

## Korea, 1976-1978 -- A Memoir

Reprinted October 2013 with the addition of pages 61-77, as Volume Seven to accompany my Oral History.

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Lieutenant General John H. Cushman

U.S. Army, Retired

April, 1998

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Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army, Retired

*I served in Korea from February 10, 1976, through February 10, 1978. They were my last two years of active duty; I returned home and, on March 1, 1978, retired from the Army.*

*I could not have had a finer final assignment. I was a field commander in an overseas theater of vital concern to the United States. I was blessed with two superb higher commanders, General Richard G. Stilwell until September 1976, and General John W. Vessey, Jr., through the remainder of my tour. In a multinational, multiservice command, I was working with other U.S. services and learning to know and appreciate the Army, and other armed services, of the Republic of Korea. And I was among the industrious and warm-hearted Korean people, whose defense and well-being the United States was pledged to protect and whose heritage, culture, and development I found endlessly fascinating.*

*It has been twenty years since I left that assignment. I have visited Korea for research in my writings -- my last visit was in 1988. Relying on my memory, on letters home written then, and on papers and briefing materials collected during those two years, I have prepared this account.*

*They were interesting times. I did some good, and was fortunate to have lived them.*

**Dedicated to the people of the Republic of Korea and to its  
Army, and to Bruce Grant, who helped me to know them both.**

*John H. Cushman*

## Korea, 1976-1978 – A Memoir

Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army, Retired


In January 1976 I had been commanding at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,<sup>1</sup> for two and a half years, when General Frederick C. Weyand, Army Chief of Staff, telephoned me to say that he was nominating me for my third star and for the position of Commanding General, I Corps (ROK/US) Group, in Korea. He told me to come to the Pentagon for the standard round of interviews -- with himself, with the Secretary of the Army, and with the Secretary of Defense -- that would satisfy the higher-ups that I was an appropriate nominee.

It would be a two-year tour. My wife Nancy and I decided that she would remain at Fort Leavenworth, in student quarters as a "waiting wife," to see Ted (a senior in high school) and Anne (in eighth grade) through the school year, and to take proper care of the Vietnamese teenager who was living with us and struggling in his first year in an American school, Immaculata High in Leavenworth.<sup>2</sup> Whether, after that, she and Ted and Anne would join me in Korea was undecided.

Although I had taken a team of assistant commandants from TRADOC's schools to Korea a few months earlier, I knew little about the details of my new command. A field army-size formation defending the Western Sector of Korea's DMZ, I Corps (ROK/US)

<sup>1</sup>Where, under the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) I was: Commander of its Combined Arms Center; Commandant of the Army Command and General Staff College; and Commander of the Combined Arms Combat Development Activity.

<sup>2</sup>This was Diep, the son of Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong of the Republic of Vietnam Army, a sterling and much admired officer whom I had known in two Vietnam tours and whom, with his family, Nancy and I had sponsored upon the April 1975 fall of the Republic of Vietnam. General Truong and his family had lived with us for a time at Fort Leavenworth and upon moving to Northern Virginia had left Diep to finish high school.




Group had its Korean-American headquarters located at Camp Red Cloud near Uijongbu, north of Seoul; it was known as the Shield of Seoul. Its peculiar "corps group" (group of corps) designation derived from its conversion a few years earlier from the U.S. I Corps, when the U.S. 7th Infantry Division was taken from that command and returned to the United States, leaving only the U.S. 2d Infantry Division behind. With a Korean major general as my deputy commander and a Korean-American staff I would have operational control of eleven ROK (Republic of Korea) divisions organized into three ROK corps, plus a ROK Marine Brigade, and of the 2d Infantry Division -- all deployed along the western half of the DMZ north and east of Seoul, the capital of the Republic.

I would be under the command of General Richard G. Stilwell, U.S. Army, who had been the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), for some three years. He bore the additional title of CINUNC (Commander in Chief, United Nations Command) which dated from General MacArthur's time and gave him operational control of ROK forces. He was also the Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army, the U.S. Army-only command in Korea. I had known him with high regard since the late 1950s; as Operations Chief for General Harkins, the U.S. Commander in Vietnam, he had in 1963 engineered my assignment as Senior Advisor to the 21st Vietnamese Infantry Division, for which I had been grateful.

I would be replacing Lieutenant General James F. Hollingsworth, a man I had never met and about whom I knew little. Upon reading his news clippings (three pages of which are at Appendix A) I saw that he had made quite a reputation in Korea. When I visited Generals Weyand and DePuy, both told me "You've got a hard act to follow."

While in the Pentagon for my interviews I visited the Army Staff for briefings on the situation in Korea. That situation's key feature was the Demilitarized Zone, which derived from the 1953 Armistice Agreement (between the United Nations Command on one hand and North Korea and Communist China on the other) that ended the 1950-53 Korean



War and that was still in effect. Four kilometers wide, and demilitarized in name only, the DMZ snaked across the peninsula to separate the two sides.

To the north of the DMZ, in an offensive posture and armed to the teeth, was the North Korean Army; to the south, disposed for the defense, there stood the ROK Army. At the point where the highway from Kaesong to Seoul crossed the DMZ was the Joint Security Area, established by the 1953 Armistice Agreement. The JSA was the meeting place for the Military Armistice Commission with its representatives of both sides. Deployed in garrisons north of Seoul was the U.S. 2d Infantry Division, one battalion of which was across the Imjin River backing up the United Nations Command troops inside the JSA. That battalion, whose sector was in the center of a regimental sector of the 1st ROK Infantry Division deployed along the DMZ, also occupied two platoon-sized guard posts inside the DMZ, astride the highway and overlooking the JSA. Seoul was 25 miles away.

In the post-Watergate, post-Vietnam, climate of 1975 and 1976, the Congress was insisting that the United States not go to war in Asia, or anywhere else, without its consent. Notwithstanding the United States commitment in the ROK/US Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 to come to Korea's aid in the event of attack, some saw the dispositions of the 2d Infantry Division as an undesirable automatic trigger to go to war. Pressures were on the Ford administration to move the division behind the Han River, which ran through Seoul.

In testimony to Congress, Pentagon officials, and General Stilwell as well, attempted to relieve those concerns by saying that in a crisis units of the 2d Infantry Division could be moved out of the way and that the President would be given time for a decision to go to war. (This view is reflected in the asterisked paragraph on General Hollingsworth, page A-2.)

I saw a contradiction here: If the ROK/US defenders detected credible evidence of an imminent North Korean attack, the 2d Division could be withdrawn (even though that might indicate a U.S. lack of will to come to the South's aid, and such perceived irresolution could lead the North to miscalculate, hence trigger a war). But if the North gave us virtually no warning, which it would surely try to do, would not the U.S. forces on the DMZ, with no time to move out, be immediately engaged? It was true that, in its present dispositions, the 2d Infantry Division could be seen as a "hostage" (or, more correctly, as certain evidence that the U.S. would fight for South Korea).

But were the Pentagon and the Korea command being honest with the Congress and the American people to assure them otherwise? I decided to face up to this contradiction between public assurances and the reality of the situation on the ground. (Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter, in the early days of his 1976 campaign for the Democratic nomination for President, solved this contradiction by announcing that in five years time he would remove all U.S. ground forces from Korea. More on that later.)

Meanwhile, I was wanted in Korea by February 10th and time was short. Until a replacement was named, I would be turning over my duties to Major General Morris Brady, who had been until then the Deputy Commander, Combined Arms Combat Development Activity. But until departure, I still had a command to run.

In my final weeks as Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, I established a "Korea Elective" for those students who would be ordered to Korea at the end of the Regular Course, with the idea that I could ask one or more to be assigned to my I Corps (ROK/US) Group headquarters. I was determined to put into practice in my new command a system of "battle simulation" based on that which we had developed in 1973-74 and had instituted for 1974's entering class at the Command and General Staff College. Called "First Battle," it was a free-play exercise in which students played the roles of corps, division, and brigade commanders reacting to a Warsaw Pact attack on the fictitious U.S. X Corps in Europe. The battle outcomes, as influenced by the student-commanders' decisions in real time, were determined by controllers working on a massive "wargame board" in which small counters represented the engaged units of both sides. It was a marvelous instructional tool, and I intended to institute it in Korea with the actual senior commanders participating, and learning from their experience. The College faculty prepared a full kit of its techniques for me to take to Korea.

I arranged for a vacant set of student quarters in an apartment building on Doniphan Avenue to be assigned to Nancy as a "waiting wife" for the remainder of the children's school year. But there simply was not time for me to complete the move from our Commanding General's quarters on #1 Scott Avenue, and with great regret I left Nancy to accomplish that on her own; with inadequate help, that turned out to be a major trial.

I packed uniforms of all types (with new shoulder patches, the I Corps black and white "bullseye"), civilian clothing, personal gear, and books and papers into a couple of traveling bags and two new wooden footlockers. On February 9th I took a helicopter with

that baggage to the Nashville Airport to board a flight to Seattle, then another to Japan. "Frocked" as a three-star general,<sup>3</sup> I was travelling in uniform (first class authorized).

I was met at Haneda Airfield in Tokyo (my engineer battalion had built Haneda after the war) by Major General Clyde Lynn (Clyde, stationed in Japan, had been one of my assistant division commanders in the 101st Airborne Division) and was taken by helicopter to Yokota Air Base, where I had supper with Clyde and his wife Jackie. As I wrote my wife the next day...

"I [then] flew a small Air Force jet (T-39) from Yokota to Seoul, arriving at 11:30 pm Tuesday. Lots of flashbulbs popping in my face as I made my way down the steps to shake the hand of MG Jim Smith, UN Command Chief of Staff, and others. More photos - then a walk to the terminal building where General Stilwell (at 11:30 pm!) was waiting... Then in General Stilwell's big car to my VIP suite."

I was handed the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) itinerary; this is it, Xeroxed.

EUSA ITINERARY FOR LTG CUSHMAN - 10-12 FEBRUARY 1976

Tuesday, 10 February

o/a 2200 Arrive Kimpo International Airport, Seoul, via T-39,  
met by General Stilwell or MG Smith (C/S)  
2200- Inprocessing, enroute to quarters

Wednesday, 11 February (Duty Uniform - Army Greens)

0710-0715 Enroute to Sorabol House (General Stilwell's quarters)  
via sedan  
0715-0755 Breakfast hosted by General Stilwell  
0755-0800 Enroute to United Nations Command Center via sedan  
0800-0815 Forward Command Post briefing  
0815-0820 Enroute to Building 2556, accompanied by Captain (USN)  
Albert M. Hunt, J-2  
0820-0855 Briefing and tour of Combined Intelligence Center, Korea  
0855-0900 Enroute to Command Building, accompanied by CAPT Hunt  
0900-0915 Conference with Major General Smith  
0915-0945 Conference with General Stilwell

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<sup>3</sup>Three star slots in the Army were limited to a fixed number. General Hollingsworth was holding down one of that number, and I was to take that slot when he retired. This situation occurred often, and the Army got around it by issuing orders to generals in my position that "frocked" them, meaning that the officer was authorized to wear the insignia of his forthcoming rank, to be addressed by that rank, and to sign his name as if in that rank -- but he remained in his old rank, paid as such. Before departure I had my stars pinned on at a small ceremony in the College's Bell Hall.

0945-1000 Enroute to U. S. Embassy, accompanied by General Stilwell, via sedan

1000-1030 Conference with the Honorable Richard L. Sneider, U. S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea

1030-1045 Enroute to ROK Army Headquarters via sedan

1045-1110 Conference with General Lee Sae Ho, Chief of Staff, ROK Army

1110-1115 Enroute to Ministry of National Defense, via sedan

1115-1135 Conference with General Ro Jae Hyun, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

1135-1200 Conference with the Honorable Suh Jyong Chul, Minister of National Defense

1200-1205 Enroute to Hartell House via sedan

1205-1310 Luncheon with General Stilwell

1310-1315 Enroute to Command Building via sedan

1315-1330 Preparation for Honor Guard ceremony

1330-1350 Honor Guard ceremony, hosted by General Stilwell

1350-1355 Enroute to Command Building

1355-1455 Conference with General Stilwell

1455-1655 Briefings/Discussions with selected staff members, hosted by MG Smith (Mr. Hausman will attend)

1655-1700 Enroute to Hartell House annex via sedan

1700-1830 Reception hosted by General Stilwell (Greens)

1830-1855 Enroute to quarters

1855-1900 Enroute to Hartell House

41900- Dinner hosted by General Stilwell (Civilian informal)

Thursday, 12 February (Duty uniform - Fatigues)

-0930 Activities as desired

0930-0935 Enroute to Yongsan Army Garrison helipad (H201) via sedan

0935-0950 Enroute to Camp Red Cloud helipad (H209) via UH-1, accompanied by General Stilwell

0950-1000 Preparation for Change of Command ceremony

1000-1045 Change of Command ceremony

1045-1050 Enroute to Commanding General's Mess

1050-1200 Reception hosted by I Corps (ROK/US) Group

1200- Activities as scheduled by I Corps

<sup>4</sup>The evening of February 11, General Stilwell was hosting a farewell dinner for General Hollingsworth at the Officers Club in Yongsan, the Army community in Seoul, which would be attended by General Hollingsworth's many admirers, Korean and American. It was inappropriate for me to be there, so I was taken to dinner at the Hartwell House by Jim Smith, Chief of Staff. Also at dinner was Jim Hausman, Special Advisor to CINCUNC; having been in Korea since 1946, when he was a captain in the U.S. military advisory group and then an advisor to the South Korean President, Syngmann Rhee, Jim was perhaps the most knowledgeable American on Korea and its military in the country. When I told Jim Smith and Jim Hausman that evening that I wanted very much to learn about Korea and its culture, Jim Hausman volunteered the services of his assistant, Bruce Grant, a former Mormon missionary in Korea who was extraordinarily fluent and knowing, to take me on a tour the following Sunday. That began a lasting and rewarding relationship with Bruce.



After a day in Seoul I went by helicopter with General Stilwell to Camp Red Cloud for the change of command ceremony. Generals Stilwell and Hollingsworth and I were in line abreast before a grandstand filled with Koreans and Americans. To our front were troops and colors representing the ROK units of my new command and the 2d Infantry Division, along with the Eighth Army band. I felt all eyes on me, the successor to the legendary Hollingsworth, a folk hero to the Koreans and an idol to his staff.

General Stilwell spoke words of farewell to my predecessor and of welcome to me, General Hollingsworth said his piece, the I Corps colors were placed in Hollingsworth's hands, someone read my orders to assume command, and General Stilwell, as a symbol of the change of command, then transferred the colors to me. I then read the remarks that I had written on the back of the itinerary that I copied at pages 6-7:

"General Stilwell. Thank you, sir, for your expression of confidence. I pledge to you that I will use, without stint, every talent that I possess to be worthy of that confidence and to meet the responsibilities which I now undertake.

"General Hollingsworth. I accept from your hands the Shield of Seoul, with the great strength and luster that you have given it. Let no one question whether this Shield will defend the national territory in its sector, well forward. It will do so, in accordance with the agreed strategy and plans, totally committed to protecting the vital interests of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

"Officers and soldiers of the I Corps Group. With pride I take command of his magnificent fighting organization."

As I took my place beside him to await the troops passing in review, General Stilwell said to me, "Very good."

The ceremony over, we repaired for a reception to the I Corps Group Commanding General's Mess, a spacious and charming building near the helipad, with a bar and lounge decorated with memorabilia, and with an attractive dining room. A pleasant hour of a receiving line, handshaking, and talk ensued in the bar/lounge. I met my commanders... Lieutenant Generals Lee Hui Sung, Lee Jae Jon, and Lee (given name unknown) commanding I ROK Corps, VI ROK Corps, and V ROK Corps (left to right across my front); Major General Roy Thurman, commanding the 2d Infantry Division (whom I knew); and Brigadier General Lee (given name unknown), commanding the ROK Marine brigade

defending the Han River estuary in the west of my sector. (Note that all three corps commanders and the commander of the Marine brigade had the family name of Lee, which was second only to Kim as a common Korean family name.)

The reception broke up, and in due time I said goodbye to General Hollingsworth and his wife, who got into their sedan to go to the airport.<sup>5</sup>

Now appeared the two ROK Army generals assigned to my headquarters; I had met them at the reception. One was Major General Kang Yeung Shik, my deputy commander. He and I are shown below.



The other was my G-3 (operations officer) Brigadier General Ryu Joon Hyung. Notwithstanding their admiration for my predecessor, I sensed that they immediately transferred their loyalties to me, as did my Chief of Staff, Brigadier General David Grange; in 1968 he had been executive officer in my 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, north of Hue.

That evening, these three officers and I had dinner in the CG's Mess. Round tables for eight was the style, and excellent American food was served. The headquarters was


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<sup>5</sup>Upon returning to the United States, General Hollingsworth was assigned a pre-retirement task in Europe for the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Chairman of which, Senator John Stennis, was an admirer of Hollingsworth and his approach to the defense of Korea in his sector. His task, including visiting Europe and writing and briefing his report, took some time, during which time I continued to be "frocked" -- an irritating condition which, when I finally called it to General Stilwell's attention, he swiftly corrected.

about 60% ROK Army and 40% US. It was a happy headquarters. We had a good conversation that evening, and I went to bed pleased to be where I was.

The next day, Friday, we awoke to a dusting of snow, which General Kang, who showed early that he was well versed in Korean lore, announced at breakfast as an excellent omen for my tour in command. That day was no doubt dedicated to briefings for me. The following day, Saturday, I remember as rainy. I had asked Colonel Jim Coglean, the U.S. deputy G-3 to General Ryu, to take me around my area as far as he could by road. We spent the whole day in a jeep on the muddy roads, in touch with my headquarters by radio. The next day, Sunday, I was met at Camp Red Cloud by Bruce Grant (see footnote, page 7), who -- with both of us in civilian clothes -- showed me around Seoul.<sup>6</sup>

I plunged immediately into learning the situation and doing my job. My first priority was to establish and exercise a war-gaming capability. I decided that the first situation that we would wargame would be that of the 1st ROK Infantry Division sector, sketched with reasonable accuracy below.



<sup>6</sup>Bruce took me to a Seoul neighborhood and into one of its homes, in which lived a middle-aged Korean and his family. He demonstrated his talent at Chinese calligraphy, and I decided to study that myself.

The 1st ROK Infantry Division<sup>7</sup> defended the Kaesong approach, a primary North Korean avenue of attack and the shortest route to Seoul. Across the Imjin River and occupying defensive positions hewn into rock at the edge of the DMZ was one regiment of the division; the division's other two regiments were for the most part behind the Imjin. The Joint Security Area was inside the DMZ, astride the road; overlooking it in the DMZ were two platoon-sized guard posts of the 2d Infantry Division. The battalion furnishing those guard posts was stationed north of the Imjin; its prepared positions (dug into the earth with some overhead cover) were up against the DMZ, right in the middle of the fortified positions of the 1st ROK Division's forward regiment. The division's positions on Hill 140 (a company position) and Hill 229 (battalion-size) had been strengthened with fighting positions with concrete overhead cover, connecting tunnels, and ammunition storage areas, all underground.

The Forward Defense Concept, instituted by General Stilwell and put into effect in the Western Sector by General Hollingsworth, called for defending well forward. We would not, as in the Korean War, give up Seoul, but would defend it. That called for the ROK 1st Infantry Division to put up a stout defense.

Taking a leaf from the wargaming we had done at Leavenworth for the defense of Western Europe, I estimated that North Korea, being students of the Soviets, would attack in the 1st Division sector in overwhelming mass. I credited the North with the ability to prepare such an attack in secret, giving us only six hours between the time that, reacting to indications of an imminent attack, we ordered a high state of alert and the time of the North Korean attack. The ROK Army had not visualized so powerful and concentrated an attack on such short notice; I thought it was, if not the most likely scenario, the one we should prepare for.

Complicating the picture was the battalion of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division stationed north of the Imjin where the road crosses that river. Its battle positions when we went to a high state of alert were up against the DMZ, inserted between positions of the 1st ROK Infantry Division. We had never practiced withdrawing that battalion at a high state of alert; I thought that in a crunch we would not do so, and that we had better take a close look at how we would fight when it was not withdrawn.

I scheduled the wargame for late April 1976. Luckily for me as I began to organize it, the Assistant Division Commander of the 2d Infantry Division was Brigadier General Louis

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<sup>7</sup>All but one of my eleven ROK Divisions were infantry. The exception was the Capitol Mechanized Division, in a reserve position in V Corps. I and V Corps each also had an armored brigade.

Menetrey, a fine officer who had been my G-3 (operations officer), and who had then commanded the 2d Brigade, when I had commanded the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell in 1972-73. The two of us figured a way to use for our wargame a newly rehabilitated, but not yet occupied, recreation center in the 2d Division's Camp Howze on the road from Munsan to Seoul. I also created in the G-3 Section a wargaming and operations analysis staff, drafting into it Major Hilton Dunn of the engineer battalion of the 2d Infantry Division. Major Dunn, then a captain, had been a student of mine before going to Korea; with another student he had invented the "Dunn-Kempf" wargame for Leavenworth's instruction. He knew wargaming.

Our first requirement for a wargame was a "game board" -- a terrain model of the 1st ROK Division sector, at a scale of three inches to the mile, over which a flat transparent plastic cover could be built, on which company-sized "counters" could be moved by controllers at the direction of the commanders of the opposing sides. The Eighth Army training aids shop would build that game board and would make the counters for us.

The next requirement was to modify the game rules for Leavenworth's "First Battle," which had been built for Soviet and U.S. armored/mechanized forces on Germany's terrain, to accommodate the mostly foot infantry (but with some armor) forces of North Korea and the ROK/US defenders. We called the adaptation "Korea First Battle."

We then had to lay out our temporary wargame center at Camp Howze, write the orientation material for the controllers and the players of both sides, and organize and train the controllers. The defending players would be the division commander and his regimental and battalion commanders, the latter of which would be in touch by telephone with controllers on the game board. These played the roles of company commanders, manipulating the companies according to orders received and reporting results to the battalion commanders in the "language of combat." I designated the Corps Group G-2 (intelligence officer) as the commander of the attacking forces. His small staff would give orders to the controllers manipulating the attacking companies.

For this first exercise, which we called Caper Crown I, I organized a Steering Committee; it included myself; the I ROK Corps commander, General Lee Hui Sung; my deputy, General Kang; General Thurman, commanding the 2d Infantry Division; and (inasmuch as we intended to apply powerful tactical air and to simulate its application) Major General Pittman, Commander of Air Forces Korea.<sup>8</sup> At our first meeting, I told how we

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<sup>8</sup>Although only a two-star general, General Pittman had operational control in war of the ROK Air Force Combat Air Command, commanded by a ROKAF three-star general.



would not withdraw the battalion of the 2d Infantry Division that was on the DMZ, but would leave it in place to fight. At that point, General Lee Hui Sung jubilantly blurted, "In that case, the enemy will not attack!" -- thus confirming my impression of the harm being done to ROK confidence by U.S. declarations that the 2d Infantry Division troops were subject to withdrawal in event of a crisis.

My operations analysis staff then portrayed how the first few hours of the enemy attack would unfold, based on the strengths and operations plans of the opposing forces, and taking into account the defenders' fortifications. Against the company-size position on Hill 140, my staff had pitted a full North Korean regiment supported by heavy artillery; they found that in a matter of hours Hill 140 would fall. (Against an even stronger attack, the battalion on Hill 229 was still holding.) General Kang's immediate reaction was, "You can't do that! In your first two months in command, you have allowed the enemy to take Hill 140! This has never happened before!" I said that the 1st ROK Division had never been subjected to so powerful an attack, and that we had better face up to reality and figure out how to cope. I said that that was the purpose of the wargame.

