

H I S T O R Y

Of The

M I N D A N A O G U E R R I L L A S

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- C H A P T E R I

A. PHASES OF THE WAR IN THE PHILIPPINES

FIRST PHASE: 8 DEC '41 - 6 MAY '42. - On 8 December 1941, Japan struck vital United States territories without warning or formal declaration of war. One of the first Japanese bombs fell in Davao, Mindanao. The whole Philippines awoke horror-struck at what was the inception of a most horrible national cataclysm.

Girded for battle were a handful of American and Filipino fighting men, the latter consisting mainly of young inexperienced "trainees" with no previous taste of battle conditions and hastily mustered into line to stem the tide of invasion. But the issue had long been decided before the actual hostilities began. There was no stopping the enemy. He had absolute superiority in the air, on land and sea. He came in overwhelming numbers in men and material.

BATAAN FALLS

Lieut. NORMAN REYES, one of Brigadier General ROMULO'S Propaganda Staff, in a broadcast from Radio Station, "VOICE OF FREEDOM", in the besieged Corregidor in the early morning of 9 April 1942, uttered the deathless words:

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"Bataan has fallen. The Philippine-American troops on this war-ravaged and bloodstained peninsula have laid down their arms. With head bloody but unbowed, they have yielded to the superior force and numbers of the enemy.

"The world will long remember the epic struggle that Filipino and American soldiers put up in the jungle fastnesses and along the rugged coast of Bataan. They have stood up uncomplaining under the constant grueling fire of the enemy for more than three months. Besieged on land and blockaded by sea, cut off from all sources of help in the Philippines and in America, these intrepid fighters have done all that human endurance could bear.

"For what sustained them through all these months of incessant battle was a force that was more than merely physical. It was the force of an unconquerable faith--something in the heart and soul that physical hardship and adversity could not destroy! It was the thought of native land and all that it holds most dear, the thought of freedom and dignity and pride in these most priceless of all our human prerogatives.

"But the decision had to come. Men fighting under the banner of an unshakable faith are made of something more than flesh, but they are not made of impervious steel. The flesh must yield at last, endurance melts away, and the end of battle must come.

"Bataan has fallen, but the spirit that made it stand a beacon to all the liberty-loving peoples of the world - cannot fall!"

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On 6-7 May, midnight Corregidor capitulated. Lt. Gen. JONATHAN M. WAIN-WRIGHT left in command of the Fil-American Forces, after Gen. DOUGLAS MacARTHUR had gone to Australia to prepare for the "long march back", had no other choice.

SECOND PHASE: 7 MAY '42 - 19 OCTOBER '44. - Sporadic flare-ups of guerrilla movements, few and far between, took place. It was not however, until 16 Sept. 1942 that guerrilla activities in Mindanao assumed serious proportions.. enough to distract the enemy on that island in the enjoyment of his booty, peace of mind, and security as a Conqueror.

During the last lap of the third quarter of 1942, no less than seventy odd guerrilla bands all over Mindanao came into existence, without previous understanding among themselves, yet appearing as if by a prearranged signal. Enemy patrols were ambushed, garrisons attacked; convoys waylaid; puppet officials seized, some jailed; local civil government formed. In effect, a war, however unequal, was declared by tiny guerrilla units, each operating against the gigantic war machine of a victorious empire. The move was more than audacious. It bordered on the preposterous. The conservatives, more or less defeatist in attitude, called it untimely and mad. But there was no stopping the surge of the new resistance government.

Despite difficulties and reverses, the resistance movement in time took definite form; organized, solidified, unified - a striking force that asked no quarters from the enemy and gave none.

Unification of the Mindanao Guerrillas brought into being the Tenth Military District, recognized by higher commands and operating as an Army: Intensifying intelligence coverage through strategically situated radio stations; harassing the enemy, pinning him within the narrow compass of isolated sectors. Before the coming of the American Liberation Forces, eighty-five per cent of the island of Mindanao was under the control of the Tenth Military District.

THIRD PHASE: 20 OCTOBER '44 - 5 JULY '45. - The reconquest of the Philippines began when the American Liberation Forces, led personally by General MacARTHUR, landed on Leyte on 20 October 1944. On 24-25 October 1944, one of the most decisive naval battles in all United States History was fought in the Philippines, with Leyte as the focal point. In this naval battle, the enemy was so badly battered that he emerged from it with his naval arm torn in half. In the whole Pacific campaign of MacARTHUR that was the only time when the Japanese Navy came out and fought gamely and with considerable strategy, even though it ended in destruction and rout. That was the stern beginning of the fulfillment of MacARTHUR's pledge to return and drive the enemy from the Philippine shores!

Then followed subsequent death-blows dealt in rapid succession - Leyte, Samar, Mindoro, Luzon by way of Lingaven Gulf, the rest of the Visayas. Then on 10 March 1945 was launched the first American offensive of Mindanao - with troops landing in force on Zamboanga west coast. This was followed by another offensive, by a landing at Parang, Cotabato on 17 April 1945.

On July 5, 1945, Gen. MacARTHUR announced that the entire Philippine Islands were liberated, and that the Philippine campaign as a whole could be regarded as virtually closed. Of the 450,000 Japanese or a total of twenty three divisions, only some 30,000 were left, scattered widely and isolated. Only seventeen American divisions were pitted against the

total Japanese forces in the Philippines. There were reported 54,000 Americans killed, wounded and missing in the campaign. Gen. MacARTHUR cited the drives that followed the American landing as one of those rare instances in any long campaign where a ground force, superior in numbers and well-entrenched, was entirely destroyed by a numerically inferior opponent. The battle of Leyte Gulf was, according to Gen. MacARTHUR, the major turning point in the Pacific War.

B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THIS RECORD

This historical record dwells on the guerrilla resistance movements in Mindanao, the merits of which are crystalized in the cohesively-concrete organization, activities and accomplishments of the Tenth Military District, under the command of Col. WENDELL W. FERTIG, its undisputed Father, Leader and Mentor. Some mention is also made of the intelligence coverage for the 9th Military District, comprising the provinces of Leyte and Samar, which for purposes of intelligence operations was placed under the command of Col. FERTIG on 22 Feb. 1943 by order of Gen. MacARTHUR.

This composite history is intended to present an impartial and factual picture of the Guerrilla Resistance Movement in Mindanao and to preserve in more or less permanent form the historical record of the Tenth Military District from the beginning of the first sporadic resistance movement to the formal date Mindanao was declared liberated by Gen. MacARTHUR.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT

A. WHY BATAAN?

The Battle for Bataan from the first days of January to April 1942 was an epic in itself. However, the Bataan stand bore nothing of Thermopylae. It was not intended to defend the Philippines against invasion, because the country had in the course of the previous weeks, grunted out its indefensibility. But it was a battle for delay; delay which meant so much to the reassertion for military power of the then unprepared great American Democracy. Bataan was more than a shock absorber. It was a stumbling block in the path of the avalanche of Japanese hordes that sought world conquest. To their campaign for the complete subjugation of the entire Philippines and the rest of the Western and South Pacific Area. The enemy had no alternative but to smoke out its gallant defenders or crush them to complete destruction.

When Finally on 8 April 1942 Bataan surrendered, three solid months of valuable time have elapsed...enough breathing spell for the greatest republic on earth to vindicate its unreadiness and to begin turning the tables. For three months, Bataan diverted from destructive actions elsewhere, the thousands of Japanese troops which then were utilized by the enemy to defeat a greatly inferior strength entrenched on the little peninsula. There are, to be sure, bloated enemy claims on the exaggerated significances of the Bataan battle. But at the bottom, Bataan demonstrated emphatically to the enemy the kind of conquered people he had to deal with in future campaigns; its loyalty and courage, which the vaunted power of Japanese steel and ingenious methods of fiendish tortures could not blot out!

B. MACARTHUR DECLARES WAINWRIGHT'S SURRENDER OF NO VALIDITY

When Gen. MacARTHUR transferred his headquarters to Australia from Corregidor sometime in March 1942, he had definite plans of coming back to the Philippines as soon as this could be made possible...this time at the head of Liberation Forces which no longer would suffer from grievous lack of men and materiel. Abandoning the Philippines to the Japanese had, by all indications, never for once entered the mind of the General. As the months rolled by, there infiltrated into the Philippines by various means a message from Gen. MacARTHUR constantly repeated, the now famous words of hope, "I SHALL RETURN".

It is a known fact that Gen. MacARTHUR never intended to have his troops in the Philippines surrender en-masse to the enemy. His plans, as clearly shown by an interchange of radiograms and messages, were to split up the Fil-American troops into small bands, with the obvious object of obtaining vital intelligence information from and about the enemy and at the same time harass and exploit the Japanese in true guerrilla style. Paraphrased portions of some of these messages follow:

"All forces in the Philippines except those on fortified islands at entrance to Manila Bay, are hereby released to your command. Inform all concerned. Report at once to MacARTHUR for orders. I believe you will understand the motive behind this order".

On the same day, Gen. MacARTHUR sent Maj-Gen. SHARP this radio message:

"WAINWRIGHT has surrendered. From now on communicate on all matters direct with me. Have your communications with CHENOWETH".

In a letter dated 7 May, written at Fort Mills, Corregidor, on the subject of surrender, WAINWRIGHT wrote SHARP:

"To put a stop to further useless sacrifice of human life on the fortified islands, yesterday I tendered to Lieutenant General HOMMA, the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, the surrender of the four harbor forts of Manila.

"General HOMMA declined to accept my surrender unless it included the forces under your command. It became apparent that the garrisons of these forts would be eventually destroyed by aerial and artillery bombardment and by infantry supported by tanks, which have overwhelmed Corregidor.

