

CHAPTER XVI

R A D I O G R A M

For reception only

May 6, 1942.

TO SHARP 3CF V 20 X

ALL FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES EXCEPT  
THOSE ON FORTIFIED ISLANDS AT ENTRANCE TO MANILA  
BAY ARE HEREBY RELEASED TO YOUR COMMAND. INFORM  
ALL CONCERNED. REPORT AT ONCE TO MACARTHUR FOR  
ORDERS. I BELIEVE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THE MOTIVE  
BEHIND THIS ORDER.

WAINWRIGHT.

The portentous implication of this message to General Sharp confirmed the worst fears concerning the hapless garrisons on Corregidor and its satellite forts. Obviously confronted by the ultimate disaster of surrender, Wainwright sought to prevent carrying the southern islands down in defeat with him. Additional verification of these conclusions was received by General Sharp when, following closely upon the first message, a second arrived - from Melbourne:

May 6, 1942.

BNDL DE VNDN

RADIO MELBOURNE CK 37

WAINWRIGHT HAS SURRENDERED. FROM NOW ON COMMUN-  
ICATE ON ALL MATTERS DIRECT WITH ME. HAVE YOU  
COMMUNICATION WITH CHYNOWETH?

MACARTHUR.

The tragedy of the overwhelmed Luzon Force, while not unexpected, was nevertheless a staggering blow, especially - as the news spread by "bamboo wireless" - to troop morale. Many of the soldiers on Mindanao had families, relatives and friends on Luzon and apprehension for their safety became acute. Some men abandoned themselves completely to despair, while in others the desire for vengeance was exhibited in more zealous and unrelenting efforts at exterminating the foe at hand.

At 11:32 PM on the night of 7 May, broadcast\* over the Japanese controlled Manila radio, came a voice which the Japanese announced introduced as General Wainwright's. This voice, husky with suppressed emotion, now proceeded to make statements and issue orders which caused universal consternation wherever they were heard. Reiterating the terrible fact of the surrender of the fortified islands to the enemy, Wainwright announced his re-assumption of command of all United States forces in the Philippines as a prelude to directing the complete surrender of these

\*See appendix #9 for text of broadcast.

troops also!

Many of the listeners, failing to recognize or being unfamiliar with Wainwright's voice, considered the broadcast only another tiresome link in the long chain of efforts by the Japs to spread confusion and create disorder among the Filipinos. Those who did recognize the General's voice through the exhaustion and strain which were evident, considered it most probable that the message had been issued under duress and therefore not legally binding.

However, Wainwright had stated that an officer of his staff, Colonel Jesse T. Traywick, was being sent to General Sharp with a letter of instructions\* which he was directed to scrupulously carry out. This precious interval before the arrival of the courier would, at least, afford time to communicate with Australia and obtain a directive from MacArthur. Meanwhile there would be no cessation of operations throughout the southern islands.

During the next day or so Jap planes dropped hundreds of messages repeating the fact of the downfall of Corregidor and urging the troops to lay down their arms, forsake "imperialistic America, and cooperate with Nippon".

During the afternoon of 9 May a somewhat larger plane circled the area also dropping leaflets which, in the light of the preceding days' activities, were for some time disregarded. Finally some curious soul idly picked one up, discovering the following message in the stilted, oddly-phrased English of the

\*See appendix # 10 for text of letter.

372

Japanese:

"TO: Commanding Officer of the Front Line.

I, having a very important message from Lieut. General J. M. Wainwright, must deliver it personally to Major General William F. Sharp.

When any one who receive this letter, he should raise a white flag visible to the Japanese Army and stop firing and the Japanese Army will do the same.

When both sides stop firing, you send a U. S. A. officer to the front line with a white flag, I will meet him.

In order to deliver my message to General Sharp as soon as possible you should be prepared to furnish a guide and a car for me.

Signed Jesse T. Traywick, Jr.,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
United States Army,  
May 9, 1942."

Colonel Traywick, a virtual hostage, was accompanied by a representative from General Honma's staff, Colonel Haba, and brought with him, in addition to the Japanese instructions for conducting the surrender, a personal letter to Sharp from Wainwright which emphasized repeatedly the necessity for complete and precise compliance with the conditions as laid down by the victors:

HEADQUARTERS

United States Forces in the Philippines

Fort Mills, P. I.

7 May 1942.

Subject: Surrender

To: Major General William F. Sharp, Jr., Commanding  
Visayan-Mindanao Force.

To put a stop to further useless sacrifice of  
human life on the Fortified Islands, yesterday I tendered  
to Lieut. General Homma, the Commander-In-Chief of the  
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, the surrender  
of the four harbor forts of Manila Bay.

General Homma declined to accept my surrender  
unless it included the forces under your command. It be-  
came apparent that the garrisons of these forts would be  
eventually destroyed by aerial and artillery bombardment  
and by infantry supported by tanks, which have overwhelmed  
Corregidor.

After leaving General Homma with no agreement be-  
tween us I decided to accept in the name of humanity his  
proposal and tendered at midnight, night of 6-7 May, 1942,  
to the senior officer on Corregidor, the formal surrender  
of all American and Philippine Army troops in the Philippines.  
You will therefore be guided accordingly, and will repeat will  
surrender all troops under your command both in the Visayan

Islands and Mindanao to the proper Japanese officer. This decision on my part, you will realize, was forced upon me by means entirely beyond my control.

