ORAL HISTORY

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US Army, Retired

VOLUME TWO, TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface to Volume Two

I undertook this Oral History project in early 2009. In late 2008 I had arranged with Conrad Crane (Colonel, US Army, Retired) to begin it with an interview in January 2009 at the US Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA, where Colonel Crane was then Director. Subsequent interviews have taken place at the Knollwood Military Retirement Residence in Washington, DC, where I live.

The interviewer has been historian Robert Mages. Until March 2011 Mr. Mages was assigned to the Military History Institute. Since then he has continued the project while assigned to the Center of Military History, Fort McNair, DC, where assigned duties have limited his availability for conducting, transcribing, and editing interviews.

The project has become substantial, not to say massive. Its planned extent:

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1	*Born in China*	*1-1 to 1-13*
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16	*At the 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY*	*16-1 to 16-10*
17	*Cdr 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Vietnam*	*17-1 to 17-35*
	(the above have been transcribed and jointly edited in MSWord)	
18	Cdr Fort Devens, MA	
19	Advisor, IV Corps/Military Region 4, Vietnam	
20	Cdr 101st Airborne Division & Fort Campbell, KY	
21	Cdr Combined Arms Center and Commandant CGSC	
	(interviews for the above have been partially recorded)	
22	Cdr I Corps (ROK/US) Group, Korea	
23	In Retirement I	
24	In Retirement II	
	(interviews for the above have yet to be recorded)	

I have had Chapters 1 through 7 in 25 copies (Volume One) printed, for my own distribution. This, self- printed, is Volume Two.

Chapter Eight
Infantryman

GEN CUSHMAN: I went down to Schweinfurt and reported into the 22d Regiment headquarters. Schweinfurt in those days was a well beat up town. It had been subjected to considerable air bombardment during the war. The 22d Infantry was housed in a panzer kaserne that was built in the 1930s. It was called Ledward Barracks and was an excellent kaserne, headquarters and barracks. The barracks were three stories high with a basement and an attic. You could do training up in this attic. Conn Barracks was nearby. There was a small airfield there as well as a battalion of the 44th Field Artillery that was in direct support of the 22d Infantry.

INTERVIEWER: The 22d Infantry was a regimental combat team?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. I got there on a weekend and got myself assigned to a BOQ, looked around and reported to the adjutant the next day. The regimental commander was Colonel Lou Riggins. He was a solid infantry soldier. He had known my father. He was of my father's generation of officers. The 22d Infantry had a black battalion, the 3d Battalion. The other two battalions were white. In talking to different people I thought to myself, boy it would be very interesting to be assigned as an S3 there. The S3 slot in the 3d Battalion was filled so I went to the 1st Battalion.

One of the first officers I came to know in the 22d Infantry was Lieutenant Colonel George I. Forsythe, commander of the 2d Battalion. He later became a three star general. He took a liking to me and he filled me in on the regiment and its situation. The 1st Battalion was commanded by Major Sam Carter, a crusty old infantry officer who had served in the 18th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, throughout World War Two. He had been a weapons company commander and he was really experienced. He was frank with his opinions and that was probably why he had been passed over for lieutenant colonel. He couldn't have been a better mentor for me assigned as the S3 of the 1st Battalion.

I have the letters that I wrote my wife those days. They've helped refresh my memory because I have forgotten a lot about that time. I wrote that I was in an office with about the same kind of people I had in the S3 section of 38th Engineer Battalion but it was a totally different kind of work. I told her here I am, a brand new infantry officer, a graduate of the associate advanced course, in my first assignment without any experience as an infantry officer. Now I am the S3 and I am making out training schedules and instructional plans. Fortunately I had brought all the course materials from Fort Benning with me. I told Nancy I am learning this stuff. It is by the book, so I think I am going to be effective here.

Apparently I was, because as I saw later Sam Carter wrote in my efficiency report that I was picking things up quickly and that I was going to turn out all right. I thought I was on top of my job. I ended up running the training for Sam Carter and I worked well with the company commanders. We had three rifle companies (A, B, C) a heavy weapons company (D) and a headquarters company. I would tell them what to do and what the schedule was and give them instructions. I developed something I called an "S3 Note." I sent these to each company commander signed by me and it would say, "Here is what we are going to do tomorrow. The trucks are going to leave at such and such a time and we will get on the trucks and go to the training area and we will do this." It also contained coordinating instructions. My clerk delivered these notes to the company commanders. This put instructions in writing instead of relying on the telephone. That was an innovation and it was effective.

I remember my first field exercise, a battalion march and bivouac in the woods nearby. I remember marching out on a narrow German road. It was cold and there was sleet coming down. This was my first exposure to infantry as an officer. I hadn't had a bedding roll in my previous job so I was getting to be a field soldier.

INTERVIEWER: Did the S3 job in an infantry battalion hold any surprises for you?

GEN CUSHMAN: I can't think of anything that surprised me. It was educational. I just hadn't done that before. We were out in the cold and eating out of a mess kit and so forth. It was a new experience.

INTERVIEWER: How old were you at this time?

GEN CUSHMAN: I was 30. I turned 31 in October of 1952.

INTERVIEWER: How did your knee hold up?

GEN CUSHMAN: My knee held up fine. I felt fine and I thought that this was the life for me. Soon after I became S3 I was assigned as an umpire for a command post exercise with the 1st Infantry Division. The idea of a command post exercise is to test the communications and staff procedures and to practice moving your headquarters. I was an umpire for the 16th Infantry, which was the unit I had enlisted in, K Company, 16th Infantry, in 1940. I thought that was neat. I reported to the chief umpire at division headquarters where all the umpires were given their assignments and was given the script, what was to happen and when. It was a three or four-day exercise that called for certain messages to be delivered at certain times. During the CPX the command post would be required to displace, and so forth.

INTERVIEWER: What did a regimental command post look like?

GEN CUSHMAN: A regimental command post in the field was where you found the regimental commander when he wasn't out with his units. The exec was there usually. You had the S2 Intelligence, he had a little section with him; you had an S3, Operations Section, operations sergeants. It is where they wrote plans for the regiment and issued orders.

INTERVIEWER: Were they under canvas?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes, at least partly. Sometimes they moved into a nearby building.

INTERVIEWER: How were the radios carried?

GEN CUSHMAN: Different units had different setups. Most of them had a vehicle, a 2 ½ ton truck with a built up covered command post in the bed with a generator and light set mounted alongside. You could sit down there with a typewriter and write orders and keep a record. Almost all the regiments had something like that.

INTERVIEWER: You had a builtup 2 ½ ton truck and they worked out of that?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. They had a good set up. They had a mess and a mess sergeant. I was in a pup tent. I had my my own driver and jeep from the 22d Infantry. I reported into the regimental commander and found that his name was Bill O'Connor and remembered him as a dear friend of my Mom and Dad. He and his wife had known my father at Fort Benning when he was an infantry captain and O'Connor was a 1st lieutenant. They were good friends.
I said to Colonel O'Conner, "Well, Colonel, I have messages to hand you. But you don't have any battalions out here to communicate with. I want to play the part of each of your three battalion commanders. I want to make up things that they would be telling you inside this scenario. It will give me something to do and it will exercise your staff." He said, "OK, I'll give you a radio." My driver and I kept those three battalions working for three days with made-up situation reports and it was great fun. I was showing some initiative and being smart about the thing. After the CPX Bill O'Connor wrote a complimentary letter to Colonel Riggins about me.

Then a few months later I was an umpire on another CPX, this time with the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. That was an interesting experience because the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment was commanded by Creighton Abrams. When I reported to the chief umpire for instructions an assistant division commander said to me, "I want to tell you about this Abrams; he is really something. He knows everything and he sure knows how to use a tank battalion." He had had one in the war, and again in 1950 after being busted down to lieutenant colonel. So I arrived at the 2d Cavalry Regiment command post, and I said, "Here I am, I'm your umpire." The S3 gave me a cup of coffee. I asked, "Where's the regimental commander?" He said, "He's not here. He's out with the

troops, He thinks these CPX's are a waste of time." Finally Abrams showed up to spend the night.

I went through that CPX scenario with the regiment with messages in the ordinary way. But the great thing about it was that Abrams came into the command post after supper and I was there with his headquarters staff. Nothing was going on and we just sat there and shot the breeze. I listened to Abrams talk about the regiment and the training and he was a wonderful commander. Before I left, the S3 of the cavalry regiment told me the same thing that ADC had told me. He said, "This Abrams knows everything. He knows weapons. He knows communications. He knows maintenance. He knows it all. He knows how to lead." I was lucky to watch him operate. I had not trained with tanks or cavalry before so this was a very different environment. He was showing a certain leadership that made a big impression on me.

INTERVIEWER: What was it about Abrams that impressed you so much?

GEN CUSHMAN: His calm and his directness and his use of just a few words. I was impressed by the respect that his men had for him and his willingness to share his views with them. He entered into it as a colleague. He had command presence. I got to know him better later on in life when I was working for him in Vietnam.

INTERVIEWER: What exercises and training did you conduct as an S3?

GEN CUSHMAN: I was learning from Sam Carter. I remember one time I wanted to train the companies to conduct a night attack. I wrote the exercise according to the Fort Benning way. I had picked a piece of ground to train on and I planned it exactly the way that Fort Benning said. I established a line of departure and was about to order the company to get to there at night and attack the hilltop. I took Sam Carter out and I said, "This is the problem I'm going to set up for the company night attack." He said, "That's no good. That's not the way you make a night attack. In the war these lieutenants would come to us in the 18th Infantry from Fort Benning and we'd have to train them all over again. I don't know how many of these lieutenants we had to straighten out before they got killed. That's not the way to make a night attack. The way to make a night attack is you go up to the enemy line, and you put them through single file, and you get behind the enemy, set up a position in their rear and then surprise them the next morning. That's the way you make a night attack."

From Sam Carter I learned how to do a night attack and by experience I learned about teaching. He taught me how to handle machine guns. We had a machine gun platoon, a 75mm recoilless rifle platoon, and an 81mm mortar platoon in our weapons company. Each company had three platoons plus a weapons platoon with machine guns and 60mm mortars. It was a simple and straightforward organization, easy to manage. He

had ideas on how things should be done. He took a liking to me. When I saw his efficiency reports later they showed that he thought highly of me.

Sam Carter once taught me how he proposed to defend against Soviet tanks. Our regiment had two truck companies attached, enough to put the whole regiment on wheels. It had three infantry battalions, a tank company, a heavy mortar company, a service company and a headquarters company. We were going to be fighting large Soviet tank units. How can you stop tanks with infantry mounted on trucks? Sam Carter said that these tanks were going to move down the roads and would eventually move through the towns. He wanted to create anti-tank ambushes from the houses in and around these towns. He figured that the way to do it is create tank-killer teams armed with machine guns and recoilless rifles and position them at choke points in the town. We'd set up a line of mines off to the side of the road and then pull them across, in front of the advancing tanks, stop them and shoot them up.

He said to me, "I want you to set up a demonstration." He wanted to get the whole battalion out there and show them how to do this. So I found a little town near a small hillside with a view into the town. We put the soldiers of the battalion up there so they could observe the whole event. I had a demonstration platoon set up a defense in the town. We put up loud speakers and I was doing the instruction. I said, "Now here's how this is done." I had a tank from our tank company roll through and the demonstration platoon pulled the mines across the road and simulated ambushing the tank column. It was a good demonstration.

That day our new regimental commander was there watching. His name was LeGrande A. Diller. He had been with General Douglas MacArthur in World War II. He had gotten out of the Philippines with MacArthur and had been his PAO [Public Affairs Officer]. He had been around the regiment some, but this was the first time he saw me in action, teaching. It made an impression on him because made me his regimental S3.

I became regimental S3 at about the time they were repositioning forces in Germany and had given the 4th Division a different area of responsibility near Fulda. The regiment had to move from Schweinfurt to Giessen. I want to talk about my family for a moment. My family was in St. Petersburg, Florida and my wife had indicated unhappiness with going to Germany because she did not want to have to evacuate with three girls if the Soviets attacked. She was very concerned about the danger. She's a very cautious lady and she had the three girls who were four, three and one and a half. So she had reservations. The Army was building new quarters down at Wurzburg that they were going to move us into when they were finished in April or May. I told my wife, "I've got to turn in my application to get you over here. It takes time to process it so what are you going to go?" I said, "I'm going to put my application in as you can always turn it down." That is what I did and she finally decided to come. My family arrived there in May 1952. We ended up in Schweinfurt in a set of quarters.

While we were in Schweinfurt orders came down that regiments with black battalions had to be fully integrated. There were nine infantry battalions in the 4th Division, three per regiment. One of those nine was black. That was our 3d battalion. The way they integrated the regiment was to have each battalion divide their people into nine equal packages. They didn't tell the battalions which of those sections they were going to pick so commanders couldn't pack the section they were giving up with their substandard soldiers. It took couple of months or so but we ended up integrating the regiment.

INTERVIEWER: What month and year was this?

GEN CUSHMAN: This started in summer and finished around October of 1952. I got to the 22d Infantry in late 1951. President Truman had issued the executive order to desegregate in June of 1948. It was a courageous act on his part because he was coming up for election. He decided to issue an executive order rather than ask for legislation. Integration began then but the Army moved very slowly. Our 3d Battalion, the black battalion, was a problem. It was overstrength and barracks were overcrowded and the battalion was difficult to handle. It was a problem in the field because it wasn't responsive. It was a problem in garrison because the troops misbehaved. They didn't take care of their weapons. They didn't take care of their equipment. It was a weak third leg to a stool.

When the regiment went to the field we always had trouble with the 3d Battalion. You get all these black soldiers together and they are somehow hard to deal with, hard to make function. That can be explained I think as the heritage of slavery and resentment and justly so. I almost volunteered to be the S3 of that battalion because I was interested in learning how to handle leadership problems like that, and somebody told me, "Jack stay away from it. Don't do that. That's no place for you over there." It wasn't going to happen anyhow because they already had a major as S3.

INTERVIEWER: Were the 3d Battalion's field grade officers and commanders all white?

GEN CUSHMAN: The battalion commander, the XO and the S3 were white. I don't think they had a black captain in there, maybe they did, maybe black lieutenants.

INTERVIEWER: What type of discipline problems did they have?

GEN CUSHMAN: Bad behavior, AWOLs, not taking care of their weapons, fighting, that kind of thing. I was put on a court martial to try the case of a black soldier who had gotten into some kind of trouble. I don't recall what the offense was but I remember that I found this particular man to be of below average intelligence and aptitude. I think we

had a number of soldiers like that in the 3d Battalion. They were hard to handle and hard to train.

INTERVIEWER: How did the German civilians view the African-American Soldiers?

GEN CUSHMAN: They had their own prejudices. You'll have to go to a sociologist for that answer. I think it was a curiosity. Some German women went out with them. Those soldiers had their own clubs and bars that they frequented downtown.

INTERVIEWER: Did racial integration improve unit efficiency?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. When I was the regimental S3 I saw no particular distinction between battalions. Later on the 3d Battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joe Chabot, Class of 1935, West Point, a really fine officer, very mature. He was nine years my senior. He got out of West Point nine years before I did, and Joe was a wise man. He had suffered through the Bataan Death March and was a prisoner of war in Japan and had been brought back into the Army. Now he was a lieutenant colonel and given his shot at command. He was a good commander. He had an effective way of handling that integrated battalion. It did all right. It was the thing to do and it should have been done sooner.

INTERVIEWER: Did you feel that way at the time?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes, I wrote to my wife, "The sooner we get this integration done the better."

INTERVIEWER: Did all the regiments in Europe integrate the same way?

GEN CUSHMAN: I think so. I think it was more than division policy to do that. It was carefully done. They made sure that units couldn't simply pass off all their eight balls.

INTERVIEWER: Was there any specific guidance issued to the regiment regarding the timing of this integration?

GEN CUSHMAN: I don't remember. I think it took a matter of weeks or months. It was deliberate. They had time to accept the rosters and get everybody squared away and ready to go and then they did it.

INTERVIEWER: Did the leaders receive any kind of special training on commanding mixed units?

GEN CUSHMAN: No. It was an exercise in normal troop leadership. Life goes on as always.

INTERVIEWER: In your opinion, would it have been appropriate to conduct any kind of additional training for leaders?

GEN CUSHMAN: There may have been some special instruction but I don't remember. I think it would be appropriate if the division commander would say to his subordinate commanders, "Look, we're going to go through a reorganization here integrating our black soldiers. We want to do it right and I'm going to hold each one of you responsible for doing it right in your unit, because this is going to happen and don't bitch about it."

INTERVIEWER: What was the opinion of your fellow officers?

GEN CUSHMAN: I didn't hear any particular grumbling among the officers of the regiment.

INTERVIEWER: Integration must have presented some very difficult leadership challenges, particularly if you had a situation where family members of an officer do not feel part of the ethos that would require them to treat other people as comrades in arms.

GEN CUSHMAN: It creates a strain I'm sure. We had social events with black couples and there were some who might have been unhappy about having to socialize with people from another race. This was a very deep-seated attitude. We also had Puerto Rican Soldiers in the 22d Infantry. The issues with Puerto Ricans were quite different from both the blacks and the whites and they would misbehave in some different ways.

INTERVIEWER: What problems did you anticipate or did the chain of command anticipate?

GEN CUSHMAN: We thought there might be problems with white, southern soldiers taking orders from black NCO's. You have a black platoon sergeant from Ohio telling a white squad leader from Mississippi to get with the program, which could cause a few problems. I was very much aware of that.

INTERVIEWER: This must have been a pretty significant event. Did any of the officers have problems serving in an integrated unit?

GEN CUSHMAN: Some might have felt that way but they were in the Army and I didn't notice anybody saying they couldn't serve in an integrated outfit. After we were integrated I had a black communications platoon leader in my battalion who was really good. I don't think I had any other black officers. I didn't have any black company commanders.

INTERVIEWER: How were officers assigned to that battalion?

GEN CUSHMAN: I don't remember any particular scheme for that.

INTERVIEWER: Were the company commanders assigned to the 3d Battalion strong?

GEN CUSHMAN: I don't remember.

INTERVIEWER: Did all the regiments in your division integrate the same way?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. Their battalions all received their contingents of black soldiers from our 3d Battalion.

INTERVIEWER: That must have presented some very difficult leadership challenges, particularly in a situation where family members do not approve of integration.

GEN CUSHMAN: It creates strain I'm sure. This is a very deepseated attitude.

INTERVIEWER: Did you encounter that in your battalion?

GEN CUSHMAN: I didn't notice it. An officer can't know everything that goes on in his outfit. He doesn't know the attitudes of all his men in all things. I'm not saying we were color blind because we weren't but we didn't let it bother us.

INTERVIEWER: Tell us about the move to the new garrison at Giessen.

GEN CUSHMAN: We moved into a tent city there because our new barracks at Kirchgoens weren't finished. There were quarters for the dependents but the troops were in a tent city the winter of 1952. It was a dismal winter. The division commander was Harlan Hartness, West Point Class of 1919. He was a superior soldier and strictly a field soldier. The other division in Europe was the 1st Infantry Division. Up to then it had been part of the occupation forces. They were a palace guard outfit with chromed-plated steel helmets, white scarves and white laces on their boots. The 4th Division was a field outfit.

Soon after we arrived in Giessen we received a new regimental commander, Colonel David Lincoln Edwards, USMA 1936. Hartness chose Edwards to be the regimental commander. He had known Edwards at Fort Leavenworth where Edwards had been on the faculty of the staff college when Hartness was commandant. In World War II Edwards had commanded an AMTRAK battalion in the Pacific. Now he was commanding an infantry regiment and he was a character. He had ideas of his own and he was different. He was a disciplinarian and hard to work for. Within a couple of weeks he had relieved his S1, S2 and S4 but he kept me as the S3. I satisfied him but I had to stand

up to him because he had peculiar ways. He didn't tinker around with me. Although he growled at me from time to time he didn't give me orders to shape up. Among his many ideas he started a punchbowl ceremony for the 22d Infantry and he made an effort to a football team and he put the players in a separate barracks with special treatment, not a good idea. He took a platoon leader who had played football at West Point and made him coach. It broke his heart.

INTERVIEWER: How was he as a trainer?

GEN CUSHMAN: He was all right. He favored participatory training led by an instructor in small groups that he called skull sessions. He knew his tactics and staff procedures from having been on the faculty at Leavenworth. In those days I'd educate myself by reading field manuals. After World War II the Army got all of those troop leaders back from the war and sat them down at Fort Benning and Fort Leavenworth and Fort Sill and had them write up a new batch of field manuals; 7-10 was the Rifle Company, 7-20 was the Infantry Battalion, 7-40 was the Infantry Regiment. I studied those manuals.

Field Service Regulation Operations, FM 100-5, 1949, taught how to run the whole thing. I loved that manual. That manual was my bible. I used to read it at night. In the field I would have that manual with me. It was so clear. It was just sentences, small paragraphs, not chapters, and it wasn't like bullet points, but just paragraph after paragraph, short paragraphs of good, solid wisdom.

INTERVIEWER: How does that balance with your experience with Major Carter?

GEN CUSHMAN: It was consistent. I found Major Carter was a good tactician. He could look at the contours on a 1:100,000 map and say, "That's a good place for a machine gun position." He had a sense for ground that was remarkable.

INTERVIEWER: What was his opinion of infantry doctrine?

GEN CUSHMAN: He thought the doctrine as written was all right but you had to use common sense in application such as when you are organizing a defensive position with machine guns and strong points. The doctrine didn't tell you how to do it on a much larger front than the field manuals were written for. You have to figure that out for yourself. Carter taught me how to adapt.

INTERVIEWER: That's interesting. One of the things I have found interesting about you is your approach to doctrine. You believe that doctrine should make you think. Did you get that from Carter?

GEN CUSHMAN: I've been thinking that my whole life. I'm a believer in thinking. At the officer level we should teach you both how to fight and how to think. Now at the squad

level you have to have battle drill but inside that framework you still think. I believe in structure, thinking inside the structure.

INTERVIEWER: Was that Sam Carter's approach too?

GEN CUSHMAN: He wasn't a revolutionary. He didn't want to reorganize the Army. He just adapted to the situation.

INTERVIEWER: The adaptation of the tank-killer team is an example of that. It seemed like you were task organizing squads around effective weapon systems.

GEN CUSHMAN: The regiment had a sector of the front line with a cavalry screen in front of us. My battalion expected to meet the Russians near a town called Alsfeld. It was a broad front but the book didn't say how to organize ground like that. Doctrine called for a smaller front. It is fine to draw little circles and dots on a map but when you have a large front and the enemy is coming at you with this big outfit and all you have is a battalion on foot and in trucks, you have to adapt. We task organized around choke points and that's the way we'd fight.

INTERVIEWER: So you liked the doctrine. You used to read 100-5 when you were a regimental S3. You found it interesting and useful.

GEN CUSHMAN: I read other things of interest. While we were at Schweinfurt I bought a volume of Army history in the post exchange bookstore. It was called "Three Battles, Arnaville, Altuzzo, & Schmidt." It was the most interesting book I'd ever read. It contains fascinating accounts of small unit actions. It is a beautiful book. Reading that book was part of my education.

I want to mention here something about the regiment. These were not the type of officers that I'd served with in 38th Engineer Battalion at Sandia. Those officers were handpicked and all were sharp. The officers in the 22d Infantry were run of the mill, not men to look down on, but they were different.