By this time I had been working on my Korean with Bruce Grant, who had been for years a Mormon missionary in Korea and was exceptionally fluent. Korean has a unique alphabet from which syllables of words are constructed; but it would take me too long to learn to speak from a Korean text. Bruce devised a way for me to read aloud phonetically using the English alphabet; I began using his technique to make short speeches as if I were reading Korean. So I asked him to develop a short speech with which I would open the wargame in Korean. He did so, and my opening words were...

한국말로 하겠습니다.  
HANGUNG MALLO HAGESSUMNIDA. O

Korea language-by do will.

The top line is in Korean; the middle line is the phonetic pronunciation of the top line; and the bottom line is a literal translation of each Korean word in the top two lines. By reading the middle line with the right inflection I was saying, in speech Koreans could understand, "I am going to speak in Korean." In about eight minutes I thanked the 2d Division for its help, said that in two months I had been very impressed with the ROK Army, called attention to the enemy's massing of a powerful force and his seeking surprise, and gave

our recipe for a successful defense: strong defensive positions, coordinated with strong massed air and artillery firepower. I ended with "Chochon pakssal, hapshida!" -- "First round knockout, let's do it!" Bruce Grant's full text, read by me, is at Appendix B.

The inflection was vital, as were the accurate pronunciation and pacing of words. Although in due time I got rather good at this imitation of reading Korean, I had to struggle through this first try at it. Nonetheless, I heard from my bemused Korean audience that they could understand what I was trying to say.

This first effort taught us that wargaming was feasible. We learned however that we could not afford the two shifts of controllers needed to exercise around the clock. We could only go twelve hours at a time, using three days for 36 hours of combat.

It also taught us that wargaming was useful. For example, we had a vivid experience in fighting that one battalion of the 2d Infantry Division in the midst of the ROK 1st Division. If it were to stay there, as we thought it should, it had to do better at coordination and to strengthen its fortifications. And -- to ROK dismay, and notwithstanding a suspension of wargame rules at the end of the exercise, after which we counterattacked and restored our positions along the DMZ -- we suffered a deep penetration in the 1st ROK Division sector. While to ROK thinking this was distasteful, I held it to be a realistic experience that challenged all of us to do better. We had to face up to reality.


I decided to pursue a full fledged capability to conduct wargames. We would build a warfare simulation center at Camp Red Cloud; we would put together a wargaming staff; and, adapting Leavenworth's First Battle, we would develop an array of routines that would allow the valid representation of air/land combat in real time with a thinking enemy in the execution of our operations plans. It would be October 1976 before we would conduct our next wargame; it would be a full air/land test of I ROK Corps and its four divisions. Appendix C, which copies pages from a presentation that I made at the Mitre Corporation in December 1978 after I retired, summarizes fairly well what we did in the next year and a half.

Meanwhile, I was moving on a broad front to improve our capabilities. I established an "all-source intelligence center" in our underground wartime headquarters at Camp Red Cloud. I began a program to build covered positions for the TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) antitank missile companies that the ROK Army was now getting. I brought realism into our plans for the employment by the ROK corps of artillery-


delivered atomic weapons. I sought to improve the communications links up and down from our I Corps Group command center. With the commander of Air Forces Korea, I worked on improving air/land coordination so that we could make good on our claims that we would bring overwhelming air firepower down on any attacker. I encouraged liaison with offshore Navy, Marine, and Air Force tactical air. And I remember being incensed upon hearing that Jim Hausman had reported to General Stilwell that I was working my staff too hard (Jim assured me that he had done nothing of the kind).

At the same time I was learning Korean sufficiently to carry on a rudimentary exchange of pleasantries, and, using the technique developed by Bruce Grant, was making speeches, short and long, in the Korean language. At the frequent parties given by Koreans, guests were always called upon to sing -- so I became proficient in Korean songs.


And with Bruce Grant's help I took up calligraphy, the writing of Chinese and Korean characters. This was a process of "copying" again and again a vertical row of characters that spelled out a Chinese phrase or aphorism until it looked right, and then framing that work. Mine was not a free flow "writing" of characters, which is true calligraphy, but "copying." As I gave away framed gifts of my work I became rather famous. To the right is how Bruce laid out "Wise mother; good wife," from which I did one of my best (next page) giving it to the wife of a distinguished Korean, Mr. Paek Too Jin, who had befriended me.<sup>9</sup>




HYŎN, Wise; P. 13.



MO, Mother; P. 8.



(R)YANG, Good; P. 82



CH'Ŏ, Wife; P. 8

<sup>9</sup>In a letter of April 25, 1976, to my mother I told about my first social venture in using the Korean language and calligraphy. "One big event of the past week has been the dinner party in my honor by the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Korea, Minister Suh. All the ROK chiefs of service and the Chairman, ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, were there, plus my corps commanders, General Stilwell and the senior American commanders, and the American Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission and all of their wives. Minister Suh welcomed me with a few remarks, and I responded in Korean, reading a little speech that I had spent quite a bit of time practicing. At the end of it I gave the Minister a framed calligraphy that I had done." This calligraphy, the first I presented to anyone, was not really very good; it was "Yu Bi Mu Hwan," a proverb of a revered Korean patriot meaning "He who is prepared is not anxious." My remarks in Korean were understandable and well received, and my presentation of a "schoolboy-like" calligraphy was a new experience to them. In retrospect, I cannot imagine what the real reaction of the Koreans was to the whole affair, two and a half months into my job.



賢母良妻

許明哉女史呈上

具壽萬





By June 1976 Nancy and I had made arrangements for her to join me in Korea. Ted, who had been accepted at Harvard, would come for the summer and Anne would be enrolled in the ninth grade in the Yongsan dependent school. Our young Vietnamese ward would return to his parents in northern Virginia. Nancy and I would be assigned family quarters at the U.S. Army's Yongsan compound in Seoul. Living in my bachelor quarters at Camp Red Cloud some fifteen miles away, I would be able to visit Nancy overnight from time to time. I assured Nancy that, regardless of what she had read and heard, Korea was safe.

Meanwhile, I was working hard on improving the condition of my command<sup>10</sup> -- and on improving my understanding of Korea and its culture. I was impressed by the "Saemaul" ("new village") movement that had been instituted by President Park Chung Hee to improve, through self-improvement and government-supported local initiatives, the lot of people in the countryside, and I visited village projects. When the manager of a nearby shirt factory invited me to attend an assembly of its employees at which it was to receive an award from Sears Roebuck for excellence in manufacturing Sears products, I asked Bruce Grant to prepare a speech of congratulations, in Korean. I assured those present that the security of their shirt factory, and of the region, was guaranteed by my command.

Bruce Grant had taken me to the restored pavillion on the Imjin River in our sector that had been built centuries before by a Korean statesman and patriot named Yi Yul Gok.



Legend had it that years after his death the pavillion had been set afire to illuminate a night retreat across the Imjin by a Korean army escaping from the invading Japanese; Yi Yul Gok had thereby "served his country long after he had died."

Yi's famous saying was "Yu Bi Mu Hwan" -- "he who is prepared is not anxious." Taking that as a motto for the Western Sector, I presented my calligraphy of that expression to the Seoul Correspondents' Club following a speech there in July 1976, the final part of which I made in Korean. The press release, with the part in Korean, and my own script prepared by Bruce Grant for my reading in Korean, are at Appendix D. This was a typical public assurance of the determination of my command to defend the territory of the Republic.

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<sup>10</sup>With the help, beginning in July 1976, of my new and highly effective Chief of Staff, BG William J. Livsey, who replaced Dave Grange, who had been selected for major general.

Before I had left Leavenworth, my daughter Cecelia had told me about her sponsorship of a ten-year-old Korean child, Chong Sun Jae, through "Save the Children," a Westport, Connecticut, foundation that accepted money from Americans and channeled it to deserving Korean children. To my surprise I learned that the child's family lived in Uijongbu, just next to Camp Red Cloud. I had my driver, Mr. Tae, reconnoiter the location of their home; then I paid them a visit.

I was received in a charming way. The father was a laborer in a more wealthy farmer's nearby rice field. He and his wife and children, including Sun Jae, greeted me in the small courtyard of their modest home, then ushered me into its main room. There I was seated on the floor at the place of honor, which (because the room's heat came from a charcoal fire under the floor, its warmth carried through buried pipes to a chimney) was the warmest spot in the room. Tea was served. Looking around, I was stunned to see on the wall a photograph of my daughter, Celia, and her family, including her son Johnny (then six years old). They obviously loved Celia and referred to me, not as "General Cushman" but as "Johnny's grandfather." It was a most heartwarming visit.

It soon became time for me to welcome Nancy; I met her plane Monday, August 16th, and brought her, Ted, and Anne to their quarters at Yongsan where we had supper and where I spent the night. The next day I showed my family around Seoul, then returned that night to Camp Red Cloud, to return to Yongsan Wednesday and prepare for a trip to Pusan on Thursday. Wednesday was a very hot day with air conditioners not working well. With Nancy in a chair with her feet in a tub of cold water, the telephone rang. Someone from my headquarters told me that there had been "trouble in the DMZ" and that two wounded American officers were en route by medevac helicopter to the Yongsan helipad. My helicopter was on the way there too, to pick me up.


My driver was in the driveway. I told Nancy of the message, went back to my bedroom, strapped on my pistol and put on my helmet, said goodbye to my family, and left for the helipad, arriving there just as the medevac came in with its two casualties, mortally wounded. They were immediately loaded into the waiting ambulance, my own helicopter came in, and I flew to Camp Red Cloud, leaving Nancy to cope with the alert notices that called for dependents to prepare to evacuate to Japan! Some welcome!

At Camp Red Cloud, and in a quick visit by helicopter to the JSA, I learned that two or three days earlier a work party of South Korean laborers had been clearing branches

from a tree that had been interfering with the vision between two United Nations Command guard posts inside the JSA, on our side of the military demarcation line, when its Korean supervisor had been told by North Korean guards that this activity was prohibited. The UN Command's commander in the JSA had on the 18th sent out another work party to continue clearing the branches, placing a U.S. Army captain and lieutenant in charge. A contingent of North Korean soldiers had attacked this work party with ax handles and had beaten them, singling out the two American officers for especially brutal beatings.

General Stilwell, UN Commander, was in Japan for the day; he had been notified and was arranging to return. I was the senior U.S. Army officer in country; I flew to Seoul to talk with Major General John Singlaub, Chief of Staff. With him was Colonel Zayne Finkelstein, the Staff Judge Advocate and resident expert on the Military Armistice Agreement and the history of the Joint Security Area. I suggested that we assert our rights to be in the JSA by using force to cut down the tree.

Three days later, after intensive planning and coordination, that is what General Stilwell did. The Joint Chiefs of Staff staged a powerful force of B-52 bombers out of Guam, sent an aircraft carrier into nearby waters, and reinforced Korea with tactical air. General Stilwell brought his forces to a high order of readiness, directed I Corps Group to aim its artillery at North Korean targets adjacent to the JSA, and, with backup forces standing by, ordered an engineer platoon of the 2d Infantry Division to move swiftly into the JSA and chop down the tree. For the direction of this operation (see chart below), the Secretary of



Defense and the JCS Chairman shared the JCS command center and the two of them bypassed the Commander in Chief, Pacific, in Hawaii.<sup>11</sup> General Stilwell, operating from his Yongsan command center,<sup>12</sup> placed every other link in his everyday chain of command "off line," standing by for action if necessary. This made possible immediate control and feedback. (By this time, Major General Brady, my Leavenworth colleague, had become CG, 2d Infantry Division.) When the engineer platoon's chainsaw broke as it cut into the tree, the Pentagon swiftly knew it, and again when the chainsaw broke a second time. When, using its third chainsaw, the platoon cut down the tree, Washington knew that swiftly too. While they were at it, the platoon removed some road blocks that had been illegally installed in the JSA by the North.

The action took the North Koreans completely by surprise. At noon that day, even as the UN command force was preparing to leave the JSA, the North Korean representative on the Military Armistice Commission delivered a message from Kim Il Sung, the North's dictator, for General Stilwell calling the killings of the US officers "regretful" (See Appendix E), and then delivered a second message complaining about the operation itself. When the operation was completed, President Gerald Ford sent a message to General Stilwell congratulating him on his response, as did President Park Chung Hee. In a period of some twenty-four hours, General Stilwell had heard from three heads of state.

In due time, things settled down on the DMZ and activities returned to a normal routine.<sup>13</sup> But that August, Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter was nominated as Democratic candidate for President. Earlier in the year he had said publicly that, if elected, he would withdraw all U.S. ground forces from Korea in a period of five years -- after "consultations" with the Republic of Korea and Japan, but making no mention of requiring corresponding actions by North Korea. The August events in the DMZ notwithstanding, President Carter campaigned on that promise, and after the election on December 26th, upon naming Harold Brown to be his Secretary of Defense, he publicly reaffirmed that intention.

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<sup>11</sup>President Ford, accompanied by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General George Brown, JCS Chairman, was at the Republican National Convention in Kansas City throughout the period of response. Admiral James Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations, acting for the Chairman, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements were on the other end of the telephone line in Washington.


<sup>12</sup>The US Ambassador to Korea, Richard Sneider, was with General Stilwell in the command center. The story goes that at one point, when Ambassador Sneider reached for the telephone to make a point, General Stilwell admonished him that this was his, Stilwell's, line to the Defense Department, not to be used by the Ambassador.

<sup>13</sup>A few weeks after the crisis, President Park Chung Hee hosted a lovely party in his residence (called the "Blue House") for General Stilwell, myself, General Brady, and some others and our wives at which he paid special compliments to the conduct of operations on August 21st.



Before continuing on that line, let me tell of a couple of events at Christmastime, 1976.

On December 22d we had a visit at Camp Red Cloud from President Park Chung Hee; it was one stop in his annual pre-Christmas tour of troop units along the DMZ. I took him on a tour of our wargaming facility, where we had in October exercised I ROK Corps in the defense of the Kaesong-Munsan approach. Listening attentively as I explained our methods, he asked, "What did you learn?" I replied that we learned that we had to cope with strong tank-infantry attacks on a narrow front. I presented President Park with a calligraphy built around a section of the tree that the 2d Infantry Division engineers had cut down in August. This clipping from the front page of the December 23 Korea Times, a Seoul English-language newspaper, describes that event and gives an account of a pep talk by me typical of the times.



**SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENT** Park Chung Hee looks over a calligraphy written and presented to him by Lt. Gen. John H. Cushman, I Corps (ROK-U.S.) Group, during a visit to Camp Red Cloud. The

calligraphy contains the I Corps motto, "Unity and Victory Over Communism." Park was briefed by Cushman and Gen. John W. Vessey, United Nations Command, U.S. Forces and 8th Army commander. (ROK)

## Cushman: GIs Morale High For Combat

President Park Chung-hee inspected a Korean Army unit and the I Corps (ROK-U.S.) Group on the front line and encouraged the servicemen there yesterday.

Accompanied by Defense Minister Suh Jyong-chul and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Lee Sie-ho, the Chief Executive was welcomed by Gen. John W. Vessey, commander-in-chief of the 8th U.S. Army, and Lt. Gen. John Cushman, commander of the I Corps.

Lt. Gen. Cushman assured the President that Korean and American soldiers in the I Corps were highly capable of repelling any type of aggression by the enemy at the current front line with their high combat morale and excellent war equipment.

President Park had lunch with Gen. Vessey, Lt. Gen. Cushman and other staff members of the I Corps at a mess hall in the unit, where Commander Cushman hoped the strong unity between Korea and the U.S. would last forever.

President Park delivered diaries and an electronic gramophone as his Christmas gifts for Lt. Gen. Cushman and his soldiers. In return for the President's gifts, Lt. Gen. Cushman offered the President a medal of the I Corps and a shield made of the very popular tree cut down at Panmunjom after the Aug. 18 incident. In the shield were inscribed the letters for "unity" and "victory over communism" in Chinese calligraphy by Lt. Gen. Cushman.

By Christmas 1976 I was doing all right not only at calligraphy, but also at singing Korean songs, and at making talks in the Korean language.

Our compound at Camp Red Cloud had for years supported Kyung Min, a middle-thru-high school in nearby Uijongbu. In early December, Mr. Hong, its principal, came to my office and asked if I would attend his Christmas program. I said, sure. A couple of weeks later he returned with the program in hand. There were 16 items -- the brass band of the commercial high school would play; the girls' high school would do a dance; and so on. Item 13 caught my eye: "Vocal solo...John H. Cushman, CG, I Corps (ROK/US) Group."

I said, "Mr. Hong, I didn't agree to sing!" His reply, "But sir, we have printed the program." I agreed to sing, but only in a trio -- myself, a Korean soldier/guitarist who had entertained at our officers club, and a girl student selected by Mr. Hong. The song would be "Danny Boy," in Korean. We had a couple of rehearsals.

On the appointed day, what should I see outside the small theater where the program was to be held but an equipment van from Korea's largest TV network! The show started. The camera crew filmed a couple of numbers, then sat idle. With item 11, it stirred. When our act was introduced, it was ready to roll the video cameras.

A few days later, the program aired. We had no TV at our quarters in Yongsan, so Nancy and our daughter Anne came up to Camp Red Cloud. We watched and waited. Shortly there appeared the defender of the Western Sector, in utility uniform, three stars showing, singing "Danny Boy." There was no trio; the cameraman had done a close-up.

The next day I happened to be in Seoul visiting General John (Jack) Vessey, who had in September 1976 replaced General Stilwell as CINCUNC.<sup>14</sup> He opened the conversation drily: "I understand you were on TV last night."

\* \* \* \* \*

Six days after taking office in January, President Carter approved a Presidential Review Memorandum that asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine possible courses of action for withdrawing U.S. ground forces from Korea within five years (he did not ask "whether,"

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<sup>14</sup>I had known Jack Vessey for some time, although not well, and had a high regard for him. Coming from the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans on the Army Staff, he was an excellent choice. On his first visit to my headquarters, he had spoken of the need for "stability," which I took as a signal that I had been stirring things up a little too much. But I took that occasion to describe to him the scenario for our upcoming Caper Crown II, which would see a very powerful attack right into the heart of I ROK corps, and the logic behind that. We had been getting some flak from his operations staff on that notion, but he said to go ahead.

but "how" they should be removed). At a March 9th press conference he again made public his intention to do so. On March 11th, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Habib told the South Korean opposition leader Yi Chol Sung that "consultations" meant only that the U.S. will explain this position to Korea and Japan, but will not modify its decision after consultation.

These developments not only alarmed the Korean leadership and its body politic, but gravely concerned the ROK/US chain of command in Korea, who deeply believed that they evidenced a lack of resolution that might tempt Kim Il Sung to attack south. General Vessey in February 1977 provided his input to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as they prepared their reply to the President's tasking. In March the Chiefs told the Secretary of Defense that over the next five years there should be no significant reduction in the ground forces in Korea over and above those already programmed, which amounted to some 7,000 spaces. These views had no evident effect on the President or his civilian advisors.

In October 1976 we had run Caper Crown II, a wargame of the defense by I ROK Corps of the Kaesong-Munsan approach. We followed that in February 1977 with Caper Crown III, which had V Corps defending in the Chorwon approach. In both these exercises North Korean forces, attacking in mass on a narrow front, had broken through our forward defenses to the extent that we would have had to use the 2d Infantry Division, held in reserve, to stop them short of Seoul. This was a fundamentally new finding; heretofore the 2d Infantry Division had been looked on as a "deterrent" force, not essential to reinforce the ROK Army in "warfighting."

In March I visited General Vessey in Seoul and, using maps, showed him the penetrations of I and V Corps<sup>15</sup> and gave him our findings. His headquarters had already prepared a fact sheet (Appendix F) for the press and visitors that spelled out North Korea's threat. I suggested that he call on the Army to send experts to Korea to check out the validity of our warfare simulations and, if those were deemed valid, that he send me to the Pentagon to brief the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the findings of our wargames. We were soon visited by Dr. Wilbur Payne and Colonel Homer Davis, TRADOC experts; they found our simulation routines "fully adequate." So I prepared a briefing for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to be first presented to General Vessey, and then to the ROK/US senior chain of command. By mid-April we were ready.

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<sup>15</sup>Our battle simulation routines called for 30 minute "game turns," meaning that each 30 minutes the controllers on the game board manually updated the situation, basing their battle reports on the new situation. Using the records of each update, we were able to recreate on maps the opposing sides at each half hour.



The months since Governor Carter's election in November 1976 was a time of growing anxiety in Korea generally and in the ROK/US chain of command in particular. We were uncertain as to the rationale for the new President's conviction that US ground forces would be withdrawn in five years time, whether or not North Korea made concessions of any kind. We were sure that it sent to Kim Il Sung and his henchmen a signal of reduced American resolve that contributed to an increased danger of war. Without an announced rationale, a common impression was that, for whatever reason, the new President, notwithstanding his assurances otherwise, was indeed less willing than his predecessors to go to war for the territorial integrity of South Korea.<sup>16</sup>

In early April 1977, the new Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Richard Holbrooke, visited Korea. Thirteen years earlier, in 1963-64 when I was the senior advisor to the Army of Vietnam's 21st Infantry Division deep in Vietnam's Delta region, Dick Holbrooke, then a young foreign service officer on his first assignment, had been a valuable member of my advisory team as we crafted new approaches to pacification of the countryside. I wrote Dick a note of congratulations on his new job, and he replied:<sup>17</sup>

Dear Jack:

Thank you for your kind letter. It looks like we've both come a certain distance since Bac Lieu, but we're both still enmeshed in Asia. I want very much to talk to you at length and informally if you are back in Washington. I have not yet planned a trip to Korea but if I come out perhaps we'll be able to spend some time alone together.

The important thing is to carry out the President's overall policy objectives in a way that is not disruptive in a situation of considerable turmoil and domestic pressure.

I hope to see you soon.

Warm regards,



Richard Holbrooke

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<sup>16</sup>In testimony on July 13, 1977, before the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, General Bernard W. Rogers, Army Chief of Staff, stated that while he was in Korea at the end of April, he had been asked by Major General John Singlaub, the Korea command's Chief of Staff, "what rationale has been given (for the Carter decision to withdraw ground forces)?" General Rogers said that his answer was "None."

<sup>17</sup>In Vietnam I had often given the young Holbrooke advice to have his bushy hair cut, for a proper impression on the Vietnamese. When I saw him at an Embassy party, his hair was in the '60s style, bushier than ever. His first remark to me was, "Jack, you can see that I still need a haircut." Our discussion, at that occasion only, was unsatisfactory. He had come to sell the President's decision to the Koreans, who were not buying.

Meanwhile I was coming to think that, in view of the authoritarian nature of Park Chung Hee's regime and in view of President Carter's emphasis from the outset of his administration on "human rights," he may well have been thinking that for the United States to come to Korea's aid in event of a North Korean attack was not necessarily a worthy cause. So I had been working on an article titled "Is the Defense of Korea a Worthy Cause?" A perhaps idealistic treatment, I wrote it, "first, to explain to my Korean friends why it is that the continued presence of the American infantryman (in Korea) depends on Americans believing that there is, or will be, democracy in Korea... and, second, to try to convey to Americans that, despite the obstacles of culture, history, and the threat from the North, there is in Korea a better prospect for democracy than America seems to think..."

Saying that, on a scale of zero (like Albania) to 10 (like Massachusetts or Sweden), the Republic of Korea deserved a "democracy" rating of "five" or so, I concluded that "To those who know Korea, its history, its people, and its potential to be a member of the democratic family, it would be disappointing in the extreme if America, the light of freedom, were to dismantle the shield it has held for almost thirty years, in the misguided notion that Korea is not enough of a democracy to be a worthy cause." The full article is at Appendix G.

