

CHAPTER IX

When the 81st and 93rd Infantry - the Samar Brigade - arrived at Surigao, Mindanao in the very early part of January the Brigade Commander, Lt. Colonel Ben Hur Chastaine, was ordered to take up dispositions in the valley of the Agusan River. A defensive position was to be taken covering the beaches on Butuan Bay and other troops were to be disposed in areas to the south, prepared to organize and hold that part of Mindanao against all hostile efforts at penetration.

The rainy weather which had so favored the movements of these troops at sea became a serious handicap in the overland travel from Surigao to Butuan. Torrential downpours washed out bridges and flooded lowlands, making the roads impassable for the limited number of motor vehicles - all more or less in need of repair - available to the Brigade Commander. To reach Butuan by marching also proved out of the question. The rains had turned the streams into raging torrents and trails into bottomless quagmires. The transfer of these troops and supplies was eventually accomplished by the steamer Governor Taft.

Brigade Headquarters were established in Butuan on 7 January and steps were taken at once to secure adequate bodegas up river away from the beaches for the storage of the food and supplies which had accompanied the troops.

MAP #9 SURIGAO-BUTUAN

(Northern Agusan Sector)

The mission of the brigade was expanded to include the defense of Gingoog Bay, with especial emphasis upon the protection of the docks and airport operated by the Anakan Lumber Company. The 81st Infantry, commanded by Major Arden R. Boellner, took up positions in the Butuan area, while the 93rd, under Captain John C. Goldtrap, proceeded to Gingoog and Anakan.

The 81st Infantry had been mobilized sufficiently early to have had some months of training before war broke, but the 93rd was composed mostly of men without prior training leavened by a few who had been only partially trained in one reserve camp of two week's duration. When this regiment moved to Mindanao the first of January most of its enlisted men had never fired a rifle. As soon as the regiment was established in the Gingoog Sector, daily periods of instruction were instituted.

Due to the importance of the landing facilities at Anakan and the airfield of the Anakan Lumber Company, the Sector Commander established his command post there, with the other administrative elements and supply near Butuan. One reason for this was to be able to supervise more closely the development of the 93rd Infantry. The other was to supervise the unloading of cargo vessels expected to bring in supplies from the United States or Australia. Only one of these expected vessels ever arrived. This was the Coast Farmer.

About 20 February the 93rd was shifted to the Del Monte area as part of Force Reserve and to enable it to institute a more

comprehensive training program. The 3rd Philippine Constabulary Infantry which had been operating with General Vachon's 101st Division on the Cotabato-Digos front, and more recently stationed near Cagayan in the sector of the 102nd Division, took over the responsibilities of the 93rd in the Gingoog-Anaken area. Hastily mobilized about 9 December, this organization was a heterogeneous collection of about 60 officers and 980 men, all Filipinos, varying in age from youngsters to men almost too old to be active, drawn from many sources. Thrown into combat early in the war there had been virtually no opportunity for training. The officers and non-coms were almost wholly without knowledge of how to dispose their troops or occupy positions in response to orders. As a constabulary organization most of the men would have been quite proficient and neither their patriotism nor attention to duty -- as they saw it -- are questioned, but the perception and understanding of the demands of combat were completely lacking.

This condition necessitated all of the American officers at Sector Headquarters, from the Sector Commander down, exercising constant personal supervision over the location and construction of emplacements and trenches, siting of weapons, clearing fields of fire, and the countless other details incident to the establishment of a defensive position. Troops left without American supervision for even a reasonably short time were found to have constructed shelters for themselves squarely in the fields of fire of their own guns. On another occasion it was discovered that an

observation post had been manned by an entire platoon, which had built a barrier surrounding the point, thereby advertising the activity. At the time of the inspection the entire platoon, including its officers, was sound asleep.

Daily periods of instruction were instituted but small progress had been achieved before the Japanese invaded.

Although this outfit appears to have been Lt. Colonel Roy D. Gregory's particular cross, it seems that he did not command it until the day after the invasion of the Macajalar Bay area began. The regimental commander prior to this time was Lt. Colonel Donesa* who had as his executive officer Major Diviro.

During the time this regiment was stationed in the Cotabato-Digos area, a circus troupe which had been performing in the province, joined the stream of refugees evacuating the area threatened by the enemy and many of the women of the troupe had attached themselves -- not without encouragement -- to the soldiers for safety. Other enlisted personnel reporting for duty, had brought with them wives, children, pigs, dogs, chickens and boxes of household and personal equipment.

It was difficult to the point of impossibility to divorce these men from their impedimenta. Battalion and company commanders had little sympathy with orders to this effect, exhibiting both reluctance and inability to cope with the situation. Officers and men alike professed an ignorance as to the identity of these people, when questioned.

*Donesa later became pro-Jap and according to the guerrillas was known during the occupation as the leading American-hater of the Island.

When the regiment moved from one point to another direct orders were issued concerning the removal of these devotees of Romany existence to established evacuation centers. Transportation was provided to these points only to discover a few days later that these camp followers had left the trucks a few kilometers down the road, reappearing, in all their glory, a few days later in the new regimental area.

In justice to the women however, it must be said that on the march, except for those in advanced stages of pregnancy -- who were many -- they carried their loads and traveled as well as, if not better than, the men.

At Surigao the Provisional Battalion which had been inducted into USAFFE early in January was continuing uninterrupted training. The Philippine Constabulary unit here accomplished splendid results with its motor boat patrol in Surigao Strait. Approximately 30 Japanese mines were brought ashore by these patrols, the explosive powder removed and used in the creation of grenades and land mines.

The facilities of the Anakan Lumber Company and those of the Mother Lode Mine at Surigao were utilized in the construction of grenades, as well as replacement parts for weapons. Although the machinery available was limited the workmen in these shops accomplished excellent results, often with improvised methods.

On 13 January Lt. Colonel Chastaine, Agusan sector commander, decided to dispatch a portion of his troops to Camp Kalao to prevent possible infiltration of the enemy from Davao north into this area and - as stated in his report - "to maintain the security of the Davao-Agusan Highway which was being threatened by the enemy". Captain John S. Miner, commanding the 1st Battalion 81st Infantry, left Butuan on that day to carry out this mission.

(Map #10)

The underlying reasons for this disposition are not clear considering the fact that the road from Davao north was, at best, a poor secondary one which ended a short distance south of Moncayo. For the rest of the distance to Butuan the road was merely a projection, still dependent upon construction.

The movement of troops into the Davao-Agusan area precipitated logistical problems of monumental difficulty. Indeed, considering the astounding array of natural obstacles which interposed between the Surigao-Butuan area and that region south of the source of the Agusan River, it appears that this dispersal of force and diversion of effort contributed only negative results. A logical deduction from available information leads one to suppose that this undertaking was made with the purpose of creating a diversion to relieve pressure on troops of General Vachon's division in the Digos area. It is a matter of opinion that more positive results could have been obtained by transferring troops from this sector to reinforce the Digos front rather than by expending the time and manpower necessary to convey our troops and supplies over hundreds of miles of hazardous water

MAP #10 SOUTH CENTRAL MINDANAO
(Southern Agusan Sector)

and trails. Had the Jap been aggressive in this direction it would have been smarter to allow him to waste his time and substance in negotiating the easily defended avenues of approach to the north.

Beyond San Mateo, some 15 kilometers south of Butuan, travel is limited to the river or to foot trails. All supplies therefore must be transported by boat. A number of Diesel-motor-driven launches were commandeered but it was only with the assistance of Fred Varney, W. E. Kellogg and other civilians familiar with this dangerous and little known river that this objective was accomplished. Varney, and Kellogg who operated his own launch in the upper Agusan, were given temporary commissions as acting officers in the Army.

For perhaps 50 kilometers the current of the river is swift, in places closely resembling rapids. South of Talacogan the stream spreads out into a great, flat marshland cut by many channels, all obstructed to a greater or lesser degree by logs of all sizes, bamboo and debris of every sort washed down by floods to stagnate and rot in the quiet marshlands. This debris not infrequently formed impenetrable barriers in the channels.

This marshy jungle region is little known to white men and only slightly more so to the Philippine Constabulary and the provincial government had made little effort to maintain an open channel for river traffic.