INTERVIEWER: Was it the same for soldiers as well? Is it the same across the board?

GEN CUSHMAN: We didn't have many foot soldiers in the 38th Engineers. They were technical specialists. When I commanded my MP Company they were the same soldiers.

INTERVIEWER: So the soldiers in the 22d Infantry were similar to the soldiers you had served with and commanded before?

GEN CUSHMAN: The soldiers were about the same. I was serving with a different kind of officer. A lot more run of the mill, good officers but different, I'd get along with them all, but different. That was one thing I wanted to point out.

INTERVIEWER: How did that change the way you went about your business?

GEN CUSHMAN: I just dealt with what I had. I noticed that their language was different. Their education was different. Their backgrounds were different.

INTERVIEWER: Did you direct them the same way?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. My interaction with them was quite normal. I didn't have to adjust my way of doing business to take care of them. That came naturally.

INTERVIEWER: Did you learn anything from that?

GEN CUSHMAN: I learned it takes all kinds. Some are good and some are bad and you have to work with what you have.

INTERVIEWER: What did they make of you?

GEN CUSHMAN: I think I was respected. I don't think I was standoffish in any way, not acting superior. I had certain standards, I spoke English properly. I went to Mass daily, was upright. You couldn't get away with anything with me and I spoke my mind.

INTERVIEWER: How was your relationship with Colonel Edwards?

GEN CUSHMAN: Colonel Edwards was a character, but he took a liking to me. He had strange ways. His daughter wrote a book called "Military Brats - Legacies of Childhood Inside the Fortress" that describes him and she's not complimentary to her Dad. His wife was a lovely woman. I remember once the Edwardses had Nancy and me to dinner in his quarters. I asked for a second helping or something and Nancy said, "Jack, you're eating too much," or something like that, and Dave Edwards says to Nancy, "You don't feed toothpicks to a blast furnace."

I will insert into this oral history one experience working for Colonel Edwards. In April 1953 I was regimental field officer of the day. We had recently moved into in our newly built kaserne at Kirch-Goens. Many years later I found in my officer's records folder a copy of a four-page report that I had written on that occasion. It is in the next four pages exactly as typed by me. It must have been included in the OER submitted by Colonel Edwards as something he liked.

Half a century later I'm still a little amazed at its content. It provides a glimpse into the state of one regiment of the Army in Europe in the early 1950s, and of my ways at the time.

It belongs in this oral history as an indication of the kind of officer I was, and as an indication that is not necessarily reckless to be that kind of officer. It can be good for one's career. It certainly was for mine, in retrospect.

It follows, pages 14-17.

Notes on FOD Tour, 18-19 April

CO, 22d Inf S3, 22d Inf 19 April 53

1. These notes are a partial record of my tour as Field Officer of the Day, 18-19 April 1953. Certain recommendations are included.

2. At 2215 I ordered the fence guard along south fence to be increased, because of the inability of gate guards to cope with the persistent xxxxx crossing of the incompleted fence. Offenders seemed to originate in the EM Club.

3. I visited the EM Club. It was about half full, a stage show having ended about 30 minutes before. Men had jackets unbuttoned, tables covered with bottles, floor littered, glass panel on entrance door broken. Using guard on door and NCO in charge I settled the place down xxxxx to some extent. The club was full of drunk young soldiers and needed a firm hand.

EM Club should have two or three tough sergeants running it, backed by the guard. Uniform regulations must be enforced. The place must be kept clean, bottles off tables. Bounc ers to break up a fight right away. I f it is not kept under control it will be a continual source of trouble.

4. NCO Club was quiet. Sgt. in charge was out of uniform and had allowed men to enter out of uniform. Good NCO's can police their own club.

5. K Company reportedxxxxxxxxxxx that two men being guarded by a company guard had escaped, along with the guard. Incident occured at 1900, not discovered until about 2015, not reported to OD until 2215, not reported to battalion duty officer at all. I informed Bn Duty Officer, guard was alerted. At about 2330 the men turned up, one prisoner drunk, guard still carrying his weapon. I returned them to custody of K Co Duty NCO. Bn Duty Officer prepared report.

I then studied the situation with respect to guards, confinement, arrest, etc. It is the regimental habit to place men in confinement, using company guards, in the barracks. This is of doubtful legality, in my opinion, and leadsx to loose handling of prisoners. The UCMJ requires xxxx that a certain procedure be followed when placing a man in confinement, that confinement not be used except under certain conditions.

I directed the following:

Set up regimental guard house (a small room in G Cos barracks since G Co was guard company)

Add six men to guard (from K Co) to guard prisoners committed to confinement.

Bn Duty Officer duly place in confinement one of the prisoners of K Company. This was authorized because of the long list of offenses for which the prisoner was awaiting trial (insubordination, AWOL, breaking arrest, etc.) The other prisoner needed no such action since he had been released from confinement temporarily at Augsburg to attend 360 board proceedings. He was also placed in the guard house.

Bn Duty Officer duly place in arrest the guard who had allowed the prisoners to "escape". I doubt if he can be reached with much under the UCMJ because my brief investigation revealed that he had received no clear orders and did not know what he was supposed to do.

Recommend that all confinement be handled according to the book, and that regimental guard house be designated as a place of confinement. Recommend that a temporary guard house be set up in classroom space now on third floor of Hqs Co 3d Bn. Company guards to be eliminated.

6. By this time it was about 0015. I walked about in the barracks area, noting that lights were on in every barracks, that radios were playing, men taking, inside and outside the barracks. I then toured several barracks buildings, with the following results:

- I Co.- Cpl. KM Staley and Pfc GJ Meyer in as quad room with beer bottles in their hands, 2/3 empty. Lights on, a group congregated, taking. CQ taking no action. I picked up the beer, labeled it, turned it overto the Bn Duty Officer.

  I Co barracks were littered, windows closed in almost every squad room, rooms stuffy. CQ did not know when to turn off lights. No CQ instructions available in orderly room.

- K Cp Lights on, windows shut.

- L Co Orderly room window broken, lights on in barracks, Large group in day room, playing records and talking. Dayroom a mess.

7. On my way to the 1st Bn area I heard the radio tone signal at 0100. At 0101 I spotted a couple of men coming through the gate with bottles in their hands. They entered Co B. I followed at 0104. They were in the orderly room, bottles on the desk. CQ had

signed them in as of 2445. His clock agreed with my watch. I picked up the beer, labeled it, gave it to Bn Duty Officer. The men's names - Sgt. Dill and Pvt Young. The CQ - Cpl. Isbell. He had no CQ instructions.

8. I then visited 2d Bn Hqs, determined that H Company had reported all present at bed check. Had Lt. Gerow, Duty Officer go with me, inspecting H Co.

On second floor (time about 0140) in latrine a group was congregated listening to two guitar players, could be heard all over 2d Bn area. CQ stated that they had been there while he made bed check, but they were in barracks so that was OK. CQ - Sgt Lathrop.

A bed check could not be properly made - no name cards on bunks, no lists of occupants on door, no system.

9. I told Duty Officer of 3d Bn to check one of his companies. Duty Officer 1st Bn had already done so (Hq Co).

10. Returned to regimental headquarters. Noted that office of CO and EXEC O was not secure. Capt Bryan was duty officer. I locked both rooms, retained the keys, giving to Major Briggs next day, when relieved.

11. Service Co had reported all present. I visited Svc Co. CQ said he had made bed check. We checked three rooms. At empty bunks CQ siad "They were here when I inspected before" I checked the pass list against six absentees, found one to be unauthorized. On questioning the CQ and the Duty NCO I determined that in fact no bed check had been made, that the Duty NCO (Sgt. Goodworth) had "checked pass book and figured they were all in" and told CQ to make the report. Sgt Goodworth stated that he planned to make a check at 0400, to catch men who had gon eout. Cpl. Daniel, CQ, had no instructions, did not know his duties.

12. I decided to check K Co, which had reported all present. K Co orderly room was clean, CQ instructions up to date and easy to follow. Bunks were marked. A list of names had just been obtained by the Bn Duty Officer and the CQ. One man - Sgt Javits - was missing. He had been missing at previous bed check, I feel sure, but had not been picked up or had not been reported. Sgt. Harrelson, Duty NCO, stated that he had made out a list of absentees when he had made his bed check, but he could not produce the list. I think his check was superficial, or not honest.

13. By this time it was 0330. I could have continued the same process throughout the regiment, and I feel sure the results would have been about the same in every company.

NCO's who are afraid to do their jobs, lack guts to tell men to turn off lights, get in bed, settle down. Why?

They are not instructed

They are not backed up.

They are not supervised.

14. We must have honest reports from responsible NCOs. I recommend that every night, after Duty NCOs have made their reports;

Bn Duty Officer check the report of one company in each battalion, by making another bed check.

Regimental Duty Officer do the same for the regimental companies, while Bn Duty Officer temporarily relieves him.

Field Officer of the Day ~~XXX~~ check the report of ~~xxx~~ One of the Bn Duty Officers, by makin g a third bed check.

J.H. CUSHMAN
Major, Inf.
S3

I was working my butt off for Colonel Edwards and he liked that. We were going to the Grafenwoehr training area for six weeks, and he wanted to make good use of that period. I went to Grafenwoehr and looked at the ranges. I went to a range conference and got the ranges I thought we needed for the programs we had in mind. Then I went back and worked very hard to write schedules for those ranges. I drew up the training program, and then I drew up problems building scenarios for the ranges and a rotation schedule for the battalions. I had a six inch stack of training and lesson plans that I showed to Colonel Edwards. I said, "This is what you're going to do in Grafenwoehr." He thought that was great.

So we went to Grafenwoehr and he was very pleased with me. I was in his confidence and I liked that. I'd been the Regimental S3 for eight or nine months and we were conducting a battalion field problem. The 2d Battalion was given a mission. It had to cross the line of departure at, say, 0600. At 0600 Colonel Edwards called the battalion commander on the command net and asked where his battalion was. The battalion commander replied that he was at the line of departure. The regimental commander was at the line of departure and he could see that the 2d Battalion was many minutes away. So Colonel Edwards relieved him.

When I found that out I went away for half an hour and came back. I said to Colonel Edwards, "Sir, I think I can command that battalion." He said, "I'll go down to division right away and arrange it." He came back later and said, "You've got it." So now I'm battalion commander and under the direct command supervision of Edwards. He wanted to tell me how to run my battalion. I had to stand up to him. I had my own ideas about commanding a battalion.

He was a nut on statistics. He tracked AWOLs very closely. If a man was not present at morning formation you had all day to get him back to duty and if he's not there at midnight he's AWOL on the morning report. Colonel Edwards' practice was if a man was AWOL on the morning report his battalion and company commanders had to report to the regimental commander that morning and explain why the man was absent. That was an ordeal, that's not a good leadership technique. Company commanders were sending platoon sergeants down to the gasthauses to round up AWOL soldiers.

I got tired of this and I got my company commanders together and I said, "We're not going to go looking for AWOLs anymore." I told them, "We're going to tell these soldiers that if they go AWOL we are not going to go looking for them. If they're absent we're going to punish them when they get back. We're going to pay attention to our soldiers and give them good training, good discipline, good leadership and good things to do with their time. We aren't going to put up with this." We started having fewer AWOLs.

Every month Colonel Edwards would have a meeting with his officers and NCOs down to platoon sergeant and he would go through the statistics for each battalion. He would give the number of AWOLs, the number of sick calls, and then he would have a number of DRs, [Delinquency Reports] written up by the military police in town. These documented minor offenses like being out of uniform, or driving too fast, or misbehaving. It turned out on one particular month the 2d Battalion hadn't had a single DR. That was pretty unusual. When Edwards found out he said to me, "What deal have you made with those MPs?" That was the kind of guy he was.

But he treated me all right. We were his best battalion by many measures. I was really enjoying being the battalion commander with a green tab. A major with green tabs is something. I was a good battalion commander. Once we went on Operation Rosebush, a theater exercise conducted by Seventh Army. We were defending and the 2d Armored Division was the aggressor. I had my battalion organized into the platoon task forces that I was just describing to you. We had a few tanks and flak wagons attached. I assigned these teams to defend choke points in our sector. Before the exercise I went to our tank company and borrowed radios from deadlined tanks and gave them to my company commanders. So my company commanders had radios with good range. I had really tight control of my rifle companies and they had control of their platoons. The battalion was spread across a broad front but the extra big radios allowed us to maintain command and control. I remember feeling like I was really on top of my job, that I had a battalion that was really functioning.

I put one of my platoons down at a road junction and we outnumbered the 2d Armored Division on the scene. I said to the aggressor commander, "You can't go through here." He said, "I'm going through here." I said, "No, let's get the umpire and see who has the most points." They had a score sheet and so forth and the umpire told the 2d Armored Division they had to go back. That was a good feeling for me.

I also led the battalion through testing at Wildflecken in the summer of 1953. The battalion tests were big things in Europe. I'd been the battalion commander for two or three months and the battalion test was scheduled and the battalion test officer at V Corps was a guy named Depuy. Bill Bond was up there with him and he was another good man. They would create a scenario and put each battalion through the paces of attack, defense, retrograde and so forth. They'd observe, take notes and give a score card. They'd fill out a form that added up the numbers and grade the battalion. They looked at things like light discipline and troop leading procedures. They put the battalion through drills and check that the battalion did things in the proper way. They had a huge number of checklists.

I got the checklists, they were available to anyone, and found out what was going to be evaluated. Only two or three evaluated the battalion commander's troop leading procedure. I saw that the score depended on what my platoons did There's somebody with

every platoon to see if they have light discipline, if they dug foxholes, if they knew how to make out a range card, if they knew how to prepare a machine gun position, if they planned interlocking fields of fire. I decided to really concentrate on training my platoons. Their performance determined most of the battalion's score.

Sam Carter had taught me a trick on putting in a defense position. You give every soldier a quarter-pound block of TNT and a blasting cap with a fuse on it. You make sure they each put the TNT in one pocket and the blasting cap in another. When you get to the position and you select the location of your fox hole, you dig a hole about 8 inches deep for the TNT. You fuse the TNT and you tamp it and light it with a match and you go back and wait for it to explode. That makes it really easy to dig out the crater and you can really get a fox hole dug very quickly. So I trained my soldiers to do that. Their fox holes were terrific. We got high grades on that.

INTERVIEWER: Did they actually do it?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes and we got a good score on the defense. I got a good score on that and other things like that that I trained those guys to do right. That's why we got the regiment's high score on the battalion test.

INTERVIEWER: Is that the first time you met Bill Depuy? What was your impression of him?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes, but I didn't know much about him.

INTERVIEWER: Did he have a reputation?

GEN CUSHMAN: Both DePuy and Bill Bond were well thought of. Later Bill Bond was killed in Vietnam. He was a comer.

INTERVIEWER: Did you think that was a good way to evaluate the readiness of your battalion?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. If you met the standards you would do all right. I figured I could handle that. What I wanted to do was to have the soldiers and squads and platoons do it right. I wrote an article for Army Magazine on my thoughts on training. It was a solid article. After about six months the regiment received a new lieutenant colonel and Colonel Edwards had to give him command of the battalion. Then he made me the regimental S4.

INTERVIEWER: Why would he put you in the S4? Did you consider that a step down to go from S3 to S4?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. It was also an opportunity. I had never been in the logistics and maintenance business. It gave me a chance to learn and do something different. But I had long had the idea of working on a senior staff. When I was at Fort Belvoir at the Advanced Course I had learned French from a private tutor. So I began looking around.

INTERVIEWER: You left battalion command in November of 1953.

GEN CUSHMAN: I had in mind to get on the SHAPE staff. Rather naively I decided to investigate the situation at USAREUR. I went down there to look around.

INTERVIEWER: You went to USAREUR Headquarters, Heidelberg?

GEN CUSHMAN: I went there in my POV on a weekend or a day off. I soon found myselff in the office of the USAREUR G3. I think he thought to himself, "Who is this major?" The next thing I know he's putting me on orders. To my surprise I came out as a liaison officer for the 1st Belgian Corps. Europe was going to have nuclear weapons, allies included, and a structure was being set up for that.

INTERVIEWER: Did Colonel Edwards know you were looking around for another billet?

GEN CUSHMAN: I didn't tell him.

INTERVIEWER: What do you think his reaction would have been if you had?

GEN CUSHMAN: I don't think he would have liked it, that's why I didn't tell him. I think he suspected it and when orders came down he probably thought, "What's going on here?" I was not proud of myself for doing that without his knowledge.

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever have a subordinate do that when you were the commander?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: What was your reaction then?

GEN CUSHMAN: That was okay. I had some guys like me.

INTERVIEWER: What is the tradeoff between loyalty and ambition?

GEN CUSHMAN: Well ambition is good, but ambition is unhealthy when you state only the things that will please your boss or when you go behind his back and do him or the unit harm. I didn't think that my leaving the S4 job would do the regiment any harm. I have believed that an officer creates his own career in large part. You should try to in-

fluence some events yourself and that's the way I've been all my life. That's not altogether admirable because it can be construed as this man just wants to get ahead and get the best job he can, get promoted and so forth.

INTERVIEWER: Does that perception matter?

GEN CUSHMAN: I've thought about this a lot. About the idea of whether you should be self-seeking or selfless. I think entirely selfless is a mistake because who knows what the Army will do with you. Self-seeking too much is also a mistake. I'm a little bit on the self-seeking side of that equation, perhaps too much. I wanted to get something different while I was in Europe. It turned out to be advantageous for my development. I think some people looked at me as an ambitious person. I think ambition is all right, a certain amount is good for you.

Edwards said, "Jack, are you sure you want to do this? You're going from being a big frog in a small puddle to being a small frog in a big puddle. I don't know if you want to do this." I said, "My mind is made up, I'm going to do it, I've enjoyed being here and all that, but I don't think I want to stay in this job." I had been a major at the age of 32, commanding a battalion. Ahead of most of my classmates, of many majors somewhere, I was proud of myself and probably a little cocky.

The orders came down in December. About that time we learned that Nancy was pregnant. I would not have done any of this if we had known that. As always she had two sick months. They were really hard on her. We were assigned quarters in a requisitioned house in Cologne, near the Rhine, grey skies, ice floes in the river, German neighbors. Our last baby, Mary, had been born just a few months earlier, in May 1953. Jack would be born in August of 1954. We did not expect that she would be pregnant so soon. Nancy was very sick until March. That situation was not good.

Here I was with the Belgian First Corps, part of a two officer team charged with being the liaison to the commander of its corps and his staff. Our duty was to coordinate the delivery, under tight control, of nuclear weapons from U.S. Army ordnance teams to the Belgian corps artillery, and to advise the corps commander on how to use them. Northern Army Group had a Belgian corps and a couple of British corps, and I was in Cologne with the Belgian corps commander. I was interested in doctrine and began following what General Gavin was doing. He was commanding VII Corps. He was going to use nuclear weapons and hedgehog-like defenses to stop a Soviet attack. He had his own tactical scheme and I was fascinated by it. I went to VII Corps to learn more about it. General Gavin had thinkers around him. I began to think about how you bring the atomic weapon into the Army.

INTERVIEWER: What did you learn?

GEN CUSHMAN: I learned how to deal in concepts. Gavin was a conceptual man. He had ideas on the way to fight and how to fight. He was looked at as a kind of screwball in some nearby and higher circles, off the wall. But he was imaginative, a real forward thinker. To give you an idea of how imaginative and forward thinking he was, that April of 1954 he had an article in Harpers magazine titled "Cavalry and I Don't Mean Horses." It proposed airmobile units equipped with helicopters that would reconnoiter and screen, performing a cavalry function. The term he used for his hedgehog defenses concept was Operation BEARTRAP. This was all early thinking on how the Army would use atomic weapons. We were in the initial stage of learning how to fight with them in Europe and we still thought it was possible.

INTERVIEWER: When you observed that nuclear explosion on a seaplane tender off Eniwetok you were convinced that nuclear weapons could not be used in operational and tactical war. Did Gavin's thinking change your mind?

GEN CUSHMAN: I was willing to look at it. I wasn't saying this is stupid. I was saying let's see how we can try to do it. We're trying to make this work. By this time the Army had established a prefix-7 qualification for a nuclear trained staff officer at Leavenworth who could compute height of burst and things like that. We were just beginning to engage in that kind of thinking.

INTERVIEWER: You thought the academic exercise of trying to wrestle with the problem was interesting and valuable?

GEN CUSHMAN: I found it illuminating to see what planners wanted to do with these weapons. In Cologne I started writing an article that I finished when I was at Leavenworth and submitted to the Military Review. I won a prize for it. It was titled "Harness the Revolution."

At Fort Benning's library I had come across the writings of Basil Henry Liddell Hart and later the writings of J.F.C. Fuller. In April I wrote B.H. Liddell Hart in England a letter and said that I had been a follower of his writing for some time. I told him I was working on an article and I'd like to talk to him about it. I sent along a couple of pages of the article. I got an answer back immediately with an invitation to visit as his houseguest

I took some leave, and went to visit him. I met his wife Kathleen and spent a night there. He and I talked and he autographed some books for me. I've still got them. He said, "What do you want to do?" I said, "I'm going to our Staff College now." He said, "What do you want to do after that?" I said, "I think I want to be an instructor." He said, "You can't be an instructor as a major at the Staff College, that's a job for a senior lieutenant colonel or colonel." Which is true in the British Army. I said, "I think I can," and I did. That trip was profitable to me. I admired his thinking. Later I learned that he didn't have the highest reputation in our Army. When I got to Leavenworth I found that some

people disagreed with his "indirect approach," which from the time I read about it at Fort Benning had intrigued me. There were other disagreements.

INTERVIEWER: What did you learn about his approach to military history and his use of military history?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes, he had written books about the leaders of World War I. I learned from him to pay attention to what's going on in the real world. I think it had reinforced my theory, that if you don't know what's really going on you're not in charge and you're not ready to make good decisions. I think it reinforced the idea that a commander must understand what's happening and understand reactions. He had just written the Rommel Papers that I was then reading. The Rommel Papers and George Patton's "War as I knew it" were the two most influential biographies and military writings that I read.

INTERVIEWER: Why is that?

GEN CUSHMAN: Because they're so filled with lessons.

INTERVIEWER: What lesson did you take from Rommel?

GEN CUSHMAN: Speed, surprise, find a point to attack. Patton's book taught me not to take counsel of your fears and don't give the enemy a chance to react, keep them off balance. Both men were good at logistics, they said that you can always get the logisticians to do more than they think they can. That was an important lesson to me. This period with the 22d Infantry and later in Belgium was very intellectually stimulating for me as a thinker, as a military thinker. I was coming to grips with the reality of military action and its principles, reading the field manuals, and the works of military thinkers. I became doctrinally adept. I could write about it and think about it.

INTERVIEWER: Did Liddell Hart encourage you to write something?

GEN CUSHMAN: He thought what I had written was good. He autographed a book for me with "in admiration for his progressive military ideas." My article was about how to deal with the atomic bomb and how to get air mobility working and how to defend and how to attack. That was the birth of my interest in Army doctrine. While this tour in the Belgian First Corps was really hard on my family, it was more valuable for me than would have been duty as the regimental S4. I was broadening my horizons and developing concepts and thinking about strategic doctrine, operational doctrine, tactical doctrine. I was involved with all three of them.

INTERVIEWER: Where did you live in Belgium?