"After leaving General HOMMA with no agreement between us, I decided to accept in the name of humanity his proposal and tendered at midnight of 6-7 May, 1942, to the Senior Japanese officer at Corregidor, the formal surrender of all American and Philippine Army troops in the Philippines. You will therefore be guided accordingly, and will surrender all troops under your command both in the Visayan Islands and Mindanao to the proper Japanese officers. This decision on my part, you will realize, was forced upon me by means entirely beyond my control.

"Colonel JESSE T. TRAYWICK, Jr. G.S.C., my Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, who will deliver this to you is fully empowered to act for me. You are hereby ordered by me as the Senior American officer in the Philippines to scrupulously carry out the provisions of this letter as well as such additional instructions as Colonel TRAYWICK may give you in my name.

"You will repeat the complete text of this letter, and of such other instructions as Colonel TRAYWICK may give you, by radio to General MacARTHUR. Let me emphasize that there must be on your part no thought of disregarding these instructions. Failure to fully and honestly carry them out can have only the most disastrous results".

SHARP RECEIVES DIRECT ORDERS FROM MacARTHUR

On 11 May 1942, Gen. MacARTHUR sent Gen. SHARP this radio message:

"Orders emanating from General WAINWRIGHT have no validity. If possible separate your force into small elements and initiate guerrilla operations. You of course, have full authority to make any decision that immediate emergency may demand. Keep in communication with me as much as possible. You are a gallant and resourceful commander and I am proud of what you have done".

At 7:30 PM, same day, Gen. SHARP sent Gen. MacARTHUR this radio message:

"I have seen WAINWRIGHT's Staff Officer and have withdrawn my order releasing Commanders on other islands and directed complete surrender. Dire necessity alone has prompted this action."

The order referred to by Gen. SHARP in his message to Gen. MacARTHUR, which order was directed by radio to Gen. CHENOWETH, Cebu; Colonel HILLSMAN, Negros; Col. CORNELL, Leyte-Samar; Col. CHASTAINE, Agusan; and Capt. BLANCAS, Bohol - sent on 10 May 1942, follows:

"As I have not yet surrendered, the instructions given you yesterday releasing you from my command are withdrawn. I resume command and direct that you cease all operations against the Japanese Army at once. You will raise a white flag and await the arrival of my Staff Officer who will make the terms of the negotiations for surrender of the forces under you. This is imperative and must be carried out in order to prevent further bloodshed. Acknowledge."

CHRISTIE OBJECTS TO SURRENDER

Col. CHRISTIE, Commanding Panay but under the immediate command of Gen. CHENOWETH, Cebu, sent Gen. SHARP at 10:30 AM, 10 May 1942, the following radio message:

"Acknowledge receipt of a clear message on surrender signed SHARP but doubt his authority to order any such thing. To satisfy me I must have MacARTHUR's okay, otherwise it may be treason. I do not see even one small reason why this unit should be surrendered because some other unit has gone to

hell or some Corregidor shell-shock terms are issued without proper verification which can readily be obtained by airplane. Mass armed banditry certain. Request a clear hand."

To this Gen. SHARP answered, on 11 May 1942 reiterating his order for subordinate Commanders to surrender. Col. CHRISTIE radioed 12 May 1942 calling the surrender of his forces unnecessary, emphasizing that his troops were in excellent shape and had reasonable chance to fight.

"Make me independent. Do not put me on the sacrifice block," the message ended.

In another radio message, dated 19 May 1942, Col. CHRISTIE queried General SHARP:

"What did MacARTHUR say in answer to your radio sent by you in regard to your surrender?"

At 10:00 AM, 19 May 1942, Gen. SHARP sent Col. CHRISTIE this radio message:

"You are under my command accordingly will surrender yourself and troops as I have previously directed. CHENOWETH has already complied. Acknowledge this message and state actions taken at once."

COLONEL CHRISTIE SURRENDERS

Quoted in part is a letter dated 12 May 1942, brought by Col. THAYER, Gen. SHARP's personal representative to contact Col. CHRISTIE:

"xxx Be it understood that I have the highest regard for your courageous and resolute stand in carrying out the original mission of maintaining centers of American resistance in these islands. xxx However, developments of the war make such action utterly impracticable regardless of the capabilities of your forces. If any other course were open to me I would most assuredly have taken it. You will understand from the letter addressed to me from Gen. WAINWRIGHT, my Commander, that in the name of humanity, there is but one course of action to take. xxx Col. T. TRAYWICK, Jr. G.S.C., imparted to me certain information which Col. THAYER, my representative, will relate to you, which will help explain the situation."

To which at 2:32 PM, 19 May 1942, Col. CHRISTIE answered by radio:

"Col. THAYER arrived last night and decision made to comply faithfully with your orders for the surrender of my division." *

* Col. WENDELL W. FERTIG, on 15 Sept 1942, commented:

"The sad facts are that WAINWRIGHT's surrender did not end the slaughter, which continued under the polite name of starvation in prison camps without adequate medicine or food." *

C. PICTURE OF GLOOM

The surrender of the USAFFE troops in Bataan, Corregidor, the Visayas and Mindanao, coming one after another, were a series of disasters that overtook the hapless forces. Gloom encompassed the Islands. There was nothing now to stand between the people of the Philippines and the Conqueror. The wanton disregard of the Japanese of the rights of the people, previously protected by their constitution and laws; the atrocities taking various forms, ranging from abusive handling of helpless, meek, poor and harmless civilians to looting, rape, tortures and heinous methods of killing for insignificant reasons...these barbarious acts only served to accentuate the hatred for the enemy. The hushed groans of the down-trodden were carried through an atmosphere reeking with Japanese bestialities. Rising to a protesting crescendo, they became loud proclamations of odium and rolled back like angry, uncontrollable waves, lashing in all its fury at the face of the invader. GUERRILLAS! Time alone was to tell the important part Mindnao guerrillas were to play in the defeat of the enemy!

BEGINNING AND GROWTH OF THE TENTH MILITARY DISTRICT

1. FACTORS FAVORABLE FOR GUERRILLA GROWTH:

- How this organization came into being and succeeded in pushing its missions to a successful conclusion, is a story of so many stories, linked and inter-linked to become an interlaced whole, one and indivisible. It is in great part, the story of Colonel WENDELL W. FERTIG.

2. NUCLEUS OF THE TENTH MILITARY DISTRICT:

WILLIAM A. TATE, American-Negro-Filipino mestizo, who before the war was an employee of the Mindanao Autobos Co. and late Chief of Police of Momungan, Lanao, under the Japanese, decided to revolt. Past midnight of 16 September 1942, TATE, in compliance with a prior arrangement made with Capt. LUIS MORGAN. American mestizo PC officer, crossed Panguil Bay in a sailboat with thirty-four men from Baroy, Kolambugan, Lanao to Tangub, Misamis Occidental. They were poorly armed but determined in their mission. The intention was to surprise the puppet Japanese-sponsored officials in that and other municipalities and take away the arms and ammunition scheduled to be ready for delivery to the enemy authorities. These were kept in the municipal halls. TATE met no opposition, and the move was highly successful. He arrested several puppet officials, ordered them jailed and confiscated eighty-seven firearms which were waiting collection by the Japanese military.

FERTIG ASSUMES COMMAND - 4 OCTOBER 1942

MORGAN followed two days later. The two guerrilla leaders moved from town to town in the Northern portion of Zamboanga, attempting to consolidate guerrilla units already in existence and creating new militia groups in places where there were none.

MORGAN and TATE, lacking in the fundamental essentials of strong leadership and knowing their own limitations, sought Col. WENDELL W. FERTIG through Capt. CHARLES W. HEDGES, later promoted Colonel, asking FERTIG to head the planned organization of the Visayas-Mindanao Force. Before the outbreak of the war, Col. HEDGES was the Logging Superintendent of the Findlay Millar Timber Co at Kolambugan, Lanao with a commission as Captain in the Reserve, United States Army. He was a very close friend of Col. FERTIG. He also knew personally MORGAN and TATE and, in fact, met them at the Baroy beach when they came to request Col. FERTIG to command the proposed Visayas-Mindanao Guerrilla Force. Lending the weight of his friendship and influence, he aided in convincing Col. FERTIG to accede to the request of MORGAN and TATE. Col. FERTIG recognized the immediate need for united and concerted action in the attainment of a common purpose and agreed to assume command of the Mindanao Guerrillas, then going by the name "Mindanao-Visayan Force". This was on 4 October 1942. In his own words, quoted from a radio message to Gen. MacARTHUR:

"The unification of the scattered guerrilla forces is made with the end in view of eliminating dangerous friction between them and coordinating their efforts against the enemy x x x."

Thereafter he concentrated his efforts, time and energy in the reorganization, organization and administration of different guerrilla units in Mindanao, beginning with Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga. All guerrilla groups, one by one, fell in line under the new leader, Col. FERTIG, who was soon to initiate similar plans to unify all scattered guerrilla units on the island under one unified command.

On 12 Nov 1942, the guerrilla units in Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga were formed into the 106th Infantry Regiment, the first regiment to be activated under the command of Col. FERTIG.

WENDELL W. FERTIG, an American mining engineer in the Philippines, was called to active duty with the Corps of Engineers early in 1941; served on Bataan and in March 1942, was flown to Mindanao to continue the construction of airstrips. When the order of general surrender came, he refused to surrender but stayed in Kolambugan, Lanao where, when TATE and MORGAN started the guerrilla resistance movement, he accepted the offer to take command of the organization. A man of vision, Col. FERTIG saw in the movement tremendous possibilities ahead though attendant with multiple hardships, deficiencies and heartaches, but the coming events justified his hopes.