Colonel Jesse T. Traywick, Jr., G. S. C., my Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, who will deliver this to you is fully empowered to act for me. You are hereby ordered by me as the senior American Army officer in the Philippines to scrupulously carry out the provisions of this letter, as well as such additional instructions as Colonel Traywick may give you in my name.

You will repeat the complete text of this letter and of such other instructions as Colonel Traywick may give you by radio to General MacArthur. Let me emphasize that there must be on your part no thought of disregarding these instructions. Failure to fully and honestly carry them out can have only the most disastrous results.

(Signed)

J. M. WAINWRIGHT

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

Sharp's dilemma at this time was further complicated by the fact that, also on 9 May and prior to Traywick's arrival, he had received a radiogram from General MacArthur stating that "Orders emanating from General Wainwright have no validity" and containing instructions to deploy his forces and initiate guerrilla operations:

BNDL DE VNDN NRI MOST IMMEDIATE GR 84  
AG 676 9/5 AG676 ORDERS EMANATING FROM GENERAL WAIN-  
WRIGHT HAVE NO VALIDITY. IF POSSIBLE SEPARATE YOUR  
FORCE INTO SMALL ELEMENTS AND INITIATE GUERRILLA  
OPERATIONS. YOU, OF COURSE, HAVE FULL AUTHORITY TO  
MAKE ANY DECISION THAT IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY MAY DEMAND.  
KEEP IN COMMUNICATION WITH ME AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.  
YOU ARE A GALLANT AND RESOURCEFUL COMMANDER AND I AM  
PROUD OF WHAT YOU HAVE DONE.

MACARTHUR

0445 z/9

This communication placed the responsibility for a grave and momentous decision squarely on Sharp's shoulders. There were two factors which, in all probability, determined his course of action: One, that MacArthur had granted him "full authority" to act as he saw fit; and second, that it appears to have been the generally accepted belief that all persons on Corregidor would be massacred if the Japanese terms were not strictly complied with. No definite evidence is obtainable that such a specific threat was ever actually made by the Japanese, but there seems to have been no doubt of their intentions in the minds of those on whom this fateful decision rested.

It is true that Homma was quoted as saying to General Wainwright that "hostilities against the fortified islands will be continued unless the Japanese surrender terms are accepted". Considering the

fact that all arms on Corregidor larger than .45 caliber had already been destroyed, this could have been the basis for this belief.

Although Colonel Traywick and Colonel Haba had landed on Mindanao before dusk on the 9th, the complexities of the transportation situation, plus the difficulties in establishing contact with Sharp's Headquarters and the uncertain temper of the belligerents through whose lines they must pass, prevented an interview with the Mindanao Commander before the following morning. Sharp's decision would seem to have been fairly well crystalized before the conference however, since as early as 9:30 on the night of the 9th, units in the Sumilao-Dalirig sector had received orders to "stack arms and .....surrender at daybreak".

On the morning of 10 May - Sunday - General Sharp received Colonel Traywick and the Japanese representatives and the day was devoted to negotiations and formalities incidental to the accomplishment of the surrender. At 7:15 that night Sharp radioed MacArthur that he had "directed complete surrender", prompted by "dire necessity":

vndn V BNDL NR1

FOR MACARTHUR STOP I HAVE SEEN WAINWRIGHTS STAFF  
OFFICER AND HAVE WITHDRAWN MY ORDER RELEASING  
COMMANDERS ON OTHER ISLANDS AND DIRECTED COMPLETE  
SURRENDER DIRE NECESSITY ALONE HAS PROMPTED THIS  
ACTION

SIGNED SHARP

SENT AT 7:15 PM May 10/42



if actually emanating from Sharp, as having been issued under compulsion and therefore void, and was ignored.

In central Mindanao where telephone communication was still possible, the authenticity of the order was not open to question, but loud and long and caustic were the debates as to expediency, advisability or necessity, and biting recriminations flew.

As Traywick's unofficial disclosures to Sharp gained circulation however, some of the bitterest opposition subsided and the surrender of many of the central Mindanao units\* took place on the night of the 10th and on the 11th. Even Wilson in far-off Zamboanga turned over his command on the 12th, but it was not until the 22nd that liaison was established with General Fort. Colonel Dalton, with Major Prichard, had been dispatched on parole bearing Sharp's written order for the surrender. Moro guides had led them to Fort's well-concealed jungle position.

In a subsequent letter to General Sharp, General Fort said, in part:

"Many of my officers - and strange to relate, Filipino and Moro officers - encouraged me to disobey orders and continue the resistance (which I'll admit was a temptation) as my own small force was undefeated and growing stronger with the reorganization which I had undertaken. My officers, both American and Filipino, and many enlisted

\*Troops under command of General Vachon, Colonel Morse and Colonel Dalton.

322

men, were quite overcome with emotion and disappointed at this sad ending to our efforts to keep the flag flying, and I had some difficulty in holding some of them true to discipline".

