ORAL HISTORY
Lieutenant General John H. Cushman
US Army, Retired

VOLUME FIVE: Leavenworth, Korea, and Reflections on a Career

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Cdr Combined Arms Center and Commandant CGSC</td>
<td>21-1 to 21-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Cdr I Corps (ROK/US) Group, Korea; The Air/Land Battle</td>
<td>22-1 to 22-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>In Retirement</td>
<td>23-1 to 23-24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

I began this Oral History with an interview in January 2009 at the US Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA. Subsequent interviews have taken place at the Knollwood Military Retirement Residence in Washington, DC.

The interviewer has been historian Robert Mages. In March 2011 Mr. Mages was assigned to the Army Center of Military History, Fort Leslie J. McNair, DC. He has since continued the project. In this volume he has allowed me, with my references to the added Volumes Six and Seven, to depart from an oral history format. The work is now complete.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Born in China</td>
<td>1-1 to 1-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Growing Up</td>
<td>2-1 to 2-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td>3-1 to 3-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>West Point Cadet</td>
<td>4-1 to 4-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Commissioned</td>
<td>5-1 to 5-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sandia Base</td>
<td>6-1 to 6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>MIT and Fort Belvoir</td>
<td>7-1 to 7-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Infantryman</td>
<td>8-1 to 8-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1954-1958</td>
<td>9-1 to 9-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Coordination Group, Office of the Army Chief of Staff</td>
<td>10-1 to 10-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>With Cyrus Vance, Defense General Counsel</td>
<td>11-1 to 11-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>With Cyrus Vance, Secretary of the Army</td>
<td>12-1 to 12-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>With the Army Concept Team in Vietnam</td>
<td>13-1 to 13-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>With the ARVN 21st Division, Vietnam</td>
<td>14-1 to 14-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>At the National War College</td>
<td>15-1 to 15-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>At the 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY</td>
<td>16-1 to 16-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Cdr 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Vietnam</td>
<td>17-1 to 17-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Cdr Fort Devens, MA</td>
<td>18-1 to 18-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Advisor, IV Corps/Military Region 4, Vietnam</td>
<td>19-1 to 19-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Cdr 101st Airborne Division &amp; Fort Campbell, KY</td>
<td>20-1 to 20-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Cdr Combined Arms Center and Commandant CGSC</td>
<td>21-1 to 21-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Cdr I Corps (ROK/US) Group, Korea; The Air/Land Battle</td>
<td>22-1 to 22-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>In Retirement</td>
<td>23-1 to 23-24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For my own distribution:

in November 2012 I had Chapters 1 through 7 (Volume One) printed.
In February 2013 I had Chapters 8 through 13 (Volume Two) printed.
In March 2013 I had Chapters 14 through 17 (Volume Three) printed.
In July 2013 I had Chapters 18 through 20 (Volume Four) printed.

With Chapters 21 through 23 this, printed in October 2013, is Volume Five.

Volume Six is a reprint of my Fort Leavenworth – A Memoir, September 2001.

Volume Seven is a reprint of my Korea, 1976-1978 -- A Memoir, April 1998.

John H. Cushman
Chapter Twenty-One
Commander CAC and Commandant CGSC

GENERAL CUSHMAN: In 2001 I wrote Fort Leavenworth -- A Memoir. I distributed it to general officers with whom I had been associated in my tenure at the Combined Arms Center, and to the libraries at the Army War College, West Point, and Fort Leavenworth. Its Volume I, Narrative, and a few pages from its Volume II, Annexes, form Chapter Six of this oral history.

To understand the 1973-76 years at Fort Leavenworth as I saw them, an interested party should first read, from Chapter Six, Part Two of its Volume I. It, along with those few pages from its Annexes, is key to this oral history. For the further interested, the complete Memoir is in Folder 2 at http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/.

The US Army Combined Arms Center was created in early 1973 when Army Chief of Staff William C. Westmoreland approved the findings of Operation Steadfast. Steadfast split the existing Continental Army Command (CONARC) into a Forces Command (FORSCOM) and a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Into FORSCOM went all Army forces, active and reserve, in the United States. Into TRADOC went all Army training centers and service schools.1 TRADOC absorbed the US Army Combat Development Command and its subordinate combat development agencies located at the various service schools.

Steadfast created under TRADOC three “coordinating centers,” one of which was the Combined Arms Center (CAC).2 CAC consisted of the existing Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Combined Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA), a renamed element of the Combat Development Command, it was already at Fort Leavenworth.

General William E. DuPuy, who as a lieutenant general had conducted the Steadfast study, was appointed Commander TRADOC, its headquarters at Fort Monroe, VA. Selected by him, I was named Commander CAC, and at the same time Commandant CGSC and Commander CACDA. I assumed command in early August 1973.

INTERVIEWER: On assuming command, what did you do first?

---

1 Except the Army War College.
2 There was also an Administrative Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN, and a Logistics Center at Fort Lee, VA.
GENERAL CUSHMAN: Three days after arriving I welcomed the entering Regular Class. College and CACDA’s officers were in the audience. I spelled out my thinking.

From Volume I of my Fort Leavenworth -- A Memoir, page 30:
“In writing this account, it was a pleasure for me to read again the 21-page manuscript of my opening remarks. They were too long, perhaps, but I poured into them all of the expectations and convictions I had now arrived at, recalling all the while my experiences of almost 20 years before. They were indeed a blueprint for what I meant to accomplish, and what I believe I am largely did accomplish.”

My remarks are in first nine pages of Volume II of the Memoir. While they are indeed long, I suggest that a serious reader might well scan those remarks.³ (Key paragraphs are at page 85 of the accompanying Memoir.)

Within a month I had issued instructions on both the College curriculum and on doctrine, as contained in Annexes B and C. If one wants to appreciate the magnitude of the effort taking place at Leavenworth in the months to come, and the resulting environment, these two annexes are also worth scanning. They are at the same third folder, as described in the footnote. (Key paragraphs are at pages 86-89 of the accompanying Memoir.)

INTERVIEWER: How did you approach your Combined Arms Center mission?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: That mission called for merging the efforts of the existing Command and General Staff College and the new CACDA. CACDA was already at Leavenworth as part of the Army Combat Development Command. Steadfast had placed the Combat Development Command under TRADOC and had made CACDA part of the Combined Arms Center.

In my opening remarks I told the students that CACDA would provide an integral part of their experience. Emphasizing a conviction of mine, I said, “…the instructional faculty, the combat development faculty and the students are interdependent… each of us, in every group, will contribute to our common effort… controlled adaptation, to meet the challenge of our times.”

Illustrating a long-held element of my thinking, I said, “Out in La Brea tar pits near Los Angeles was uncovered the remains of a magnificent and fearsome animal, the sabertooth tiger. Thousands of years ago he was King of the Beasts. He is now extinct, a classic example of overspecialization… Our Army It is confronted with the problem faced by living things since the dawn of time, the problem of evolution, of adapting itself to changing conditions.”

INTERVIEWER: Early in Part Two of your Leavenworth Memoir you write that your story, “…cannot be told without describing my problems with Bill DePuy and his with me.”⁴ What was your first evidence that you might have problems with General Dupuy?

³ Go to http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/. Under Library you will find Fort Leavenworth -- A Memoir. Click on that to bring up six folders. The first item in the third folder is the text of my opening remarks.
⁴ Page 28, Fort Leavenworth -- A Memoir.
GENERAL CUSHMAN: The Combined Arms Center had been described to me as a coordinating center for combat arms schools -- the Infantry School, the Armor School, the Aviation School, etc. Not long after I took command, I sent a message to these commandants that said that I was organizing a conference to discuss how we might treat Army aviation in our instruction and in the development of doctrine. I thought that, having just commanded the 101st Airborne Division with its six aviation battalions in two aviation groups and its 400 plus helicopters, it was not inappropriate of me to do so.

I did not inform General Dupuy of this, nor did I ask his permission. Apparently one of the school commandants did inform General Dupuy. He called me on the telephone to let me know that such initiatives would be taken by him, not by me. Of course I called off the conference. That sent a message to my retinue of school commandants, and to me, about who was in charge.

That turned out to be quite satisfactory to me. I knew who was in charge of Fort Leavenworth and I had much to do and not much time to do it in.

INTERVIEWER: What would you say were the roots of your conflicts with General DePuy?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: One, we were both strong-willed. Two, on many matters we had fundamentally different views. On some matters I bent to his will, my superior in the chain of command. On others I was neither willing to bend to him, or to ask to be relieved.

INTERVIEWER: Did you find it difficult to merge the College and CACDA?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Yes. That turned out to be the cause of some of my difficulties with Bill DePuy. He was looking at CACDA as the key element of the Combined Arms Center engine that would drive the many changes that he wanted to make in the Army. It took me too long to realize that.

CACDA was a different breed of cat. It had no instructional function, but its officers were developing future concepts of employment that would eventually be taught by College faculty. Before Steadfast, agencies of Combat Development Command wrote field manuals. With Steadfast, that became a TRADOC function, assigned to the various schools. At Leavenworth it went back to being a College function. It did not occur to us that CACDA should do it.

CACDA also lacked a capacity to do work on matters of personnel administration and logistics, and the title “Combined Arms Center” conveyed the notion that logistics and personnel administration belonged to other TRADOC centers. On the other hand, “Command and General Staff College” conveys a concern with the full scope of the commander’s responsibility and that of the full general staff, including logistics and administration. The College had instructional and doctrinal expertise that could be brought to bear on all such matters. I looked

---

5 For one thing, CACDA’s officers had been wearing the insignia of the general staff corps, not that of their branch.
at CAC from the CGSC viewpoint and used College assets when logistics or administration work was called for. Not that we had any trouble when we asserted this.

General DePuy, in his driving influence on Army organization and doctrine, set great store by CACDA. Before my arrival, in an April 1973 visit to Leavenworth, he had told its assembled senior people that he “regards the combat developments mission as one of charting the direction in which the Army in the field should move in peacetime... so as to be better prepared for employment and more time or in crisis situations.” He was referring to the Army’s full range of organizations, concepts and doctrine, and matériel.\(^6\)

**INTERVIEWER:** Give me an example of your conflicting views.

**GENERAL CUSHMAN:** General DePuy believed in using scenarios to determine requirements for weapons and to evaluate weapons performance, and also for developing tactical concepts. He instituted SCORES (Scenario Oriented Recurring Evaluation System) for installation in all TRADOC schools. CACDA converted a former stables into SCORES working spaces used for managing the play of two-sided, open wargames with controlled play scenarios. As I wrote in my Leavenworth Memoir, “Though I kept my distaste for this ponderous process to myself, I could not be enthusiastic about SCORES...” A few years later SCORES collapsed of its own weight.\(^7\)

Another example: TRADOC’s Comptroller was the smart Brigadier General Maxwell Thurman. He came up with a “School Model” for application in all TRADOC schools. The model set up a “doctrine” establishment that would provide the material for the “instruction” establishment to teach. The word went out that General DePuy bought that notion. Other TRADOC schools did so. I believed that, under the College, a seasoned and thinking instructor (“subject matter expert”) could, and should, act as pioneer in the writing of new doctrine, and that it could be tested in the classroom. We stayed put.

Another example: Under the newly adopted Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) the CGSC was the proponent for Officer Specialty Field 54, Force Development. That meant that we were to define the expertise for this field, which was an inexact science. To provide the College faculty experience in the criteria for determining the combat support and combat service support units that would compose a force, I put instructors (and students taking a force development elective) to work in what I called a Corps Force Study Effort. The CFSE purpose was to establish the two troop lists, one a forward deployed force and the other a contingency force, that were to be used in all instruction. In May 1975, General Depuy said “no dice” to that.

My Leavenworth Memoir is replete with instances of my seeking to reconcile and combine the efforts of the College and CACDA in a common effort.

---

\(^6\) See pages 35-36 of my Leavenworth Memoir.
\(^7\) Leavenworth Memoir, page 36 et seq, incl footnote 33.
In a May 1975 briefing to General DePuy and his key staff at TRADOC, I finally recommended doing away with CACDA as a separate entity. I presented a way to perform its functions in other ways. I gave my rationale. General DePuy did not agree. He provided explicit guidance. (See pages 67 and 68 of my Leavenworth Memoir.)

The slide introducing my briefing showed sketches of Bell Hall, housing the College, and Grant Hall, housing CACDA. Between the two was a sketch of the Stars and Stripes on a flagpole; it was being blown in the direction of Bell Hall. At the end of the briefing General DePuy said, “Show me that first chart.” I did. He told me, “Next time, I want to see that flag blowing toward CACDA.”

To find a solution I moved my office from Bell Hall to Grant Hall. I reorganized, so as to mesh what the College did and was good at, while doing the same with CACDA. In September 1975 I sent a long letter (see Annex I) to General DePuy that both explained my moves and told him that we were embarking on curriculum year, 1975-76 that would be superior in every respect.8

INTERVIEWER: In his The Generals,9 Tom Ricks, tells of the conflict between you and General DePuy. He seems to take your side. What was your connection to Tom Ricks?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I live at a military-oriented retirement residence in Washington. A few years ago I went to hear Ricks speak about his book Fiasco at a bookstore nearby. I invited him to speak to our residents. There he spoke with admiration about George C. Marshall, with whom my Dad had been in the 15th Infantry in China in the 1920s. So I gave him Chapter One, Born in China, of my Oral History. We exchanged writings. While working on his new book he found my Fort Leavenworth – A Memoir. He used it.