FERTIG's immediate goal resolved into:

- a) Smoothing out rivalry among loose, roving bands of scattered guerrillas to prevent the development into serious, internal conflicts resulting from petty misunderstandings and feelings of distrust between themselves;

b) The unification of all guerrilla groups into one compact command to be more effective in the prosecution of plans against the enemy; and

c) Making definite provisions for the security, protection and maintenance of the fast-expanding troops. The last included the organization of an essential intelligence not to know the strength, movements and plans of the enemy.

B. SCATTERED GUERRILLA UNITS ON MINDANAO

L A N A O P R O V I N C E

TAMPARAN DISTRICT: During the last week of May 1942, the Japs sent a strong patrol to Bacolod Grande on the Northwest shore area of Lake Lanao. The Patrol burned all houses in the settlement, killed some Maranaos. This was retaliatory to the strong opposition offered by the Maranaos in that sector during the first week of May 1942 when the Japs were advancing on Dansalan. The enraged Maranaos fled to the mountains to have more freedom in planning for revenge, for the Moros have the memory of an elephant in remembering crimes committed upon them. They do not forget.

These Moros completely ignored the order of the Japs in Dansalan to return to their homes and resume their normal pursuit of living. To show that the Japs were taking their own orders seriously, punitive Jap patrols were sent out from time to time. These Japanese patrols killed Moros whom they met on the way. There were also glaring instances of brutal abuses perpetrated on the Moro women. The Moros became obsessed in their determination to revenge these insults.

In early August 1942, a strong Japanese patrol went to Uya-an by way of Gadongan. The patrol killed several people in Gadongan and burned all the houses. Upon arriving at Uya-an, they immediately set fire to the large houses, including the market place. Here, for the first time, the Japs met resistance. Two Japs were killed and the rest retreated in time to avoid being surrounded, cut-off and massacred.

MOROS FORMALLY CHALLENGE JAPS

Two Tamparan Datus, patriotic and influential, LASUB and DIMALAANG by names, constructed a strong, well-situated cotta at Lalaboan in the Basak area. When the cotta was finished and provisions for battle ready, the two Datus sent a joint letter to the Jap Commander in Dansalan, challenging the Japs to a show-down of armed might.

126 JAPS KILLED!

On 12 September 1942, the Japanese, not to let such a challenge go unanswered, promptly sent one full company of soldiers, under Captain TAKIUCHI all loaded in one launch. They landed at the mouth of the Lalaboan District and proceeded along the National Highway in the direction of the Moro cotta. Here however, the Japs soon found themselves surrounded with all means of escape barred. Of the 126 Japs who took part, not a single person escaped - all were killed.

Ground encounters proving too costly for the Nips, they resorted to safer tactics. The succeeding three months saw Tamparan District bombed and strafed heavily by Japanese planes but long before the bombs fell, the Moros had moved to safer areas.

KOLAMBUGAN AREA: A Jap patrol consisting of 200 officers and men, landed at Kolambugan at 4:00 AM, 25 August 1942. The purpose of the patrol was to secure the surrender of Captain LUIS MORGAN, and other USAFFE officers who had refused to surrender and who continued to hide from the Nips. The Japs failed to find MORGAN, who was the CO of the PC Detachment at Kolambugan prior to the surrender and despite the order of surrender, he managed to keep his command intact and evade the enemy.

Many attempts were made by the Japs to capture or convince MORGAN and his men to surrender, but all failed. Incidentally, during this patrol, four Americans who too had not seen fit to surrender, barely escaped capture. They were WENDELL W. FERTIG, CHARLES W. HEDGES, CHARLES SMITH and JOHN A. HAMNER. All of them later played important roles in the organization of the Mindanao Guerrillas.

ILIGAN AREA: On 16 Sept 1942, an estimated 250 Jap troops left Iligan passing the National Highway towards Kauswagan. On the way they were ambushed by Lt. FELIPE FETALVERO (PC) and his men who knew of the Japanese movement beforehand. Two men, Lt. LAZARO SILVA, PA, (now a Major and CO, 108th Division) and FELIPE MORALITA, a PC Sergeant, with their own guerrilla troops, assisted Lt. Fetalvero, (now Major and at one time CO, 105th Division) in this encounter. Taken by surprise, the Japs lost a number of lives. The following day, Japanese launches landed Jap troops behind the position occupied by Lt. SILVA. This caused him to withdraw his troops; the Moros under JOSEPH SANGUILA, and another unit composed of Christians under Corp. MIPANGCAT GALAWAN; however, the Japs thought best not to proceed to Kauswagan and returned to Iligan.

In the latter part of Oct 1942, a Jap convoy of a considerable number of trucks moving from Dansalan to Malabang were ambushed by a swarm of Moros under Datu Aguam. The entire convoy was wiped out in the vicinity of Lake Dapao.

Another attempt to open for traffic the Iligan-Cayagan part of the National Highway was made on 27 Oct 1942 when forty Jap trucks loaded with men and material left Iligan in the direction of Cagayan. Guerrillas on the way systematically attacked the convoy, in almost all hours of the day and night. Only twenty-three trucks reached Cagayan on 5 Nov 1942, seventeen having been wrecked in transit and many Jap personnel killed and supplies destroyed.

DAWAG DISTRICT: The moving spirit behind the early guerrilla unit in Daway was Lt. PEDRO ANDRES, with headquarters at Daway, Sta Filomena. He was assisted by Lt. FELEXBERTO CASTRO, Sgt. ENGRACIO C. ALCANTARA, Mr. DAMASO P. MOLDES, Mr. AURELIO QUIDLAT and Mr. MANUEL VILLAMONTE.

Early in October 1942, a company was organized composed of civilians and former USAFFE men who reported for duty to Lt. ANDRES at Daway. This unit was later designated "I" Co, and the Japs were soon to learn of this organization.

On 19 October 1942, a Jap patrol was sent to go after Lt. PEDRO A. ANDRES and bring him back dead or alive. This patrol met no encounter for ANDRES' unit was not yet fully prepared and so chose not to give battle.

On 24 October 1942, two cargo trucks, one confiscated bus and a passenger car, all loaded with Japs, arrived at Sta Filomena where they were ambushed by ANDRES and his men. One Jap officer and fifteen of his men were killed. Thus began the offensive section of another guerrilla unit against the common enemy.

HINAPLANON, PUGAAN, PANUL-IRAN, PENDUGANGAN: In the first week of Oct 1942, ABRAHAM WABE, a resident of Tuburan, Iligan, succeeded in gathering some arms and ammunition and started to form an organization at Hinaplanon. Realizing his limitations in military matters, WABE turned over his small guerrilla group to Lt. PEDRO ANDRES. Further organization of this unit, later designated "K" Co, was made by Lieut. GRACIANO JAYLO. Sgt. FABIAN CABRERA and Corp. PABLO S. PACANA, all PC, were assigned by ANDRES to the unit.

In the early part of November, a guerrilla organization was born in the valley of Pugaan, headed by Lt. GIL D. SUMPPIO, PA, with the assistance of Lt. HONORIO AQUINO. This unit was later designated "L" Co.

In the sitios of Panul-Iran and Pendugangan, a civilian, JOVENCIO YU, assisted by another civilian, ROMEO ALCANTARA, started the guerrilla movement in those adjacent localities. Later this unit was designated "M" Co.

All these guerrilla units had no actual contact with the enemy at the early stages of organization though organized for just that contingency. Companies, "K", "L", "M", were later organized into the 3rd Bn of the 108th Inf Regt. Lt. PEDRO ANDRES became the CO of the battalion while Capt FETALVERO

became CO of the Regiment. Still later, this battalion was lifted bodily and made the 3rd Bn of the 120th Inf Regt. This was made possible with the expansion of the 108th Inf Regt, so that one battalion taken from it did not affect its strength materially and would still meet the requirements of the PA T/O.

C O T A B A T O P R O V I N C E

M'LANG: The "Philippine Revolutionary Army" was created in M'Lang sometime in the middle of October 1942, by lieut. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN (later Lt-Colonel) from unsurrendered USAFFE officers and men. The nucleus forming the "Philippine Revolutionary Army" started operation against the enemy as early as 29 Sept 1942, by attacking the Japs in Ladtingan, Pikit, and killing some forty of them without any casualty on the guerrilla side.

Datu ALIMAN MAMASALAKEG and PEDRO SINGAYAO of the "Philippine Revolutionary Army" both commissioned officers later, with some men, ambushed three truckloads of Japs in Upian along the Sayre Highway on 5 Oct 1942, resulting in the death of seventy-five enemy soldiers and one officer, the destruction of one truck and capture of a Jap saber and flag. The guerrillas, entrenched in an invulnerable position, suffered no casualty.

These two guerrilla groups, the "People's Revolutionary Army" and the "Philippine Revolutionary Army" continued to give plenty of trouble to the enemy. The former continuously engaged the enemy at Bulanan, Lumopig, Salunayan and Libungan. The latter unceasingly harrassed the Japs in Pikit, Kidapawan and Kabacan.

As time went on, these guerrilla bands grew in power and strength, with the result that more arms were turned into them and more men hastened to join their ranks.