I submitted my draft to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. It was returned April 13 with this comment:

"The article has been reviewed at very high Embassy level, but not yet by the Ambassador. The reviewers cannot recommend Embassy clearance to the Ambassador for the following policy reasons:

1. In several places there is the clear assumption that President Carter's decision to withdraw U.S. ground forces can be reversed. Any statement, any assumption to that effect, is contrary to policy.
2. There is linkage in the article between the withdrawal and the human rights situation in Korea. This is contrary to policy. Both the Presidential press secretary and the State Department spokesman have made plain that the human rights question should not be linked to the troop withdrawal.

"The above is a rethinking and re-review of the article following the visit to Korea on Monday/Tuesday by Richard Holbrooke, assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs. It is obvious that when the next Presidential election time comes around, Mr. Carter is going to take out the list of campaign promises he made in 1976 and tell the American public, 'I've kept them all.'"

That day, April 13th, was the day on which I briefed General Vessey and the senior ROK commanders, before taking my briefing to Washington and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup>I still have in my possession the slides for that briefing, from which I have written this account.

On April 11, before going to Seoul, I sent General Vessey this back-channel message.<sup>19</sup>

As to warning, I viewed the problem as one of decision to go to a high state of alert and move the forces from garrison to battle locations, rather than of warning, which history had all too often shown as not acted upon. I believed that six hours from the time of decision was all we could expect, given the North's ability to conceal its signs, and that we would have to fight for that much.

In a March 1977 speech,<sup>20</sup> I had spelled out my views on how to maintain communications under heavy attack.

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, if employed by my command, would consist of medium artillery and short range missile warheads, delivered to U.S. and ROK artillery units from rearward depots; we periodically rehearsed procedures for doing this. Beyond that, the gathering of intelligence and the selection of targets for those weapons, the control of their fires, and the coordination of nuclear strikes with the movement of maneuver units called for the highest order of ROK and U.S. proficiency; we simply were not conducting sufficient training in those matters. In any event, a decision to use nuclear weapons would have to come from the President and for that the situation would have to be desperate; our conventional defense would have essentially failed. I decided that my priority must be to put my command in condition to defend its sector without calling for the use of nuclear weapons and I devoted my attention to that aim.

<sup>19</sup>A "back channel" message, common between general officers, goes over the network of the Special Security System as "Eyes Only" for the recipient, to be delivered to him in person by a Special Security Officer. This is the draft that I handed to the Special Security Officer at my headquarters.

<sup>20</sup>"What I Think About Communications-Electronics," Remarks at the Senior Communicators Conference, US Forces Korea. (Appendix H)


FOR GENERAL VESSEY'S EYES ONLY

11 April 1977

TC: CINCUNC

SUBJ: What I really believe.

- The briefing I will give is the best picture now available as to the outcome of battle/balance of forces in the Western Sector. Future wargaming will improve the picture.
- An extraordinary ROK/US effort - well organized, well monitored, quiet - is required to bring about the necessary conditions of strength for the 2d Division to be pulled out. Cannot waste any time getting started; the clock is running.
- The last 2d Division force should not leave, nor should I Corps Group be disestablished, until the Military Armistice is replaced by another instrument and minimum political concessions for peace and stability are obtained from North Korea.
- Assumption as to sufficient (6 to 18 hours) warning is highly questionable.
- The ability of tacair to do the required damage to the enemy is, as of now, a matter of faith and not of rigorous analysis.
- We must prepare for a major, possibly catastrophic, loss of communications when the enemy attacks.
- Ammunition and maintenance logistics readiness needs major work.
- I Corps Group's operational capability for tactical nuclear warfare won't stand an audit.



FOR GENERAL VESSEY'S EYES ONLY

With the assembled commanders in Korea, and with the JCS on April 20th, I reviewed our wargaming effort, specifically describing the enemy penetrations in Caper Crowns II and III. I concluded with this assessment of the defense of the Western Sector:

- o Outcomes will vary -- depending on quantitative factors, and imponderables.
- o The probable outcome today: Without the US 2d Division, we can probably not keep the enemy out of Seoul.
- o With the 2d Division, to stop him short of Seoul will be most difficult; no margin for mistakes.
- o The 2d Division's probable involvement is the decisive deterrent today.
- o Removal of the 2d Division requires major improvements in Western Sector defense (I listed eleven "essential actions," top of next page). (Read footnote<sup>21</sup> carefully)

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<sup>21</sup>These five points, especially the second "bullet," made a profound impression, both to my Korean audience and to the JCS. I had prepared a "side briefing" to account for this fundamental change in the perception of the need for the 2d Infantry Division. It said that the prevailing official view in early 1975 was indefinite as to the need for the 2d Division; that, generally, the ROK Army could do the job by itself; that the 2d Division's presence in Korea was essential for deterrence and for stability in Northeast Asia and that the division was valuable also as a Pacific reserve; and that the DMZ mission of the 2d Division was not essential.

With respect to this last point, I recounted how the presence of the 2d Division, with its US commander and ready forces near the DMZ, had been absolutely essential in permitting a controlled and measured response by the United Nations Commander, General Stilwell, to North Korea's "ax handle" murders in the DMZ on August 18, 1976. As the lineal descendant of General Mark Clark, the UN Commander who signed the 1953 Military Armistice Agreement (the ROK government refused to sign it, on the basis that it split the Korean people), and as the representative of the US President, who was designated executive agent for the United Nations for the defense of the Republic of Korea after the North invaded in June 1950, General Stilwell had an urgent need for a responsive American force nearby to cope with so serious a violation of the armistice; the ROKs were simply too trigger-happy, hence unreliable in their discipline, in those days. It was a matter of amazement to me that presidential candidate Jimmy Carter took no note whatever of this August 1976 lesson and its implications for stability of the DMZ until the Military Armistice was superseded by a peace treaty.

As to the warfighting capabilities of the 2d Division, I said that developments in late 1975 and 1976 had created fundamental change. The first development was a study on "warning" by the Defense Intelligence Agency; it concluded that, because of increased North Korean measures for security, there would be less warning than heretofore assumed of an imminent North Korean attack.

Next, there was a study by the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence that found that the number of tanks possessed by North Korea had climbed from 840 in 1973 to 1920 in 1976. Corresponding increases had taken place in other categories; for example: AN-2 aircraft, used for infiltration of special operations troops, rose from 75 in 1971 to 243 in 1976; heavy ponton bridging rose from 200 in 1972 to 1224 in 1976. (The explanation offered for this dramatic buildup of offensive capabilities was that, with President Nixon's 1969 announcement of the "Nixon Doctrine," whereby US friends in Asia would be to a larger degree responsible for their own security [a rationale for his "Vietnamization" of, and troop withdrawals from, the war in Vietnam, and also for pulling out the US 7th Infantry Division from Korea in 1971], the North Korean dictator, Kim Il Sung, believing in the increasing unlikelihood that the United States would come to South Korea's aid, had ordered a massive buildup of his armed forces, toward an eventual reunification of the Korean Peninsula by force. The explanation offered for not discovering the buildup sooner was that with the end of the Vietnam War intelligence assets devoted thereto had become available to focus on North Korea.)

The third development was the transfer to the Korea scene of assumptions made since 1973 by TRADOC and the US Army in Europe that the Soviets, in an attack across the NATO frontier in Germany, would massively concentrate their forces for a breakthrough on a narrow front, seeking local superiority of six and eight to one over the defenders. South Korean defenders had not heretofore visualized so concentrated an attack.

The fourth development was the initiation of wargaming in I Corps (ROK/US) Group, which, in addition to its value in educating and training commanders and staffs, allowed a net assessment to be made of a likely (but not foreordained) outcome, and insights about measures to improve the defenders' performance.

The "essential actions," which we had derived from our analysis of the situation including our wargames, were: increase antiarmor; increase artillery; strengthen fortifications; accelerate barrier emplacement; develop army aviation; improve road net; improve logistics; harden communications and command posts; upgrade intelligence; develop air/land battle proficiency; and develop operational expertise.<sup>22</sup>

To the JCS I described the Republic of Korea reaction to my presentation. I said that it was sobering information; that there was a touch of panic and that defeatism was possible in many quarters; that a determined, workmanlike attitude predominated among the seniors; and that there was uncertainty about the United States and anxiety about the future.

I concluded with this assessment: The US-ROK relationship has been a durable friendship with many tests; extraordinarily sensitive years lie ahead to bring about the new conditions where ground forces are out and air cover only remains; that some benefits were to be gained if we do it right;<sup>23</sup> that there is potential for damage and even an unwanted and unnecessary war if we do it wrong; and that there is no room for avoidable doubts or questions as to motives by either party.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff listened soberly to my presentation. I have since learned that two days later the Policy Review Committee of the National Security Council was to meet on the response by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others to the Presidential Review Memorandum on Korea that the President had approved on January 6th. General George Brown, JCS Chairman, asked his colleagues whether my briefing should go before Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to the President. (The Army Chief of Staff, General Bernard Rogers was not present; he was represented by General Walter Kerwin, Vice Chief of Staff). Their consensus, I gathered, was that it was too late; the President and those around him had their minds made up.

The next day it was arranged for me to take my briefing to Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, to retired Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and to a group in the Political-Military Affairs Section of the State Department. The latter

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<sup>22</sup>Although only some of these came under my jurisdiction as CG, I Corps (ROK/US) Group, I had undertaken a program of tracking progress in each one, assigning responsibility for its monitoring to a member of my staff.

<sup>23</sup>The benefits, as I saw them, would be, one, that the ROK armed forces could in due time come into their own with a capability to defend the national territory with their own ground forces, without the United States as the "older brother" guiding their every act; and, two, that North Korea might finally come to understand that reuniting the peninsula by force was out of the question and, with that, could agree to a peace treaty that would end the Military Armistice.

received me cordially and asked a few questions, but did not indicate that it made much difference in their assessment of what to do in Korea. Admiral Turner, on the other hand, listened carefully. In a later briefing at the action level in the Defense Intelligence Agency, I learned that CIA analysts, working from a static examination of the opposing forces (as distinguished from our wargaming, which was a dynamic assessment), had arrived at conclusions remarkably similar to mine. I do not know how Admiral Turner weighed in on the matter within the National Security Council.

On my own initiative, I decided that I would attempt to brief Cyrus Vance, President Carter's Secretary of State. I had been one of a small group working for him on organizational matters of the Department of Defense in 1961-62 when he was General Counsel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and had gone with him as a military assistant when he became Secretary of the Army in September 1962; I had left for Vietnam in April 1963. I called Mr. Vance at his office and left my number with his secretary. When he called back I told him why I was in town and that I would like to brief him. He arranged for me to come to his office. With my slides and with a slide projector aimed at the wall alongside his desk in his beautifully appointed office with its furniture from Thomas Jefferson's time, I went through the gist of my briefing. I could tell that it made an impression.

I later heard that, in the National Security Council meeting on April 27th, Mr. Vance mentioned my findings -- to the dismay of the President and others present (but perhaps not to General Brown's dismay). But it made no difference. On May 5th, the President signed off on a Presidential Decision Memorandum that told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that their recommendations had not been accepted; the withdrawal would go ahead beginning very soon -- in increments to be developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Presidential candidate Carter's idea for withdrawing all ground forces from Korea was naively, perhaps idealistically, conceived in early 1976 with marginal understanding of the true situation in Korea and with a flawed grasp of the political/military realities of that situation. A year later neither events nor additional information available to him had changed his opinion. The notion of ground force withdrawal, so dangerous to peace and stability in Northeast Asia, had become to him a fixation, to be carried through in spite of what the Koreans (and other Asian countries), the Korea military command, the informed judgments of Asia experts, and the President's military advisors themselves thought of it.

Late in April I returned to Korea and debriefed General Vessey on my trip, to include my session with the Secretary of State. General Vessey and his staff were busy contributing

inputs to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the nature of the first increments of withdrawal of ground forces, and I went back to work at Camp Red Cloud.<sup>24</sup>

In the eight months since Nancy's arrival, we had done a fair amount of sightseeing. On Friday, May 20th, we began a four day trip by car into the region south of Seoul, spending the first night at Kunsan airbase where Air Forces Korea fighter squadrons were located. Early the morning of the 21st I was called there by someone from General Vessey's headquarters who informed me that there was a major flap in Seoul stemming from a story in the Washington Post of May 19th that quoted Major General John Singlaub, the Korea command Chief of Staff, on the subject of the troop withdrawal plan. I was being called simply to inform me of that flap. I asked the caller if he thought that I was needed back in Seoul or at my headquarters. The reply being negative, I decided to continue on our trip.

The Washington Post story began with: "One of the top ranking U.S. generals in South Korea says that President Carter's plan to withdraw U.S. troops here in the next four to five years is a mistake that will end with war with North Korea," and continued by quoting General Singlaub as saying, "If we withdraw our ground forces on the schedule suggested it will lead to war." The last paragraph in the story quoted General Singlaub further that "An intensive intelligence effort over the last 12 months has discovered North Korea to be much, much stronger than we thought. My deep concern is that people making the decisions are basing them on information that's two or three years old." The Washington Post story is at Appendix I.

The reporter, John Saar, had interviewed General Singlaub in his office. General Singlaub, not denying the accuracy of the story, claimed however that he had been "ambushed;" he had understood that the interview was "on background."

But the fat was in the fire. There ensued an uproar in the White House and the Pentagon. President Carter immediately ordered General Singlaub to Washington, where, after meeting with General Rogers, Army Chief of Staff, and Secretary of Defense Brown, he saw the President on Saturday, May 21st. An hour later, Secretary Brown announced that General Singlaub would be relieved from his duties as Chief of Staff of the Korea command.<sup>25</sup> On Wednesday, May 25th, General Singlaub testified before the House of Representatives

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<sup>24</sup>Where, six months before, Major General Chang Bong Chun, formerly ROK defense attache in Washington, had replaced Major General Kang Yeung Shik, as my deputy commander. My time as I Corps Group commander had truly been blessed with these two loyal and articulate deputies, both good friends.

<sup>25</sup>Two or three days later, the Army announced that General Singlaub would become Chief of Staff of the Army's Forces Command at Fort McPherson, GA.

Armed Services Committee.<sup>26</sup> Returning to Korea to wind up his affairs, General Singlaub found himself a hero with the people of South Korea, second only, if that, to Douglas MacArthur -- a status that continues to this day.

There ensued a flurry of messages from the Pentagon that addressed the rights and responsibilities of military officers who disagreed with policy. One, a back channel of June 15th from the Army Chief of Staff to the Army's general officers, was titled "Speaking Up/Speaking Out." At Appendix J, it said that "once a decision has been made we have the responsibility to give our wholehearted support to that decision... Before the decision the requirement for frank and open discussion is dominant; after the decision the requirement for unity of command and singleness of purpose becomes paramount."

General Vessey, CINCUNC, while personally believing that President Carter's decision as framed by him was a mistake, nonetheless in a soldierly manner went about planning for its implementation.<sup>27</sup> A June 1997 Eighth Army "Troop Topic" (reproduced at Appendix K), prepared by the Command Information Branch of his Public Affairs Division, tried to explain that decision to his troops, saying that "until that future day comes when ground defense responsibility is placed solely in Korean hands, you have a vital, essential mission - to be trained and ready to defend this nation...." Planning for the first increment of ground forces reduction went forward. It would involve inactivation of an infantry battalion of the 2d Division while strengthening the division's armor and antiarmor. Believing that the ROK Army could and should reinforce the signal links from my headquarters to the ROK corps and divisions in my command, which were our primary means of command and control, I offered a reduction in the U.S. signal support to I Corps (ROK/US) Group.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Curiously, General Singlaub told the House Armed Services Committee that in his talk with the President, with the Secretary of Defense present, the President had accused him of an assertion (deleted in his testimony) that according to the Secretary of Defense was particularly unpardonable. But General Singlaub afterward pointed out to the Secretary that he had made no such point and that in fact that (deleted) point had been made by me in my briefing. I do not know what that point was, but surmise that it might have been my conclusion that "without the 2d Division we could not keep the enemy out of Seoul." In any event, it is clear that my briefing (which I have been told was referred to by Mr. Vance in the NSC meeting on April 27th) was the source of it. The President had evidently in his own mind combined me and General Singlaub into a single bearer of bad news from Korea -- although we had been separate, one acting privately and the other publicly.

<sup>27</sup>In 1979, General Vessey was being considered as a replacement for General Rogers, Army Chief of Staff, whom President Carter had nominated to be Supreme Commander in NATO Europe. When interviewed by President Carter for that assignment, General Vessey told the President that he could not agree with his policy on Korea and would have to say so. The President then chose Lieutenant General Edward C. Meyer, an officer much junior to him, to be Chief of Staff. General Meyer then chose General Vessey to be his Vice Chief of Staff, and in 1982 recommended to President Reagan that Vessey be nominated as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, which President Reagan did.

<sup>28</sup>In 1978, my successor in command did not agree with this reduction.



It was budget time in Washington, and General Vessey's Staff Judge Advocate, Colonel Zayne Finkelstein, was monitoring the appearance of Pentagon officials before committees of the Congress. Toward the end of June he reported that General Rogers, Army Chief of Staff, had replied ambiguously to questions as to whether the senior Army officers in Korea were of like mind to General Singlaub. And, since President Carter's first instructions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I had been deeply concerned that no member of the JCS had gone public with the view that his idea fundamentally lacked merit.<sup>29</sup>

So the afternoon of June 28th I sent a back channel to General Vessey (reproduced at Appendix L) that contained a message that, unless he were to indicate otherwise, I proposed to send that night to General Brown, JCS Chairman, and General Rogers. My proposed message read:

*From: LTG Cushman, CG I Corps (ROK/US) Group, Uijongbu, Korea*

*To: Gen Brown, Chairman JCS Washington*

*Gen Rogers, Chief of Staff US Army Washington*

*Info: Gen Vessey, CINUNC Seoul Korea*

*Subject: My Views on U.S. Korea Policy*

*1. I note from press reports that Washington officials are, or may be, asked questions along these lines: "What do senior U.S. officers in Korea think of the U.S. Korea policy?" or "Do the generals in Korea agree with General Singlaub?" This is to provide a brief expression of my views, for such use as you may wish to make of them.*

*2. My view is that the policy to withdraw most of U.S. ground forces and all of the 2d Infantry Division in five years is unwise. It is by no means certain that compensatory measures can in that time increase the warfighting capability of the ROK Army so that it, with U.S. tactical air and logistical support, can successfully defend the Republic of*

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<sup>29</sup>From 1954-58, when I was a major at Fort Leavenworth, into my service in the offices of the Army Chief of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army, and throughout my career, I had been one of those who often wondered why senior officers, including the Army Chief of Staff, did not go public with their disagreements with flawed policies, to include submitting their resignations from positions of authority when they felt deeply about an issue. My hero in this regard was General Matthew B. Ridgway who, as Army Chief of Staff in 1953-55, took exception to President Eisenhower's "New Look" with its emphasis on massive nuclear retaliation and its shrinking of U.S. ground forces, and who expressed himself in public and private; after two years, he was not reappointed Army Chief of Staff. An opposite, and more common, viewpoint was that given by General Rogers on July 13, 1977, in testimony on Korea before the House Armed Services Committee. General Rogers said, "You can't have any influence when you resign from a position such as this, Mr. Chairman. You can only have influence when you are working within the system and trying to influence it there." Perhaps one, albeit naive, motivation in my sending the backchannel that starts on this page to Generals Brown and Rogers was to influence them to strengthen their pronouncements.

*Korea. In any event, no compensatory measures can provide the deterrent ability of the 2d Division, nor its trucekeeping ability, both of which are unique to a U.S. combat formation. I believe that the last several battalions of the division should not be removed until such adequate arrangements are made to replace the 1953 Armistice as would signify considerably less tension between North and South than now exists.*

*3. I cannot believe that the President's policy on Korea is as inflexible, nor his decisions as final, as they are being interpreted to be. The President is being interpreted here as having decided to remove U.S. ground forces in five years regardless of conditions. This perceived determination to carry out the removal whatever the circumstances is, I believe, the greatest source of anxiety as to the security of the peninsula, and the main cause of the widespread misgivings here as to the motives of the United States.*

*4. I believe that the origins of the decision to remove the 2d Division lie in a data base one or two years old. I expect that as the realities of the situation are better understood the decision will change. For that reason I can conscientiously and wholeheartedly direct my headquarters and its subordinate units toward bringing about the conditions which will permit the final removal of all U.S. ground forces, with faith that removal will not ultimately take place until the right conditions are reached even if that takes longer than five years.*

*5. I think that the above puts me in substantial but not complete agreement with General Singlaub. I keep these views to myself and to official channels.*

General Vessey called me that afternoon and told me that the time was not right for such a message. I did not send it.


That June and July I was busy, among other projects, preparing for Caper Crown VII, which would be a two corps wargame involving I ROK Corps defending the Kaesong-Munsan approach and VI ROK Corps alongside it defending the center corps sector with its Highway 1 coming south through Tongduchon, where was located the 2d Division's Camp Casey, and Uijongbu. We were developing quite elaborate, although mostly manual, wargame routines for operations, logistics, and the application of tactical air.

I was also involved in arrangements to send Nancy and Anne back to the United States. Although Anne, now thirteen and a freshman in the American dependents' high school at

Yongsan, had gone out for the track team and had made a trip with it to the Philippines, neither she nor we her parents were at all satisfied with either the academics or the discipline that year in the Yongsan school. Anne had been accepted by Kent, a preparatory school in Kent, Connecticut, for her sophomore year. We decided that she and Nancy would go home, with Nancy to live until my tour ended in February as a "waiting wife" in quarters set aside for that purpose at Stewart Army Airfield near West Point, New York. They left in early July.

In late July the Korea command was to be visited by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and his party, to include JCS Chairman George Brown, for the purpose of meeting with their ROK counterparts in the annual Security Consultative Meetings called for in the 1953 ROK/US Mutual Assistance Treaty. Shortly before the party arrived, General Vessey asked me to send him again the message that I had prepared on June 28th; he said that he intended to give it to General Brown, which he did.

On July 26th, Secretary Brown and his party came to Camp Red Cloud for a briefing by me, then a tour of some ROK units in my sector. I concluded my briefing, which was similar to, although shorter than, the one that I had taken to Washington in April, with this chart, which I said reflected our conclusions, stemming from our wargames, as to the balance of forces in Korea's Western Sector.



I said that at that moment, mid-1977, and considering ROK Army capabilities only, and considering both the capabilities of the opposing forces and their likely employment, North Korea had an advantage over the defending forces and the defenders probably

could not stop the enemy well forward. With the execution of the "essential actions" that I listed (below),<sup>30</sup> the defenders could over time become equal to the attackers and in due time could alone defeat the enemy on "FEBA Alpha" (a line well forward). Because the slope of one line depended on North Korean efforts, and the slope of the other depended on those of the South, no one could predict when that time would come, although five years could be the target.

#### **ESSENTIAL ACTIONS**

- INCREASE ANTI-ARMOR
- INCREASE ARTILLERY
- STRENGTHEN FORTIFICATIONS
- ACCERATE BARRIER EMPLACEMENT
- DEVELOP ARMY AVIATION
- IMPROVE ROAD NET
- IMPROVE LOGISTICS
- HARDEN COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMAND POSTS
- UPGRADE INTELLIGENCE
- DEVELOP AIR/LAND BATTLE PROFICIENCY
- DEVELOP NEW CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND WARGAMING EXPERTISE

Since April 1977 we had substituted this wording, for "Develop operational expertise."

See pp 46-47.