GEN CUSHMAN: Cologne.

INTERVIEWER: So you were collocated with the Belgian corps?

GEN CUSHMAN: The corps headquarters was right there in Cologne. They had two Belgian divisions in Germany and one in Belgium.

INTERVIEWER: Were they keeping you busy as the liaison officer?

GEN CUSHMAN: There wasn't much to do. I had time to spare. I was able to take days off to visit nearby battlefields of World War I and World War II. I visited Cambrai, where the British used tanks successfully for the first time. In a trip to SHAPE in Paris, I visited Verdun where fortifications still existed from 1917. I spent a couple of days visiting the battlefield around Schmidt carrying with me my copy of "Three Battles, Arnaville, Altuzzo, & Schmidt." Its "Objective: Schmidt" tells of the 28th Infantry Division in the Huertgen Forest in November 1944, from the squad level on up. I walked the ground. I went down its famous Kall trail, a logistics lifeline to forward units. Nancy and I took our kids to Brussells and to the Netherlands countryside where we saw windmills, canals, and fields of tulips.

INTERVIEWER: Was there any kind of special training that you had to go through for your liaison duties?

GEN CUSHMAN: No, we were just supposed to be there to try to see what was going on and help to transfer the weapons and to advise. I had learned French so I began to speak French with the Belgians. I got quite good at French. I gave briefings in French .

INTERVIEWER: What was your impression of the Belgian Army?

GEN CUSHMAN: I thought it was good, and I felt the staff work excellent. They had a lean staff. The corps headquarters was smaller than headquarters of the 4th Division.

INTERVIEWER: Did they give you work to do as part of their staff?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. We had a social life too. They had an officer's club and Nancy and I would go to their parties and dinners. There was a skating rink there, with hot chocolate served. My kids went to a British school, we were in the British zone. It was professionally very interesting. But those first months were hard on Nancy and I always regretted that.

INTERVIEWER: Did your children like Europe?

GEN CUSHMAN: They liked it. Kathleen went to a kindergarten, but Connie and Celia went to the primary school there in Cologne. It was a British school. They began to

speak with a British accent, to do arithmetic with pounds, shillings and pence, and to participate in things British and they liked it. They were smart kids.

INTERVIEWER: Did your wife find this to be a difficult period?

GEN CUSHMAN: Until March, very much so, but she carried on. That was the kind of wife she was. Once when she was feeling especially poorly because of her pregnancy, a British diplomat whom we had met at a social function noticed that. He mentioned her condition to his mother, Lady Freeman, who was living with him. Lady Freeman reached out to Nancy, invited her to her home, and was particularly kind to her.

INTERVIEWER: Did this cause any friction between you and your family?

GEN CUSHMAN: Nancy came from a family in which family came first. This was new to her.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned her father was usually 8 to 5.

GEN CUSHMAN: The family came first to him and he did not work late. He wasn't driven.
She recognized at Sandia Base at our very first assignment together that she was with somebody that was driven. She knows that to this day. I'm driven and she's not, except to be a good mother. It's a great combination because it makes a very good marriage. She puts up with me. She reins me in from time to time. I've learned to be a little more reasonable about these things.

INTERVIEWER: What advice would you offer to a young officer who finds himself in a similar situation?

GEN CUSHMAN: Well, honestly, do your job. The Army is not 8 to 5. You can make a living 8 to 5, but you can't build a career that way. You've got to show some drive. You've got to show some interest in making things better. You've got to show some interest in doing things right. The Army's filled with people who are doing reasonably well but that's it. They are good people, but they are not driven to improve the organization and situation. That's the way I feel about that.

INTERVIEWER: How did you come to that conclusion?

GEN CUSHMAN: I was born with that conclusion.

INTERVIEWER: So you received orders to report to Fort Leavenworth?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. In April I got a telephone call from the colonel at USAREUR G3 who had originally interviewed me. He said, "I've been asked if you can be spared to go to Leavenworth. Do you want to go?" I said Yes. It was a reprieve.

Orders came through. The course would start in late August 1954. I asked to be released early since Nancy was pregnant and would not be able to fly in August. Permission was granted and we went home by boat in May.

Chapter Nine
Fort Leavenworth 1954-58

INTERVIEWER: Tell us about your assignment to Fort Leavenworth and your time at CGSC [Command and General Staff College].

GEN CUSHMAN: Nancy was pregnant so we had to board a transport in May 1954 to be at Fort Leavenworth to deliver the baby in August. We sailed from Bremerhaven to New York. After we visited our parents I headed to Leavenworth by car. Nancy was going to follow by air. I arrived in early July, six weeks before the course started, and was assigned to Combat Development Section of CGSC. It was engaged in the formulation and writing of Army organizational and operational doctrine.

This was a time of considerable doctrinal turmoil in the Army. We had ended the Korean War and were trying to figure out how to integrate nuclear weapons. While I was at Sandia Base we didn't have any nuclear weapons in the Army but by this time the Army was going to get nuclear weapons. I was there at the creation of the Combat Development method, a new idea. General Robert M. Montague, formerly in charge of Sandia Base, was in charge of combat developments at CONARC [Continental Army Command]. He knew a lot about nuclear weapons and he was a competent artillery officer.

The Combat Development Section at CGSC was composed of six to eight colonels and lieutenant colonels taken from the instructor staff. Their job was to think about the future. They were in the basement of Wagner Hall, three or four offices and a conference room. When I arrived they were working on the ANA [Atomic Non-Atomic Army] concept. The goal was to design an army possessing both atomic and non-atomic capabilities that could be fielded by 1965. The big problem was designing and synchronizing tactics for war either with or without the use of atomic weapons.

INTERVIEWER: Were you considering "atomic" as a condition or as a capability?

GEN CUSHMAN: Both. Eventually the College developed two concepts: Active Atomic Operations and Non-active Atomic Operations. Non-active Atomic Operations were operations as we had long known them, on a non-atomic battlefield but with atomic weapons available on either our side or on both sides. You had to figure out how to fight without using atomic weapons while also being prepared to react if the enemy used them. This was a huge challenge. I have to say that he Army never did figure it out.

The section was also developing a new division structure. We started with the division TO&E used during the Korean War. It was much like the World War Two infantry division. We were also looking at the corps structure. But we were just getting started. From Cologne I had submitted to the Combat Forces Journal an article titled Thoughts on Training that came out while I was working in the basement of Wagner Hall.

INTERVIEWER: This article put forward your view on infantry training?

GEN CUSHMAN: It was on how to train a battalion. I was pleased with it. It laid out my approach to training. I did well in that section. I could conceptualize. I could write. I could figure out how to put these things together. This was the right environment for me. I was glad to be assigned there.

INTERVIEWER: How well informed was the ANA team on the effects of atomic weapons?

GEN CUSHMAN: They had data on it. They knew about the height of burst and radiation and blast effects. The doctrinal issues very interesting. Was planning for nuclear fires that demolished everything within miles, to be handled by the G3 or by the artillery officer? Was this just another fire means the artillery could handle or was it a special weapon with extraordinary effects?

INTERVIEWER: What were the arguments on either side?

GEN CUSHMAN: The artillery argued that it's just artillery and that it requires fire coordination as did any other fires. We weren't sure which echelon would have organic atomic fires. The larger caliber cannons with atomic munitions were not then organic to the division.

INTERVIEWER: You mean you'd have atomic weaponry at the corps not at the division?

GEN CUSHMAN: You would not have delivery means at division but you'd have the use of it. You could assign nuclear targets. Was that a G3's or an artilleryman's job?

INTERVIEWER: What was the argument for the G3?

GEN CUSHMAN: That it was a major force multiplier. It was not just fire support. It changed the whole battlefield and it affected everything. The G3 has to integrate all the combat power of the division to accomplish an objective. The G3 is a general staff officer and the artillery officer is a special staff officer. There's a difference. The special staff officer deals with a specialty. The general staff officer deals with the commander's problems, the general's problems. The division artillery officer happened to be a brigadier general and the G3 was a lieutenant colonel. This division artillery officer was one of three top people in the division. He could be in line to assume command of the division.

In those days an infantry division had three generals; a division commander, an assistant division commander and a division artillery officer. That was a decision made by McNair [Lieutenant General Leslie McNair] in 1940 when they put the triangular division together. Before that the old square division had two brigadier generals, each commanding one of the two brigades. When they went to three regiments they kept the two brigadier generals by making one of them an assistant division commander and the other the division artillery officer.

This nuclear weapon shifted the balance of power. If the general had this atomic weapon that produced these wide effects the, G3 had to make the coordinated plans and select the target. That was the issue.

INTERVIEWER: How would you characterize this effort? Were they trying to work current doctrine around the atomic weapon or were they trying to rewrite doctrine entirely to account for an atomic battlefield?

GEN CUSHMAN: It was the former. They were trying to make an adjustment by adding nuclear weapons into an existing organization. That's where they ran into difficulty.

INTERVIEWER: Did you have a reputation for understanding atomic weapon employment and doctrinal issues or was it luck that put you into combat developments?

GEN CUSHMAN: I didn't have a reputation as an infantryman. I began to acquire a reputation for understanding these issues. It wasn't because of my work at Sandia. I don't think I ever mentioned the fact that I was on an assembly team. I would just as soon forget about my time as an engineer. I didn't want to be known as just an engineer. I didn't make any effort to make that known. I didn't need to make it known because it wasn't germane. That experience had nothing to do with the employment of atomic weapons.

INTERVIEWER: I understand, but you knew the power of these weapons.

GEN CUSHMAN: I sure did.

INTERVIEWER: That experience wasn't useful?

GEN CUSHMAN: Every officer had seen films of the tests. Many tests were run in those days. Of course I always had my reservations. I wondered how we could fight knowing the havoc these weapons create in an area of operations. But we charged ahead as if this was just another weapon. There wasn't much introspection about what this meant to the Army as a whole. Now I was never a prefix seven officer, a nuclear specialist. They had a special school in Pope Hall at Fort Leavenworth. It was an entertainment facility with a dance floor that had been converted into a highly secure area. They ran a six week course that qualified division and corps staff officers to plan for the use of nuclear weapons. I didn't want to do that. I wanted to be able to use those people but I didn't want to be one of them.

INTERVIEWER: Tell me about CGSC and your impressions of CGSC as a student.

GEN CUSHMAN: I was with contemporaries who had been selected to attend, all interested in learning and in doing well. The instruction was standardized. During World War Two Fort Leavenworth was turned into a factory to produce staff officers for a large army. A riding hall had been converted into an immense classroom. Since the war it had been made into twelve classrooms that could each hold fifty students. The class of six-hundred was divided into four sections, A, B, C and D. On a given day each section of three classrooms got exactly the same instruction. One section of

three classrooms might be taking intelligence, another taking logistics, and another into the division in the attack and so forth. It was all oriented towards Europe.

INTERVIEWER: All the scenarios were based in Europe.

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. And they were solution oriented, to teach a standard way of thinking.

INTERVIEWER: What is solution oriented instruction?

GEN CUSHMAN: The structure was a lesson assignment which gave you a situation and your maps. You were issued all your class material at the beginning of the week. They had a printing plant that produced all the maps. The unit of instruction was prepared by an instructor, reviewed by a faculty committee and approved by the department head or higher. We'd be given, say, an introduction to division operations and then we'd be presented with a situation in France.

The first thing you had to do was color the map and highlight the high ground. It was very important at to know where the high ground was and God help you if you didn't select a good avenue of approach. It was structured around learning objectives and tactical decision making. You had to study, to figure out what they wanted you to learn, and give it back to them in the examinations.

INTERVIEWER: Study as in memorization? Was it learning by rote?

GEN CUSHMAN: Typically you'd be given advance material for study the night before. You'd come into class and the instructor would say, "You're the G3 of the 20th Infantry Division and you have been in contact for seventeen days. You've been fighting across France, here is the enemy situation, this is the status and disposition of your division, and here is the mission. What do you do now?" The construction of one of these problems is an art form. The instructors had mastered it.

INTERVIEWER: How did this instruction compare to infantry officers' associate advanced course?

GEN CUSHMAN: The format was very much the same. You are presented with a problem, your chosen course of action is evaluated against the school solution and you move on to the next problem. Maybe you got it right and maybe you didn't but you aren't getting graded on those daily problems. You were graded by examination.

INTERVIEWER: Who was the enemy in these scenarios?

GEN CUSHMAN: It was an Aggressor force. The Army had developed a full Aggressor force with mechanized and tank divisions. The order of battle was very much like the Soviet Army.

INTERVIEWER: How would you describe the pace of the course?

GEN CUSHMAN: It was not hard. If you knew how to study you were fine. Some people studied very hard.

INTERVIEWER: How would you rate the quality of your fellow students?

GEN CUSHMAN: Good students from all parts of the Army. It was a good social experience too. The family experience was good.

INTERVIEWER: Did your wife enjoy the tour?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes she did.

INTERVIEWER: What were your quarters like?

GEN CUSHMAN: We had five children so we lived in the Beehive, a huge brick four story barracks that had been converted into student officers' quarters. We had an apartment on the first floor. We had one bathroom and four bedrooms, enough for us. There was a laundry with our washing machine in the basement. We got by.

INTERVIEWER: How did you do academically?

GEN CUSHMAN: I did very well. I studied hard. I sometimes studied with others. Right across the street was a man named Mark Boatner, a school buddy of mine from Fort Benning. He was a class ahead of me at West Point. He was a bachelor, divorced. We studied together. It helped a lot to study together. I studied with John Eisenhower, a West Point classmate.

INTERVIEWER: This is Ike's son?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. His father was then President. John had married Barbara Thompson, whose parents in the 1930s had been dear Army friends of my Mom and Dad. As the Eisenhowers arrived at Leavenworth I had called on them. The school year went on; John and I took to studying together occasionally.

The class standings would be posted about once a month. I was always in the top ten of a class of six hundred. Then we got into corps instruction which included lessons on the employment of nuclear weapons. By that time I was disenchanted with nuclear warfare. I didn't think it would work at all.

INTERVIEWER: What were you disenchanted with?

GEN CUSHMAN: Disenchanted with the idea that nuclear weapons could be used by our Army. That we could conduct regular operations on a nuclear battlefield. From my own experience and my work with the Combat Development Section I had concluded that this was fallacious.

INTERVIEWER: You found the scenario unbelievable?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. They put the corps in a situation that would call for nuclear targets. I had not paid that much attention to their method of doing this. It is important for a student to understand what the instructor has in mind when he creates an examination because he's covered it before in the classroom. His learning points should be all drilled into you, and I didn't absorb the learning points on the employment of nuclear weapons. I should have. I got a bad grade on that corps examination, a D-minus, just above a U for unsatisfactory. I almost flunked it. I graduated number twelve in my class. Before that I had been number four or five. The first ten were called out at the graduation exercises as distinguished graduates and I was number twelve.

INTERVIEWER: What does that tell us about you?

GEN CUSHMAN: I don't know. I've thought about this experience. Based on my time at Leavenworth and elsewhere in the Army, I like to have my own way, I am stubborn. When I'm right, I really don't like to change. I'm a smart guy, some have said brilliant. That shows up in many of my efficiency reports. But I have a stubborn streak. I've got a headstrong streak. This was the first time I ran into something in the Army that I didn't agree with. It was at this time at Leavenworth that I became a maverick. Until that time I was just a smart officer. This time I began to think things aren't right here and it was true. I decided that I could design a better course of instruction at Leavenworth.

INTERVIEWER: Did you have that thought before the corps examination or after?

GEN CUSHMAN: Before. I had it during the last three or four months. I thought the course was hidebound. I thought the course was generating officers that could not innovate. I thought the course was not rewarding creativity. I thought the course was rewarding conformity. I thought the course should be based more on history not dogma and doctrine. I thought that the course should make you think. That was the radical attitude I developed as a student.

In March of 1955, I sat down with a big piece of graph paper, we used to call them "horse blankets," and I designed a course of instruction. I had gotten to know Doctor Ivan Birrer who was the educational advisor at CGSC. Dr. Birrer was a wide open thinker. He took a liking to me because I was innovative. With his input I developed a plan for the Leavenworth course. It involved creating a pilot model to run for a year as an experiment. Unfortunately that spreadsheet has disappeared. Years later I sent it to Huba Wass de Czege [Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege] when he was developing SAMS [School of Advanced Military Studies] at Leavenworth and he never sent it back. It's deep in his foot locker somewhere. It was a good piece of work. I was proud of it.

INTERVIEWER: After graduation, West Point tried again to grab you for a utilization tour.

GEN CUSHMAN: That's right. You are supposed to serve a utilization tour after you complete graduate instruction. I was offered a job as a math instructor and later as a military history instructor. I fought to get out of it. I had enjoyed my six weeks in the

Combat Development Section and I wanted to get on the faculty of CGSC. Now to stay on the faculty at Leavenworth you had to be recommended by an instructor and I wasn't sure that any of them would give me a recommendation. I didn't have a good mentor among the instructors. I was a former engineer officer and while smart I was an infantry officer without a CIB [Combat Infantry Badge]. That bothered me for years, always weighing on my mind. At this time I was very much aware of the fact that my infantry classmates had been in combat and I had not. That is probably one of the reasons I was not considered by some as qualified to be an instructor. So I went to see Colonel Weld who was in charge of future analysis and I told him I wanted to be assigned to Leavenworth.

INTERVIEWER: So you wrote a memo to Colonel Weld on 24 February 1955 requesting that you be allowed to serve your utilization tour at CGSC instead of West Point. You argued that your work at MIT included operational research analysis and since this type of work was being done at Leavenworth you could best serve the Army there. Obviously Colonel Weld agreed?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. He thought highly of me.

INTERVIEWER: You made a very strong case. Not for the first time, you took your career into your own hands.

GEN CUSHMAN: That's right. After I completed the "horse blanket" I showed it to Dr. Ivan Birrer and he suggested I take it to the Commandant. I got an appointment with the Commandant and I showed it to him. I laid out the progression of the whole curriculum. It was probably not as good as I thought it was but it was aimed at getting a deeper understanding of tactics and operations through a different kind of course of instruction emphasizing among other things examination of history. Examples of success and failure. Causing students to think.

INTERVIEWER: And what was General Davidson's [Major General Garrison H. Davidson] reaction?

GEN CUSHMAN: He was bemused. I think that nobody had done anything like that before. He must have thought, "What does this student know about my job? What business does he have coming into my office and telling me my job?" Nothing happened. He said, "Thanks" and gave the spreadsheet back to me.

INTERVIEWER: Did you suffer for it professionally?

GEN CUSHMAN: No, I never suffered. My effrontery did not bother him.

INTERVIEWER: Did you think General Davidson was going to take your plan and hand it to his faculty?

GEN CUSHMAN: I thought he might. I thought an officer in his position would recognize that I had an interesting idea and he might use it but he didn't.

INTERVIEWER: Where you surprised by that?

GEN CUSHMAN: I was disappointed but not surprised. I thought that could have happened. I did it because I thought something better would come out of it but it did not.

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever regret doing it?

GEN CUSHMAN: Never. I didn't regret putting the time into it and I didn't regret doing it. Trying to improve things is what makes me run. My basic approach is to try to improve things, make them better. That's what I did everywhere.

INTERVIEWER: You did remain at Fort Leavenworth.

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. I was selected to be on the futures faculty. I was not going to be on the teaching faculty. I had wanted to be on the teaching faculty, to get some platform time. I wanted to run a class and to teach something to students. Platform time is the coin of the realm at Leavenworth. I was on the research side. I did undergo faculty training, instructional training. The new people were given a few classes on how to be an instructor by Dr. Birrer. The final item in this class was a unit of instruction delivered to a record player

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INTERVIEWER: So you recorded a lecture?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. I had written a paper called the "Design of the New Infantry Division". It was a good paper. My recorded lecture was a plea for the majors of the Army to get together and reform the Army. That was what I said.

INTERVIEWER: Did you renew your relationship with Colonel Forsythe at this time?

GEN CUSHMAN: My first year on faculty (1955-56) was an interesting year because it was a year of great change in the Army. Eisenhower had come in as President. He did not reappoint Ridgway as Army Chief of Staff and brought in Maxwell Taylor [General Maxwell Davenport Taylor] in 1954. Maxwell Taylor had ideas. He created the Coordination Group in his office to help with that and he filled it with smart lieutenant colonels and colonels. George Forsythe was in that group as well as Bill DePuy. I hadn't known Bill DePuy but I had known George Forsythe. We thought well of each other. I stayed in touch with him.

General Taylor produced the National Military Program which placed an emphasis on "brushfire wars" as opposed to atomic warfare. The Coordination Group coordinated that action. It called for a change in strategy. Taylor was running into headwinds with the Eisenhower Administration. Secretary of Defense Wilson and JCS Chairman Admiral Radford were working to cut the size of the Army and rely on nuclear weapons. The Army was fighting for its life. The Coordination Group helped set up the Association of the U.S. Army [AUSA] as a lobbying organization that would counteract the influence of the Navy League and the Air Force Association. I got involved and became the first secretary of the Henry Leavenworth Chapter of AUSA. It was AUSA's first chapter. I was an activist.

INTERVIEWER: What kind of information were you trading with Colonel Forsythe?

GEN CUSHMAN: We were both doing the same thing. We wanted to get the Army into its rightful place. I wrote him letters, talked with him on the phone, and went and visited him. It was during that time that I began to read books on strategy like Robert Osgood's book, "Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy." I visited and talked to the authors that interested me.

INTERVIEWER: Was this in an official capacity?

GEN CUSHMAN: No. I went on leave or as a side trip when on TDY. When I was a student, an article that I had written called "Harness the Revolution" was published in the Military Review. It was about the kind of Army we needed in the atomic era. The Military Review had a competition for the best article that year and it placed second. It was not a great piece but it contained the right buzzwords like flexible, powerful, innovate and such.

INTERVIEWER: So in September 1955 the Research and Analysis Office was reorganized and you were assigned to the current analysis office. You have characterized the work of this office as the short range development of Army organization and doctrine. You were given several projects including writing a manual for the Pentomic division and serving as project officer for the Atomic Field Army [ATFA]. You had some innovative ideas. You proposed merging the division support commander with the G4. Did you make any waves?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. I was writing a critique of Exercise BLUE BOLT which was an experiment conducted by the Infantry School at Fort Benning. The 3d Infantry Division down there was testing a new division organization. They were trying to make the division more flexible and responsive. One of the ideas tested was the establishment of a division logistical train, called a support command, led by a colonel. The support command included all the ordnance, maintenance, medical and service elements of the division. I had observed the British Army in Germany while I was LNO to the 1st Belgian Corps. On a British division staff they had an operations chief who was a combination of operations officer and chief of staff. That officer also had the intelligence man working for him. And they had somebody on the division staff called the AQ who was the logistician. The whole thing was run by the operations officer. He was the division commander's right hand man. It's the same in the German Army. They called their operations officer the "Ia".

I was struck by this and by the fact that the German logistical planner also commanded the logistics units. I prepared a paper with comments on BLUE BOLT. I said that the idea of creating a logistics commander was a good one and that he also should also be the G4 who was responsible for planning and eliminate that position. I submitted it and nobody noticed it. They didn't read the damn thing. It went on to the next higher level and they didn't comment either. I thought it was going to go out with General Davidson's signature and the world would think that Leavenworth wanted to do away

with the traditional G4. So I asked around, "Do you know what this says?" That caused an uproar. CGSC could never let that kind of paper go out so that was toned down.