MIDSAYAP: Datu MANTIL DILANGALEN and FROILAN MATAS, each with a guerrilla following, fused their forces sometime in the latter part of Sept 1942, into what they called the "People's Revolutionary Army". On 2 Oct 1942, this joint command occupied Midsayap which had just been vacated by the Japs. On 6 Oct 1942, they formally took over Midsayap by observing the raising of the American and Filipino flags in the town right on the spot where the Jap emblem had previously flown. On 8 Oct 1942, while Datu MANTIL DILANGALEN was inducting officers and men in the market place into the "People's Revolutionary Army", two truckloads of Japs arrived and attacked the guerrillas at two points near the Midsayap junction. In the ensuing battle, twenty-one enemy soldiers were killed and some wounded. Lt. NICOLAS ABEJO and Sgt. ANTONIO VIRAN of the guerrillas, were wounded.

GLAN AND SARANGANT AREA: A band of guerrillas, somewhere in Malungon, Buayan, under the leadership of Capt. NICOLAS VILLAMOR, was organized with a few rifles and shotguns, as early as Oct. 1942.

In and around Glan proper were some sixty USAFFE soldiers with rifles and shotguns, under the leadership of Capt. ROMAN R. AQUINO, FA, USAFFE.

A union of VILLAMOR and AQUINO guerrilla bands was highly desirable. Through the efforts of Maj. HERBERT C. PAGE and a Dr. GIL B. PABILLO, the merger was effected on 14 Dec 1942 when VILLAMOR with his men and PABILLO came to Glan upon the invitation of Maj. PAGE and Capt. AQUINO. The combined guerrilla groups established their headquarters at Glan with Capt. V. S. BILBAO, commanding.

LEBAK-SALAMAN AREA: In November 1942 on one dark night, eighteen prominent citizens in the Lebak-Salaman District gathered in a certain house at Puricay; MARCELINO A. CONCHA, prominent businessman, Justice of the Peace RICARDO A. CABALUNA, Manager of American Land and Commercial Co., FORTUNATO P. MENDOZA, JUAN CELESTE and others. They decided to form a guerrilla unit to fight the enemy, due to the abusive powers of the Japanese overseers, most of whom were civilians. All they required was a military leader and they persisted in their search for one.

MAGSAKAY BECOMES LEADER
WITH GOOD REASONS

Capt. FELICIANO MAGSAKAY, former CO of the PC detachment stationed at Lebak was then hiding in the mountains. He not only had military training and experience but he entertained a deep personal hatred of the Japs. When on 27 July 1942, the Japanese came to Lebak, MAGSAKAY was summoned to attend a conference. At the time a patrol of sixteen Japanese went to Barurao where the wife of MAGSAKAY and three children were staying. They demanded to know where her husband hid the arms and ammunition of the USAFFE. Upon her refusal, the Jap officer struck her several times on the legs with his sheathed saber. Further questioning resulting in failure, the officer again struck Mrs. MAGSAKAY on the head with the same weapon. Then kicking the woman and her children, they left as unceremoniously as they came.

MAGSAKAY, upon his return from the conference, reacted as would any normal human being. He swore revenge and took his family to the mountains. It was there that four months later, the request of the eighteen prominent men reached him. He gladly accepted leadership. Other than strictly patriotic reasons, it offered a welcome change to square accounts with the enemy.

On November 1942, MAGSAKAY with seven regular PC and PA soldiers armed with rifles and ten civilian volunteers handling shotguns, struck! At 3:00 PM, that day, a Japanese patrol car came to Barurao from Kalamansig. When the vehicle passed through a coconut grove of the American Land and Commercial Co., a concentrated fusillade of enfilading fire met it. The Automobile was immediately wrecked. A Jap Captain, said to have been a Bataan "Hero", four other Japanese and two Filipino Civilians with them were killed. The two civilians peculiarly died as a result of the explosion of a Jap grenade thrown by the dying Jap Captain. It landed but a few feet from the Capt. and killed the two Filipinos.

ANOTHER GUERRILLA UNIT FORMED

On 16 Nov 1942, a public meeting was held in Barurao to acquaint the people with the new movement and the motives behind it. The now Lt-Col JAMES R. GRINSTED was one of the more than three-hundred men, Moros and Christian alike, who attended the meeting. The command was offered to the American officer but he graciously declined the position yielding in favor of MAGSAKAY and satisfying himself with being second in command. MARCELINO A. CONCHA was elected Director of Internal Affairs. FORTUNATO G. MENDOZA, Food and Supply Administrator and RICARDO A. CABALUNA, Staff Adviser.

That very day, the guerrilla band, now augmented by some two hundred civilian volunteers, marched to Kalamansig, the seat of the puppet Jap government, arriving there at midnight. Then early in the morning the guerrilla troops closed in from all directions. But the enemy garrison was no longer there, having moved secretly to Sta Clara two days previously, leaving a lone Filipino guard who surrendered without resistance and delivered to the guerrilla band three rifles.

That marked the end of the Japanese administration in the Lebak-Salaman area, occurring three and one half months after its establishment. The guerrillas took possession of the town and began garrisoning it.

AGAIN TAKES OFFENSIVE ACTION

On 23 Nov 1942, Capt MAGSAKAY, Lts BALONGAY and ABAS GUIABAR with twenty-five soldiers and civilian volunteers, marched to Sta Clara at 2:00 AM, intent on capturing that Jap garrison. At 7:00 AM, they attacked the garrison from three points. The exchange of fire lasted for three hours. At 10:00 AM, the garrison surrendered. Two Filipino civilians were killed and four Japanese civilians, former overseers of the Japanese-sponsored civil government in Lebak-Salaman area, were captured along with Capt JESUS SONGALIA, Lt JUAN DE CASTRO and twenty Filipino soldiers. About four hundred Filipino civilians, previously herded inside the garrison by the Japs, were released. No Jap soldiers were in sight. Without MAGSAKAY's knowledge, the Jap garrison had evacuated Sta Clara for Cotabato on the

night of 21 Nov 1942, leaving SONGALIA, DE CASTRO and the twenty Filipino soldiers to defend the camp in case of a guerrilla attack. These Filipino officers and men, were Prisoners of War brought by the Japs from Cotabato to Sta Clara. Captured in this action by the guerrilla were twenty rifles, including a BAR; three shotguns, five revolvers, and five-hundred rounds of ammunition.

On 21 Dec 1942, the Hq of the MAGSAKAY guerrillas was moved to Barurao from Kalamansig.

THE KIAMBA AREA: During the first week of March 1943, a guerrilla band, headed by Cap NICOLAS VILLAMOR, attacked Kiamba. VILLAMOR ransacked the entire town, after placing under arrest seven Jap civilians. These had been left by the enemy to administer, along with the puppet town officials the government of Kiamba. VILLAMOR brought the Jap civilians to Glan.

DULAWAN: Capt GUMBAY PIANG, USAFFE, due to ill-health paroled from the Concentration Camp at Malaybalay in Sept 1942, went to Dulawan, the seat of the Japanese-sponsored civil government in the Dulawan sector and stayed there, still a virtual Prisoner of War. During his one-year stay at Dulawan proper, he secretly organized a guerrilla unit out of former USAFFE officers and men and civilians whom he selected to be in his confidence for their bravery, discretion and patriotism.

In June 1943, having heard that Col WENDELL W. FERTIG was the recognized Commander of all Mindanao Guerrillas, PIANG sent two envoys, Lieuts MANDANG MAMALANGKAS and ABDUL GUIANI, to contact him in Liangan, Lanao and secure authority for the organization of a guerrilla unit in Cotabato. The envoys returned early in August 1943, bringing the information that pending personal interview with PIANG himself, the issuance of the desired authority was to be held in abeyance. In the meantime, sometime before the arrival of his emissaries, PIANG with his family and followers evacuated to Kabinge, a hinterland sitio, twenty two kilometers from Dulawan, where he organized his temporary headquarters. He left, however, a letter addressed to Cols JIMBO and YAMASHITA at Dulawan informing them of his move. This was a challenge flaunted in the face of the Japanese Commanders and henceforth, PIANG rose high in the black list of the enemy.

In the middle of August 1943, he with twenty-three followers in an arduous and dangerous trip went to Misamis, Misamis Occidental, to contact personally the Commanding Officer of the Tenth Military District. The result of this conference was the authority for PIANG to organize a separate guerrilla unit, which was the nucleus of the 119th Inf Regt, 106th Division. Capt PIANG returned to Kabinge on 10 October 1943 and set himself fully to the task of organization.

B U K I D N O N - P R O V I N C E

IMBATUG-STA-FE-LIBONA: Sometime in June 1942, Lieut LEOPOLDO BLANCO, Lieut ELEAZAR ANDUQUI and some EM, who had refused to surrender to the enemy, started collecting arms and ammunition in Imbatug, Sta Fe and Libona, preparatory to the organization of a respectable guerrilla unit. The then Major ERNEST E. McCLISH with some American companions came to Imbatug. BLANCO sought the advice of McCLISH and was told to continue collecting more arms and ammunition. A guerrilla unit was then organized with McCLISH in command and BLANCO assisting him.

KALABONG-DALIRIG: In the later part of July 1942, Pfc MARGIANO
PUNTAIR AREA DERROTA and Pvt ROMELO JAGA organized guerrilla units in Kalabong and Dalirig.

On 14 Oct 1942, DERROTA with forty-eight men ambushed enemy trucks at Mangima, killed some Japs and captured foodstuffs and other supplies. DERROTA, being fast on the go and very active, was nick-named by his men "The Mystery Shadow".

On 17 Nov 1942, DERROTA and JAGA with nineteen men took Puntian without encountering resistance. Puntian, though not garrisoned by the enemy, was frequented by Japanese police patrols.

In the vicinity of Puntian, a certain Cpl LUDOVICO LOPEZ had about forty men under him with a few arms. He promptly merged his group with that of DERROTA and worked under the latter in a subordinate capacity.