At the time the 81st Infantry entered this area some of the log-jams had been accumulating for years, and were in places as much as 500 yards long. In order to pass these jams it was necessary

to send the troops up the Agusan to the Simulao River, a tributary of the Agusan, which was free of obstructions and which would permit traffic as far as the town of Basa. From Basa a trail led back across country to Santa Josefa on the Agusan, making three sides of a triangle.

From this point onward the river tumbles down from the mountains in a torrent so swift all obstructions are swept aside. This in turn presents another difficult problem for upstream traffic, in that fourteen stretches of rapids must be negotiated to Camp Kalao. Beyond Camp Kalao a trail leads cross-country, paralleling the Manat River for 12 kilometers, to the end of the so-called improved road leading to the city of Davao.

This troop movement required, besides the use of Diesel launches, traversing in barotos series of rapids so swift they necessitated lining the boats through by drag ropes; and cross-country marching over muddy trails into which the men sank sometimes to their waists.

In the Agusan valley the few scattered barrios provided the usual scrawny chickens and eggs, a few cattle and pigs, but no rice and no surplus of other food products beyond the needs of the local population. This required that all foodstuffs as well as ammunition, medical stores and other items necessary to maintain troops in the field must be transported over this exhausting and time-consuming route.

To Roy Welbon, who established and maintained radio communication along the projected Davao-Agusan Highway, and to Enos J. Emery, who, operating barotos, took charge of and maintained that section of the line of communication between the end of the motor-launch

transport line and Camp Kalao, must go a large part of the credit for the success of this operation.

Welbon, owner of a lumber firm in Mindanao before the war, continued his radio work after the surrender, as a lieutenant of guerrillas, until his death at the hands of a Japanese patrol. Father Haggerty, who knew him well, tells of the small white cross on the plaza in front of Father Thibault's little wooden church at Baroy, Lanao.

(Map #3)

Since the trails across country from Basa were impassable for any sort of pack animal, it was necessary for the troops to carry on their backs, in addition to their arms, ammunition and personal equipment, the battalion's medical supplies, cooking equipment and sufficient food to last until further stocks could be brought up the river. Although the entire battalion made two trips through the deep mire of the so-called trail from Basa to Santa Josefa, it was still necessary to leave behind some equipment. Much of it did not reach them until many weeks later when river transportation had been considerably improved.

Upon the arrival of the battalion at Camp Kalao, it was learned that emissaries of the enemy had sent messages to the commander of the Constabulary unit there, urging him to bring his force and join the Imperial Japanese Army. Arrangements for meeting the constabulary commander having been outlined in a letter, Captain Miner immediately laid plans to capture this group of hostile emissaries.

The meeting was scheduled to take place near Kilometer Post 106, near the end of the Davao-Agusan Highway, on or about 25 January. A combat patrol, under command of an officer, and with a civilian guide, arrived at the rendezvous in advance, concealing themselves from observation. The emissaries arrived in a car flying the Japanese flag, and after setting up another flag near the kilometer post, adjourned for the night to a nearby house, leaving the car at the roadside.

Under cover of darkness the patrol surrounded the house, called upon the occupants to surrender, and captured three of them -- one Japanese and two Filipinos. Some of the occupants of the house jumped from windows after an exchange of shots with the patrol, and escaped. One of these was killed later by a Philippine Army reservist who had taken refuge in the vicinity, and the officer who led the patrol was mortally wounded. He died later that night.

The results of this first skirmish so impressed most of the members of the battalion that they lost part of their dread of the initial contact with enemy. Battalion patrols were dispatched further along the highway until they covered the territory to the South where a tributary of the Hijo River crossed the highway at Kilometer Post 82. At that point a series of landslides had blocked the highway making it impassable for vehicles. Other patrols were pushed farther to the flanks reconnoitering also the country in the vicinity of Compostela and Manat and into the valley of the Saug River.

On the afternoon of 2 February a patrol advancing toward Davao

encountered a Jap bicycle patrol near Kilometer Post 81* on the Highway. The Japanese quickly retired, but not before one member of their group had been killed. This man was identified as one of the Davao "Irregulars" and the entire number had been observed to be Jap civilians only partly armed and equipped.

The following day Miner's entire battalion moved forward toward Davao City. Late in the afternoon the advance guard entered the barrio of Mawab, near Kilometer Post 75, and found it deserted save for a few civilians. It was known that it had been occupied by a Jap irregular force which had established a defensive position in and around the schoolhouse. Judging by the widely scattered food, equipment and clothing, this force had decamped in something of a hurry the preceding night.

During the night the battalion advanced and took up positions astride the highway near Kilometer 74, at which point the road sweeps around a tributary of the Hijo River and along the shoulder of steep hills rising to the north. "B" Company was disposed to the north of the Highway and "A" Company to the south, each with their machine-gun sections commanding the road and covering the approaches to the river. "C" Company had been detached to cover trails to the south. Outposts were sent forward, supported by machine-guns whose fields of fire also converged on the road, which had been partially blocked by a landslide compelling motor vehicles to negotiate the spot in low gear.

At 6:00 AM on 4 February the outpost warned of the approach of

* Kilometer posts are established each 1000 meters from the center of the road at each end of the road - in this instance Davao.

an enemy motorized column. The column consisted of an advance truck carrying personnel followed by a tank and seven additional personnel trucks, a staff car and an ambulance, in that order.

The leading truck was permitted to approach the landslide without being fired upon. As it was negotiating the turn the machine guns open fire. This truck was completely disabled and its occupants virtually annihilated before they could go into action.

Having blocked the column effectively with this truck the machine guns then devoted their attention to the remainder of the force. Fire from the enemy tank was completely screened by the disabled truck. Enemy troops from the rear trucks dispersed, some climbing the cliffs, others descending into the river bed. Those who climbed the cliffs encountered the outpost force, which accounted for numerous casualties in the hostile ranks before they were outnumbered and forced to fall back on Company "A".

Meanwhile, "B" Company on the north was being hard-pressed. The company commander, instead of calling for reinforcements from the battalion commander, attempted to get help from "A" Company on his left. Unfortunately, the commanding officer of "A" Company had already become extremely apprehensive about the situation developing on his front and had ordered an immediate retreat without informing either the battalion commander or the troops on his right.

Receiving this information, the commander of "B" Company immediately began to withdraw his troops - also without advising the battalion commander - who learned of these movements only when

stragglers from "A" Company began drifting through the battalion command post. These men were hastily reorganized and placed in position along the road.

The machine guns attached to "A" Company drew back in orderly fashion and reported to Battalion Headquarters about 10 A.M. These were emplaced on the hills overlooking Mawab.

The commanding officer of "B" Company reported to Battalion Headquarters and informed the battalion commander of what had occurred and that his troops were withdrawing along the ridge overlooking the town. He was ordered to reorganize and hold the ridge, to prevent the enemy from flanking the position to the north. It developed later that due to the demoralization of his troops he had been unable to carry out this order.

Meanwhile, enemy aircraft appeared and bombed the machine gun positions, killing one man and wounding others. The Japs, having turned the north flank, began firing on the command post from flank and rear. Simultaneously enemy troops were reported entering the town of Mawab on the left flank, and the sound of motors on the road indicated that the road block had finally been cleared. Accordingly orders were issued for a general withdrawal to the previous positions at Kilometer 82.

Battalion headquarters withdrew to the south of the highway hoping to intercept any troops of "C" Company who might be proceeding from Manat toward Mawab. In its retirement the battalion headquarters ran into an ambush prepared by a squad of hostile infantry;

but the entire party, taking cover, was able to escape without casualty. The troops of "C" Company were assembled and employed as a covering force for the reorganization of the battalion.

Enemy casualties were heavy during the early stages of the action. Our machine gun crews had continued to operate their weapons until the infiltrating enemy infantry were almost upon them. It was estimated that the enemy casualties were approximately 110; our own amounting to two dead, four wounded and three missing. All elements of the battalion, including those few individuals who had been cut off on the right flank by hostile penetration, were fully accounted for. The battered enemy retired in the direction of Davao following the action.*

By 19 February the command post had been established at Kilometer 83, the outpost was forward at Kilometer 65 with the main body of troops at Kilometer 75, adjacent to the town of Mawab. Flanking patrols penetrated as far as Andalli to the south, approximately abreast of Kilometer 74; while to the north they had proceeded equally as far down the Saug River, encountering pro-Japanese Moros. In a skirmish with these one of the patrols had one man killed and another severely wounded.