Secretary Brown asked no questions, and went on with his tour.<sup>31</sup>

In early August, General Vessey shared with me a letter of July 28th that he had received from General Rogers, Army Chief of Staff (at Appendix M). It read in part:

*"George Brown has shown me the message which Jack Cushman had considered sending to CJCS and me. I think it would have been inappropriate for him to have such a message floating around, particularly since he apparently does not know the position that George and I have taken with respect to continuing evaluation by the JCS of the balance between South and North Korea during the entire proposed period of the withdrawal of ground forces."*

<sup>30</sup>By this time we had in being a process of accomplishing step-by-step those essential actions that my headquarters could largely execute, encouraging those in others' domains, and monitoring them all. We had, for example, seen improvement by the ROK government of the road nets in our rear area, essential for the movement of reserves.

<sup>31</sup>In his recent book, Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Addison Wesley), Don Oberdorfer reveals, for the first time to my knowledge, that both Cyrus Vance and Harold Brown disagreed strongly with Carter on the withdrawal plan. Both kept their disagreement quiet, and Brown gave no evidence of it whatever on this occasion. In a September 1977 speech in New York he still spoke of the "planned withdrawal of the 2d Division."

Enclosing extracts of his July 13th<sup>32</sup> testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, he added...

*"Perhaps you might like to share with Jack these extracts so that he can be assured that I am aware of the responsibilities of the Chiefs as a corporate body to continue to retain a high level of interest during the withdrawal period and, if we believe instability will result from our failure to take the appropriate action, to stand up and be counted before the final withdrawal is made."*

General Rogers had evidently grasped my implied message (see footnote, page 32). I realized that I had probably stung him, but I did not regret having written the message when I did, nor his having eventually received it. I was satisfied that, in that circumstance, to have informed him and General Brown of my views was the soldierly thing for me to have done and that it was good for them to know those views.

I had long since become good friends with Lieutenant General Kim Chong Hwan, the commander of Third ROK Army. He and I shared command of the three ROK corps in my sector; I was their commander for planning and executing the defense of their assigned sectors, but he controlled their personnel and logistics matters, their funding, their training programs, their housekeeping, and their efficiency reports. He had better and more continuous communications with them than I did. It was important that I keep him informed of my major intentions, and run by him in advance my thinking; it was crucial that he and I not be seen to be at cross purposes. And I had to assure myself that, if we ever went to war, with his support those corps commanders would do as I told them. In my first week I had been graciously welcomed at his headquarters south of Seoul, and I visited there monthly. General Kim occasionally invited me to join him and the corps commanders in afternoon golf sessions that ended in a steam bath and leisurely supper of high camaraderie.

July and August were very busy months for me. I was spending a lot of time working with the new Commander of Air Forces Korea, Major General Robert Taylor, with whose command I had established a very good working relationship.<sup>33</sup> I had persuaded him to

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<sup>32</sup>I had drafted my original backchannel to Generals Brown and Rogers in June after seeing transcripts of General Rogers' testimony to a different committee of the Congress.

<sup>33</sup>That had not been true of Major General Pittman, his predecessor, who had evidently taken my interest in developing effective procedures for air/land operations as "interfering" with his command. It came to General Vessey's attention that in backchannel traffic to his boss, the Commanding General, Pacific Air Forces, General Pittman had commented unfavorably on my wargames. General Vessey then invited that PACAF commander to visit Camp Red Cloud to see for himself, and then asked for a new commander of Air Forces Korea. That was General Taylor, who moved to that position from being PACAF's director of operations and who had an entirely different attitude.

overhaul the Eighth Army air/ground SOP, the procedures of which derived from those long taught at the Air-Ground School at Hurlburt Air Force Base, Florida. These called for the divisions, corps, and my headquarters to generate their requests for tactical air support 72 hours in advance through a laborious process that began, strike by strike, at the lowest echelon. Hardly adequate for a fast moving offensive situation, such processes were totally unsuited for a situation in which war would erupt on short notice and we would be on the defensive with little real-time target information at the outset, but badly needing the immediate and powerful application of tactical air.

So we devised what General Taylor called "emergency CAS (for close air support) procedures" that at the outset of war would override the Eighth Army SOP. General Vessey, with the advice of the commander of Air Forces Korea, established the allocation of all tactical air into (1) offensive air operations, including deep interdiction, which also included the ground-to-ground use of Nike Hercules air defense missiles, (2) defensive air operations to cope with enemy air aimed at targets behind our front lines, and (3) close air support, which it would be our task to direct in support of the various corps and the ROK Marine brigade. General Taylor agreed that CAS, defined as the attack of targets that could be pointed out by front line observers, would be expanded to include those near-in targets (defined as "battlefield air interdiction") of great concern to the corps commanders, to be struck as selected by my operations staff and air liaison officers and controlled by airborne forward air controllers or visually by the pilot based on map coordinates.

According to U.S. doctrine as taught at Hurlburt, a field army headquarters such as ours would have an opposite number tactical air force; each corps would have an "air support operations center," or ASOC; and divisions, regiments, and battalions would each have "tactical air control parties," or TACPs. But in Korea there was only one "air force" -- Air Forces Korea -- which was a subordinate command of the CINCUNC, General Vessey. I Corps Group had an Air Liaison Officer and Air Support Operations Center, and the three corps had to be satisfied with one USAF TACP, headed by a major, and a few ROK Air Force TACPs that they could scatter among the divisions and some regiments -- none at battalion level.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>Our Air Liaison Officer, Colonel "Bo" Marshall, was an invaluable direct connection to General Taylor. He helped us coordinate with the Seventh Fleet to arrange carrier-based "alpha strikes" into simulated "penetrations" in our rear area. General Vessey's deputy CINC, Air Force Lt. Gen. John Burns, the senior airman in Korea with whom I clashed occasionally on the employment of air, was out of the Taylor-Cushman loop. He saw an I Corps Group message one day that had Seventh Fleet as an inadvertent "action (rather than information) addressee" and raised hell with me for violating the command chain.

We developed procedures through which ROK field artillery units -- on the call of field artillery forward observers at company level who through artillery liaison officers at battalion were in touch with the regimental TACPs, who in turn were in touch with the inbound strike aircraft -- could mark targets with smoke just in time for the flight of two to four strike aircraft to see that smoke and strike the target. We set up simulations at each corps, using which the players in this procedure could practice, and we ran demonstrations of the real thing on artillery ranges in the corps group area. Caper Crown VI, in early September 1977, was an application of these procedures in a rerun of one event in Caper Crown III that called for a maximum effort in the simultaneous application of air and artillery firepower to save a situation.<sup>35</sup>

Intelligence collection and processing was another critical problem; we needed immediate target intelligence should war erupt. Inasmuch as, in war, I would have operational control of a ROK special forces group stationed in my area, I decided to employ their behind-the-lines capabilities in the observation of key roads and trails over which the enemy would move so that, inserted there by low-flying helicopters, they could call in air and artillery fires. The special forces brigade commander,<sup>36</sup> sought missions calling for more derring-do, such as the attack of enemy command posts. But I had my way.

The 2d Infantry Division, which would be in reserve the first hours or even days of a war, possessed rather elaborate van-mounted electronic collection and processing capabilities not available to the ROK troops. So I stationed its vans under overhead cover at the I ROK Corps underground command post, so as to provide I ROK Corps, in the most dan-

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<sup>35</sup>Speaking of artillery, the effectiveness of which we always sought to improve, one day I was visited by the Commanding General, 3d Marine Division, from Okinawa who was himself visiting a composite Marine artillery battalion, well supplied with howitzers and ammunition, that was using an artillery range in my sector. I told him that, in the event we went to a high state of alert and war was believed possibly imminent, I would assume operational control of that battalion and that the commander of the 2d Infantry Division Artillery would direct its employment. He demurred, saying, "Well, you understand that we don't break up Marine units, Marines fight alongside other Marines." Even when I pointed out that there were no US Marines in my sector, he persisted. I then pointed out that if he were to visit the nearby headquarters of the 2d Division he would find among memorabilia displayed there a photograph of General John LeJeune, once a Commandant of the Marine Corps, who in World War I commanded a Marine brigade in the 2d Division, and then commanded the division. I said that General LeJeune would roll over in his grave at the idea of my visitor's holding back on placing his Marine artillery battalion under the same 2d Division. He wouldn't budge; neither, I believed, would Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, his next higher headquarters, and General Vessey would have to take the matter up with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which seemed ridiculous. So, knowing that I would have my way in a true emergency, I simply told the 2d Division to have its artillery commander visit the Marine battalion and exchange signal procedures, frequencies, and call signs, and to prepare to assign the battalion its position areas and missions if and when the occasion came to do so.

<sup>36</sup>ROK Army Brigadier General Ro Tae Woo, who after the assassination of President Park Chung Hee and the military coup by General Chun Doo Hwan, succeeded Chun Doo Hwan as President of the Republic of Korea.

gerous sector and on the shortest route to Seoul, the benefit of electronic intelligence not otherwise available to them in periods of high warning and the first hours of enemy attack.

I was very concerned about warning, believing that we "had only one chance to not be surprised." Into the all-source intelligence center (ASIC), located in our command bunker, flowed intelligence from every possible source -- from outposts on the DMZ, to downlinks from side-looking radars borne by aircraft flying along the DMZ, to electronic intercepts, to satellite photos, to reports by higher headquarters -- including North Korean news/pro-paganda broadcasts picked up by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. There my G-2 (Intelligence) staff would analyze the information flow, looking for indications. Each evening and each morning, my ROK Army G-2 would give me an estimate of the likelihood that the enemy would attack in the next twelve hours. We changed checklists often, to avoid falling into a habit of seeing no evidence of impending attack. When our sensitized nerve ends were tingled, we shared our judgments with General Vessey's headquarters. I based our operations plans and alert readiness on an assumption that, from the time of a decision (not warning, but a decision based on warning) to go to a higher state of readiness, we would have six hours until the enemy launched his attack. North Korea being the world's most secure country, I knew that we would have to fight to achieve that amount of warning. To test our ability to be on position in six hours -- with all forces and reserves in good order, and barriers installed -- we conducted each month a no-notice alert of the full Corps Group.

July and August were busy months, as we accomplished the summer rotation of U.S. officers on one-year tours and prepared for Caper Crown VII. Caper Crowns IV, V, and VI were partial simulations aimed at improving our methods and our understanding of how to coordinate air-ground operations. Caper Crown VII would be our largest wargame and the culmination of our wargaming effort during my time, a two corps wargame of the I ROK Corps defending the Munsan approach and VI ROK Corps alongside it in the center of our sector. Beginning on page 37 of Appendix C is a description of Caper Crown VII.

Over a period of days I walked the 70-mile-long DMZ in my sector, from the mouth of the Imjin to the boundary between I Corps Group and the First ROK Army on our east. To go up and down the hills along the chainlink fence that marked its south side, inspecting the lookouts and guard positions, was a most interesting experience. One day in mid-August I was accompanied by Mike Tharp of the Wall Street Journal, who had spent a couple of days with me. Mike wrote me up in an August 31 piece for his paper, next page.



# The Humanist General in South Korea

By MIKE THARP

**EASTERN SECTOR, DEMILITARIZED ZONE, SOUTH KOREA**—Lt. Gen. John Cushman had hiked for nearly two hours along the "iron fence," a barbed-wire barrier strung with rusty grape juice cans and lined with rocks. The fence runs along the South Korean side of this no-man's land dividing the Korean peninsula.

Several senior South Korean military officers and a handful of lieutenants half his age were left panting behind him as he scaled a steep stony hill and strode across a wooden suspension bridge swaying over a river.

Now he stands in the last bunker on the very eastern edge of the territory under his authority. Peering across a low-lying flood plain into North Korea, he addresses the young South Korean infantryman standing stiffly behind his M-60 machine gun.

"This is a good place to be," says Gen. Cushman.

The young soldier, in his spartan front-line guardpost, might have doubts about that. But the 56-year-old general clearly enjoys his job as commander of 180,000 South Korean and U.S. combat forces in the forward-most positions between the DMZ and the capital city of Seoul. That job has become increasingly important as the U.S. prepares to withdraw some 32,000 ground combat forces, including 14,000 from the 2nd Infantry Division, from the Korean peninsula over the next four to five years.

Although the first contingent of 6,000 troops isn't scheduled to leave until next year, Gen. Cushman and his American and South Korean aides already are busy planning for the eventual takeover of South Korean responsibility to defend their own country from possible attack.

Details of the transfer are still being worked out, and the whole pullout plan faces uncertain reception in the U.S. Congress. But perhaps more important than the number of tanks to be left behind or the amount of money to be paid for new weapons is whether the departing Americans can convince South Koreans of the overall U.S. commitment to their security. And, according to many analysts, Gen. Cushman is particularly well-suited for this part of the job.

"I wouldn't go so far as to say he's a Renaissance general," says one seasoned observer, "but he's certainly a humanist general and one whose serious thinking goes well beyond military issues." Adds a South Korean defense ministry official: "When we see him, he speaks in the Korean language to us, and that gives a feeling of friendship. He is another outstanding field commander."

## Decorations and Solzhenitsyn

The athletically-built West Point graduate doesn't fit the conventional mold of a career military man. He served in the Pacific during the Second World War but also has a master's degree in civil engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has been awarded dozens of decorations and medals during his 37-year career, including several for valor under fire, but also reads Solzhenitsyn and paints Chinese-calligraphy scrolls.

He has a staff car and helicopter at his disposal but jogs 1½ miles nearly every morning and has walked 75 miles along the DMZ, visiting troops, since he came to South Korea in February 1976. He carries a .38-caliber aviator's revolver on his hip but says he's never had it out of the holster in battle.

"That's not my job and not my style," he explains. "My job on the battlefield isn't to engage the enemy but to make sure my people are properly led, motivated, organ-

ized, equipped and orchestrated to do the maximum damage to the enemy."

With his intellectual bent and managerial approach to soldiering, Gen. Cushman differs in several ways from his predecessors in South Korea. In particular, many observers make the inviting contrast between him and the previous three-star general in charge of the Western Defensive Sector of South Korea, Lt. Gen. James Hollingsworth.

Gen. Hollingsworth, who gained a reputation for firing pistols from his helicopter at North Vietnamese soldiers, struck a re-

*With his intellectual bent and managerial approach to soldiering, Lt. Gen. John Cushman does not fit the conventional mold of a career military man. Nevertheless, he is considered a 'fighter's fighter.'*

sponsive chord with many South Korean military men. They liked his flamboyant aggressiveness and colorful descriptions of the fate that would befall any enemy at the hands of his troops.

(North Korean sources in Tokyo have consistently denied that their country intends any hostility or aggression toward South Korea. And they maintain that the withdrawal of U.S. forces is a ploy to disguise a heavy rearmament of South Korean forces.)

Gen. Cushman dislikes any comparisons with Gen. Hollingsworth, and speaks highly of his predecessor. "The forward defense concept evolved (under Gen. Hollingsworth) from mid-1973 to the end of 1975 and was for the Koreans an electrifying turnaround in their defense thinking," says General Cushman. "It meant that the protective force would defeat the enemy very soon after he crossed the DMZ, stop him in his tracks and then eject him."

Although the troop withdrawal itself is uppermost in the minds of military men here, they're also concerned with maintaining a strong defensive posture and morale among their soldiers. One way to do both, says Gen. Cushman, is to continue to train troops to protect Seoul and not evacuate it. "What President Carter is seeking isn't all that significantly different in terms of fighting a war," says the general, "from what we have been working to achieve with South Korean forces so that they can exert the forward defense concept without U.S. ground forces."

To prepare for the eventual Koreanization of military capability in his command, Gen. Cushman is taking several steps. He has encouraged American officers to learn enough of the Korean language to hold simple conversations with their South Korean counterparts. He actively solicits opinions from South Korean officers on tactics, and recently assigned a South Korean officer to brief Gen. John Vessey Jr., commander of all UN troops in South Korea and Gen. Cushman's immediate boss, on current joint training operations.

Gen. Cushman also has expanded simulated battle sessions during which dozens of South Korean and American officers spend two or three days shuttling small pieces of wood and plastic across topographic boards to depict actual battle situations. "These aren't war games," Gen. Cushman asserts. "They're a deadly serious attempt to recreate the totality of combat."

His critics charge that these efforts

aren't enough to convince North Korea that combined U.S.-South Korean field operations will deter potential aggression. These critics believe that a more dynamic approach is needed in a country where centuries of Confucian tradition demand a strong, tough-talking leader. "Initially," says one Korean, "he gave the impression of being a scholar and very gentle. Gen. Hollingsworth used to give a big gesture, a demonstration of firepower, for example, and normally Korean or Asian people like to see that strong image."

Unlike many generals, Gen. Cushman encourages views that don't jibe with his own. Maj. John Speedy III, now with a tank brigade in South Korea, recalls an episode when he was in a class taught by Gen. Cushman at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: "He had written an article on pioneers of tank operations, and, frankly, it wasn't a very good article. But he passed out copies to the student body and said we could criticize it. Then he went on stage in front of 1,100 officers and read the criticisms. A man's ego can get pretty wounded in a situation like that, but it established an atmosphere of open, no-holds-barred discussion."

## A Classic Operation

Other officers suggest that below his soft-spoken, intellectual mien, Gen. Cushman is a hard-driving "fighter's fighter." Col. Bernhard Mittermeyer, who served with Gen. Cushman in Vietnam, describes him as "the kind of guy you both respect and fear a little." One battalion under Gen. Cushman's command specialized in night ambushes in Vietnam, and once mounted what Col. Mittermeyer calls "one of the most classical cordon operations of the entire Vietnam war," during which the U.S. Airborne forces surrounded a North Vietnamese battalion for three days and eventually captured more than 100 prisoners.

Nearly every military officer in South Korea opposes to one degree or another President Carter's withdrawal policy. But after Brig. Gen. John Singlaub was reassigned from his post in Seoul for speaking out publicly against that policy, senior officers have softened in public their reservations about the plan. Gen. Cushman won't debate the correctness of the policy.

"The military field commander has a very grave responsibility to take all possible actions which would prevent a war, and to take no action, which he can avoid, to increase the risk of war," he says. "My main job is to execute the policy—that's my duty. I've got some personal convictions, but I think those can be reconciled with the policy."

There's a chance that Gen. Cushman will be the last three-star general to work in such close coordination with South Korean soldiers. Defense planners from both countries haven't yet determined the command structure of the UN truce-keeping force once American forces drop below a certain number. As a result, future commanders might not hold a three-star rank.

Meantime, Gen. Cushman sees no slackening of his dawn-to-dark pace.

On a recent morning, he stopped walking long enough to ride to a guard post within the DMZ itself. On the way to a lonely hilltop bunker, Gen. Cushman held on to his helmet and quoted to another passenger a phrase from the Korean scholar and statesman, Yi Yul Gok, which he said has become his personal motto:

"Did you ever hear the phrase, 'Yu bi mu hwan?' Gen. Cushman asked. "It means, 'He who is prepared is not anxious.'"

Mr. Tharp is Tokyo correspondent for the Journal.

In August I had begun planning a three week official/unofficial trip to the United States. I left Korea September 9th, traveling home and back on military aircraft, giving briefings in Hawaii and Washington, speaking to the student body at Leavenworth, visiting family, and attending the wedding of our elder son in New Jersey.<sup>37</sup> While in the States I was invited to speak at a luncheon meeting at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City. My talk, as submitted and as cleared "as amended" by Security Review at the Department of Defense, is at Appendix N. It is a good summary of my views at the time.

Returning to Korea on September 29th I plunged into the final preparations for Caper Crown VII, to begin October 17th. I and VI ROK Corps would be the force exercised, and V ROK Corps would provide the controllers. We built a "tent city" on the Camp Red Cloud parade field to house the command posts of the two corps and their divisions and regiments, linking these with telephone lines that would represent the communications of wartime. (Commanders would "fight" for ten hours during the day, then return to their field locations at night to return and fight the next ten hours the next day.) The regimental commanders were linked by telephone with their battalion commanders, who were represented by controllers maneuvering "chips" representing companies on the immense plastic sheet-covered game board that showed the terrain at three inches to one kilometer.

We played logistics with the real logistics units, we caused artillery pieces to fail with heavy usage and kept them out of action until the required spare part was on hand. We required trucks to go back to ammunition points, draw down their stocks, and "haul" the ammunition forward on congested roads. We played tactical air, controlled from a simulated Tactical Air Control Center according to the "new frag"<sup>38</sup> that General Taylor and I


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<sup>37</sup>I visited Atlanta to call on Charles Kirbo, a long-time political associate and advisor to President Carter, with the aim of bringing to him the realities of the situation in Korea (I can't recall how this visit was set up, but it was officially sanctioned). In Washington I had an office call on General Rogers, Chief of Staff, who, trying, but failing, to be funny, greeted me by asking "How much did you pay for that write-up in the Wall Street Journal?"

<sup>38</sup>According to heretofore established air-ground operations doctrine, the Tactical Air Control Center controlled air operations through a daily "frag" (short for "fragmentary [!] order"), the preparation of which was supposed to begin with "requests" from lower units (down to battalion) two full days before the day of the "frag." The order was issued about midnight in a teletype message three or four meters long. It listed each mission (of two to four aircraft), its time, and its target. On the defense initially, our corps and divisions could not know where the enemy would be attacking, hence could not predict needs for the first day. So the "new frag" laid out the level of the air effort that would go to CAS ("close air support" for targets that could be seen from the front line) and BAI ("battlefield air interdiction" for targets of concern to the corps commander beyond the CAS limit), placed these sorties/missions in locations indicated by our best intelligence, and allowed for moving those sorties/missions around on short notice to meet the circumstances of battle. It also allowed for concentration of all air (and artillery) effort in a single area to meet an unexpected dangerous situation. We had practiced these procedures in Caper Crown VI, using a situation that had developed in Caper Crown III, concentrating a powerful strike against an incipient enemy breakthrough in the V Corps' Chorwon corridor.

had developed, and controlled from the front end by air liaison officers and tactical air control parties. We developed a theater air plan, within which our Western Sector air employment would take place. And we organized a powerful enemy force, with its own air component and air plan.

Roughly sketched here is the enemy scheme of maneuver:



For several summers the ROK Army had been improving its fortifications along the DMZ and rearward; by now we had very strong positions forward, with overhead covered emplacements and connecting tunnels hewn into the rock, and less strong positions rearward.

The enemy would launch a powerful secondary attack into I Corps to pin down its divisions and an even more powerful main attack into the vulnerable flank of VI Corps, aiming for the

Yonchon-Tongduchon avenue of approach. I had never been satisfied with the boundary between VI and I Corps, so we shifted that boundary for this exercise and I told the VI Corps commander to strengthen his sector across the Imjin. I only hinted at this enemy plan to the corps commanders, *urging them to be flexible and adapt to the battle as the enemy attack unfolded.*

\* \* \* \* \*

To digress on "flexibility".... For months I had struggled to understand, cope with, and remedy my corps commanders' habits of stereotyped and outdated tactical thinking. I had come to Korea from being Commandant of the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Army's premier institution for instruction and doctrinal development on the military operational art. There, in the mid-seventies as the Vietnam War ended and the 1973 Arab-Israeli "October War" revealed new lessons in armored/mechanized warfare, the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command was using the College (and the Army's Combined Arms Combat Development Command, also at Leavenworth and which I also commanded) and other institutions, to turn Army doctrine in the direction of Europe, to carry out a major rewrite of it, and to imbue the Army in the field with its new tenets. None of this new thinking had penetrated into the ROK Army.

Not long after I arrived in Korea, I had visited the ROK Army's Command and General Staff College at Chinhae, near Pusan in the south. There I reviewed their instructional material. I had been a student, then an instructor, at Leavenworth in the mid-1950s, when we were bringing there senior and mid-level ROK Army officers as students, and the U.S. Advisory Group was helping the ROK create an Army in the US. mold. At Chinhae I noted with interest the instructional material. To my surprise I was told that they had simply taken Leavenworth's material from the mid-1950s (which had itself been substantially modified in the late 1950s and early 1960s) and had superimposed on maps of Korean terrain the map overlays from those exercises located primarily in Europe. They had copied, without thinking through the necessary adaptation.