THE ACTIVITY OF AVANCENA

On 15 December 1942, MARINO AVANCENA, arrived at a sitio near Sumilao. Claiming to be a Captain and a direct representative of Major BOWLER, he called all the guerrilla leaders, instructed them to place their units under the command of Maj BOWLER. The different guerrilla entities were then and there organized by AVANCENA into a battalion with himself as Battalion Commander. Telling his men to stand by, he proceeded to Sumilao.

On 26 December 1942, AVANCENA came back and ordered an all-attack on Impasugong and Maluko. The attack was carried out but the objectives were not taken.

It later developed that AVANCENA was a suave pretender, that he represented nobody but himself. Credit must be given him, however, for the fact that in his planned attacks some forty Japs were killed with only one wounded on the side of the guerrillas. AVANCENA was reported to be also responsible, with his daring at impersonation in recovering thousands of rounds of ammunition from Dalirig.

TANKULAN, SUMILAO: AND MALUKO

In the early part of Sept 1942, USAFFE officers who did not surrender, found themselves in Tankulan, Sumilao and Maluko and environs. They too began collecting arms and ammunition, and organizing independent guerrilla units in these areas. Among them were Lts. PATRICIANO A. DESTAJO, JOSE P. LABARO, ISAIAS ARBOLEDA, DOMINADOR IPANAG, RAMON ONAHON. RAMON ONAHON deserves special mention. In those uncertain days, he unmindful of the risks he was running, displayed extraordinary courage in harassing the enemy along the Sayre Highway, inflicting considerable casualties in lightning raids with his small unit.

KITAO-TAO, KIBAWA: ALANIB, MALAYBALAY

In Bukidnon, sometime in the later part of 1942, four distinct, strong guerrilla units were merged into one command. No squabbles were encountered in the fusion. Each group had only one mission; that of dealing the heaviest possible blows to the enemy. Each knew without being told of the fundamental applicability of the axiom: In union there is strength.

These guerrilla units were 1) under the leadership of Pfc VICENTE LEUTERIO of Kibawe; 2) under the leadership of SALIPADA PENDATUN of Kalungan, Cotabato; 3) under Capt ALPIPIO JUNTILLA of Alanib and 4) under Maj F. D. MC GEE at Kanayan and Silae.

After the surrender, Pfc VICENTE LEUTERIO went straight to his farm at Palma. Peace, in his farm, was denied him, however. Somebody reported to the Jap authorities that LEUTERIO was hiding arms and ammunition. LEUTERIO escaped before the Japs arrived. On 5 Oct 1942, he organized some twenty-five reservists and civilians.

ATTACK ON SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY

He was able to arm seven of the strongest and most capable men. LEUTERIO then divided among them some 1000 rounds of .20 cal ammunition. This band, including LEUTERIO, inaugurated the Seventh Anniversary of the Philippine Commonwealth by attacking the Japanese outpost in Kitao- tao at dawn of 15 Nov 1942. This sudden attack netted seven Japs and one Filipino Jap policeman KIA and a few Japs wounded. LEUTERIO's group suffered no casualties!

On 17 Nov 1942, LEUTERIO and his men ambushed the last of the three Jap trucks at Pinamaloy, all bound for Malaybalay. Eight Japs were killed and some wounded.

On 19 Nov 1942, Capt AMADO CRUZ, Senior Inspector Jap BC, with a squad of soldiers went to Kibawe to get LEUTERIO dead or alive. Having been informed of this, LEUTERIO made a jump ahead of Capt CRUZ. At 10:00 PM, that same day, LEUTERIO and his men attacked the house where CRUZ and his soldiers were sleeping, killing the inspector and three of his men.

LEUTERIO INSPIRES THE PEOPLE

This whirlwind activity of LEUTERIO was inclined to be magnified, especially by the poor people, who had always feared the Japs as invincible and invulnerable. Overnight he became a legend. More men joined his command and more arms and ammunitions were gathered in.

The Japanese set a price on LEUTERIO's head. It was at this time that he asked assistance from Datu UGTUG of Eastern Cotabato, on 20 Nov 1942. On 27 Nov 1942, SALIPADA PENDATUN, brother-in-law of DATU UGTUG, arrived at Kibawe with some one hundred men, fully armed. After a short conference between LEUTERIO and PENDATUN on 1 Dec at Kibawe, it was agreed that the two units would be fused and PENDATUN was to lead. They also agreed to contact and invite officers and men who did not surrender and were at that time in Bukidnon, hiding from the Japs. Among these officers contacted were TEODORO GARCIA, NICOLAS GABUTINA, TOMAS CABILI, MELENCIO ORBASE and many others. Several Americans were also contacted. Among them were VINCENT DOUGLASS (later Capt), JACK CLARKE (later commissioned Lieut), FORREST HOWARD (later Lieut), TRACY TUCKER (later Lieut), and ANTHONY BENAC (later Lieut).

A delegation was sent to Congressman MANUEL FORTICH, the Grand Old Man of Bukidnon, for his opinion of the movement. Without reservation, FORTICH pledged full support and cooperation and encouraged the resistance movement. This attitude heartened and encouraged the guerrillas no end.

On 4 December 1942, PENDATUN assigned LEUTERIO to the Pinamaloy sector and LEUTERIO promptly cut down the telephone line to Malaybalay. The Kitao-tao garrison immediately sent several men to repair the line. LEUTERIO ambushed the group and killed three of them; the rest ran back to take refuge in the schoolhouse at Kitao-tao.

PENDATUN sent LEUTERIO reinforcements which reached LEUTERIO on 5 Dec 1942 including Lietus ALBERTO CRUZ and MELENCIO ORBASE. That same evening, Jap reinforcement came from Malaybalay. The enemy was then contacted and the battle lasted for three days. On Dec 8th, the Japs left Kitao-tao for Malaybalay having suffered no less than forty dead and five wounded. On the guerrilla side only one was killed, a Pvt LAMAK-LAMAK.

The guerrillas then occupied Kitao-tao and Pinamaloy and as far as Dologon.

FORTICH'S SUPPORT HELPFUL

At this juncture, another meeting took place in the house of Congressman FORTICH at Dalirig. The Old Man reiterated his pledge of support and cooperation and gave the guerrillas, now very much united, thirty rifles and 10,000 rounds of ammunition. When the people of Bukidnon heard of the open and full adherence of Congressman FORTICH to the movement, they also came out openly in support of the guerrilla. Army men left their hiding places and with whatever arms and ammunition they had, offered their services. Even civilians elements demanded admission into the fold. In less than ten days, the equivalent of two skeleton regiments were formed with nine hundred armed with rifles, and a few machine guns. No less than 20,000 rounds of cal .30 ammunition were in the hands of the unit at that time.

ALANIS: Sometime in October 1942, at Alanib, a group of about fifty men, consisting of reservists, PC men and civilians, banded themselves together to form a guerrilla unit. They were armed with rifles, some automatic, and each man carried no less than seventy rounds of ammunition. Sgt LEOPOLDO ALBERTO and JOEPE NOBLEZA headed this guerrilla band.

About the first week of December 1942, a certain Capt ALIPIO JUNTILLA left his hiding place at the Katoan Quinine plantation and went to see Major BOWLER to ask for authority to organize a guerrilla unit in Alanib and vicinity. On 12 Dec 1942, JUNTILLA returned with HIDALGO and MC VICKERS with a platoon detachment and, absorbing the unit of ALBERTO and NOBLEZA, organized the Alanib sector. Other officers in hiding in the Kitanglad mountains volunteered. By 14 Dec 1942, this group numbered around two hundred fully armed men with .30 cal rifles, three of which were automatic. It also developed a medical unit, labor pool, and an Ordinance section.

This unit, a short time later, was absorbed into PENDATUN's ever growing guerrilla unit.

TALAKAG: Up to 29 Oct 1942, Talakag was governed by Japanese puppet Filipino officials and was frequently visited by Japanese officers and soldiers as well as Japanese civilians. The Cagayan-Talakag road was at that time still passable by motor vehicles.

On 29 Oct 1942, Lieut WALDO MC VICKERS with a few armed men took Talakag by surprise and forced the surrender of the Japanese police and eleven puppet officials. This action was sanctioned previously by the then Maj ROBERT V. BOWLER, an American officer who chose not to surrender to the enemy but instead stayed in Wanguilan, a sitio near Talakag.

Immediately thereafter, a conference was held in Talakag, presided over by Maj BOWLER, MC VICKERS, BENITO T. HIDALGO, WILLIAM L. F. MC LAUGHLIN, NICOLAS DENOSTA, ALBINO NOBLE, CIRILO RIVERA, AMADO SANTIAGO, RICARDO RODRIGUEZ all made Captains later attended the meeting. Plans for effective campaigns against the enemy; mustering of men into the guerrilla fold; collection of more arms and ammunition; feeding of the troops; and establishment of the civil government were among the matters discussed.

On 30 Oct 1942, the American and Filipino flags were raised over Talakag. A patrol, under MC VICKERS, was immediately sent to destroy the ferry-boat at Ugiaban, Talakag which heretofore had been in use by the Japanese. All along the highway from Talakag to Lumbia, outposts were established.

KANAYAN AND SILAE: At Kanayan and Silae, some fifty armed men were under Maj FRANK D. MC GEE. On 20 Dec 1942, Lieut VICENTE VILLANUEVA, personal representative of PENDATUN who at this time, by resolution of all his officers, assumed the rank of "Brig-General", contacted Maj MC GEE at Kabangahan. A little later, Maj MC GEE proceeded with his men to Mailag and turned over his command to PENDATUN.