On 19 February the enemy again attacked with a motorized column, but due to a demolished bridge at Kilometer 72 were forced to leave their mechanized equipment and proceed on foot in this attack against Mawab. Hostile artillery, unable to cross the stream, was placed in position at the bridge and fired blindly and ineffectively into our

*Approximate strength in this action was: Miner's strength, 3 companies - about 500 men - but number of effectives unknown. Jap strength estimated at about 280.

positions which were screened by intervening wooded areas along both sides of the highway. This served solely to heighten the morale of the Filipino troops upon discovering how harmless artillery fire could be on well-concealed positions.

Resistance to the enemy on this occasion was confined to small skirmishes and no casualties were suffered by our troops. Hostile casualties were not determined.

During all this period crews of native workmen had been employed clearing away the log jams in the main channel of the Augusan River to expedite flow of supplies. Constant vigilance was needed throughout the campaign to prevent the jams from reforming as the current bore new logs and debris down from the upper reaches of the river.

With the main channel reasonably well cleared, a bodega was established in the marshlands. Above this point Mr. Kellogg, with his own light-draft motor launch, would assist in the transportation of supplies as far as Varuela. In tribute to Mr. Kellogg's untiring labors the bodega compound became known as Camp Kellogg.

Beyond Varuela, where the rapids precluded the use of any craft heavier than barotos, traffic crawled in slow motion until some bright soul hit upon the idea of attaching outboard motors to the baratos. The Force Quartermaster, by some legerdemain best known to himself, produced a few and although the maintenance of them in these wastelands was a major problem, the results were well worth the cost in headaches, sweat and strain.

With the first troop movement upriver, Roy Welbon, who had been

commissioned a temporary lieutenant, had transported radio equipment from a Bureau of Posts' station on Dinigat Island, setting it up temporarily at Bunawan. When the river channel was opened as far south as Varuela, the station was established there permanently and became known as Welbon Station. In addition to retaining active charge of this station throughout the campaign, Welbon found time to set up and maintain a second radio station with the troops on the Davao-Agusan front, and was of material assistance in developing proficient radio operators from selected enlisted men of the Philippine Army. (Map #1)

On 5 February it was decided to transfer the remainder of the 81st Infantry, less the 3rd Battalion, from Butuan to the Davao-Agusan front for possible offensive action against the enemy in that sector. The 3rd Battalion of the 81st, in conjunction with the troops of the Butuan Provisional Battalion would continue to garrison the Butuan Bay positions. Other contingents of the 81st stationed at Lianga and Talacogan were relieved by detachments from the Provisional Battalion also.

Because no interruption could be permitted in the flow of supplies to the force already in the Davao area, this troops movement was accomplished intermittently, as boats became available. The 2nd Battalion set out first, followed by Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion and then later by Colonel Boellner and members of his staff on February 15.

By March 3, all elements of the 2nd Battalion were in position

at Kilometer 106, relieving the 1st Battalion, which had been in contact with the enemy since its arrival more than a month previously. "A" Company, 81st Medical Battalion also arrived and set up an improvised field hospital in the town of Moncayo.

During the first few days of March, the Sector Commander visited and inspected the positions, issuing orders to the effect that vigorous action would be taken to harass the enemy in his positions at Kilometer 63, as well as along his flanks in the direction of Hijo and the Saug River Valley.

However, due to the sudden sharp increase of malaria among the troops, the number of effectives available for duty limited action to patrols. The microscopic supply of quinine available was impotent to effect cures.

Hostile air operations were increasing over the entire Davao-Agusan sector during this period. Supply boats on the river were frequently harassed and earlier Camp Kalao had been virtually wiped out in a bombing attack. Campostela and Bunauan were subjected to a similar though less destructive foray, as were barrios in the Saug Valley, following the operations of our patrols in that section.

Toward the end of March Colonel Boellner was transferred to the Cagayan Sector. Lt. Colonel William S. Van Nostrand, who had been transferred from the 61st Infantry in the Malabang area, arrived from Butuan on 4 April and assumed command of the 81st Infantry.

Shortly after this when the Air Corps personnel were recalled to Fifth Air Base Headquarters at Tankulan for transportation to Australia, a third shift in commanders was necessitated. The battalions were now commanded by quite capable Filipino officers - Gavino, Cleofe and Trinidad. There were three American officers remaining with the regiment. Murphy and Price never rejoined the 61st and the battalions went into action against the Japanese invasion with these commanders.

Our attached Air Corps officers and men had been assiduous in their attention to defensive preparations. They furnished valuable instruction to our .50 caliber machine gun squads and contributed materially to the morale of the regiment by their cheerful and confident air. We hated to see them go. They had done us a genuine service. But pilots, navigators, bombardiers and gunners were needed where there were planes to fly. We understood, but nevertheless keenly felt the loss.

The Cebu branch of the San Miguel Brewing Company was, at this time, still bottling its Pale Pilsen and occasionally a few cases found their way to Cagayan. The Fifth Air Base seemed to have advance notice of these meagre shipments for they never failed to have a truck on hand at the distributors. It was rare indeed that any of the little luxuries of life fell into the hands of the forces

occupying the beach positions. But one evening Lewis and I, having fairly accurate information that there were a few bottles of cold beer at a quiet little hotel in Cagayan, set out to quench our thirst.

We found the hotel. It occupied the upper floor over several shops and had a cool, comfortably furnished lobby. Our reconnaissance must have been very poor not to have discovered this oasis ere this. The landlady proved to be a very gracious Filipina and quite willing that we should share her small supply of beer.

There were three other occupants of the lounge when we arrived. They were wearing the Mohammedan fez and proved to be Lanao Moros. Two were slim and wiry and the other rather stocky of build, but all presented smiles of gleaming gold. One of the slender ones appeared to have authority over the others who were talkative when invited, otherwise they indulged in golden-toothed smiles as accompaniment to their spokesman.

The conversation that evening proved most interesting, including a vivid and lively demonstration of blade fighting and the use of scabbard and sarong in this type of combat. We touched on the art of manufacture of blade weapons by the Moro craftsmen and examined some exquisitely wrought daggers and krises worn by these three. But this genial companionship and entertainment was followed by the inevitable request for a favor.

During Captain Baldwin's regime in Cagayan he had contracted with this Datu Mangoda Maulana for some 48 bolos which the data insistently claimed were delivered as per contract, even producing

a penciled acknowledgement from Baldwin. The trouble, explained the datu, was that payment had not been received and he could ill afford to assume the responsibility of financially placating the artisans.

He had made inquiry and found that Captain Baldwin was no longer in Cagayan. He was most anxious that the account be satisfied and earnestly solicited my help. It developed upon further questioning that cash settlement was not important if he could receive equivalent value in dry goods from one of the Japanese stores which had been taken over by the government upon the outbreak of hostilities and for which the Constabulary were designated custodian.

We agreed to meet at Constabulary Headquarters the following morning to lay the case before the officer in charge. Upon the evidence of the agreement and the acknowledgement of receipt the Constabulary officer agreed to furnish from such stocks as remained, payment in kind. To show his appreciation the datu at once adopted me as his father!

He was quite voluble in his gratitude when it also proved possible to arrange transportation for him and his party on a military vehicle headed for Dansalan, which would take them to a point near their home in Bacolod. The truck on its return brought a load of very excellent bananas for the regiment -- a gift from the datu.

A few days later he and his brother -- the stinky one --

showed up at my headquarters for what was claimed to be a visit with his "father". The visit lasted for several days during which he expressed again and again his desire to enlist for the purpose of serving as my body-guard. Captain Almojuela, the regimental surgeon, had examined the slightly-built datu and expressed the opinion that he had a lung condition which was disqualifying. Undismayed, Maulana then sought service as a civilian employee, but unfortunately he could not qualify as mechanic, truck driver, cargadore or cook - the only kinds of civilian labor we were authorized to hire. He then announced that he would stay with me anyway and perform such duties as I saw fit to assign him.

About this time we were engaged in mapping our area and exploring the canyon trails to the south. Maulana volunteered to explore and sketch the Little Agusan River canyon and I agreed that he make the attempt. After about three days he came back with a rough but fairly comprehensive sketch showing several trails which gave access to the plains - trails which might prove useful in our operations later.