INTERVIEWER: He writes:10 “…the fundamental difference between the two men, as Cushman saw it, was that DePuy was teaching the Army how to fight, while Cushman was complementing that work by teaching army officers how to think about fighting…” Is that the way it was?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: That’s a short way of putting it. “Conflicting Ideas,” pages 44-48 of my Leavenworth Memoir, tells where I was coming from. It’s important to read that. It was a different place from where Bill DePuy was coming from. Each of us had his convictions.

INTERVIEWER: What were your main convictions?

---

8 I have long regretted that I was unable to get into that curriculum a presentation of the methodology behind Operation Excellence as a way to solve both military and nonmilitary problems. Midway in my time at Leavenworth I invited Bob Fisher, the retired lieutenant colonel who had been my comptroller at Fort Devens and custodian of the Operation Excellence program, to visit the College and explain to faculty what we had been doing. The tenets and formats of Estimate of the Situation and the Five Paragraph Field Order were too ingrained for his ideas to take hold.


10 Ibid p. 348
GENERAL CUSHMAN: Long ago, while I was a captain, I had discovered Infantry in Battle.\textsuperscript{11} It is a collection of company level combat, tactical, monographs, based on actions in the first World War. They were written by students at the Infantry School when George C. Marshall was Assistant Commandant there in the early 1930s. I remember that my father had a first edition.

I do not doubt that General Marshall, then a colonel, wrote himself much of the commentary, and specifically the opening chapter, “Rules.” Here are his first three paragraphs\textsuperscript{12}...

“The art of war has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice. Mission, terrain, weather, dispositions, morale, supply, and comparative strength are variables whose mutations always combine to form a new tactical pattern. Thus, in battle, each situation is unique and must be solved on his own merits.

“It follows, then, that the leader who would become a competent tactician must first close his mind to the alluring formulae that well-meaning people offer in the name of victory. To master his difficult art he must learn to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its decisive elements and base his course of action on these. The ability to do this is not God-given, nor can it be acquired overnight; it is a process of years. He must realize that training in solving problems of all types, long practice in making clear, unequivocal decisions, the habit of concentrating on the question at hand, and an elasticity of mind, are indispensable requisites for the successful practice of the art of war.

“The leader who frantically strives to remember what someone else did in some slightly similar situation has already set his feet on a well-traveled road to ruin.”

While I was a major helping develop the new 1957-58 CGSC curriculum under General McGarr, I saw to it that a copy of Infantry in Battle was issued to each student. I did the same in 1973. I was fundamentally opposed to tactical recipes. I wanted future battle commanders to learn how to think.

In 1957, again while working for General McGarr, I had discovered in the 1953 Dictionary of Army Terms a short definition of “doctrine” that, to me, said it all...

“Doctrine. Principles and policies applicable to a subject which have been developed through experience or by theory, that represent the best available thought, and indicate and guide but do not bind in practice. Essentially, doctrine is that which is taught.”

“[I]ndicate and guide but not bind in practice.” That, and Marshall’s view in “Rules,” made up my key convictions. That was my philosophy. Not that I knew exactly how to teach my students “how to think.” With the support of Ben Harrison, Deputy Commandant, and many others, I aimed to try.

INTERVIEWER: Ricks writes:\textsuperscript{13} “It would have been better if the two men had been able to resolve their differences and give Army officers both what they needed at the time and what

\textsuperscript{11} 2nd Ed, Garrett & Massie, Richmond,1939. Reprinted by CGSC with permission of The Infantry Journal.

\textsuperscript{12} These paragraphs apply as well to the design of operations, strategy, and grand strategy.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, p. 348.
they would need in the future. But DePuy and Cushman could not find such a compromise. The result was that, in the 1970s and 1980s the Army for the most part neglected Cushman’s approach and followed DePuy’s. It produced a generation of officers who tended to be tactically adept, proficient as battalion commanders, but not prepared for senior generalship -- especially when the Cold War ended and they faced a series of ambiguous crises.”

What was your reaction when you read that?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I thought Tom Ricks had it about right. But, notwithstanding his correct insight, it would have taken a fundamental change in outlook not only by General DePuy but by many others to have set the Army on a right path. In those days after Vietnam. An entirely new way at looking at officer education was required. Instead, Bill DePuy and like-minded people created an environment that drilled the Army on fighting the Soviets. In 1990, in Desert Storm, Army commanders had been well trained to fight that kind of war. In 2003, after defeating Iraq’s forces, they were largely unprepared to cope with the conditions that then arose. It took years to adapt.¹⁴

INTERVIEWER: Ricks writes:¹⁵ “At one point DePuy told [General Donn] Starry that he had decided to fire Cushman and was traveling to Fort Leavenworth to do so, but, for reasons that are not known he did not. Instead he gave Cushman a blistering performance review. ‘Gen. Cushman is a very strong-minded individual,’ it stated, ‘it is very difficult to make him truly responsive to guidance, to make him a member of the team’”

GENERAL CUSHMAN: That quoted remark was not by General DePuy. It was by Lieutenant General Orwin Talbott, his deputy and my rating officer. In August 1975, when he retired from the Army, he rendered that efficiency report on me. General DePuy simply endorsed the report; I remember that he said that I was “liked by the students.”

In “Trouble with TRADOC” on pages 42-44 of my Fort Leavenworth -- A Memoir (now Volume Six of this Oral History), and in the correspondence in its added pages 89-96, is the story of Lieutenant General Talbott’s April 1975 visit to the Command and General Staff College and its aftermath. His remarks on my OER make sense in that light. (Footnote 46, page 44, contains Lieutenant General Talbott’s efficiency report remark.)

I might have been oblivious to General DePuy’s signals, but I never believed that I was close to being relieved by him. It didn’t cross my mind. Anyhow, I doubt if he could have got such a move by General Abrams.

INTERVIEWER: Ricks quotes General Donn Starry as saying,¹⁶ “General Jack Cushman at Leavenworth led the surge of resentment about the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 -- Active De-

¹⁴ I remember seeing Major General Ray Odierno, in 2006 or 2007, on C-SPAN testifying before Carl Levin’s Senate Armed Services Committee, in confirmation hearings on his nomination to lieutenant general and to a key position in the Iraq force. Replying to a question on why the Army had been so slow in adapting in Iraq, he replied in something like; “That was what we had been taught. We hadn’t been taught anything else.”
¹⁶ Ibid, p. 345.
fense. I have characterized that many times as probably the greatest act of institutional and individual disloyalty I have ever had the chance to observe."

**GENERAL CUSHMAN:** I don't know what Starry was talking about and I take strong exception to his charge of “disloyalty.”


The “active defense” was a mobility-based tactic offered by the 1976 version of FM 100-5, Operations. It applied to the US armor/mechanized divisions in Europe defending on their wide fronts against massive Soviet force. The Armor School, Donn Starry the commandant, had its views on active defense, as did Leavenworth. My Memoir (pp 48-49) addresses my other Field Manual 100-5 difficulties.

George C. Marshall once wrote: “Make a point of extreme loyalty, in thought and deed, to your chiefs personally; and in your efforts to carry out their plans or policies, the less you approve the more energy you must direct to their accomplishment.” I admire General Marshall, but admit that in my relations with Bill DePuy I fell short of his advice.

**INTERVIEWER:** Tom Ricks writes: “...Fred Weyand, ...Army chief of staff, liked and admired Cushman. (He) promoted Cushman and sent him to a top Army position in Korea. DePuy would have his revenge: Shortly after Cushman left for Asia, DePuy canceled the third Leavenworth symposium on ethics, scheduled for April 1976.” Tell me about that.

**GENERAL CUSHMAN:** Bill DePuy took a dim view of philosophical discussions, including those of ethics. I thought that such discussion had an important place in officer education. My Leavenworth Memoir, in two chapters beginning on page 56 and in Annex H of its Volume Two, addresses such issues. Inclosure 2 to Annex H tells how we used true-to-life cases, “dilemmas in officer responsibility,” as vehicles. Truly dilemmas, they involved principles, such as “loyalty” and “obedience,” in conflict. Their discussion illuminated understanding. Students needed that.

I remember well one such case, “War College Thesis.” In it one student at the Army War College has clear evidence of plagiarism by another officer at the War College. In this case, so as to leave no doubt among our own students, we presented the College solution: some sort

---

18 In a letter on the dust cover of his *Memoirs of My Services in the World War 1917-1918*, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1976)
19 “The Generals” p. 348
of action was required, for the good of the Army. CGSC said that the War College student should either confront the offending officer or report the matter to a War College authority. He was not to leave the situation not acted upon.

At a luncheon with a group of TRADOC officers at Fort Monroe’s Officers Mess, I was present when General DePuy brought up my use of that case. His telling of it made evident that his solution would have been simply to make a mental note of the officer and the incident, keeping those in mind but dismissing the matter otherwise. I chose not to argue the point.

I was not surprised when in Korea I heard from Ben Harrison that the Commander TRADOC had used his authority to cancel the third Symposium on Officer Responsibility. Ben ran a substitute symposium on, as I remember, “obstacles to readiness.”

INTERVIEWER: Your Leavenworth Memoir, on its pages 49-53, tells of “other initiatives” — simulation, command post organization, and computers. Tell me more.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: In a vacant small gymnasium, Jess Hendricks, Director of the Department of Command, set up for instructional and development use an infantry division main command post, fully equipped with situation maps, telephones, etc. Jess organized an elective in which the division SOP (see my Memoir, page 52) served a student staff. We took the students through a “white knuckles” drill like that for a battalion commander at page 50 of the Memoir. When the visiting Army Chief of Staff, General Abrams, toured this setup, he nodded his pleasure.

INTERVIEWER: How did your ideas on Army-Air Force relationships figure into your time at Leavenworth?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: My Memoir, page 70 onward, relates how General Abrams teamed with General George S. Brown, the Air Force Chief of Staff, to bring together their two services. It describes how this played out at the TAC-TRADOC level. At Leavenworth it produced an opportunity for me to pursue long held beliefs.20

Not described in my Memoir is our expansion of CACDA’s SCORES wargaming into JSCORES, where we explored concepts using airpower and the techniques and procedures for its application. We involved both the Tactical Air Command’s liaison team located at Fort Leavenworth and the Air War College’s representative on the CGSC faculty with his team of instructors and our Air Force students as well.

Responsible for supervising the Army element at the USAF-operated Air-Ground School at Hurlburt Air Force Base, FL, I visited there from time to time and became fully familiar with existing doctrines and procedures.

20 One of the first things I did was to arrange that in 1974 the USAF officer students be more than doubled, to forty, so that we could have two per classroom (one in each of two 15-student work groups). We matched that with forty US Navy/US Marine Corps, combined.
This, and my conversations with airmen, familiarized me with the lingo and taught me a lot. Especially meaningful was a visit by the TAC commander, General Dixon, to a JSCORES drill. In a situation in which we had used what we thought was a suitable application of air-power, General Dixon stopped me. He said something like, “That’s not airpower. Put some real air power in there.” He showed me what he meant. He was right.

Culminating this Leavenworth air/land effort was the establishment and manning of an Air/Land Battle Coordinating Center, to be used for the development of techniques and procedures, and for the exercise of air/land battle staffs in two-sided wargames. The substantial effort we put into this is described in page 70 onward of my Leavenworth Memoir. In Annex L of Volume Two of my Memoir you can find the details of how we set it up. The experience was useful in my next assignment, to Korea. Ironically, a few months after I arrived there I was told that my successor as Commander, CAC, had disestablished the ALBCC.

INTERVIEWER: Tell me about your family at Fort Leavenworth.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: We lived in the spacious Commandant’s quarters. In 1973 son Jack began his first year at Dartmouth, Ted entered Leavenworth High as a sophomore, and 10 year old Anne enrolled first in a parochial school downtown, then in the post school. My enlisted aide, driving his pickup truck, had brought Anne’s horse from Fort Campbell. She had three delightful years, enjoying the post stables and the Pony Club with her friends.

When Vietnam fell in 1975 I heard that my friend and fighting comrade Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong was in the hospital with battle exhaustion. His I ARVN Corps had been shattered by the final NVA offensive. I cabled Major General Homer Smith, who headed up the last US presence in country, asking him to inform General Truong that Nancy and I offered our home to him and his family. General and Mrs. Truong and their two sons finally reached us, their two daughters having been brought to the United States by Theresa Hull. As a State Department consul, she had been his last advisor.

The Truongs lived with us for several month. They then moved to Northern Virginia where General Truong had found employment. Their son Diep stayed on with us to finish his year at Leavenworth High.
Chapter Twenty-Two
Commander I Corps (ROK/US) Group; The Air/Land Battle

GENERAL CUSHMAN: In 1998 I wrote Korea, 1976-1978 -- A Memoir, a narrative of my time in command of the I Corps (ROK/US) Group. That Memoir, and all its appendices, are the first two items in Folder 3 at http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/. To facilitate reading this chapter, that Memoir, and three of its appendices, accompany this Oral History as its Volume Seven. In this chapter I often refer to it. One might well read that Memoir (but not necessarily its appendices) before reading this chapter.

A review of the third item in Folder 3, “MORS Presentations, 2010-2013,” is also essential to an understanding of my time in Korea. Click on that item to bring up its explanation, its slides, and its narration. I suggest printing out the narration of my 109-slide presentation, and referring to that narration while viewing the downloaded slides one at a time.