By 20 Dec 1942, PENDATUN's force had swelled into a total of 1,117 officers and men, and was functioning as a Division. It became known as the "Bukidnon-Cotabato Force".

THE MALAYBALAY SIEGE

MALAYBALAY: Smacking of medieval warfare and looming unique in the history of the Bukidnon guerrillas, was the protracted siege of Malaybalay undertaken by the PENDATUN forces which lasted for some fifty-three days from 12 Jan to 6 March 1943. It was a tale of sheer courage, determination and devotion to duty.

Major MC GEE's forces occupied strategic places between Dalwangan and Malaybalay. Almost simultaneously, Lieut ARLINDO F. ANGELES' Engineering Group undertook the destruction of all bridges North of Kalasungay. In the dead of the night of 11 Jan 1943, Kabacan Bridge was blasted with dynamite, with the deafening detonations of the explosion heard far and wide. It was an announcement to the Japs in Malaybalay that something serious was afoot.

Previous to this, however, the Japs sensing trouble, had begun transferring Prisoners of War from Casisang to Malaybalay and from Malaybalay to Cagayan.

Note: Had the PENDATUN forces succeeded in gaining full control of the National Highway from Dalwangan to Kalasungay, the Japs in Malaybalay would have been entirely cut off from contact with their garrisons in the North.

By this time, there was absolutely no more Jap garrison South of Malaybalay, except possibly that in Kabacan, Cotabato, 160 kilometers away. Datu UGTUG's forces occupied positions in Upian, Aroman, Cotabato, to cut off any enemy reinforcements from Cotabato - which act of the enemy was then considered a remote possibility.

The Japs in Malaybalay were determined, however, to keep the Dalwangan-Malaybalay Road open. At 5:00 AM, 12 Jan 1943, Japanese patrols sent to investigate the condition of Kabacan bridge, encountered a platoon under Lt ROSALES JUNI. That day, another platoon under Lt LORENZO DEFUNTORUM encountered a light Japanese patrol in the vicinity of Kalasungay. In both

encounters, the enemy employed heavy weapons but without effect - there were no casualties on the guerrilla side. That same day, a strong Japanese outpost with heavy weapons, guarded the immediate vicinity of Kabacan while the Kabacan bridge, dynamited by the guerillas the day previous, was being repaired by the Japs.

On 14 Jan 1943, Major MC GEE and a few men occupied Daiwangan and captured four Filipino Jap Policemen who first resisted but later gave up, having been convinced that their position was untenable.

GUERRILLAS ENTER MALAYBALAY

At 4:00 AM, 15 Jan 1943, LEUTERIO and twenty-six EM attacked the Central School Building, Alhambra Cine and Governor ANTONIO RUBIN's residence. Simultaneously, Lt SALVADOR GA and nineteen men of MC GEE's troops attacked the Japs in the Forestry Building. In both attacks the Japs replied with heavy weapons, mortars and machine guns but to no avail. None of the guerrillas were hurt.

At 9:30 on the same day, Lt FELICIANO CASTELO and his men crossed the Sawaga River and marched towards the PC Barracks occupied by Filipino BC's under Lt JUAN LAGRAMA, Prisoner of War. LAGRAMA offered to surrender all arms and ammunition in the possession of the BC's under him. But while the negotiations were going on, ROQUE ASENERO, BC, unnoticed slipped away and informed Cap ALVIAR who in turn informed Capt YOSIOKA, the Jap Commander. Immediately, Lt. CASTELO's position was shelled and machine gunned.

In that exchange of fire, the BCF's (Bukidnon-Cotabato Forces) lost five men and seven wounded. Casualty of the enemy was believed high. That act of treachery on the part of a Filipino engendered deep rancor in the hearts of the guerrillas.

Action on the Northern outskirts of Malaybalay was fast and furious. This was the sector allotted to the MC GEE forces. While Lt. JUNI and his men were fighting the Japs in Kalasungay, Lt GA and his men with a commanding position in Sumpung Hill ambushed Jap foot soldiers going to the Forestry Building from the Normal School Building. Two rifles were taken from the enemy. Eighteen Japs dead, twelve of which were killed by Corp PAJO. No casualties on the guerrilla side.

JAPS CAPTURE A GUERRILLA OFFICER

On 28 Jan 1943, in the vicinity of the Sumpung Hill, JUNI and his company, another platoon led by Lt. FRANCISCO AZOONA and a third group under Lt. CONRADO TADEO, locked horns with a considerable number of Japs. In this encounter a Jap Captain MIRAI was killed. Capt GIL ALTAMIRANO, Executive Officer of MC GEE, was captured by the enemy and subsequently tortured to death.

By then Malaybalay was a town of foxholes. Even the Filipinos insider were in foxholes.

One skeleton battalion under Capt ORBASE succeeded in driving the Japs from the PC Barracks and occupied it as well as the Bukidnon High School Grounds and the area West of the road near Governor RUBIN's mansion.

Japanese planes bombed and strafed continuously guerrilla positions in Kalasungay, Casisang and Impalambong. Some eighty bombs were dropped by the enemy without any casualties.

In various assaults made by BCF men, the guerrillas suffered four casualties.

CATAPULT CAPTURED BOMBS

In the later part of February, action was intense. The guerrillas were using bombs retrieved from the Maramag Landing Field. These were thrown to the enemy positions by means of catapults. The depletion of the Japanese forces began to show. This was confirmed by prisoners escaping from the town to the protection of the guerrillas. They revealed that the beleaguered Japs were thinking of surrendering if the expected aid from the North did not come on time. On 23 Feb the biggest number of prisoners escaped from

Malaybalay and included Lt Col LUIS M. DELGADO, Capt GRISPINO DE CASTRO, Lt ALFREDO BUSTAMANTE, ALFREDO BAKING, MALACAS MEDINA, FRANKLIN LABAON, F. ABUNDA, SAYUSAY and many EM. Most of the officers and EM were ill. Some of these were later to join the guerrillas and play an important part in future history.

An answer to the frantic call for help of the Malaybalay garrison came in the form of about thirty-five Japs from the North, who were engaged incessantly by the guerrillas while enroute. More followed and three hundred of them finally entered Malaybalay at 5:00 PM, 6 March.

Due to shortage of ammunition, the guerrilla forces withdrew eight kilometers south of Malaybalay and maintained a front line extending from Bugcaon to Linabo.

The original strength of Japs in Malaybalay was more than 250. They were well entrenched, employing heavy and automatic weapons with a great amount of shells and other ammunition. They were aided by BC's loyal to Japs.

Malabalay was not taken. But the very audacity of the attack and the protracted siege the guerrillas undertook struck a new note of fear into the heart of the enemy. Moreover, the action strengthened the confidence of the troops in their capabilities and opened the eyes of the Filipino defeatists. The possibilities for future moves were astounding and definitely encouraging.

The now Lt-Col FRANK D. MC GEE, a West Point graduate, an unsundered USAFFE officer, was the strategist of the guerrillas in the Malaybalay operations. To him was largely due the credit of planning and putting into effect almost all the important strategy employed by the BCF in the Malaybalay siege.

M I S A M I S O C C I D E N T A L

The guerrilla units in Misamis Occidental came into being not in the heat of actual battle but in preparation for the coming clash with the enemy. These guerrillas had made no operations against the Japs in the early days although later they, like the rest, have had their share of fighting.

As the Misamis Occidental was the first province to form the nucleus of the Tenth Military District, it was essential that guerrilla groups be organized fully in the shole provinces. Added to this was the fact that Col FERTIG had chosen Misamis Occidental to be the seat of his Headquarters and hence it must of necessity need to be properly garrisoned.

GUBA, MISAMIS: On 16 Sept 1942, just before MORGAN joined TATE in the town of Misamis, Lt ANACLETO C. DINO, MORGAN's Junior Officer in 8th Lanao Co, PC, was directed by MORGAN to assist Lts PATROCINIO GARCIA and JOAQUIN DIAMAL, both PA, to organize the Militia in Misamis to apprise MORGAN of the organization. On the same day, 18 Sept 1942, MORGAN sent for DIAMAL and the men to proceed to Misamis immediately. MORGAN, however, did not wait for the men. That day he proceeded to Dipolog, leaving DINO, GARCIA and DIAMAL to organize the militia at Misamis, with the men from Guba forming the nucleus.

DIAMAL arrived at Misamis on the 19th with about forty men. Preparation for the defense of the town was immediately undertaken. Plans were set to discuss important matters relating to the organization. In the conference were present Lts PATROCINIO GARCIA, PEDRO S. AQUINO, SEGISMUNDO HULIGANGA, OSLAS MACAMAY And a prominent civilian, FELICISIMO BACULI.

CLARIN: Lieuts JOSE MABOLO, VICENTE LUGTU and PEDRO YIAGAN undertook the organization of the Clarin Militia in mid-Sept 1942.

TUDELA: Lieuts JESUS AGUILAR, MEXIMO LAO, FELECISIMO GABULE and FRANCISCO OBUT organized the Tudela Militia, in mid-Sept 1942.

JIMENEZ: Lieuts PANCHITO and AGUILAR organized in the middle of Sept 1942 the Jimenez Militia, joined later by Lieuts CELSO VALMORES, VIDAL AMOJELAR, ANDRE ANCHETA, BENJAMIN CAJITA, FELICISIMO CAYLO, LORENZO EVIOTA and HAMABAR BONDOD.