The Lanao force was officially surrendered at Dansalan on 27 May, having lost, between 29 April and 5 May, approximately eighty percent of its Filipino strength in killed, missing and deserted. Price's one remaining 2.95 gun was also surrendered at this time.

Although most of the widely-scattered units of Chastaine's command had received their instructions on the 10th, the great distances to the designated assembly points and the difficulties of travel in this area caused delays.

In the lower Davao-Agusan area, Van Nostrand had received his orders at 3 PM on the 10th. At 6 PM that night the opposing forces opened a vicious attack, led by tanks, which lent wings to the heels of the troops withdrawing from the forward positions. By eleven o'clock that night the pursuing enemy had reached Kilometer 72 where they were delayed by a wrecked bridge for approximately three hours. The destruction of a second bridge lengthened the distance behind the retreating 81st Infantry, which reached Camp Kalao without further contact.

By the 19th the regiment, including some five hundred malaria

patients from the hospital at Moncayo, had reached Butuan by baroto and bamboo raft, and the surrender of these troops was accomplished the following day.

On this same day Lt. Colonel Roy D. Gregory arrived on foot from Anakan, accompanied by 31 enlisted men, most of whom were from an Air Corps group which had been stationed at Anakan airfield. Others were enlisted personnel of the Navy from the wrecked PT boats.

It was not until 30 May however, that the surrender of all the divergent elements of this sector was finally completed.

Meanwhile, there had been hell to pay in the Visayas. Colonel Cornell, on Leyte, had received Sharp's first order (later rescinded) on 9 May, which released all subordinate commanders from responsibility to Force Headquarters and directed the immediate institution of guerrilla activities. When the order for surrender was received on the following day, the movement of his troops into previously prepared mountain positions, already well under way, was not discontinued, Cornell refusing to acknowledge this latest message as authentic.

On Cebu, General Chynoweth had not received the May ninth release, hence Sharp's radiogram of the tenth in which he "resumed command" of the Visayan-Mindanao Force before directing the surrender, was quite incomprehensible. Furthermore, the fact that the message was not coded appeared to Chynoweth to indicate even more strongly enemy trickery, and the decision was accordingly made to ignore it.

Meanwhile, the Japanese commander on Cebu was also making repeated

efforts to obtain Chynoweth's surrender. Prisoners captured during the action on the island were sent up into the hills with increasingly stern demands for capitulation, the last of which, brought up by Colonel Deter, embodied an ultimatum to the effect that "if you do not comply by May 14, we will launch a fierce attack and will take no more prisoners". Deter urged Chynoweth to accept. He said the Japs meant business this time.

The General sent Deter back with a message stating that "I consider that General Wainwright's order was issued under duress and is not legally binding upon me. ....we do not feel that we can honorably surrender". This was on May 12.

Chynoweth then sent copies of the Jap letter and his own reply to all of his own groups. Not wanting to destroy them by what he chose to call his own stubbornness, he authorized any of them who wished to surrender individually to do so. Much to his pride and exaltation not a single one of the American Army officers - either regular or reserve - took advantage of this offer. Two Filipinos, one of whom had been suspected of collaborationist leanings, an American Naval officer and an American civilian did surrender at this time.

The troops were demoralized by the gossip concerning the surrender. Osmena reported to Chynoweth that the men were still loyal, but they were bewildered and frightened and were fading into the bush by the dozens.

Cebu could never be good guerrilla territory and the General

now decided that if he and his staff were to continue to elude capture and remain in operation their best bet would be to return to Panay, which had from the first offered the best prospects of sustained and effective guerrilla warfare. Suspecting that the direct route via Negros would be too closely guarded by the enemy at this time, it was decided to move first to Leyte, thence by cautious stages in a wide circle to the north, island-jumping by sailboat, landing on Panay's rugged northwestern coast which gave quick access to the mountains.

Meanwhile, a message from Christie on Panay to Sharp was picked up by the Cebu radio. In characteristically blunt phrases Christie not only questioned the validity of the surrender order, but the necessity and even the advisability of compliance without MacArthur's approval even if authentic, on the grounds that "it may be treason". Furthermore, Christie saw no reason why his thoroughly intact and capable command should be surrendered "because some other unit has gone to hell, or some Corregidor shell-shocked terms are issued without proper verification....."

The depressed Cebu contingent were vastly cheered by Christie's buoyantly courageous declarations of ability, and anticipated with great satisfaction joining forces with him again.

Three days after the interception of Christie's radio message and on the day scheduled for their departure for Leyte, a courier arrived from Negros by sailboat, bearing a letter from Hilsman stating that he had evidence sufficient to convince him that the

surrender radiogram signed by Sharp was indeed authentic, and that a staff officer from Visayan-Mindanao Force Headquarters was en-route to conduct the necessary formalities.

"That knocked us into a tailspin", says Chynoweth. "To me, the entire question at this time was, 'what did General MacArthur want'? If MacArthur wanted us to surrender, there was nothing to do but surrender. If he didn't, we weren't going to surrender. That was the situation."

"If General Sharp was actually sending somebody to conduct the surrender it looked to me as though it must be from General MacArthur. I decided to hold off for the evening radio broadcast. We were hoping to receive some word from General MacArthur authorizing us to continue in action."

But the only word received that night was the stark statement over San Francisco's KGEI that MacArthur had reported all contact with the Philippines was now cut off!

