, FROG missiles, and 750 armored personnel carriers. The north Korean navy consists of 425 to 450 combat vessels including 10 to 12 submarines, 17 to 19 missile boats, 300 coastal patrol boats, 90 amphibious craft and 27,000 personnel. The 45,000-man air force includes 550 jet fighters, 20 fighter-bombers, 85 bombers, 65 helicopters, and 250 transports.

These are - by any reasonable measure - forces far larger than necessary for the defense of the north. They constitute by their very size, and in many cases by their composition, a significant offensive capability.

Appendix F

In fact, the growth of offensive weapon inventories in the past five years has been striking. Other aspects which mark north Korea's military capabilities as principally offensive in nature include:

(1) The creation of an unusually large commando-style unconventional warfare force which could be highly effective in rear area operations, particularly at the outset of a surprise attack. Both the navy and air force are equipped to insert these forces into the ROK.

(2) The construction of naval bases and airfields in the forward areas which would greatly facilitiate operations over and along the flanks of the Republic. In 1973, the north Korean navy and air force graphically demonstrated their capability to operate effectively in areas surrounding the five Northwest islands under UNC military control.

(3) The augmentation, in mid-1975, of its 14 divisions deployed near the DMZ with the equivalent of an armored division about 40 miles north of the DMZ near the traditional invasion corridors into south Korea -- Kaesong and Chorwon.

(4) The construction over the past 3-4 years of heavily reinforced concrete artillery positions close to the DMZ. While these positions would be important for defensive purposes, equipped with long-range weapons they can be used to bring effective artillery fire almost to the Seoul city limits while remaining relatively invulnerable to counter-battery fire and air attack.

(5) The large-scale tunneling operations under the DMZ which date back to 1971 and were actively pursued even after the July 4 pledge the following year. Two of the north Korean tunnels have been uncovered and neutralized. The first, discovered Nov. 15, 1974, was shallow and small, obviously suited only for insertion of troops and light weapons. The second tunnel, uncovered in March 1975, was blasted through solid granite at a depth greater than 50 meters. In cross-section, this tunnel measures two meters high and two meters wide - large enough for three soldiers marching abreast and for the passage of multiple rocket launchers, heavy mortars and light artillery.

(6) Continued high spending for military. Despite an increasingly precarious financial situation, north Korea spent some $890 million - estimates place this at more than 30 percent of its national budget despite their 16.5 percent claim - to support its military establishment in 1976.

A pattern to north Korea's efforts to unify the country on its terms is clearly traceable to 1965 when, in a major speech, KIM Il Sung declared

that the "revolution" in south Korea was not progressing rapidly enough and needed active encouragement and assistance from the north. In October 1966, north Korean began an active campaign of violence along the DMZ, including many incidents which caused American casualties, and greatly increased its ground and sea infiltration into the south. The north Koreans apparently envisioned that their efforts would achieve the eventual withdrawal of U.S. Forces as American public opinion recoiled to the opening of a "second front" in Asia. They also expected a revolution in the south. Instead, their campaign of violence and subversion prompted U.S. and ROK authorities to further strengthen the Republic's defenses, particularly after the raid on the ROK Presidential Mansion in a suicide assassination attempt and the capture of the USS Pueblo in international waters, both occurring in January 1968. North Korean casualties steadily mounted in the face of improved DMZ and coastal defenses, and the campaign of violence was frustrated and almost totally ended by mid-1971.

In analysis, north Korea was unable to exploit its initial successes in infiltrating the south because it did not, at the time, possess a sufficient offensive capability to insert major invasion forces across the DMZ. That the north Koreans recognized this weakness is demonstrated by the fact that the north, under cover of a peace offensive beginning in 1971, set into motion the steps to correct that deficiency forpossible use in future anti-ROK operations.

The vast improvement in the north's military capabilities was to really take off in 1973. A few statistics tell the story. From 1973 to the present:

- the number of north Korean submarines more than doubled.
- the number of tanks more than doubled.
- the inventory of armored personnel carriers increased sharply.
- helicopter assets doubled.
- field artillery underwent a 50 percent increase.
- amphibious warfare craft increased four-fold.
- transport aircraft for paratroop insertion have increased markedly.

This vast and continuing improvement in north Korea's military hardware underlines Pyongyang's interest and willingness to resort to military force as a viable alternative in case its peace front failed to attain the goal of unifying the peninsula under communism.

In summary, then, north Korea possesses a substantial military capability - far exceeding that needed for defense only. Coupled with Pyongyang's determination to unify the peninsula under its control, the offensively oriented north Korean military force constitutes a most serious threat to the ROK. Hostilities could be initiated at any time and with little warning.

On January 6, 1978, Congressman Samuel S. Stratton, Chairman of a Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, and some members of that subcommittee and the subcommittee counsel, visited my headquarters at Camp Red Cloud. This was one stop in a tour of South Korea. The visit was part of the House Armed Services Committee hearings on "Review of the Policy Decision to Withdraw United States Ground Forces from Korea," that had begun on May 25, 1977, with testimony by Major General John K. Singlaub.

The transcript of my testimony that day is at pages 257-281 here. Although classified material is deleted and explanatory slides are omitted, most of the substance of my testimony can be inferred. A careful reading of this transcript is recommended toward grasping the situation's complexities and its operational and policy ramifications.

In the first few pages, through page 265, Congressman Stratton struggled to understand the dispositions of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division on and near the DMZ in the Kaesong-Munsan avenue of North Korean approach, and the contradiction between a desire to give the U.S. President the option of deciding to commit U.S. troops, and the exigencies of coping with a North Korean attack with little or no warning, which would deny him that option.

Our preferred disposition of the 2d Infantry Division at the time of North Korean attack was in reserve areas from which its tank and infantry/antitank capabilities could be committed to prevent a breakthrough. At the same time, we saw little likelihood that the division's two platoons in guardposts overlooking the Joint Security Area would be withdrawn at a time of great tension; they were essential proof that an attack would surely be met by the commitment of U.S. force. Nor did we want to remove the nearby battalion of which they were a part.

Appendix Q

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
I Corps Group, Korea, Friday, January 6, 1978.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:15 a.m., I Corps (ROK/US) Group, Korea, Hon. Samuel S. Stratton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. STRATTON. General, I think perhaps the best thing is for you to give us your presentation of what you do here, and I think we would be particularly interested in your analysis of the war games situation, which I understand you were in charge of.

I believe you presented this in person to the President, did you not?

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. JOHN H. CUSHMAN, COMMANDING GENERAL, I CORPS (ROK/US) GROUP, KOREA

General CUSHMAN. No, sir, not to the President.

Mr. STRATTON. Was it to the Secretary of Defense?

General CUSHMAN. I did not give the Secretary of Defense this briefing, but I saw him; I gave it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; to Admiral Turner. This was in April of 1977.

Mr. BEARD. But you didn't give it to the Secretary of Defense?

General CUSHMAN. I saw the Secretary of Defense, gave him the substance of the briefing, but I did not take these charts.

I had at that time, as you will see, a lot of the slides that I will show. I think he is familiar with the substance of the matter, but I did not present the briefing.

Mr. STRATTON. General Vessey met with the President, did he not?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. Was that before you presented your briefing?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. Maybe you could give us a little of the background of the war game, when it took place, and how you handled this kind of procedure.

General CUSHMAN. Very well, sir. If it is all right with you, I would like to use some slides. It would make it go a little more clearly.

Mr. STRATTON. What we would like to have you do whatever you like.

[Slides deleted].

General CUSHMAN. This, Mr. Chairman, will include many of the slides and information that I presented in April; however, we have done a good deal since April, and so I will bring you up to date to last month.

Of course that is where we are. Just to show you again my sector—I pointed it out earlier—the DMZ has two field army-sized units on it. One is the 1st ROK army and it takes care of the eastern half of the peninsula. I Corps (ROK/US) Group, my command, is responsible for the western half. You can see the terrain is very rugged—

you will fly there today—in the east, and then less rugged, until it is fairly open and good for cross-country maneuvering in this approach into Seoul.

Mr. STRATTON. Let me just interrupt, if I may, General. I don't know whether Miss Dempsey will be bothered by the fact that we have the slides because there will be a lot of "here" and "there," Miss Dempsey do not worry about it; just transcribe it as well as you can. Don't try to designate where he is pointing.

General CUSHMAN. Seoul is only 25 miles from the nearest North Korean forces, the capital city of the country. You are familiar with it. It has one-third of the gross national product. It is the proximity of Seoul that leads to the forward defense concept to defeat the enemy [deleted]. You can check the scale of this map. The DMZ is 4 kilometers wide.

Mr. STRATTON. Could you show us the location of your headquarters?

General CUSHMAN. Right here, Uijongbu. The 2d Division is here, Tong Duchon.