INTERVIEWER: Did you expect that item to be controversial?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. I expected it to be reversed. I expected to argue for it. I expected somebody to notice it and ask why I was recommending it.

INTERVIEWER: Were you trying to provoke something?

GEN CUSHMAN: No. I was trying to change something. I was trying to get a discussion going. I favored that position. I didn't expect to win the argument but I though at least it should be discussed.

INTERVIEWER: What was the Pentomic division?

GEN CUSHMAN: It was to bring the Army into the atomic age, General Taylor wanted to create a new division structure as a departure from the old World War Two division. Selected colonels and lieutenant colonels went down to Fort Benning to create a new organization for the airborne division based on five battle groups instead of three regiments. Each battle group had five companies instead of the standard battalion with three line companies. Supposedly, it would be more flexible. They added a "Little John" rocket battery to provide the means to deliver a nuclear weapon. In 1956 the Army adopted that idea for the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions. Then it decided to use the same organization for an infantry division using the "Honest John" rocket.

The CGSC was told to write a field manual for the new organization. Late in 1956 it assembled a group, members of the faculty, and told them to write the manual. I acted as its secretary. That team wrote the ROCID [Reorganization of the Current Infantry Division] field manual, FM 7-100. This was the basis for the reorganization of all infantry divisions in the U.S. Army, including National Guard divisions. They did not reorganize the armored divisions. They had three combat commands and that was considered a flexible organization.

INTERVIEWER: What was your opinion on the concept at the time?

GEN CUSHMAN: I didn't think it would work. It required command and control gimmicks. I explained how it would work in an article called "Reorganization of the Current Infantry Division" in Military Review. It was the most requested article in the history of that magazine because out there in the Army they wanted to find out how the new division would work. The manual hadn't come out yet, so I was directed to write the article based on the manual.

INTERVIEWER: So the reorganization happened before the manual was ready?

GEN CUSHMAN: It came out as the reorganization was taking place.

INTERVIEWER: What were some of the doctrinal challenges?

GEN CUSHMAN: In the first place five battle groups are not easy for a division commander to handle. Division commanders would frequently form a task force of two or three battle groups commanded by an assistant division commander. The Army couldn't keep a brigadier general as the division artillery officer because they had reduced the number of artillery pieces in the division. So they created two assistant division commander positions. One would be assistant division commander for maneuver and the other would be assistant division commander for supply and logistics. That's still the way it is.

INTERVIEWER: Did you anticipate that span of control could be an issue?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. We were trying to figure out how to get around it by standardizing the formation of multi-battle group task forces.

INTERVIEWER: What other activities were you engaged in?

GEN CUSHMAN: I had the idea of getting some of the smartest guys I knew in the faculty together to write a series of articles for the Military Review with the title "Readiness for the Little War." I organized this study group in late 1955 to examine significant questions of strategy and operational warfighting. There were first class officers in that group, all senior to me, the only major. We met nights in a room on the third floor of Sherman Hall with maps and files handy. We produced three good articles that influenced the Army in those days.

In Europe after I left the 22d Infantry and went to the 1st Belgian Corps, I wrote another article and sent it in to the Combat Forces Journal, a new publication that combined the infantry, cavalry, and artillery journals. When the Association of the US Army was established it became ARMY Magazine. The article came out in October 1954 after my first two months of school. It was called "What is the Army Story." It said that nobody is telling the Army story and I told my notion of what that story was. I thought it made good sense. That's about the first time that I started to think big.

And about mid- or late-1957, General Taylor came up with the idea that he wanted to have a team from Fort Leavenworth travel around the Army and brief the new ways of fighting with nuclear weapons. It would be called the Model Corps Exercise. I was appointed to the team that would write the briefing. We were to take an Army corps and put it in the scenario and describe how it fought. Jim Sheppard, full colonel, War College graduate, was the officer in charge.

INTERVIEWER: We have some of that material in our archive by the way.

GEN CUSHMAN: The scenario was the X Corps in Pakistan. With an airborne and other divisions it had somehow been deployed to help Pakistan defend against an Aggressor that had invaded through Afghanistan. The corps had nuclear weapons.

I was a skeptic on nuclear weapons, but I must have said oh heck they want us to do this so let's do the best we can and figure out how to use this nuclear weapon. Our

briefing complete with Vugraphs was approved by the CGSC management. We took it to a big auditorium in the Pentagon. General Taylor was there. The people from the Coordination Group were there. Bill DePuy was there. Now here comes the briefing. It gets to the point where we fire a nuclear weapon. General Taylor says something like "Wait a minute. Tell me more about that." After a few minutes, that was the end of the Model Corps Exercise. He tanked it. It just wouldn't work. Max Taylor was right, he didn't want to put that kind of nonsense out for the troops to listen to.

INTERVIEWER: That's a fascinating story. Tell me about your social and family life at Fort Leavenworth.

GEN CUSHMAN: We had four good years of family life on perhaps the best family post in the Army. Son Jack was born two months after we arrived and son Ted was born two months before we left. My first year on the faculty I was elected president of the Holy Name Society at St. Ignatius Catholic Church on post. That year I undertook to arrange with the diocese of Kansas City, KS, that children of Catholic families at Fort Leavenworth could be accommodated at some of the parochial schools in Leavenworth. I also arranged with post authorities that bus transportation would be provided for those children to and from those schools downtown. In visiting the bishop of Kansas City I was struck by the economy of his office. He had one assistant, chancellor I think was his title, and a secretary. With little more than that staff and without any intermediate headquarters he was somehow able to manage I don't know how many hundreds of parishes. That taught me something about organization. Post kids began attending downtown Catholic schools in 1956.

I like to sing so I joined a group of singers organized by one of the College's eminent tactics instructors. They were practicing barbershop quartet singing. But that didn't work out, my ability to harmonize was just not that good. One spring I decided to take one of the garden plots offered and to grow vegetables. But that didn't work out either because I came down with a violent case of hay fever. Margaret Ryan, wife of Ward Ryan who was a department director, drafted me to be secretary of the Dramatics Club. I later could not account to my successor for some folding chairs and had to turn in a report of survey. Another lesson for me.

Three sets of Leavenworth students came and went during my three years on the faculty, so from time to time Nancy and I would see old friends. But after I got deeply into curriculum reform I became so busy that such social activities tapered off. Our children loved Fort Leavenworth with its neighborhood children everywhere, its swimming pools and playgrounds, its Brownie Scouts, and so on.

INTERVIEWER: Can you talk about your relationship with Dick Hallock?

GEN CUSHMAN: I didn't know Dick Hallock until the summer of 1956 . He was a CGSC student just assigned to the faculty, in nonresident instruction. At Leavenworth they celebrated the birthday of the Infantry branch with a ball every year on the 14th of June. People on the faculty were organizing the event. They detailed Dick Hallock and me, a couple of majors, to hang a large Combat Infantryman Badge in the ballroom. We took a truck and got this thing. We started talking. We discovered that we were kindred

spirits. We had exactly the same opinion of CGSC. I told him about my pilot model curriculum plan that I had presented to General Davidson without success.

Dick had combat experience in an airborne battalion in World War II. He had lately been an intelligence officer. He was an insightful thinker, a good communicator and a born conniver. He had worked for General Lucius Clay [General Lucius Dubignon Clay] in Germany as his intelligence advisor. General Clay trusted him to write papers. He had also served under Major General McGarr [Major General Lionel C. McGarr], the commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division. In 1956 McGarr was arriving to be the new commandant. Dick thought that he could approach McGarr with my new curriculum. He said, "He will listen to me. He will do something about this. I can get to him." I said, "Good, let's get to him." He and I decided we would approach McGarr with my scheme for rebuilding the curriculum. I didn't talk to McGarr, I worked with Hallock, supporting him. I was beneficial to Hallock because I was smart and could write and I agreed with him. I had a good reputation already in the college and for all the things I'd done with AUSA, the ROCID Division and the articles for the "Military Review."
INTERVIEWER: You prepared a very strongly worded and frank memorandum for presentation to General McGarr. It stated: "CGSC instruction is inadequate. It is out of date, sterile, stereotyped, inflexible, unimaginative, and it fails to prepare for conditions as they exist in the field. Its doctrine is essentially ETO World War II, and its approach to atomic warfare is to superficially impose atomics on conventional doctrine." Then you go on to say: "The cause of the situation lies in the CGSC system… The system is complacent, inbred, essentially negative in outlook, closes ranks against change, and stifles growth." That is very pointed.

GEN CUSHMAN: I knew it was overstating things but I agreed with Dick to write that. It was radical. It was a call to action and it fit my opinion.

INTERVIEWER: Was this meant to be inflammatory?

GEN CUSHMAN: It was meant to get McGarr's attention. The memo was never published. It was kept between Hallock and me and McGarr. Hallock went to see McGarr and he showed it to him. Now McGarr was a conniver too. McGarr was a secretive mold breaker and he liked to operate covertly, and this was a covert operation. I went along with that. It was probably questionable as to whether I was justified in conniving directly with the Commandant against the whole establishment.

INTERVIEWER: Your presentation to General McGarr was nearly concurrent with the findings of an educational survey commission that had been looking at the Staff College.

GEN CUSHMAN: That's right. That report coincided with General McGarr's arrival. I think he was sent out to shape up Leavenworth. That's the impression that we all had. McGarr was not an educator. He was an excellent tactician who earned a great reputation as a battlefield commander in World War Two and Korea. McGarr was not a very polished man. He was very direct and no nonsense and he wanted to have his own way. McGarr bought off on our scheme and that began a year of turmoil for me and for the college and everybody. I worked as an assistant and partner with Hallock. In time it

got to be noticeable. It would have been hard not to notice it when McGarr announced in an October, or November, faculty meeting that both Hallock and Cushman had been selected for lieutenant colonel, below the zone.

INTERVIEWER: You wrote in your memoir that General McGarr was not an adept change agent because of the way he worked. What happened next?

GEN CUSHMAN: He scheduled a faculty meeting that late summer of 1956 where he read a paper that said he was going to change CGSC and that he was going to start with the curriculum for the 1958 academic year (1957-1958 equals "/8"). This was without explanation or discussion. He said that for /8 every unit of instruction in the whole curriculum was going to be redone. He announced that there would be a /8 planning group under Colonel Ward Ryan of the college staff. He described how he was reorganizing the college into five new departments to be transitioned to for /8 as the College was conducting the current /7 curriculum. All of this hit like a thunderbolt.

Dick Hallock and I continued to collaborate. He was an innovative, imaginative guy. We asked each other "What should we call the new departments? How should they be structured? What should they teach?" We made our recommendations and McGarr bought them, to totally reorganize the College in 1956-57 for launching a completely new curriculum in the year 1957-58.

INTERVIEWER: General McGarr wrote in his approach to instruction: "While the student is indoctrinated in sound doctrine and procedures, detailed instruction and memory work in skills and techniques which are subject to change and more rapidly learned in the field are held to the minimum. Instruction is oriented primarily on developing logical, practical and original reasoning ability in military problem solving rather than on the merits of any single solution." That seems to cut to the heart of your critique of the CGSC curriculum as you knew it. Were these your words reworked?

GEN CUSHMAN: They were mine and Hallock's. We understood the issues in the same way. Hallock was often the lead drafter. I was the author of a pamphlet that explained to all what was happening in Leavenworth. I've still got one copy of it. It was a significant pamphlet. I was the author of other doctrinal publications that were part of the /8 curriculum. I wrote faculty guidance on the doctrinal approach to instruction. I explained that doctrine and instruction must be considered together and that the one feeds the other. I was a philosopher of teaching and doctrine, so to speak.

INTERVIEWER: How was McGarr's guidance received at CGSC?

GEN CUSHMAN: Many disliked it, thought it was "change for change's sake."

INTERVIEWER: What was the opinion of the Deputy Commandant, General Train [Brigadier General William F. Train]?

GEN CUSHMAN: Hallock and Train clashed. Train had come in during my first year on the faculty. Train was no dummy; he figured out what was happening. I knew him socially from a Great Books club that met in his quarters. That was well before I had met

Hallock. I had had my own experience with General Train. I had been reading J.F.C. Fuller's book, "Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier." Fuller wrote that when he was made chief instructor at the British Staff College at Camberley in the 1920s, he decided to throw out the whole curriculum and start over. Fuller believed it was out of date. He wanted to emphasize mobility, flexibility and so forth. I was taken by this. So I went in to see General Train with Fuller's book and I read him the paragraph on Fuller's work to reform Camberley and said, "Sir, that's what you have to do here." This was in my first faculty year. He was bemused, too.

INTERVIEWER: So General Train knew where all these reform ideas were coming from.

GEN CUSHMAN: He knew what kind of guy I was and it didn't take him long to put two and two together. I had to keep my meetings with Hallock secret, but you can't do this kind of thing in secret. When I stopped working on the ROCID manual, McGarr put me on the "/8" curriculum committee under its chairman, Colonel Ward Ryan. I was one of his key staff officers and the author of many of the new curriculum's documents promoting my ideas and those I got from Dick Hallock.

INTERVIEWER: What role did Dr. Ivan Birrer play?

GEN CUSHMAN: He was in favor of Dick Hallock's work. The faculty was split into two camps. You had the McGarr/Ryan camp on one side and Train and the /7 curriculum guys on the other side unhappy with them. Train knew it wasn't all coming from Hallock, he knew I was working on it too. Hallock was first made a special assistant to the Commandant with a desk right there in the Commandant's outer office. Later he worked out of Dr. Birrer's office with access to the Commandant. It soon became evident to Train that I, working with Hallock, was causing problems for him. Others began to notice it too,

INTERVIEWER: As a part of the /8 you were also developing your view of atomic warfare. You wrote that the doctrinal dichotomy between atomic and non-atomic operations was an over-simplification. The idea was to classify operations as "non active atomic" and "atomic." In other words the use of atomic weapons was something a planner would always have to think about.

GEN CUSHMAN: Right. That became a part of the doctrine. In the /8 curriculum we for the first time used the terms "atomic" and "non-active atomic" war. You always fought under the threat of atomic weapons. You couldn't put atomic warfare out of your mind but you couldn't always be thinking about whether a position or force was vulnerable to nuclear weapons. It was someone else's job to prevent the enemy from using atomic weapons and you had to hope he succeeds.

Another thing, the /8 curriculum was going worldwide in its instruction rather than use only European terrain. We had to figure out what regions we would use in scenarios and get the maps for them. I organized a conference called ROETAF [Roles and Operational Environments of the Army in the Field]. We had an assembly at Leavenworth with representatives from all the schools and people from the Chief of Staff's Coordination Group. The purpose of the conference was to decide what parts of the world we

would use for different scenarios. It wasn't for operational planning. It was all instructional. This was a key development during my time at Leavenworth. The College had to get a lot of new maps.

INTERVIEWER: The /8 curriculum breaks down into hours; staff instructions, special weapons, infantry division, and non-division. A few items got my attention. You programed sixty-five hours for the study of future warfare, and ninety-seven hours for something called "educational subjects," defined as cultivation of wisdom and judgment. Were these additions to the curriculum?

GEN CUSHMAN: Some of them were. The guest speaker program also came under this.

INTERVIEWER: Were these "educational subjects" electives?

GEN CUSHMAN: No, there weren't any electives at that time.

INTERVIEWER: What innovative things did you personally add to the "/8" curriculum?

GEN CUSHMAN: I was in favor of many things. I wanted to change the emphasis from memorization and school solutions. That's hard to do. They are still trying to do it today. More small group instruction was another innovation. Instructors learned how to run a seminar or a syndicate as the British called it. That had never been done at Leavenworth.

INTERVIEWER: What did you do after you finished work on the /8 curriculum?

GEN CUSHMAN: I worked on a rewrite of FM 100-5 Operations during the fall of 1957 .

INTERVIEWER: Were you working on the /8 curriculum at the time?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes I was also representing Colonel Weld's shop on a College group tasked with rewriting the manual. The work group had people from various College departments. I had become a believer in the 1949 version of 100-5 during my tour with the 22d Infantry and that's what I wanted to see in this version. I also wanted to see a chapter on "air/land warfare". I fully believed that there was no longer any such thing as "land warfare," it's now "air-land." That has been the case since the days of Billy Mitchell [Brigadier William Lendrum Mitchell]. So I wrote a chapter on air/land warfare but the College took that chapter out of the draft manual prior to forwarding. I can't find the draft chapter; it's disappeared.

INTERVIEWER: What was in that chapter?

GEN CUSHMAN: I don't remember its details. It would have reflected views that I had arrived at when I wrote my 1954 Combat Forces Journal article "What is the Army's Story?" (see page 12). There I wrote, "The Armed Forces are composed of land, sea, and air elements. Each of these elements depends on the other two to a greater or lesser degree depending on the operations in progress. Both land and sea forces re-

quire integrated air elements for all operations. These elements are not necessary part of the air forces. Land forces operate most effectively with the closest ties with their supporting aviation, and for this reason United States Army doctrine could logically state that command of supporting aviation be assigned to the land force commander."

I'm satisfied that what I wrote in that draft chapter of FM 100-5 reflected that viewpoint. I can understand why the College would not want to forward the chapter.

INTERVIEWER: How had you arrived at those views?

GEN CUSHMAN: For years, at least as far back as when I was in Cologne. I had been thinking about larger questions. At Leavenworth I had been stimulated by Samuel Huntington's book The Soldier and the State. I suppose my thinking about air warfare began at Sandia when among the Strategic Air Command people we were working with. With Air Corps and Navy officers around me in 1947 I watched legislation for the unification of the armed services come about. I had a smart Navy lieutenant jg, Annapolis 1946, working for me; his name was Bob Wertheim. In the summer of 1949 I followed in the newspapers the controversy between the Navy and Air Force after Secretary of Defense Johnson canceled construction of the huge aircraft carrier USS United States and the Navy's revolt of the admirals began. I was interested in that and more.

I investigated the evolution of air warfare thinking from the early days of the Air Corps and naval aviation in the 1920s through the emergence of Army Air Forces doctrine in World War II, to the controversy over Service roles and missions during the late '40s as the unification legislation was being debated and after it was passed. Then came the Korean War in which the Marine Corps showed the Army and Air Force how tactical air should be coordinated with land forces. After the Korean War the Eisenhower years brought strategic air to dominance.

The theme of air/land warfare (spelled that way, not AirLand as TRADOC had it in the 1980s) has run powerfully through my life ever since.

INTERVIEWER: What happened after you completed your work on the /8 curriculum?

GEN CUSHMAN: I wanted to get out of Leavenworth after /8 was finished. It was well on its way in late 1957. I was unhappy with my relationship with Dick Hallock. I had become too closely identified with him and the whole reform process and I wanted some independence. I let that be known to my friends in Washington. In October of 1957 General [William C.] Westmoreland, who was a major general at the time and the Secretary to the General Staff, came out to visit General McGarr. I got a call from General McGarr's office, "General Westmoreland wants to talk to you." I went in there and talked to him for a few minutes. He must have been sizing me up because about a week later I got DA orders to join the Coordination Group in the Chief of Staff's Office. This was six months before my tour was up, highly unusual. Dick Hallock said, "We need you around here, I want you to stay." I said, "No, I've got to get out of here, this is more than I can handle." So that was my winding down.

INTERVIEWER: Were you known to the members of the Coordination Group?

GEN CUSHMAN: Some knew about me because I was an activist. I was helping with the AUSA. I was writing articles and publishing, and pushing my views at Leavenworth.

INTERVIEWER: What lessons did you learn from your time on the faculty at CGSC and your reformist activism?

GEN CUSHMAN: One lesson is that it is dangerous to get yourself in a secretive position and situation like that. Determining where your loyalty lies can be difficult. Placed in a subordinate office, I needed to be loyal to my bosses and I believed I was. But somehow my loyalty also went to McGarr and his mission. He was a difficult man to be loyal to because he had flaws in his leadership style. He had difficulty communicating with the faculty and was not loved by them in any way. McGarr had an instinctive grasp of what he was trying to do but he couldn't articulate it in his own words. He had to use somebody else's words, written words. In a way I was a nonreg part of his mind. I thought highly of McGarr. I was loyal to him despite his flaws. He could count on me. I had trouble being open about it in that scene.

INTERVIEWER: You were loyal to General McGarr but he had his own agenda and a mission to accomplish and his way of doing things was very different from yours.

GEN CUSHMAN: That's right. That ambivalent situation during my last two years at Leavenworth wasn't good for me. I don't know whether people thought I was being dishonest or was overly ambitious. Members of the faculty were sometimes wary when they were around me even socially and it made me uncomfortable.

INTERVIEWER: Did you care what people thought?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes, I did. I have thought that this period was a kind of watershed of my life. I did well after that but I think that, in more than one place, I was seen as one of the participants in the "major's revolution" against the established way at CGSC.

INTERVIEWER: You were convinced that the curriculum at CGSC was deeply flawed. You had an opportunity to make a difference and you exploited it for the good of CGSC and the U.S. Army. It was probably not the most collegial way to get it done.

GEN CUSHMAN: I think that is an accurate description.

INTERVIEWER: Was that wrong?

GEN CUSHMAN: No. It had to be done. I had a choice to make. I could lie low or I could take advantage of an opportunity and go with it. I took advantage of an opportunity, and I believed I was working for the greater good. There may have been a degree of self-serving ambition, but I think I was right.

INTERVIEWER: What advice would you give to a young officer in a similar position?

GEN CUSHMAN: I would say go with your gut instincts. Do what you think right. I didn't want to be a casualty in all of this. I was trying to get a job done that was consistent with General McGarr's desires. We did a lot. We fundamentally changed CGSC. I was intellectually and morally committed to it. But I think the methods we used probably hurt my reputation.

INTERVIEWER: Is it also accurate to say that reform can have a personal cost?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. Hallock suffered because his inner fire burned hotter than mine. I think that he just did not care about the consequences. In the mid-1960s he went to the U.S. Army War College. General Train was its commandant. Hallock got a student evaluation that cost him promotion to full colonel. He fought it and proved that General Train was being vindictive. He was eventually promoted to full colonel but he left the Army after that. I ran into Dick in the early 1960s when we both were in Washington. He was working for DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] and succeeded in torpedoing a couple of projects that the Army wanted. He really got into it with Bill DePuy over the MICV [a prototype before the Bradley Fighting Vehicle] program]. He never stopped being a rebel.

INTERVIEWER: Did you both believe it was worth it.

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. We ended up with a better Command and General Staff College.

Chapter Ten
Coordination Group OCSA

INTERVIEWER: Henry Gole states in his biography of General Depuy[1] that George Forsythe brought you to Bill Depuy's attention, and that Depuy requested that you be assigned to the Coordination Group in the Army Chief of Staff's office. Is that correct?

GEN CUSHMAN: I've never heard that. It could be. George Forsythe was close to Bill Depuy and like him in many ways. When Bill came out to Leavenworth for our ROETAF (Roles and Operational Environment of the Army in the Field) conference I invited him to our house for lunch. My son Jack, two or three years old, met us and Bill took his hand and walked him up the steps to the house. It was touching. I wouldn't be surprised if he tried to get me into the Coordination Group. I was known as an activist.

INTERVIEWER: You were assigned to the Coordination Group in the Chief of Staff's office, on 13 July 1958. What was the mission of the group?