This explained to me, for example, why the battalions of the ROK corps engineer groups in my sector were disposed well rearward, far from the DMZ where they would be needed to activate on very short notice the barriers emplaced to impede a North Korean attack; far more than six hours would be required for them to perform that mission. This disposition stemmed from the normal location of corps engineer battalions on Leavenworth's overlays.

In 1976, the Army had published a new field manual on its basic operational doctrine -- FM 100-5, Operations. Its orientation was entirely on war in Central Europe, involving armored/mechanized forces on both sides. When I visited the First ROK Army on my east in early 1977, the army commander showed me with pride a translation ordered by him of that U.S. field manual into Korean, without change, to be used in instructing his commanders. It mattered not that, among other differences, his forces and the enemy's were primarily infantry and that his mountainous terrain was quite different from the, mostly, plains of Central Europe.

From my first month in command, I had preached that in order to succeed we must...

- o Deny the enemy total surprise.
- o Be ready, on position, essential barriers installed, artillery deployed, and reserves in good order, at the time the enemy attacks.
- o Master in advance the tactics, the logistics, and the command and control methods that the conditions of battle will demand.

What were to be those methods? In brief, they were, when the war started, to:

- o See the battlefield.
- o Determine the main enemy attack.
- o Rapidly concentrate maneuver units, artillery, tactical air, and logistics, and..
- o Conduct an active offensive-defense to defeat the enemy well forward.

And, how were we to learn how to do that? Through discussion, learning together, and above all "battle simulation."<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>My Korean corps commanders, to varying degrees, believed that by their simple assumption of command, they were qualified to command their corps and had little to learn, especially from me, who was new to Korea and only recently promoted to three star rank. I could not browbeat them into learning, nor persuade them of the logic of my thought; I could only encourage them, show through simulation what needed to be done, if they would only recognize it, *and lead them to think*.

At Appendix P is a 40-minute talk that I made in Korean to the cadets at the Korean Military Academy, in which I spelled out my views. One significant passage translates into English as follows: "Living in time of peace, we do not wage war. But it is imperative that commanders find a way to gain realistic experience of war, without actually fighting. I believe that only through realistic warfare simulation can we achieve this kind of experience. Only that military force which adopts this kind of wargaming and applies its results to its real situations can be equipped with the sound tactical thinking that is an essential ingredient for victory in battle. When war breaks out, it is too late to learn. We must, before war comes, realistically and honestly assess our strengths and our vulnerabilities. After that we can exploit our strengths and reinforce our vulnerabilities. Wargaming is a singular way of self appraisal. But it is not a panacea. It is simply a better way than any other to understand our tactical problems and learn to do better. Armies that do not make honest self-appraisals and stick to old concepts suffer in war -- just as did the French in the first stages of World War II. Wargaming is a tool for self evaluation. We, military leaders, must get rid of old, invalid practices, and adopt methods most appropriate for the current situation in repelling a strong enemy attack. In this regard, the coordination of air-ground operations is critically important." I did not circulate this address within my command and to Third ROK Army; perhaps I should have.

Years later, based on my thinking at the time of Caper Crown VII, I wrote:<sup>40</sup>

"The particular contribution of battle simulations is that they make graphic, and vivid for all to see, the nature of the air/land battle in the specific situation being war gamed. They thus allow the participants and observers to visualize more clearly the conditions and requirements of warfare, to study the phenomenon in a working laboratory, to critique the realism of the simulation itself, and to improve it. They reduce the need for a major exercise of the imagination as to what the overall battle will be like if it ever comes. At the same time, they permit a more precise application of imagination and logical thought as to the specifics of the particular battle. They provide a common framework and point of departure for discussion and development of tactical and logistical solutions.

"These simulations are especially valuable in knitting together the tactical air and army components of the air/land battle: forcing commanders, staffs, and all participants to examine the realities of the battlefield and to solve the real problems as they would be forced to do in combat. They permit fighting the war in advance, learning its lessons in advance, and improving the forces through adaptation in advance."

Although we were far from achieving it in Caper Crown VII, the object of air/land battle simulation as I saw it in 1977 and have seen it ever since was to represent to the land commanders (say, at the levels of brigade, division and corps), and their staffs (in their actual command posts, or realistic mock-ups),... and to the tactical air force commander(s) (which may eventually include wing and squadron level) and to the people in their command and control centers,.. all of whom are part of an air/land battle force with a mission, a concept of operations, and a battle plan,... and who are connected by the actual communications they would have in war (or by realistic simulations of these communications),... and who, as a fighting team, working together, are faced by a realistically represented enemy with a mission and concept of operations and simulated forces and command and control means of his own,... a real-time experience in the command and control of air/land battle that is as close to the experience of war as it is possible to achieve without actually fighting.<sup>41</sup>

We were looking for "lessons learned." As in all battles there would be a "battle outcome," but our aim was to learn from experience how to do better next time.

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<sup>40</sup>In Chapter X, "Air/Land Battle Mastery Through Air/Land Battle Simulation," of Organization and Operational Employment of Air/Land Forces, prepared for the U.S. Army War College, 1983.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid. pp. 10-9-10-10.

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This battle simulation of Caper Crown VII would truly test my commanders' capacity.

Well, we succeeded, and in succeeding, they failed. I will cover the next few weeks by quoting from letters to my wife... (each letter written in the early morning)...

September 30: "It looks good here. My people have been working well and we are in the last two weeks of preparations for our comprehensive wargame; it begins the 17th."

October 1: "My staff has done some fine work, but it is a mammoth undertaking. I hope it all comes together all right."

October 4: "I got out into the area yesterday, lining up how the enemy will attack in our wargame. My people are pressing hard. It will be a big operation, and will get a lot of attention."

October 7: "Yesterday I went down to Yongsan again, to work the close air support problem with MG Bob Taylor, Air Forces Korea commander, for our wargame ten days from now. He has done a remarkably good job, and we will have the best tactical air play yet - and in my opinion we are approaching an order of professional work that begins to measure up to the demands. It is gratifying to see how things have progressed, in one year."

October 8: "My visitor yesterday was the commander of the US Air Force B-52 bombers on Guam, visiting here with his key staff officers. We would like to have B-52s helping us if the enemy should attack, so we spent some time working out how to do that, and now we will try that in the simulation we run week after next in our Caper Crown VII.

"Its preparation is coming right along. My people have really extended themselves and are now flat out toward the deadline of next Friday evening, everything to be ready. It should be quite an extravaganza - more than seven hundred telephones to install to support it. Tents going up for the staffs, hustle and bustle in our simulations facility. Quite a far cry from what we did a year and a half ago in April, when we had our first one, Caper Crown I."

Weeks before Caper Crown VII began, I had worked out, coordinated with Jack Vessey, and issued to and discussed with my commanders a new concept of operations, in draft, that I had said that we would use in that exercise. It went like this:



- o Main Battle Area Alpha is renamed the "second defensive zone." All forward of that is the "first defensive zone."<sup>42</sup>
- o Fortify continuously from the DMZ rearward. Strengthen positions and barriers in the first defensive zone. Extend fortifications in depth into the third defensive zone.
- o Strong resistance beginning with first defensive zone.
- o Determine the enemy main effort early.
- o Except for designated first defensive zone units, defending units remain in place to the last man.
- o Reinforce ahead of enemy main effort with reserves and units not engaged. Stop the enemy attack on or before the second defensive zone.
- o Wear the enemy down on the rocks of the defense. Destroy him with firepower.
- o Counterattack when the enemy is weakened and the chance of success is high.

I devoutly hoped that they would put this concept into effect.

October 8 (continued): "I spent an hour yesterday with the I Corps commander and his people - he is one of the players, along with his divisions. We are using the occasion to try out some new tactics, and one of the difficulties I have is getting understanding on both sides of the conversation on tactics, when the conversation is across a language barrier. General Lee Hui Sung is a very intelligent man and capable of doing his own thinking, interested in doing the right thing, and taking some exception to the words we wrote into our tactical concept. That is what I want to have happen, anyhow - to foster tactical discussion so that we can gradually arrive at what will work best, by test. The test being simulation, before the battle if there is one, so we won't be surprised completely when the battle comes, if it should."

October 14: "Big commanders' meeting yesterday. BG Jim Leslie, who is the new Asst Div Cdr of the 2d Inf Div and my 'enemy' commander, said it's not often that you can see all the commanders of a field army driving off after a meeting... We are in fairly good shape."

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<sup>42</sup>The "first defensive zone" was our new name for the outdated term "general outpost" (or GOP), which had extended from the south edge of the DMZ rearward three kilometers more or less to Main Battle Area Alpha. The term GOP derived from long-standing US Army defensive doctrine. The function of the GOP, in doctrine, had long been to detect the enemy attack, to resist it to a degree, and to fall back on the "main line of resistance" (an old term that had been superseded in the 1950s by "forward edge of the battle area, or FEBA; FEBA Alpha was the forward edge of Main Battle Area Alpha). Our objective had been to stop the enemy on or before Main Battle Area Alpha. Inasmuch as many positions in the GOP had been heavily fortified, it no longer performed a delay function. This provision of our revised concept of operations was aimed at confirming the new situation, in which we would offer a stout resistance beginning at the southern edge of the DMZ.

October 15: "Things are coming together, toward a crescendo. Everything seems to be all right, and the weekend is available to put the last touches on our wargame. It will be as they say mindboggling to the visitor, of which we expect many."

October 17: "The CPX starts today... I think it is going to be all right."

October 18: "My enemy force has disappointed me by not doing what they were supposed to do, and I don't think we can count on Kim Il Sung's forces to be that awkward. But they will straighten out overnight, while getting ready for the next day's fighting..."

"Big problem - the affair is in Korean, and is told about in Korean, but the ideas behind it are mostly American. I'm not sure the transfer of ideas across the language barrier is all that I had hoped for. Complex material, it is."

October 19: "Things went well yesterday, and I believe it will be a worthwhile exercise."

October 19th, the third day of the exercise, saw the fighting from the 20th to the 30th hours of battle. The enemy had launched his attack at 0400; by the 20th hour it was midnight of the first day of battle. Because of poor generalship by the VI Corps commander, the situation had developed badly; the enemy had taken our fortified positions overlooking Yonchon; the corps units to the north were cut off; and the enemy was into the Imjin valley and headed for the Yonchon-Tongduchon road. We massed our tactical air and artillery to attack his penetration at daybreak, but his penetration continued almost to Tongduchon. I was briefing visitors and did not see that developing, or I would have intervened with my controllers, rather than letting it run according to the wargame rules. At that point, to allow the enemy the deep penetration he was about to make would have been a stinging defeat for our side, so I suspended realistic wargame rules and allowed the ROK forces to "counterattack" and restore the situation. We then terminated the wargame.

October 20: "Quite a day yesterday, with visits from the (ROK) Air Force and Army Chiefs of Staff and parties, and with a tumult of activity in our wargame as the enemy made a breakthrough while the controllers were not looking and we had to repair the damage.

"The outcome of the wargame is disturbing indeed, as it exposed serious vulnerabilities which we must correct as soon as possible. So many participants know of these vulnerabilities and we have had so many visitors, that it is certain that the other side must know of them as well. That is a grave dilemma - because not to have exposed them in this

way would not have created the climate of understanding that is required and without which corrections would be agonizingly slow if at all. But our ROK friends do not fully realize the trouble that they are in.

"General Lee Sae Ho (ROK Army Chief of Staff) finally asked me the question directly that I know has been in the minds of many - how does it happen that two years ago the Western Sector commander assured us that we could defeat the enemy in nine days no doubt about it and now you tell us that we will have a hard time stopping him before he gets to Seoul? To a room full of his commanders and staff officers I gave (interpreted into Korean), I am satisfied, a very good answer to that question, and now he has the real situation. We'll see if he is tough enough to take what action is needed.

"One of the points I made with Lee Sae Ho after I explained to him in detail the assessment and its history in the last two years was that I was like a doctor who had to tell his patient bad news - that I must be honest about it. I said also that I had heard of the Chinese emperor who, when a messenger brought him bad news, cut off the messenger's head. I said I hoped that he would not be like that Chinese emperor."

October 21: "Yesterday was a low point. We had put serious unrealities into the exercise the afternoon before and their effect ballooned until the tactical situation became that of a (scripted) command post exercise, drilling staffs to no useful effect, rather than a measurable wargame. My hard working simulations and analysis people are grievously disappointed. Notwithstanding, we will get enormous good out of it. It has made clear beyond doubt how badly off we are, and if we can get the action taken, as now seems more likely now that we know, the investment will have paid for itself."

October 22: "Caper Crown VII is over. I call it a success as a wargame and lesson to all who joined into it.... I had misgivings during the drill, but as an exercise it was very worthwhile, and will have important effect on the ROKs I think. My only concern, and it is a grave one, is that word of our weakness, plus a misjudgement of American lack of resolve to come to Korea's aid if the North attacks, might cause a reckless Kim Il Sung to indulge his obsession to unite Korea by force or to deal a death blow to this land."

October 23: "My wargame left me with much to do, to improve our defenses. I will start right away. I briefed Jack Vessey yesterday, but only for a few minutes. He has got things to do.<sup>43</sup>"

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<sup>43</sup>General Vessey had been in Washington throughout Caper Crown VII.

October 27: "It is appearing rather harder than I had thought to have any real effect on the Korean's tactical thinking through the 'learning by experience' method, because they have not yet grasped that my wargames are in fact a substitute for experience. The more senior men believe that I have set up a worst case, assuming that the enemy is able to do things that he is not able to do. Famous last words of the French before the Germans swept their country in 1940. I definitely have a problem here, and I am afraid that General Vessey has one as well - and I don't know how he will solve it. He could disown me a little, and that might make the ROKs feel better, but it might not stir them to the action they must take to relieve their real problem. We'll see."

For the next three or four weeks I busied myself developing a Caper Crown VII briefing that would explain what happened and why, and that would present the many lessons learned, of all kinds, and what should be done about them. Criticism was abroad about the wargame's lack of realistic outcomes. President Park sent a trusted "inspector general" type out to Camp Red Cloud to seek my views on what went wrong. I urged him not to look at the outcome, but at the lessons learned. Meanwhile...

November 1: "I had lunch with Tom Stern (US Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission) yesterday, after about an hour of talk in his office with him and some of the Embassy people. A review of my wargame and its significance. It has gotten rather more attention than I had figured, largely because of its outcome. The outcome, stemming as it did from failure to apply the tactical thinking demanded by the conditions, was such as to alarm many. It does not alarm me, unless we fail to take the measures we must take. I wish that it had been possible to have the ROKs do what they need to do, without my showing them the consequences if they do not - and so vividly. Perhaps it was, but I really do not think so. There are habits of thought now in their makeups that need a substantial institutional reform if they are to get them out - institutional and personal reform.

"Afterwards, in the mid-afternoon, I took my helicopter to the point on the DMZ where the enemy made his main driving attack in our wargame, and with a party of my officers including General Chang (my deputy commander) I walked the route the 'enemy' took, down to the Imjin River, which in our wargame he had forded easily. I waded across the Imjin, getting wet to a little above my belt.... Proved the point - to include the speed with which forces could move through that undefended area."<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>Despite my urging after ordering the boundary to be changed, the VI Corps commander had done little or nothing about his new sector along the DMZ; the North Koreans could, and did, breeze right through it.

November 6: "Last night I went down to Yongsan to [a party] and I saw many people I had not seen in weeks. There are two schools of thought about my wargame and its effect. One, whom I will call the enlightened, thinks that it is bitter medicine but good for Korea, and the other, whom I will call the threatened, don't like its implication that it exposed deficiencies in the senior officer commanders. That group is indeed somewhat threatened, because, as Bruce Grant told me yesterday, President Park has gotten wind of it and has asked about the story that commanders were not as flexible as they should have been in their tactics. The ROK senior generals were all smiles, but I think they were being inscrutable.

"General Kim Chong Hwan (Third ROK Army commander) came out for four hours yesterday, and we went through it in very considerable detail. He is not at all dissatisfied, and takes it very seriously but I sense he does not feel adequate to bring about the changes in thinking and dispositions that are called for. He wants me to lead the way in that. So I will, but I know I'll have his support. Jack Vessey has given his already. So here we go."

I worked into my briefing a set of slides that would describe how the battle evolved from the early morning enemy attack through the morning of the second day. At each thirty minute "game turn" during the exercise, we had recorded the dispositions of each company-sized ROK unit and each battalion-sized North Korean unit. We hung 1:50,000 scale maps on the wall of our simulation center for each of those intervals, plotted both sides' dispositions, and showed the line of contact as the North Korean forces drove south. We then photographed these maps and made colored slides that would explain exactly what happened. In so doing we presented the air picture, hour by hour. It made a fascinating story. We completed the story with "lessons learned." They were many.

For example, I worked with both the I Corps and VI Corps commanders to develop a portrayal called "if we had...," in which we critiqued the performance of each of their forces. The appraisal showed that, if they had taken certain timely action as the enemy attack unfolded, according to our new concept of operations, the result would have been to halt the enemy attack at the second defensive zone. I met with each corps commander in private, using the wall maps, and included the two "If we had..." in my briefing.

It was at about this time that I called the three corps commanders into my office for a private conversation. I had asked Bruce Grant to prepare remarks in Korean for me, and to

sit by my side, interpreting further as required. In Korean, my remarks are at Appendix P. Here is the gist of what I was trying to say...

*Our wargame's results were not satisfactory, and I want to give you my views on that.*

*I have been in Korea about two years and have come to love Korea and the Koreans. You know that I was born in China, but you may not know that my father was an operations advisor to the Nationalist Chinese Army and was ejected from the mainland when China fell. He wrote a report about the reasons for China's defeat and I have read it.*

*You also know that I served in Vietnam for four years, but you may not know that for three of those years I was an advisor at division and corps level. So I know something about South Vietnam's tragedy and the reasons for it.*

*Of course Korea is very different from China and Vietnam. But we must correct our vulnerabilities before Kim Il Sung tries to launch a surprise lightning war; that is my greatest worry. I am devoting all my efforts to insure that a China- or Vietnam-like tragedy will never come to Korea. After six years in Asia as commander, advisor, and in combat, I know how to find the enemy's weak points and to win.*

*It is not an easy task to command another nation's troops, or for a nation's field commanders to serve under a foreigner. I do not know how long I will serve as your commander or even how long I will remain in uniform. I don't want to be harsh, but I must give you my frank observations.*

*First, most ROK Army generals have been trained in and are still practicing out-dated U.S. Army tactics. Second, we must cast off illusions and acknowledge reality. The B-52 bomber will not save us; only strong fortifications, massed artillery (and air), and timely unit maneuvers will stop his attack. We must study and find winning tactics. Third, you are not recognizing your own tactical deficiencies. I do not claim to know the solutions; I want you to find them by honestly studying the closest thing we have to combat, our wargames. If you do not correct deficiencies in peacetime, the enemy will expose them in war. Damage to your self-esteem in a wargame is nothing compared to the ruin your nation will suffer in defeat.*

*Lastly, I am not only your commander but your friend and brother. Frank words like these can hurt, but I do not mean them to. I hope that you will appreciate my true feelings. Thank you.*



My commanders listened soberly, even asked a question or two. Whether I truly reached them, I never learned. (See footnote 47, pages 54 and 55). I ended with...

*And now let's go to the Corps Group mess and have a drink.*

After this I went on preparing my briefing for Seoul, which included a slide, shown below, that told of the kinds of data that we had collected on our logistics performance. This would be invaluable in later analysis of how we could improve that performance.<sup>45</sup>

**FROM LOGISTICAL DATA, ANALYZING:**

- ARTILLERY AMMUNITION ISSUED, BY UNIT, TYPE, ROUND AND TONNAGE.
- ASP CONGESTION AND TRAFFIC CONTROL.
- USE OF MOBILIZATION ASSETS.
- ARTILLERY FAILURES AND REPAIR PARTS REQUIREMENTS.
- ARTILLERY MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS.
- USE OF AMMUNITION RESUPPLY VEHICLES.
- MOVEMENT TIMES FOR MAJOR UNITS.
- TIMES REQUIRED FOR ARTILLERY AMMUNITION RESUPPLY.
- VEHICULAR DENSITY OF ROAD TRAFFIC.
- EXPENDITURE DATA FOR REVISED REQUIRED SUPPLY RATE.
- EXPENDITURE DATA FOR CONTROLLED SUPPLY RATE.
- DEGRADATION OF ROAD BY TRAFFIC AND TONNAGE MOVED.

November 13: "Worked all day yesterday, the first Saturday like that in some time. Getting my script together, for Thursday with Jack Vessey and then for a week from Tuesday, the 22d. It must be done on a script, because there will be a simultaneous reading of the Korean into the headsets which the Koreans will have. Also, each of the slides must be made into Korean as well, for a two screen slide show. Lots of slides. We never leave the screen blank.

November 22: "Today I will finally give my briefing to the assembled ROK and US commanders in Yongsan. Having previewed it with Jack Vessey, who thought it was fine, I think it's the right thing to be saying. There is an awful lot there to think about, if they want to think. And act. We'll see."

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<sup>45</sup>To illustrate the value of such data, some time earlier after Caper Crown II and III we had analyzed calls for artillery fire from battalions in contact, determining that some two-thirds of them called for air bursting proximity fuzes. These would inflict more casualties on North Korean infantry attacking our fortified positions than did point-detonating fuzes. Our distribution of fuzes in the ammunition supply points had to that time been one-third proximity and two-thirds point detonating. From this finding the ROK Army changed not only the distribution of fuzes in ASPs but its procurement of fuzes.

One very gratifying result of our joint efforts that culminated with Caper Crown VII was the response of Bob Taylor of Air Forces Korea. In typical Air Force fashion he crafted a series of "initiatives" several pages long that, in total, would eventually make a major difference in warfighting not only in the Western Sector but in Korea as a whole. Bob also had a significant influence on the ROK Air Force, whose Chief of Staff, correcting a deficiency highlighted in Caper Crown VII, had for example moved all his tactical air control parties (TACPs) from their central location at Wonju to join and live with the corps to which they are assigned. This would be a great improvement in readiness; it had made sense for some time, but it took the vivid illustration of Caper Crown VII to make it happen.

ROK senior officers had questioned the realism of my wargame.<sup>46</sup> So I concluded my briefing on November 22d with three slides:

Slide 1: Questions as to realism:

1. Were outcomes of engagements valid?
2. Were rates of movement valid?
3. Were the effects of air, artillery, barriers, and fortifications valid?
4. Was battle information like that of combat?
5. Was the mood of battle established?

Slide 2: Caper Crown Purposes:

- o Train
- o Evaluate operations plans

Slide 3: Caper Crown VII:

Sufficiently realistic to serve the purposes intended.

Not intended to predict the outcome of battle.

Those slides were one final effort to put Caper Crown VII in perspective.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Notwithstanding that Dr. Wilbur Payne (see page 23) had reported that our wargame "in its present form is fully adequate to identify inadequacies in defensive concepts and deployments and deficiencies in the ability to support and establish operations. In some areas, such as artillery assessment and representation of logistics, it is a substantially better model than those now in use." And we had since improved the simulation.

<sup>47</sup>It was painful for ROK commanders to subject themselves to a wargame in which they might not do well, and it was probably too much for me to expect that I could convince them of the necessity to do so, in their

November 23: "Got by OK on my briefing yesterday. That chapter in our work here is done, and we move on."

We did move on, but it was not to be for very much longer. The next morning I wrote...

November 24: "An important day yesterday. I went down to see Jack Vessey on affairs in general, and in his office he showed me a message that he had just received from General Kerwin, the Army's Vice Chief of Staff, that 'the Chief of Staff has approved Jack Cushman's retirement at the end of his two years in Korea - please let him know so that he can make his plans.' The message said that my replacement, as yet unnamed, will be on hand on 14 February."