OROQUIETA:

The Oroquieta Militia, organized in mid-Sept 1942, was composed of two companies, "A" and "B". "A" Co was commanded by Lt SIMPLICIO APAO with Lt FELIMON LAGMAN as Executive Officer and Lts ANTONIO G. GOZAR, EUFONIO LLANTO and HIGINIO REBOSURA as Staff Members. Hq building was the Provincial Hospital. "B" Co was commanded by Lt LUCAS NARANGO. Staff: TEODORO SULAY, EUGENIO NERI, DEMETRIO U. SY and ESPIRITU TAN. Hq building, the Central School.

LOPEZ JAENA:

The Lopez Jaena Militia was organized by Lt NARCISO DIGAMON, assisted by Lts SIMEON LED-ESMA, ORLANDO CARREON and BERTY EDMILAO in Sept. 1942.

TANGUB:

Mayor EPIFANIO FLORES was instrumental in the organization of the Tangub Militia assisted by Lt SEGISMUNDO HULIGANGA. A meeting was held at Pulao, Tangub with FLORES presiding and attended by Lt HULIGANGA and two other officers. The militia started with ninety men. On 31 Sept 1942, Lt DINO in the absence of MORGAN, designated Lt PEDRO S. AQUINO to command the Tangub Militia.

BONIFACIO:

The Bonifacio Militia was organized about the middle of Sept 1942 by ZOILO RUAYA, assisted by Atty ERNESTO CASTANEDA and Lt DANIEL LUMAPAS.

BALIANGAO:

Lts ABELARDO NERIDA, ANGEL RUPERTO, PATRICIO ATAY and one CORPUS were the organizers of the Baliangao Militia in mid-Sept 1942.

PLARIDEL:

The militia at Plardel was organized by Lt CALIXTO DE LEON in 22 Sept 1942.

ZAMBOANGA PROVINCE

DIPOLOG-KATIPUNAN-DAPITAN:
MANIWAY (DAPITAN), SINDA-
NGAN

The MORGAN Expeditionary Force arrived at Dipolog the afternoon of 18 Sept 1942. The militias were immediately organized in Dipolog and other barrios subsequently visited by the expedition. Most of these were nameless and unknown, but were absorbed by MORGAN into the Organization under "General" FERTIG.

A BRIGADIER GENERAL WILL COMMAND

The explanation to the people by MORGAN was brief: An American Brigadier General has arrived from Australia to organize a new Army, fight the Japs and at the same time prepare the ground for the coming of the American Liberation Forces. Cooperation was expected of everybody. Those who did not cooperate with the new movement were classed with the enemy and would be considered as such when the American Forces arrived.

However pressure was unnecessary. The sight of an American at that time was viewed with the greatest elation by the people. The knowledge that an American General was around to lead the fight, gave the people new hope out of the ashes of defeat, despondency and dejection. There were, of course, some who were skeptical: "Who is FERTIG?" "Never heard of him before!" "Is it really true that he came from Australia?" "How does he look?" "Is he not only a mythical character of MORGAN's imagination?" These questions and more were asked. But the majority, quickly and eagerly, volunteered their services.

UNITS ARE FORMED EVERYWHERE - SEPT 1942

In Dipolog District, Lieut PATERNO LUBATON, was appointed by MORGAN to head the militias, assisted by Lieuts EUFEMIO SALERA, DEOGRACIAS HAMAC, JEREMIAS BARINGA and MIROPE FRANCO. The officers and their men concerned themselves at the outset with the collection of arms and ammunition.

In Katipunan District, Lieut ESTEBAN ABIAD was appointed leader of militia, assisted by Lieuts NARCISO ENGLIS, CRISOSTOMO EGUIA, PEDRO ALO and ROBERTO PENARANDA.

In Dapitan District, Lieut FRANCISCO HAMOY was appointed to command, assisted by Lieuts VICENTE DALMAN, HERMINIAHON ZAPANTA, JOSE ADRAINCEM and RODOLFO GALLEPOSO.

In Maniway District (this is a big barrio of Dapitan), Lieut RAFAEL T. CLASO was left in command, assisted by Lieuts RENORIO NATIVIDAD, EPIFANIO BCO, ABELARDO BARRIOS, FELIPE ALVIOLA and VICTOR MANIGSAGA.

On 20 Sept 1942, at 4:30 PM, MORGAN arrived at Sindangan, and because he wanted to cover as much territory as possible, he left Maj JUSTINO TEANO, an old PC officer, to head the organization of the militia in Sindangan. The Sindangan Militia Force was organized on 21 Sept, with the reorganized 2nd Company of the former PC stationed in Sindangan during the war, composing the greater bulk. It became the Sindangan Militia District.

FERTIG GOES TO DIPOLOG

On 6 Oct 1942, FERTIG arrived at Dipolog with MORGAN and Maj FABIAN MEJIA, a PC officer who was elected to head the guerrillas in Misamis Occidental. From Dipolog, the party continued on inspection of other guerrilla units in Northern Zamboanga.

Dipolog, Dapitan, Katipunan and Maniway Militia Districts were made into Sub-Sector 5A with Capt PETRONELO RUIZ as the Commander: Dipolog District became "A" Co; Dapitan, "B" Co; Katipunan, "C" Co; and Maniway, "D" Co.

Sindangan Militia District was made into Sub-Sector No. 5-B and designated "E" Co led by Capt FELIPE QUEJADA, an old PC officer, assisted by Lieuts JOSE SOL BALORIA, GALILEO ACOSTA, GAUDENCIO DUHAY-LUNGSOD, LUCIO ALBOS and FILEMON PARTOSA.

On 11 Nov 1942, Sub-Sectors 5-A and 5-B were organized into the 107th Inf Regt which covered the towns of Plaridel and Baliangao (Misamis Occidental) and Dapitan, Dipolog, Katipunan and Sindangan (northern portion of Zamboanga).

On 17 Nove 1942, Maj JUSTINO TEANO assumed command of the newly organized 107th Inf Regiment.

PAGADIAN: On 12 Sept 1942, the puppet government in Pagadian ended. A certain Jap, YANO by name, sent by the Dansalan Jap Government to act as overseer in Pagadian, was killed in that evening. The killing was engineered by PC and PA men who as early as July 1942, had arrived at Pagadian and bided their time. The following day, 13 September 1942, the Motor Launch "Chingkan", owned by some Chinese businessmen, arrived at Pagadian from Margosatubig bringing a lone Jap, ITO, overseer of the puppet government of Margosatubig. Not having any inkling as to what happened to YANO, ITO landed in Pagadian. He was immediately put under arrest by PC and PA men and in the evening promptly beheaded. This was after his early activities during June, July, August and early September 1942.

Consternation gripped the puppet officials. Some of them were unceremoniously thrown to jail. Others were allowed freedom but given stern warning. Anxiety tugged at the heart of the town. The people expected the Japs to send plenty of soldiers and conduct a punitive expedition. However, this misgiving was unfounded. The Japs did not return until much later.

The leaders of the new movement included Lieuts FERNANDO PAGADIAN, NEMECIO BUYCO and FEDERICO PADAYHAG. Most of the men were those belonging to the former 3rd Zamboanga PC Co stationed at Pagadian before the surrender. This guerrilla unit decided to garrison Pagadian and establish their headquarters there instead of going into the hills.

All the PC men formed a company and selected Lt PADAYHAG as their Commanding Officer; the PA's formed another and elected Lt. PAGADUAN to head them.

On 14 October, at 9:30 in the morning, MORGAN at the head of his rolling force arrived at Pagadian, by way of Aurora and Labangan. WILLIAM TATE was with the party. Organization immediately followed.

On 17 Oct 1942, the Pagadian Sector was formally organized with Capt NICOLAS P. LASOLA as Sector Commander.

MARGOSATUBIG, KABASALAN: AND MALANGAS

municipality of Margosatubig.

Shortly after the surrender, Moro bandits started raiding and looting the sitios in and around Malangas, a barrio belonging to the

During all this time FRANK MC CARTHY, a contractor in the Malangas Coal Mines, together with other public-spirited men, banded themselves together in their evacuation place some nineteen kilometers inland. They had with them some of the old laborers of the mines who continued to live with and work for them. MC CARTHY had them promise to stick by him which they did.

Little by little they gathered quite a number of arms and ammunition. Some they bought outright from retreating soldiers who badly needed money to return to their homes. Other soldiers with arms and ammunition were prevailed upon to join the guerrilla unit instigated by MC CARTHY.

MORO BANDITS CAUSE TROUBLE

In the meantime, the Moro bandits became stronger and richer by their constant pillaging forays. They controlled Malangas, making this their headquarters and store-house for their looted goods. To make it worse, news reached MC CARTHY that Moros in Siay, Kabasalan, had started to pillage nearby villages. MC CARTHY decided to take action. With Moro bandits in Malangas and Moro bandits in Kabasalan - he felt bottled up, and his people in immediate danger.

LIBIO CRUZ, member of the MC CARTHY group, volunteered to go to the Moros in Malangas, pretending that he was dissatisfied with his lot in the MC CARTHY outfit and wanted to join the bandits. This plan worked satisfactorily. The Moros believed the story of CRUZ. Then he told CRUZ that they were about to loot two wealthy Subanos living not far from Malangas. CRUZ immediately sent a secret message to MC CARTHY, arranging for an ambush. MC CARTHY planned accordingly.

MORO BANDITS AMBUSHED

On 20 June 1942, the Moro bandits and CRUZ proceeded to put into action their plans of robbing the wealthy Subanos, but the MC CARTHY ambush was successful. Three Moros were killed outright and two died later after having been badly wounded in the encounter. MC CARTHY's group suffered no scratch.