GEN CUSHMAN: To keep track of policy issues, to review books, to prepare "think pieces" for the Chief of Staff, to analyze ideas and concepts for possible adoption. In 1955 General Maxwell Taylor had become Chief of Staff, replacing Matthew Ridgway whom President Eisenhower had chosen not to appoint for a second two-year term. Ridgway had been a problem for President Eisenhower and his Secretary of Defense as they reshaped the armed forces. One issue was roles and missions. The Army was into missiles, both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air, in a big way, So was the Air Force, which saw missiles as the key to its future. Another issue was strategy. "Massive nuclear retaliation" had been adopted. In 1953 Admiral Arthur W. Radford, who was a believer in that idea and no fan of the Army, had become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Army, downsizing from the Korean War, was bucking the tide in the JCS and in OSD and fighting for its existence

The Coordination Group's role was comparable to that of the DCSOPS [G-3, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations]. Working with the DCSOPS and under the SGS [Secretary of the General Staff], General Bonesteel [General Charles Hartwell Bonesteel, III], we also helped get General Taylor ready for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The DCSOPS people were smart. They were the strategic thinkers. Our task was to stay current with strategic thought, to feel the pulse, to write papers, and to call things to General Taylor's attention.

I was made secretary of the General Staff Council. The General Staff Council was headed by the Vice Chief of Staff, General Lemnitzer [General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer]. It met twice a week. It consisted of all the deputy chiefs of staff, the Chief of Legislative

[1] Henry Gole, General William E. Depuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War, (Lexington: University Press of Kenturcky, 2008)

Liaison, the CINFO [Chief of Information], and others. I sat in the back row behind the Vice Chief of Staff, took notes and typed them up after the meeting. I sat in on briefings the DCSOPS staff gave to General Taylor to get him up to speed before a JCS meeting. On some matters I went to the debrief after a meeting. DCSOPS people did all the work. I became familiar with how the JCS worked, its flimsies, buffs, greens, and red-striped papers. This and the General Staff Council gave me a picture of how the Army operated and how decisions were made and how the senior leaders approached problems.

INTERVIEWER: How was the Coordination Group composed?

GEN CUSHMAN: Colonel Hamilton Twitchell was the chief. We had Bernie Rogers [General Bernard William Rogers], who was a lieutenant colonel at the time and who soon became General Taylor's aide-de-camp. There was Bill Depuy, Jim Camp, Dick Lee, me, and a couple of others. Six or eight months before I got there, the Coordination Group had been writing position papers for a fight the Army and Air Force were having over roles and missions, including air defense. Someone had leaked to the New York Times a report critical of the Bomarc Missile, [C-10 Boeing Bomarc]. General Taylor believed that the Coordination Group was the source so they shipped out George Forsythe and others and replaced its chief with Ham Twitchell. The group had to withdraw into its shell a bit. General Bonesteel often arranged meetings with outsiders. Before they rose to high fame we met with Henry Kissinger and Herman Kahn.

INTERVIEWER: Who controlled your interaction with the Army staff?

GEN CUSHMAN: We worked for the SGS, General Bonesteel, who gave us free rein. He was a born strategic thinker. He later became a four star general commanding in Korea.

INTERVIEWER: Do you recall any frictions with the Army staff as a result of your work?

GEN CUSHMAN: As we worked on projects for General Taylor Colonel Twitchell and General Bonesteel were able to keep frictions with the DCSOPS to a minimum. Before I got there, the Army had published something called "The National Military Program." It spoke of the need to the ready for limited war. General Taylor tasked us to write an updated version of the document. General Bonesteel set up a small group of us with some DCSOPS people, under its Plans director General Woolnough, to go for a week to an offsite location at Fort Ritchie, MD, to write it. After General Taylor retired he published a book, "The Uncertain Trumpet." We pretty much wrote that book up there. It got presidential candidate Kennedy's attention.

General Taylor retired in 1959 and General Lemnitzer became JCS Chief. After the 1960 election General Taylor was asked to join the administration as the President's military advisor. Later he was appointed Chairman of the JCS. I came into the Coordination

Group an admirer of General Ridgway who in a soldierly manner was standing up to the Secretary of Defense. General Taylor was taking a different tack. I wrote a review for my buddies of his congressional testimony from 1955 to 1959. Each year he told Congress that, while Army funding was adequate that year, any additional cuts would be a disaster. Each year the Army budget was cut and he said the same thing. I thought that he should be more resolute and stand his ground. I remember making that point emphatically to Bill Depuy. He said to me, "Jack, have you ever heard of Sisyphus?" Sisyphus was a mythological king who was punished in the afterlife by being compelled to roll an immense boulder up a hill, only to watch it roll back down, and to repeat this throughout eternity. "That's you," Bill said. I realized that General Taylor was under pressure. One year the President even required each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to put his signature under a statement that the defense budget was adequate. When asked to explain this on Meet the Press, General Taylor said that the total amount was adequate but not its distribution among the Services.

INTERVIEWER: What was the work flow like? Did you work individually or collaboratively?

GEN CUSHMAN: We worked as individuals on assigned projects. Sometimes we worked collaboratively on a big project like creating briefing books for the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of the Army in preparation for policy meetings. After Sputnik in 1957 President Eisenhower had proposed legislation to strengthen the Defense Department. In 1958 Congress passed a defense reorganization act that called for major changes, including tripling the size of the Joint Staff serving the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reorganizing it into J-Sections, strengthening the role of its director, and making it a proper staff. In 1959 the Coordination Group supported the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff with paperwork and briefing books as they attended meetings to work out directives that would put this legislation into effect.

General Bonesteel arranged visits to our office by people like Herman Kahn, an Air Force consultant who had just written "On Thermonuclear War." Kahn argued that US strategic air and missiles must reduce their vulnerability to Soviet attack. Only such an effort could make the Soviets believe that the US could surely launch a devastating second strike and thus deterrence would work. Bonesteel also brought in the Stanford Research Institute's Richard Foster who was arguing for a robust air defense system using an advanced Nike missile, then called the Nike Zeus, to protect American cities and strategic air and missile bases. He sent me and another Coord Group member to a week-long national strategy symposium run by a think tank at the Asilomar Conference Grounds located on the Monterey Peninsula in Pacific Grove, CA. We were the Army Staff's point of contact with the AUSA [Association of the US Army]. The AUSA had been launched three or four years earlier as the Army's counter to the Navy League and the Air Force Association. Bill Depuy did most of that work. He worked with the AUSA's Executive Director Bob Cocklin and the CINFO organizing the program and lining up speakers for the annual convention.

INTERVIEWER: What kind of administrative support did you have?

GEN CUSHMAN: We had secretaries right there in the office and copy machines down the hall. The offices were fine, on the D-Ring. We had more room than average action officers. I had a typewriter to type my drafts. I had a safe.

INTERVIEWER: How did you all get along?

GEN CUSHMAN: We liked each other. Sometimes we'd go out to lunch together. Bill Depuy would take us up to a nearby Mexican restaurant.

INTERVIEWER: Were there special lanes that each one of you was assigned to?

GEN CUSHMAN: We all had certain lanes but were general purpose too. You might call my lane the General Staff Council and JCS prebriefs/debriefs. I was an effective member of the coordination group and I think well regarded.

INTERVIEWER: General Bonesteel characterized you as brilliant and intense.

GEN CUSHMAN: I was intense.

INTERVIEWER: How was this intensity manifest?

GEN CUSHMAN: I was concerned about issues. I said what I thought. I thought I knew what I was talking about. Not to overdo the point, I had a good mind and a good grasp of the issues. I could think.

INTERVIEWER: Is it difficult to be tactful under these circumstances?

GEN CUSHMAN: I did not get personal about it. I was not afraid to speak my mind and I reasoned soundly. I think I was considered a good officer, and I was learning all the time. I learned a lot from others. I learned a lot from Depuy. I was not polished. Nobody ever asked me to be his aide.

INTERVIEWER: Would you have wanted that job?

GEN CUSHMAN: No. I was not a social man, not a tennis partner. Maxwell Taylor had aides whose primary function was to play tennis with him.

INTERVIEWER: How about your family? What was your family life like?

GEN CUSHMAN: My family was happy. We lived on Fessenden Street until 1961 when we moved to Maple Avenue in Chevy Chase, Maryland. My family stayed there during

my first tour to Vietnam and while I was at the National War College until 1965. In Washington I lived right down the street from Fritz Kraemer. Fritz was a German, a true Prussian, who became an American citizen during World War II. He was a consummate strategic thinker. In 1958-59 he was a student at the National War College. Fritz then returned to the Pentagon. I spent hours with him in his backyard on Sundays. He taught me a lot about strategy. He was close to Henry Kissinger. He discovered Henry Kissinger in the Army in World War II. Later he was disappointed with Kissinger's performance as Secretary of State. Our relationship was a key part of my development in Washington. A conversation with Fritz Kraemer was pretty one-sided. Sometimes he could be rather extreme and combative but he expanded my thinking. He was my friend all my life and he made a considerable impression on me.

INTERVIEWER: What did he teach you that you didn't know?

GEN CUSHMAN: The meaning of power and the meaning of war, conviction, the meaning of strength, of principle. He was a great admirer of Charles de Gaulle.

INTERVIEWER: Were your children happy at this time?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. They got used to my working hard. My wife put up with it. She was caring for six children and loved that. The older children came to her aid. She was robust enough physically. Although Nancy is unusually sensitive to the needs of others she is surprisingly strong mentally and psychologically. She does need wide margins of time. She was seriously involved in the education of our young. Before we got to Washington she had looked around for the best schools. She chose Stone Ridge Academy of the Sacred Heart on Wisconsin Avenue north of the District. She wrote to the nuns there and asked for tuition help for our oldest daughter who was an outstanding student. They gave her a full scholarship, as they did two of her sisters. We have seven children and every one of them was a National Merit Scholar. All got sizable scholarships paid for by the Army Central Welfare Fund. My wife is an extraordinarily gentle and sensitive person who has kept me on an even keel and I love her very much.

INTERVIEWER: Was it difficult to maintain your family in DC?

GEN CUSHMAN: We got by. I wrote articles for publication to earn a little extra money. It wasn't much but it produced $50 or $75 now and then. We were frugal. We didn't have a second car and the one we had was bought used. We didn't have a television.
INTERVIEWER: What was your typical work schedule with the Coordination Group?

GEN CUSHMAN: I got into the office by 7:30 or 8:00 and left at 5:30 or 6:00 pm. I occasionally worked late into the night. I didn't work on the weekends. That was Pentagon policy. I had worked much harder at Leavenworth and I worked longer hours at Sandia Base.

INTERVIEWER: What did you gain from the assignment?

GEN CUSHMAN: I developed a view of an officer's stern duty to accept responsibility and to measure up to it, and to see that those subordinate to him do likewise. On one occasion I sat in on a briefing to the Secretary the Army, Wilbur Brucker. It aimed to tell him why a serious shortfall and cost overrun had occurred in the development of the Corporal surface-to-surface missile. All of the two- and three-star principals, including the Chief of Ordnance, were there. It was not a happy story. Secretary Brucker got madder and madder. He finally asked all the back row people to leave. I went to the anteroom. Finally he left, red-faced and angry. Clearly, he had just told off some important people. A few minutes later everybody left, led by Chief of Staff General Lemnitzer. They were all laughing. General Lemnitzer had evidently ended the conference with a good joke and all was well. To my young mind, this was not a serious way to end the session.

INTERVIEWER: Did you enjoy the assignment?

GEN CUSHMAN: I loved it. I learned about the running of the Army. The only thing I had run up to then was a battalion for six months. I had been in the machinery but I had not run the machinery. I was learning all the time. I read about the general commanding the Army intelligence school and agency at Fort Holabird, Maryland. He made a name for himself by clearing out a massive backlog of security clearances. I went over there and asked him how he did it and he showed me his method. The key was to look deeply and discover what was holding things up. I later became efficient at straightening things out by this method.

INTERVIEWER: Can you be more specific about the method?

GEN CUSHMAN: First, you must understand in detail the current situation -- where you are. Then you must establish your objective -- where you want to be. Then, looking at the elements of the current situation, you must set down a step-by-step program for addressing individual problem areas toward the attainment of the objective, and then order it done. Finally, you must follow up, monitoring the progress of each step. I later became proficient in that kind of management technique and learned how to get things done. It served me well. I've used it again and again in my life.

INTERVIEWER: Army historians frequently point to the Coordination Group as an organization that many leaders took as a model for managing change. It is an example of how a forceful leader can take a small cell of exceptionally talented people and use it to pivot a large organization into a determined direction. Do you agree with that conclusion?

GEN CUSHMAN: I agree with that conclusion but not necessarily with it as a description of the Coordination Group. General Taylor did not use us quite that way.

INTERVIEWER: Does that make these cells a potential danger to a larger organization?

GEN CUSHMAN: No. I think every commander needs that sort of organization. A commander of a large activity is busy with people, meetings, paperwork and the like. He has many things to do. He has to have somebody help him think, direct, and keep track of progress. I believe it is essential to have somebody like that.

INTERVIEWER: What kind of people do you need in these cells? What characteristics would you look for?

GEN CUSHMAN: You need idea people. They have to be intelligent, practical, and articulate. You may not always buy their ideas but such people are very useful. Depuy specialized in that. He could spot those people. In 1959 or so he left the Coordination Group for a year at the Imperial Defence College in London, and after that battle group command in Germany. Colonel Twitchell had been replaced by then. We had been augmented by Fritz Kraemer, by Bob Montague, first in his West Point class of 1947, whom I would encounter in my first tour in Vietnam and by Alain Enthoven, who had been a systems analyst at the RAND Corporation. Bill Kintner also came in about that time. A few years earlier he had written a book, "Atomic Weapons in Land Combat.

One of my last projects was to prepare an answer for the question posed by Senator Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He had asked, "Why can't you get more than 13 divisions from an Army of 870,000?" I worked long and hard on it and prepared many briefing charts but was never able to present a convincing case. In October 1960 I went in with Ham Twitchell and my easel and charts to tell my story to the Vice Chief of Staff, General Decker. He was watching the TV. The World Series was being played. General Decker turned off the TV sound. I went on with my tale while the ball game went on.

INTERVIEWER: At about this time you were being considered for a senior service college.

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes, In the questionnaire that they sent me I told the assignment people that I preferred to attend the U.S. Naval War College if assigned to a senior service college.

INTERVIEWER: Why did you want to attend the Naval War College?

GEN CUSHMAN: I had come to admire the Navy. I had worked with Navy people at Sandia Base and I got an appreciation for how the Navy looked at things. I'll tell you one of the experiences I had in the Coordination Group. We were getting into strategic weapons and I heard about this thing called the Polaris missile and the Polaris submarine. I made an appointment with Admiral Rayburn's Polaris team over at the Munitions

Building. They showed me their plan for putting together the Polaris system. They explained to me their PERT diagram with all the inputs and successive tracks and critical points for creating a submarine and its associated missiles as an end product. The CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], Arleigh Burke [Admiral Arleigh A. Burke] took an approach to nuclear weapons called "limited deterrence," meaning that you didn't need a huge amount of them; you needed only a quantity sufficient to convince the enemy not to start a war. The Air Force wanted to crank out thousands of nuclear weapons. I came back and I told my buddies in the Coordination Group, "The Navy has a better approach. They can have these things at sea and move them around so the enemy can't find them. They are more secure. They won't need any fixed bases and you can get by with a lot less. We don't need all these hundreds of B-52s and B-50s." The Chief of Staff, although not a fan of the size of the Air Force strategic buildup, never bought fully into Admiral Burke's idea.

INTERVIEWER: You were deferred from attending a senior service college.

GEN CUSHMAN: In late 1960 I received orders to attend the Air War College. I had no desire to go there. I had no admiration for the Air Force and its ways. Although I was a student of its history and doctrine, they were not my favorite people. I didn't want to take my family down into the racial difficulties of the schools in Montgomery, Alabama. When I interviewed with Cyrus Vance for a job in OSD I told him that I was on orders to the Air War College. He said that he would get me out of it. I was deferred a year, which suited me fine.

Chapter Eleven

With Cyrus Vance as General Counsel

INTERVIEWER: How did you get assigned to Cyrus Vance's office?

GEN CUSHMAN: In December 1960 President-elect Kennedy named Robert McNamara as his Secretary of Defense. McNamara brought in Cyrus Vance as Department of Defense General Counsel. Vance was an able lawyer from New York, a U.S. Navy veteran and a graduate of Yale Law School. He had been staff director for a Senate committee chaired by Vice President-elect Lyndon Johnson. We understood that Johnson had suggested Cyrus Vance as General Counsel. Soon word came down that McNamara wanted an Army officer to serve with one from the Navy and one from the Air Force on a team in Vance's office that was going to work on Department of Defense reorganization. General Throckmorton [General John Lathrop Throckmorton], had replaced General Bonesteel as SGS and he sent up the Coordination Group's Al Moody, Class of 1941, lieutenant colonel artilleryman and number one in his class, to be interviewed by Vance. Vance didn't find him acceptable so the SGS sent me up. I was a lieutenant colonel. I had just written a paper on how I thought the Department of Defense should be reorganized. Titled "The Question of Defense Organization," it laid out with my own logic a comprehensive proposal for the reorganization of the department. I emphasized the newly strengthened position of the Director of the Joint Staff, arguing that he should primarily serve the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The Director should be able to understand and restate the position of the Service chiefs on each issue and to use the Joint Staff to formulate a Chairman's position for the Chairman to send the Secretary. I considered Al Gruenther [General Alfred Maximilian Gruenther] as a model for this position. I had tried to get it published as an article in a professional journal but it read too much like a staff paper. I took the paper with me when I went to meet Vance. I went in there and while talking I said, "Sir, I brought this paper that I'd like to leave with you." Vance read it overnight and he hired me. My orders came down to report right after the 1961 Inauguration.

INTERVIEWER: What were your duties?

GEN CUSHMAN: The first thing I had to do when I got there was to get some civilian clothes because the OSD people, including military officers, wore civilian clothes. I immediately went down to Lewis and Thomas Saltz in Washington, a good men's store, and bought myself two suits. I was on a team with two other officers. The Air Force sent up Major Abbott Greenleaf, he was a transport pilot and a hot-shot, articulate, smart, and likable. Formerly with the Social Sciences Department at West Point, he had been one of the Air Staff's "goal tenders," working on interservice matters like roles and missions. The Navy officer was a JAG lawyer named "Doc" Cooke. He later stayed on at the Pentagon for thirty years to eventually became its "mayor" as chief of OSD administration. The three of us worked for Solis Horwitz, a mature lawyer who

had been working with Vance on the Senate committee. He wasn't the same caliber as Vance but he was a straightforward thinker and managed the three of us. He didn't write any papers. He managed our papers and reviewed them with us. Joe Califano worked nearby as Vance's special assistant. He was in our orbit. Joe later rose to a high position in the Johnson White House. It was a heady atmosphere. Our E-Ring office was right next to that of the thirty-three year old Harold K. Brown, McNamara's DDR&E [Director of Defense Research and Engineering]. The press called him and others the "whiz kids." He later became Secretary of Defense. He was now "Harold" to me and I was "Jack." They were working big things in his office and throughout the Pentagon. Charlie Hitch had been brought in from the RAND Corporation to be the Department of Defense Comptroller. Working for him was his RAND sidekick named Alain Enthoven who was a systems analyst specialist. Coincidentally Enthoven had a couple of months earlier been hired by the chief of the Coordination Group so I had come to know him. While there I had educated him, using a blackboard to explain the organization of an Army division beginning with the squad. McNamara came in determined to accomplish large projects. His predecessor was Thomas Gates who in his last months in office had established the Defense intelligence Agency. McNamara moved swiftly to modify that directive. Abbott Greenleaf was the action officer on a paper that made that agency responsible for all service military attaches. The angst that caused the Army, Navy, and Air Force gave our little four-man team immediate visibility.

INTERVIEWER: I can imagine.

GEN CUSHMAN: Then he told Vance to prepare a directive that would make the Air Force responsible for the launching of all space vehicles. NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] had in 1955 chosen the Navy's Vanguard missile to put the first US satellite in orbit. Soon after Sputnik in October 1957 Vanguard had exploded on the launch pad. NASA told the Army to modify its Redstone, an IRBM [intermediate range ballistic missile] missile then under development, for the launch. 84 days later, modified as Jupiter C, it placed Explorer I in orbit. Abbot Greenleaf coordinated that space directive in January and February. Cyrus Vance worked it over with McNamara. Within two months of assuming his office, Mr. McNamara shocked the Army and the Navy with DOD Directive 5160.32, Development of Space Systems. It allowed each Service to conduct preliminary R&D on space technology but made the Air Force the lead agency for R&D and operations of DOD satellites and their ground support.

INTERVIEWER: Busy little office.

GEN CUSHMAN: McNamara came in wanting to get rid of the Army's technical services. Their, usually three-star, chiefs were the Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, Chief Signal Officer, Chief of Transportation, Quartermaster General, and Surgeon General. Each technical service had its own agencies for personnel, schools, doctrine, materiel development and procurement, and combat developments. Each chief com-

manded all that branch's units. McNamara viewed the technical services as independent baronies in need of authoritative direction and coordination. For example, you had the Signal Corps developing air defense radars for detection and the Ordnance Corps developing air defense radars for target acquisition, using the same technology but dissimilar systems. McNamara knew that change would require legislation and put General Counsel Vance on the job. Of the ninety or so McNamara initiatives this was Project 80. I was made the project officer at the DOD level. The Secretary of the Army set up the Army's own Project 80, under Deputy Comptroller of the Army [Leonard W.] Hoelscher. The Hoelscher Committee took over a suite of offices in the basement of the Pentagon and got to work. Vance asked me how the Army should do it so I cooked up an outline. I said all the functions of the technical services must be broken up. One of their functions was materiel. I told Vance the Army does three things: move, shoot, and communicate. We should reorganize the Army's materiel organization around functions like that. I charted out a concept for a "materiel command" like that of the Air Force. The chart had subordinate commands for developing and fielding materiel with various functions such as vehicles and guns. I don't remember the names of the commands that we suggested. Anyhow McNamara presented that notion to the Army. The Hoelscher Committee came up with U.S. Army Material Command and developed a subordinate structure. One subordinate command was Tank-Automotive. This had been the domain of the Chief of Ordnance. He was eliminated. His other functional responsibilities were assigned elsewhere. Another subordinate command was Communications-Electronics, largely the domain of the Chief Signal Officer, also eliminated. The Hoelscher Committee consolidated the other functions each technical service under other new major Army commands. Their personnel functions went to an Office of Personnel Operations, later MILPERCEN. Their schools and training centers and stateside units were put into CONARC [Continental Army Command]. Their combat development agencies were assembled into a new Army Combat Development Command. This was a traumatic experience for the Ordnance Corps. As it turned out, breaking up the technical services meant that the Army lost something. For example, they lost some officer expertise in their ammunition specialists. Development of that specialty disappeared for a while and was later restored. The Chief Signal Officer was gone, with all his power. The Army was totally changed. It took years of further reorganization. It is still going on. In 2008 the Army established a Logistics branch that will include the former Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Transportation Corps.

INTERVIEWER: Did you compose a paper documenting this?

GEN CUSHMAN: No. Perhaps I wrote a paper but I remember only the butcher paper charts that I prepared. I prepared a briefing and presented it to Vance.

INTERVIEWER: So was it an actual briefing?
GEN CUSHMAN: Yes, I put it on butcher paper. Vance took me into McNamara and I briefed him.