In the first days of January 1976 I received at my office a telephone call from General Frederick C. Weyand, Army Chief of Staff. He invited me and my wife Nancy to dinner and an overnight stay, a week or so hence, at his Fort Myer quarters. We went to that dinner, spent the night, had breakfast with the Weyands the next morning, continued our travel to visit the Army War College, and returned home.

A couple of weeks later a second call from General Weyand led me to believe that he had extended the dinner invitation so that he could size me up. In that call he told me that he was nominating me for my third star and to assignment in Korea where I would command the I Corps (ROK/US) Group. It was the Republic of Korea/United States field army size formation defending the Western Sector of Korea’s Demilitarized Zone.

In Korea I would be replacing Lieutenant General James F. (Holly) Hollingsworth, Jr., an officer who was well known for his George S. Patton-like persona. The January 13 Wall Street Journal had recently published a story on him. It was headlined “U.S General Envisions ‘A Short, Violent War’ If Korean Reds Attack -- Hollingsworth’s Personality And Strategy Draw Fire; Plan Is Called Unrealistic.”

One paragraph: “General Hollingsworth says he has prepared for a short violent war. Relying on heavy artillery, already in place along the DMZ, and on massive air support, including B-52 bombers now on Guam, he claims he can win any war in nine days. ‘We’ll need five days and nights of real violence,’ he says, ‘After that we’ll need four more days to tidy up the battlefield.’”

This Journal piece appeared shortly before General Weyand’s second telephone call. I believe that, while Holly’s departure for a well-deserved retirement had for some time been visualized, the stir caused by the piece had accelerated that departure. I was told to get to Korea right away. Winding up my affairs at Leavenworth, I arrived February 10.

1 See the top appendix in Folder 3 at http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/.
INTERVIEWER: How did you use those few weeks?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I went to Washington for the required three-star nominee interviews with the Secretary of the Army and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and to Fort Monroe for an unnoteworthy departure call on General DePuy. While in Washington I visited the Army Staff office responsible for Korea. There I learned of the anomaly that placed a battalion of the 2d Infantry Division on the DMZ while assuring the public that war would not be automatic if North Korea should attack the South.²

Back home I set in motion a scheme through which the 1976 CGSC graduates slated for assignment to Korea took a newly designed “Korea Elective” in their final term. I arranged for one of them, whom I would seek to be assigned to my headquarters (which were at Camp Red Cloud north of Seoul), to become thoroughly familiar with our College instructional wargame, First Battle. I intended to adapt that wargame and use it in my new job.

When I got to Korea among the first things I did was to use wargaming to address the strategic anomaly posed by the battalion of the 2d Infantry Division on the DMZ (see pages 11-13 of my Korea Memoir and the remark of the Commander I ROK Corps).

Of the 2d Infantry Division, General Hollingsworth had said in his Wall Street Journal interview, “They wouldn’t get a scratch on them.”³ I found that hard to believe.

INTERVIEWER: What was it like to follow General Hollingsworth in that job?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Interesting. I had not known Holly before. He and I were completely different. A formidable figure, he had become a folk hero in Korea. On the next page is a story about his departure from Korea, clipped from the January 24, 1976, Washington Post. It gives an idea of how the press and public in Korea reacted to Holly’s being replaced, not to speak of the ROK Army and its generals with whom I would be dealing.

Holly was colorful. He was referred to by his voice radio call sign, "Danger Seven-Niner."⁴ This was his trademark; the officer’s club and the theater at Camp Red Cloud became the 79-er Lounge and the 79-er Theater. Holly had made a practice of equipping his sedan, which bore three star plates, with a siren which its driver used regularly as Holly was driven around the area. His command helicopter’s pilots always flew at maximum speed at treetop level when he was aboard. I did none of this. Definitely a different command presence.

² See pages 3-5 of Volume Seven, my Korea Memoir.
³ See the middle column of the top appendix in Folder 3 at http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/.
⁴ Holly had used that call sign in Vietnam when he was assistant division commander to Bill DePuy (whose call sign was "Danger Six") commanding the 1st Infantry Division.
Gen. Hollingsworth Retiring

By John Saar
Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL, Jan. 23 - Lt. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth, the feisty and controversial general who has commanded an Army of 185,000 Americans and South Koreans since July, 1973, is to retire in March.

Hours before today's Washington announcement, the 58-year-old general said: "After 35 years' proud service of my country, it's time to make room for someone else."

The retirement has been greeted with bitterness among his fellow officers, with some speculating that politics rather than a normal retirement prompted removal of the outspoken general.

In Washington, Army officials insisted that Hollingsworth had stayed in Korea longer than the normal two-year tour of command and that his retirement was routine. Hollingsworth's retirement, they said, is not akin to the recent and sudden removal of Lt. Gen. Robert L. Fair, commander of V Corps in West Germany, who ran into trouble with his boss, Gen. George Blanchard, commander of American forces in Europe.

Hollingsworth is to be replaced by Maj. Gen. John H. Cushman, commandant of the Army Command College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.

Gen. Hollingsworth's career stretched from the armor battles in Europe during World War II through the Vietnam war where he served two tours. Since taking command of the I Corps Group, a 13-division army holding a critical sector of the demilitarized zone dividing the two Koreas, Hollingsworth planned defense strategy for a short, quick war.

This tour, said Hollingsworth, was "the highlight" of his career. The fall of Indochina to the Communists last year led to increased fear of hostilities in Korea and Hollingsworth rallied South Korean morale with a promise to destroy any North Korean attack in "nine days of violence."

Hollingsworth, then a major general, in Vietnam in 1972.

"Because of building this new strategy, there's an honest-to-God defense of this country for the first time," he said. In the typically outspoken fashion which has irritated some of his fellow generals, Hollingsworth claimed the plans that he discarded might have resulted in the loss of Seoul in any future war.

Hollingsworth won two distinguished service crosses — the nation's second-highest bravery award — a silver star, distinguished flying cross and a host of other American and foreign awards. His helicopter was shot down twice in Vietnam and he won the last of six purple hearts there. In 1972, while flying his command and control ship over the besieged Vietnamese town of Anloc, he was hit in the right eye.

He postponed surgery until the battle was won, personally directing the town's defense and calling in massive U.S. air power until the North Vietnamese attackers were forced to withdraw.

Three operations left Hollingsworth with limited sight in the eye and could have led to his medical retirement. The late chief of staff, Gen. Creighton Abrams, retained him in the service and promoted him to the Korean post, reportedly with the comment: "I'd rather have Hollingsworth with one eye than most men with two."

Hollingsworth's retirement comes at a time when he has been under some criticism for bellicose statements. A U.S. Army spokesman here admitted "an unfortunate coincidence," but denied any relationship between the rumblings and Hollingsworth's retirement after an unusually long tour of duty.

He has inspired intense loyalty among Korean and American subordinates and many among his U.S. staff officers had hoped he would win another star and eventually replace Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, the supreme commander of U.N., U.S. and South Korean forces.

His impending retirement has cast a pall over this headquarters for the last few days. Besides the natural sense of loss at the departure of a popular commander, there is also a feeling that a fighting general of ability and fitness belying his age is being put on the bench prematurely.

"He would have made a fantastic, teaching, inspiring chief of staff," said a colonel regretfully.

"It's an asinine, deplorable thing," another officer commented. "It points up to me the extent to which politics has entered the Army."

Whatever the suspicions of his subordinates, Hollingsworth has no such complaints. He says he is certainly prepared to serve on, but retirement comes as no surprise.

While there is no set retirement age for generals, the most senior posts are presidential appointments contingent on an appropriate vacancy. Abrams warned Hollingsworth that he might have to retire and the present chief of staff confirmed the order.

General Stilwell said today: "Our service together in Korea has magnified my professional admiration for him perhaps, in comparable tactical skill and total dedication to mission."

22-3
While these differences reflected different ways of doing business and while the ROK and US officers in my headquarters were surely taking note of my ways, I did not doubt the transfer of their loyalty to me (as I noted in my Korea Memoir, page 9.)

INTERVIEWER: How did you like the assignment?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Here’s what I wrote in introducing my Korea Memoir, and I meant every word of it.

I could not have had a finer final assignment. I was a field commander in an overseas theater of vital concern to the United States. I was blessed with two superb higher commanders, General Richard G. Stilwell until September 1976, and General John W Vessey, Jr., through the remainder of my tour. In a multinational, multiservice, command, I was working with other U.S. services and was learning to know and appreciate the Army, and other armed services, of the Republic of Korea. And I was among the industrious and warmhearted Korean people, whose defense and well-being the United States was pledged to protect and whose heritage, culture, and development I found endlessly fascinating.

Those two years were the culmination of my life’s work to that point in the realm of military operations and doctrine. I had more to offer the Army in other realms, but that would be it for me.

INTERVIEWER: What was it like to command Korean commanders and troops?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Although I didn’t really command them, it was rewarding. Koreans, a distinctive race, are poetic, family loving, and musical, yet hard working and disciplined. Their very language reflects a hierarchical order based on age and position. They are hardy, take well to the military life, and make excellent soldiers. Their officers and noncommissioned officers are imbued with a high sense of duty.

When I arrived Koreans were familiar with American generals. From the outset I had their good will. Of course, by what I said and did in the military realm I had to gain their respect for my tactical and operational knowledge and opinions. I knew that they were observing me with interest and that I had to develop a reputation that I had something to offer.

One opportunity to do so arose when, soon after my arrival, the ROK Army began receiving from the US the first shipments of the TOW missile launcher. The TOW (which means tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) features a warhead that kills a tank. Ours would be tripod mounted. We intended to build for them concrete bunkers with overhead cover, over-
looking tank avenues of approach. The TOW’s backblast when launched meant that its bunker must be open to the rear.

An incident: After we had built the first such bunker, the ROK lieutenant colonel who at it was briefing my commanders and me showed a chart illustrating the TOW missile’s flight from launcher to target. Rather than the straight line that the tracking optics and trailing wire would guide it along, the missile being illustrated followed a curved, plunging, trajectory to its target. When I corrected the briefer he showed me faulty US documentation from which he had copied that erroneous trajectory, thereby complicating my efforts to educate. It was an example, occasionally encountered, of the difficulties I would have of getting Korean officers to think for themselves.

INTERVIEWER: Give me another example.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: On pages 43-44 of my Korea Memoir I tell of my visit to the ROK Army’s Command and General Staff College. There I had noted that its map exercise instructional material (an overlay) for an exercise of corps in the defense had, for the disposition of corps engineer battalions, simply duplicated that used for a similar map exercise at Leavenworth in the 1950s, without regard for the terrain. My corps commanders (at least one of whom had been Leavenworth trained in those days) had similarly placed their engineer battalions, without regard for the different situation.

I also tell of my visit to the headquarters of the First ROK Army (FROKA) on my east. There its commanding general presented me, with pride, a Korean translation of the newly published US Army Field Manual 100-5. Our manual had been written specifically for armor/mechanized formations defending against Soviet forces in Germany. Translating FM 100-5 in its exact detail, FROKA had issued it, notwithstanding that for FROKA the terrain was different, the enemy was different, and FROKA’s forces bore little resemblance to those of the United States in Germany.

INTERVIEWER: How did you get started on wargaming?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Coming from Fort Leavenworth, it was the natural thing for me to do. I think I was simply applying my principle, ‘teach them not ‘how to fight,’ but ‘how to think about how to fight.’” It was a different approach, certainly different from that of Hollingsworth.

I wanted to subject my commanders to real-time, two-sided, free-play wargaming of their actual operations plans. I thought that they would learn from that. Because one of my first priorities was to address the anomaly posed by the battalion of the 2d Infantry Division on the DMZ, I had the Eighth Army training aids shop build our first wargame board for the sector of the First ROK Corps, along with the wargame’s unit chips. With lightning speed, my people modified the routines of Leavenworth’s First Battle and created Korea First Battle. In April 1976 we ran a rudimentary test wargame of the 1st ROK Division’s plan. That story is at pages 10-13 of my Korea Memoir.
As we continued with wargaming, the briefing slides of this first “Caper Crown” exercise grew into the dozens, and then into the hundreds. I brought many slides home with me, secured them until they became unclassified, then turned them over to the Army War College. The AWC digitized them and I downloaded 200 or so for briefings. In 2010 the operations analysis people of the Military Operations Research Society (MORS), having heard about our wargaming in Korea, invited me to make a presentation at their annual symposium. It was to be a historical example of the value of realistic wargaming. For the 2013 symposium I was again invited.

At http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/, in its Folder 3, is a folder, “MORS Presentations, 2010-2013.” There you will find a 109-slide presentation, and the narration that goes with it, that tells the essential story of our wargaming. I ask the interested reader to view this presentation, preferably right now. It, along with Korea, 1976-1978 -- A Memoir, is essential to an understanding of this chapter.

INTERVIEWER: Give me an example of the value of wargaming.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: At the granular level, take for example those corps engineer battalions mentioned on page 22-5 above. Our first two wargames showed that their garrison (Defcon 3) positions were too far rearward and that the required obstacles could not be completed in the six hours that the wargame scenario allowed to get to Defcon 2. I could have exhorted (persuaded) the corps commanders (and the TROKA commander, who had the necessary authority) to move those garrison positions forward. After those two exercises they did it themselves. That was just one of many such lessons learned by wargaming.

My 109 slide MORS briefing is replete with lessons learned at the granular or tactical level, to those at the operational level, to insights gained at the strategic and policy levels.