This was final, then. The Philippines had been written off the books - for the time being, at least.

Perhaps, General Chynoweth now reasoned, MacArthur might prefer the capitulation at this time, if the relief expedition from the States were to require a considerable period of time to organize. Perhaps his statement that the Philippines were cut off actually meant that he could better proceed from his end if action were suspended in the Islands.

In the darkest hour of his life, Chynoweth dispatched a note

to the Japanese Chief of Military Administration in Cebu, Colonel Kawakami, advising him of the expected arrival of Sharp's emissary; and to all of his own groups telling of the latest developments and directing their assembly at Sudlon on the following morning, prepared to lay down their arms.

Only the belief that he was acting in accordance with the wishes of General MacArthur had prompted Chynoweth's acceptance of the order.

The headquarters of the Negros Sector at this time was located in the northern mountains, some ten or twelve miles from the city of Fabrica. A day or so after Wainwright's radio broadcast and before Sharp's envoy arrived, a letter was brought in to the Headquarters addressed to "Colonel Carter R. McLennan, Commanding Officer of Negros Island". The letter had come into the hands of Major Roque who commanded the battalion which was outposting the coast in the vicinity of San Carlos, through the capture of four Filipinos who stated that they were representatives of the Nipponese commander on Cebu and wished the letter transmitted to Colonel McLennan. (Map #2)

The letter was a demand that Colonel McLennan surrender the forces on the Island of Negros to the Japanese commander on Cebu. The letter further stated that this commander was making this demand on his own responsibility - presumably with the idea of adding a feather to his cap by stealing the Negros garrison from the commander on Panay, the officer designated by Homma to receive their surrender. Obviously, the Nips were unaware that Colonel Hilsman

had returned to Negros and superseded McLennan in command.

It appeared to McLennan that an interview with the four collaborators might prove diverting, perhaps even amusing, and God knows anything in that category was more than welcome in those days. Accordingly - the war being at a standstill so far as this uninvasion island was concerned - McLennan set out the following morning for Vallehermosa to meet Roque. In a large farmhouse near Roque's command post the emissaries, under guard, were introduced as Colonel Valeriano, "Peiping" Osmena and two Cebu attorneys. Valeriano, prior to the arrival of the Nips, had been Chief Inspector for the Visayan-Mindanao section of the Philippine Constabulary. Tall for a Filipino, he was handsome and dignified, with an excellent military carriage, but possessed of a greatly inflated opinion of his own importance and as a natural result cut the usual capers of a pompous ass. He was heartily disliked by his subordinates, most of whom he had antagonized by his pomposity and unreasonableness. Osmena was the blacksheep son of the (then) Vice-President of the Philippines. He had been in numerous scrapes with the police and was reputed to have led a distinctly checkered career. Neither the names nor the reputations of the two attorneys are a matter of record, but a logical deduction would be that they were birds of a feather.

The mission of these four unsavory characters, according to their story, was that they had been sent by the Nipponese commander of Cebu to set up a civil government on Negros. Valeriano, naturally, was most interested with the establishment of the Constabulary, the others



concerning themselves with different branches of the government. They had brought with them several bundles of posters ballyhooing the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and setting forth the might of the Nip armed forces, plus announcements of the great advantages of Nip-Filipino cooperation. In smaller bundles were announcements of police regulations and other restrictions which were to be "temporarily" imposed on the citizenry; together with a number of blank warrants - in English - providing for the appointment of individuals to all the official offices on the Island from governors of the two provinces down to dog-catcher, at the pleasure of the Nip commander. It was all quite complete - except for the mere detail of surrender.

Eventually the subject of the surrender was approached. McLennan inquired as to what proposal they had to offer. The emissaries replied that they had none. They were then asked what terms the Nipponese commander who had sent them had directed them to offer. Their reply again was that they had no instructions as to any terms.

It was then pointed out to them that, if any surrender were to be effected, there must be terms and conditions stated, such as the place, date and hour of surrender; determination as to where and how the surrendered troops were to be housed and fed, and so on; and that unless some very definite arrangements were made beforehand there could be no surrender for no one would know where, when or how to surrender anything to anybody. This appeared to the confused emissaries as quite logical, but they had no solution to offer - in fact

until the matter had been explained to them had apparently not given the details much thought.

Outwardly poker-faced, inwardly chuckling at the discomfiture of these four scamps, McLennan stalled the conference along for quite a while, apparently seriously discussing point after point concerning which the envoys had no instructions and, consequently, no solution. McLennan had brought with him to the conference Lt. Colonel Mantilla and Lt. Colonel Bololong, Constabulary Inspectors for the provinces of Occidental and Oriental Negros. They were enjoying the performance exceedingly, particularly the embarrassment and confusion of their former commanding officer, Colonel Valeriano, who had previously been so pompous and so self-assured but whose vocabulary was now limited to three words: "I don't know".