INTERVIEWER: Did General Decker [General Henry Decker] or General Lemnitzer know you were doing this?

GEN CUSHMAN: The people in the Army knew about it. One day I entered the outer office of Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric. Just ahead of me was Under Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes. I heard the Gilpatric's secretary say, "Good day, Mr. Ailes. How are you this morning?" and I heard Ailes answer, "I'd be okay if I could just get that Cushman off my back." Then Ailes turned around and saw me.

INTERVIEWER: How did you get into a position where you could actually walk into Secretary McNamara's office with a butcher pad and brief him on an unstaffed proposal for changing the Army?

GEN CUSHMAN: Vance brought me in. He trusted me. I made sense to him.

INTERVIEWER: You certainly made an impression on McNamara as well. Tell us about that hand written note that Secretary McNamara placed in your personnel file.

GEN CUSHMAN: John Rubel, one of Harold Brown's deputies and a holdover from the former SecDef's regime, took a liking to me. I got to know him rather well. He was assigned a Pentagon staff car. He lived near me in Chevy Chase and occasionally gave me a ride to and from work. He was working on a project called ADVENT. ADVENT was a communications satellite, the first one, being developed by the Signal Corps. We talked about it in the car. He asked Vance if I could write a paper for him to give to Secretary McNamara on the future of satellite telecommunications. Vance agreed. So I went to work for Rubel for a few weeks. We visited General Electric and other contractors building the satellite. I wrote a paper called The Future of Satellite Telecommunications. It was a good paper. It talked about how this technology would be a great benefit to civilization and how it would cover the whole world and revolutionize communication.

INTERVIEWER: So this wasn't necessarily a technical paper it was a practical examination of the application of this technology.

GEN CUSHMAN: The engineering of it was straightforward. This was a conceptual paper about its potential. I described how this technology could be used to benefit our country and our Army, what it might do for places like Africa. He sent it in to McNamara who told John Rubel it was the best paper he had seen since he came to the Pentagon. The paper was unclassified. For years I had a copy but can't find it now. McNamara sat down and wrote a note on scratch paper praising the report and Cy Vance had it put into my efficiency report.

INTERVIEWER: Remarkable.

GEN CUSHMAN: In those days a few people in the Army were pushing helicopter mobility. General Gavin, who had become the Army G3 in 1954 and then chief of Army R&D, had spearheaded it before retiring in 1957. In 1955 the Army and Air Force had run Operation Sagebrush in Louisiana. An experimental troop of heliborne sky cavalry was scheduled to participate. The exercise director, Tactical Air Command commander General Weyland, would not approve it. He argued that this was an Air Force mission. The issue had to be decided by Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles. He said to let the Army experiment. In 1956 BG Hamilton Howze got his aviator wings and was named director of Army Aviation. The Army Aviation Center was in business at Fort Rucker. While in the Coordination Group I had sat in on a briefing of the Rogers Board. It laid out a plan for a future family of Army aircraft, to include the UH-1 and the CH-47 Chinook helicopters and the fixed wing Mohawk and Caribou.

INTERVIEWER: Please describe your impressions of the air mobility testing conducted by the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg in 1961.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: A paper on Army aviation prepared by Colonel Edwin "Spec" Powell in the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering was floated up to Secretary McNamara. The paper suggested that the Army exploit the mobility of the helicopter to improve its agility and responsiveness. McNamara liked the idea and directed the Army to get busy on air mobility. The Army gave the job to XVIII Airborne Corps who then assigned it to the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg. The tests were run by the ADC of the division, Ed Rowny [Lieutenant General Edward L. Rowny], whom I knew rather well from his days as a colonel on the JCS. They put together a task force, a battalion or two, and equipped them with helicopters. We had great flexibility in Vance's office so I would put myself on orders and go down to Fort Bragg to check it out. The early results were promising and interesting and the success of this testing helped lead to the establishment of the Howze Board.

INTERVIEWER: What was the size of these tests?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: The troop units were at battalion and brigade level, supported by a variety of aviation assets, both helicopters and fixed wing.

INTERVIEWER: Did these tests give you a sense of the capabilities and limitations of air mobility?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Yes. I was enthusiastic. I reported my enthusiasm to Cyrus Vance. A year later, when he became Secretary of the Army he selected Ed Rowny to head up ACTIV [Army Concept Team in Vietnam]. Ed took many of the people who had worked on air mobility testing with him to Vietnam.

I should say that not everybody in the Army was enthusiast about air mobility. Rowny ran into this when after ACTIV he was assigned to the DCSOPS and was put in charge of Army aviation. His boss was Harold K. Johnson who later became the Chief of Staff. Johnson didn't believe in air mobility. He would ask, "How many tanks can we buy for the price of a single Huey?" Of course, helicopters were more expensive than tanks. Johnson slowed down Rowny's career. While Johnson was the Chief of Staff Ed went from being the most junior major general in the Army to the most senior one. When Westmoreland came in as Chief of Staff he quickly promoted Rowny to lieutenant general.

INTERVIEWER: How were you supervised in our office? Did you report directly to Vance every day?

GEN CUSHMAN: My daily boss was Solis Horwitz. He wrote my efficiency report. I saw Vance often. He was endorser. Neither Solis nor Vance knew much about the Army but they knew the importance of an efficiency report. Working with Vance and in the E-Ring we were not insiders but we had a good seat on what was going on. We watched the Bay of Pigs disaster unfold and the personnel changes that followed, such as General Lemnitzer being replaced by General Taylor as JCS Chairman. We observed how President Kennedy approached the situations in Laos and Vietnam at the beginning of his administration. He told the State Department to take the lead on Laos and the Defense Department to take the lead on Vietnam.

INTERVIEWER: Did they assign you specific projects? Were you closely supervised?

GEN CUSHMAN: We worked independently. We'd write papers and review the papers among ourselves. I worked on the "Strike Command" concept. McNamara wanted to place all combat forces in the continental United States into one joint command. The Navy and Marine Corps objected so the JCS started with a paper that placed Army and Air Force units under a unified command called Strike Command. The JCS sent McNamara five position papers on this organization, one each from the Chairman, the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines. McNamara thought it was ridiculous to be presented with five studies for a decision He wanted a single, joint study prepared that gave the alternatives and recommend a decision. So he directed the Joint Staff to prepare a single study for him to look at and that's what they did. One day I ran into Carol Helena who had been in the study team we had organized at Leavenworth in 1955 to write three articles for the Military Review. He was now in the Pentagon. He said, "Jack, did you see that McNamara bought our idea?" We had recommended such a unified command.

INTERVIEWER: What was your role in this project?

GEN CUSHMAN: My role was to help McNamara. He started to deal directly with the Joint Staff. He would deal directly with General Wheeler who had become Director of the Joint Staff.

INTERVIEWER: What was your role in preparing the Joint Staff paper on Strike Command?

GEN CUSHMAN: McNamara had us review the paper.

INTERVIEWER: So you were grading homework for the Joint Staff?

GEN CUSHMAN: We were helping McNamara do his job, which he took was to overhaul the Pentagon. The one that he had found was dysfunctional. He found that in Europe the Air Force was preparing for a short war and the Army was preparing for a long war. Each was buying material and laying out forces based on separate war plans. He moved right away to straighten that out. He brought in systems analysis. Charlie Hitch set up a systems analysis office under Alain Enthoven and they found so many problems that it was like shooting fish in a rain barrel. They came up with McNamara's planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS). It placed the Services' various forces into categories such as general purpose and strategic, for analysis and budgeting. McNamara was unhappy with split papers coming up from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the Chiefs' inability to present a crisp solution to a problem because they had to work out a compromise. In the paper that I had given to Vance when he hired me I had suggested that the Chairman and Secretary of Defense rely more on the Director of the Joint Staff. I thought that they could operate along those lines without change in the law. McNamara began to operate that way. The Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986 finally put the Joint Staff directly under the Chairman.

INTERVIEWER: The role played by your group did not escape notice from the other Services.

GEN CUSHMAN: We got publicity right away. Beginning with the space directive reporters came around to see this office that was so powerful. The Washington Post and the Washington Star reported that there was this little team of people working for Cyrus Vance giving McNamara advice on how to straighten out the Pentagon.

INTERVIEWER: Were you quoted or mentioned by name in these articles?
GEN CUSHMAN: No but word got around. When I went to call on my old boss Ham Twitchell and my buddies in the Coordination Group, Twitchell said, "Jack, you're getting a lot of visibility here. They came to see me and asked me to get in touch with you. They want me to straighten you out."

INTERVIEWER: Who is "they"?

GEN CUSHMAN: People on the Army staff.

INTERVIEWER: Informally?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes, in conversation. They asked Twitchell to rein me in. Twitchell told them, "I can't rein in Cushman, he's his own man." I knew I had visibility.

INTERVIEWER: You were certainly punching above your weight.

GEN CUSHMAN: In April 1961 I was with McNamara in a conference room when he was receiving a briefing on the Bay of Pigs invasion. I said something during the briefing that really ticked off some admiral. He looked over and demanded, "What the hell are you talking about? Why are you here?" I was perceived as being a hatchet man for McNamara. It caused some resentment. I had some very good protective cover. I could not be reached. They would have to reach me later.

INTERVIEWER: What was your opinion of McNamara?

GEN CUSHMAN: He was brilliant, articulate and persuasive. But some said that he knew the price of everything and the value of nothing. He sure knew how to count costs. He didn't understand the intangibles. They are hard to measure in a systems analysis..

INTERVIEWER: Was he doing the right things in your opinion?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes, I thought so. He was hard driving. The budget system he had developed was great. It was a rational way to determine how much we needed and its cost. Other reforms were good. His systems analysis people told him that troops were wasting time in transit on troop ships. He decided to scrap the troop ships and go for airlift. That was the start of the buildup in the Air Force's airlift fleet. He was on the right track most times.

INTERVIEWER: It seems that this was similar to your time at Fort Leavenworth. You felt the institution was not operating on a rational basis and believed you had a role to play.

GEN CUSHMAN: That's right. I was a creative thinker and this was an opportunity. It was a way to get my ideas adopted. What we were doing made sense to me. McNamara came up with the concept of the Defense Logistics Agency [DLA]. That lane was "Doc" Cooke's. McNamara was looking for material commonality and efficiency. They finally put all the Services in black shoes, but they never could get the Marines to go along with a common belt buckle.

INTERVIEWER: You left Fort Leavenworth with mixed feelings. You were proud of the work you did but you regretted the way that some of that work was done. Is that a fair characterization? Did you feel the same way working in OSD?

GEN CUSHMAN: I thought that in a way I might have redeemed myself a little bit because while working in Cy Vance's office I was regarded not as a conniving insider but as a man who used his ideas to change things.

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever met socially with people in OSD?

GEN CUSHMAN: Well I went to Rubel's house. Alain Enthoven and his wife had Nancy and me to dinner. We went to parties at the Vance's house.

INTERVIEWER: Did you feel comfortable in that?

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: Your wife also?

GEN CUSHMAN: Oh yes. She knew and liked the Vance family. They came to our daughter's christening party. Our kids were the same age and knew each other. They had a lovely family.

Chapter Twelve

With Cyrus Vance as Secretary of the Army

INTERVIEWER: Cyrus Vance took you with him when he was made Secretary of the Army.

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. Elvis Stahr [Elvis Jacob Stahr Jr.] was made the Secretary of the Army when McNamara came in. He didn't satisfy McNamara. In June 1962 he told Stahr that he would be relieved. Vance was nominated to be Secretary of the Army. Vance wanted me to go with him. I went over to see Sid Berry, USMA 1948, the highly regarded lieutenant colonel assistant to McNamara's outer office executive. I had come to know him and valued his opinion. I said, "Sid, I'm going down with Mr. Vance and his team. I will have to defer the Air War College again. What do you think?" He said something like this, "Jack, I don't know if that's a good move. Maybe you ought to get out of this scene where you have so much visibility. I'm not sure you want to go down there where it's just more of the same." He said in effect that I could get a reputation as a self-seeking career type who wants to get good jobs with important people. I said, "No, I'm going down there because I think I can help." I had made myself valuable to Vance. He thought the world of me. He was going to have a full colonel in there and he wanted me as his lieutenant colonel. Vance asked me to recommend a colonel executive assistant. In the Coordination Group I had known a good man, a planner named Jim Baldwin. Jim would graduate from the National War College that June. He was about to go to Germany. I suggested to Vance that he grab Baldwin to be his military assistant and he did. The colonel executive in Stahr's office was Harry Kinnard [Lieutenant General Harold William Osborne Kinnard II], famous airborne type. To arrange the transition I went down to see him. Kinnard gave me a cool reception. Clearly he was not happy to see me coming into the Secretary's office. It was evident that I gotten myself a reputation as unpredictable, a dangerous man to have around.

INTERVIEWER: Then what happened?

GEN CUSHMAN: Cyrus Vance assumed office in early July 1962. It was just Jim Baldwin and me in the outer office along with some very good secretaries, old hands at the business. They did a great job breaking us in. A senior DA civilian, Mr. Doolan, was the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. He ran a large office that handled all the paperwork. He had seen a number of Secretaries of the Army come and go. He was invaluable to us. Jim Baldwin operated smoothly with a deft hand. He was a member of the Secretary of the Army's mess on the D-Ring. Jim went there every day for lunch where he mingled with the three-stars and others on the Army Staff.

INTERVIEWER: What was the Secretary's mess?

GEN CUSHMAN: It was for general officers and the Secretary's key subordinates. I never went down there. I had lunch in my office or standing up at one of the A-Ring cafes. I didn't want to be around where people would be wondering what I was thinking about or listening to what I was saying. I knew that people knew very well that I was giving Vance advice. General Decker [General George Henry Decker] was the Chief of Staff when Vance was made Secretary of the Army. Decker had become Vice Chief of Staff in 1959 when I was in the Coordination Group. In October 1960 General Lemnitzer was made Chairman of the JCS and General Decker became Chief of Staff. General Wheeler [General Earle Gilmore Wheeler] replaced him in October 1962. General Decker was a steady workmanlike officer but was out of place with the dashing Kennedy people. Time magazine referred to him as a "basket of fog." In 1961, after I went to Vance's office, I had gone down to visit my parents on Sullivan's Island near Charleston, SC. They asked me who was the Army Chief of Staff. George Decker, I answered. My mother exclaimed, "George Decker?'" She simply could not believe it. He had been an apparently unremarkable lieutenant in the 29th Infantry at Fort Benning in 1933-34 where my father was then a captain. In time I came to Decker's attention as evidently a real problem for him. He may have thought that Vance was listening to my advice rather than to his. George Forsythe was Decker's executive officer. One day he told me that Decker wanted to see me. He went with me into Decker's office. I stood at attention while Decker chewed me out. He said, "Colonel, you are in my way. You have been giving advice to the Secretary that I do not agree with and I want you to stop it. I want you to stop interfering with my work." I just stood there and took it.

INTERVIEWER: What was going through your head as the Chief of Staff was dressing you down?

GEN CUSHMAN: I wished it wasn't happening. But there wasn't anything I could do about it; I had to do what I thought was right.

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever think about your career at all? Did you ever think this was damaging your career?

GEN CUSHMAN: I was aware of that possibility, sure. But I was reckless. I was concerned about my career but I was not going to change my opinion about matters. In time I did think it was time for me to get out of there. It was the same when General Wheeler became Chief of Staff. I was a serious problem to him. Vance's office had a private connecting door to the Chief of Staff's office next door. The Chief would often enter unannounced. Vance had a very bad back. There was a small side room in Vance's office suite where he could go and lie down and ease his pain on a cot at the level of a high table. One time he was lying on that cot and I was in the room with him reviewing some matter and in walks General Wheeler. He sees us in there confiding together. He gave me a disgusted look and walked out, telling Vance that he would be back. Years later Fritz Kraemer told me that he had attended a meeting in the Pentagon along with Wheeler when Wheeler was the Chairman of the JCS. Kraemer overheard

Wheeler say, "I'm going to run that Cushman out of the Army if it's the last thing I do." After I had done my first tour in Vietnam and graduated from the National War College I ran into Wheeler at the Mall Entrance of the Pentagon. He looked at me sharply and asked, "What are YOU doing here?" Vance asked my advice often. The Chief of Staff sent him, for his approval, the criteria for the next brigadier general selection board. Year Group 1938 was the cutoff. I suggested that the board could also look at especially qualified officers from year group 1939. I said, "There are many very good young officers out there in year group 1939. You should consider them. They fought in World War Two and they've had great experience." He said, "Can I do that?" I said, "You can if you want to. You can tell the Chief to consider tear group 1939 as well." Well, he did. That created a furor out in the Army because some very good men in year group 1938 didn't make general because men from year group 1939 jumped ahead of them. I think that some people suspected that I was behind it.

INTERVIEWER: Why did you suggest Vance consider year group 1939?

GEN CUSHMAN: I did that for the good of the Army. I believed it would get the best men promoted.

INTERVIEWER: Just because Cushman thinks it's for the good of the Army doesn't necessarily make it so. Yes?

GEN CUSHMAN: That probably wasn't the smart thing for Vance to do. He trusted my judgment a lot.

INTERVIEWER: Did you take advantage of that?

GEN CUSHMAN: If I had been more cautious I would not have done that. It upset some people but it also got some very good people promoted. That's just the way the ball bounces. I did some good for the Army's air mobility. It was an important time for Army aviation. In 1961 President Kennedy had ordered a number of Army aviation helicopter companies to Vietnam to provide mobility for the Vietnamese Army. Not long after taking office Vance decided to set up a team in Vietnam to evaluate and assist the employment of Army aviation. While General Counsel he had come to know Ed Rowny and he had followed his activities testing air mobility in the 82d. He selected Ed, a brigadier general just nominated for major general and slated to command the 1st Cavalry Division in Korea, to head that team. Ed named it ACTIV [Army Concept Team in Vietnam]. Ed took with him some of the people who had worked on air mobility testing. When he got stablished in Saigon he maintained, in the Pentagon, a liaison officer, a lieutenant colonel named Frank Clay; Frank had just returned from Vietnam advisory duty in the field. I kept in touch with him. The Howze Board's final report reached the Chief of Staff in August 1962.

That month I wrote an eight-page position paper for Vance's signature to Secretary McNamara on Aviation Responsibilities of the Three Military Departments. It began, "In order to provide a contribution to the judgments on military departmental responsibilities in the field of aviation which will of necessity be made in the next few weeks, I should like to set forth the basic views of the Department of the Army in this field." In developing this paper I was able to cite McNamara's April 1962 memorandum to the Army that led to the creation of the Howze Board.

INTERVIEWER: What was the significance of your paper?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: The Army was in a roles and missions fight with the Air Force. The Air Force was trying to exploit Vietnam too, and they were not very happy about the Army getting into air mobility. The Air Force was opposed to the Army having these helicopters. I was determined to write a paper that would define the roles and mission of Army aviation. I wrote that the services operated in three environments: land, maritime, aerospace. I said the maritime environment, sea to the shoreline, belonged to the Navy and the Marine Corps, the aerospace environment belonged to the Air Force and the land environment belonged to the Army. I included the airspace above, to a certain elevation, as a part of the land environment. I believed that if an aviation system had characteristics such that the aircraft could take off and return to airfields in the field Army area, and if the aircraft was designed to be capable of missions entirely within the combat zone, such an aviation system, by definition, operates in the land environment. Therefore, the Department of the Army should develop aircraft to operate in this environment. In the theatre of operations forces must work together under a single commander. However, this separation of environments should dictate how we organize, train and equip.

INTERVIEWER: Can you illustrate further this separation between the aerospace and air-land environments?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: Well, take the Caribou [CV-2 Caribou Medium Tactical Transport] for example. This was a light transport aircraft developed by the Canadians for bush pilots. It operated in the land environment. The plane flew low and slow and didn't require a long runway. The Air Force transports were large, heavy aircraft that required a long runway and operated differently, pretty much by themselves. Aircraft operating forward and at low altitude over the land environment required very close coordination. Air Force fighter aircraft and fighter bombers had to operate and coordinate too but they flew at high altitude and returned to fixed bases in the rear area where their missions were planned by people on the ground.

The paper said that responsibility for development of aviation systems which operate in the environment of the ground soldier should be assigned to the Department of the Army. It spelled out that environment in general. Vietnam was becoming important. Army aviation units were beginning to flow into that war. The Air Force was beginning

to muscle in with low-flying slow-flying aircraft organized into Jungle Jim squadrons. The paper discussed counterinsurgency aviation at length, saying that it was largely in the ground soldier's environment.

Cyrus Vance was already a believer. He read it, signed it, sent it to McNamara, and sent a copy to the Chief of Staff. The paper was well received within the Army Staff.[1]

INTERVIEWER: Vance clearly trusted your judgment.

GEN CUSHMAN: Yes. I was useful to him. In September 1962 the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the state of Mississippi to accept James Meredith into the University of Mississippi. There was great resistance. It caused riots down in Oxford, Mississippi. Governor Ross Barnett refused to call out his National Guard. Federal marshals were going to escort Meredith onto the campus and into the administration building. President Kennedy told the Army to back up the Justice Department. The 2d Infantry Division at Fort Benning moved to Memphis Naval Air Station to be ready to reinforce the US marshals. Bobby Kennedy, Attorney General, sent his deputy Nick Katzenbach [Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach] down there to see that Meredith was admitted. The plan was to register him on a Monday. Katzenbach came up with the idea of registering Meredith quietly on Sunday. Sure enough they brought in James Meredith on Sunday to register him. Word got around swiftly. The surprised and outraged protestors began gathering on campus. Katzenbach called for the 2d Division to send a battalion right away. The battalion at Memphis Naval Air Station that had been planned for this mission was not ready on alert. The division had been told that this was not going to happen on Sunday. They were on stand down. I learned what I thought was an important lesson from that; think for yourself when you are in command. The division scrambled to get other troops down there. Protestors knew the battalion was on the way and threw rocks at the convoy from highway overpasses. Things were getting dangerous. Night was coming on. I had been in the office with Vance that Sunday morning helping him as he kept an eye on the situation. Vance's back was painful. He was lying flat on the floor. We were watching the TV. Suddenly there is James Meredith being registered at Ole Miss. Vance said, "That's not supposed to happen until Monday." Into Vance's office comes the DCSOPS, General Porter. Vance asks him, "Did you know about this?" Porter answers, "No, this is news to me." Well, it was news to the 2d Division too. We went right down to the Secretary's conference room on the second floor that we had converted into a makeshift command center. I was seated outside. I heard Vance on the phone with the President. The President was asking, "Where in the hell is the Army? They're supposed to be there." Vance told him he didn't know and was trying to find out. People were trying to contact the National Guard unit in Oxford – they had an armored cavalry troop there - and tell them to move out. But somehow neither tactical nor commercial communications were working. The President told Vance to hurry because the marshals were in trouble and calling for help. I went to a telephone nearby, dialed

[1] It can be found at "Library," at http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/.

the Pentagon operator, and asked to be connected to Oxford, Mississippi. I asked Oxford to connect me to the National Guard Armory. The cook answered the phone. I asked to speak to the troop commander. The cook told me "Captain Faulkner (that was his name, really) left with the troop for the University where there was some trouble. I asked, "How far is the University?" He said, "About ten minutes." I asked, "How long ago did they leave?" He said, "A few minutes ago. Who are you?" I said, "This is Lieutenant Colonel Cushman calling from the Pentagon." He said, "You sound like a newspaper man to me. I'm going to hang up." I said, "Don't hang up." But he hung up the phone anyway. I went over to Vance who was still on the phone with the President and I said, "Sir, I just talked to the armory. They will have troops there in five minutes." Vance says to the President, "Sir they'll be there in five minutes." And they were. That was the Army command and control system that we had in those days.