The forward defense concept took the place of the former concept in which there was a plan to fight a delay and retrograde action and then bring in forces, and in effect fight a repeat of the Korean war.

You remember in the Korean war we lost Seoul two times. The forward defense concept visualizes that won't be permitted, that we will stop the enemy well forward so as to deny him any substantial territory; but not only that, to keep, especially in this sector, his artillery from being moved forward so they can bring Seoul under direct artillery attack.

Mr. STRATTON. The 2d Division then is slightly out of the direct line from Kaesong to Seoul?

General CUSHMAN. The 2d Division headquarters used to be right here, and they have a brigade headquarters here. There is a battalion across the Imjin River so there is a brigade in this sector. That is a third of the fighting strength of the division. The division artillery is here in Uijongbu and two brigades are up here by Tong Duchon.

Mr. STRATTON. This brigade goes out first?

General CUSHMAN. [Deleted.]

Mr. STRATTON. The brigade is on that route then; it would almost inevitably be involved in any attack?

General CUSHMAN. [Deleted.]

If we got sufficient warning, and we expect to have sufficient warning to permit it, the forces of the 2d Division [deleted].

And if we get sufficient warning, which we expect to have, that will be an [deleted] defense across the front.

I will have a slide that shows that, will explain that a little more.

Mr. STRATTON. What are your orders in the event of such an attack?

[Deleted.]

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. [Deleted] I think, Charley, if you would go to that picture of the joint security area, that might be a good thing for us to discuss right now.

Let me just go quickly to the dispositions of the 2d Division. This is the 2d Division's position, sir. They have the 2d Battalion of the 9th Infantry north of Munsan. You will be going to the joint security area and you will see some of their units and you will be flying over there today, and I will point out their camp to you.

[Deleted.]

We have the division artillery here and the rest of the division is here. [Deleted.]

Mr. STRATTON. This seems to be a little different from what I understood yesterday. Is that a brigade that you have over there—a battalion above there?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. 2d Battalion?

General CUSHMAN. Of the 9th.

Mr. STRATTON. Are they in garrison status or are they in outposts there?

General CUSHMAN. I will show you in just a second another chart. They have two outposts inside the DMZ, they have a [deleted] that is backing up the joint security area, and they have the battalion minus that.

Mr. STRATTON. Are they dug in, prepared to fight? Or are they just sitting around in garrison condition?

General CUSHMAN. The two outposts on the DMZ are dug in, prepared to fight.

Mr. STRATTON. Then it is incredible to me that you say the first step is to take [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. The brigade is in its garrison location at this point, including brigade headquarters, right now today.

Mr. STRATTON. What is the point of having American forces here who are supposed to be defending us and having them just sitting around the line of attack in garrison status [deleted]. This is incredible, General.

In answering my question, General Vessey said he would have to get approval. Is he supposed to [deleted]?

That is incredible.

General CUSHMAN. Let me go to the dispositions that we have.

Mr. STRATTON. In what operation order was this contained?

General CUSHMAN. OPLAN 5027, Defense of Korea.

Mr. STRATTON. 5027. I think we are going to have to get a copy of that.

Mr. STRATTON. The thing that disturbs me is that I thought the description we received from General Vessey is that if the enemy came crashing across the line and near our troops, [deleted]. What you are talking about is if you had a week's notice—what type of notice are you talking about?

General CUSHMAN. I can describe it, just what we did in one of our war games. That would be a very graphic picture.

Would you like to go to that right now?

Mr. WON PAT. I think that would be better.

Mr. STRATTON. The thing that disturbs me is that I thought the point of getting notice was for you to have time for everybody to get set to zero in your artillery, to get everybody in position, and to make sure you have all of your supplies ready to zap the enemy the minute he sticks his nose across the first bridge. [Deleted.]

General CUSHMAN. The purpose of notice is that. We will do that with the [deleted] units that are under my operational control.

Mr. STRATTON. [Deleted.] I just don't understand that. Have those always been the instructions you have had?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. From the very first?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WON PAT. Seoul will still be vulnerable because of the proximit

Mr. STRATTON. The point of being out there is to stop the enemy wh he comes, [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. This will give you a better picture. You will l looking at some of these dispositions today. This is a scale 1 to 50,0 Each one of these squares is a kilometer. This is the Imjin River, th is the DMZ, this is the joint security area where the Military Armisti Commission, both sides, had their meeting place. It is where the a murders took place in August of 1976. You will be visiting the tomorrow.

When the 7th Division pulled out, Mr. Chairman, in 1971 befo they pulled out actually U.S. troops had a very substantial stretch the DMZ. It started here, and they went past here off this map, a they manned the outposts in this area. In fact, during the Vietna War period, 1965–70, this was a combat area, there were actual e gagements in this area.

Mr. STRATTON. Do they have orders to get warning? [Deleted.

General CUSHMAN. Not at the present time. When the troops we withdrawn, this little section here was given as the only U.S. presenc in the DMZ. This is about 1 or 2 kilometers wide, as you can see. Ther are two guardposts up here manned by American soldiers out of 6 guardposts in my sector. That is American.

There is a [deleted] at this advance camp. That is U.S. 2d Divi sion. Then there is a battalion back here and an artillery battalion. They are there today, day in and day out.

The OPLAN 5027 calls, if we have sufficient warning, to [deleted]. This is what we have rehearsed. This is what we have worked out in detail with the responsible commanders.

[Deleted.]

Second, the 2d Division represents a very substantial counterattack and blocking capability, which we want to keep intact. The instructions that I have are to [deleted].

Mr. STRATTON. What is the purpose of having them in an [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. The purpose of this position is to provide security for this piece of ground and to support the United Nations commander.

Mr. STRATTON. You have your battalion, and where is the brigade? That is farther down?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. What is the point of having the infantry up there? Is that supposed to supply security or something or other?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, it is to back up the U.N. commander's responsibilities.

Mr. STRATTON. You mean this is just sort of peacetime law and order security? Is this what you are talking about?

General CUSHMAN. No, sir. It was graphically illustrated, in fact, in August of 1976, when the ax murders took place. These were the forces used to go in there and to protect the rights of the U.N. commander.

Mr. STRATTON. That is what I mean, to maintain civil order. Does it have any relation to combat mission?

General CUSHMAN. The 2d Division's presence—I would say this is point not generally understood by the public at large—over here in this area really has three utilities. The first of these is war fighting; that is in case of an attack. The second is deterrence. The third is trucekeeping.

The 2d Division presence here is for deterrence and trucekeeping so it is not a civil problem. It is essentially a military purpose.

Mr. STRATTON. I understand that. But the thing that bothers me is that it would seem to me when we have as carefully channeled access route, attack route, as we have, that we ought to have [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. We do, sir, with the [deleted].

Mr. STRATTON. To the extent that these forces are in those positions, aren't they [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. When this attack comes and the forces are out—if they are—the U.S. Forces—this battalion is out of here, they are very well prepared—you will see some of them today—positions that the ROK 1st Division occupies to execute its defensive responsibility for this sector. [Deleted.]

Mr. STRATTON. I don't want to belabor this thing, but it would seem to me when the [deleted]. I wouldn't think.

General CUSHMAN. You are right, and if I could just give a little background on that, I think it might be useful to you, sir. [Deleted.]

Mr. STRATTON. That is it exactly, and this is what we tried to explore yesterday. But we were told, no, there wasn't going to be a problem similar to what we experienced with the *Pueblo* when they didn't wake up Lyndon Johnson to see whether we ought to do something. It is almost inevitable that if the 2d Division is in the line of attack and had orders to defend themselves, and since offense is the best defense, they would be going right into the battle.

What you have said I think bears out what Admiral Baldwin told us I believe with regard to this, that the 2d Division—maybe it was the person from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that talked to us [deleted]. If this is a blitz attack that comes down there, I can see happening exactly what happened with the *Pueblo*. They can't move without the President's say-so, and the President, according to General So-and-So from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will have to check with the Congress, and by the time they do all of that, Kim Il Sung will probably be taking a sauna bath in Seoul.

General CUSHMAN. You certainly have underscored the political-military mix with those comments.

Mr. STRATTON. Pardon me?

General CUSHMAN. You have underscored the political-military complexity of this situation with those remarks.

Mr. STRATTON. In other words, you recognize the problem that is involved?

General CUSHMAN. Very well, sir. As the commander who has to execute that, I have wrestled with this in detail in our war games. When I first arrived here in February of 1976 I decided we would have a war game in April of 1976 of this sector right here.

Put that map of the 2d Division on again, please, the one that I just had.

I would like to describe what went into my head because it is very similar to what you are talking about.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. To get this in some sort of chronological perspective, may I ask a question at this point?

Mr. STRATTON. Sure.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. At some time in the past things weren't like this—presumably an invasion occurred and the U.S. Forces fought almost automatically; is that correct?