The next day I asked Jack Vessey for leave so that I could go home and make arrangements for my retirement and next location. I booked a PanAm flight that would get me to New York late on December 2, whence I could go to Stewart Air Force Base, just outside West Point, to meet with Nancy -- and talk about the rest of our lives.

Returning two weeks later, I entered a round of final visits to my troops and fellow commanders, farewells to friends and senior personages, and party after party. I did get some satisfaction that my wargames had an effect...

December 17: "I went down to the ROK command post bunker yesterday morning to see the logistical wargame that ROK Army headquarters put together. My former I Corps Group artillery officer, Colonel, now Brigadier General, Park, was managing it. Wonderful job - very encouraging to see how they grasped the essentials. The roomful of American visitors was impressed from the start, and more so as we toured the action. Someone once described the kind of pleasure one gets from such as that as akin to watching your youngster finally play the saxophone."

The CIA station chief, Bob Grealey, and his wife Mary had been quite good friends of ours. So I made a calligraphy for them, of a saying that Mary loved.

January 15: "The Grealeys had a nice party for me last night, and they were very pleased with my calligraphy. I thought it was very good myself, and the Koreans there

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own interest. Caper Crown VII's alarming outcome was indeed a wake-up call, so I suppose that they really did not believe me when I said that our wargames were intended to give insights as to how to do better, and not to predict the battle's outcome, which for each situation had a range of possibilities. In 1979 I returned to Korea as a consultant on wargaming and command and control to the Mitre Corporation. In a discussion with the J-3/C-3 (Operations Director on the Joint/Combined Staff) I was told that "We are not doing wargaming of actual operations plans now. The commanders get too emotionally involved."

marvelled. I made something that looks graceful and meaningful. It's the Chinese characters that are graceful - and I simply copy them well sometimes."

I gave the Grealeys this note. The calligraphy itself is on the next page.



January 1978

Dear Mary and Bob -

The words are, phonetically, "YU VI, YU CHA, YU SON."

The first, third, and fifth characters mean "to be" or "have" or "exist" or "must have". Each is composed, at top left, of the ideograph for "hand", abbreviated, and under that, "moon".

The second character means "morality, right conduct, righteousness" or "duty to one's neighbor" or "moral sense, sense of duty or honor" or "justice, integrity". It combines two characters. On the left is the ideograph for "sheep" meaning "sacrifice". On the right is the ideograph for "I, me, or one". From these two comes "self-sacrifice" or "the moral sense". Second only to "jen", or "humaneness", it is the most profound concept of Confucianism.

The fourth character means "love" or "affection" or "tenderness" or "compassion" or "to be gentle, kindhearted, considerate". The top half conveys the idea of "to grow" or "increase in size". The bottom half is the ideograph for "heart". An early form of the character clearly shows the mother's hand holding food toward a baby, above the drawing of a human heart.

The sixth character means "humility, modesty, diffidence, self-effacement" or "to decline in favor of another" or "to hold back out of politeness". It combines three ideographs. In the center is the idea of "son". On the right is the character for "inherit, carries on, follows". Together these two mean "grandson", and also mean "gentle" or "obedient" since these are the characteristics of an ideal grandson. The character to the left and under is a radical that conveys the idea "to go" or "to walk slowly". All together, they mean "to go about, gentle and obedient" thus "humility".

"And what does the Lord require of you but to act justly, love tenderly, and walk humbly with your God?" Micah, 6:8.

With thanks for your friendship,

*Jack*



有義有慈有遜





And, at a huge party given by the Korean-American Friendship Association, after I presented its President, Mr. Tae Won Son, a calligraphy expressing my affection for Korea, he and I joined in a duet of "Hwangsong Yettoe," an ancient Korean song that was a favorite of President Park Chung Hee.





I became laden with gifts, plaques, and mementos, including more calligraphy equipment than I could possibly ever use. Perhaps the memento that pleased me most was from Bob Taylor. It was a bronze replica of the hand controls at the top of the cockpit "stick" used by a fighter pilot. On its base was inscribed my name and "Mr. Air/Land Battle."

And on February 8th, two days before I left Korea, Chung Ang University, founded decades before by American Methodist missionaries, conferred on me the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws -- complete with the academic robes to go with it!

A significant development in my final weeks was a January 6, 1978, visit by Congressman Samuel S. Stratton and members of his Investigations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, which had since General Singlaub's appearance before it in May 1977 been conducting hearings on a "Review of the Policy Decision to Withdraw United States Ground Forces from Korea."

The transcript of that visit is at Appendix Q. Although in view of its classified nature it has many "(deleted)s," it is worth reading as a summary of my work and judgments in Korea.

With that, and a month of visits and farewells, I completed my tour, departing February 10, 1978, two years after arriving, decorated handsomely by the ROK government.

It was raining, so my departure ceremony, which was held instead of a change of command in that my successor had not yet arrived, was indoors. Jack Vessey, who had learned Korean, and I had a little contest as we essayed to make extemporaneous remarks in the Korean language, to the amusement of all.

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*United Press International, February 25, 1978. The commander of US forces in Korea said yesterday he did not favor President Jimmy Carter's plan to withdraw US ground forces from the republic. General John Vessey, Jr., also told a Senate Armed Services subcommittee that any future war involving South Korea would be a disaster for the Seoul government, even if it won.*

*Washington, D.C., April 25, 1978. (Press release [at Appendix R]) President Carter's decision to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea could pose "grave hazards to the stability of Northeast Asia," the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee declared in a report released today by Congressman Samuel S. Stratton (D-N.Y.). As a consequence the subcommittee "strongly" recommended "that a*

*basic U.S. ground combat force be retained in Korea until the current armistice has been superseded by a formal peace agreement" between North and South Korea.<sup>48</sup>*

*Associated Press. July 21, 1979. Washington - President Carter ordered a halt in most U.S. troop cutbacks in South Korea until at least 1981, the White House announced Friday. (Upon his inauguration in January 1981, President Reagan suspended the troop withdrawal indefinitely.)*

(At Appendix T is a one-page biography of the author.)

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<sup>48</sup>From page 277 of Appendix Q: "General Cushman. ...Even when an adequate ROK Army warfighting capability is achieved, there will still be a need for a U.S. combat formation on the ground north of Seoul for as long as the 1953 military armistice agreement remains the governing political instrument separating the two Koreas." On February 2, 1978, Congressman Stratton had written me the letter at Appendix S.

On January 6, 1978, Congressman Samuel S. Stratton, Chairman of a Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, and some members of that subcommittee and the subcommittee counsel, visited my headquarters at Camp Red Cloud. This was one stop in a tour of South Korea. The visit was part of the House Armed Services Committee hearings on "Review of the Policy Decision to Withdraw United States Ground Forces from Korea," that had begun on May 25, 1977, with testimony by Major General John K. Singlaub.

The transcript of my testimony that day is at pages 257-281 here. Although classified material is deleted and explanatory slides are omitted, most of the substance of my testimony can be inferred. A careful reading of this transcript is recommended toward grasping the situation's complexities and its operational and policy ramifications.

In the first few pages, through page 265, Congressman Stratton struggled to understand the dispositions of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division on and near the DMZ in the Kaesong-Munsan avenue of North Korean approach, and the contradiction between a desire to give the U.S. President the option of deciding to commit U.S. troops, and the exigencies of coping with a North Korean attack with little or no warning, which would deny him that option.

Our preferred disposition of the 2d Infantry Division at the time of North Korean attack was in reserve areas from which its tank and infantry/antitank capabilities could be committed to prevent a breakthrough. At the same time, we saw little likelihood that the division's two platoons in guardposts overlooking the Joint Security Area would be withdrawn at a time of great tension; they were essential proof that an attack would surely be met by the commitment of U.S. force. Nor did we want to remove the nearby battalion of which they were a part.

Appendix Q

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,  
*I Corps Group, Korea, Friday, January 6, 1978.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:15 a.m., I Corps (ROK/US) Group, Korea, Hon. Samuel S. Stratton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. STRATTON. General, I think perhaps the best thing is for you to give us your presentation of what you do here, and I think we would be particularly interested in your analysis of the war games situation, which I understand you were in charge of.

I believe you presented this in person to the President, did you not?

**TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. JOHN H. CUSHMAN, COMMANDING  
GENERAL, I CORPS (ROK/US) GROUP, KOREA**

General CUSHMAN. No, sir, not to the President.

Mr. STRATTON. Was it to the Secretary of Defense?

General CUSHMAN. I did not give the Secretary of Defense this briefing, but I saw him; I gave it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; to Admiral Turner. This was in April of 1977.

Mr. BEARD. But you didn't give it to the Secretary of Defense?

General CUSHMAN. I saw the Secretary of Defense; gave him the substance of the briefing, but I did not take these charts.

I had at that time, as you will see, a lot of the slides that I will show. I think he is familiar with the substance of the matter, but I did not present the briefing.

Mr. STRATTON. General Vessey met with the President, did he not?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. Was that before you presented your briefing?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. Maybe you could give us a little of the background of the war game, when it took place, and how you handled this kind of procedure.

General CUSHMAN. Very well, sir. If it is all right with you, I would like to use some slides. It would make it go a little more clearly.

Mr. STRATTON. What we would like to have you do whatever you like. [Slides deleted].

General CUSHMAN. This, Mr. Chairman, will include many of the slides and information that I presented in April; however, we have done a good deal since April, and so I will bring you up to date to last month.

Of course that is where we are. Just to show you again my sector—I pointed it out earlier—the DMZ has two field army-sized units on it. One is the 1st ROK army and it takes care of the eastern half of the peninsula. I Corps (ROK/US) Group, my command, is responsible for the western half. You can see the terrain is very rugged—

you will fly there today—in the east, and then less rugged, until it is fairly open and good for cross-country maneuvering in this approach into Seoul.

Mr. STRATTON. Let me just interrupt, if I may, General. I don't know whether Miss Dempsey will be bothered by the fact that we have the slides because there will be a lot of "here" and "there," Miss Dempsey do not worry about it; just transcribe it as well as you can. Don't try to designate where he is pointing.

General CUSHMAN. Seoul is only 25 miles from the nearest North Korean forces, the capital city of the country. You are familiar with it. It has one-third of the gross national product. It is the proximity of Seoul that leads to the forward defense concept to defeat the enemy [deleted]. You can check the scale of this map. The DMZ is 4 kilometers wide.

Mr. STRATTON. Could you show us the location of your headquarters? General CUSHMAN. Right here, Uijongbu. The 2d Division is here, Tong Duchon.

The forward defense concept took the place of the former concept in which there was a plan to fight a delay and retrograde action and then bring in forces, and in effect fight a repeat of the Korean war.

You remember in the Korean war we lost Seoul two times. The forward defense concept visualizes that won't be permitted, that we will stop the enemy well forward so as to deny him any substantial territory; but not only that, to keep, especially in this sector, his artillery from being moved forward so they can bring Seoul under direct artillery attack.

Mr. STRATTON. The 2d Division then is slightly out of the direct line from Kaesong to Seoul?

General CUSHMAN. The 2d Division headquarters used to be right here, and they have a brigade headquarters here. There is a battalion across the Imjin River so there is a brigade in this sector. That is a third of the fighting strength of the division. The division artillery is here in Uijongbu and two brigades are up here by Tong Duchon.

Mr. STRATTON. This brigade goes out first?

General CUSHMAN. [Deleted.]

Mr. STRATTON. The brigade is on that route then; it would almost inevitably be involved in any attack?

General CUSHMAN. [Deleted.]

If we got sufficient warning, and we expect to have sufficient warning to permit it, the forces of the 2d Division [deleted].

And if we get sufficient warning, which we expect to have, that will be an [deleted] defense across the front.

I will have a slide that shows that, will explain that a little more.

Mr. STRATTON. What are your orders in the event of such an attack? [Deleted.]

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. [Deleted] I think, Charley, if you would go to that picture of the joint security area, that might be a good thing for us to discuss right now.

Let me just go quickly to the dispositions of the 2d Division. This is the 2d Division's position, sir. They have the 2d Battalion of the 9th Infantry north of Munsan. You will be going to the joint security area and you will see some of their units and you will be flying over there today, and I will point out their camp to you.

[Deleted.]

We have the division artillery here and the rest of the division is here. [Deleted.]

Mr. STRATTON. This seems to be a little different from what I understood yesterday. Is that a brigade that you have over there—a battalion over there?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. 2d Battalion?

General CUSHMAN. Of the 9th.

Mr. STRATTON. Are they in garrison status or are they in outposts there?

General CUSHMAN. I will show you in just a second another chart. They have two outposts inside the DMZ, they have a [deleted] that is backing up the joint security area, and they have the battalion minus that.

Mr. STRATTON. Are they dug in, prepared to fight? Or are they just sitting around in garrison condition?

General CUSHMAN. The two outposts on the DMZ are dug in, prepared to fight.

Mr. STRATTON. Then it is incredible to me that you say the first step is to take [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. The brigade is in its garrison location at this point, including brigade headquarters, right now today.

Mr. STRATTON. What is the point of having American forces here who are supposed to be defending us and having them just sitting around the line of attack in garrison status [deleted]. This is incredible, General.

In answering my question, General Vessey said he would have to get approval. Is he supposed to [deleted]?

That is incredible.

General CUSHMAN. Let me go to the dispositions that we have.

Mr. STRATTON. In what operation order was this contained?

General CUSHMAN. OPLAN 5027, Defense of Korea.

Mr. STRATTON. 5027. I think we are going to have to get a copy of that.

Mr. STRATTON. The thing that disturbs me is that I thought the description we received from General Vessey is that if the enemy came crashing across the line and near our troops, [deleted]. What you are talking about is if you had a week's notice—what type of notice are you talking about?

General CUSHMAN. I can describe it, just what we did in one of our war games. That would be a very graphic picture.

Would you like to go to that right now?

Mr. WON PAT. I think that would be better.

Mr. STRATTON. The thing that disturbs me is that I thought the point of getting notice was for you to have time for everybody to get set to zero in your artillery, to get everybody in position, and to make sure you have all of your supplies ready to zap the enemy the minute he stacks his nose across the first bridge. [Deleted.]

General CUSHMAN. The purpose of notice is that. We will do that with the [deleted] units that are under my operational control.

Mr. STRATTON. [Deleted.] I just don't understand that. Have those always been the instructions you have had?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. From the very first?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WON PAR. Seoul will still be vulnerable because of the proximity of the point of being out there, is to stop the enemy when he comes. [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. This will give you a better picture. You will be looking at some of these dispositions today. This is a scale 1 to 50,000. Each one of these squares is a kilometer. This is the Imjin River, this is the DMZ, this is the joint security area where the Military Armistice Commission, both sides, had their meeting place. It is where the murders took place in August of 1976. You will be visiting this tomorrow.

When the 7th Division pulled out, Mr. Chairman, in 1971 before they pulled out actually U.S. troops had a very substantial stretch of the DMZ. It started here, and they went past here off this map, and they named the outposts in this area. In fact, during the Vietnam War period, 1965-70, this was a combat area, there were actual engagements in this area.

Mr. STRATTON. Do they have orders to get warning? [Deleted]. General CUSHMAN. Not at the present time. When the troops were withdrawn, this little section here was given as the only U.S. presence in the DMZ. This is about 1 or 2 kilometers wide, as you can see. Then are two guardposts up here manned by American soldiers out of 6 guardposts in my sector. That is American.

There is a [deleted] at this advance camp. That is U.S. 2d Division. Then there is a battalion back here and an artillery battalion. They are there today, day in and day out.

The OPLAN 5027 calls, if we have sufficient warning, to [deleted]. This is what we have rehearsed. This is what we have worked out in detail with the responsible commanders. [Deleted.]

Second, the 2d Division represents a very substantial counterattack and blocking capability, which we want to keep intact. The instructions that I have are to [deleted].

Mr. STRATTON. What is the purpose of having them in an [deleted]. General CUSHMAN. The purpose of this position is to provide security for this piece of ground and to support the United Nations commander.

Mr. STRATTON. You have your battalion, and where is the brigade? That is farther down?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. What is the point of having the infantry up there? Is that supposed to supply security or something or other?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, it is to back up the U.N. commander's responsibilities.

Mr. STRATTON. You mean this is just sort of peacetime law and order security? Is this what you are talking about?

General CUSHMAN. No, sir. It was graphically illustrated, in fact, in August of 1976, when the ax murderers took place. These were the forces used to go in there and to protect the rights of the U.N. commander.

Mr. STRATTON. That is what I mean, to maintain civil order. Does it have any relation to combat mission?

General CUSHMAN. The 2d Division's presence—I would say this is a point not generally understood by the public at large—over here in this area really has three utilities. The first of these is war fighting; that is in case of an attack. The second is deterrence. The third is trucekeeping.

The 2d Division presence here is for deterrence and trucekeeping so it is not a civil problem. It is essentially a military purpose.

Mr. STRATTON. I understand that. But the thing that bothers me is that it would seem to me when we have as carefully channeled access route, attack route, as we have, that we ought to have [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. We do, sir, with the [deleted].

Mr. STRATTON. To the extent that these forces are in those positions, aren't they [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. When this attack comes and the forces are out—if they are—the U.S. Forces—this battalion is out of here, they are very well prepared—you will see some of them today—positions that the ROK 1st Division occupies to execute its defensive responsibility for this sector. [Deleted.]

Mr. STRATTON. I don't want to belabor this thing, but it would seem to me when the [deleted]. I wouldn't think.

General CUSHMAN. You are right, and if I could just give a little background on that, I think it might be useful to you, sir. [Deleted.]

Mr. STRATTON. That is it exactly, and this is what we tried to explore yesterday. But we were told, no, there wasn't going to be a problem similar to what we experienced with the Pueblo when they didn't wake up Lyndon Johnson to see whether we ought to do something. It is almost inevitable that if the 2d Division is in the line of attack and had orders to defend themselves, and since offense is the best defense, they would be going right into the battle.

What you have said I think bears out what Admiral Baldwin told us I believe with regard to this, that the 2d Division—maybe it was the person from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that talked to us [deleted].

If this is a blitz attack that comes down there, I can see happening exactly what happened with the Pueblo. They can't move without the President's say-so, and the President, according to General So-and-So from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will have to check with the Congress, and by the time they do all of that, Kim Il Sung will probably be taking a sauna bath in Seoul.

General CUSHMAN. You certainly have underscored the political-military mix with those comments.

Mr. STRATTON. Pardon me?

General CUSHMAN. You have underscored the political-military complexity of this situation with those remarks.

Mr. STRATTON. In other words, you recognize the problem that is involved?

General CUSHMAN. Very well, sir. As the commander who has to execute that, I have wrestled with this in detail in our war games. When I first arrived here in February of 1976 I decided we would have a war game in April of 1976 of this sector right here.

Put that map of the 2d Division on again, please, the one that I just had.

I would like to describe what went into my head because it is very similar to what you are talking about.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. To get this in some sort of chronological perspective, may I ask a question at this point?

Mr. STRATTON. Sure.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. At some time in the past things weren't like this—presumably an invasion occurred and the U.S. Forces fought almost automatically; is that correct?

General CUSHMAN. That is correct.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. When did this change, and why?

General CUSHMAN. You are asking me for something outside my competence.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. I realize you perhaps weren't here.

General CUSHMAN. I was not here.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. But somebody made a decision that it would be like that any more?

Mr. STRATTON. That is what I was trying to ask earlier.

General CUSHMAN. It took place in the late 1960's, early 1970's in my opinion. It took place with the withdrawal of the 7th Division when the 7th Division sector along the DMZ was shrunk to what I have just showed you, a small 1- or 2-kilometer slice that protected Panmunjom. It took place as a result of concern of the U.S. body politic about automatic involvement in Korea based upon the experience in Vietnam.

Mr. STRATTON. That is right.

General CUSHMAN. It took place because we wanted to give assurance under the war powers resolution and other legislation, and with congressional and public concerns that wanted assurance, that U.S. forces would not be committed without Presidential decision. It took place because of the commander's desires over here to accommodate those concerns and those themes, and it creates a very complicated, difficult military situation for the commander to do that because it is like saying you can engage your blood vessels, but you can't engage your bones in a war.

Mr. STRATTON. Or your heart.

General CUSHMAN. It is very difficult. However, we, as the commanders on the scene, are doing our level best to accommodate that. The complexity of the situation in Korea is not very well understood. Because day in and day out there on the DMZ you have American forces looking out into North Korea. Any day, any hour, an incident can take place. Those forces are needed there where they are because without those forces you haven't the ability to support the U.N. commander's requirement to guarantee that truce.

General Vessey is the direct descendant by sequence of command of General Mark Clark, who signed that truce. No other person from our side signed it. On the other side it was Kim Il Sung and a Chinese general.

The DMZ is a very sensitive area where violence could erupt at any time. It is General Vessey's responsibility under the President, who is executive agent for the United Nations, to maintain that truce. That must be maintained by Americans for a number of reasons: First, the ROK Government never signed the armistice agreement, although they agreed several years later to abide by its terms.

So we can't use ROK forces to maintain his rights and responsibilities.

The other very important reason is that they speak English, the 2d Division troops and orders are understood and the nuances are understood, and it is very difficult, I can assure you, after almost 2 years in a ROK-U.S. command, to convey in a tight situation, where there is tension, where there is opportunity for misunderstanding, the precise requirements. So those U.S. forces are needed there. They are needed there until there is a substitute for this armistice. They are needed there until a political settlement is achieved, and my firm conviction is, as we come down the line and get closer and closer to the time for the final withdrawal, that will be recognized and they won't be pulled out until that time.

I am satisfied that is what history is going to unfold as this goes on. Mr. BEARD. Since we are the only ones on this side that signed the truce, if they do pull out that would only leave the North Koreans up there?

General CUSHMAN. The South Koreans.

Mr. BEARD. But as far as the U.N. capacity—

General CUSHMAN. I don't think any President is eventually going to turn over the issues of war and peace that might stem from a serious incident or accident along in here—not going to turn over the issues of war and peace to the Republic of Korea forces. He is responsible ultimately as executive agent.

Mr. STRATTON. General, I don't want to spend too much time on this, but I think you have given us a very important point and one that certainly we didn't understand although we have had conflicting information with regard to it.

What concerns most of us in connection with the withdrawal is that the additional fighting capacity of the 2d Division would be removed. In spite of all the talk about not forsaking our commitment, it is our impression that the reason for this withdrawal is to make sure that the United States doesn't get involved in another land war in Asia.

We want to get out so that when things erupt we at least are not involved. That is the thing that disturbs us about this whole withdrawal.

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. What I didn't understand was that back in the 1960's we began that process of not getting involved by changing this whole procedure.

General CUSHMAN. I would say it was late 1960's or early 1970's, I don't know precisely when.

Mr. STRATTON. I never was aware of it. In other words, the real commitment of the United States has not been as substantial as most of us recognize for the last 10 years—8 or 9 years—and so to that extent this decision of the President's is simply going one step beyond what was done then. I would assume this is sort of tied in with the Nixon doctrine?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. That we weren't going to commit U.S. forces any more to help our allies; we would give them weapons but they had to supply the manpower. That was apparently the way we proceeded?

General CUSHMAN. I would say so.

Once again, I am not knowledgeable on the policy discussions at that time, but I would say this, that the presence of the 2d Division



here with its forces on the DMZ day in and day out is the decisive one, and the difference between that and manning a section of the line is nowhere near as great as pulling them out completely.

Mr. STRATTON. That I can understand, but there is a tie-in there. In other words, we are keeping our forces there as a deterrent [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. I would say that my environment here is that of a commander with my commanders and ROK officers. I would say their perception is that they view the removal of the 2d Division and its pulling out, the plan to pull them out of here completely, in just the way you describe, as, although it may not be intentional on the part of our Government, a clear indication that the commitment is somehow less.