Persistent reports had been trickling in of suspicious and unusual happenings in the vicinity of Bayabas, over beyond Cagayan. Reports of flares and rockets being sent up from the beaches in that locality at night lent some small credence to the rumor that these were signals to Jap intelligence agents who lay off shore during daylight in small fishing craft and came ashore after dark for their information. Even though Bayabas lay to the west of the

(Map # 4)

Division sector, the hush-hush rumore of unusual doings indicated that we determine the accuracy of these reports.

Maulana again volunteered and begged to be allowed to accompany the selected party to make this investigation. Having on several occasions tested his loyalty and sincerity and having established his reliability he was named as one of a party of three to make this expedition. All trace of military uniform and equipment was removed from their persons and armed only with bolos they set forth.

They spent three days in the suspected area. Lying hidden at intervals along the beach at night, fighting the swarms of mosquitoes and night-flying insects, they kept the beach under constant surveillance during darkness. During daylight hours they dispersed and represented themselves as lone travelers, strangers to each other, and managed to be invited into the Nipa shacks of several of the inhabitants.

The party returned, exhausted from lack of sleep and wretchedly puffy from the numerous insect bites they had endured. They brought no evidence of subversive activity or disloyalty among the natives of the area, but did agree that there were spots here and there, in the dry sands back from the beach, which could have been caused by burning powder. They were also in accord that the little datu had increasingly assumed the leadership of the expedition, for which they admitted he was eminently qualified by virtue of his ability to negotiate strange terrain in utter darkness. Maulana acknowledged

the acclaim with a tired but glittering smile.

Following this little expedition it was significant that no further reports of flares, rockets or unusual activity in the Bayabas area came to light. Whether the whole thing had been a myth or whether smart and cagey Jap operatives changed their methods or their base of operations was never learned. It was probably of little consequence since we never operated under martial law and were never permitted to restrict in any way the circulation of civilians through and within our defensive sectors. It was a foregone conclusion that the Jap was minutely informed as to every detail of our defensive structure. This was borne out later, after the capitulation, when occasion offered to examine one of their maps of the Macajalar defenses. It was accurate even to the inclusion of two of Webb's mortar positions which had been established only two days prior to the invasion.

Not long after this Maulana became homesick and wanted to visit his native heath for a few days. He came to bid his "father" farewell with the request that he be allowed to take two drums of deisel fuel from the area to Bacolod in order to get his fishing boats operating again on Lake Lanao. This could not be permitted in spite of a strong desire to grant his request a hundredfold in order to clear our area of these hazardous supplies.

Several hundred drums of gasoline and deisel fuel were strewn across our front in rather sizeable caches. We entertained no doubt but that these caches were well known to the Jap - everything

else was - and must have presented tempting targets to his airmen. Yet they were never molested. The Jap must have clung to the idea of capturing the supply intact. Repeated effort had been made to induce Force Headquarters to remove this menace from our area. The answer was always a flat "No" without explanation.

Later, after all interisland shipping had been destroyed, Force agreed to the removal of this fuel to the interior. The reason given for earlier refusals was that it was to remain near the beaches to be readily available for the refueling of ships which were expected to arrive. No fuel had even been taken from any of these exposed caches to refuel any ships that did put into Bugo. However we breathed easier when the last drum of these inflammables had been trucked to the interior.

Maulana left for his home but was back again in about a week. On the occasion of his return, in a flowery speech, he presented his adopted father with an exquisite dagger which, he said, had been the ceremonial weapon of his real father. In spite of my protests at accepting such a valuable heirloom, his hurt insistence won out. The dagger was a beautiful thing. Its polished blade was set in a hilt of intricately wrought gold. The lacy flower designs in bold relief were in turn set with many seed pearls; and a scabbard encased with pure gold, with encircling bands in intriguing relief made up a princely gift - one that I cherished as an interesting "objet d' art". The Japs deprived me of this at Karenko, Formosa and gave me a receipt for it. The

confiscation was officially completed at Shirakawa, Formosa, when they took away the receipt.

The little datu now attached himself to me as my constant body-guard. Where I went he followed at a discreet distance. When I was engaged in conference or transacting business indoors he maintained his vigil outside. He played the role of shadow until we received the news of the invasion of Cotabato and Parang to the west. His concern for the safety of his home and people led him to request that he be excused that he might return to Bacolod.

We said good-bye. A few days later the Japs came in at Macajalar Bay. The fate of the little datu remains unknown.

The ammunition situation on Mindanao had been considerably improved during the month of February by the 800,000 rounds from the submarine and the shipment from the Coast Farmer, as well as the smaller amounts brought in by bombers from the East Indies at intervals. All of this increase had been placed in Force Reserve and none issued to the troops with the exception of General Vachon's division, which received 28,500 rounds of caliber .30; and Colonel Chastaine's brigade, to which was allotted 160,500 rounds of caliber .30 and 14,365 rounds of caliber .50 for the machine guns. Both of these units were in contact with the enemy - Vachon's in the Cotabato-Davao area and Chastaine's in the Davao-Agusan sector. While no major engagements took place at this time there were daily encounters with enemy patrols, in addition

to periodic minor skirmishes with Japanese irregulars, composed of reservists from the Davao area, only partly armed and equipped as well as with Imperial troops.

It was reiterated that the mission of the 102nd Division was to defend on the beaches of Macajalar Bay to deny the Del Monte Air Base to the enemy. Establishment of effective defensive positions required continuous search for materials that could be utilized as obstacles, revetment and protection. Organized parties were sent up on the plateau to search out and recover barbed wire from ranch fences. The cattle from these ranches had for some time been herded into remoter and safer areas. We had been successful in procuring sufficient wire by this procedure to construct the first defensive apron along the beach at the low water mark. We were well started on our second line of entanglement when Colonel Morse stopped by and handed me, with a wink, the following note:

Morse must have been struck by my speechless and amazed expression, for he said in a softer than characteristic tone, "What'n hell are you tearing down the General's fences for?"

While Morse and I were discussing other means of effecting defensive obstacles, the officer in charge of the barbed-wire salvaging party came up with the story of having been ordered out of the area by General Sharp. He had, however, managed to bring in the wire he had removed before being discovered by the General!

Actually the fence in the vicinity of CPY* was down in several places and served no useful purpose -- either to keep cattle in or the Jap out.

Morse left with the parting shot, "Why don't you try other areas? But if I were you I wouldn't take any more wire from CPI -- at least in daylight!"

Wire salvaging continued until, little by little, we completed the second line of double apron entanglements, with some left for further protection of our machine gun emplacements.

The heavily branched tops of bamboo were cut, dried and sharpened to needle points. These were stretched across the regimental front covering the third defensive line. This bamboo was securely staked to the earth and resembled nothing so much as huge tumbleweeds, but presented an abattis equally as formidable as the barbed wire.

Traps were improvised from bamboo by securely tying at right angles to a wide strip of bamboo several smaller but thicker

strips, the free ends of which were sharpened. The wide strip was bent into a circle by bringing the ends together and securing them. A restraining band was then fixed near the sharpened, free ends in order to constrict them into a much smaller circle and at the same time allow sufficient flexibility of the lower part of the sharpened strips to permit a human foot to slip through it easily. These traps resembled a bamboo strip cage in the form of a truncated cone. The cones were fitted, narrow end down, into holes and securely fastened near ground level by means of passing long spikes through the top and into the earth. Camouflaging the opening completed the installation. Once a foot had gone into this trap there was no way to get the foot out without removing the trap from the excavation, or taking time out to whittle away the tough bamboo prongs. The more one tugged and struggled to extricate the foot, the more the sharpened sticks would gouge the flesh. These were known throughout the Division as Jap-traps, and were highly regarded. While they were responsible for a few Jap casualties during the attack against our beach positions, their use was not sufficiently wide-spread to effect any considerable results. It did, however, make the Jap wary of moving rapidly on foot in these areas and did pin a few of them down for our riflemen.

Hand grenades were not available, but bamboo again furnished the material for improvisation. A half-stick of dynamite, a percussion cap and short piece of fuse fitted snugly into a bamboo tube made up our grenades. But lack of matches or an adequate

supply of dry punk or long-burning cigars added to the tropical dampness to render this instrument of doubtful value. It had no fragmentation effect, depending entirely on concussion for its efficacy. But each of our soldiers was armed with four of these gadgets and a more liberal supply was cached at the automatic weapons positions.