INTERVIEWER: Might not strategic and policy insights have been above your level as a commander at the operational level?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: It was my duty to assess what might happen in battle, to explore its implications, and to tell my chain of command what I found. To position that battalion of the 2d Infantry Division up against the DMZ was a strategic decision.

Pages 18-21 of my Korea Memoir describe the incident of August 1976 in which soldiers of the North Korean army murdered two American officers in the Joint Security Area. That elicited a powerful response in which the United Nations Command deployed a force into the JSA.

Among other consequences this event made clear the utility of the 2d Infantry Division as a peacekeeping force. Its presence as a deterrent to North Korean attack had long been rec-
ognized. Our wargaming made known to all its required presence as a war fighting force, a strategic/policy insight. ⁸

Slides 41-44 of my MORS presentation informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of basic conclusions gained from our operational wargaming. They made points of strategy and policy for the contemplation of those who were in a position to decide.

INTERVIEWER: How did your subordinate Korean commanders react to your wargaming?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: “Losing face” was a phenomenon to be considered. A Chinese sociologist has written that, to an oriental person, “Losing face is a serious matter which will in varying degrees affect one’s ability to function effectively in society. Face is lost when the individual, either through his own action or that of people closely related to him, fails to meet essential requirements placed upon him by virtue of the social position he occupies.”⁹ This applied to my ROK commanders, who most definitely did not like to make a tactical mistake in public. I went ahead anyhow, softening the blow when I could. For example, when I had my “if we had” sessions after Caper Crown VII¹⁰ I was careful to do it one on one.

As it turned out, it may have been impossible to ease such anxieties. When I returned to Korea in 1979, I asked the J-3 of the Korea command if I Corps (ROK/US) Group had continued the sort of wargaming we had been doing in 1977-78. He told me that they had been discontinued because “people had become too emotionally involved.”¹¹

INTERVIEWER: The last sentence of your April 1977 back channel, “What I really think,”¹² to General Vessey reads: “I Corps Group’s operational capability for tactical nuclear warfare won’t stand an audit.” What led you to say that?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: The United States had some years before moved air- and artillery-deliverable nuclear munitions onto Korean soil, to be carefully safeguarded. The ROK Army had designated certain 8 inch and 155 mm howitzer battalions to be trained for their receipt and for their delivery to target. Eighth Army had prepared plans to transfer the munitions from the custody of special Ordnance teams to those battalions when ordered.

---

⁸ When I sent an early draft of Chapter 22 to my US deputy G-3 of those days, he wrote: “I’m convinced that the I Corps (ROK/US) Group staff’s professional response to the murder of two US officers by North Koreans inside the Joint Security Area on 18 August 1968 resulted from two factors: (1) The preparation for, participation in, and observation of Caper Crown I, which refocused the staff on the command’s essential tasks and promoted teamwork among the various staff sections. In its aftermath, staff coordination and cooperation improved markedly. (2) The dispatch of teams composed of a Korean and a United States field grade officer to monitor unit deployments during periodic alert drills resulted in accurate information that increased confidence within the staff.”

⁹ “On the Concept of Face,” by David Yau-fai Ho, University of Hong Kong, in the American Journal of Sociology, 1976.

¹⁰ See page 51 of Korea Memoir and slides 91 and 92 of my MORS presentation.

¹¹ Korea Memoir, page 55, footnote.

I had no supervisory role in any of this, nor did I know anything about how air-delivered nuclear munitions were to be handled or employed. My overriding aim was, if the North attacked, to defend my sector without having CINCUNC being forced to consider nuclear war. An equal aim was that there be in the minds of Kim Il Sung and his generals the conclusion that the likelihood of a successful attack was questionable, that the US/ROK response without using nuclear weapons would thoroughly devastate their homeland, and that to attack would be foolhardy in the extreme.

I knew enough about the theater plans and about the ROK Army's capacities to doubt their collective abilities to orchestrate nuclear operations, to determine suitable targets, and to cope with the effects that I believed we should strive mightily not to go there.

INTERVIEWER: In the Wall Street Journal article, on page 40 of the Korea Memoir, you come across as a “humanist general,” an intellectual. Did it bother you not to be looked at as a fighter?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I could not do anything about that perception. I had to be what I was. I was confident that I knew my job, that I was doing my job -- to prepare my command for war -- and that if war came I could handle my job. I was satisfied that I had correctly determined what we would have to do to get ready (as laid out in slides 17-19 of my MORS presentation) and that I was pressing with vigor a program of Essential Actions to do those things.

Consumed by the conviction that we must not be surprised, I kept a variety of nerve ends sensitive to any indication of possible attack. If the enemy attacked, I wanted my corps commanders to be prepared to fight in their sectors as ordered. I would support them and handle the reserves. Above all, I was determined to wield with maximum effect the superior airpower available to our side.

It was my business to be alert and ready. I sought to insure that, If Kim Il Sung should ask the field marshal commanding his army, “Is now the time to attack?”, the answer would be, “Not now.” If the test of war should come on my watch, I was confident that my instincts would lead me to good battle judgments. They had before, in Vietnam.

INTERVIEWER: Can you describe "nerve ends"? It sounds like you relied on instincts.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: At Leavenworth, working hand-in-hand with the Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, AZ, we had been developing the concept of an all source intelligence center (ASIC), with its high security area for communications intelligence. I had established an ASIC, to operate around the clock, in our underground command post on a hilltop at Camp Red Cloud. Nearby were the full-time offices of the corps group G-2 section.

“All source” meant everything -- from reports of guard posts on the DMZ, through the reports of Army Mohawk aircraft with their side looking airborne radar (SLAR) that flew daily along the DMZ seeking signs of enemy movement, to reports generated by higher and other service intelligence-gathering means, and more. Reports by the Foreign Broadcast Infor-
information Service of the State Department, that monitored North Korean broadcasting were perused for any subtle indications. These made up our nerve ends, or ganglia.

We worked out a checklist, which I participated in revising periodically to obviate complacency. After going through it, each evening my ROK G-2 and his US deputy came to my office to present their estimate of the likelihood of an enemy attack that night. These were serious discussions. Warning is of no use if a command decision to go on alert is not made. I only had one chance not to be surprised. “Should I go to Defcon 2?” was constantly on my mind.

INTERVIEWER: You don’t seem to have lost any time learning how to speak Korean.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: As in Vietnam, that came naturally to me. The same with calligraphy and learning Korean songs. Not only did I enjoy it but also I believed that it was good for me to show my interest in Korean culture and history, and that by learning Korean so rapidly I demonstrated that I was a smart guy. I thought that Koreans would take it as a compliment that I made that kind of effort. But that was all secondary. It was through what I said and did in the military sphere, my tactical and operational knowledge and direction, that I had to gain their respect.

INTERVIEWER: On pages 36 and 37 of your Korea Memoir there are footnotes that indicate early problems you had with the U.S. Air Force in Korea. Tell me more about that.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: The USAF component of US Forces Korea (USFK), which was a sub-unified command of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii, was Air Forces, Korea. AFK consisted essentially of fighter wings, with squadrons stationed at Osan, Kunsan, and other air bases south of Seoul. AFK operated a Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), jointly manned by ROKAF personnel, at which the ROKAF lieutenant general who commanded the ROKAF Combat Air Command was stationed. All operational tasking of air missions went out from this TACC. When I arrived, AFK was commanded by Major General Don D. Pittman. Although junior in rank to the ROKAF commander, the Commander AFK essentially ran the air war.

Another senior USAF officer in Korea was Lieutenant General John J. Burns, the deputy to General Stilwell, the CINC, United Nations Command, and Deputy Commander USFK as well.

This\textsuperscript{13} was my conception of the air/land battle.

\textsuperscript{13} Slide 47, MORS Presentation.
I had just brought it to doctrinal fruition at Fort Leavenworth. I was determined to put it into practice in Korea. This brought me into collision with Don Pittman, and to an extent with John Burns.

Pittman reported to the four-star Commander, Pacific Air Force, that I was telling him how to use his airpower. When the Cdr PACAF so informed General Vessey, Vessey invited him to visit me. At a game board, I showed him how we were integrating air and land warfare in practice. He replaced General Pittman with his PACAF director of operations, MG Bob Taylor. Bob Taylor became an enthusiastic partner in our effort. The results are described throughout my Korea Memoir and specifically from slide 45 onward in my MORS presentation.

The footnote on page 37 of my Memoir refers to a displeasure of John Burns when he read a message from my headquarters to the Commander Seventh Fleet. We were coordinating the details of carrier aviation participation that we had arranged for a Caper Crown exercise. The message was inadvertently sent for “action,” rather than for the intended “information.”

INTERVIEWER: Tell me about your work on the Air/Land Battle.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: This Korea assignment was an opportunity for me to put into practice thinking that I had developed over many years. Beginning at the bottom of page 36, my
Korea Memoir tells how, working with Air Forces Korea, we put into place revised operating methods and procedures for air/land warfare.

Given that enemy would chose the time and place of attack, it was clear that the close air support (CAS) procedures taught at Hurlburt AFB’s Air-Ground School, and corresponding procedures of the Eighth Army air-ground SOP, would not work. An intelligence-based USAF/ROKAF tactical air plan for the theater could be prepared in advance of an opening enemy attack, but after that we could not live with a system in which units in contact daily requested the next day’s air strikes. Nor could we define CAS as only those strikes observable from the front lines, or within the fire support coordination line (FSCL). We had to be able to designate targets in the enemy second echelon forces that were beyond that line.

Bob Taylor and I worked out the modifications. We instituted “emergency CAS” (in the first days of war everything was an emergency) and expanded CAS to include “battlefield air interdiction.” In a series of Caper Crown exercises,14 we tried these out. Slides 45 onward of my MORS presentation tell highlights, the tip of an iceberg of effort.

In Fort Leavenworth -- A Memoir (see Volume Six) I wrote:15

“...in two years we made great progress in air/land battle coordination. The Commander, Air Forces Korea, who in war would command the ROK/US tactical air forces in support of my force, and I developed and war gamed mechanisms for bringing in tactical air harmoniously with my forces, not only in close support but in “battlefield interdiction” (a new term for close-in, but not “close” air support), thus making it possible for us to hold our positions -- provided however that, employed under the direction of the overall Korea commander, General John W. Vessey, additional tactical air forces also targeted and sufficiently devastated the reinforcing echelons of the North’s armies. At I Corps (ROK/US) Group we called our part of the defense the ‘air/land battle.’”

I went on: “When I returned to the United States in February 1978, I visited TRADOC, then commanded by General Donn Starry, who in 1975 had gone from Fort Knox to command V Corps in Germany, where he had further developed the ‘active defense’ ideas of FM 100-5. Using a couple of cassettes of slides, I presented a two-hour briefing to him and his staff, titled “Defense of Korea’s Western Sector.” I described what we in I Corps (ROK/US) Group had done in harmony with Air Forces Korea, labeling that notion as air/land battle, and telling of the Vessey combination of deep attack on the enemy’s reinforcing echelons together with close air/land teamwork in the zone of contact.”

On the Internet I have found an April 1981 Military Review article by General Starry, an adaptation of an address made by him on 30 March 1978 at a symposium at Fort Leavenworth. Derived from his experience commanding V Corps, it reads:

14 Ibid, slides 48-59.
15 On pages 75-76 of its Epilog.
“...our operational concept was to see deep, concentrate, suppress enemy fires, strike into enemy rear areas... This attack concept was somewhat changed from before. Attacking enemy rear areas was now to be a key feature of any attack rather than a special operation. This was so because the main fight must be with the second echelon; otherwise, we would be caught in a battle of attrition that could return us to the tactics of World War One. Striking enemy rear areas went hand in glove with the see deep idea. The rear area facilities of command, control, communication and logistics were the vulnerable parts of an enemy defensive operation. They must be destroyed. If we could destroy these by fire, maneuver or by overrunning them, the cohesion of the defense would be broken.”

Speaking offensively, Donn Starry had been discovering and solving in Europe the tactical air requirement that General Jack Vessey and I, defensively, were discovering and solving in Korea, at about the same time.

A footnote on page 76 of Fort Leavenworth -- A Memoir:

“In 1980 I began hearing of something called “AirLand Battle,” which with its deep attack features seemed very like prescribing for Central Europe’s air/land forces what the Korea command had been doing for three years. It was coming from briefings by BG Donald R. Morelli, who in December 1979 had become TRADOC’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine. With its unorthodox spelling, the concept was introduced by TRADOC’s General Donn Starry and LTG Bill Richardson of Leavenworth in articles in early 1981 and was incorporated into the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 and into the 1986 version after that, but disappeared in the 1993 version. When I first heard of Morelli’s pitch I thought it was more public relations than doctrine, but it took hold for about 10 years as a useful rallying cry.”

INTERVIEWER: In pages 48-50 of your Korea Memoir your letters home show you as troubled by the outcome of Caper Crown VII.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Indeed I was. While we were entertaining visitors, the wargame went on unattended for a couple of game turns. What had started as an enemy penetration of FEBA Alpha turned into a rout (slides 88-90, MORS Presentation). Pages 50 onward of my Korea Memoir tell how I tried to cope with this disastrous outcome, to turn the discussion to “let’s talk about lessons learned.” President Park himself sent one of his trusted people to see me at Camp Red Cloud for an explanation. I was frank with him about what I thought, good as it was, the ROK Army needed.