Two or three months later Major General Ted Clifton, who had been the Army PAO then had become President Kennedy's military aide, came over to see Vance. Clifton told Vance that Bobby Kennedy was very unhappy with the responsiveness of the Army in that whole event. Bobby believed we didn't get there fast enough and was going to tell that to the newspapers. He was trying to take the heat off the President. Vance told Clifton, "You tell the Attorney General that, if he does, I'm going to come out with what really happened. I'll tell the press that the Justice Department didn't tell us that they were going to go on Sunday instead of Monday. They surprised us and we should have been told." That's the kind of man Vance was. He had guts. Bobby Kennedy stayed quiet.

INTERVIEWER: What was your and Vance's connection with the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis?

GEN CUSHMAN: Cuba had been a concern ever since the revolution that culminated in Castro's 1959 overthrow of the Batista regime, especially so since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion. I was only on the fringe of the various actions being taken to counter Castro after that.

Just by reading the newspapers Jim Baldwin and I were aware in early October of the possibility that something serious was happening regarding Soviet missiles in Cuba. We later learned that Secretary Vance had been one of the few officials who were informed when U-2 reconnaissance produced photographs that showed Soviet missiles in Cuba. He was not a member of the President's EX-COMM crisis management team although he was kept informed to some degree. I'm sure he knew of measures taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy forces and to increase troop readiness.

Along with the rest of the American public Jim and I learned of the full dimensions of the crisis when President Kennedy addressed the nation in a televised speech, announcing the presence of offensive missile sites in Cuba. That was the day that US military forces went to DEFCON 3. Then the Army and other forces swung into action

and began serious deployments into the southeastern United States to prepare for an invasion of Cuba, Secretary Vance was very much involved with General Wheeler and the Army staff. I was simply an observer of all this.

The crisis eased when Soviet Premier Khrushchev announced over Radio Moscow that he had agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba. It had been a very interesting month.

INTERVIEWER: I'd like to discuss your role in creating the Army Aviation Indoctrination Course.

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I had long wanted to become an Army aviator. Back in November 1962 I had worked with Bob Schulz of the Army Aviation directorate. I had known him as G3 of the 4th Infantry Division. He had been one of the promising Army colonels whom General Howze had selected to become an Army aviator. At my urging he originated a staff paper that said that the Army is short of field grade officers knowledgeable in Army aviation and that a special six-week course at the Army Aviation School with some flying time should be tried out. Bob got his paper approved by the Army Staff. Then I volunteered to take a one-man pilot course and to write a report on it for the director of Army Aviation. In February and March of 1963 I took the course. I took ground school. I got 80 hours flying time. I soloed in the OH-13 helicopter and the O-1 Birddog. I flew as a student pilot in every aircraft of the Army except the Flying Crane. Then I wrote a full report, recommending that the program be continued. Mine ended up being the first, last, and only such course of instruction. That was Step One on my becoming an Army aviator.

INTERVIEWER: Did you ever feel out of control or over your head when advising McNamara or Vance?

GEN CUSHMAN: I regretted some advice given to General McGarr at Fort Leavenworth because he was a very blunt instrument. I was sometimes sorry that I had advised him to do a certain thing, because the way in which he followed my advice was not fortuitous. I didn't feel that was the case with McNamara or Vance. Vance became a great believer in air mobility. That was one thing I influenced him on. But other people were doing the same. I don't think I ever gave advice to a senior person in the Pentagon that I regretted later. I don't think McNamara or Vance made any mistakes based on my advice. Sometimes they didn't follow my advice when I believed they should have. I may have gone too far when I suggested to Vance that he expand the list of colonels eligible for promotion to general. That might have been a mistake because it upset the system.

INTERVIEWER: It seems to me that in our Army today and I think in the Army of tomorrow, many officers are going to find themselves in an interagency environment where they are paired with a senior civilian civil servant or senior civilian political appointee. They're going to be asked their opinion on issues that can impact directly on the Army

or perhaps run counter to the intent of senior commanders. What advice would you offer those officers?

GEN CUSHMAN: I would say that it can be dangerous. Give your honest opinion but be sure that you have thought it through. Higher authorities may have things to consider that differ from what you are considering. Don't take counsel of your fear that you might offend somebody, but be careful. Be sure you're right and are acting on principle. Remember that you're not responsible and that you might figure things differently if you were. Be careful with your advice but don't be afraid to do your job. You are fortunate if you have a boss who can modulate your bad judgment. Vance had wisdom. He was unfamiliar with the Army but he learned about it and learned to love it. Cyrus Vance was Secretary of State when Jimmy Carter decided to launch the mission to rescue the hostages in Tehran in April of 1980. He told Carter not to do it and that if he went ahead with it that he would resign as Secretary of State no matter how it turned out. Carter went ahead with the mission and Vance resigned. I think that Vance was wise then because he had been the Secretary of the Army and he knew that these great plans sometimes aren't surely going to work.

At the end of that Pentagon tour I had a reputation as a really smart guy who was unpredictable and maybe reckless. I think a piece of that reputation may have followed me for my whole career. After six months with Vance in the Secretary's office I found that Sid Berry I had been right. I wanted to get out of there. I was coming up on five years in the Pentagon. I had worked out daily in the Pentagon Athletic Center and passed the airborne physical tests. I drew a movie projector from the Army and I watched films on jump training. At age 41 in late November 1962. I went to Airborne School. When I came back I volunteered for Vietnam. I wanted to do a short tour. They said okay but you're off the War College list. I told them it was okay by me.

INTERVIEWER: Why did you want to skip the War College?

GEN CUSHMAN: I figured I could get to the War College again. I wanted to do it later.

INTERVIEWER: What made you think you could go later?

GEN CUSHMAN: I had a good record. I would remain eligible. There would be other chances later on. It was a little reckless but I wanted to go to Vietnam. This was not the time to be cautious. I had not been in combat. I had always regretted my lack of combat experience. There was combat in Vietnam and I had a chance to go over there. Ed Rowny was there in charge of an Army experimental outfit in Saigon that was introducing air mobility. I was in touch with Ed. I arranged to be assigned to his team. It was called the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV). I thought that after that I could get an advisory slot, and indeed that's the way it worked out.

INTERVIEWER: What about your family?

GEN CUSHMAN: Our family was then living quite happily and doing well. We were completing our fifth year in Washington. We had lived three years on Fessenden Street at 44th, NW. In 1961 we moved to Maple Avenue in Chevy Chase, MD. That summer of 1963 Connie, our oldest, would be entering her senior year at Stone Ridge Academy out Wisconsin Avenue. Cecelia would be a year behind her and Kathleen a freshman. Mary, Jack, and Ted would be in local grade schools. Nancy was pregnant. Her baby was due in January 1963. So here I am. I've got a family. I've got a pregnant wife who is going to have a baby in January. And I'm going off to Vietnam and leaving her with seven kids to care for. Of course I believed that the older girls would, as they always had, be a big help to Nancy taking care of the younger. Looking at myself several decades later I am wondering, what was I thinking? Suppose I had been killed. Where would that have left them? I admit that possibility did not enter my mind. You could say that I was in denial. If so, I was not conscious of it. If that's the case I have had a lifetime character flaw. I was however the world's most fortunate man in my wife, whom I have loved more each year. Nancy bore this burden and more without a word of complaint and came through it the same Nancy. She hadn't come from that pattern of life. With her father, family came first. For me, and at this stage of the game, family evidently came second.

Chapter Thirteen

With the Army Concept Team in Vietnam

INTERVIEWER: So you arrived in Vietnam in April of 1963 and you were assigned to ACTIV as the head of the Air Mobility Division. What mission were you given?

GENERAL CUSHMAN: I was told to evaluate the Caribou. The Caribou is a twin engine transport plane built by de Havilland Canada. It was a follow-on to the de Havilland Canada Otter [U-1A Otter], a single engine bush transport. The Army wanted to test the Caribou in Vietnam. In 1962 they deployed the 1st Aviation Company with about 20 aircraft to Vung Tao, near Saigon. General Rowny wanted my team to evaluate the Caribou's performance. The Air Force was operating a competitive twin engine transport called the C-123. It was the well established baby brother of the four-engine C-130 and carried a bigger load than the Caribou. But the C-123 was a heavier airplane and it needed a longer runway with a better surface.

I was to write a report that evaluated the Caribou relative to the C-123 and the C-130. I had a section of three or four people including a liaison officer pilot from the Caribou company, Captain Gene Dewey. I started to fly by Caribou from Bien Hoa to locations throughout South Vietnam. After seeing the aircraft in action I decided that we would write our evaluation to include not simply a systems analysis reporting on its comparative characteristics and cost effectiveness. We would also write a series of narratives that reflected the responsiveness and the suitability of the plane for a Vietnam-like environment. We collected vignettes about the Caribou. We would write each one up in a short paper and give them catchy titles like "Chop Suey for Al Loui." That was a story about a Caribou flying in ingredients for chop suey to a Special Forces camp with a short grass runway.

We produced thirty such vignettes and each was a pleasure. I'd gather my gang together and we would swap stories. I'd say, "Write that up," and I would edit. Gene Dewey, who fifteen years later joined the State Department where he eventually became an assistant secretary of state, did most of the writing. Meanwhile I was pushing hard to be assigned as a senior advisor with an ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam] division.

One day I was in my office and Dick Stilwell [General Richard G. Stilwell], the J3 at MACV [Military Assistance Command Vietnam], called me on the phone. I had known him from my time in the Coordination Group and I had met him a few times when I was flying around the theater. He said, "Jack, I'm assigning you as senior advisor to the 21st Infantry Division and I want you there in early July." I wrapped up my report on the Caribou.

When I left ACTIV we had a party at a restaurant on the Saigon River. The team presented me with a book titled, "Write That Up." It was the story of all those Caribou missions. I loved that book; years later I donated it to the Army Aviation Museum at Fort Rucker. The Army eventually lost the Caribou to the Air Force as part of an agreement in which they said that the Army could have all the helicopters it wanted.

In early 2001 I came across the book Once Upon a Distant War, by William Prochnau. He told of the early years of the war in Vietnam, some of which coincided with my first months in-country, and how they were reported. I decided to write a paper that merged sections of that book with what I was writing in letters to my wife Nancy. The remainder of this chapter tells the story of my life in April through early July 1963. In large part it is reflected in extracts from my letters to my wife at the time. In March 2001 I wrote...

Letters from Vietnam, 1963

William Prochnau's Once Upon a Distant War[1] tells how, when in late 1961 the buildup of American advisors and troops in South Vietnam began as ordered by President John
F. Kennedy, a contingent of American correspondents soon joined the scene. The troops were largely Army helicopter and special forces units and Air Force counterinsurgency air. Although the presence of these units and their activities were well known, US authorities in Vietnam. following orders from Washington, were unwilling to admit to
these early newsmen that US troops and US advisors were engaging in combat. Thus "began an escalating friction between the correspondents and the American officials in
Saigon" that "was made for [eventual] dlsaster."[2]

Among those correspondents was a controversial trio of young future winners of the Pulitzer prize -- Malcolm Browne, 31, Associated Press; followed by Neil Sheehan, 25, United Press; then David Halberstam, 28, The New York Times.[3] In time all who were on
the scene would agree that, yes, this was a war.[4] But in 1962-64 newsmen in Vietnam, especially these three, reported the progress of that war in language that was quite

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[1] William Prochnau, Once Upon a Distant War; Young War Correspondents and tbeir Early Vietnam Battles, [New York, Random House, 1995].

[2] Prochnau, p. 20. Prochau quotes William Trueheart, then deputy US ambassador to South Vietnam: "This ... was at the root of the really bad problems we [then and later] had with the press, this no-comment kind-of position on things that were self-evident to anyone on the ground." Trueheart told Prochnau that the policy was one of "foolishness, not duplicity."

[3] Horst Fass and Peter Arnett of the Associated Press, and Charles Mohr of Time rnaqazlne, rounded out the six key news figures in Prochnau's book. At the center were Browne, Sheehan, and Halberstam.

[4] 0n a stopover at the Saigon airport in February 1962, the President's brother Robert argued that what was happening in Vietnam was not a war but a struggle, "a struggle short of war," Prochnau, ibid, p.41.

different from what the American people were being told by US military and civilian officials both in Vietnam and in Washington.

Prochnau's book has led me to go through the letters that I, in Vietnam from April 1963 to April 1964, wrote home. Using those letters, Prochnau's book, Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie,[5] and other writings including my own, my aim here is to relate my experience to the full picture of that time, which is well-known now but was not then, at least to me, and especially to the basic issue, how we were really doing in that war.

Then a lieutenant colonel, I went to Vietnam from duty as a military assistant to the Secretary of the Army, Cyrus Vance, whom I had served since January 1961 when he became General Counsel of the Department of Defense and since mid-1962 when he became Secretary of the Army. On April 14th, I had left my wife Nancy and our seven children, ages 15 years to three months, in Chevy Chase, Maryland. From my letters home...

April 15, 1963 (Honolulu). "Arrived here at 11:00 Hawaii time, too late to call relatives, and will take off in an hour ..."

April 17, 1963 (en route to Clark Field, Philippines). "We crossed the International Date Line about three hours ago, so yesterday was only two hours long... This C-135 [which left from Travis AFB, CA] is the 'Embassy run' -- it goes on to Bangkok, Calcutta, New Delhi, Karachi, and Dharhan, then turns around and comes back. My seatmate is an Army doctor headed for Thailand ..."

April 18, 1963 (Clark Field). "We layover in the Philippines a full day as our jet, with an
engine running rough in the final hour, will not finish the trip. Another jet is coming in.
We will have lunch at the club overlooking the pool, then on to Saigon."

April 19, 1963 (Saigon). "...completed my first day in Vietnam... My first project in ACTIV will be with the Caribou evaluation."

Note: ACTIV was the Army Concept Team in Vietnam; its mission was to energize, and to learn lessons from, the employment of Army aviation in Vietnam. Cyrus Vance had initiated the ACTIV idea in the fall of 1962. [6] Vance chose for ACTIV's

[5] Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, [New York, Random House, 1988].

[6] In mid-1962 the US Army had deployed to Vietnam its first armed helicopter unit, the Utility Tactical Transport (UTT) Helicopter Company. Carrying .30 caliber machine guns and 2.75-inch rockets and ccausing a controversy with the Air Force, the UTT company had begun to escort the slower Army H-21and Marine H-34 troop carriers as these took ARVN troops into landing zones to engage the Viet Cong. General Rowny's ACTIV had begun to evaluate the armed helicopters' combat employment and was verifying their value.TIV had begun to evaluate

commander Edwin L. Rowny, who had just been selected for major general from his duty as Assistant Division Commander, 82d Airborne Division.

In the 82d, Ed Rowny had been running the first tests of Army air mobility; these had begun in late 1961 at the insistence of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. In the Pentagon, before Ed Rowny left his job as a special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to become a brigadier general in the 82d, Cy Vance had come to know him well. I admired him tremendously myself. Upon volunteering for Vietnam duty in late 1962, I had written General Rowny asking to be assigned to ACTIV and he had agreed.

The Caribou was a twin-engined transport, a competitor to the Air Force C-123. It had been built by deHaviland for use in Canada and then adopted by the Army. In those days the Army was fighting with the Air Force to gain a foothold for its own aviation, both helicopter and forward-based fixed wing. One Caribou company of some twenty aircraft had by this time been deployed to Vietnam.

<u>April 21, 1963 (Saigon)</u>. "Yesterday started by my boarding a Caribou for the 'milk run' down in the delta region south of here. A better tour could not have been found for orientation. We went into a half dozen or more little strips to bring the local MAAG people things, passengers, and mail -- and to pick up the same. The route was Can Tho, Soc Trang, Bac Lieu, Ca Mau, Vi Thanh, Rach Gia, Long Xuyen, and Saigon -- then to Vung Tau where I spent last night, the home of the Caribou company... Met some interesting people along the way and today -- New York Times and AP correspondents on the plane, a fine civilian rural affairs advisor, several really first rate lieutenants, captains, and majors... I know a lot more about this land today than I did three days ago when I got here. A couple more trips like this and I will be fairly well oriented ... This is a lovely country, yet tragically in a state of civil war, with an ever present enemy all around. How the war is going I cannot say, and I ask everyone for his judgment. Nobody knows, although some are optimistic, saying 'we are gaining.' The people know, but we can't read their minds."

Note: David Halberstam was the <u>NY Times</u> man. Perhaps the key newsman figure in Prochnau's book, he had been in Vietnam since September 1962 and was on his way to legendary status. In an October visit to the 7th ARVN Division[7] at My Tho south of Saigon he had met Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann, division advisor, who had

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the armed helicopters' combat employment and was verifying their value. Commanding the UTT company was thecolorful and outspoken Major Ivan Siavich, to whom the reporters took an immediate liking. Siavich encouraged them to accompany hishelicopters on operations and became a source for their stories.

[7]From that day, Halberstam's story line was formed. <u>Times</u> headlines: October 9, 1962: "Vietnam War a Frustrating Hunt for an Elusive Foe; October 11: "Viet Cong Maintaining Strength Despite Set-Backs." Prochnau, pp 164-65, writes ... "In his first Sunday 'blockbuster' from his new posting [October 21], Halberstam abbreviated the lesson from his new mentor... 'It should be reported that there is considerably less optimism outin the field than in Washington or in Saigon and that the closer one gets to the actual cntact level of this war, the farther one gets from official optimism.'" John Vann ended his Vietnam tour April 4, 1963.

sent him on an operation, then talked with him through the night, and then became his most important source in the countryside. At Ca Mau our Caribou blew a tire. As we waited in the advisors' mess hall for a new one, I listened to him and the advisors for a couple of hours. Halberstam called Ca Mau "the southernmost province of North Vietnam" -- an unforgettable phrase. I had encountered Halberstam that day at Saigon's Ton San Nhut airport, where he was standing at the Caribou dispatch shed reading a clipping he had just received in the mail of an April 14 story by him in the New York Times.[8]

<u>April 22. 1963 (Saigon)</u>. "I spent today at ACTIV headquarters, except for a call on General York. We had a nice chat and he took me by his villa... He has two girls here, one 15 and one 12. They were on their way for a holiday in Baguio in the Philippines. They are in the local American school."

Note: Brigadier General Robert H. York, US Army, [9] was in charge of Project Agile, which was an effort by the Defense Department's Advance Research Projects Agency to contribute advanced technology to the US effort in Vietnam. Bob York remembered me from 1938 when my father, then an Army major, was stationed at Fort Wadsworth on Staten Island, New York, and 2d Lieutenants Bob York and Ben Sternberg, USMA 1938, reported to the 18th Infantry located there. Two very likeable young officers, both boxers, both well thought of, both lifelong friends of my parents, they both distinguished themselves as battalion commanders in the 1st Infantry Division during the war, and Bob York had also commanded a regiment in the 83d Infantry Division. I turned 17 that fall and two years later enlisted in the Army to try for West Point. (I was later Sternberg's chief of staff when he commanded the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, 1966-67.)

<u>April 23. 1963 (Saigon)</u>. 'Today I visited General Harklns'[10] headquarters and sat in on a daily staff briefing -- good rundown on what went on yesterday. I sure would like to know if we are winning this fight to make Vietnam a secure and peaceful country. Everybody says we are but I don't know how they measure progress yet."

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[8] On page 5, with the headline "...So There I Was, Based in Bac Lieu," it was a delightful, full-column, humaninterest story about the life of an American advisory team with the 21st ARVN (Army of Vietnam) Infantry Division in the district town of Bac Lieu deep in the Vietnam Delta. Portraying a team of high morale and good humor, the story was charming in its own right. Beyond that, it showed Halberstam's keen eye and ear for people. That brought him into their confidence and gave him exceptional insight and access into what was really happening in these advisors' experience. This was a key ingredient of Halberstam's skill as a reporter.

[9] United Press correspondent Neil Sheehan admired Bob York's courage and honesty. In early January 1963,after driving at night down Highway 4 to the 7th Dvision command post, Sheehan had been the first reporter at the 7th Division's "miserable damn performance" in battle at a hamlet called Ap Bac. (John Vann's angryremark above in newsmen's presence reached print, thus enraging both Saigon and Washington officialdom.)The next day Sheehan came under ARVN artillery fire while accompanying York who was reviewing the battleaction along a paddy dike. "We burrowed into the ooze in terror ... In a feat of self-control York proppedhimself up on his elbows and kept the front of his fatigue shirt clean. 'I didn't want to get my cigarettes wet, son.' he said when I noticed his unsoiled shirt." Sheehan, op cit, pp. 272-274.

[10] General Paul D. Harkins, Commander, US Military Assistance Command Vietnam, since February 1962.

April 24. 1963 (Saigon). "[Impressions of Saigon ..] Too many Americans will ruin this town. The French can fit in (there is a sizable French population) but somehow it doesn't work out the way we do it... Street scene: a large US housewife loading two cases of Schlitz into a small cab outside the PX. She was perspiring and could hardly wait to get home to open up a cool can and loosen her girdle."

April 25, 1963 (Danang). "I am up-country in the I Corps zone. Danang is a few miles south of Hue, which was the imperial capital city. I am staying tonight in the Grand Hotel, which is somewhere between the Majestic of Saigon and a 1910 boarding house on (a French) Coney Island ... Rode up on 'TWA' -- teeny weeny airlines as the pilot called it. My seatmate was a Vietnamese Catholic priest, cure in Dai An to 'deux mille Cretiens.' We spoke French reasonably well. Very interesting .... Visited various places and had a good talk and dinner with Colonel Bryce Denno [corps advisor] ..."

April 26. 1963 (Nha Trang). "I sat in on a very interesting briefing of an operation at 2d ARVN Infantry Division headquarters this morning at Danang. Then here by C-123 [to] another Grand Hotel -- with big rooms ... picturesque bay... After briefings at the Special Forces headquarters I changed clothes and went for a delightful late afternoon swim .... This must have been a lovely resort town ... It's a different Indochina from what it was in, say, 1938. I have a jeep tonight, courtesy of Special Forces. I drove along the waterfront and returned here for supper. Broiled lobster and Alsace wine ..."

April 27. 1963 (Pleiku). "I started the day at Nha Trang with a swim ... Spent half an hour or so on the sand, talking to a 10 year old Vietnamese boy. He knew no English but we taught each other to count to ten in the other's language. By the time we were through there was quite a congregation, and much good-natured amusement at my pronunciation of Vietnamese. The language is *very* 'tonal' -- the way you say the word means very much.... [II Corps at] Pleiku [where the senior advisor is Colonel Hal McCown] is completely different in terrain, population, and situation ... I am learning how tremendously complex this operation is over here ... I feel that I am very green and realize how difficult it is to grasp the many aspects of the problem Vietnam faces and how we are going about the job. It is a wonderful education ..."