McLennan finally put an end to the business by the statement that, so far as the Negros command knew at the moment, the "surrender order" was nothing more than a broadcast from a commercial radio station well known to be under Nip control, and so far as orders were concerned had no official status whatsoever. Also that Colonel Hilsman was in command of the troops on Negros and therefore McLennan could not surrender the troops even if he would. He promised to present to Colonel Hilsman the discussions of the conference but held out no hope that the commander's attitude would be any different than his own. However if they wished to wait until the following morning for Hilsman's reply before returning to Cebu they might do so, provided they restricted themselves to the limits set

by Major Roque - the confines of the house in which they were quartered - but that they were free to leave for Cebu at any time they chose. They agreed to wait and McLennan left the conference, with some inward doubt as to the wisdom of their decision.

There had been a great deal of talk, especially among the civil population of the Island, as to what they would do to the Nips if and when opportunity offered, and while these four were not Nips they were, most undeniably, Nip collaborators, and in the eyes of the civil population doubtless much worse than bona fide Japs. How much of the talk might be idle boasting and how much might be translated into action, there was no way of knowing, but there seemed to be no point in putting temptation in their way by permitting the presence of these collaborationists to become generally known, especially to the less desirable elements of the civil population. It seemed quite possible that any "accidents" to his chosen ambassadors might furnish the Nip commander on Cebu with an excuse for being a bit rough with the personnel on Negros - military, civilian or both. Hence McLennan ordered Roque to carefully hand-pick his most reliable and conscientious guards for the four, and to caution strictest secrecy concerning them and their mission.

Late that afternoon, after McLennan's return to Headquarters, a telegram was received by special messenger stating that the emissaries wished permission to return to Cebu at once. Nothing could have pleased Hilsman and McLennan more, since the presence

of these men was regarded as a considerable hazard, and a reply was immediately dispatched by the same messenger, instructing Roque to expedite their departure with all possible speed.

Some twenty-four hours later Major Roque, his Adjutant, and a corporal appeared at Hilsman's command post. Roque and the Adjutant were quite volubly excited - the corporal trussed up like a prize porker, his arms and hands bound with yards of rope, his feet and legs haltered just short of the point of immobility. While the Commander was in conversation with Roque a little to one side, the other personnel of the command post, in some astonishment, mentally debated what heinous crime this mild-looking prisoner must be guilty of, to warrant such strong shackles.

Sharp exclamations drew attention back to Roque, and the Commander whose consternation was now apparent. Turning to McLennan who stood nearby, Hilsman in great agitation exploded, "Mac, d'you know what's happened? That --- -- - ---- killed Valeriano, Osmena and the others! My God! What'll we do? What'll we do? They'll kill us all! The Japs'll kill us all!

Stripped of hysterical embellishments it appeared that on the preceding day, following McLennan's departure, Roque had made a careful selection from the non-commissioned officers in his command to be detailed as special guards. The telegram granting permission for the visitors to return to Cebu had not been received by Roque until almost dark, whereupon the four had decided, in view of the lateness of the hour and the obvious difficulties in navigating a

small open boat in the wide Tanon Strait in darkness, to wait until daylight before setting out.

Early next morning, when the guard was changed, the now-trussed-up corporal, armed with a Browning automatic rifle, was posted as sentinel. A few moments later he had entered the room where the four Quislings were quartered and sweeping the room with his rifle had emptied the full twenty rounds into the sleeping collaborationists.

The sound of the firing brought Roque on the double from a nearby building, but the grisly deed was done. Roque's first impulse had been to conceal the crime. He had a pretty good case. He could say that they had left for Cebu - if they failed to arrive that was no fault of his. Gathering a small detail of thoroughly reliable soldiers, he had a shallow grave scooped out and the four bodies, together with all their papers, deposited therein. Their arms and ammunition he retained - these things were valuable!

But the more Roque pondered his actions the more dubious he became of their wisdom. That damned gun had made one hell of a lot of noise in the quiet of the early morning hours, and the more Roque thought of it the more noise it seemed to have made. He wondered how many people had heard the firing. And how long it would be before someone started asking questions which were sure to be embarrassing. Despite the fact that this was an Army installation firing was a very rare event. Ammunition was very scarce and strict orders for its conservation had been in force, and respected, for months. The putting off of twenty rounds all at once was positively unheard

of. It had not happened, on Negros, since the war started. Certainly, a number of persons must have heard - and noted - and would probably talk about the lengthy shooting.

Then, too, there was the matter of the burial. It wasn't very deep, nor very well done, and with just a little bad luck would certainly wreck any story of the men's departure for Cebu. And maybe his trusted soldiers were not as trustworthy as he thought. What if one of them should turn collaborator, too?

All of which led to some doubt in Roque's mind as to whether the corporal he was protecting was worth all this agony. The man was a murderer, obviously, reasoned the Major, and even though he was a soldier he had been a hell of a poor one, killing the men he had been specifically assigned to protect!

The death of the emissaries, per se, bothered Roque little or none. Like almost everyone else Roque felt that shooting was too good for a collaborationist, but despite this favorable view of the corporal's action there was no denying both that it constituted legal murder and a serious violation of military orders. Having arrived at this conclusion, Roque had forthwith arrested the unresisting corporal, tied him up securely and marched him off to the Fabrica Woods to report the whole sorry business to the Commander.

Without doubt it was a ticklish situation. Everyone felt that the Nips could - and with a certain amount of justification - be quite nasty about the matter if they chose. No other solution

being forthcoming, McLennan suggested the only thing he could think of, which was a letter of apology and condolence to the Jap commander on Cebu, setting forth the facts and expressing regret. This was agreed upon and McLennan delegated to compose the letter.