A beautiful specimen of locally-manufactured hand grenade had been sent down to us for test. It conformed in appearance to our regular military grenade except that it was at least three times as large. It packed a terrific wallop. There were only two faults with it. These were its size, which precluded the small Filipino from throwing it far enough away from himself to escape being killed by the blast; and even had this been correctible there was still the inability to manufacture in quantity sufficient to arm even a small percentage of the troops.

I am reminded at this point of my first meeting with Colonel Frissell. He came into my area and introduced himself, presenting me with a bottle of pale, orange-colored liquid, the label of which bore several Chinese hieroglyphics. Frissell assured me that it was excellent orange wine and that I would find it a veritable nectar. In spite of the fact that it resembled nothing so much as a bottle of pop I was pleased by the implied promise, and gratefully acknowledged his thoughtfulness. Then the purpose of his visit rapidly materialized.

He had learned on good authority, so he said, that I had a supply - and the only supply in the southern islands - of several

hundred real, honest-to-Gawd hand grenades and he felt that it would be extremely inconsiderate of me if I didn't "divvy-up". No amount of protestation convinced Frissell that I didn't have caves of grenades hidden away. I don't think he believes it to this day. The fact is, if he had seen any grenades in the Philippines he had seen more of them than I had.

He didn't get any grenades, and I kept the wine -- which turned out to be as innocuous as the myth of the grenades.

Molotov cocktails were made from bottles filled with gasoline and wrapped with a rag which could be soaked with gasoline and ignited at the time of use. This was supposed to be effective against modern tanks, by covering the tank with flames and thereby roasting the occupants. Anyway it was a bit of a morale factor. We even had five-gallon demijohns filled with gasoline and tied with the rags to dump on the tanks from the steep walls along the serpentine Sayre Highway where it climbed tortuously to the Bukidnon plains.

The bridges in the area were prepared for demolition with heavy charges of fused dynamite fixed to the critical members of the bridge. Drums of Diesel fuel were placed at each end of the bridges and a demolition guard stationed at each bridge to prevent sabotage of the explosive and incendiary. This guard was also charged with demolishing the structure at a specific prearranged signal or on a direct order from the regimental commander or delegated staff officer. For the most part the destruction of these

bridges could only impede the lateral movement of the enemy in the beach areas and could not seriously hamper his frontal thrust against our positions.

Explosive charges had been previously placed along the steep climb of the Sayre Highway from Tinao to the plain. These demolitions were designed to blast out sections of the road where it clung to the canyon walls and where it offered the greatest difficulty for bridging or reconstruction.

When this portion of the road was included in the sector of the 61st Field Artillery, a thorough inspection of the demolitions was instituted. This inspection revealed rotten fuzes and a completely erroneous concept of effective demolitions. Charges had generally been placed where their intended destruction would have been ineffectual and in every case the amount of explosive was pitifully inadequate.

In this area the Sayre Highway was THE artery of traffic to the interior. If this road were denied to the enemy he would be forced to negotiate the rugged trails and canyons and expose himself to ambush and guerrilla tactics. The necessity of insuring adequate measures to deny the enemy access to the plains via this route was apparent. It was the critical point and without doubt would form the focus of the Jap invasion in the Macajalar area.

Three points were selected which, if blown out, promised to create an effective barrier to Jap progress along the Sayre

Highway. The two lower of these proposed to eliminate a size-able section of the road where it clung to the side of a cliff and could not be by-passed without major engineering operations. The third proposed to eliminate a knife-edge section of the road. Each end of the knife-edge continued between precipitous cliffs. This location was determined to be the principal demolition. It would require the enemy to resort to extensive bridging operations and could be effectively covered by our machine-guns from well-camouflaged positions.

Work on the principal demolition was undertaken immediately. The general scheme of preparation was to cut down to more precipitous slopes each side of the narrow link; to bore several transverse tunnels well below the road surface to receive the charges and to join the charges for simultaneous explosive effect. Something over 200 cases of dynamite and several one-hundred pound aviation demolition bombs were tamped into the tunnels and wired for detonation by electrical means.

Two demolition experts from the 440th Ordnance Company (Bomb) were procured by Division and attached to the 61st F. A. for general supervision of the project. (Walter N. Alexander, Pfc., Ord, and Alton L. Arnold, Pfc., Ord.) These men merit much praise for their knowledge, diligence and devotion to duty and rendered commendable service toward the success of the operation. Labor was furnished by the 61st Field Artillery initially, but later highway construction gangs were placed on the work in a night and day race

against time to complete the installation prior to the imminent invasion. Only a matter of days lay between the completion of the project and the arrival of the Mip. The road-bed at this point had been so narrowed as to restrict traffic to one way at a time. Machine guns located to the south-east and to the west effectively covered the mined area to discourage and impede bridging efforts by Jap engineers.

Neither time, labor nor explosives were available to complete the other two projected mines.

This was the period of continuous efforts to improve discipline, training and morale; to perfect organization and supply, to spot and correct weakness in our defenses within the means and materials at our disposal. This was the period during which we prayed hardest for the miracle of qualified American officers in all units down to battery level. Leadership generally was unsatisfactory and depended on natural aptitude and inclination. Some of my Filipino officers had qualities of leadership to a marked degree and their courage and devotion to cause was unquestionable. The others needed much more training and experience to determine their true leadership values.

Continuous inspections, reconnaissances and surveys were mandatory to maintain a state of readiness and alertness.

During a routine night inspection of beach defenses, including the alertness of our outposts, Lt. Col. "Buck" Lewis and I had just left a .30 caliber machine gun position and were walking

along the beach in the deep shadows of the coconut palms. Suddenly I noticed that I was alone. Then from my left rear came a dry, scuffling sound, accompanied by a subdued epithet. Then a lusty "Damn my soul!" and "Hey! Colonel Tark! Help pry me out of this goddam foxhole!"

Buck was a big man -- six feet one and 190 pounds when he was eating regularly -- and he had stepped squarely into a fox-hole designed for the small Filipino soldier.

These fox-holes were revetted by gabions of woven bamboo strips, to prevent cave-ins. A Filipino soldier, hearing the commotion, came to investigate and with his help we were able, after a few minutes struggle, to extricate Lewis. But the gabion came with him and had to be peeled off after we hoisted him to the surface!

The next morning Buck was nursing a ruffled spirit and some rather painful abrasions as a result of his experience and was not in his usual mood for the "ribbing" which followed the exaggerated version of his attempt to disappear into a hole in order to get a little rest -- believing that what any Filipino could do, he could do better.

His sombre mood dissipated quickly with the arrival of Captain Price whom we hadn't seen since he left us on the ninth of January, and his irrepressible spontaneity completely reasserted itself when Price dramatically produced a bottle of spiritus frumenti and a carton of real tailor-made American cigarettes. This was an

impressive feat of legerdemain. We hadn't smelled an alcoholic cork or smoked anything short of atomic-powered native tobacco since we arrived on Mindanao. It was great to have Price with us again, for we had missed him more than we would admit. He was a thousand times endeared to us by this princely offering which, he told us, was wangled from the skipper of the sub that had put into Parang from Australia on the 14th, with badly needed ammunition for Mindanao.

His arrival was doubly apropos since it furnished the ingredients for a little celebration in honor of Wollman's recent appointment as a 2nd lieutenant, A.U.S. So Lewis, Wald, Price, Wollman and myself, through the haze of mild aromatic tobacco smoke and carefully treasured drinks of good liquor, summed up once more the general outlook of the Pacific war.

Price left us the next morning and we were back against reality again with our daily concerns.

Liaison between front line commanders was maintained by frequent visits to discuss problems common to the area, means of improving dispositions and ways of providing better mutual support.

I remember on one occasion making a hurried trip to consult Woodbridge about a matter that seemed urgent at the time, and finding only a corporal on duty at his headquarters. He jumped to attention and saluted in the best tradition of the Philippine Army.

"Colonel Woodbridge not here?" I demanded. I should have

known better.

"Yes, Ser", was the reply.

"Where is he?" I asked.

"But he is not here, Ser".

I had made the mistake of phrasing a question in a negative sense. Since I had stated in my question that Colonel Woodbridge was not there, the soldier was in full agreement and had answered grammatically, "Yes, Ser, he is not here".

"Do you know where I may find Colonel Woodbridge?" I queried further.

"But, Ser, he is out removing his bowels", was the serious answer.