INTERVIEWER: In your Korea Memoir, on page 51 you tell of your “if we had” critiques with your corps commanders. How did those work out?.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: The narrative text before Slides 91 and 92 of my MORS presentation reads, “From our wargame records we then built for each corps situation maps at 30 minute intervals. Two weeks later I invited each corps commander to come to my headquarters to go through with me an “If We Had,” with a situation map display.”

---

16 In the second folder of Folder 2 of http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/.
Slides 91 and 92 show how each commander could have done better. I trusted that they learned something from the exercise.

INTERVIEWER: The narrative to slide 65 reads, “This enemy attack struck at our vulnerability, the boundary between I and VI Corps. I had earlier told my commanders my view on this vulnerability, and for this exercise had ordered a revision of this corps boundary to the dotted line.”

It seems as if neither corps commander adjusted his dispositions accordingly, and that this lapse led directly to the enemy breakthrough at that point. Did your commanders ever get the point? Did you succeed in adjusting the boundary between I and VI Corps?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: On page 50 of my Korea Memoir I tell about walking, with my deputy MG Chang Bong Chun, the route taken by the enemy’s attack and its penetration. On that ground we found no evidence whatever of a fortified position. It stunned me. I brought that condition to the attention of the I and VI Corps commanders and of LTG Kim Chong Hwan, commanding Third ROK Army.

When I left Korea in February we had not resolved that boundary issue. I was confident that LTG Kim Chong Hwan, who was responsible for developing and funding the fortification plan, would eventually weigh in and bring about that change so as to put a heavily fortified position in that gap. This was consistent with my way of operating in Korea – don’t tell my corps commanders what to do, let them learn.

Fortunately the North did go south on my watch. I should have insisted on the boundary change.17

INTERVIEWER: In pages 51-53 of your Korea Memoir you tell of your heart-to-heart talk with your three ROK corps commanders. How do you think that went over?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: They listened. There was no pushback, no discussion, no professional exchange of views. That disappointed me. I hoped they talked among themselves.

INTERVIEWER: In late November 1977 General Vessey told you that General Rogers had “approved your retirement” at the end of your two years in Korea. Were you surprised?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: It was a blow, but not surprising after I thought about it.

INTERVIEWER: Explain, please.

17 My US deputy G-3 in those days has written, “General Hollingsworth was never satisfied with the corps boundaries and shortly after assuming command, he tasked me with recommending new ones. For guidance, he said that under the status quo, he was “already outflanked.” Per C&GSC methodology, I determined frontages, then applied control measures that resulted in boundaries generally perpendicular to the DMZ at the limiting points. This created ‘pie-shaped’ (more accurately ‘trapezoidal’) sectors for I and VI Corps. The finished product created a stir among the Korean members of the staff, whose counterproposal imparted only minor changes and left the general north-south orientation of the boundaries intact. General Hollingsworth did not further pursue the matter, but told me privately that on the outbreak of hostilities, he would change the boundaries.”
GENERAL CUSHMAN: Reflecting on where I might light next, I had thought that if I could name my next assignment I would put myself on the Army Staff as Comptroller, where I could bring efficiency and money saving management to the Army. At some time, a fantasy, I might even become Vice Chief of Staff where I could really do the Army some good.

I surmised that Bernie Rogers, Chief of Staff, with whom I had never worked, had arrived at a fairly accurate opinion of me and that he did not want an outspoken, unpredictable, trouble-making three-star in the Pentagon or anywhere else in the Army.

INTERVIEWER: On page 32 of your Korea Memoir you tell of a frank back channel to JCS Chairman Brown and General Rogers that you drafted but did not send. General Vessey ultimately gave it to General Brown. On the Korea Memoir’s page 35 is General Rogers’ adverse opinion of that back channel. Do you think that episode had anything to do with his decision?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: It may have contributed. I think his decision would have been the same without it.

Things turned out all right. Nancy was ready for me to retire. More years would have been very hard on her. Anyhow, I might have had too high an opinion of myself.

INTERVIEWER: How would you assess your experience, those two years in Korea?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I was satisfied with my performance. I could have done some things better.

What could be called a culminating event took place on January 6, 1978, when Congressman Samuel S Stratton, subcommittee chairman, held a meeting of the Investigating Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, at Camp Red Cloud. I presented to that subcommittee a comprehensive briefing. Although its classified material has been removed and explanatory slides are omitted, the informative transcript of the subcommittee meeting is at the added pages 61 through 73 of my Korea Memoir. I urge any interested reader of this oral history to read that transcript.

On February 2, 1978 Congressman Stratton wrote me a letter of thanks and appreciation. It is at page 74 of my Korea Memoir. I was gratified by his letter.

At pages 75-77 of my Korea Memoir is the subcommittee’s April 26, 1978 press release. It “urges no total Korean troop withdrawal before peace settlement.” That too was gratifying.

With considerable satisfaction, as is evident from the final pages of my Korea Memoir, on February 10, 1978, I left for home.

---

18 A year ahead of me at West Point, he was First Captain, a star man, and later a Rhodes scholar. I knew him, but not socially, as a classmate at the CGSC regular course, 1954-55, Like Hollingsworth, he had been an assistant division commander under DePuy in the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam. I judge that they were on good terms.

19 See the transcript also on 8-20 of Folder 3 of http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/, titled “Appendices to Korea Memoir” At pages 21-23 is the Subcommittee report. Page 24 is Congressman Stratton’s letter to me.
INTERVIEWER: Please tell me about your retiring.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: The Army set my last day in Korea for February 10 (1978) and my retirement date for February 28. Returning home I went first to Washington for an exit call on General Kerwin, Vice Chief of Staff (substituting for General Rogers), and then to Fort Monroe to tell Donn Starry, the commander TRADOC, what we had been doing in Korea.¹

In August 1977 Nancy and our daughter Anne had returned to the United States where Anne entered prep school and Nancy became a waiting wife at Stewart Air Force Base near West Point. After learning that I was to retire, Nancy found a house to rent in New Canaan, CT. I linked up with her and our household goods and moved us in. I had been asked where I would like the retirement ceremony. My answer was Fort Devens. We spent the night there, February 27.

It was a proper ceremony, indoors, with a troop contingent and band. My friend Jeff Smith, commanding First Army, came down to preside. Nancy was there as were many of our young. Some people from nearby came to it. We had a reception at the officers’ club.

INTERVIEWER: What was your approach to retirement? Had you made any plans?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I needed an income; I had not much more than a couple thousand dollars in the bank. We were still putting son Ted through college and Anne was in prep school. I wanted to raise enough for a down payment soon on a house. In Washington I went to see Larry Williams, Deputy Army SJA. He advised me on how to stay out of trouble, avoiding conflicts of interest working for defense contractors.

Fortunately I was able to go to work right away as a consultant. I had become known to the top people of the MITRE Corporation, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC).² In 1975 or so, when I was Commandant, CGSC, I had received a telephone call from John Clapper. As a lieutenant colonel John had been a member of a study group that I had organized while on the faculty of the Command and General Staff College back in 1956.³ Retired from the Army, he was working for the MITRE Corporation.

John Clapper said that the MITRE Corporation leadership was eager to learn current Army thinking on tactical nuclear warfare. He had suggested a visit to Leavenworth, where he knew I was in command. I told John that we would be pleased to host a group. The result: a two day visit by Robert R. Everett and Charles A. Zraket, respectively president and chief execu-

¹ See page 22-11, Chapter 22.
² An FFRDC "assists the United States government with scientific research and analysis, development and acquisition, and/or systems engineering and integration. FFRDCs address long-term problems of considerable complexity, analyze technical questions with a high degree of objectivity, and provide creative and cost-effective solutions to government problems." (MITRE website)
³ See page 9-12, Chapter 9.
tive officer of MITRE. When I went to Korea I stayed in touch with “CAZ” Zraket. He knew what we were doing in warfare simulation.

While on home leave in December 1977 I went by MITRE’s main office in Bedford, MA. I let them know that I was to retire February 28, 1978. They offered me a consulting contract, to be effective March 1. After my retirement ceremony Nancy and I spent the night in Concord, MA. The next day was my first day at MITRE, not far away.

INTERVIEWER: How did you manage the transition to retired status? Was it problematical?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I would have to say, yes. While I had consulting work waiting for me at MITRE, I wanted more than that. I cast about, investigating a variety of possibilities, none of which panned out. I even went to law school (at night in Fordham University) for a semester. I’m sure that my restless ways were a problem to Nancy. I finally settled down, calling myself a “consultant” or “management consultant” and looking for work.

INTERVIEWER: What did you think you had to offer?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Having left the Corps of Engineers decades ago I had little to offer to a construction company. I had zero experience in manufacturing. In the Army I had demonstrated management skills and problem-solving abilities. I could probably run a trucking company or a bakery if put in charge of it, but where would that opportunity come from? MITRE’s specialty was “command and control.” I discovered that command and control was something I had been doing most of my life. My recent experience with simulation was something I could use. I ended up pretty much working at what I had been doing and was good at. Building on that I went on to make an interesting retired career and a satisfactory living.

INTERVIEWER: 1978 was thirty-five years ago. Tell me about the full thirty-five years.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: My retired life has been in essentially three ten or twelve year phases. The 1980s were very busy for me; we moved to Bronxville, NY, and I did considerable traveling. In 1990, we moved to Annapolis, MD, where I tapered off my consulting and began writing for the US Naval Institute Proceedings and others; I wrote memoirs and such for myself. In 2002 we entered the Knollwood Military Retirement Residence in Washington, DC, where, at a fairly relaxed pace, we have been to this day.

INTERVIEWER: Whom else did you work for besides MITRE?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Bob Fisher, my former sidekick at Fort Devens, had retired. He was in Rochester, NY, working as an agent for The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, whose main offices were on Sixth Avenue in New York. Bob knew the chief of the Equitable’s agent operations division. He recommended me as a management consultant. I went to New York for an interview and was hired. Using what I had done with Operation Excellence, I introduced “Simplicity in Management” to The Equitable, I wrote a pamphlet, developed a workbook, prepared an instructional video, and taught management to agents.
I joined a consulting firm known as Kepner-Tregoe, home office in Princeton, NJ. Its expertise was analytic troubleshooting, for which it had developed a particular approach. I worked for them a few years, visiting a number of companies (John Deere, Rockwell International, others).

I had brought back from Korea cassettes of my briefing slides with the story of our warfare simulation. Storing them in MITRE’s safes, I began to use them for briefings. MITRE, generous with its consulting money, supported my travel to Washington to brief at various places there, and travel with a MITRE team to Europe. In Europe we briefed, and gathered information on command and control.

I had clients among hardware companies, like TRW, who were bidding for government contracts. My work for such companies was to advise in the characteristics of a product and in the development of scenarios that they could use to illustrate that product. I did not speak to or meet with contracting people.

I branched out into the organization and doctrine for joint and combined forces. Paid by various companies (e.g., BDM International, RAND, SAIC), I consulted with and wrote papers for, among others, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army War College, the Army Combined Arms Center, and for USAREUR and USAFE. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff I wrote a treatise, “On Representing Warfare;” it explained battle simulation. Following my briefings, at USAREUR and USAFE, of our warfare simulation in Korea, those two commands jointly established and manned a Warrior Preparation Center, at which I consulted. For Leavenworth I wrote a scenario-based “Five Lessons on Command and Control of Joint Operations,” as an experimental course for senior fellows at the School for Advanced Military Studies; its read-ahead material included a treatment of battle commanders: Alexander the Great, Wellington, Ulysses Grant, Horatio Nelson, and the RAF’s Hugh Dowding.

INTERVIEWER: Tell me what you did at MITRE.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: MITRE had been working mostly for the Air Force. I began writing papers on the command and control of what I called “theater forces,” the all-service forces in a theater of operations. This was a new and expanding field of interest for them. I explored the current state of these theater systems and the manner of their development by the various services.

I had long believed that the evolutionary approach was the way to go in developing and fielding force command and control systems. When I joined MITRE the Defense Science Board had just recommended that such systems, especially those of the decision-aid/decision-support type, be acquired using an evolutionary approach. With Department of Defense support the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) undertook a massive Command Control (C2) System Acquisition Study. MITRE enrolled me to participate.

4 On SAGE (Semiautomated Ground Environment), a continent-wide system of radar detection stations and interceptor guidance that had been built responsive to the threat of Soviet air attack.
5 Chapter 21’s section on TOS (Tactical Operations System) in my Fort Leavenworth -- A Memoir, tells of my conviction (pages 53-55).
CAZ Zraket had been supporting the work on information systems that was being directed by Anthony Oettinger, PhD, at Harvard University’s Program for Information Policy Research. Tony had been an early pioneer in computers. He used PIRP to run seminars and generate papers. Knowing that I had something important to say about command and control systems, CAZ offered my services to him.

In December 1981, at one of Tony’s Seminars on Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, I spoke on “C3I and the Commander: Responsibility and Accountability.” I began with a “very sober assessment...”

“The sad story is that the command and control systems that are in the hands of the deployed US field forces, and of the Allies alongside whom we will no doubt have to fight, are barely marginal for conditions short of war. I’m satisfied that any realistic audit will show that they are, and will be, seriously inadequate for war.

“To be specific, they are not well tied together from top to bottom. They are not being exercised realistically under the expected conditions of war. Great sections of them will probably not survive the attack against them that is sure to come in war. For the major operational commander, Allied or US, whose forces must use these systems (I’m talking about theater of operations command) they are largely unplanned, spliced together, ill-fitting components which have been delivered to his forces by relatively independent parties, far away, who have coordinated adequately neither with him and his staff nor with each other. They do not exploit the present capabilities of technology, nor does the system for their development adequately provide that future systems will.”