During all this period the prisoner had sat calmly on a stump, viewing the commotion with the utmost detachment and unconcern, by all odds the coolest and most collected man in the place.

When the letter was ready for dispatch, Hilsman suddenly announced, "We'll send that --- ----- along with the letter. We'll send him along!"

To most of those present this seemed rather unnecessarily rough on the little corporal. Unquestionably the youngster would wind up in Nip hands sooner or later - after all the letter proclaimed his guilt and said that he would be subject to Court Martial. It was more or less to be expected that the Nips would demand possession of the murderer and, the situation being what it was, it would be difficult to deny the demand. But there seemed to be no point in rushing the thing, at least until the Nips required it.

All of these details were pointed out to Hilsman, but changed his decision not one iota. He argued that, if the man would have to be turned over to the Nips anyway, why delay the inevitable. Why not do it now. Besides, "that blankety-blank s.o.b. is no good anyway, and the sooner he is gotten rid of, the better!"

Roque and his Adjutant returned from Cebu, minus the prisoner, a few days later, unharmed. What happened to the little corporal in the hands of the Japanese is not known, but there is ample reason to doubt that it was pleasant.

The corporal had justified his actions, to Roque, by saying that the emissaries were bad men and deserved to die - he had therefore killed them. It was as simple as that.

The Negros Command Post had moved, after the Roque affair, to the Insular Company's compound at Fabrica, where the living quarters were excellent; Hilsmas having decided that they might as well be comfortable as long as they could - which, obviously, was not going to be very long. It wasn't.

A few days after these events, on 18 May, Lt. Colonel Humber of the Visayan-Mindanao Force staff arrived at Fabrica, bearing General Sharp's orders and instructions for the Negros surrender which, by Homma's order, was to be tendered to the Japanese commander at Iloilo, Panay. Since Colonel Hilsman was again ill, Colonel McLennan volunteered to make the trip. There was considerable doubt as to whether the Nips would deal with an alternate inasmuch as the Japanese order specified that the commanding officer effect the surrender, but having just won their war they were in an expansive mood and not disposed to quibble about details. Accordingly, at daybreak on the 21st, the Japanese occupation forces, with McLennan as hostage, landed at Bacolod, Negros, enroute to effect the physical surrender of the



Negros troops.

Shortly after the news of the arrival of the Nips became noised about, Lt. Colonel Montilla, in charge of the internee camp at Isabella, telephoned the Command Post in something of a dither. Montilla, a capable officer of sound judgment, reported that a number of the less desirable citizens of the barrio were talking right nasty about what they were going to do to the internees. He was not sure it would amount to anything more than talk, but if it did, not only was his tiny force inadequate but he doubted seriously that his Filipino soldiers would be interested either in shooting other Filipinos or in getting shot themselves, simply to protect a lot of Jap internees.

Hilsman, accompanied by McLennan, therefore called on the Nip commander - one Colonel Otah - to secure permission to move the internees to Bacolod and to obtain the necessary transportation. Apparently quite indifferent about the safety of his countrymen, after a bit of argument Otah agreed to provide a few trucks - which finally arrived some eight hours later.

A short distance west of Isabella the convoy was halted at a barricaded bridge. Machine guns, manned by several Filipino soldiers under command of a Filipino lieutenant, covered the approach, the lieutenant threatening to shoot anyone who attempted to pass the barricade. McLennan chanced it and walked onto the bridge. The young lieutenant put up a lengthy and vociferous argument, the gist of which was that he had absolute orders from Major Absede, who commanded the troops in the mountains south of Isabella, to "hold the bridge

at all costs", and that he would not dare go back to Absede if those orders were disobeyed. Eventually however, he agreed to surrender the bridge provided McLennan would guarantee him safe conduct to Bacolod so that he need not face Absede.

Shortly after dark McLennan arrived at Isabella with his convoy and found the internees intact, but guarded only by Lt. Colonel Montilla and one sergeant - the balance of Montilla's men having deserted and departed for the hills to join Absede.

According to the greatly concerned Filipino officer, McLennan's arrival was in the nick of time. A bolo battalion - so Montilla said - was being organized in the barrio and as soon as a sufficient number of blades had been recruited they would descend upon the schoolhouse, kill all the internees and anyone else who presumed to interfere with the business. In telling the story afterward McLennan quipped, "I doubt that I ever saw anyone in my whole life who seemed to be more pleased to see me than Montilla appeared to be!"

In compliance with Japanese orders messages had been sent to the five Filipino sub-sector commanders in their hill positions, instructing them to report, with their troops, at specified central locations for the purpose of surrender. Understandably, none of these detachments viewed the prospect with any degree of enthusiasm and were in no hurry to comply with the order. Most of these men were on their home grounds and saw little or no reason to forego even the precarious freedom of the hunted for certain captivity and, if

what they had heard of the Bataan Death March were any indication, probably much worse.