This gave me one of the deepest laughs I had enjoyed since arriving in the Islands. It was difficult to stifle it so as not to offend the serious and courteous soldier.

This little bit of Filipino English had brought instantly to my mind a picture of good old Woody indulging in the time-honored Japanese custom of hari-kiri. But before long there was Woodbridge, his usual jovial self and apparently none the worse for this implied ordeal.

It was on this visit that Johnny pointed out on a central bulletin his standing offer of five pesos for every Jap skin brought in in good condition. "For my Jap-skin rug" he added facetiously.

Johnny Woodbridge enjoyed humor and was an accomplished story

teller, in addition to being a thoughtful and thoroughly capable officer.

A bit of humor and a bit of a laugh now and then was a real antidote for the depressing flow of news of our reverses and the successes of the enemy. It relieved the tension of waiting, with the ocean in our laps, for the local fight that was inevitable. Action would bring welcome relief to fagged brains, weary muscles, pent-up emotions and strained nerves.

And now the radio brought the dire news of the Bahu Pahat retreat of the British down the Malay Peninsula which ended with the fall of Singapore. Singapore, which by legend was the invincible fortress in the minds and hopes of many.

Singapore, guardian of the Straits, with her guns pointing hopelessly and futilely to sea; and the jungle-trained and experienced Jap warriors opposed by British soldiery, brave enough but still swaddled in the wraps of formal parade-ground training and the niceties of administration.

It was a tragic incident in the life of the British Empire. It was a tragic and discouraging event for Allied forces throughout the Pacific area to realize that more seasoned Nip troops would now be released for efforts elsewhere in the steady march of the Emperor's forces to the South.

It is certain that no one is prepared to state that Singapore could have withstood the onslaught of the victory-glutted Jap if the British soldiery had been adequately trained and

accustomed to jungle warfare. Discussion of this disaster with many of the surviving defenders leaves no room for doubt as to their courage and resourcefulness. The blame cannot attach to an individual or individuals, but to an unrealistic system of training for combat.

The retreat of the Malayan Forces from Bahu Pahat had culminated in their withdrawal over the half-mile causeway onto the island of Singapore. On 31 January the Battle of Malaya ended and the Battle of Singapore began.

As to the defense of Singapore, information not intended to be critical or condemnatory is presented herewith for its historical value and to focus attention primarily on a condition of unpreparedness which existed generally in all nations except those who applied the torch that set off the second world conflagration.

General Sir Archibald Percival Wavell, Supreme Commander of ABDACOM, combined American British, Dutch and Australian Forces, had left Singapore after a conference with the Malaya Commander, Lt. General Sir Arthur Ernest Percival. On Friday, 6 February, with General Wavell enroute to his headquarters in Java, the Malaya Commander issued his message of encouragement to the troops:

"We will hold Singapore! There is no question about it. Just because we do not see so many of our aircraft overhead and large naval vessels about, it does not mean the air force and navy have abandoned Singa-

pore. They have gone to places whence they can bomb the Japanese bases just as effectively and build up our naval strength."

By the eighth Singapore had been subjected to increased air attacks and reinforcing Jap columns ferried from the peninsula were rapidly developing their offense from the vulnerable land side of the fortress.

Under date of 10 February, General Percival received the following letter from General Wavell:

"It is certain that the troops in Singapore Island heavily outnumber any Japanese who have invaded the Straits. We must destroy them. Our whole fighting reputation is at stake and the honor of the British Empire.

"The Americans still hold out in the Bataan Peninsula against far heavier odds. The Russians are turning back the picked strength of the Germans. The Chinese with almost complete lack of modern equipment have held the greater part of their country against the full strength of the Japanese for four and a half years.

"It will be disgraceful if we yield our boasted fortress to inferior enemy forces. There must be no

thought of sparing the troops or civil population,
and no mercy must be shown in any shape or form.
Commanders and senior officers must lead their troops
and if necessary die with them. There must be no ques-
tion or thought of surrender. Every unit must fight it
out to the end in close contact with the enemy. Please
see that the above is brought to the notice of your
senior officers and by them to the troops. I look to
you and your men to fight to the end and prove that the
fighting spirit that won our Empire still exists to en-
able us to defend it."

"Singapore 10 Feb. 42"

"A. P. Wavell, General."*

By the fifteenth the Jap had gained a foothold within the fortress and was subjecting its defenders to increased devastating air attacks. On 15 February 1942, Percival issued this directive to his command:

"Immediate.

"G" Ops, 15 Feb 42.

"It has been necessary to give up the struggle but
I want the reasons explained to all ranks. The forward
troops continue to hold their ground but the essentials

* This quotation is believed to be reasonably accurate. Any inaccuracies are attributable to the illegibility of a war-damaged document.

of war have run short. In a few days we shall have neither petrol or food. Many types of ammunition are short and the water supply upon which the vast civil population are dependent threatens to fail. The situation has been brought about partly by our being driven off our dumps and partly by hostile air and artillery action. Without these sinews of war we cannot fight on. I thank all ranks for their efforts throughout the campaign."

"A. E. Percival,
Lt. Gen'l., Gen'l. Off., Comdg. Malaya Command."

The finale on the drama of the Singapore action elicited these remarks from Winston Churchill on 17 February:

"I have also been asked whether I will make a statement about the fall of Singapore. This extremely grave event was not unexpected and its possibility was comprised within the scope of the argument which I submitted to the House on the occasion of the vote of confidence three weeks ago."

The Prime Minister is also alleged to have made the following remarks in speaking before the House of Commons with reference to the Singapore surrender:

"I regret to have to give you the deplorable news of the fall of Singapore and the loss of Malaya to the Empire. The present is no time for recriminations and no purpose can be served in the public washing of dirty linen at this time. I pledge my word to the nation, however, that when the war is over, due punishment will be meted out to those responsible for the loss. For this I make myself personally responsible."

The above, while not offered as a verbatim statement, was purported to be a reasonably accurate paraphrase of a radio broadcast by Mr. Churchill over British Broadcasting Company facilities, according to a member of the Malaya Force, who personally gave it to the author in a Japanese Prisoner of War camp.

CHAPTER X

For some time General Chynoweth had not been satisfied with the progress of the "Baus Au" program. Since the convalescent hospital was now quite well-organized and running smoothly, the General called Major Deter away from his medical work temporarily and detailed him as the dynamo for the supply situation. Attacking this assignment with the same zealous diligence which characterized all his activities, Deter soon had built up a little civilian organization to assist with this job, including old Pop Heise and a Swiss member of the community, who were invaluable. In a very short time supplies were moving back into the mountains at a much more rapid rate.

The first objective of "Baus Au" was a six month's supply of food in the hills. Rice was the primary requirement since this is the main article of diet for the Filipino soldier, but polished rice cannot be kept for this long a period, hence it was necessary to store palay, or unhusked rice. This in turn required moving up into the hills a few small, portable mills necessary to husk or polish the rice. A large supply of canned goods had been procured from the rapidly diminishing stocks on the Island; a new fish cannery was started up on the northeastern coast, and a contract made with Mr. Hodges, an American who owned a large ranch, for five thousand head of cattle.

Sometimes the men complained bitterly that it was not going to sound very heroic when they had to tell their children that all they did in the war was to haul food back into the mountains, but Chynoweth was determined that no shortage of food should restrict operations against the invaders here as it was even then on Bataan, and as it did on some of the other islands later.

One of the minor problems which beset us all at this time was the shortage of tobacco. All forms of manufactured tobacco were long since exhausted. The raw, native tobacco available locally was lethal to palates accustomed to more mellow blends. In desperation, General Chynoweth concocted a mixture of his own, composed largely of corn silk and corn leaves cut up with a little of the native tobacco for flavor, plus a touch of licorice and with part of a bottle of cognac sprinkled over the mixture. He thought it not too bad. Certainly more innocuous -- and innoxious -- than the native weed. One evening in his nipa hut he offered Christie one of these smokes. The Chief of Staff had little more than lighted his cigarette, however, when he suddenly "recalled" an urgent matter which necessitated his return to headquarters at once. Perhaps it was Chynoweth's imagination that Christie eyed him contemptively for several days thereafter -- anyway he declined all subsequent proffers of cigarettes.