In the early 1980s the outspoken Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, USAF General David C. Jones, had written and testified in Congressional hearings on the need for an overhaul of the JCS. General Jones’ view was echoed by, among others, Army Chief of Staff Edward C. Meyer. Hearings ensued in the House Armed Services Committee. In 1982 I saw to it that committee staffer Archie Barrett received a draft (a “Yellow Draft”) of my PIRP book.

On the AFCEA book’s dust cover, Dr. Barrett (“House of Representatives Armed Services Committee”) wrote: “I read Jack Cushman’s book in draft and immediately arranged to have a copy provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee. As a result his work has subsequently influenced both houses of Congress as deliberations on the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and more properly, the national defense establishment, proceed.”

---


7 It was Tony’s practice to send to numbers of knowledgeable people full drafts, in shiny yellow covers, of PIRP publications, for comment. Returned, they contributed to his rigorous review of the final book.
James R. Locher was a senior staffer on the Senate Armed Services Committee during the hearings that culminated in the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. In 2002 Locher wrote Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon. From its pages 156-7:

“(T)he SASC staff’s initial thinking on the adequacy of a unified commanders authority was significantly influenced by a study completed in April, 1983, by a retired three-star Army general, John H. Cushman... Cushman concluded that operational commanders’ “authority and capacity... are very much out of balance with their responsibility and accountability.”

I had begun writing Command and Control of Theater Forces; The Korea Command and Other Cases, published in 1966. As hearings went on in 1984-85. I was sharing with Jim Locher and Archie Barrett draft sections of this book. I was in frequent telephone contact, especially with Archie, and met with them often. They were working respectively with Senator Goldwater and Congressman Nichols.

From page 157 of Locher’s Victory on the Potomac:

Although Cushman’s second theater command and control study was not published until March, 1986, he had formulated many ideas during 1984, including some on Beirut. In occasional meetings and telephone calls with me, Cushman analyzed the barrier between the unified commander and his service components created by Unified Action Armed Forces and service culture. Cushman called this barrier the “wall of the component” and concluded that it is “always inhibiting” and can be “devastating to mission readiness and mission performance.”

He considered the marine barracks bombing “a classic example of the devastating effect of the ‘wall of the component.’” He believed General Rogers was inhibited by his limited authority, which “does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training except when a subordinate commander requests assistance.” Rogers’s authority also excluded “tactical employment of the forces” of a service component. Responsi-

---

8 College Station, TX, Texas A&M University Press, 2002, 525 pages
9 See Folder 5 at http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/.
Go to http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/. That website of six folders originated with Folder 1 in 2007. Containing perhaps my first post-retirement critique (in this case, of US operations in Iraq 2003) that website has since been used by me for posting other items of my writings over the years. They are relevant to this Oral History.

At the website’s Folder 4 you will find Command and Control of Theater Forces; The Korea Command and Other Cases. Scroll down to pages 7 and 8 for a Summary of Findings. Scroll through its Table of Contents to page 19 for an idea of its scope. Published in 1986, it was out in Yellow Draft in 1985).\(^\text{10}\)

Now bring up, on page 131 of its 638 pages, “Case 2: Beirut Marine Tragedy, 1983.” Jim Locher was referring to pages 5-29 onward of the book.

Scroll down to Chapter XV of the book (p 547 of 638), “A Matrix for Decision.” There you will find a 73 page tutorial offered for the use of the staffs of the two armed services committees as they worked on the legislation to be considered. (Printing out pages 614 and 615 will provide an example of the depth of my treatment.)

As the two committees used my work in 1985 and 1986, the effort on “responsibility and accountability” that I had begun with my 1981 appearance at one of Tony Oettinger’s seminars bore fruit. It was with satisfaction that I read the language in the enacted Goldwater Nichols bill, strengthening the authority of the Chairman of the JCS and other reforms.

**INTERVIEWER**: Do you have any other examples of the useful effect of your writings in those days?

**GENERAL CUSHMAN**: The early 1980s were highly productive for me. I was finding a receptive hearing wherever I went, briefing on and discussing the organization and employment of forces.

In 1983 I visited Major General Carl E. Vouno at the 8th Infantry Division in Germany, where I was impressed with his grasp of such matters. That summer he took command of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. I arranged to soon brief him and his people on the

\(^\text{10}\) For a look at who received the draft I invite readers to print out its page 3 (p 4 of 638).
work I had done in 1975-76 with our Air/Land Battle Coordination Center. He immediately understood its possibilities, which my immediate successors had ignored. Carl Vuono conceived the institution of what, under his successors LTGs Riscassi and Bartlett, would become the full-fledged Battle Command Training Program, exportable for the training of the commanders and staffs of divisions and corps worldwide. As the BTCP idea was taking shape I visited Leavenworth often, to keep track and offer suggestions.

1983 War College Text. In 1983 the Army War College engaged me to write a text, “Organization and Operational Employment of Air/Land Forces.” Published in January 1984, it was introduced by Major General Thomas F. Healy, AWC Commandant, with, “This reference text... has been prepared for use by the students and faculty of the US Army War College. But, in a larger sense, it has been designed for the entire Army and specifically for use by our mid-level and senior leadership. For this reason the reference text is being widely distributed throughout the Army.”

At [http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/](http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/), in Folder 4, can be found the document’s text. A printout of its pages 15-18, Table of Contents, will show the scope of its 188 pages. It was unique. Nothing like it had been published before.

There is also a March 1984 letter from Major General Merrill A. McPeak, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, of the Tactical Air Command. His letter read, in part:

> I have recently had the occasion to review your reference text, Organization and Operational Employment of Air/Land Forces, written by Lt Gen Cushman. I am enormously impressed with this document. I wonder if it is possible to get 10 copies or so for distribution here at TAC headquarters.

One can wonder what the effect of that text was, up to and including on the Gulf War, 1990-91.

1985 Essay on Military Effectiveness. In 1984 I was visited in my Bronxville, NY, home by Colonel Robert Doughty, head of the History Department at West Point, and Williamson Murray, a historian. Along with Allan R. Millett, Murray was undertaking to edit, for the Cambridge University Press, a three volume work titled Military Effectiveness.

Millett and Murray had gathered 21 historians, each of whom had agreed to write a treatment of the military effectiveness of the armed forces of one of seven nations in one of three periods. The periods were: World War I; the years between the wars; and World War II. The nations were: the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia/Soviet Union, Italy, and Japan.

---

11 In Chapter 21, at page 21-10, I wrote: “Culminating this Leavenworth air/land effort was the establishment and manning of an Air/Land Battle Coordinating Center, to be used for the development of techniques and procedures, and for the exercise of air/land battle staffs in two-sided wargames. We put substantial effort into this; see Annex L of Volume Two of my Leavenworth Memoir. In addition to my Memoir, page 70 onward, it must be read as well. The experience set me up for my 1976 assignment to Korea.” After I left for Korea my successor did away with the ALBCC.

12 In 1988 General McPeak became Air Force Chief of Staff.
For a chapter on the political and strategic dimensions of the nations’ armed forces’ military effectiveness, they had engaged historian Russell F. Weigley. They were asking me to write the corresponding chapter on the operational and tactical dimensions of those nations’ armed forces’ military effectiveness.

I accepted. I chose to approach my chapter by considering the challenge that the leadership in each of the 21 cases encountered in its time, and that leadership’s response.

In Folder 4 at http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/, is Volume 3 of Military Effectiveness, with its Chapter 9, my 21-page essay “Challenge and Response at the Operational and Tactical Levels, 1914-45.”

Writing in the mid-1980s that critique of military leaders’ performance in the 20th century’s first half, I concluded with what was required to produce a superior military:

- very high standards of performance;
- a school system that, with historical and other study and thought, develops and fosters the spread of those standards and indoctrinated the officer corps with what those standards meant in practice;
- a chain of command that understands what those standards mean and sees to it that they govern what officers do; and
- a system of selection for responsible positions that ensures that those selected meet the standards and screens out those who do not.

I don’t know who may have read those words. When Robert Gates became Secretary of Defense, I called my essay to the attention of his military assistant, Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli. When General Martin E. Dempsey (later to become Army Chief of Staff, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) became the commander TRADOC, I mailed him my own copy of Volume 3, with a bookmark at my essay.


For eighteen pages my presentation text dealt with ROK/US command relationships, some issues being rather arcane. Five paragraphs from the paper’s end, I recommended that the United States withdraw its nuclear munitions from Korea.

The panel’s organizers had released my text beforehand. That paragraph caused a sensation. Heretofore US policy had been to “neither confirm nor deny” that US had nuclear munitions in Korea. No US officer had ever spoken this way. I had generated front page news.

Scroll down to pages 24-25 of the URL (pp 19-20 of my paper) to read the offending paragraph. Then scroll down to pages 27-30 of the URL to read my panel remarks, as typed up later from the notes that I made on its pages 31-39. Page 40 of the URL is press coverage. The last URL page is an addendum that I wrote in January.
I said: “A sovereign people... will simply not permit its chief executive or defense ministry, or another nation's military on its soil, to say for very long, ‘We can neither confirm nor deny’ a matter so profound as the presence of nuclear weapons in its territory. We don't do it that way in NATO, and we can't do it much longer in Korea. Writers with access to unclassified sources, and through the Freedom of Information Act, have established that there clearly are nuclear weapons in Korea and, whether correct or not, their storage and other arrangements. US nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent to North Korea.” I said that with modern delivery means and weapons we can do this from offshore.

In September 1991 President George H. W. Bush announced the unilateral withdrawal of nuclear munitions from Korea.

1990 Gulf War. On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Our family had just settled in Annapolis, MD. For Tony Oetinger’s Program on information Resources Policy I began writing what would become PIRP’s, "Command and Control of Theater Forces: Issues in Mideast Coalition Command” (See Folder 4) of the URL posting my work.)

Writing that book allowed me to apply, in a war planned and waged by a force in a theater of operations, all that I had learned up to that time. Part Two's chapter titles: Operational/Tactical Direction; A Primer on Theater Warfare; Some Fundamentals of Theater Warfare; Organizing for Battle, Options; A Superior C3 System for the Force; and Training the Force.

Part One of the book was titled Political/Strategic Direction. Chapter I addressed how political/strategic direction had been provided in World War II, in the Korean War, in Vietnam, and in NATO. Chapter II described the Middle East situation and the several nations involved. Chapter III laid out options for political and strategic direction.

Part One’s final chapter was titled “The End Product: Guidance for the Force.” It follows:
Chapter IV. The End Product: Guidance to the Force

The February 1944 directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower, in London preparing for the allied invasion of Europe, is a model of clear instructions to an operational commander. To illustrate the issues to be addressed in political/strategic guidance, it is reproduced below paragraph by paragraph, with, in italics, possible corresponding words for a Mideast commander from a multinational political authority (here visualized as the United Nations Security Council), if indeed there should be a single commander and an authority to guide him. No comment is offered on the lines in italics, although almost every sentence provokes reflection on its implications and on the problems that would arise in its actual drafting.

1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed under your orders for operations for liberation of Europe from Germans. Your title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.

   You are hereby designated as Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces now being assembled in and near Saudi Arabia responsive to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Your title will be Commander in Chief United Nations Mideast Command.

2. Task. You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May, 1944. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed toward securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

   Task. When directed by the United Nations Security Council, you will undertake operations aimed at the destruction of Iraqi armed forces and the liberation of Kuwait. In executing this task, you are authorized to conduct air operations throughout Iraq and land operations into Iraq as necessary to recover and defend Kuwait and to destroy such Iraqi forces as immediately threaten Kuwait's territory.

3. Notwithstanding the target date above you will be prepared at any time to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the enemy on your front, to effect a reentry into the Continent with such forces as you have available at the time; a general plan for this operation when approved will be furnished for your assistance.

   Pending authority to execute the above task you will defend the territory of Saudi Arabia. Should Iraq forces attack into Saudi Arabia you are authorized to conduct defensive air, land, and sea operations, to include hot pursuit over Iraq's territory.
4. **Command.** You are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will exercise command generally in accordance with the diagram at Appendix (omitted here). Direct communication with the United States and British Chiefs of staff is authorized in the interest of facilitating your operations and for arranging necessary logistics.

You are responsible to the United Nations Security Council, reporting through the Military Staff Committee, and will exercise command in accordance with the diagram at Appendix (Note: a detailed chain of command diagram may not be advisable or necessary; if issued it should insure unity of command). Direct communication with national representatives of nations contributing to the United Nations force is authorized in the interest of facilitating your operations and for arranging necessary logistics.

5. **Logistics.** In the United Kingdom the responsibility for logistics organization, concentration, movement, and supply of forces to meet the requirements of your plan will rest with British Service Ministries so far as British Forces are concerned. So far as United States Forces are concerned, this responsibility will rest with the United States War and Navy Departments. You will be responsible for the coordination of logistical arrangements on the Continent. You will also be responsible for coordinating the requirement’s of British and United States forces under your command.

The responsibility for logistics support of national forces to meet the requirements of your operation will rest with the respective nations; this can include agreements between nations for logistic support. You will be responsible for coordinating the logistic requirements of the forces under your command, for coordinating their logistic activities, and for bringing to the attention of the Military Staff Committee logistic deficiencies which will adversely affect your operations.