General CUSHMAN. That is correct.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. When did this change, and why?

General CUSHMAN. You are asking me for something outside my competence.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. I realize you perhaps weren't here.

General CUSHMAN. I was not here.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. But somebody made a decision that it wouldn't be like that any more?

Mr. STRATTON. That is what I was trying to ask earlier.

General CUSHMAN. It took place in the late 1960's, early 1970's in my opinion. It took place with the withdrawal of the 7th Division when the 7th Division sector along the DMZ was shrunk to what I have just showed you, a small 1- or 2-kilometer slice that protected Panmunjom. It took place as a result of concern of the U.S. body politic about automatic involvement in Korea based upon the experience in Vietnam.

Mr. STRATTON. That is right.

General CUSHMAN. It took place because we wanted to give assurance under the war powers resolution and other legislation, and with congressional and public concerns that wanted assurance, that U.S. forces would not be committed without Presidential decision. It took place because of the commander's desires over here to accommodate those concerns and those themes, and its creates a very complicated, difficult military situation for the commander to do that because it is like saying you can engage your blood vessels but you can't engage your bones in a war.

Mr. STRATTON. Or your heart.

General CUSHMAN. It is very difficult. However, we, as the commanders on the scene, are doing our level best to accommodate that.

The complexity of the situation in Korea is not very well understood. Because day in and day out there on the DMZ you have American forces looking out into North Korea. Any day, any hour, an incident can take place. Those forces are needed there where they are because without those forces you haven't the ability to support the U.N. commander's requirement to guarantee that truce.

General Vessey is the direct descendent by sequence of commanders of General Mark Clark, who signed that truce. No other person from our side signed it. On the other side it was Kim Il Sung and a Chinese general.

The DMZ is a very sensitive area where violence could erupt at any time. It is General Vessey's responsibility under the President, who is executive agent for the United Nations, to maintain that truce. That must be maintained by Americans for a number of reasons: First, the ROK Government never signed the armistice agreement, although they agreed several years later to abide by its terms.

So we can't use ROK forces to maintain his rights and responsibilities.

The other very important reason is that they speak English, the 2d Division troops and orders are understood and the nuances are understood, and it is very difficult, I can assure you, after almost 2 years in a ROK–U.S. command, to convey in a tight situation, where there is tension, where there is opportunity for misunderstanding, the precise requirements. So those U.S. forces are needed there. They are needed there until there is a substitute for this armistice. They are needed there until a political settlement is achieved, and my firm conviction is, as we come down the line and get closer and closer to the time for the final withdrawal, that will be recognized and they won't be pulled out until that time.

I am satisfied that is what history is going to unfold as this goes on.

Mr. BEARD. Since we are the only ones on this side that signed the truce, if they do pull out that would only leave the North Koreans up there?

General CUSHMAN. The South Koreans.

Mr. BEARD. But as far as the U.N. capacity——

General CUSHMAN. I don't think any President is eventually going to turn over the issues of war and peace that might stem from a serious incident or accident along in here—not going to turn over the issues of war and peace to the Republic of Korea forces. He is responsible ultimately as executive agent.

Mr. STRATTON. General, I don't want to spend too much time on this, but I think you have given us a very important point and one that certainly we didn't understand although we have had conflicting information with regard to it.

What concerns most of us in connection with the withdrawal is that the additional fighting capacity of the 2d Division would be removed. In spite of all the talk about not forsaking our commitment, it is our impression that the reason for this withdrawal is to make sure that the United States doesn't get involved in another land war in Asia.

We want to get out so that when things erupt we at least are not involved. That is the thing that disturbs us about this whole withdrawal.

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. What I didn't understand was that back in the 1960's we began that process of not getting involved by changing this whole procedure.

General CUSHMAN. I would say it was late 1960's or early 1970's, I don't know precisely when.

Mr. STRATTON. I never was aware of it. In other words, the real commitment of the United States has not been as substantial as most of us recognize for the last 10 years—8 or 9 years—and so to that extent this decision of the President's is simply going one step beyond what was done then. I would assume this is sort of tied in with the Nixon doctrine?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. That we weren't going to commit U.S. forces any more to help our allies; we would give them weapons but they had to supply the manpower. That was apparently the way we proceeded?

General CUSHMAN. I would say so.

Once again, I am not knowledgeable on the policy discussions at that time, but I would say this, that the presence of the 2d Division

here with its forces on the DMZ day in and day out is the decisive one, and the difference between that and manning a section of the line is nowhere near as great as pulling them out completely.

Mr. STRATTON. That I can understand, but there is a tie-in there. In other words, we are keeping our forces there as a deterrent [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. I would say that my environment here is that of a commander with my commanders and ROK officers. I would say their perception is that they view the removal of the 2d Division and its pulling out, the plan to pull them out of here completely, in just the way you describe, as, although it may not be intentional on the part of our Government, a clear indication that the commitment is somehow less.

Mr. STRATTON. Right.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. We have had witnesses, specifically I recall the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that said war risks would be greater after your withdrawal. That really would relate then to the truce-keeping function more than the weight that the strategic reserves the 2d Division might provide?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, that is right.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. That is very interesting.

General CUSHMAN. If I could get into the war fighting function. In the war games here we have focused on both of those, the truce-keeping and deterrence functions and the warfighting function, but primarily on the war-fighting function because the truce-keeping deterrence problem only comes out because it gets us into that intricate problem of [deleted].

I would like to go into the war fighting with you.

Mr. STRATTON. Please do. Maybe you can explain to us what you cranked in with respect to the delay in getting word from Washington.

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, I can. I will show you a scenario that takes us down hour by hour before the enemy attack.

Mr. STRATTON. This is extremely helpful.

General CUSHMAN. If I also might say, Mr. Chairman, it is not until you get in a war game with this and force the commanders to deal with these issues that many of them surfaced. That is the great value of the war game. It makes vivid the complicated military-political mix we have in the western sector.

Everybody we have ever brought here and sat in these seats has come away with the same idea because they never really grasp. And I didn't myself, to be quite frank, almost 2 years ago when I started here and got my first briefing at the JSA, that was the first time I really grasped the complexity of this and decided to exercise that coordination in the first war game we had. It was extraordinarily beneficial to all the commanders involved. In fact, I will tell you what happened on it. I will give you a little story.

I described to the corps commander of the 1st ROK Corps in the western corridor how we were going to do this. I said, [deleted] and the enemy is going to have to attack right across the DMZ.

He said: "Then there won't be a war. There is not going to be a war under those circumstances."

Mr. STRATTON. In other words, [deleted]. Has anybody you have ever had out here complained and said that isn't right, we ought to do something about it? Have you had anybody from Congress?

General CUSHMAN. I don't recall any particular visitors that have done that, no, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. Secretary Brown? Did you give him this briefing?

General CUSHMAN. I gave him a very abbreviated form of this.

Mr. STRATTON. I see.

General CUSHMAN. This is a ROK–U.S. force, Mr. Chairman. It is kind of like horse and rabbit stew because that is about the relative proportion of ROK–U.S.—11–ROK divisions and 1–U.S. division. There are ROK divisions on the DMZ itself and one on the Imjin River. I have three corps commanders, three-star generals, under my OPCON. They have these reserve divisions, reserve positions, and that is the Korean side of my force only.

Then I have told you about the 2d Division. It fits right into that.

This slide [deleted] is the mix that I have. I have 12 divisions. These are the weapons. You can see the U.S. contribution weaponswise. For example, the ROK have [deleted] of the TOW missile. The 2d Division [deleted], more by far than the rest of my force put together. With its tanks and TOW's, the 2d Division is very valuable as antiarmor.

I point out this figure here, which shows that day-to-day authorization in peacetime is [deleted.] Mobilized reserves flesh out all the units; it takes [deleted] hours to do that. Total strength would then be almost one-quarter of a million. This highlights the importance of getting some warning because many of these units are short, especially the supporting units.

Mr. STRATTON. They have a total force of, what is it, 600,000?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. That includes Air Force and the Navy. I have [deleted] minus the U.S. part of that, which is 15,000, so say [deleted] minus the ROK Marines, so I would say [deleted] of the ROK Army's strength is in my sector.

Mr. STRATTON. So it would take [deleted] days——

General CUSHMAN. [Deleted].

Mr. STRATTON. Oh, [deleted]—to get another [deleted.]

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. Those are individual reservists that come in to flesh out the units. That is the maximum. They actually achieve much of this in the very first hour. Some reservists are right over in Uijongbu.

Mr. STRATTON. Do you have any idea how many troops the North Koreans could mobilize at the point of impact?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, and I will show you that in just a second. That is our size, the friendly side.