On 4 March Chynoweth received a radiogram from USAFFE advising him of the division of the Visayan-Mindanao Force into two separate commands, and assigning him as commanding officer of the

Visayan Force, with headquarters on Cebu. He was also informed that a suitable staff would be made available from officers in Luzon who would shortly be sent down. Although this assignment represented a promotion since the Visayan Force was comparable to a Corps, instead of a Division, which he had been commanding, Chynoweth was not at all pleased with the order. After months of effort the organization on Panay was just beginning to show some possibility of effectively carrying on for the duration of the war. The first six month's supply of food was just being completed in the hill masses; the guerrilla training classes were showing marked progress and the island was well-suited to guerrilla warfare. Cebu, on the other hand, is a long, narrow island, very thickly populated, heavily cultivated and with very little jungle or woodlands which are essential to guerrilla operations. The order meant that instead of carrying out his long-planned Robin Hood existence in the mountains of Panay, Chynoweth must now go to a much less suitable region, with correspondingly less chance of remaining in operation for any considerable period. However, there was nothing to do but go.

The staff which had been promised failed to materialize, which was not difficult to understand, unless the men were to be sent by submarine. Japanese operations throughout the Southern islands had recently been intensified. Cruisers and destroyers were numerous in the surrounding waters, and Cebu, particularly, was beginning to be subjected to a virtual blockade. Various

points on the island had been shelled and the intense air activity indicated a probable invasion of Cebu at a not too distant date.

By fifteen March, General Chynoweth had decided that it was impossible to wait longer for the staff from Luzon, and took off soon after dusk in a small tug, accompanied by Major Deter and Lt.

Gordon Benson, his aide, who with Capt. Tom Powell, Jr., his Division Engineer and devoted friend, would form the nucleus of the new staff on Cebu. Powell was to join them in a few days after completing some last minute details on his air field organizations. Christie, having been promoted to Brigadier General by Chynoweth, would remain in command on Panay, with Fliniau, McLennan, Velarde and the rest.

(Map #2)

As the goodbyes were being said young Peralta was overheard murmuring to one of his friends, "Well, I only hope the Japs don't pick him up on the way over!"

There seemed to be a very good chance that they would. The crossing to Negros was made without misadventure, however, and they were met at Pulapandan by Colonel Hilsman, who was then in command on Negros.

Hilsman was much perturbed and appealed to Chynoweth for assistance. President Quezon was on Negros. He had never gotten beyond this island. He was calling on Hilsman day and night for one thing after another, and the constant pressure was beginning to be a major problem.

Chynoweth advised Hilsman to tell Quezon frankly that he

must leave for the South. This Hilsman was extremely reluctant to do, fearing that it might antagonize the volatile Filipino, and implored Chynoweth to issue the ultimatum.

The hours of darkness within which the General must reach Cebu were passing rapidly. There was no time for palavering with presidents tonight. But Chynoweth promised that he would radio Quezon from Cebu the next morning.

Then it developed that the President was also planning to go to Cebu. He was having a house prepared there and expected to leave in a day or so. His ship, the Princess of Negros, was even then in the harbor at San Carlos awaiting his pleasure. Hilsman was greatly perturbed lest the Japs should pick Quezon up in Tañon Strait, and he, Hilsman, would be personally responsible for letting Quezon go.

(Map # 11)

Chynoweth assured Hilsman that he would back him up, and again promised to radio the President from Cebu the following morning. Then the General and Deter sped on around the northern tip of Negros to the port of San Carlos, from which a small motor ferry operated every night across the twenty-odd miles of channel to Toledo, Cebu. This was the stretch of water in which the Japanese warcraft which had been circling Cebu for days were concentrating.

Shortly after pushing off from San Carlos the skipper of the little boat stopped the motor and rushed out in the bow to stare frenziedly off into the blackness. The suspense was agonizing.

MAP # 11 C E B U

(INITIAL ORGANIZATION)

Nothing materialized, however, and after an interval the motor was started again.

About midway across the strait numerous lights began to twinkle up and down the channel, in all directions. Deter questioned the skipper as to their probable meaning, and he replied, somewhat shakily, "They are feesherman, Ser -- I theenk!"

Some of them seemed a bit out-sized for fishermen, to Chynoweth, and evidently the skipper was of the same opinion, as he altered his course to give the nearest as wide a berth as possible. It was not a comfortable situation. Chynoweth looked at Deter, who grinned and shrugged his shoulders -- and with one accord they stretched out on a bench, pulled up a blanket, and went to sleep.

Dawn was touching the waves as the little boat tied up at the Toledo pier. Nothing had happened -- yet.

Captain Bill Miner awaited them on the dock, a silent, solemn-looking youngster, but a very able officer. As their car wound higher and higher up the mountain which parallels the coast shellfire sounded in the harbor below them. A Japanese destroyer had come in and was shelling installations on the docks and in the harbor area.

They were safe by a margin of perhaps twenty minutes.

The little ferry boat was captured and towed away; after which the destroyer re-crossed the Strait, shelled San Carlos and captured the Princess, which was still waiting for Quezon.

During the drive across the island to the city of Cebu where Colonel Scudder, the Island Commander, had his headquarters, General Chynoweth studied his surroundings closely, estimating the suitability of the island for guerrilla activities, and the more he saw the less he liked it. In this area, at least, all woodlands had been cleared to make way for cornfields and other crops. Every possible inch was under cultivation, yet the people did not appear to be too well fed. Population was much more dense on this island than on Panay.

There was a great deal of heavy concrete emplacement work on the road itself, and many heavy tank obstacles had been constructed, but it seemed to be quite obvious that these could be avoided without great difficulty. Apparently any enemy mechanized advance from the west coast would be made without serious impediment, except for a few spots along the crest of the mountain range where demolitions of bridges could cause delays.

Arriving in Cebu City the General found Colonel Scudder intensely occupied issuing orders to his various units concerning enemy activities taking place at that moment on the island. An enemy landing had been attempted on the northeast coast at Danao and Lt. Commander Barron, a Naval officer functioning with the Army, had been killed in the action. A second landing had been reported on the south coast, but this later proved to be a false alarm. Intense air activity over the island, however, especially of photo-reconnaissance planes, indicated further assaults to be

(Map #2)

imminent.

Cebu was definitely too hot a spot for the President, and Chynoweth hastily dispatched to Hilsman, for delivery to Quezon, an urgent message informing him of the general situation and advising him by all means to proceed without delay to Mindanao. Mindful of his own narrow escape from Japanese naval craft, Chynoweth suggested that Quezon fly to Mindanao, since the Japs were in control of the waters.

The President, upon receiving this message, flew into one of his famous rages. He was born to command, not to follow! He would take orders from no one!

Nevertheless, the urgency and obvious sincerity of General Chynoweth's concern convinced the President of the necessity for his departure. Unfortunately, plans having been already perfected by the high command to evacuate the Quezon party by PT boat, General Chynoweth's statement concerning Japanese surface craft caused some confusion, which increased Quezon's irritation.

Two nights later Colonel Soriano, of Quezon's staff, met Lt. Bulkeley's PT boat in the midnight darkness at Dumaguette with the disturbing news that a radiogram had just been received from General Wainwright ordering the trip cancelled due to the heavy concentration of Japanese warcraft in the vicinity. However, Soriano believed that the President might consider it wiser to take his chances of interception on the trip than remain on Negros, where the obvious certainty of capture was only a question of time.

(Map #2)

Soriano suggested that Bulkeley talk it over with Quezon, who was staying with friends some 45 kilometers up the coast.

It was apparent that Wainwright's order had disturbed the President greatly. He was now between two fires. But after considerable discussion of the matter he reluctantly concluded to disregard Wainwright's order and proceed with the trip as planned.

Then a debate began, which soon grew quite heated, as to the amount of baggage which would accompany the party. The matter was finally settled when Bulkeley remarked acidly that his PT boat was not the Queen Mary!

Shortly before three AM the little ship bearing His Excellency and seventeen members of his family and staff pushed off into a black and wind-whipped sea, for Cagayan. Tempestous waves flung the small craft about viciously, and in a very short time the distinguished passengers all became quite ill. So much so that the President directed Bulkeley to change course and make for the nearest port on the Island of Mindanao, and "the hell with the prearranged schedule".

Dawn found them, sleepless and exhausted, at Oroquieta on the western shore of Iligan Bay. The thunder of the PT's motors having roused the water-front, inquisitive as children the natives came flocking -- as soon as they had satisfied themselves that the visitors were friendly! When the identity of the passengers was discovered there was great excitement, and the owners of the few good passenger cars still available vied with each other for the

(Map #3)

privilege of transporting His Excellency to Dansalan, Lanao.