6. **Coordination of operations of other Forces and Agencies.** In preparation for your assault on enemy occupied Europe, Sea and Air Forces agencies of sabotage, subversion, and propaganda, acting under a variety of authorities are now in action. You may recommend any variation in these activities which may seem to you to be desirable.

In furtherance of the United Nations’ aim of liberating Kuwait, a coordinated program of special operations is now in action. You may recommend any variation in these activities which may seem to you to be desirable.

7. **Relationship to United Nations Forces in other areas.** Responsibility will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff for supplying information relating to operations of the Forces of the U.S.S.R. for your guidance in timing your operations. It is
understood that the Soviet Forces will launch an offensive at about the same time as OVERLORD with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western front. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater, will conduct operations designed to assist your operation, including the launching of an attack against the south of France at about the same time as OVERLORD. The scope and timing of his operations will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You will establish contact with him and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your views and recommendations regarding operations from the Mediterranean in support of your attack from the United Kingdom. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will place under your command the forces operating in Southern France as soon as you are in a position to assume such command. You will submit timely recommendations compatible with this regard.

*It is expected that, when you undertake offensive operations against Iraq, Turkey and Syria will also attack into Iraq. You are authorized direct contact with senior Turkish and Syrian military authorities to provide them with intelligence on Iraqi forces, to suggest the employment of their forces, to coordinate the timing of their operations, and to determine their requirements for air operations by your forces to assist their operations. Your instructions in the event of Iraqi military operations against Israel or Jordan are provided separately.*

8. Relationship with Allied Governments -- the re-establishment of Civil Governments and Liberated Allied Territories and the administration of enemy territories. Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date.*

*Instructions for the re-establishment of civil government in Kuwait and for the administration of Iraqi territories taken by your forces will be issued at a later date.*

The guidance to General Eisenhower contained neither rules of engagement nor limits on his forces' operations. The world has changed; something like this may be needed today:

*Use of nuclear weapons is not contemplated... Prepare for retaliatory action, both chemical and other, should Iraq use chemical weapons... Taking into account the need for military effectiveness and the avoidance of unnecessary military casualties, make every effort to limit damage to noncombatants, religious structures, and the civil infrastructure of Kuwait and Iraq.*

However, even this much might not be enough. In current thinking, "strategic guidance" would include "defining operational conditions to be achieved" and "establishing cam-
paign purposes and sequencing to achieve these conditions." These may not be self-evident from all the paragraphs in italics above.*

Thus, for example, strategic guidance could add something like this:

The aim of (conditions to be achieved by) your air campaign will be to gain immediate air supremacy over the Iraqi air force, and complete freedom of air action.

Your land campaign will aim at the destruction of Iraqi forces in Kuwait and the liberation of Kuwait. You are authorized to permit Iraq to make the first offensive move, which, if made, you will decisively defeat, thereupon taking up an offensive which destroys the opposing Iraqi forces and achieves the liberation of Kuwait. You will, however, prepare a land campaign which takes the offensive when directed by the United Nations Security Council, in the event Iraq does not attack on land.

The signature block could read:

For the United Nations Security Council,

______________________, Chairman

The value of such guidance should be evident, and indeed the process of preparing it would be salutary. One can hope that a draft of something along its lines is in preparation, somewhere, today.

Creating a coalition that through the United Nations Security Council (per Figure 8, page 22) or through a "Council of Nations" (per Figure 7, page 20) or its like could produce guidance like this would not be easy. In the absence of such, however, the commander (or an ad hoc commanders' council of war) would be left to develop guidance for himself (or themselves), or find himself (or themselves) jerked around by ever-changing guidance, or immobilized, denied guidance at a critical juncture, or straying away from acceptable strategy and being forced to change the plan or, worse, executing a bad plan, or otherwise in serious trouble with operations out of step with strategy.

That would be no way to run a war.

*Omitted here.
I wrote Chapter IV because there had been talk in the informed press about what the guidance to General Schwarzkopf was to be, who was to provide it, and was there even to be any guidance. On my bookshelf I found the Army Chief of Military History’s 1950 Cross-Channel Attack. In it was the text of the World War II JCS Overlord directive. I went from there.

On page 2 of "Command and Control of Theater Forces: Issues in Mideast Coalition Command" Tony Oettinger points out that I circulated drafts of the Mideast Coalition paper in September and October 1990, and that in December the PIRP sent Yellow Drafts to reviewers for comment. One such Yellow Draft was mailed to General Schwarzkopf at his rear CENTCOM headquarters at MacDill AFB, FL, with a request that it be immediately flown to his headquarters in Saudi Arabia. As Tony remarks, that draft differed from February’s final version only in that it corrected “inaccuracies and other errors reviewers called to our attention.”

Desert Storm’s air campaign began January 17, 1991. The ground campaign began February 24. Around the first of January, at my Annapolis home, I answered the telephone. General Schwarzkopf was on the line, calling from Riyadh. He said that he had received and read my book, that he had found it quite good/useful, and he thanked me for it.

Years later, on going up the steps of the Army-Navy Club on 17th Street in Washington, I encountered Richard (“Butch”) Neal, USMC. As a brigadier general on General Schwarzkopf’s operations staff at Riyadh and the daily CENTCOM situation briefer, he had in 1991 become famous. I introduced myself. Recognizing me immediately, he told me how valuable my book had been.

INTERVIEWER: What other activities in retirement would you like to mention”

GENERAL CUSHMAN: In June 1986 I went to China. In the mid-1980s, before the events of Tiananmen Square, there was a thaw in United States-China relations. After AFCEA published my book, Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy, AFCEA was contacted by the Chinese government. The Chinese said that, if AFCEA were willing to send me to China, the Chinese would pay my expenses for a week. They proposed that I lecture at the People’s Liberation Army staff in Beijing and at the PLA technical university at Changsa. AFCEA agreed, and so I went.

I was given VIP treatment throughout my visit. Coordinating with the Peoples Republic of China’s mission to the United Nations, in Manhattan, I let them know that I was born in China. They included a trip to my birthplace at Tianjin 90 miles from Beijing. There I saw the old barracks of the 15th infantry, including the headquarters building, flagpole and parade field where my father had been the regimental adjutant.

Taken by a guide around Changsa, Mao Tse Tung's birthplace, I got a glimpse of how China was changing. A most interesting trip.

Moving to Annapolis in 1990 brought me in touch with the Naval Academy and with the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Proceedings’ editor Fred Rainbow welcomed articles with a joint

Living in Annapolis’s historic district, I participated in neighborhood actions. Annapolis’s long-time mayor, Al Hopkins, named me chairman of a City-sponsored, contractor supported, study effort on the Future of Annapolis. This led to my being named in 1997 to head the transition team for the newly elected mayor, Dean Johnson.

Our home in Annapolis brought me near the National Archives facility in Suitland, MD. There I found records from my 1967-68 time in the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, including the daily brigade and battalion journals. Copying pages, I assembled in my workplace on the third floor of our Revell Street home the material for a 174 page Personal Memoir -- An Account of the 2d Brigade and 2d Brigade Task Force, 101st Airborne Division, September 1967 through June 1968. In its ultimate draft, as written in the early 1990s, it is at http://www.angelfire.com/rebellion/101abndivvietvets/page217aCushmanToc.html.

From my own records and using those that I could obtain from the National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, MO, I assembled the names, addresses, and phone numbers of members of the 2d Brigade of my time. Among them I was able to find battalion and company commanders and brigade and battalion staff people and senior NCOs. At an annual reunion of the 101st Airborne Division at Columbus Georgia, I assembled three or four dozen of these people. In a classroom at Fort Benning’s Infantry School I shared with them a draft of my Personal Memoir and gained their inputs and suggestions.

This meeting evolved into periodic reunions of the 2d Brigade of 1967-68 at Fort Campbell, KY. I was able to travel to Vietnam with a video cameraman to film scenes where the brigade had fought. This developed into a video cassette which I shared at our 1996 reunion. Made later into a DVD, I offered it to brigade members along with copies of my Personal Memoir.

Desert Storm’s End Game. In October 1993 the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings published my article by this name. Building on my Mideast Coalition paper and General Schwarzkopf’s autobiography, “It Doesn’t Take A Hero,” the article is a critique of Schwarzkopf’s generalship in the four day battle of Desert Storm.” I wrote:

German operational doctrine uses the term fingertipsenfuehl (fingertip touch) to capture a commander’s masterful hands-on sensing of the moving tactical situation on the battlefield, together with the situation’s risks and opportunities. For the ground war of Desert Storm Schwarzkopf did not have fingertip touch; he had not created a command-and-control scheme that would allow it. Lacking this essential fingertip touch in the war’s final hours, he evidently did not grasp – and he surely failed to seize – the opportunity to trap all of Iraq’s forces south of the Euphrates...

(Ninety-one and a half hours) after Schwarzkopf launched his attack, General Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had him on the telephone, to pass along the Presi-
dent's wish to stop the attack as soon as possible. He mentioned 0500 (Schwarzkopf’s
time) as the hour the President had in mind and asked Schwarzkopf’s reaction. As he gave
a tentative assent, General Schwarzkopf added, “I’ll check with my commanders.” From the
moment that Schwarzkopf talked to (the commander of Third Army) its two corps began ir-
reversibly to stop fighting...

If General Schwarzkopf had from the outset been thinking in terms of trapping [not “destroy-
ing’] the enemy, and if he had fully grasped his lead forces’ actual situations, plans, and
capabilities when queried late in the evening of 27 February, he could have replied (without
polling his commanders) to General Powell, “Give me until noon local time tomorrow. By
then I’ll have the highway north of Basrah blocked and the Euphrates causeway secured
and we’ll have the Iraqis trapped.”...Had he done so, not only would the world have seen a
true example of fingertip touch, but Saddam Hussein would have been more surely in the
victor’s grip, there would have been no lagging aftertaste of a Desert Storm because too
many of the enemy got away, and history might well have taken a different turn.

At http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/, in Folder 6, is the text of Desert Storm’s
End Game, with its full thesis for General Schwarzkopf’s missed opportunity. In a box labeled
“Arguments Against” are counters to that thesis. The article provides food for military profes-
sionals to discuss what might, or might not, have been.

Joint Doctrine. Believing that the Army should take the lead in writing joint doctrine, in the
1980s I followed Leavenworth’s work with hope as it produced successive versions of Field
Manual 100-5, Operations. In December 1991, after my eighth visit to the School of Ad-
vanced Military Studies (SAMS) I expressed in a lengthy letter to Dutch Shoffner, command-
ing the Combined Arms Center, my frustrations that an adequate joint approach was not be-
ing taken. The last appendix in the sixth folder of Fort Leavenworth - A Memoir’s Folder 2 is
my nine page letter to LTG Shoffner.

Realizing that a fully joint approach was more than I could reasonably expect from the Army,
I set out to write my own treatment of joint doctrine. Privately printed as a 64 page pamphlet
in Annapolis in 1983 and titled Handbook forJoint Commanders, it came out in 1000 copies.
Retitled Thoughts for Joint Commanders, it was again published in August 1983, in 5000 cop-
ies. At $5.00 each, copies went on sale in the Pentagon book store. At a discount, the U.S.
Naval Academy bought a copy for each first class midshipman. (At Amazon.com a copy can
now be bought for $24.95 plus shipping.)

It was with pleasure that I read, in the November 1993 Military Review, a review of its first
edition by General Donn Starry, now retired in Colorado, with this lead: “It is difficult to review
the superb little book with a review shorter than the book. For it is more than a ‘handbook’ for
joint commanders. It is a set of ‘musts’ for those entrusted with command of joint forces.”

14 From the Marine Corps Gazette: “General Cushman has done a great service by putting together a timely and in-
sightful book on joint warfighting... His approach to the fire support coordination line debate is particularly enlightened;
that discussion alone is worth the modest price of the book.”
Failure in Iraq. At http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/, in Folder 1, can be found the video of an April 2007 presentation by me at the Army War College on the 2003 Iraq War. This presentation derived from my having offered to the Army War College’s Parameters a January 2007 paper that I had written for the Program on information Resources Policy. It was titled, “Planning and Early Execution of the War in Iraq; An Assessment of Military Participation.” That paper is also in Folder 1.

It concluded that...
- The Secretary of Defense grievously misjudged the war’s post-hostilities requirements.
- The JCS Chairman failed in that he did not comprehend the nature of the war that the United States was about to enter and the grave deficiencies in the Secretary of Defense’s guidance for the post-hostilities phase, or, if he understood all that, in that he did not forcefully make known his objections to the Secretary of Defense and if necessary to the President.
- General Franks failed in the same way, and in that he did not offer an alternative plan that met the situation within resources reasonably available.
- The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed in that they either did not comprehend the nature of the war and the deficiencies in guidance, or understanding them did not forcefully make known their objections.

Rather than publish my paper, the Commandant invited me to speak to students and faculty during their lunch period. The 60 minute video resulted.

In Folder 1’s third, more comprehensive, paper, I write, “In 2002-2003 the Joint Chiefs of Staff missed an opportunity to remind the Secretary of Defense of the Army’s experience in the 1945–46 occupations of Germany and Japan and in civil-military action in Vietnam.”

The fourth paper in Folder 1, “A Service Chief Should Have Spoken Up” speaks both to the above point and to the January 2002 memorandum in which Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ruled that detainees were “not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes of the Geneva Convention of 1949.”

I wrote: “The Service chiefs [especially those of the Army and Marine Corps] should have consulted their Judge Advocates General. Following that they should have told the Secretary of Defense that their Services’ forces would abide by Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.