Here is the enemy. He has opposite me [deleted] of his corps, [deleted] and he has [deleted] divisions in each one, so he is kind of like we are except his dispositions are well forward. He has reserve divisions and units back in here. Then, back in the country at large he has the rest of the forces. I won't go into the detail of his positions, but the total he has, [deleted] like this (indicating), and [deleted]. I, for planning purposes, give him the capability of concentrating and achieving relative surprise with [deleted] of these divisions and all [deleted] attacking my sector. This is what we have war gamed again and again.

Mr. STRATTON. Against your 12?

General CUSHMAN. Against my 12. Of course, there are other reserve divisions that are available to me. The [deleted] is available very shortly, positioned in my area.

Mr. STRATTON. Are his divisions roughly the same size?

General CUSHMAN. They are smaller in numbers. They are organized Soviet style. They have slightly fewer weapons because their strength is a little less, but they are very powerful. They have more tanks, for example, than our divisions.

Mr. STRATTON. Are those [deleted] the DMZ?

General CUSHMAN. [Deleted.]

I will show you a scenario in which they do concentrate. That is one of the great changes in the situation from a couple of years ago, their ability to concentrate.

Now I am into war fighting here. If we are going to succeed, the first thing we have to do is to deny the enemy total surprise.

Mr. WON PAT. How do you do that?

General CUSHMAN. With an all-out intelligence effort, watching his every move that we can. This by no means is a guarantee. You have to fight for warning.

Mr. STRATTON. This is what you try to do?

General CUSHMAN. What we must do. General Vessey has really put the pressure on this because I have to have time to get ready on position with the essential barriers installed, this artillery deployed, and reserves all in good order when he attacks.

I say that I must have the equivalent of [deleted] of warning to do that. It takes units time to move from their training and other positions day in and day out; some take a good deal less than that, as on general outposts. Up against the DMZ it takes less [deleted] sometimes [deleted] but it takes [deleted] to get myself in a good posture from a standing start. I have to have that much time, and that is simply enough to prevent disaster.

We also must master in advance the tactics, the logistics, the command and control methods, and all the other techniques that the conditions of battle will demand. I will describe those in a little more detail. When a war starts, as the commander I and my subordinate commanders have to see the battlefield with our intelligence means, see what is out there. Most of all, from my point of view, we have to determine where the enemy is concentrated, and then move against his force—it is kind of like he has the ball, lining up in a football game with his 11 men, and I have mine, and I can't even see him line up, and I still have to hold him to about a 2-yard gain. So I have to concentrate the maneuver units, the artillery, the tactical air, and the logistics. Once concentrating, then I have to conduct a very skillful offensive defense to defeat him [deleted]. The advantage is largely with the enemy because of his initiative and his ability to concentrate.

Mr. STRATTON. Does he have any alternate route so that he would have an ability to feint and to deceive?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. He is good at that. I have to read through that deception.

Mr. STRATTON. You can't assume he is going to come down the easiest and most obvious path?

General CUSHMAN. That is right. I can't focus on that.

[Deleted.]

So this is by no means certain, although I do feel, if you would ask me where do you think he would make his main attack, I would have to tell you, based on everything, it will come down through here because [deleted]. But he is a thinking commander. He is going to try to get me to think that and do something else, so I have a serious problem with intelligence and all the other reporting components of my front-line commanders to do this, and it is an extraordinarily complicated problem.

As a result of this being the problem, we have to practice and it was this that led me to war gaming. I came here from the Army's Command and General Staff College, where I was commandant, where we introduced war gaming into the teaching of officers, majors in rank, to be commanders. But here I didn't figure I was going to teach. I was going to let them learn by exposing them to what would happen if they didn't do it right. That is my educational philosophy, to learn by experience. Here in our war games we can do it again without cost. So I started these war games.

The first values of a war game are these two (slide) [deleted]. It has been valuable with our Air Force friends; they have participated in these war games from the beginning. This has been an educational experience for all concerned, but we also find that they help us to identify deficiencies in our operations plans. We find out we could have done better if we put our forces in a different place to reinforce the barriers, et cetera.

The final thing (slide) [deleted] and I show you this chart with some reluctance because there is a lot of controversy about this chart, is that war games contribute to the net assessment of the balance of forces—I emphasize the word contribute because you can't predict how a war is going to turn out. If we had run a war game of the October 1973 war, the balance of forces would never have worked out. That would have been the answer in a number of other wars, but it makes you understand the problem better and whether you need to build your forces to a greater extent. I think most people will agree to this, but would each have their own definition of contribute. I don't say it is a total measure, but it does make a substantial input into my own judgment.

General Vessey went to the States in February of 1977. He was going to testify. He actually didn't testify. He saw a lot of people in the executive branch, including the President. He came back. We had just finished our second big war game. I don't like to interpret General Vessey; he should tell you this himself. But I believe he would say that the war gaming being used in the executive branch was not dynamic, it was more of a static aggregation of capabilities, and it did not include the surprise and dynamics and initiative.

I told him we had just run two war games which gave us a substantial insight into the balance of forces. I said it might be useful for me to put together the experience of those war games and take it back to Washington.

He asked for a Dr. Wilbur Payne, the Army's expert on war gaming, to come to Korea and take a look and see if our games are adequate. And they were pronounced adequate, so I prepared the briefing. I went back to Washington in April of 1977. I conducted a series of briefings. You won't hear all of it, but I will show you what we might call the

bottom line on the briefing. First let me go through Caper Crown II. if you don't mind.

Mr. BEARD. Did Dr. Payne come over?

General CUSHMAN. Yes. They pronounced it good for the purpose for which it was being used.

Mr. STRATTON. What branch of the Pentagon handles that? Is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General CUSHMAN. All parts of the Pentagon are into war gaming.

Mr. STRATTON. The various services?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, but I would say the net assessment would be by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because that involves all the services. This was Caper Crown II. This was October of 1976. This is [deleted] divisions attacking first to seize [deleted] and then to press on against this defense. There are some of the lessons learned. This will give you the insights that came out of Caper Crown II, extraordinarily valuable.

Here is Caper Crown III. We went over here [deleted]. Here he gave me a secondary attack at [deleted] and made his main attack here against this defense, and then these are some of the lessons learned. And once again, very useful.

As a result of these Caper Crowns I said, here is my assessment of the adequacy of the western sector defense. First thing, outcomes are going to vary; although we only get one chance, there are a great variety of possible outcomes. It will depend on quantitative factors, such as the number of tanks and divisions on both sides, but also on imponderables—luck, surprise, tactical leadership, and so on. But it is my job as the responsible commander here to make an honest assessment and that has to be separated from what I might say to my troops for motivation or what I might say to the Korean public for confidence building. I have to make my honest personal assessment. Incidentally, that is a very difficult thing to do sometimes because you tend to believe your own propaganda.

Mr. STRATTON. Just on the mechanics of the war gaming. I think I understand it in a general way. I know they had it in operation at the Naval War College, for example, but to some extent this is done on a machine, isn't it?

General CUSHMAN. No, sir. I should have possibly explained it sooner. But we have the commanders here themselves. This is not a machine game. This game is manpower intensive. Commanders make the decisions. There is very little computer support. The machine games were the ones General Vessey did not like.

Mr. STRATTON. But the decision as to which way the enemy is going to come, for example, is made by the guy playing the enemy?

General CUSHMAN. Yes. The friendlies don't know the enemy. They use these war game rules.

Mr. STRATTON. You don't roll the dice?

General CUSHMAN. Actually, you do. If you say, if we could hit this tank say three times out of four, then you roll the dice to find out if you actually hit the tank. But it is to determine the particular outcome of that battle.

So I said, now my assessment today, that is April of 1977, is [deleted]. No margin for mistakes. That means you have to do a very good job reading this thing, putting the 2d Division in the right place, fighting a good battle. I don't expect to make any mistakes. One of my reasons for my war game is to keep me and my subordinate commanders from making mistakes. I hope Kim Il Sung makes his share of mistakes. Even though this might be the problem here, I am going to come up like Notre Dame licking Texas. That would be my way of looking at it, even if they do have the advantage.

Mr. STRATTON. [Deleted.]

General CUSHMAN. This was a surprise to the people back in Washington at that time because they hadn't understood that was the situation, and I will give you a slide which shows the prevailing view as of early 1975.

In early 1975, in testimony of Congress and everywhere else, [deleted] this was the prevailing view. It was rather indefinite as to the military need for the 2d Division in Korea. Its war-fighting contribution was rather uncertain. Generally the feeling was the ROK Army could do the job all by itself and the division's presence in Korea was essential for deterrence and for stability, and might even be available for Pacific reserve. The DMZ mission of the 2d Division was not essential. This was the prevailing view. What changed it? Because people asked me: 2 years, before this was it; now you are coming in and giving us this assessment. Why?

There are several factors that led to a change. First, we had a study by the Defense Intelligence Agency just before I took command here—it was briefed over here in November or December or January, late 1975, early 1976—which said the assumption of warning of, say [deleted] wasn't all that valid, that there was a very strong possibility of a good deal less warning than that.