Mr. STRATTON. Right.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. We have had witnesses, specifically I recall the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that said war risks would be greater after your withdrawal. That really would relate then to the truce-keeping function more than the weight that the strategic reserves the 2d Division might provide?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, that is right.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. That is very interesting.

General CUSHMAN. If I could get into the war fighting function. In the war games here we have focused on both of those, the truce-keeping and deterrence functions and the warfighting function, but primarily on the war-fighting function because the truce-keeping [deleted] problem only comes out because it gets us into that intricate problem of [deleted].

I would like to go into the war fighting with you.

Mr. STRATTON. Please do. Maybe you can explain to us what you cranked in with respect to the delay in getting word from Washington.

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. I can. I will show you a scenario that takes us down hour by hour before the enemy attack.

Mr. STRATTON. This is extremely helpful.

General CUSHMAN. If I also might say, Mr. Chairman, it is not until you get in a war game with this and force the commanders to deal with these issues that many of them surfaced. That is the great value of the war game. It makes vivid the complicated military-political mix we have in the western sector.

Everybody we have ever brought here and sat in these seats has come away with the same idea because they never really grasp. And I didn't myself, to be quite frank, almost 2 years ago when I started here and got my first briefing at the JSA, that was the first time I really grasped the complexity of this and decided to exercise that coordination in the first war game we had. It was extraordinarily beneficial to all the commanders involved. In fact, I will tell you what happened on it. I will give you a little story.

I described to the corps commander of the 1st ROK Corps in the western corridor how we were going to do this. I said, [deleted] and the enemy is going to have to attack right across the DMZ.

He said: "Then there won't be a war. There is not going to be a war under those circumstances."

Mr. STRATTON. In other words, [deleted]. Has anybody you have ever heard out here complained and said that isn't right, we ought to do something about it? Have you had anybody from Congress?

General CUSHMAN. I don't recall any particular visitors that have done that, no, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. Secretary Brown? Did you give him this briefing? General CUSHMAN. I gave him a very abbreviated form of this.

Mr. STRATTON. I see.

General CUSHMAN. This is a ROK-U.S. force, Mr. Chairman. It is kind of like horse and rabbit stew because that is about the relative proportion of ROK-U.S.—11-ROK divisions and 1-U.S. division. There are ROK divisions on the DMZ itself and one on the Imjin River. I have three corps commanders, three-star generals, under my OPCON. They have these reserve divisions, reserve positions, and that is the Korean side of my force only.

Then I have told you about the 2d Division. It fits right into that.

This slide [deleted] is the mix that I have. I have 12 divisions. These are the weapons. You can see the U.S. contribution weaponswise. For example, the ROK have [deleted] of the TOW missile. The 2d Division [deleted], more by far than the rest of my force put together. With its tanks and TOW's, the 2d Division is very valuable as antiarmor.

I point out this figure here, which shows that day-to-day authorization in peacetime is [deleted]. Mobilized reserves flesh out all the units; it takes [deleted] hours to do that. Total strength would then be almost one-quarter of a million. This highlights the importance of getting some warning because many of these units are short, especially the supporting units.

Mr. STRATTON. They have a total force of, what is it, 600,000? General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. That includes Air Force and the Navy. I have [deleted] minus the U.S. part of that, which is 15,000, so say [deleted] minus the ROK Marines, so I would say [deleted] of the ROK Army's strength is in my sector.

Mr. STRATTON. So it would take [deleted] days—

General CUSHMAN. [Deleted].

Mr. STRATTON. Oh, [deleted]—to get another [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. Those are individual reservists that come in to flesh out the units. That is the maximum. They actually achieve much of this in the very first hour. Some reservists are right over in Uijongbu.

Mr. STRATTON. Do you have any idea how many troops the North Koreans could mobilize at the point of impact?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, and I will show you that in just a second. That is our size, the friendly side.

Here is the enemy. He has opposite me [deleted] of his corps, [deleted] and he has [deleted] divisions in each one, so he is kind of like we are except his dispositions are well forward. He has reserve divisions and units back in here. Then, back in the country at large he has the rest of the forces. I won't go into the detail of his positions, but the total he has, [deleted] like this (indicating), and [deleted]. I, for planning purposes, give him the capability of concentrating and achieving relative surprise with [deleted] of these divisions and all [deleted] attacking my sector. This is what we have war gamed again and again.

Mr. STRATTON. Against your 12?

General CUSHMAN. Against my 12. Of course, there are other reserve divisions that are available to me. The [deleted] is available very shortly, positioned in my area.

Mr. STRATTON. Are his divisions roughly the same size?

General CUSHMAN. They are smaller in numbers. They are organized Soviet style. They have slightly fewer weapons because their strength is a little less, but they are very powerful. They have more tanks, for example, than our divisions.

Mr. STRATTON. Are those [deleted] the DMZ?

General CUSHMAN. [Deleted.]

I will show you a scenario in which they do concentrate. That is one of the great changes in the situation from a couple of years ago, their ability to concentrate.

Now I am into war fighting here. If we are going to succeed, the first thing we have to do is to deny the enemy total surprise.

Mr. WOOD PATT. How do you do that?

General CUSHMAN. With an all-out intelligence effort, watching his every move that we can. This by no means is a guarantee. You have to fight for warning.

Mr. STRATTON. This is what you try to do?

General CUSHMAN. What we must do. General Vessey has really put the pressure on this because I have to have time to get ready on position with the essential barriers installed, this artillery deployed, and reserves all in good order when he attacks.

I say that I must have the equivalent of [deleted] of warning to do that. It takes units time to move from their training and other positions day in and day out; some take a good deal less than that, as on general outposts. Up against the DMZ it takes less [deleted] sometimes [deleted] but it takes [deleted] to get myself in a good posture from a standing start. I have to have that much time, and that is simply enough to prevent disaster.

We also must master in advance the tactics, the logistics, the command and control methods, and all the other techniques that the conditions of battle will demand. I will describe those in a little more detail. When a war starts, as the commander I and my subordinate commanders have to see the battlefield with our intelligence means. What that is out there. Most of all, from my point of view, we have to determine where the enemy is concentrated, and then move against his force—it is kind of like he has the ball, lining up in a football game with his 11 men, and I have mine, and I can't even see him line up, and I still have to hold him to about a 2-yard gain. So I have to concentrate the maneuver units, the artillery, the tactical air, and the logistics. Once concentrating, then I have to conduct a very skillful offensive defense to defeat him [deleted]. The advantage is largely with the enemy because of his initiative and his ability to concentrate.

Mr. STRATTON. Does he have any alternate route so that he would have an ability to feint and to deceive?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. He is good at that. I have to read through that deception.

Mr. STRATTON. You can't assume he is going to come down the easiest and most obvious path?

General CUSHMAN. That is right. I can't focus on that.

[Deleted.]

So this is by no means certain, although I do feel, if you would ask me where do you think he would make his main attack, I would have to tell you, based on everything, it will come down through here because [deleted]. But he is a thinking commander. He is going to try to get me to think that and do something else, so I have a serious problem with intelligence and all the other reporting components of my front-line commanders to do this, and it is an extraordinarily complicated problem.

As a result of this being the problem, we have to practice and it was this that led me to war gaming. I came here from the Army's Command and General Staff College, where I was commandant, where we introduced war gaming into the teaching of officers, majors in rank, to be commanders. But here I didn't figure I was going to teach. I was going to let them learn by exposing them to what would happen if they didn't do it right. That is my educational philosophy, to learn by experience. Here in our war games we can do it again without cost. So I started these war games.

The first values of a war game are these two (slide) [deleted]. It has been valuable with our Air Force friends; they have participated in these war games from the beginning. This has been an educational experience for all concerned, but we also find that they help us to identify deficiencies in our operations plans. We find out we could have done better if we put our forces in a different place to reinforce the barriers, et cetera.

The final thing (slide) [deleted] and I show you this chart with some reluctance because there is a lot of controversy about this chart, is that war games contribute to the net assessment of the balance of forces—I emphasize the word contribute because you can't predict how a war is going to turn out. If we had run a war game of the October 1973 war, the balance of forces would never have worked out. That would have been the answer in a number of other wars, but it makes you understand the problem better and whether you need to build your forces to a greater extent. I think most people will agree to this, but would each have their own definition of contribute. I don't say it is a total measure, but it does make a substantial input into my own judgment.

General Vessey went to the States in February of 1977. He was going to testify. He actually didn't testify. He saw a lot of people in the executive branch, including the President. He came back. We had just finished our second big war game. I don't like to interpret General Vessey; he should tell you this himself. But I believe he would say that the war gaming being used in the executive branch was not dynamic, it was more of a static aggregation of capabilities, and it did not include the surprise and dynamics and initiative.

I told him we had just run two war games which gave us a substantial insight into the balance of forces. I said it might be useful for me to put together the experience of those war games and take it back to Washington.

He asked for a Dr. Wilbur Payne, the Army's expert on war gaming, to come to Korea and take a look and see if our games are adequate. And they were pronounced adequate, so I prepared the briefing. I went back to Washington in April of 1977. I conducted a series of briefings. You won't hear all of it, but I will show you what we might call the

bottom line on the briefing. First let me go through Caper Crown II, if you don't mind.

Mr. BEARD. Did Dr. Payne come over?

General CUSHMAN. Yes. They pronounced it good for the purpose for which it was being used.

Mr. STRATTON. What branch of the Pentagon handles that? Is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General CUSHMAN. All parts of the Pentagon are into war gaming.

Mr. STRATTON. The various services?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, but I would say the net assessment would be by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because that involves all the services. This was Caper Crown II. This was October of 1976. This is [deleted] divisions attacking first to seize [deleted] and then to press on against this defense. There are some of the lessons learned. This will give you the insights that came out of Caper Crown II, extraordinarily valuable.

Here is Caper Crown III. We went over here [deleted]. Here he gave me a secondary attack at [deleted] and made his main attack here against this defense, and then these are some of the lessons learned. And once again, very useful.

As a result of these Caper Crowns I said, here is my assessment of the adequacy of the western sector defense. First thing, outcomes are going to vary; although we only get one chance, there are a great variety of possible outcomes. It will depend on quantitative factors, such as the number of tanks and divisions on both sides, but also on imponderables—luck, surprise, tactical leadership, and so on. But it is my job as the responsible commander here to make an honest assessment and that has to be separated from what I might say to my troops for motivation or what I might say to the Korean public for confidence building. I have to make my honest personal assessment. Incidentally, that is a very difficult thing to do sometimes because you tend to believe your own propaganda.

Mr. STRATTON. Just on the mechanics of the war gaming, I think I understand it in a general way. I know they had it in operation at the Naval War College, for example, but to some extent this is done on a machine, isn't it?

General CUSHMAN. No, sir. I should have possibly explained it sooner. But we have the commanders here themselves. This is not a machine game. This game is manpower intensive. Commanders make the decisions. There is very little computer support. The machine games were the ones General Vessey did not like.

Mr. STRATTON. But the decision as to which way the enemy is going to come, for example, is made by the guy playing the enemy?

General CUSHMAN. Yes. The friendlies don't know the enemy. They use these war game rules.

Mr. STRATTON. You don't roll the dice?

General CUSHMAN. Actually, you do. If you say, if we could hit this tank say three times out of four, then you roll the dice to find out if you actually hit the tank. But it is to determine the particular outcome of that battle.

So I said, now my assessment today, that is April of 1977, is [deleted]. No margin for mistakes. That means you have to do a very good job reading this thing, putting the 2d Division in the right place, fight-

ing a good battle. I don't expect to make any mistakes. One of my reasons for my war game is to keep me and my subordinate commanders from making mistakes. I hope Kim Il Sung makes his share of mistakes. Even though this might be the problem here, I am going to come up like Notre Dame licking Texas. That would be my way of looking at it, even if they do have the advantage.

Mr. STRATTON. [Deleted.]

General CUSHMAN. This was a surprise to the people back in Washington at that time because they hadn't understood that was the situation, and I will give you a slide which shows the prevailing view as of early 1975.

In early 1975, in testimony of Congress and everywhere else, [deleted] this was the prevailing view. It was rather indefinite as to the military need for the 2d Division in Korea. Its war-fighting contribution was rather uncertain. Generally the feeling was the ROK Army could do the job all by itself and the division's presence in Korea was essential for deterrence and for stability, and might even be available for Pacific reserve. The DAMZ mission of the 2d Division was not essential. This was the prevailing view. What changed it? Because people asked me: 2 years, before this was it; now you are coming in and giving us this assessment. Why?

There are several factors that led to a change. First, we had a study by the Defense Intelligence Agency just before I took command here—it was briefed over here in November or December or January, late 1975, early 1976—which said the assumption of warning of, say [deleted] wasn't all that valid, that there was a very strong possibility of a good deal less warning than that.

It led me to conclude I might have a [deleted] but I couldn't count on more than [deleted] of warning to Defcon Two. That changes the ratio in favor of the enemy.

The second is that the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U.S. Army, made a study of enemy tank strength. For years, because of the focus on Vietnam, the intelligence analysts were looking at Southeast Asia. They turned their resources to Korea and they started counting tanks. This was briefed here in Korea in December of 1975.

Here is a tank inventory. As it eventually turned out, you can see somewhere in here—1970—Kim Il Sung made a decision to rearm. We started reading the output up in here. That is not just of tanks; it is true of everything. It is true of his artillery, but not quite as graphic.

Mr. WOX PAT. The ratio is [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. This [deleted] to one from way back in 1968.

The third factor is that we had been studying Soviet tactics and it was clear that he was going to concentrate; he wasn't just to make an attack across this whole front. You just don't attack that way; it makes no military sense that way. So we put these concentrations in. This is the concentration for October 1976 game. You see, you have this secondary attack to deceive me it is coming that way, and he put in here, [deleted].

Here is the kind of ratios we have against our forces. You can see the ratios of maneuver battalions, and his tanks versus our tanks and TOW's. If we concentrate, people say, well, that is the worst case. And that is right and that is what he wants to give me, my worst case, so I have to figure out how to handle my worst case. We can handle this,

as I will show you later, by the right tactics. This is by no means a hopeless situation.

So the final thing was, we had begun our war gaming and we had an improved net assessment. People might disagree with my net assessment. I have my judgment because I am familiar with the situation. I may be a little more pessimistic than others, but that is the price you have to pay for having a commander who is concerned about his situation.

Here is a picture of our war game plan, Mr. Chairman. We take the actual plans, we bring the actual commanders and staffs in here, and try to create the realism of actual battle without fighting. We strive for authenticity in all of these games, the net result being the closest we can come to battle without fighting.

We have a war game terrain board. Three inches equals 1 kilometer. The relief is in there a little exaggerated. The first few war games we ran were of a full corps sector, a sector of a whole corps.

During the game, these are the controllers and assessors. We move the chips around—these represent the friendly and the enemy units—and we move them around and we have tables and rules that are improved on but scientifically derived that tell the outcome of battle. This is all passed to the commanders just as if they were getting it in a real battle. We bring them in close and bring communications right to their command posts.

We have these battle simulation routines. We found these, for example, very valuable in the logistics area. These are the combat, intelligence routines.

Mr. STRATTON. What is the time factor?

General CUSHMAN. We haven't had a game more than 30 hours. It is enough to get us through the first day-plus of war. We bring them in and we only do the game during daylight hours. Then they go back to their units and then they assemble again and take it up. It takes about a week to run one.

This is Wilbur Payne's assessment.

The game in its present form with its current rules is fully adequate to identify inadequacies of defensive concepts and deployments and deficiencies in the ability to support and establish operations. In some areas, such as artillery assessment and representation of logistics, it is a substantially better model than those now in use for similar purposes by the U.S. Army. There are some important details discussed below where we believe you will either have to improve the model or supplement it with careful judgment.

I won't go into these improvements in detail. He gave us a critique of the barrier routines, for example, and some of the other aspects.

Mr. STRATTON. Could I ask, General, when did you conclude the discussions you have just set forth? At the end of 1977?

General CUSHMAN. April of 1977.

As a result of studying our first three war games, particularly Capers Crown II and III, I made the conclusion in April of 1977.

Mr. STRATTON. I see. The President, of course, made his decision even before he was inaugurated. Then I think our testimony was that the Joint Chiefs were asked to comment in early February?

Mr. LALLY. March 7, I think.

Mr. STRATTON. So when the Joint Chiefs got into the picture they still were operating under the earlier assumptions presumably. They hadn't your information?

General CUSHMAN. They got my information, I don't know the exact date, but it was in mid-April. I actually briefed the Joint Chiefs in their JCS conference room. They listened to my briefing.

Mr. STRATTON. The actual directive hadn't been set until May?

Mr. LALLY. General Rogers was out here at the end of April.

General CUSHMAN. He was here while I was there. From my point of view, I figured when the President discussed it at his press conference, 9th of March when the President discussed it at his press conference.

Mr. STRATTON. I think you are right. The thing actually wasn't firmed up.

General CUSHMAN. It was those war games that led me to this [pointing]. Then I also went ahead and decided if that is the case the 2d Division's probable involvement is the decisive deterrent today.

Mr. ROBERT DAVEN. General, what aspect of the 2d Division involvement makes the difference?

General CUSHMAN. It is primarily their defensive strength and antiarmor, blocking the rearward lines, the defensive lines. [Deleted.] This is the kind of thing we work on again and again.

Mr. STRATTON. You were going to tell us what you cranked into this thing in terms of [deleted] cranking in the approval from Washington, and then how did you actually deploy the 2d Division.

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir; I will come to that. It will come out. Incidentally, I think we probably ought to continue all the way through my briefing, so why don't you let the V Corps commander know we are going to be a little late.

Mr. BEARD. Have you been asked to do another war game with the 2d Division out and using the compensatory—

General CUSHMAN. No, sir, that is a long-term thing and I am interested in the day-to-day.

Mr. STRATTON. They may ask him to do a war game where it comes out better without the 2d.

General CUSHMAN. Then I told them, if you are going to remove the 2d Division—in other words, I figured my briefing was to shed light on the problem. General Vessey said: "I am not sending General Cushman back there to do anything except to shed light on the problem."

I said:

If you are going to pull the 2d Division, that means we have to have major improvements in the western sector defenses. I am just looking at it from my sector. I came up with the 11 essential actions I saw at that time. We had to have more antiarmor, more TOW's, more .90 millimeter recoilless rifles, and better tactical employment.

We had to modernize the tank force. You are familiar with that. We had to improve the artillery, these measures.

We had to strengthen the forward fortifications forward of the main battle area, but also in the main battle area. We had to accelerate the GOP nine emplacement—to emplace them right against the DMZ in peacetime, to relocate the combat engineer effort forward.

Actually, the GOP is the first outfit to get in combat. It means general outpost. It is the outpost right along the DMZ.

Mr. BEARD. I hope your GOP does better than ours. That is not too reassuring.

Mr. WOOD PAT. What I am asking, if we pull out emergency forces, those units will be manned by ROK forces?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. This is all to get the ROK Army so it can defend without U.S. ground forces.

Mr. WON PAT. How long will that take?

General CUSHMAN. It will take about [deleted] more or less.

Improve logistics.

Harden communications and command posts.

Upgrade the intelligence [deleted]. All sources means all sources available to us.

Develop air-land battle proficiency, get sufficient ALO's and tactical air control parties. And foster flexibility in the commanders so they can read the battle and move with fire and maneuver, seize control of the battle. That is a very important change in the fighting.

All of those together are what we must do if we are to pull the 2d Division out.

Now, the ROK reaction to this—these are, once again, the slides I used. We briefed the Koreans before I left. It was pretty sobering information because they had not seen the results of this kind of thing. [Deleted.] However, the seniors were being very straight forward about it and going about their work. But there was this uncertainty about the United States, anxiety about the future.

Then I gave my overall assessment at that time. I am showing you because it is the chart I used in the States. You can just read it:

U.S.-ROK relationship has been a durable friendship with many tests.

Extraordinarily sensitive years ahead to bring about the new conditions where ground forces are out and air cover only remains.

Some benefits to be gained by doing it, if we do it right.

Potential for damage and even an unwanted and unnecessary war if we do it wrong.

No room for avoidable doubts and uncertainties or questions as to motives by either party.

Mr. ROBERT DANIEL. What are the benefits?

General CUSHMAN. General Vessey and I discussed the benefits. There are not many. But I give you only what I think.

One benefit is there is a substantial benefit to be achieved by ROK self-sufficiency; that is to say, assuming more responsibility for their own defense. In other words, it is growing up toward full responsibility for their affairs. If you do it right, the U.S. initiative could lead to a settlement of the truce and a more permanent peace, a political settlement. I would say doing it right includes that. In my judgment, the last American ground forces should not leave Korea until that political settlement becomes part of the overall outcome.

Mr. STRATTON. You mean by that that the strength of the Koreans becomes so obvious that Kim Il Sung recognizes that he can't really take over the South?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, that is true. That is my first point, that the ROK's then have their own capability to defend their country and stop the enemy, and Kim Il Sung gives up his wild notion about reuniting Korea by force. But also if we do it, it could lead to a political settlement in Northeast Asia, which would remove this tense truce situation. That calls for a change in attitude on the part of Kim Il Sung.

Mr. STRATTON. What I am saying is, if he realizes that he has no chance of taking over by force, then he will say, OK, we might as well settle it?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. That is right. Those are some of the benefits.

Then we went to Caper Crown IV. This was in May, June, July, and August. This is a slow-motion game. I wanted to have the utmost realism and just involve the senior commanders against the enemy. Enemy and friendly tactics were not known to the different sides. We had a lot of emphasis on artillery. By that time we had [deleted] so we increased the main attack [deleted] against the defending corps. By that time we had repositioned some of our reserves. We had the [deleted] that had moved at Dejeon 2 and was now backing up in the I Corps area. The enemy made his attack at [deleted] hours at night.

Mr. STRATTON. Where did the North Koreans come down in 1950? General CUSHMAN. In 1950 we had the 38th parallel. It went right across here. This is Kaesong. The 38th parallel is like that [indicating]. They came down right through Uijongbu, where you are here, but they also came through here [indicating]; this area over here was all in their hands, and they attacked down through here.

That 1950 experience has led to a certain fixation on the dangers of this Chorwon approach. But you can see by the geography now it is twice as far from here to Seoul than it is from here to (Munsan) to Seoul.

Mr. STRATTON. That is where we ended up?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. The Chinese offensive of April of 1951 drove the U.N. command back all the way. In fact, Uijongbu was the front line. A very strong counteroffensive pushed in here, and by the time we got to approaching Kaesong, that is when the other side said, let's talk. Then about 2 years of negotiations.

Actually, in this war game the enemy came through here, called [deleted] when we ended this game, the enemy had made a penetration across here and was on his way in strength. We were moving our reserves into position on successive defense lines, including the [deleted] but there was nothing in that outcome to lead me to change my assessment that [deleted]. We learned a lot out of that. We learned a lot of things we shouldn't do. I won't go into that.

These were the force ratios.

This, as I said, was where the enemy, when we called the [deleted], had advanced a very strong force. We were moving other forces into position, but the lesson learned is that essentially the April 1977 assessment still prevails. This is August 1977.

Also I said that we can win—I am satisfied we can win on main battle area Alpha—provided we do all these things [indicating]. It is going to be a problem to do it. It is work.

Mr. STRATTON. You mean we can win [deleted].

General CUSHMAN. We can win [deleted].

General Vessey has his own program over and above this, of course. Mr. STRATTON. The thing that disturbs me in all of this—and we have this so permeated through the government at the present time that even the Director of the DIA cites this as if it were existing fact—these are things provided you could achieve certain particular levels of capability in all of these areas, then you feel that it would work out. But simply listing them doesn't necessarily mean it is going to happen.

General CUSHMAN. This is hard work.  
Mr. STRATTON. At any particular time.