“They did nothing of the kind. The orders of the Secretary of Defense governed down through the chain of command... The gloves came off. A stain permeated the forces, leading among many other disastrous consequences to the abominable behavior of military policemen and intelligence personnel at Abu Ghraib in 2003.”

I decided not to write a critical article for Army magazine or Military Review. On September 27, 2008, I emailed General George W. Casey, Army Chief of Staff, and a handful of other Army four-stars the following:
"With respect, I call your attention to the top item at
http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/.

"It is for you to ponder. I will be calling it also to the attention of rising generals.

"The other items may be of interest as well."

In 2011, in a treatment of Black Hearts\textsuperscript{15} I told the story of gross criminality by soldiers of B Company, 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division south of Baghdad in 2005-06. I commanded the 2d Brigade Task Force of the 101st Airborne Division during the Vietnam War. Appalled at what I read and struck by the fact that its consequences were born by no one in the chain of command above company grade level, I wrote a paper about the full chain of command's performance in this case. Its title: Chain of Command Performance of Duty, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, 2005-06. See http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/, Folder 6, for its 30 pages.

My paper ended with, "I believe that the matter of general officer command responsibility for taking notice of poor situations at levels down the chain of command, such as that of the 1/502d Infantry in this case, and for acting to correct them, needs policy attention at the Army's highest level. The 2004 Abu Ghraib case is an example.

"The Army must not only establish high standards of performance for its most senior officers, it should also establish a process for candid critique. Decades ago the after action review (AAR) was instituted at all levels of Army training. Its value is proven.

"This Black Hearts case study offers an opportunity for the Army's senior officers to engage in an AAR of a real case, rather than an exercise, for the benefit of all. I so recommend."

I attached a paper, "Some Suggestions for Discussion Among Senior Leaders on LTG Cushman's Chain of Command Performance of Duty; 2d BCT, 101st Airborne Division, 2005-06" It read:

\begin{quote}
What does the Black Hearts paper tell us about the need for senior leaders (say, major general and above) to be aware of the situations and command climates in units two or three echelons down the chain of command?

What about the senior commander's need to be aware of behavior, in general, of individuals down to the end of the chain of command?

How do senior commanders gain awareness of such matters?

Is it necessary to establish the Army's expectations of its senior commanders in this regard? If so, how?
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15} By Jim Frederick, New York: Random House, 2010.
Is there a danger in that in seeking the highest of standards a commander will engender an undesirable “zero defects,” “no mistakes allowed” perception by his subordinates?

What action should be taken in the case of a commander’s failure to be aware of, and to act on, undesirable unit and individual situations? In acting, is it important to take into account that commander’s otherwise sterling performance, and how is this done?

Does the modular brigade concept as implemented impede a senior commander’s exercise of command supervision for his assigned modular units, especially those units attached from another division?

Should the Army establish a doctrine for senior command supervision beyond what is in Title 10, US Code, Section 3583? It reads:

All commanding officers and others in authority in the Army are required -
(1) to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination;
(2) to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command;
(3) to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct, according to the laws and regulations of the Army, all persons who are guilty of them; and
(4) to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the Army, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.

The Army may have undertaken such senior officer AARs. I do not know.

In 2011, in an input to a discussion of the Army’s Profession of Arms effort, I wrote this in a paper titled “Limited Distribution”:

“What the Army needed in the Black Hearts case was decisive action early by the chain of command. I believe that is what the Army most needs today to foster the Profession of Arms. I have in mind two recent cases that called for decisive action by four-star generals or higher, and decisive action was not forthcoming... 

“My first case is about Abu Ghraib. The (Schlesinger) report relates that the explosive photos of prisoner abuse first came to light in mid-January 2004... It seems evident that General Abizaid saw the photos a few days, and possibly a week or more, before... the photos were about to be aired in a CBS broadcast.

“(W)ithin two days after he viewed these photos, General Abizaid should have satisfied himself not only that did Brigadier General Janis L. Karpinski, commanding the 800th Military Police Brigade, fail to exercise proper command supervision at Abu Ghraib, but that Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, commanding Coalition Joint Task Force 7, likewise failed. CJTF 7, reporting directly to the Cdr, USCENTCOM, had operational control of US forces within
Iraq. General Abizaid, as combatant commander, should have forthwith relieved General Sanchez from command. He had the authority to do so.

‘My second case addresses the Army’s response to the April 22, 2004, death of Corporal Patrick Tillman in Afghanistan by friendly fire.

‘On March 26, 2007, the Department of Defense Inspector General released his report on the Army’s handling of Corporal Tillman’s fratricide. The Army referred that report to General William S. Wallace, commanding the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, for an independent review.

“Among other actions General Wallace sanctioned Lieutenant General (Retired) Philip R. Kensinger, Jr, who had been in 2004 the Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, in Corporal Tillman’s chain of command. He found that General Kensington lied in follow-on investigations conducted seven months after Corporal Tillman's death.”General Wallace had found that LTG Kensinger made three false statements in follow-on investigations, that he failed to properly notify the Tillman family of the fratricide investigation, that he failed to notify then Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee of the friendly fire investigation, and that he did not initiate a timely Army safety board investigation as required by Army regulation. General Wallace issued a written reprimand to General Kensinger.

“On July 30, 2007, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren issued a written censure to General Kensinger that addressed his knowing submission of a false report to the Secretary of the Army on a matter of grave importance to the Army. He cited General Kensinger's failure of leadership as the senior officer in the administrative chain of command of Corporal Tillman's unit, the Ranger Regiment. And he directed that an Army Grade Determination Review Board evaluate the highest grade in which General Kensinger served satisfactorily on active duty for retirement purposes.

“...I have been unable to find any report of an action by the Army Grade Determination Review Board with respect to General Kensinger. This leads me to conclude that the Army judges him to have served satisfactorily as a lieutenant general, notwithstanding the findings by General Wallace and Secretary of the Army Geren that he had lied.

‘If this be true, the Profession of Arms initiative rings a bit hollow to me.”

In 2011 I made repeated attempts to call three of my papers to the attention of the highest levels in the Army. The two emails that follow are examples.

(1) To: kgp124@yahoo.com Tue, Nov 15 2011 8:50 pm
    (LTG Campbell's DCSOPS secretary)

Kathleen, I will use this email address from now on. I think that my AOL account has been hacked.

Attached are three papers that for some time I have sought to get to LTG Campell's attention.

(They were: Black Hearts Case.pdf, LimitedDistribution.pdf. SuggestionsForDiscussion.pdf, JHC)
I attempted to go through LTG Caslen, former Commander. Combined Arms Center, to whom I sent them proposing that he send them to the Cdr, TRADOC, with my request that GEN Cone send them to GENs Dempsey (then CSA Army) and Odierno, CSA nominee.

Having been unsuccessful, last July I went to LTG Campbell, as chief of General Odierno's transition team. I believe that us.army.mil stripped them from my email.

I ask that you give them to LTG Campbell. Please let me know if they came through to you.

Please tell LTG Campbell that I ask that he give them to the Chief of Staff.

With best wishes,

John H. Cushman
LTG, US Army, Retired
6200 Oregon Avenue, NW Apt 435
Washington, DC 20015

(2) To: john.f.campbell@us.army.mil, campbelljf@aol.com Sun, Dec11, 2011 11:22 am

General Campbell, I construe your not having replied to these latest emails as meaning that you have indeed brought my three papers to the attention of General Odierno but that you do not choose to say as much.

I have now made my last effort through you to satisfy myself that General Odierno knows of the content of those papers. I take it that he does.

Thank you. Signing off.

LTG John H. Cushman, US Army, Ret
6200 Oregon Avenue, NW Apt 435
Washington, DC 20015

USMA/AOG Affairs. My involvement with West Point and its Association of Graduates was limited until 1990 when we moved to Annapolis and I joined the West Point Society of Annapolis. I took an interest in the way in which both academies were modifying their plebe systems and other aspects of cadet/midshipman life. I became president of the West Point Society of Annapolis in time for its celebration in 2002, at a Founders Day banquet in the Naval Academy’s Alumni Hall, of the 200th anniversary of the founding of the United States Military Academy. 750 guests were there, half of them Navy. Eight former USNA superintendents were present, and five former superintendents of the USMA, including General Andrew Goodpaster, the principal speaker.

In 2002 I began a three year term as the 60-year-class-trustee member of the Board of Directors of the Association of Graduates. Regularly attending board meetings, my contributions to the discussions were generally viewed as those of a typical old grad. For one thing, I took a dim view of graduates resigning upon meeting their service obligations and saw no reason to
support such. I objected to the graduate magazine, Assembly, presenting one-page advertisements from General Electric and Home Depot urging young Academy graduates to offer themselves for employment.

I took a special interest in the ongoing revision of the AOG bylaws, in particular its mission statement. The mission statement proposed for the new bylaws originally said nothing about “fostering the ideals of the Military Academy” as heretofore. I argued for the inclusion of such words; they were added.

In the last year of my term the AOG held elections for new members of its Board. Not having been nominated, I took advantage of a Bylaws provision to solicit petitions from members sufficient to be nominated. As I remember, three members of a slate of six were up for election. I came in fourth by a handful out of some 5,000 votes cast. I have an idea that I fell short because of my perceived “old grad” views. (One of which was that not fewer than half of the AOGs trustees should be graduates who had served, on active duty or in the reserves, long enough to be receiving retired pay. Some said that would categorize early outers as “second class” graduates.)

My belief in emphasizing the values of West Point raised in my mind that we plebes in 1941 had been required to memorize the words in Bugle Notes written by General of the Armies “Black Jack” Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force of World War I:

“What the Academy stands for has always been my guide throughout my military career, and to have approached the high ideals of duty, honor, and service to the country that are the real spirit of West Point, has to me a meaning that nothing else has. The longer I live, the further I have gone on in the Service, the more I reverence the things that inspire the heart and soul of young men at West Point.”

To bring that viewpoint into the cadet experience I joined with Anne Mudd Cabaniss, the widow of my West Point roommate Jelks H. Cabaniss, to propose to the Association of Graduates an endowment that would support a cadet writing competition based upon Pershing’s paragraph. The objective would be to remind graduating cadets of the relevance and practical meaning of "what the Academy stands for" and of "the high ideals of duty, honor, and service to the country that are the real spirit of West Point.”

Contributing to the endowment were the USMA Classes of 1941 and 1944 and the widow of General Pershing’s grandson, Colonel John J. Pershing, III. (Mrs. Pershing was next-of-kin to his younger brother, 1st Lieutenant Richard W. Pershing, who was killed in action in Vietnam in February 1968 while a member of my 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. In a ceremony in New York City I presented her with the Bronze Star for Valor posthumously awarded to Dick Pershing.)

At a meeting in May 2006 the AOG Board of Directors noted that the Commandant of Cadets had approved a Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic academic year 2006-07 program to conduct the Pershing writing contest as part of its Professional Military Ethic Education program for first class cadets. Bronze medallions were to be awarded to the cadets who
write the best essay in each company, silver medallions for those who write the best in each regiment, and a gold medallion for the best in the Corps.

The Board of Directors approved the Pershing Writing Award Endowment. The AOG staff ordered medallions for award to the winning cadets in May 2007. In April 2013, for the seventh year, at a luncheon at West Point I will be pleased to present the Pershing Writing Awards.

INTERVIEWER: You retired at age 56. In 1991 you turned seventy. Did you ever feel as if you should have been kept on active duty and further used?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: That was up to the Army, but I thought that I had more to offer. In my last assignments, at Leavenworth and in Korea, I could not exercise some of the capabilities that I had demonstrated at Fort Devens, in the Delta, and with the 101st at Fort Campbell. I'm talking about dealing with personnel administration, logistics, management, concern for the individual, race relations, and so on. I was ready to give those a try to improve the Army, taking my talents to a higher level.

I don't know how I might have done in the Pentagon if my fantasies had been realized. I had not been there since 1963. For the past eleven years I had been in command slots away from Washington. I'm not sure I had the bureaucratic skills for a high position in the Pentagon. General Abrams had said that I had all the right instincts and the courage and will to carry them through. I think he was right, but could I slow myself down and work within the system? Would I have been able to delegate and get the big things done and at the same time be checking on the details?

I think that my general approach to establishing and enforcing standards of all kinds might well have been of benefit. But it's one thing to bring this about in a place the size of Fort Devens. That I had what it takes to do the same kind of thing if put in charge of the Army may be doubted.

I would have given it a hell of try, but it would have been very hard on Nancy.

INTERVIEWER: Finally, after reviewing all chapters, Volumes One through Five, I would say that you appear to have once been headed for four-star rank and the highest of Army positions. As you look back on your life, would you, or should you, have done anything different?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I think not. At Leavenworth under Bill DePuy was where it went off the rails. To have him rate me highly as a subordinate would have required me to violate my innermost convictions. Given my makeup, I don’t think it was in me to bend myself with enthusiasm to his will. That would not have been possible for me.

My reputation with Bernie Rogers was established during those years. It was simply not in the cards for him to take a chance on me in a high position. That’s the way it had to turn out.

* * * * * * *
Raised in a loving and caring family, I have had a good life. I have been healthy and vigorous. Opportunities and good fortune have come my way. Enjoyment has been usual and disappointments few.

America has been my country, being a soldier has been my life’s work, and being Catholic my faith. Finding Nancy and with her bringing our family safely well into adulthood has been my prize achievement and continuing pleasure.