It led me to conclude I might have a [deleted] but I couldn't count on more than [deleted] of warning to Defcon Two. That changes the ratio in favor of the enemy.

The second is that the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U.S. Army, made a study of enemy tank strength. For years, because of the focus on Vietnam, the intelligence analysts were looking at Southeast Asia. They turned their resources to Korea and they started counting tanks. This was briefed here in Korea in December of 1975.

Here is a tank inventory. As it eventually turned out, you can see somewhere in here—1970—Kim Il Sung made a decision to rearm. We started reading the output up in here. That is not just of tanks; it is true of everything. It is true of his artillery, but not quite as graphic.

Mr. WON PAT. The ratio is [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. This [deleted] to one from way back in 1968.

The third factor is that we had been studying Soviet tactics and it was clear that he was going to concentrate; he wasn't just to make an attack across this whole front. You just don't attack that way; it makes no military sense that way. So we put these concentrations in. This is the concentration for October 1976 game. You see, you have this secondary attack to deceive me it is coming that way, and he put in here, [deleted].

Here is the kind of ratios we have against our forces. You can see the ratios of maneuver battalions, and his tanks versus our tanks and TOW's. If we concentrate, people say, well, that is the worst case. And that is right and that is what he wants to give me, my worst case, so I have to figure out how to handle my worst case. We can handle this,

as I will show you later, by the right tactics. This is by no means a hopeless situation.

So the final thing was, we had begun our war gaming and we had an improved net assessment. People might disagree with my net assessment. I have my judgment because I am familiar with the situation. I may be a little more pessimistic than others, but that is the price you have to pay for having a commander who is concerned about his situation.

Here is a picture of our war game plan, Mr. Chairman. We take the actual plans, we bring the actual commanders and staffs in here, and try to create the realism of actual battle without fighting. We strive for authenticity in all of these games, the net result being the closest we can come to battle without fighting.

We have a war game terrain board. Three inches equals 1 kilometer. The relief is in there a little exaggerated. The first few war games we ran were of a full corps sector, a sector of a whole corps.

During the game, these are the controllers and assessors. We move the chips around—these represent the friendly and the enemy units—and we move them around and we have tables and rules that are improved on but scientifically derived that tell the outcome of battle. This is all passed to the commanders just as if they were getting it in a real battle. We bring them in close and bring communications right to their command posts.

We have these battle simulation routines. We found these, for example, very valuable in the logistics area. These are the combat, intelligence routines.

Mr. STRATTON. What is the time factor?

General CUSHMAN. We haven't had a game more than 30 hours. It is enough to get us through the first day-plus of war. We bring them in and we only do the game during daylight hours. Then they go back to their units and then they assemble again and take it up. It takes about a week to run one.

This is Wilbur Payne's assessment.

The game in its present form with its current rules is fully adequate to identify inadequacies of defensive concepts and deployments and deficiencies in the ability to support and establish operations. In some areas, such as artillery assessment and representation of logistics, it is a substantially better model than those now in use for similar purposes by the U.S. Army. There are some important details discussed below where we believe you will either have to improve the model or supplement it with careful judgment.

I won't go into those improvements in detail. He gave us a critique of the barrier routines, for example, and some of the other aspects.

Mr. STRATTON. Could I ask, General, when did you conclude the discussions you have just set forth? At the end of 1977?

General CUSHMAN. April of 1977.

As a result of studying our first three war games, particularly Caper Crown II and III, I made the conclusion in April of 1977.

Mr. STRATTON. I see. The President, of course, made his decision even before he was inaugurated. Then I think our testimony was that the Joint Chiefs were asked to comment in early February?

Mr. LALLY. March 7, I think.

Mr. STRATTON. So when the Joint Chiefs got into the picture they still were operating under the earlier assumptions presumably. They hadn't your information?

General CUSHMAN. They got my information, I don't know the exact date, but it was in mid-April. I actually briefed the Joint Chiefs in their JCS conference room. They listened to my briefing.

Mr. STRATTON. The actual directive hadn't been set until May?

Mr. LALLY. General Rogers was out here at the end of April.

General CUSHMAN. He was here while I was there. From my point of view, I figured the decision and the announcement was made on the 9th of March when the President discussed it at his press conference.

Mr. STRATTON. I think you are right. The thing actually wasn't firmed up.

General CUSHMAN. It was those war games that led me to this [pointing]. Then I also went ahead and decided if that is the case the 2d Division's probable involvement is the decisive deterrent today.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. General, what aspect of the 2d Division involvement makes the difference?

General CUSHMAN. It is primarily their defensive strength and antiarmor, blocking the rearward lines, the defensive lines. [Deleted.] This is the kind of thing we work on again and again.

Mr. STRATTON. You were going to tell us what you cranked into this thing in terms of [deleted] cranking in the approval from Washington, and then how did you actually deploy the 2d Division.

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir; I will come to that. It will come out.

Incidentally, I think we probably ought to continue all the way through my briefing, so why don't you let the V Corps commander know we are going to be a little late.

Mr. BEARD. Have you been asked to do another war game with the 2d Division out and using the compensatory——

General CUSHMAN. No, sir, that is a long-term thing and I am interested in the day-to-day.

Mr. STRATTON. They may ask him to do a war game where it comes out better without the 2d.

General CUSHMAN. Then I told them, if you are going to remove the 2d Division—in other words, I figured my briefing was to shed light on the problem. General Vessey said: "I am not sending General Cushman back there to do anything except to shed light on the problem."

I said:

If you are going to pull the 2d Division, that means we have to have major improvements in the western sector defenses. I am just looking at it from my sector. I came up with the 11 essential actions I saw at that time. We had to have more antiarmor, more TOW's, more .90 millimeter recoilless rifles, and better tactical employment.

We had to modernize the tank force. You are familiar with that. We had to improve the artillery, these measures.

We had to strengthen the forward fortifications forward of the main battle area, but also in the main battle area. We had to accelerate the GOP mine emplacement—to emplace them right against the DMZ in peacetime, to relocate the combat engineer effort forward.

Actually, the GOP is the first outfit to get in combat. It means general outpost. It is the outpost right along the DMZ.

Mr. BEARD. I hope your GOP does better than ours. That is not too reassuring.

Mr. WON PAT. What I am asking, if we pull out emergency forces, those units will be manned by ROK forces?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. This is all to get the ROK Army so it can defend without U.S. ground forces.

Mr. WON PAT. How long will that take?

General CUSHMAN. It will take about [deleted] more or less.

Improve logistics.

Harden communications and command posts.

Upgrade the intelligence [deleted]. All sources means all sources available to us.

Develop air-land battle proficiency, get sufficient ALO's and tactical air control parties. And foster flexibility in the commanders so they can read the battle and move with fire and maneuver, seize control of the battle. That is a very important change in the fighting.

All of those together are what we must do if we are to pull the 2d Division out.

Now, the ROK reaction to this—these are, once again, the slides I used. We briefed the Koreans before I left. It was pretty sobering information because they had not seen the results of this kind of thing. [Deleted.] However, the seniors were being very straightforward about it and going about their work. But there was this uncertainty about the United States, anxiety about the future.

Then I gave my overall assessement at that time. I am showing you because it is the chart I used in the States. You can just read it:

U.S.–ROK relationship has been a durable friendship with many tests.

Extraordinarily sensitive years ahead to bring about the new conditions where ground forces are out and air cover only remains.

Some benefits to be gained by doing it, if we do it right.

Potential for damage and even an unwanted and unnecessary war if we do it wrong.

No room for avoidable doubts and uncertainties or questions as to motives by either party.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. What are the benefits?

General CUSHMAN. General Vessey and I discussed the benefits. There are not many. But I give you only what I think.

One benefit is there is a substantial benefit to be achieved by ROK self-sufficiency; that is to say, assuming more responsibility for their own defense. In other words, it is growing up toward full responsibility for their affairs. If you do it right, the U.S. initiative could lead to a settlement of the truce and a more permanent peace, a political settlement. I would say doing it right includes that. In my judgment, the last American ground forces should not leave Korea until that political settlement becomes part of the overall outcome.

Mr. STRATTON. You mean by that that the strength of the Koreans becomes so obvious that Kim Il Sung recognizes that he can't really take over the South?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, that is true. That is my first point, that the ROK's then have their own capability to defend their country and stop the enemy, and Kim Il Sung gives up his wild notion about reuniting Korea by force. But also if we do it, it could lead to a political settlement in Northeast Asia, which would remove this tense truce situation. That calls for a change in attitude on the part of Kim Il Sung.

Mr. STRATTON. What I am saying is, if he realizes that he has no chance of taking over by force, then he will say, OK, we might as well settle it?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. That is right. Those are some of the benefits.