Only one of the sub-sector commanders, Major Arpa, a Moro and a hell of a good officer, complied promptly and exactly with the orders, surrendering himself and 90-odd percent of his men. Major Gomez, who had been a wealthy land owner on Negros before the war, brought most of his battalion down out of the hills into Camp Magallon for the purpose of surrender, much against the desires of a large percentage of the men. But before the Nips got around to accepting the surrender of this group about half of the men had quietly disappeared.

Something less than half of Major Roque's battalion surrendered; while the remaining two commanders, Major Ernest Mata and Major Absede, strongly preferred the relative security of the mountains and surrendered neither themselves nor any of their troops, although a few of their soldiers did straggle in from time to time and surrender themselves. Various attempts were made to persuade Mata and Absede into compliance - on at least one occasion McLennan himself made a trip into the mountains to see Mata - but while these controversies were entirely amicable insofar as the pro- and anti-surrender elements of USAFFE were concerned, they failed utterly and completely to alter the decisions of the two commanders.

By three June the final formalities for the surrendering troops were completed and the long weary years of Japanese jails and prison camps had begun.

In the Leyte-Samar sector Colonel Cornell's troops had proceeded as planned with their withdrawal into the hills following his rejection of Sharp's message of 10 May as unauthentic. On 20 May, their mountain positions occupied and organization completed, the arrival of Sharp's courier with written instructions for the capitulation caused great consternation. Almost without exception the Filipinos - officers, enlisted men and civilians - were against surrender. Here, as on Negros, the troops were near their homes and had every intention of staying there. It would be a simple matter to revert to civilian status again - all one had to do was discard the ragged outer uniform and, clothed in the white shorts which are standard attire throughout the Islands, become indistinguishable. The dubious benefits of Japan's much-touted "Co-Prosperity Sphere" were not enticing - prison camps even less so.

Cornell exerted every means at his disposal to effect the surrender of his 2300 Filipinos, but on 26 May when the final obsequies of the Leyte-Samar force were completed, only forty Filipino officers and twenty Filipino enlisted men joined their eleven American officers. More soldiers straggled in at later intervals until there were eventually some 350 confined.

Meanwhile the redoubtable and pugnacious Christie on Panay had been having his troubles. On the morning of the tenth, with the bit in his teeth, Christie radioed Sharp as follows:

10:30 AM May 10

SHARP

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A CLEAR MSG ON SURRENDER SIGNED  
SHARP BUT DOUBT HIS AUTHORITY TO ORDER ANY SUCH THING  
STOP TO SATISFY ME I MUST HAVE MACARTHUR'S OKAY OTHER-  
WISE IT MAY BE TREASON STOP I DO NOT SEE EVEN ONE SMALL  
REASON WHY THIS UNIT SHOULD BE SURRENDERED BECAUSE SOME  
OTHER UNIT HAS GONE TO HELL OR SOME CORREGIDOR SHELL-  
SHOCKED TERMS ARE ISSUED WITHOUT PROPER VERIFICATION  
WHICH CAN READILY BE OBTAINED BY AIRPLANE STOP MASS  
ARMED BANDITRY CERTAIN STOP REQUEST A CLEAR HAND END

CHRISTIE

On the eleventh Sharp replied:

HQ VMF MALAYBALAY MAY 11, 1942

COL CHRISTIE

YOUR MESSAGE IN REPLY TO MY CLEAR MESSAGE CANNOT BE  
ACCEPTED STOP I AM USING CLEAR TEXT BECAUSE ALL MY  
CODES WERE DESTROYED STOP I AGAIN DIRECT REPEAT DIRECT  
YOU HOIST A WHITE FLAG AND CEASE ALL OPERATIONS AGAINST  
THE JAPANESE ARMY AT ONCE STOP YOUR FAILURE TO COMPLY  
WILL PRODUCE DISASTROUS RESULTS STOP NEITHER WAINWRIGHT'S

NOR MY SURRENDER HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS YET AND UNLESS  
YOU AND ALL OTHER COMMANDERS COMPLY WITH MY ORDERS  
AT ONCE ACTIVE OPERATIONS WILL BE RESUMED STOP I AM  
SENDING LT COL THAYER BY PLANE TO YOU WITH WRITTEN  
INSTRUCTIONS AND HE WILL EXPLAIN THE SITUATION IN  
DETAIL STOP I AM IN COMMUNICATION WITH MACARTHUR AND  
HE IS ADVISED OF MY ACTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN ORDERED  
BY WAINWRIGHT STOP YOU WILL REPLY IMMEDIATELY TO THIS  
MESSAGE INDICATING YOUR COMPLIANCE AND ACTIONS STOP  
EXPEDITE

SHARP COMDG

Stubbornly undeterred Christie continued to urge that his force  
be exempted from the general surrender:

May 12, 1942.

