# The Origin of Fort Leavenworth's Air/land Battle Coordination Center

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Pages 71-73 of Volume One of <u>Fort Leavenworth - A Memoir</u> (see http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/VolOne-2.pdf)

Followed by its Annex L

(see http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/VolTwoAnnexes-4.pdf)

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John H Cuchman

in September 1975,

converting an unused wooden Post Exchange "9 to 9" store with ample floor space, I established an experimental air/land battle facility. The Combined Arms Center letter of instructions is at Annex L.

The facility, which we called the Air/Land Battle Coordination Center (ALBCC), housed a combination of full-time and part-time participants from CACDA, the College, and the

66The doctrine authorities of the Air Force in the Pentagon and at TAC had been thrown off by the Army's EAD decision; they didn't know how to accommodate it and keep centralized control of tactical air in the theater, an ingrained tenet. TACLO, being a TAC office, would not help us plow new ground. But we had some bright USAF majors in the student body whom we enlisted in our study effort. Being, with the USAF faculty liaison section, under the Air University, they had no compunctions about thinking in new directions. 67Later renamed the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)

TACLO that represented all the subject matter expertise, from the commander on down, that was required for orchestrating the command and control of air/land operations at the corps level. From the yellowed transparencies of that time, I can duplicate our standard briefing...

#### The CAC approach:

Evolutionary, from A... to B... to C

Required: Brains, organization, procedures. Not necessarily: New money, new equipment, more people.

A Common Effort.

We then showed a layout of the ALBCC, which was essentially a command post with in its center an operations portrayal managed by an Operations Coordinator and an intelligence portrayal managed by an Intel Coordinator (choosing for experimental purposes to use different names for the G-3 and G-2). Around the sides of the space were open cubicles for the specialties — electronic warfare, fire support, reconnaissance and surveillance, and so on. We would start with maps as "portrayals" but would graduate to other means (e.g., rear screen projections) if experimentation showed they had advantages. The Direct Air Support Center with its operations, intel, and recce specialists was centered on ops/intel portrayal.

#### The Method:

Exercise the elements of the Center in slow motion in College and SCORES scenarios.

Coordinate with combined arms schools, Admin and Log Centers, and TAC agencies.

Identify problems and document deficiencies.

Develop SOPs to do the job better.

Test with full up manning with faculty and students.

Recommend actions to Commanders of TAC and TRADOC.

#### The Expected Products:

Streamlined corps headquarters; procedures for integrating the air/land battle; improved comms and ADP assistance; improved proficiency in conduct of air/land battle; benefit to both Army and Air Force combat developers.

At the ALBCC we established a battle simulation facility that could support slow motion and real time exercises in the ALBCC using College troop lists and scenarios. When up and running we had in mind making the facility available to the active corps headquarters of the Army and their associated Air Force elements.

In the winter of 1975-76 I had great hopes for the ALBCC. The full-time CACDA/College staff under the leadership of Colonel Sanders of the Department of Command was exploring the issues and periodically calling in people of the part-time staff. With Colonel Clyde Tate of the Department of Tactics and Colonel C. H. Carter, the TACLO, they

were getting into substantive discussions on how to improve air/land coordination.

Wargamers were getting established. When Lieutenant General Hank Emerson, XVIII

Airborne Corps Commander, visited Leavenworth I showed him around the ALBCC; he expressed an interest in using it.

69A few months after I left for Korea, Jess Hendricks wrote to tell me that Morey Brady's successor had closed down the ALBCC, saying that he needed the space for another purpose.

# ATZLCG

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

#### HEADQUARTERS

#### COMBINED ARMS CENTER AND FORT LEAVENWORTH FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027

10 September 1975

SUBJECT:

Letter of Instruction: Manning of Experimental

Air/Land Battle Facility

✓ Deputy Commander, US Army Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Deputy Commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

1. The concept of the Combined Arms Center experimental air/land battle facility is briefly described below:

Manager:

Colonel Hendricks

Director, Department of Command

Participation:

Staff Operations Committee,

Department of Command

TACLO

USAF Section, CGSC

Joint and Combined Operations, DSTRAT

EW and Deception Division, C&C Directorate

ISTA Branch, CCS Directorate

Student Electives, CGSC Instruction

Initial Task:

Analyze requirements for the coordination

of the air/land battle.