Then we went to Caper Crown IV. This was in May, June, July, and August. This is a slow-motion game. I wanted to have the utmost realism and just involve the senior commanders against the enemy. Enemy and friendly tactics were not known to the different sides. We had a lot of emphasis on artillery. By that time we had [deleted] so we increased the main attack [deleted] against the defending corps. By that time we had redisposed some of our reserves. We had the [deleted] that had moved at Defcon 2 and was now backing up in the I Corps area. The enemy made his attack at [deleted] hours at night.

Mr. STRATTON. Where did the North Koreans come down in 1950?

General CUSHMAN. In 1950 we had the 38th parallel. It went right across here. This is Kaesong. The 38th parallel is like that [indicating]. They came down right through Uijongbu, where you are here, but they also came through here [indicating]; this area over here was all in their hands, and they attacked down through here.

That 1950 experience has led to a certain fixation on the dangers of this Chorwon approach. But you can see by the geography now it is twice as far from here to Seoul than it is from here to (Munsan) to Seoul.

Mr. STRATTON. That is where we ended up?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. The Chinese offensive of April of 1951 drove the U.N. command back all the way. In fact, Uijongbu was the front line. A very strong counteroffensive pushed in here, and by the time we got to approaching Kaesong, that is when the other side said, let's talk. Then about 2 years of negotiations.

Actually, in this war game the enemy came through here, called [deleted] when we ended this game, the enemy had made a penetration across here and was on his way in strength. We were moving our reserves into position on successive defense lines, including the [deleted] but there was nothing in that outcome to lead me to change my assessment that [deleted]. We learned a lot out of that. We learned a lot of things we shouldn't do. I won't go into that.

These were the force ratios.

This, as I said, was where the enemy, when we called the [deleted], had advanced a very strong force. We were moving other forces into position, but the lesson learned is that essentially the April 1977 assessment still prevails. This is August 1977.

Also I said that we can win—I am satisfied we can win on main battle area Alpha—provided we do all these things [indicating]. It is going to be a problem to do it. It is work.

Mr. STRATTON. You mean we can win [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. We can win [deleted].

General Vessey has his own program over and above this, of course.

Mr. STRATTON. The thing that disturbs me in all of this—and we have this so permeated through the government at the present time that even the Director of the DIA cites this as if it were existing fact—these are things provided you could achieve certain particular levels of capability in all of these areas, then you feel that it would work out. But simply listing them doesn't necessarily mean it is going to happen.

General CUSHMAN. This is hard work.

Mr. STRATTON. At any particular time.

General CUSHMAN. That is right.

Mr. STRATTON. It is not just a case of increasing weapons; you have to get the skill?

General CUSHMAN. That is right.

Mr. STRATTON. That is an intangible as far as the future goes.

General CUSHMAN. I also said we have to change our concept of operations. Basically, it calls for more [deleted] that sort of thing. This is what I took back to the States.

I went back again in September and made briefs at different service schools. I said this is a new concept of operations for OPLAN 5027, and showed this slide in the Korean language. There is a reason for that, because this concept has to be in the minds of Koreans. It doesn't do any good for me as a commander to dream up these thoughts; Koreans have to not only understand but participate in their development. That means learning by experience through war gaming, so that is why I continue to push this war gaming as a means to understand the battle better.

It gave us an improved understanding of these 11 essential actions. I have changed this one. Instead of calling it foster flexibility, I put it study and modify tactics and plans. I gave each one of these actions to a member of my staff, operations, intelligence, et cetera, and they are working on how to get from here to there in each one of these. Some are more complicated than others. Some call for U.S. equipment, others the ROK's can do by themselves. Some are easy to accomplish. If you just go out and build a road, no problem, but some are complicated. Logistics is a difficult system. We have a program in the English and the Korean languages for each one of these in my headquarters.

Mr. STRATTON. Isn't this the kind of battlefield where the maginot or McNamara line might actually be effective? They can't go off the flanks?

General CUSHMAN. That is right. Just make yourself lots of fortifications.

Mr. STRATTON. Do you have the electronic equipment?

General CUSHMAN. [Deleted.]

Mr. STRATTON. I see.

General CUSHMAN. This chart I developed to explain to visitors the problem. Here is mid-1977, say last summer. This is western sector balance, ROK Army only. Considering not just the capability, that is counting the numbers, but the actual employment of the capability, the surprise and the concentration, today or in mid-1977, [deleted] has the preponderance. But if we take those actions that I just mentioned, all of these, that is the et cetera, over a period of time the ROK Army only defense is going to get better.

Now North Korea is going to get better too. We don't know the slope of its curve, but in time we will probably be able to say with very substantial justification that we probably would stop the enemy on main battle area Alpha.

There is a question mark as to time. It depends on the quality of our effort in this, and it depends of course on what the North Koreans do. It is not all in our hands. But this end result can be achieved within reason. I don't say the time, but I would say that [deleted] is a reasonable target but not guaranteed.

These are the longstanding missions of my headquarters, the DMZ and HRE activities. I have added to that this, which is to participate in western sector improvement. I emphasize participate because I have no resources of my own. They come from others. In fact, I share responsibility for the western sector with the 3d ROK Army commander, who actually commands OPCON forces. His headquarters is south of Seoul. This is the distribution of responsibilities between the two of us. You see we have to work very closely together because he has everything from training to fortification construction. We are partners in the execution of these 11 essential actions. That is one of the complicated features of the command situation here—I have the responsibility to fight, but he has the responsibility for readiness.

Mr. STRATTON. Did you get a chance to present this to Secretary Brown?

General CUSHMAN. I showed Mr. Brown this chart, yes, sir. That was in July.

Mr. BEARD. Being concerned about safety of troops, et cetera, have you gone through the results of your whole war game scenario and withdrawn the brigade that is being withdrawn——

General CUSHMAN. We haven't done that, no, sir.

Mr. BEARD. But I would assume in your war games it played an extremely important part in saying [deleted]. To me, that could be placing the rest of the troops in jeopardy.

General CUSHMAN. That first withdrawal only has about 3,000 of the 2d Division. General Vessey has taken the greatest pain to cut into the antitank and other strength as little as possible.

Mr. BEARD. But you are taking quite a bit of firepower out, aren't you?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

I would like to discuss the DMZ. This is the DMZ. In one part of my sector you can see the outposts, you will see them from the air today. There is about [deleted] per mile on our side. The other side has about three per mile. This reflects his forward displacement and strength. That is kind of a wild territory, as a look at it shows. Here is one of our outposts. Theirs are over in here. The south boundary has a fence, chain link, 10 foot high.

The utility of the 2d Division involves all three of these, war fighting, deterrence, and trucekeeping, as I mentioned earlier. I have been talking recently just about the war fighting, but it is important to discuss these others. I would point out back in 1975 this was the prevailing view, that the DMZ mission of the 2d Division was not essential. What changed that? It is no longer the prevailing view over here. The ax murders of 1976 made it graphic that you need the force up there protected by 2d Division troops. They were there; they didn't have to go into an escalation or raising the level of tension, by replacing ROK's with these U.S. forces. The 2d Division cut down the tree and also pulled out this barrier. These were the purposes of the August 21, 1976, action. The fundamental purpose is here demonstrated.

This is the document that was signed in 1953. I bring this out.

You may not be able to read that, but I will say paragraph 62 of the truce agreement, which was signed by General Clark, General Vessey's predecessor, says:

The articles and paragraphs of this armistice agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superceded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

Of course, that political settlement was then visualized as happening very soon. It has gone on now since the 27th of July 1973. This, plus the intricacies of these deployments up around the DMZ, the truce-keeping and deterrence mission of the 2d Division, is what is very rarely understood by people who think and write and speculate on Korea.

So I have two basic conclusions that I arrived at at that time last summer. Before I get into the last war game, which I will, I will give these to you. The first of this is that we can achieve an adequate ROK Army war-fighting capability. It will be a complex major force-building undertaking. [Deleted] is a reasonable target, given the necessary resources, but it is not a certainty. It will be costly, it will call for resources from the United States. We are not certain if it can be done in this number of years.

Mr. BEARD. Have we gotten any kind of price tag at all?

Mr. STRATTON. According to Brown, it is the $800 million of transferring the 2d Division, plus a couple billion for what the ROK's are supposed to do themselves.

Mr. LALLY. $2 billion, I believe, is what is estimated.

General CUSHMAN. General Vessey's headquarters has participated in that from the very beginning.

Mr. BEARD. In other words, that $2 billion price tag would supply that which you say is necessary?

General CUSHMAN. I think that is a very good approximation of it. I am satisfied as they get down the line they will probably make modifications, but I think that is probably the best judgment now.

Mr. STRATTON. When does the time start to run?

General CUSHMAN. At SCM, last July, [deleted].

Mr. STRATTON. From July of 1977?