April 28, 1963 (Saigon). "I flew down from Pleiku this morning to Vung Tau .. then back via the Caribou 'chaplain's run' in the Delta. With four others in Bac Lieu I went to almost a private Mass ... Tonight at supper in the [Majestic Hotel's] bar upstairs we had a glimpse of how it might have been 25 years ago. Some French with an oriental girl, a bearded occidental or two, sad French piano music, Saigon lights ... until some American teen-agers (well-behaved, late teens) came in ..."

April 30, 1963 (Saigon). "Out late tonight. I had called General York and asked if I could drop by to chat with him about our Caribou project. We had a drink at his house, then another, then supper, then I went with him to his office, and not home until 11. He is avery good man ... very shrewd, very honest, very courageous."[11]

May 4. 1963 (Ca Mau). "I came down here yesterday ... prepared to spend the night, since my old friend Fred Ladd[12] is senior advisor to the 21st ARVN Division and I thought he might invite me to stay and he did and I did. The division headquarters is actually at Bac Lieu, up the coast of the South China Sea, but it has been here several days to supervise the troops in a pacification mission in this territory. The colonel commanding the division, Colonel Nhon, is staying with the province chief, Lt Col Ut, in his house and he invited me to stay with him ..."

May 5. 1963 (Saigon). "Back late this evening after two days with the 21st Division at Ca Mau. This morning I went on a walk with an airborne company and ranger company through the 'boondocks.' Nice hike but little else ... Nine o'clock Mass in a little stone, mud, timber, and galvanized iron church ... Packed to capacity, men on one side, women on the other, devout people, chickens in the courtyard, children peeking in the windows..."

May 6, 1963 (Saigon). "My French is improving, I will begin seeing French movies at the French club in the evenings from time to time ..."

May 9, 1963 (Saigon). "Invitation from General York to dinner Saturday evening, 7:30, sport shirts. No coats and ties are worn here, to my knowledge, except to unusually formal affairs. There are some pretty fancy sport shirts, however ... "

May 11. 1963 (Saigon). "Sometime this weekend I must figure out how to proceed [with my report]... We will be systematically recording and evaluating the performance of our Caribou, the only ones [in the Army] that are doing a job in an operational theater."

May 12. 1963 (Saigon). "A very quiet Sunday ... I did some work on my report outline. Lee Wilhelm [deputy to me as Caribou Section Chief] came by and we talked the problem over. Last night's dinner party was interesting, The Yorks have just moved

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[11] Although I am certain he had them, that evening Bob York shared with me no grave misgivings about the US effort. Sheehan writes that when General Earle Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff, had headed a Joint Chiefs of Staff mission to Vietnam, "to the best of [York's] memory no one on the mission had asked him the main question the Joint Chiefs had posed: 'Are we winning this war?' York ... was an individualist with an inquiring mind, and his character was beyond reproach... He had provided Harkins, who was responsible as the commanding general, with his confidential analysis of the [Ap Bac] battle and his warning of what it portended. The choice of whether to share this analysis with members of the team belonged to Harkins... York would have been free to give his opinions if any of the visitors asked about them. None did." Sheehan,op cit, pp 299-300 and p. 740.

[12] I had known Fred since we were both eleven year old sons of infantry officers stationed at Fort Benning,,GA, and on the kid's football team.

into a mansion. We had a sit-down dinner... Dick Stilwell was there ...[13] A Colonel Trach (Vietnamese) and his wife were there, plus two other couples. Spoke French assez bien to Colonel Trach... On the way home Dick Stilwell said he'd like to get me in J-3 but I told him that I had made my mind up to get with a division as soon as Ed Rowny can let me go and a division is available."

May 14. 1963 (Saigon). "I will go to a movie at the French cultural society tonight."

May 15. 1963 (Saigon). "Went up to Pleiku and back today with Ed Rowny. Good and useful trip. Had breadfruit for lunch, something I have wondered about since reading Mutiny on the Bounty, Tastes terrible -- like bananas, persimmons, and bad cheese, mixed. Pleiku is where one of the best corps advisors there is.[14] They had words from a poem by Kipling pasted on the wall. It was quoted to me today. I think it goes:

> **At the end of the trail is a tombstone pale,**
> **With the name of the late deceased.**
> **And the epitaph drear: 'A fool lies here,**
> **Who tried to hurry the East.'"**

"Rode home from the office tonight and once again was struck by the sight of children on motorbikes with their parents ... a little boy hanging loose, with sandals flapping, held on by his up-pointed toes, calm expression .... These Vietnamese love their children and they seem to love life. They are an attractive people."

May 16. 1963 (Saigon). "It looks as if I will be a division advisor... Dick Stilwell [telephoned] me that he intended to put me in one of the divisions and had already cleared it with the Army MAAG[15] and with Ed Rowny. [Stilwell] was on the major general promotion list announced today. I went by his apartment tonight for a drink, with Ed Rowny. We talked about [my report]. When I wrap it up, I will be free to go ... probably in July."

May 17.1963 (Saigon). "Flew down to Can Tho today and back. Visited the IV Corps advisor [Colonel J. P. Connor] at lunch and talked Caribou and Army aviation in general. This was at the suggestion of Colonel Wilbur Wilson, whom I [first] met yesterday and who actually arranged the trip and did most of the talking ... Very interesting indeed to know him .... [A] great fan of General McGarr,[16] [he] has been here for two

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[13] Brigadier General Richard G. Stilwell, who had been a colonel as we both served in the office of the Army Chief of Staff in 1960, had arrived in April to become General Harkins's chief of operations (J-3, MACV). Stilwell and York were Class of 1938, US Military Academy. Rowny was USMA 1941.

[14] This was the famed Colonel Wilbur ("Coal Bin Willie") Wilson, by now advising III Corps near Saigon.

[15] Military Assistance Advisory Group, a separate command under MACV, under Major General CharlesTimmes, soon to be replaced by Major General Delk Oden.

[16] Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr had been Chief of MAAG, Vietnam, until General Harkins took command of the newly created MACV in February 1962; he then retired. I had worked closely with General McGarr in 1956-58 when he was Commandant of the Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. A superb combat commander in World War II and Korea, he was a blunt and unpolished soldier with keen insight, adept at recognizing good advice and using it but not adept in presenting himself. These qualities were precisely

years and has just extended for a year more. He is a bachelor whose only love of any kind is the Army -- a seven days a week dedicated soldier..."

<u>May 20. 1963 (En route, Danang to Saigon)</u>. "This morning at 8:00 I left Saigon by L-20,
arrived at Danang at noon [met with Bryce Denno at I Corps on my Caribou project], got on a C-123 going south, and will be in Saigon for supper. [I will go to] Dalat Saturday and Sunday to meet with all the corps senior advisors and get a united position on the Caribou. Dalat is in the mountains, cool, sweater weather for the Vietnamese, the site of the West Point of Vietnam... Meanwhile my people are all working hard and I hope that the pieces, rough hewn as they come off, can be whittled so as to fit into a useful finished report.[17]"

<u>May 23. 1963 (Saigon)</u>. "Promotion party at the Rex Hotel roof tonight. Listened to pilots tell flying stories. Pilots make good raconteurs -- the best of them do, that is. Each always has another one. They almost always talk flying, some can't talk anything else."

Note: The Rex Hotel in the center of Saigon was an officers billet, with an excellent mess and a rooftop with bar from which of an evening one could see flare ships over a nearby outpost under attack and hear the artillery fire. From my contribution to an oral history on Vietnam, written a quarter-century later:

"[One day] I went out on one of [Fred Ladd's] operations. I never will forget it. In Saigon I was staying at the Majestic Hotel and having my meals at the Rex. That morning I was Sitting on the roof of the Rex there, in a sweet kind of sunrise. Then going down to Bac Lieu, getting on an H-21 , which is a rattletrap of a helicopter, and going into a rice paddy landing zone. Getting out and cruising around in the bush with a U.S. sergeant and some Vietnamese. Then getting picked up after a day in the paddies, and ending up on the roof of the Rex."[18]

<u>May 26, 1963 (Dalat)</u>. "We flew up yesterday afternoon in a Caribou and went right to work ... The conference includes Dick Stilwell, General Oden [new MAAG Chief], the four corps senior advisors... It has been highly successful... Gen Stilwell [says that] I will go to the 21st Division in the Delta. He has cleared it with everyone, including

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the opposite of those of General Harkins whom General Maxwell Taylor, President Kennedy's advisor on Vietnam, selected to replace McGarr.

[17] I had decided that my report would be not only an analysis, comparing for example the Caribou and its USAF competitor, the C-123, but would contain a collection of vignettes relating the Caribou's employ- ment in Vietnam as uniquely responsive Army aviation. I was certain that these vignettes, one or two pages each, with photos, would yield a compelling story of the Caribou's value when flown by Army pilots. My staff gathered the Vignettes, and I wrote each in its final form. When I left ACTIV, my people presented me with a bound book of those vignettes; on its cover was my standard response whenever any of them brought me a good story.

[18] Harry Maurer, Strange Ground: Americans in Vietnam. 1945-1975: An Oral History (New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1989) p. 110.

General Harkins and my new boss, Colonel Connor, who is IV Corps senior advisor and here today. We all discussed it quite openly as if it were a foregone concluslon. General Rowny will let me go, in early July. General Rowny is going to return to Washington next month. I couldn't be more pleased with the way it is working out. The unexpected and genuine interest of Dick Stilwell is gratifying indeed. The 21st Division is the most challenging sort of a job. Its responsibility is the southernmost portion of Vietnam -- the entire area south of the Bassac River... A big job."[19]

May 27, 1963 (Saigon). Very little to report today. Everything normal. Up at 5:40, go to Mass, eat at 6:30, office at 7:00, work to noon, with a trip to laundry and one to post office, lunch at noon, back to work, quit at 5:30, supper, back to work at 6:30, work to 9:00, hotel, shine brass and shoes, talk a while with my roommate, write a letter, and so to bed. 'Work' is either write or talk... One new thing -- last night I bought a Vietnamese phrase book -- you know, how to say thank you, where is the hotel, I am a soldier, etc ... Driving in the jeep at lunch I amazed my colleagues by saying 'go straight ahead,' 'turn right,' 'turn left.' In Vietnamese it ain't easy ... nothing but unfamiliar sounds. Very amusing to the Vietnamese, mostly drivers and elevator boys, that I try it on."

May 27. 1963 (Saigon). "Rain hard this evening. Like in buckets. Washes the streets down, then it drizzles much of the night."

May 29. 1963 (Saigon). "Paper and pencil day. Reading, writing, and talking ... I am pushing a very real deadline because ACTIV will not let me go until the report is finished and I've got to be in Bac Lieu in mid-July ... Five of us were working until 10:00. We work tomorrow (Memorial Day)"

June 2. 1963 (Saigon). "I am writing this at the Saigon airport where we are gathering to bid General Rowny farewell. Ed's shoulder is painful but his face looks rested at breakfast. [He had fallen on a slippery walkway in the Rex Hotel and dislocated his shoulder, the same one that he had dislocated in a helicopter crash from many feet up onto a landing pad that January.] [20] Hard to say if ACTIV will continue effective as it has been. We come under General York's management in a few weeks. [21]

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[19] I surmise that this took some doing by General Stilwell inasmuch as I was a lieutenant colonel taking a job that had just been upgraded to colonel.

[20] Ed Rowny, who had hoped for division command (he had been on orders to command the 1st CavalryDivision in Korea when Cy Vance had selected him to head up ACTIV) would be a "deputy for air mobility" to.the three-star Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development. Because he was regarded as having been placed in this job by the Secretary of the Army, and was in fact a Vance favorite, and because he washeld to be over-zealous in his convictions about Army aviation, which were quite different from those of the Army's uniformed hierarchy, this assignment turned out poorly for him. Ed Rowny had once been the Army's youngest major general; it would be years before he got his division, and not until 1970, when he was the senior two-star on active duty, would he receive his third star, in a command position in Korea. Ed Rowny became a specialist for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on arms control. He ended his career as Ambassador Rowny, advlsinq President Reagan in that sphere.

[21] At about this time, General York heard that he would soon command the 82d Airborne Division.

June 4. 1963 (Saigon). "Worked late tonight... The drive to complete the drafting of this report is now on... I will be happy when I can get away from writing. Seems as if I have been writing for ten years. In fact I have ... ever since 2d Bn 22d Inf."

June 11. 1963 (Saigon). "I went to the Requiem Mass for Pope John today. Colonel Blakeney [formerly General Rowny's deputy, now in charge of ACTIV] was invited by the papal delegate and could not be there, so I attended. President Diem and I arrived at about the same time except he had a ten jeep escort and four battalions of troops honor guard. Not too many dignitaries there -- not many non-Vietnamese in fact. Short serviceand very well done. No sermon or euology. Good choir. Solemn High Mass ... President Diem has gotten himself in trouble by his tying church and state together. His brother is archbishop at Hue[22] and *very* many civil servants are Catholic, more than the 10-15% Catholic population. He could have let this Requiem Mass go by, like Kennedy would. After Mass there was a very serious Buddhist demonstration and, according to some stories, a clash between Catholic Vietnamese and Buddhists. Then a Buddhist monk allegedly poured gasoline on his head, set himself afire, and perished -- a deliberate 'martyr.' Bad. [The Buddhists] believe themselves to be 'oppressed' or 'discriminated against.' The latter is probably true, although it is closer to being 'less favored.' But that is bad enough and it will cause lots of trouble in the country before it is through."

Note; By far the majority of Vietnamese were Buddhists; tensions between Buddhist authorities and the government had been growing. On May 8 eight Buddhists, a woman and seven children, were killed while protesting the government's having barred Buddhists from flying their *five-colored* banner while celebrating the 2,587th anniversary of Buddha's birthday. (A few days earlier, the archbishop had arranged that Vatican flags be flown street-side for ceremonies marking his twenty-fifth year as archibishop.) The Diem government claimed that Viet Cong provoked the killings; eyewitnesses blamed government troops. Demonstrations then moved to Saigon.

On May 28,. after four hundred Buddhist monks prayed silently in front of the National Assembly, President Diem publicly called them "damn fools" and demonstrations spread throughout the country. David Halberstam, back that day from three weeks in Hong Kong, "had a field day, quickly dominating the story and propelling it onto the front page, where it stayed for the rest of the summer... Still, the one searing moment that emblazoned the Buddhist crisis in the American mind did not come from David Halberstam and his powerful newspaper. It took that man of totally. different temper-

[22] Prochnau writes: "Diem's brothers controlled [Hue], Ngo Dinh Can as a tough Oriental boss, a cross between Chicago's Boss Richard Daley and a mafia don; Ngo Dinh Thuc as an avaricious Catholic Archbishop." Prochnau, op cit, p. 303.

ament to do that... [Associated Press correspondent Malcolm] Browne, and his camera."[23] Browne's photograph of the bonze perishing in flames went around the world.

June 13, 1963 (Saigon). "The report is taking shape. I will send you a set of 28 'cases' of Caribou employment that tell something about the airplane and our use of it in Vietnam. They are unclassified and make interesting reading."

June 14, 1963 (Saigon). "Finished The Report today. Will put it on Colonel Blakeney's desk tomorrow."

June 19, 1963 (Saigon). "Worked all day... Got my draft off, but more work to do."

June 22. 1963 (Saigon). "I have no orders. The Pentagon is supposed to agree to my movement from ACTIV to the MAAG ... Fell asleep reading Vietnamese history last night and neglected to write ... "

June 23, 1963 (Saigon). "Yesterday I was down in the Delta with General Stilwell and saw Fred Ladd and arranged the timetable. I will leave Saigon on Monday the first of July, spend the night at Can Tho, the corps headquarters, move down to division headquarters at Bac Lieu on Tuesday the second. Fred and I will have Wednesday and Thursday to overlap, and he will come up to Saigon on Friday the fifth. I am going whether I have orders or not... I really do look forward to my new job. It will be entirely different in almost every respect. My surroundings will be the small town of Bac Lieu, not Saigon, although I expect that I will be visiting Saigon from time to time. My duties will keep me out in the field a lot with the division command post. Fred Ladd says that time flies by -- 'every day seems to be another Sunday'... The recent weeks of rain have filled the rice paddies. It will be good and wet down there now until September or so. I will get some mud boots, combat boots with canvas tops and holes in the insteps to let the water leak out.... Seventeen years [married] on Thursday[the 27th], and they couldn't have been happier."

June 25, 1963 (Saigon). "Got my field gear today [including] some mud boots, used, one-half size too big, but all they had. [Also a] poncho .... Last night I walked around the waterfront, or riverfront, across the street from the hotel. I sat down and talked withsome young Vietnamese children in the little playground. My Vietnamese is not too bad. They first giggle when they hear me try it on them, then the conversation starts and goes too fast. A young student was there who could speak English so we got along O.K. The student said, 'You speak very good Vietnamese. How long have you been in Vietnam? Only two months? You are very friendly.' I don't think they appreciate anything more than having an American try to learn their language. My driver is the same way. 'You are very kindly to me,' he says. The language is quite difficult to pronounce. They call grape-ade, which is a cool drink I have in the evening

[23] Prochnau, p. 308.

meal rather than iced tea, 'sweet water.' Nuoc (water) ngoc (sweet). To say 'The grapeade tastes good.' you say 'nuoc ngoc ngon nhut.' It can't be said ... Nhut means good, or best, or first. Hang nhut means 'first class' ('number one')... My French is getting better. In fact the only way I could go to Confession last week, having gone three months or so without, was to go through it in French. Equivalent of a final exam ... My clearance from Department of the Army came though so all that is left now is to publish my orders."

June 27. 1963 (Saigon). "Talked yesterday afternoon ... with various people who are knowledgeable and interested in the problems of a division senior advisor. One was Colonel Harry Huppert who had been in the 4th Division when we were in Germany and is a division advisor up in Kontum, an area completely different from mine in the Delta. Then I went over to the MAAG and MACV and talked about the tactical and political problems of counterinsurgency operations. I look forward to an interesting time. I'll tell you all about it as I learn the new situation and figure out how we should handle it."

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I did not know it then, but as I moved to the Delta the feud between the local press an d the American officials in Saigon, especially with General Harkins and his key staff, had escalated to a degree that would soon be impossible to repair. The reporters had their unofficial sources, Ivan Siavich and US advisors chief among them, whom they trusted for information on the war in the countryside far more than they trusted the official spokesmen. After the Buddhist bonze's self-immolation on June 11th had rocketed worldwide, the newsmen developed better sources among the media-wise bonzes than did the US embassy, and filled their wires back home with stories. The Diem family, and
especially Madame Nhu, the President's sister-in-law, excoriated both the Buddhists and the correspondents, who in turn went after the Diem family. The embassy, feeling the heat from Washington to do something about the deteriorating situation both with the Diem regime and the press, was at a loss.
By now the reporters, who had shifted their attention from the war in the countryside to
Saigon intrigues, had an "attitude;" Halberstam did in particular.[24] At the embassy's annual Fourth of July party he, who on another social occasion told General Stilwell to his face that what he was saying to a visiting newsman was (expletive deleted), had a sharp encounter with Stilwell's wife Alice. And when the standard toast was later offered to the Republic of Vietnam's President, Halberstam "stood tall, straight, and

[24] Prochnau, pp. 308-322, describes the deterioration. President Diem accused Malcolm Browne of bribing the seventy-three-year-old monk and the other bonzes of drugging him before setting him on fire. And Madame Nhu, beauteous wife of his brother and closest advisor, known to the press as the "Dragon Lady," went into a rage. She asked a British television crew what all the fuss was about, saying that all the Buddhists have done is "barbecue a bonze," using "imported gasoline" to do It.

stern in the middle of the room. He clutched his glass to his chest. 'I'd never drink to that son of a bitch,' he announced, and he did not announce it quietly."[25]

Not until I read Prochnau's book did I know how deep was the animosity between these newsmen and the American officials, or of how between Halberstam and Stilwell this had turned to essentially mutual hatred. Stilwell (to whom lowed my new job) would be a key figure in my new chain of command. I was determined to do well by my new mission.

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July 2, 1963 (Bac Lieu). "Spent the day today looking around and meeting the detach= ment.. .about 30 officers and some 60 enlisted men... here since 26 December... Fred Ladd has done a fine job getting the troops out of the mud ... morale is high and no one is feeling sorry for himself... Tomorrow we will travel around to each of my sector advisors -- six, one for each province chief. He will say goodbye and I will say hello."

Note: Fred had the enlisted men in a mansion in the center of Bac Lieu. For officers' quarters he had built near our offices and mess hall an attractive compound of two man tent-like wooden huts with louvered sides, -- in a paddy, now wet, with duckwalks.

July 4. 1963 (Bac Lieu). I am very fortunate indeed in the quality of my personnel, the officers are highly motivated and their morale is high, they are unusually competent ...
Fred has done tremendous job. [He] has always been one of my favorite people, honest, alive, dedicated, simple. He was on Secretary [of the Army] Brucker's staff in the old days ... the only one with gumption enough to tell the Secretary that he wouldn't carry Mrs. Brucker's handbag or bring the Secretary his tea (in a cup, with crackers}."

July 5, 1963 (Bac Lieu). "I 'assumed command' today. Good job. One I will enjoy very much. Perhaps the most difficult part of it for me is that I am an advisor, and must exert my influence through my division commander and on his division through the people who work for me and who are advisors to the people who work for him ... Find myself pleasantly busy. One nice thing about our cottage compound is that all my officers are within easy reach. They might not think it so nice. But I have gotten lots of business done since suppertime."

July 6. 1963 (Bac Lieu). "Rained hard today and the water is lying deep in the paddies around Bac Lieu, and in our little camp as well. One of the cottages, lived in by a couple of comics, has an anchor on the front porch... The duckboards keep us out of

[25] Prochnau, p. 322-324.

the mud so we are dry enough. But the frogs are out, a veritable chorus. There is one bass who keeps the time, a loud honk every five seconds... Spent the day getting my orientation... A tremendous lot to learn about my area of operations... I am developing a great respect for these people and the job they are doing, trying to get a country backunder their controL. Visited briefly with Colonel Nhon [division commander] ... Went around with the contractors and others to look at the renovation job in our enlisted men's quarters. Made some useful changes... Spoke to the men and to the officers. Tonight we have movies."

<u>July 6. 1963 (Sac Lieu)</u>. "Thanks for the clippings. The ones on Vietnam are especially interesting. We are completely out of touch with the world here. Not even the Stars and Stripes comes in ... I have ordered the NY Times west coast edition by mail, paid for by the detachment. Went to Mass this morning in a nice church just a block from our cottage camp. Then breakfast, some work, and then a full day traveling [by two seater fixed-wing 0-1, an observation aircraft] to three of my sector advisors -- at Can Tho, Long Xuyen, and Rach Gia. Got back at nightfall, buzzed the camp, jeep met us, and we came home. Tremendous lot to learn about this area. Statistics are what I must absorb, plus what lies behind the statistics -- number of strategic hamlets, percent of population in strategic hamlets, how many troops, how many weapons, how much artillery, trucks, air, ets, etc. Miles of road, miles of canal, area of provinces, number of districts, how many militia, how many are trained, what are the problems, and on and on..."

<u>July 6. 1963 (Sac Lieu)</u>. "Today I took a helicopter ride around my area along with some other people. We visited a couple of somewhat isolated posts where small militia units are located; we were their first contact with the outside world in some time. We had lunch in Rach Gia at the home of the province chief ... a delicious Vietnamese meal. Rach Gia is famous for its fish..."

So ends Part One of my first Vietnam tour.