2. This research, instructional, and experimental facility in Building 684 became available for occupancy on 2 September 1975. This Letter of Instruction establishes the minimum manning level for this facility and identifies the individuals who will fill positions in this facility.

3. The persons named in this Letter of Instruction are those members of the Combined Arms Center whose background and

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ongoing projects are most closely related to the purposes of the experimental air/land battle facility. Some of the personnel listed are identified as detailed on a full-time basis while others are listed as part-time participants. Full-time is understood to mean that the experimental facility will be the official duty location of the personnel so listed. Personnel whose place of duty is the experimental facility retain responsibility for their current assignments, to include instruction, projects, TDY, etc., and remain responsive to their existing chain of command. Personnel listed as being part-time members of the experimental facility will have their normal place of duty elsewhere and will visit the facility as necessary to fulfill their commitments to that facility. Facilities for storage of classified material, up to SECRET, will be available.

- 4. No change in OER rating scheme is involved. The purpose of grouping these particular officers in the experimental facility is to enhance air/land battle control and coordination and to provide through their presence in the experimental facility an operating context which is directly relevant to their normal duty functions. For officers listed as being full-time participants in the experimental facility, development of air/land battle procedures is considered their prime mission for the period through 1 July 1976.
- 5. The initial manning of the facility, effective 10 September 1975, is stated in Inclosure 1 in terms of the position occupied, name of the officer, department/directorate, and status in terms of full-time or part-time assignment. Additional manning changes will be by separate correspondence.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl

Colonel, GS Chief of Staff

### MANNING OF EXPERIMENTAL AIR/LAND BATTLE FACILITY

POSITION	NAME.	DEPARTMENT/ DIRECTORATE	STATUS
XX Corps Rep	COL C. J. Tate	DTAC	Part-Time
10 AF LO	COL C. H. Carter	TACLO	Part-Time
Chief of Staff	COL B. L. Sanders	DCOM	Full-Time
	Air/Land Battle Cent	er	•
A/L Battle Coord	LTC R. R. Redhair	DCOM	Full-Time
Asst Coord	LTC E. F. McGushin	DSTRAT	Rart-Time
Asst Coord	LTC R. G. Maxson	DTAC	Part-Time
Asst Coord Air	LTC E. W. Gale	DSTRAT	Part-Time
Intel Coord Asst	LTC R. W. Leister	CACDA	Full-Time
Intel Coord Ops	MAJ M. T. Chase	DCOM	Part-Time
Intel Coord Air	LTC J. E. Caudill	DCOM	Part-Time
Intel Coord Air	MAJ L. L. Shlenker	DCOM	Part-Time
FSE	LTC R. A. Bragalone	DTAC	Part-Time
Avn	LTC T. H. Bilbrey	DSTRAT	Part-Time
ADA	LTC J. T. Butterfield	DSTRAT	Part-Time
Signal	COL N. F. Hubbard	CACDA	Part-Time
Signal	LTC T. W. Hummel	DCOM .	Part-Time
Signal	CPT C. D. Cochran	DCOM	Full-Time
(continued)			

## MANNING OF EXPERIMENTAL AIR/LAND BATTLE FACILITY (continued)

PRINCIPLE OF THE PROPERTY.	•	DEPARTMENT/		
POSITION	NAME	DIRECTORATE	STATUS	
EW ;	COL L. W. Powers	CACDA	Part-Time	
EW .	LTC J. M. Hoyt	CACDA	Full-Time	
Tac Air Spt (Ops)	MAJ M. D. Goold	TACLO	Part-Time	
Ops NCO	SFC C. Aleman	DCOM	Full-Time	
All Source Intelligence Center				
Intel Coord	COL L. W. Bindrup	CACDA	Part-Time	
Asst	LTC H. C. Pickens	DCOM	Full-Time	
SIGINT	MAJ R. M. Weikle	CACDA	Full-Time	
ASA ·	MAJ J. Bircher	DCOM	Full-Time	
MI	MAJ A. Guenzburger	CACDA	Full-Time	
MIBARS	LTC A. P. Sarnecki	CACDA	Full-Time	
R&S	MAJ H. J. Towler	DCOM	Part-Time	
R&S	CPT F. Stepaniak	CACDA	Full-Time	