General CUSHMAN. That is my understanding, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. Have you done anything so far in this direction?

General CUSHMAN. This is gradual, of course. They are modifying the tanks, going to get the tanks ready to issue. We have received some tanks. We are working on fortifications. We are improving those 11 essential actions. I will say we are on track with that curve, sir, as long as you realize there is a question mark as to the end of it.

Mr. STRATTON. This [deleted] is really just a guess, isn't it?

General CUSHMAN. I would say it is a target. It is an informed judgment, but it is not a certainty.

Mr. STRATTON. Who has the responsibility for training the Koreans in handling these new equipments; would you as the I Corps commander have that responsibility?

General CUSHMAN. No, sir. The Koreans do their own training, and the training advice comes in part from me, but mostly from 8th Army.

Mr. STRATTON. Eighth Army?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. General Vessey?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Colonel BURKE. His other hat.

General CUSHMAN. They have to acquire some aviation. Our aviation group here in-country is going to assist them in understanding and developing the tactics, and so forth, for developing the aviation units.

Mr. STRATTON. It would seem to me that we have a not insuperable but certainly a very complicating factor which you mention, but I don't think most of us recognize: this language barrier.

If you get into a combat situation, you have to order these 11 ROK divisions; right?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, through the corps commanders.

Mr. STRATTON. There aren't very many guys in your command that speak Korean?

General CUSHMAN. No, sir. That is a very important point. I get my instructions in English. I issue my instructions to the ROK units in Korean. I have Korean officers on my staff that can speak English. Thanks to that, we can convert these into Korean and put them out over teletype. Not only that, in time of war whether it's telephone or face to face, I am not going to trust my mother tongue to convey to them what they must do. My deputy has just moved.

General Chang is a very fine officer; he can speak Korean and he speaks English beautifully. He used to be the defense attaché in Washington. My deputy is going to go along with me and be sure those corps commanders understand. What I tell them to do in time of tension, he is going to make sure is understood.

Mr. STRATTON. When you get into the matter of trying to show somebody how to operate a TOW or fly a helicopter, you have to have a number of people that can explain this.

General CUSHMAN. The ROK's have been doing that for years. They have taken the American manuals, converted them to Korean. They are very good at taking our training literature and making it Korean.

Mr. STRATTON. I see.

General CUSHMAN. But it is an extraordinarily important and complicating factor.

The other conclusions that I briefed visitors here is shown. Even when an adequate ROK Army war-fighting capability is achieved, there will still be a need for a U.S. combat formation on the ground north of Seoul for as long as the 1953 military armistice agreement remains the governing political instrument separating the two Koreas.

This is based on 2 years of addressing this problem. I am satisfied that both these conclusions are justified.

Mr. STRATTON. This, I take it, is not met by leaving a communications and intelligence group, et cetera, that is now supposed to be left on the ground to go along with the air forces that we leave in?

General CUSHMAN. This combat formation of several battalions, it could be a brigade-sized force, but it would be several combat battalions.

Mr. STRATTON. I don't want to put words in your mouth, knowing all the implications, but it would appear to me this means that at some point, 1982 or 1983, with the plan as now drawn up, all combat forces will be out of Korea. All ground combat forces will be out. That does not meet what you feel to be continuing need?

General CUSHMAN. Sir, I am satisfied this is the need. If we achieve that military armistice conversion into a political instrument by that

time, then that is all right. If we don't, I am satisfied this will be recognized and so the policy will be modified. That is my own assessment.

Mr. STRATTON. That is something that I think has not been made clear to the country, and I think you are making a very important point. That is more or less the thing that is on a lot of our minds, that we ought not to remove these forces until we have achieved that political settlement.

General CUSHMAN. If I might say, sir, this is the problem in the Koreans' minds because, being on the scene, they see this very clearly.

Mr. STRATTON. I hope we can take that back and spread the word.

General CUSHMAN. I would like to describe the later Caper Crown we ran, VII. It does have this question of how we got the warning and so forth. As I said, the first run of the Caper Crown exercises was in April of 1976, 2 months after I got here. We have run six or actually seven. This is the first six. This is not a terribly important slide to be copying; it is just to show you some have had substantial air. They have been for different purposes.

Caper Crown VII was a II Corps exercise for the first time. We had the I Corps and the VI Corps. It had a lot of other participants here, Reserve units, and units of the other corps and a very substantial Air Force, Korea.

These are all ROK forces. The only United States one is this 2d U.S. Infantry Division.

This is the participation that they put into it. This was run in October of 1977.

This is the kind of questions we asked them to do—an air battle analysis. It was a very good war game from the point of view of training us in how to handle air.

Mr. STRATTON. Let me just ask, if I may. Do you think we ought to get these slides?

General CUSHMAN. I am sure we can. Just go ahead and make the request.

These are the characteristics of that game. People argue about how scientific these are. They are the best we can come up with. We had enemy commanders and staffs, real time, two-sided, free play.

We enlarged our room. You will see it in a little while. We have a II Corps front on our war game.

Colonel BURKE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Mr. STRATTON. Sure.

Colonel BURKE. What season of the year?

General CUSHMAN. Good question. This one was done in October, and we used actual weather, the weather of the 17th and 18th of October.

Caper Crown II was done in the dead of winter, with the Imjin River frozen, so we have options.

We brought the commanders in, put up a tent city, and all the corps commanders and regimental commanders wired up, just as they would be, except closer.

This is one of the enemy attacking corps, commanded by a Korean. Here is the corps commander.

The enemy attack concept is this. [Deleted.]

Talk about warning—there are two parts to warning. The first is the indications, then the decisions. These are a couple of historical examples that show while you might have indications, your decisions aren't always very good to [deleted].

Mr. STRATTON. [Deleted.]

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. That is for the ground attack. [Deleted.]

Mr. STRATTON. How does this thing work in a war game? In other words, if he moves up a little piece on that model, obviously you can see it, there is no cover, and so on?

General CUSHMAN. You see, we assumed that we found these things because it is most difficult to war game the intelligence, but we are having an intelligence war game at the end of this month, in which we are going to do just that, see how we might have picked up those indications.

A war game starts when the enemy starts attacking. I didn't go through the process of saying what these indications were because we don't know. You have to be kind of a good fiction writer, a novelist, to dream that up. I deal with it day in and day out, all these indications, but there is no point in saying how I got it. I just assumed that I got it.

So I say, OK. I told the enemy commander: See what you can do about finding our vulnerabilities.

He lined up his attack. [Deleted.]

I won't go through it blow by blow with you because we don't have time for that, but essentially it didn't change my assessment that [deleted] and even then we have to do a damn good job and not make any mistakes.

People ask, is this game realistic? We keep getting these results. "How realistic," they ask, "are you?" These are some of the questions as to realism.

We have to ask ourselves, what are the objectives of the games? And I should put this in perspective for you. These are the objectives of this Caper Crown. The special objectives were to take a look at this [deleted] and also to take a look at whether our new concept of operations was right. [Deleted.]

I say that the Caper Crowns have been realistic to serve those purposes. I always make the disclaimer it is not designed to predict the outcome of battles, just to give you an assessment as to possible outcome, more like the odds.

Mr. BEARD. The people who keep asking how realistic it is are pretty skeptical about the outcome?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, and so am I. Because this is a training exercise. I allowed things to happen in this war game that I wouldn't allow to happen as the commander, so we get the benefit of making the mistakes without the penalties of combat.

Mr. BEARD. The point is do the skeptics who question the outcome have an alternative?

General CUSHMAN. They just say it wouldn't be as bad a result. Their alternative is their judgment.

Mr. BEARD. Their judgment comes from where?

General CUSHMAN. Their experience. They have some pretty experienced people that might say: General Cushman, you are taking the

worst case [deleted]. It is an informed judgment. We just come to a different conclusion.

One conclusion we came to is this. We have done that.

I also said a concept of operations is a good point of departure. I don't want to force the Koreans to copy our concept.

I much prefer a study by the ROK army to arrive at their own group conclusions and studies.

On the warning, you might want to read this chart, Warning Assumption Finding.

[Deleted.]

I would like you to read this chart because it shows we are making progress. We get our augmentation of the ACP's from Wonju, which is 10 hours away.

Mr. WON PAT. Naturally the enemy would get augmentation from Russia and China?

General CUSHMAN. [Deleted.]

I will go through two or three conclusions to give you the kind of conclusions that come out of this.

[Chart shown called "Lessons Learned to Date (Tentative)."]

This is very valuable.

Another chart called "Lessons Learned to Date (Tentative)."

He hasn't created those forces for a defense. There is no doubt about that.

[Another chart shown, entitled "Lessons Learned to Date (Tentative)."]

As a result, we have changed our essential actions. This is a present list, Mr. Chairman, of the essential actions. I modernized the tank force and just put that under antiarmor, and I added one, [deleted] so we have added that to our list.