Dietrich's Inn at Dansalan was an excellent hotel and the greatly-fatigued President planned to spend a day or so resting and recuperating before continuing the journey to Del Monte, from which planes were to transport the party to Australia and safety.

Apprised of the approach of the presidential party, General Fort, commanding the Lanao sector, met the dignitaries near Kolambugan with a guard of honor and escorted them into the city. General Sharp, at Del Monte, also notified of the arrival of the President, advised Quezon that when he was ready to continue his trip a safeguard would be provided along the route to Del Monte.

Back on Cebu, General Chynoweth found that little preparation had been made for guerrilla warfare. Near kilometer Post 32 on the Talisay-Toledo Road several storage huts had been erected large enough to contain a six-months' supply of foodstuffs, but none had been cached in the mountains with the exception of a few small stores in the vicinity of Camp X.

Camp X was an old Bureau of Forestry installation situated at the top of the mountain pass across the backbone of the island. The command post was located in a very deep hollow immediately alongside the road, while various other dugouts beneath the nearby hills were intended for the storage of food and other supplies. This area could not have been defended by the forces available on the island for more than two or three days, at the outside, and

they then would have been cut off from retreat into the forested area of the Balamban Mountains. This was a national forest reserve, and the only spot on the island suitable for guerrilla operations.

This plan had been inherited by Scudder from the preceding commander and was not primarily his brain child.

The more Chynoweth studied the mountain situation the more perturbed he became. There were only two solutions. Either the troops could make an heroic attack on the Japanese landing and fight and die on the beach -- which, judging by the character of the troops available and the paucity of equipment, would last perhaps at best a few days; or a valiant effort could be made with available means to comply with MacArthur's directive which had indicated that what he wanted was not the Spartan death, but the maintenance of American-Filipino resistance as long as possible, on each island. This, in order to facilitate the ultimate preparations for relief of the islands by incoming American forces.

Actually the existing dispositions on Cebu were such that neither plan could be effectively carried out. The troops were dispersed over a wide area some 15 to 20 miles long on the east coast, with small forces scattered along the west coast, some 20 miles away, none within mutual supporting distance. Troops were pinned to areas in accordance with established area dumps of food supplies and movement further curtailed by the serious shortage of transportation. Under these circumstances it would have been virtually impossible to fight any one fixed engagement. Few, if

any, of the troops could form a junction at Camp X, which had been specified as the ultimate defensive position. Those who did would be unable to maintain a defense of the area with any appreciable success.

(Map #12)

It would never be possible to organize Cebu for guerrilla activities as well as Panay had been, but Chynoweth began at once to make such preparations as were practicable.

In the pier bodegas in Cebu City were some ten thousand tons of food supplies, as well as a considerable supply of ammunition, which had come up from Australia, intended for Bataan. There was no possibility of getting ships through at this time. These supplies were under the jurisdiction of the quartermaster, Colonel John D. Cook, who was not subject to General Chynoweth's command but operated with direct responsibility to Corregidor. Nevertheless, Chynoweth directed Cook, as a tactical measure, to start at once with all the transportation he could gather, to move the food and ammunition back into the mountains, where it could be hidden and available for use, under any situation. Cook replied that these items would, in theory, remain under his control, but that he would carry out the General's orders.

Chynoweth's plan here would be as nearly like that on Panay as the topography of the island would permit. The food and ammunition would be secreted in many small, scattered caches, high in the mountains, so that a certain percentage of supplies would be available under almost any circumstances.

M A P #12 C E B U

(Final Defensive Plan)

The main handicap, again, was lack of time. It had taken many months to accomplish the objective on Panay. Here it appeared that there would be only a few weeks - possibly days - before the Japs launched the invasion.

"In that case", mused Chynoweth to himself, "we'll last about fifteen minutes on some dam' beach, and it'll all be over!"

For the moment, due to the extremely limited and fixed communications set-up, as well as the dominant food situation, no improvements in troop dispositions were possible. Permission was therefore secured by radio from Corregidor to bring Colonel Arthur J. Grimes over from Bohol, with his battalion, to plug a vital gap on the Toledo road just west of Camp X. In the event of an enemy landing on the west coast this would provide a pivot of maneuver which would enable troops in the area to retreat into the mountains without being cut off.

The most intensive troop training possible in guerrilla methods and tactics was instituted, and some progress made. Ultimately a small amount of telephone wire was acquired, permitting certain improvements in the communications system, in addition to the establishment of an alternate command post on a hilltop some three-quarters of a mile northwest of Camp X, in a much sounder tactical position.

During this period Japanese air reconnaissance over Cebu had been stepped up. One afternoon an observation plane made a

crash-landing just off the beach near the observation post at San Fernando. A banca was dispatched to search the area for documents and survivors. No trace of the pilot was found but the apparently uninjured observer was picked up and brought ashore where he was placed under guard and escorted to Headquarters in Cebu City. Due precautions were observed to prevent him from carrying out his intention, announced to Sgt. deVera, the interpreter, of committing hari-kiri.

The crash had been observed by an enemy cruiser and two destroyers which were operating rather close in-shore at the time, preparatory to firing on nearby targets. Abandoning their objective, the ships steamed rapidly to the scene of the crash, landing some 200 troops on the beach just north of San Fernando.

When word of the landing was received at Headquarters, Major Ernest V. Jordan, Visayan Force Operations Officer, with a battalion of the 82nd Infantry was ordered to San Fernando at once to repel the invaders. By the time Major Jordan arrived with his troops, however, the enemy had withdrawn.

During the next few days Jap planes dropped pamphlets over Cebu and along the eastern coast of Negros, offering "suitable rewards for information" concerning the fallen airman and "his surrender to the Japanese Imperial Navy on the beach at San Fernando".

The prisoner, who gave his name as Yeshuda, had at first professed neither to speak nor understand English and although at a

later date he did both, little information of value was ever obtained from him. His rank was never ascertained but from the strenuous and protracted efforts of the Japanese to obtain information regarding him it was believed that he must be someone of importance in Japan.

At the time Chynoweth and Deter had arrived on Cebu there was no field hospital in existence and no medical personnel available to staff one. The Medical Battalion remaining on Cebu was utilizing the facilities of the Southern Islands Hospital in Cebu City, and had established secondary facilities at Uhling, Adloan and kilometer Post 19. With his characteristic energy, Major Deter had promptly gone to work to dig up volunteer nurses and others who were qualified, and with the help of the local public health officer, Captain Floyd Hawks, organized a field hospital on a hill not far from Camp X. Meriting special recognition in connection with this hospital is Charlotte Martin, wife of Captain C. John Martin, whose exceptional ability and unceasing efforts were of inestimable value.

Meanwhile, Captain Tom Powell, Jr., Chynoweth's engineer officer, had completed his airfield installations on Papay and arrived in Cebu where he began immediately checking demolitions plans. Mr. Cushing, who General Chynoweth says was on a par with Peralta for daring, energy and aggressiveness, and Mr. Victor Paris, who had volunteered his services at the outbreak of war, had done

an outstanding job. Ably assisted by other loyal Americans* every step had been taken, as far as could be foreseen, to ensure the utmost damage to all military objectives and installations which the Japanese might otherwise capture in the event of a landing.

Chynoweth was greatly pleased to have Tom with him again. Not only was the youngster an excellent engineer, he possessed a stimulating and congenial personality and Chynoweth had grown to admire and depend on him during the previous dark months on Panay.

On 30 March word was received from Corregidor that the Navy would, within a few days, begin a transfer of supplies from Cebu to Corregidor by submarine and Chynoweth was directed to make the necessary arrangements. The plan was for the submarines to surface as close inshore as practicable, unload their torpedoes, take on the food and medicines and make a run for the Rock. At best it was an exceedingly hazardous maneuver and everyone concerned was very anxious about it.

The first submarine, carrying approximately forty tons of supplies, arrived at Corregidor the night of 8 April, the second the night of 9 April, one jump ahead of the devil. Both escaped safely due largely, perhaps, to the fact that Japanese attention was focused on the white flag of prostrate Bataan on that tragic 9 April.

The next morning the Japs launched the invasion of Cebu.

* Messrs Merchant, Kitchen, Hale, Garretson and Dr. Marsden.