TO GEN SHARP

YOUR RADIO SURRENDER OF MY FORCES SOUNDS TOTALLY  
UNNECESSARY AND FOR ME TO COMPLY TENDS TO TREASON  
WITHOUT SANCTION OF WD THRU MACARTHUR STOP CAN  
SURRENDERING OF ONE ISLAND AUTOMATICALLY DO SAME  
FOR OTHERS THAT ARE IN GOOD ORDER STOP DID DUTCH  
DO IT THAT WAY QUERY WILL THE JAPANESE DO IT WHEN  
OUR FORCES ADVANCE NORTH QUERY MY FORCES ARE IN

EXCELLENT SHAPE AND HAVE A REASONABLE CHANCE OF PULLING  
THROUGH ON OUR MISSION STOP SUCH ACTION WILL DESTROY  
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MORALE AND CANNOT BE UNDERSTOOD  
BY MY SIMPLE STOLID SOLDIERY WHO MIGHT TURN INTO BANDITS  
OF MORE HARM TO THE JAPANESE COMMA CIVILIAN FOREIGNERS  
AND WOMEN STOP COMMON SENSE DICTATES WE BE GIVEN A  
CHANCE STOP I STRONGLY URGE YOU TO HAVE THE APPROVAL  
OF THE WD THROUGH MACARTHUR EXPLAINING THAT EVEN IF  
EVERYTHING ELSE IS WRONG MY FORCES ARE INTACT AND CAP-  
ABLE STOP I HAVE TOO NO REASON TO QUESTION YOUR AUTH-  
ORITY OR REASONS BUT BELIEVE THEY SHOULD BE EXPLAINED  
STOP I CERTAINLY INTEND TO CONSULT WITH CHYNOWETH MY  
IMMEDIATE COMMANDER BEFORE ANY ACTION STOP TIME IS NOT  
OF ANY ESSENCE IN MY CASE FOR ANY HASTY ACTION STOP  
IN THIS DELICATE SITUATION PLEASE DO NOT ISSUE ME ANY  
PEREMPTORY ORDERS THAT WILL EMBARRASS OR GET US INTO  
A MUTUAL CONFLICT STOP RATHER DO I WANT A FREE HAND  
IN CARRYING OUT MY MISSION AND INFLUENCE BY ANY HYSTERIA  
INHERENT IN LOCAL ACTION STOP NO ANY SURRENDER PERTIONS  
STILL FREE INTACT\* AND HAVING A GOOD CHANCE OF HELPING  
THE GENERAL MISSION STOP MAKE ME INDEPENDENT DO NOT PUT  
ME ON THE SACRIFICE BLOCK END

CHRISTIE

\*This sentence evidently garbled in the transmission.

This lengthy and heartfelt plea elicited an understanding  
but adamant letter from Sharp:

UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES  
HEADQUARTERS VISAYAN-MINDANAO FORCE IN THE FIELD

May 12, 1942

Colonel A. F. Christie,  
In the Field, Panay.

My dear Christie:

I have received your two radiograms in  
reply to my original directive for the surrender of  
your force and my second message on the same subject.  
Be it understood that I have the highest regard for  
your courageous and resolute stand in carrying out the  
original mission of maintaining centers of American  
resistance in these islands.

However developments of the war make such  
action utterly impracticable REGARDLESS of the capabil-  
ities of your forces. If any other course were open to  
me I would most assuredly have taken it. You will un-  
derstand from the letter addressed to me from General  
Wainwright, my commander, that in the name of humanity,  
there is but one course of action to take.

Lest there be any misunderstanding I shall  
explain that General Wainwright has not surrendered



Corregidor and is not a prisoner of war - likewise I am not yet a prisoner. However I have pledged the surrender of all forces in the Visayas and Mindanao as ordered by my Commanding General. I likewise expect you to carry out my orders in this matter.

Colonel Jesse T. Traywick, Jr., G.S.C. imparted to me certain information which Colonel Thayer, my representative, will relate to you, which will help explain the situation.

W. F. SHARP

Major General, U. S. Army

Commanding.

Still unconvinced of the necessity for his capitulation; still persistently hopeful of finding some loophole, Christie tried once more:

May 18 VIA QJ2 Negros May 19

GEN SHARP

WHAT DID MACARTHUR SAY IN ANSWER TO YOUR RADIO SENT BY YOU IN REGARD TO YOUR SURRENDER

CHRISTIE

10:00 AM May 19/42

But Sharp's patience was by this time exhausted. A curt command to this officer whom he considered most recalcitrant, was his only reply to this message:

May 19

COLONEL CHRISTIE

YOU ARE UNDER MY COMMAND AND ACCORDINGLY  
WILL SURRENDER YOURSELF AND TROOPS AS I  
HAVE PREVIOUSLY DIRECTED STOP CHYNOWETH  
HAS ALREADY COMPLIED STOP ACKNOWLEDGE  
THIS MESSAGE AND STATE ACTIONS TAKEN AT  
ONCE REPEAT AT ONCE

SHARP COMDG

Meanwhile, on the night of the 18th, Thayer had arrived from General Sharp's headquarters in Mindanao and had - presumably - given Christie the full story of the plight of the Corregidor garrison, including, no doubt, the same telling point which Traywick had used on Mindanao and Gray on Cebu - that the lives of the more than ten thousand people on the Rock hung on his decision.

The grisly threat tipped the scales here as it had elsewhere, and this gallant commander relinquished his hope of continued resistance:

232 PM May 19

TO COMMANDING GENERAL

VISAYAN-MINDANAO FORCE

COLONEL THAYER ARRIVED LAST NIGHT AND  
DECISIONS MADE TO COMPLY FAITHFULLY  
WITH YOUR ORDERS FOR THE SURRENDER OF  
MY DIVISION END

CHRISTIE