This is just about the last slide.

[Slide shown, entitled "Western Sector Balance—ROKA Only."]

I think, frankly, we have moved along. I don't know how many years it is, but we have moved in 6 months and we are going to continue to move. We are going to continue to meet our responsibilities and carry out the policy of the U.S. Government so we can arrive at this conclusion and have adequate war-fighting capability without the 2d Division or any ground forces, just U.S. tactical air and logistic support.

But I would say that has to be emphasized.

[Other slides shown.]

That is the end of my briefing. Sorry to take up so much of your time.

Mr. STRATTON. No. This has been tremendous, General.

Did you serve in Vietnam?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. Three times. I served as an adviser to the 21st ARVN Division in the Deep Delta in 1963–64. I went back as brigade commander of the 101st Airborne Division in the fighting around Tet in 1968. I went back and served as deputy and then senior adviser in the Delta in 1970–72, almost 4 years in Vietnam, three different tours.

Mr. STRATTON. As you said, we didn't use the tanks down there. We figured the enemy wasn't going to have any, but they turned out to have them anyway. There was a different problem in Vietnam than what you have here, of course.

General CUSHMAN. It has some of the characteristics. You can learn from Vietnam, especially from the process of Vietnamization. What went on there is far different from Korea but essentially the same objective, namely the turnover, the capability to do its own fighting, the Vietnamese then and Koreans now. So it is extraordinarily complex and has to be well done.

Mr. STRATTON. In your last tour that was underway?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. I was there when the decision was made in 1969 to start the withdrawal, and I was there in the Delta during the time the turnover was taking place.

Mr. STRATTON. This is essentially a Vietnamization up here.

General CUSHMAN. You fully understand the ROK is a far different country.

Mr. STRATTON. Did you run across ROK divisions in Vietnam?

General CUSHMAN. No, sir, I never served alongside them in Vietnam.

Mr. STRATTON. We visited them a couple times.

General CUSHMAN. They had a great reputation, I would say this to you—you will see some ROK commanders. This is a fantastically proficient army down there, where you will be observing them, hardy, tough, well trained, disciplined.

Mr. BEARD. Motivated.

General CUSHMAN. Motivated, that is right. You have all the motivation that you ever need.

I think we are going to go ahead with our schedule and just arrive a little late.

Mr. STRATTON. Thank you very much, General Cushman.

[Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the meeting was concluded.]

JOHN F. LALLY
COUNSEL

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
2339 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
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225-4221, GOVERNMENT CODE 180, EXT. 4221

HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT URGES NO TOTAL KOREAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL BEFORE PEACE SETTLEMENT

FOR RELEASE:
A.M., WEDNESDAY,
APRIL 26, 1978

Washington, D. C., April 25, 1978 -- President Carter's decision to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea could "pose grave hazards to the stability of Northeast Asia," the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee declared in a report released today by Subcommittee Chairman Samuel S. Stratton (D-N.Y.).

As a consequence the subcommittee "strongly" recommended "that a basic U.S. ground combat force be retained in Korea until the current armistice has been superseded by a formal peace settlement" between North and South Korea.

The subcommittee said, however, it would not oppose the earlier scheduled withdrawal of 6,000 of the 33,000 ground combat troops presently stationed in South Korea, provided Congress first enacted legislation to authorize transfer of the combat equipment of these 6,000 troops to South Korean forces for strengthening defensive positions along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

The subcommittee report was highly critical of the processes followed by the White House in early 1977 in reaching its decision on the troop withdrawal matter.

That decision had been basically the result of statements the President had made during his election campaign, the subcommittee said, and concluded that Mr. Carter had not "sought any advice, assistance, recommendations or estimates of the probable impact of his withdrawal decision on U.S. security considerations or stability in the Far East from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.... or from other knowledgeable military sources prior to making his decision...."

The subcommittee also found that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after learning of the withdrawal decision, had proposed that no more than 7,000 troops be withdrawn by October 1982, with a subsequent further evaluation to determine whether any additional withdrawals might be desirable. Disregarding that advice from his officially designated "principal military advisors," the President ordered that 6,000 troops be withdrawn by the end of 1978, four years earlier than proposed by the Joint Chiefs, with the balance removed four years later.

Appendix R

Commenting on the military situation in Korea, which the subcommittee had surveyed firsthand during a four-nation Asian tour in January 1978, the report concluded that, "In the 25 years that the Armistice has been in effect, there has been no real peace between North and South Korea, particularly along the DMZ. Korea.... is the most explosive and volatile spot in Asia, and the military situation along both sides of the DMZ is only a hair-trigger truce that has the potential of erupting into full-scale warfare at almost any time."

Other key findings in the report are:

1. "The principal deterrent to /war/ are the 30,000 ground troops of the U.S. stationed just south of the DMZ.... This one division provides a deterrent force disproportionately greater than its relatively small size."

2. "Withdrawal of these troops will greatly impair this deterrent, with almost no discernible gain -- as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pointed out...."

3. "The public announcement of this withdrawal.... has already contributed to instability in Asia, has damaged our cooperative defensive relationship with Korea, and has had a measurable adverse impact on our relations with our other Pacific allies."

4. "The subcommittee strongly shares the belief, frequently expressed to us in Asia, that actions speak louder than words, and that if the total withdrawal plans remain in effect, no amount of constant verbal reiteration of a continuing U.S. defense commitment can offset the serious damage this withdrawal will do."

The subcommittee report found South Korea inferior to North Korea in every relevant military indicator except manpower. The report quotes General John W. Vessey, Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces Korea, as follows: "The North Koreans enjoy a two-to-one advantage in tanks, artillery and tactical aircraft. They have a four-to-one advantage in naval combatants, including a three-to-one lead in missile attack craft, and a more than twelve-to-one advantage in submarines."

The subcommittee further concluded "on the basis of current intelligence estimates.... the North Koreans possess the capability of attacking South Korea with a minimum of warning, and that the 2nd Infantry Division is needed for an adequate defense of Seoul... Were that division to be withdrawn, the defense of Seoul would be greatly complicated. This assessment appears to be confirmed by published excerpts from the Department of Defense Military Strategic and Force Posture Review...."

In releasing the report, Stratton said, "We are firmly convinced that the peacekeeping function of the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division is at least as important as its war-fighting capability. The presence of U.S. forces has deterred hostilities on the Korean Peninsula for 25 years. Before we tamper with that deterrent we ought to work for a peaceful settlement that will finally bring an end to this long war.

"It is unfortunate," Stratton added, "that congressional consideration of the compensatory actions which are integral to the withdrawal of the first 6,000 troops has been delayed because of the Tongsun Park investigation. We strongly believe that no troops, not even the first 6,000, should be withdrawn until Congress approves legislation to turn the equipment of those troops over to the Koreans, for the joint defense of remaining U.S. and Korean forces.

"When it comes to vital military matters in Korea, our actions as a nation should be based strictly on consideration of U.S. national security, as well as the security of important allies, not on extraneous and unrelated matters. Otherwise we run the risk of renewed conflict in Asia, which ought to be the last thing that any member of the House or Senate would wish to encourage."

Dissenting views on the report were filed by Representative Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.); supplementary views were filed by Representatives David C. Treen (R-La.), Robert W. Daniel, Jr. (R-Va.), and Robert E. Badham (R-Calif.).

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

2339 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
225-4221, GOVERNMENT CODE 180, EXT. 4221

February 2, 1978

Dear General Cushman:

On behalf of the members and staff of the House Armed Services Committee who had the pleasure of meeting with you during our recent four-nation fact-finding trip to the Far East, I want to express our sincere thanks and appreciation for the opportunity of meeting with you, and for the warm hospitality and courtesies you extended to us.

Particularly we want to thank you for your outstanding presentation of the military issues and the results of your war-gaming. The visit to the North Korean tunnel and to the ROK positions along the DMZ were especially helpful in understanding the problems confronting U. S. and ROK commanders.

We hope that our visit, and the report which we are in the process of submitting to our full committee and to the Congress, will help to promote peace and security in the Pacific and enhance the best interests of our country in a very vital area of the world.

Personally, I am sorry you will be retiring in the near future. I do hope your successor is able to continue to meet the very high standards you have set, and I hope we can call on you from time to time for advice and counsel in this important matter.

Please give General Yun Hung Jyong our best wishes and respect for the high degree of motivation and commitment exemplified by the troops of his command that we had the opportunity to meet. Similarly, give Lieutenant General Hwang Yung Si our thanks for the opportunity of meeting with him.

With high esteem and all best wishes for your health and happiness in the New Year,

Sincerely,

Samuel S. Stratton
Chairman

Lieutenant General John H. Cushman
Commanding General
I Corps (ROK/US) Group
APO San Francisco 96358

Appendix 5