General CUSHMAN. That is right.  
Mr. STRATTON. It is not just a case of increasing weapons; you have to get the skill?

General CUSHMAN. That is right.

Mr. STRATTON. That is an intangible as far as the future goes.

General CUSHMAN. I also said we have to change our concept of operations. Basically, it calls for more [deleted] that sort of thing. This is what I look back to the States.

I went back again in September and made briefs at different service schools. I said this is a new concept of operations for OPLAN 5027, and showed this slide in the Korean language. There is a reason for that, because this concept has to be in the minds of Koreans. It doesn't do any good for me as a commander to dream up these thoughts; Koreans have to not only understand but participate in their development. That means learning by experience through war gaming, so that is why I continue to push this war gaming as a means to understand the battle better.

It gave us an improved understanding of these 11 essential actions. I have changed this one. Instead of calling it foster flexibility, I put it study and modify tactics and plans. I gave each one of these actions to a member of my staff, operations, intelligence, et cetera, and they are working on how to get from here to there in each one of these. Some are more complicated than others. Some call for U.S. equipment. Others the ROK's can do by themselves. Some are easy to accomplish. If you just go out and build a road, no problem, but some are complicated. Logistics is a difficult system. We have a program in the English and the Korean languages for each one of these in my headquarters.

Mr. STRATTON. Isn't this the kind of battlefield where the margin of McNamara line might actually be effective? They can't go off the flanks?

**General Cushman. That is right. Just make yourself lots of fortifications.**

Mr. STRATTON. Do you have the electronic equipment?

General CUSHMAN. [Deleted.]

Mr. STRATTON. I see.

General CUSHMAN. This chart I developed to explain to visitors the problem. Here is mid-1977, say last summer. This is western sector balance, ROK Army only. Considering not just the capability, that is counting the numbers, but the actual employment of the capability, the surprise and the concentration, today or in mid-1977, [deleted] has the preponderance. But if we take those actions that I just mentioned, all of these, that is the et cetera, over a period of time the ROK Army only defense is going to get better.

Now North Korea is going to get better too. We don't know the slope of its curve, but in time we will probably be able to say with very substantial justification that we probably would stop the enemy on main battle area Alpha.

There is a question mark as to time. It depends on the quality of our effort in this, and it depends of course on what the North Koreans do. It is not all in our hands. But this end result can be achieved within reason. I don't say the time, but I would say that [deleted] is a reasonable target but not guaranteed.

These are the longstanding missions of my headquarters, the DMZ and HRE activities. I have added to that this, which is to participate in western sector improvement. I emphasize participate because I have no resources of my own. They come from others. In fact, I share responsibility for the western sector with the 3d ROK Army commander, who actually commands OPCON forces. His headquarters is south of Seoul. This is the distribution of responsibilities between the two of us. You see we have to work very closely together because he has everything from training to fortification construction. We are partners in the execution of these 11 essential actions. That is one of the complicated features of the command situation here—I have the responsibility to fight, but he has the responsibility for readiness.

Mr. STRATTON. Did you get a chance to present this to Secretary Brown?

General CUSHMAN. I showed Mr. Brown this chart, yes, sir. That was in July.

Mr. BEARD. Being concerned about safety of troops, et cetera, have you gone through the results of your whole war game scenario and withdrawn the brigade that is being withdrawn—

General CUSHMAN. We haven't done that, no, sir.

Mr. BEARD. But I would assume in your war games it played an extremely important part in saying [deleted]. To me, that could be placing the rest of the troops in jeopardy.

General CUSHMAN. That first withdrawal only has about 3,000 of the 2d Division. General Vessey has taken the greatest pain to cut into the antitank and other strength as little as possible.

Mr. BEARD. But you are taking quite a bit of firepower out, aren't you?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

I would like to discuss the DMZ. This is the DMZ. In one part of my sector you can see the outposts, you will see them from the air today. There is about [deleted] per mile on our side. The other side has about three per mile. This reflects his forward displacement and strength. That is kind of a wild territory, as a look at it shows. Here is one of our outposts. There are over in here. The south boundary has a fence, chain link, 10 foot high.

The utility of the 2d Division involves all three of these, war fighting, deterrence, and trucekeeping, as I mentioned earlier. I have been talking recently just about the war fighting, but it is important to discuss these others. I would point out back in 1975 this was the prevailing view, that the DMZ mission of the 2d Division was not essential. What changed that? It is no longer the prevailing view over here. The ax murders of 1976 made it graphic that you need the force up there protected by 2d Division troops. They were there; they didn't have to go into an escalation or raising the level of tension, by replacing ROK's with these U.S. forces. The 2d Division cut down the tree and also pulled out this barrier. These were the purposes of the August 21, 1976, action. The fundamental purpose is here demonstrated.

This is the document that was signed in 1953. I bring this out.

You may not be able to read that, but I will say paragraph 62 of the truce agreement, which was signed by General Clark, General Vessey's predecessor, says:



The articles and paragraphs of this armistice agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

Of course, that political settlement was then visualized as happening very soon. It has gone on now since the 27th of July 1973. This, plus the intricacies of these deployments up around the DMZ, the truce-keeping and deterrence mission of the 2d Division, is what is very rarely understood by people who think and write and speculate on Korea.

So I have two basic conclusions that I arrived at at that time last summer. Before I get into the last war game, which I will, I will give these to you. The first of this is that we can achieve an adequate ROK Army war-fighting capability. It will be a complex major force-building undertaking. [Deleted] is a reasonable target, given the necessary resources, but it is not a certainty. It will be costly, it will call for resources from the United States. We are not certain if it can be done in this number of years.

Mr. BEARD. Have we gotten any kind of price tag at all?

Mr. STRATTON. According to Brown, it is the \$800 million of transferring the 2d Division, plus a couple billion for what the ROK's are supposed to do themselves.

Mr. LALLX. \$2 billion, I believe, is what is estimated. General CUSHMAN. General Vessey's headquarters has participated in that from the very beginning.

Mr. BEARD. In other words, that \$2 billion price tag would supply that which you say is necessary?

General CUSHMAN. I think that is a very good approximation of it. I am satisfied as they get down the line they will probably make modifications, but I think that is probably the best judgment now.

Mr. STRATTON. When does the time start to run?

General CUSHMAN. At SCM, last July, [deleted].

Mr. STRATTON. From July of 1977?

General CUSHMAN. That is my understanding, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. Have you done anything so far in this direction? General CUSHMAN. This is gradual, of course. They are modifying the tanks, going to get the tanks ready to issue. We have received some tanks. We are working on fortifications. We are improving those 11 essential actions. I will say we are on track with that curve, sir, as long as you realize there is a question mark as to the end of it.

Mr. STRATTON. This [deleted] is really just a guess, isn't it? General CUSHMAN. I would say it is a target. It is an informed judgment, but it is not a certainty.

Mr. STRATTON. Who has the responsibility for training the Koreans in handling these new equipments; would you as the I Corps commander have that responsibility?

General CUSHMAN. No, sir. The Koreans do their own training, and the training advice comes in part from me, but mostly from 8th Army.

Mr. STRATTON. Eighth Army?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRATTON. General Vessey?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Colonel BURKE. His other hat.

General CUSHMAN. They have to acquire some aviation. Our aviation group here in-country is going to assist them in understanding and developing the tactics, and so forth, for developing the aviation units.

Mr. STRATTON. It would seem to me that we have a not insuperable but certainly a very complicating factor which you mention, but I don't think most of us recognize: this language barrier.

If you get into a combat situation, you have to order these 11 ROK divisions; right?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, through the corps commanders.

Mr. STRATTON. There aren't very many guys in your command that speak Korean?

General CUSHMAN. No, sir. That is a very important point. I get my instructions in English. I issue my instructions to the ROK units in Korean. I have Korean officers on my staff that can speak English. Thanks to that, we can convert these into Korean and put them out over teletype. Not only that, in time of war whether it's telephone or face to face, I am not going to trust my mother tongue to convey to them what they must do. My deputy has just moved.

General Chang is a very fine officer; he can speak Korean and he speaks English beautifully. He used to be the defense attaché in Washington. My deputy is going to go along with me and be sure those corps commanders understand. What I tell them to do in time of tension, he is going to make sure is understood.

Mr. STRATTON. When you get into the matter of trying to show somebody how to operate a TOW or fly a helicopter, you have to have a number of people that can explain this.

General CUSHMAN. The ROK's have been doing that for years. They have taken the American manuals, converted them to Korean. They are very good at taking our training literature and making it Korean.

Mr. STRATTON. I see. General CUSHMAN. But it is an extraordinarily important and complicating factor.

The other conclusions that I briefed visitors here is shown. Even when an adequate ROK Army war-fighting capability is achieved, there will still be a need for a U.S. combat formation on the ground north of Seoul for as long as the 1953 military armistice agreement remains the governing political instrument separating the two Koreas. This is based on 2 years of addressing this problem. I am satisfied that both these conclusions are justified.

Mr. STRATTON. This, I take it, is not met by leaving a communications and intelligence group, et cetera, that is now supposed to be left on the ground to go along with the air forces that we leave in?

General CUSHMAN. This combat formation of several battalions, it could be a brigade-sized force, but it would be several combat battalions.

Mr. STRATTON. I don't want to put words in your mouth, knowing all the implications, but it would appear to me this means that at some point, 1982 or 1983, with the plan as now drawn up, all combat forces will be out of Korea. All ground combat forces will be out. That does not meet what you feel to be continuing need?

General CUSHMAN. Sir, I am satisfied this is the need. If we achieve that military armistice conversion into a political instrument by that

time, then that is all right. If we don't, I am satisfied this will be recognized and so the policy will be modified. That is my own assessment.

Mr. STRATTON. That is something that I think has not been made clear to the country, and I think you are making a very important point. That is more or less the thing that is on a lot of our minds, that we ought not to remove these forces until we have achieved that political settlement.

General CUSHMAN. If I might say, sir, this is the problem in the Koreans' minds because, being on the scene, they see this very clearly.

Mr. STRATTON. I hope we can take that back and spread the word. General CUSHMAN. I would like to describe the later Capet Crown we ran, VII. It does have this question of how we got the warning and so forth. As I said, the first run of the Capet Crown exercises was in April of 1976, 2 months after I got here. We have run six or actually seven. This is the first six. This is not a terribly important slide to be copying; it is just to show you some have had substantial air. They have been for different purposes.

Capet Crown VII was a II Corps exercise for the first time. We had the I Corps and the VI Corps. It had a lot of other participants here, Reserve units, and units of the other corps and a very substantial Air Force, Korea.

These are all ROK forces. The only United States one is this 2d U.S. Infantry Division.

This is the participation that they put into it. This was run in October of 1977.

This is the kind of questions we asked them to do—an air battle analysis. It was a very good war game from the point of view of training us in how to handle air.

Mr. STRATTON. Let me just ask, if I may. Do you think we ought to get these slides?

General CUSHMAN. I am sure we can. Just go ahead and make the request.

These are the characteristics of that game. People argue about how scientific these are. They are the best we can come up with. We had enemy commanders and staffs, real time, two-sided, free play.

We enlarged our room. You will see it in a little while. We have a II Corps front on our war game.

Colonel BURKE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Mr. STRATTON. Sure.

Colonel BURKE. What season of the year?

General CUSHMAN. Good question. This one was done in October, and we used actual weather, the weather of the 17th and 18th of October.

Capet Crown II was done in the dead of winter, with the Imjin River frozen, so we have options.

We brought the commanders in, put up a tent city, and all the corps commanders and regimental commanders wired up, just as they would be, except closer.

This is one of the enemy attacking corps, commanded by a Korean. Here is the corps commander.

The enemy attack concept is this. [Deleted.]

Talk about warning—there are two parts to warning. The first is the indications, then the decisions. These are a couple of historical examples that show while you might have indications, your decisions aren't always very good to [deleted].

Mr. STRATTON. [Deleted.] General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. That is for the ground attack. [Deleted.]

Mr. STRATTON. How does this thing work in a war game? In other words, if he moves up a little piece on that model, obviously you can see it, there is no cover, and so on?

General CUSHMAN. You see, we assumed that we found these things because it is most difficult to war game the intelligence, but we are having an intelligence war game at the end of this month, in which we are going to do just that, see how we might have picked up those indications.

A war game starts when the enemy starts attacking. I didn't go through the process of saying what these indications were because we don't know. You have to be kind of a good fiction writer, a novelist, to dream that up. I deal with it day in and day out, all these indications, but there is no point in saying how I got it. I just assumed that I got it.

So I say, OK. I told the enemy commander: See what you can do about finding our vulnerabilities.

He lined up his attack. [Deleted.]

I won't go through it blow by blow with you because we don't have time for that, but essentially it didn't change my assessment that [deleted] and even then we have to do a damn good job and not make any mistakes.

People ask, is this game realistic? We keep getting these results. "How realistic," they ask, "are you?" These are some of the questions as to realism.

We have to ask ourselves, what are the objectives of the games? And I should put this in perspective for you. These are the objectives of this Capet Crown. The special objectives were to take a look at this [deleted] and also to take a look at whether our new concept of operations was right. [Deleted.]

I say that the Capet Crowns have been realistic to serve those purposes. I always make the disclaimer it is not designed to predict the outcome of battles, just to give you an assessment as to possible outcome, more like the odds.

Mr. BEARD. The people who keep asking how realistic it is are pretty skeptical about the outcome?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, and so am I. Because this is a training exercise. I allowed things to happen in this war game that I wouldn't allow to happen as the commander, so we get the benefit of making the mistakes without the penalties of combat.

Mr. BEARD. The point is do the skeptics who question the outcome have an alternative?

General CUSHMAN. They just say it wouldn't be as bad a result. Their alternative is their judgment.

Mr. BEARD. Their judgment comes from where?

General CUSHMAN. Their experience. They have some pretty experienced people that might say: General Cushman, you are taking the

worst case [deleted]. It is an informed judgment. We just come to a different conclusion.

One conclusion we came to is this. We have done that.

I also said a concept of operations is a good point of departure. I don't want to force the Koreans to copy our concept.

I much prefer a study by the ROK army to arrive at their own group conclusions and studies.

On the warning, you might want to read this chart, Warning Assumption Finding. [Deleted.]

I would like you to read this chart because it shows we are making progress. We get our augmentation of the ACP's from Wouju, which is 10 hours away.

Mr. WON PAT. Naturally the enemy would get augmentation from Russia and China?

General CUSHMAN. [Deleted.]

I will go through two or three conclusions to give you the kind of conclusions that come out of this.

[Chart shown called "Lessons Learned to Date (Tentative)."]

This is very valuable.

Another chart called "Lessons Learned to Date (Tentative)." He hasn't created those forces for a defense. There is no doubt about that.

[Another chart shown, entitled "Lessons Learned to Date (Tentative)."]

As a result, we have changed our essential actions. This is a present list, Mr. Chairman, of the essential actions. I modernized the tank force and just put that under antiarmor, and I added one, [deleted] so we have added that to our list.

This is just about the last slide.

[Slide shown, entitled "Western Sector Balance—ROK.A. Only."]  
I think, frankly, we have moved along. I don't know how many years it is, but we have moved in 6 months and we are going to continue to move. We are going to continue to meet our responsibilities and carry out the policy of the U.S. Government so we can arrive at this conclusion and have adequate war-fighting capability without the 2d Division or any ground forces, just U.S. tactical air and logistic support.

But I would say that has to be emphasized.

[Other slides shown.]

That is the end of my briefing. Sorry to take up so much of your time.

Mr. STRATTON. No. This has been tremendous, General.

Did you serve in Vietnam?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. Three times. I served as an adviser to the 21st ARVN Division in the Deep Delta in 1963-64. I went back as brigade commander of the 101st Airborne Division in the fighting around Tet in 1968. I went back and served as deputy and then senior adviser in the Delta in 1970-72, almost 4 years in Vietnam, three different tours.

Mr. STRATTON. As you said, we didn't use the tanks down there. We figured the enemy wasn't going to have any, but they turned out to have them anyway. There was a different problem in Vietnam than what you have here, of course.

General CUSHMAN. It has some of the characteristics. You can learn from Vietnam, especially from the process of Vietnamization. What went on there is far different from Korea but essentially the same objective, namely the turnover, the capability to do its own fighting, the Vietnamese then and Koreans now. So it is extraordinarily complex and has to be well done.

Mr. STRATTON. In your last tour that was underway?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. I was there when the decision was made in 1969 to start the withdrawal, and I was there in the Delta during the time the turnover was taking place.

Mr. STRATTON. This is essentially a Vietnamization up here.

General CUSHMAN. You fully understand the ROK is a far different country.

Mr. STRATTON. Did you run across ROK divisions in Vietnam? General CUSHMAN. No, sir, I never served alongside them in Vietnam.

Mr. STRATTON. We visited them a couple times.

General CUSHMAN. They had a great reputation, I would say this to you—you will see some ROK commanders. This is a fantastically tough, well trained, disciplined, where you will be observing them, hardy, proficient army down there.

Mr. BEARD. Motivated.

General CUSHMAN. Motivated, that is right. You have all the motivation that you ever need.

I think we are going to go ahead with our schedule and just arrive a little late.

Mr. STRATTON. Thank you very much, General Cushman. [Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the meeting was concluded.]

SAMUEL S. STRATTON, N.Y.  
CHAIRMAN

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COUNSEL

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NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

## U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

2330 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

225-4221, GOVERNMENT CODE 180, EXT. 4221

February 2, 1978

Dear General Cushman:

On behalf of the members and staff of the House Armed Services Committee who had the pleasure of meeting with you during our recent four-nation fact-finding trip to the Far East, I want to express our sincere thanks and appreciation for the opportunity of meeting with you, and for the warm hospitality and courtesies you extended to us.

Particularly we want to thank you for your outstanding presentation of the military issues and the results of your war-gaming. The visit to the North Korean tunnel and to the ROK positions along the DMZ were especially helpful in understanding the problems confronting U. S. and ROK commanders.


We hope that our visit, and the report which we are in the process of submitting to our full committee and to the Congress, will help to promote peace and security in the Pacific and enhance the best interests of our country in a very vital area of the world.

Personally, I am sorry you will be retiring in the near future. I do hope your successor is able to continue to meet the very high standards you have set, and I hope we can call on you from time to time for advice and counsel in this important matter.

Please give General Yun Hung Jyong our best wishes and respect for the high degree of motivation and commitment exemplified by the troops of his command that we had the opportunity to meet. Similarly, give Lieutenant General Hwang Yung Si our thanks for the opportunity of meeting with him.

With high esteem and all best wishes for your health and happiness in the New Year,

Sincerely,



Samuel S. Stratton  
Chairman

Lieutenant General John H. Cushman  
Commanding General  
I Corps (ROK/US) Group  
APO San Francisco 96358

Appendix S

SAMUEL S. STRATTON, N.Y.  
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ROBERT L. LEGGETT, CALIF.  
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JOHN F. LALLY  
COUNSEL

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

## U.S. House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

2339 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515  
225-4221, GOVERNMENT CODE 160, EXT. 4221

### HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT URGES NO TOTAL KOREAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL BEFORE PEACE SETTLEMENT

FOR RELEASE:  
A.M., WEDNESDAY,  
APRIL 26, 1978

Washington, D. C., April 25, 1978 -- President Carter's decision to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea could "pose grave hazards to the stability of Northeast Asia," the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee declared in a report released today by Subcommittee Chairman Samuel S. Stratton (D-N.Y.).

As a consequence the subcommittee "strongly" recommended "that a basic U.S. ground combat force be retained in Korea until the current armistice has been superseded by a formal peace settlement" between North and South Korea.

The subcommittee said, however, it would not oppose the earlier scheduled withdrawal of 6,000 of the 33,000 ground combat troops presently stationed in South Korea, provided Congress first enacted legislation to authorize transfer of the combat equipment of these 6,000 troops to South Korean forces for strengthening defensive positions along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

The subcommittee report was highly critical of the processes followed by the White House in early 1977 in reaching its decision on the troop withdrawal matter.

That decision had been basically the result of statements the President had made during his election campaign, the subcommittee said, and concluded that Mr. Carter had not "sought any advice, assistance, recommendations or estimates of the probable impact of his withdrawal decision on U.S. security considerations or stability in the Far East from the Joint Chiefs of Staff... or from other knowledgeable military sources prior to making his decision...."

The subcommittee also found that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after learning of the withdrawal decision, had proposed that no more than 7,000 troops be withdrawn by October 1982, with a subsequent further evaluation to determine whether any additional withdrawals might be desirable. Disregarding that advice from his officially designated "principal military advisors," the President ordered that 6,000 troops be withdrawn by the end of 1978, four years earlier than proposed by the Joint Chiefs, with the balance removed four years later.

Appendix R

Commenting on the military situation in Korea, which the subcommittee had surveyed firsthand during a four-nation Asian tour in January 1973, the report concluded that, "In the 25 years that the Armistice has been in effect, there has been no real peace between North and South Korea, particularly along the DMZ. Korea... is the most explosive and volatile spot in Asia, and the military situation along both sides of the DMZ is only a hair-trigger truce that has the potential of erupting into full-scale warfare at almost any time."

Other key findings in the report are:

1. "The principal deterrent to [war] are the 30,000 ground troops of the U.S. stationed just south of the DMZ... This one division provides a deterrent force disproportionately greater than its relatively small size."

2. "Withdrawal of these troops will greatly impair this deterrent, with almost no discernible gain -- as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pointed out...."

3. "The public announcement of this withdrawal... has already contributed to instability in Asia, has damaged our cooperative defensive relationship with Korea, and has had a measurable adverse impact on our relations with our other Pacific allies."

4. "The subcommittee strongly shares the belief, frequently expressed to us in Asia, that actions speak louder than words, and that if the total withdrawal plans remain in effect, no amount of constant verbal reiteration of a continuing U.S. defense commitment can offset the serious damage this withdrawal will do."

The subcommittee report found South Korea inferior to North Korea in every relevant military indicator except manpower. The report quotes General John W. Vessey, Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces Korea, as follows: "The North Koreans enjoy a two-to-one advantage in tanks, artillery and tactical aircraft. They have a four-to-one advantage in naval combatants, including a three-to-one lead in missile attack craft, and a more than twelve-to-one advantage in submarines."

The subcommittee further concluded "on the basis of current intelligence estimates... the North Koreans possess the capability of attacking South Korea with a minimum of warning, and that the 2nd Infantry Division is needed for an adequate defense of Seoul... Were that division to be withdrawn, the defense of Seoul would be greatly complicated. This assessment appears to be confirmed by published excerpts from the Department of Defense Military Strategic and Force Posture Review...."

In releasing the report, Stratton said, "We are firmly convinced that the peacekeeping function of the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division is at least as important as its war-fighting capability. The presence of U.S. forces has deterred hostilities on the Korean Peninsula for 25 years. Before we tamper with that deterrent we ought to work for a peaceful settlement that will finally bring an end to this long war."

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"It is unfortunate," Stratton added, "that congressional consideration of the compensatory actions which are integral to the withdrawal of the first 6,000 troops has been delayed because of the Tongsun Park investigation. We strongly believe that no troops, not even the first 6,000, should be withdrawn until Congress approves legislation to turn the equipment of those troops over to the Koreans, for the joint defense of remaining U.S. and Korean forces.

"When it comes to vital military matters in Korea, our actions as a nation should be based strictly on consideration of U.S. national security, as well as the security of important allies, not on extraneous and unrelated matters. Otherwise we run the risk of renewed conflict in Asia, which ought to be the last thing that any member of the House or Senate would wish to encourage."

Dissenting views on the report were filed by Representative Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.); supplementary views were filed by Representatives David C. Treen (R-La.), Robert W. Daniel, Jr. (R-Va.), and Robert E. Badham (R-Calif.).