More encounters with the Moro bad men followed. The Moros were driven from Malangas and MC CARTHY moved in on 26 June 1942. A meeting was called in the Malangas market attended by some 200 Christians, Subanos and some peaceful Moros. A volunteer guard organization was created. The following month saw the organization of VG's in Siay, Kabasalan and Kulasian, Margosatubig. The primary mission was to maintain peace and order. This mission included fighting the Moro bad elements and the Japs too, if need be.

Early in July 1942, the three Jap overseers, YAMASITA in Kabasalan; and JOVEN in Naga-Naga, heard of the activities of the MC CARTHY group.

On 13 July 1942, a Jap vessel docked at Malangas pier with some three hundred Jap soldiers aboard, under the command of Capt MAIDA. The Japs called a meeting of the town people. The theme was the same - not to disturb the peace and order and not to fight against the mighty, invulnerable, invincible Japanese empire.

At this time, MC CARTHY and his volunteer guards had to lie low a distance to the interior. It was suicidal to risk open encounter with that number of the enemy.

On 14 August 1942, the Jap-controlled motor launch "Chingkang" again arrived at Malangas led by SHIROTA, reported to be from Dansalan. He sent word to MC CARTHY to surrender with his men and their arms. He also left a warning to the Malangas civilians that if they insisted in foolishly indulging in guerrilla activity, the Japs would burn the town. SHIROTA then proceeded to Margosatubig.

MC CARTHY ASKS FOR SUPPORT

On 15 August 1942, MC CARTHY appealed to the people of Malangas at the market place in a public meeting to back his guerrillas. The civilians, hating both the Japs and the Moro bandits and liking the leadership of MC CARTHY, pledged

MC CARTHY then planned to send out in a vinta thirty of the strongest and most dependable men, well-armed and carrying explosives to Margosatubig in the dead of the night. Their mission being to sink the Chingkang. This plan failed, however, as the vinta was overtaken by low tide at the mouth of Talanusa channel not far away from Margosatubig.

SHIROTA was angered when later he knew of this. On 21 August, he arrived in Malangas aboard the same vessel with two Japanese soldiers and forty BC soldiers - all well-armed. They failed to locate MC CARTHY and his men. Three times, until 25 August 1942, the boat of the Japs went to Malangas during the day to capture MC CARTHY or at least discourage his organization and the town people against the Japs. Each night, however, the Jap vessel would return to Margosatubig, to avoid running into a raid.

KABASALAN:

A MELCHOR ALDE struck at the Japs at Kabasalan on 13 Sept 1942. The Japs managed to escape but was later captured and killed by a member of the Siay guerrillas to which ALDE belonged. On that same day, MC CARTHY and his men were on their way to Kabasalan to help the Siay group in their coup de etat against the Jap rule.

After the incident, the Siay guerrilla increased their strength. From 12-19 Sept 1942, the Siay guerrilla under the leadership of two brave brothers, CESAR and BENJAMIN BERENGUER, collected many firearms and rounds of ammunition from Naga-Naga and outlying barrios - both from Moros and Christians alike. JOVEN, the Jap overseer of Naga-Naga, having been informed of the overthrow of his government in Kabasalan fled to Margosatubig. When the men of BERENGUER and MC CARTHY reached Naga-Naga, the Japs were no longer there.

On 20 Sept 1942, the BERENGUER brothers and Kabasalan soldiers arrived in Malangas in the launch "Oboza" which they put into running condition after having captured it in Kabasalan. This trip was in response to MC CARTHY's request for help in attacking Margosatubig, and in capturing the Motor Launch "Chingkang".

Before they reached Margosatubig, however, the "Chingkang" had already left on 12 Sept 1942 for Pagadian with ITO, the Jap overseer. Had ITO delayed he would have been caught in Margosatubig by the MC CARTHY and BERENGUER guerrillas. However, on 13 Sept 1942, the fate that he ran away from Margosatubig awaited him at Pagadian where he was beheaded.

The combined MC CARTHY-BERENGUER guerrillas were met by a wildly cheering crowd upon landing in Margosatubig. Filipino and American flags were in evidence everywhere.

JOVEN, the Jap overseer of Naga-Naga who went to Margosatubig, and was left by ITO there with another Jap TACHINA, fled to the mountains. A certain L. BARBA who had been previously taken prisoner by the Japs - maltreated and robbed of his property, pursued the two Japs, found them in the interior, and killed them.

The last days of September and the first three weeks of October 1942 were used by the Siay and Malangas guerrillas to strengthen their positions, including that of Margosatubig.

On 22 October 1942, MORGAN and his Expeditionary Force arrived at Margosatubig. MC CARTHY's and the Kabasalan group under the BERENGUERS, were formed into the Malangas Sector, with Captain FRANK W. MC CARTHY, commanding.

CURUAN:

PC, PS, PA and VG's in Curuan, about forty six kilometers from the city of Zamboanga, formed themselves into the Curuan Cooperative Government which was ratified by the members and supporters on 21 Oct 1942. The activities of this government extended and branched out to the surrounding places, including Basilan and Sakol Islands.

MORGAN's Expeditionary Force arrived at Curuan on 15 Nov 1942. The Curuan Cooperative Government was then abolished and became the Curuan Sector under Lieut VIRGILIO C. ALARCON.

M I S A M I S O R I E N T A L

HIMAYA, EL SALVADOR:

In the early days of October 1942, Major MANUEL JALDON with a few officers and men having collected some arms and ammunition, formed a guerrilla unit at Himaya, a sitio in El Salvador, Cagayan. He issued a call to reservists and civilians to join in the renewal of hostilities against the enemy.

MALANANG, BARRA, IPONAN:

While JALDON was thus occupied, another unit was organized in the nearby sitios of Malanang, Barra and Iponan by Lieuts MARCELINO MAAGAD and MARCELO GEBE. The energetic push which these young men gave their work brought into their fold some thirty-five men and thirteen rifles, one shotgun, two revolvers and some ammunition. In the beginning these two officers were working independently but when they learned of each other's existence and intentions, they decided to join forces. Having also heard of the activities of Major JALDON, these two young men reported to him on 15 November 1942, at Bolisong, Hq of the former's unit, and placed their guerrilla bands at his disposal. JALDON assigned their unit to cover the Malanang-Barra-Iponan Sector. MAAGAD was designated as Commanding Officer.

On 26 November 1942, MAAGAD's unit assisted by the now Maj FIDENCIO LAPLAP, attacked the enemy at Patag, killing seventeen Japs and suffering no casualty on their part. Maj LAPLAP was one of the USAFFE officers who hid in Talacogon and later, because of his good showing in combat, was made a Staff Officer by JALDON.

This successful encounter at Patag encouraged other officers and men of the USAFFE in hiding, to join with JALDON's outfit.

NASAGPIAN:

Lieuts ARTURO CAMPO, NORBERTO JACALAN and OTONIEL COTEJO who were organizing a guerrilla unit at Nasagpian, also reported to Maj JALDON and thereafter fused with the Malanang-Barra-Iponan Sector, increasing the strength of this sector to about eighty eight officers and men.

On 28 Dec 1942, the Japs in a vengeful mood, attack this sector. The attack was repulsed and the enemy withdrew with a number of casualties.

PAGATPAT:

In November 1942, another guerrilla unit was being organized at Pagatpat by Lieuts ANDRES BACAL and MARCELINO BARILLO. This began with only a handful of men but later expanded to about one hundred men and officers.

On 16-17 Nov 1942, the Japs attacked this sector intending to smash its defenders. They failed to push through and were returned to Cagayan.

TAYTAY:

At the time JALDON was organizing his units at Himaya, a small guerrilla band in Taytay was being created under the leadership of Lt ARACID HAMID. Later HAMID, like the others, reported to JALDON for duty, placing his small guerrilla units at JALDON's disposal.

INITAO:

Maj ANGELES LIMENA was also organizing a unit of his own called the West Misamis Oriental Sector which occupied the area lying West of the Alubijid River. This in turn was sub-divided into Lugait Sector under Lt CONSTANTINO MEDADO, Naawan Sector under Lt CARLITO SUBAND, Initao Sector under Lt ANTONIO OGNIR. The Alubijid Sector was designated for command of Major LAPLAP.

BALINGASAG:

On 16 Sept 1942, twenty nine guerrillas of Balingasag, who had organized a week before, attacked a Jap officer, Capt OKUMORRA, and two Jap soldiers who were living in the church tower. The Japs expected no trouble in Balingasag as a puppet government was already in existence. The guerrilla band was led by Lieut PEDRO D. COLLADO and Pfc CLYDE M. ABBOTT, USAC. Other leading members of the organization were EUTIOQUIO CAPRIO, VICENTE MERCADO, PEDRO VALENCIA and AMBROSIO CASTINO.

ABBOTT INSPIRES GUERRILLAS

In this fight, SANTIAGO UBALDE, a guerrilla member, was killed. The exchange of fire between the Japs in the tower and the guerrillas below was continuous. The town priest was sent to the tower to negotiate for the surrender of the Japs, but they refused. CLYDE ABBOTT, in complete disregard of his own safety advanced and threw a lighted dynamite, but the explosive fell short of the tower. Then the guerrilla band decided to burn the church. This was done

with dried coconut leaves and the burning led by ABBOTT himself.

When the church was on fire, the Japs jumped out, firing at the guerrillas as they attempted to escape. VICENTE MERCADO killed the Jap Captain and other members of the band killed the other two Japs.

The next day, two Jap launches, "Mambejona" and "Tito" approached the beach to land troops. They were repulsed by rifle fire from the guerrillas lining the beach. An estimated seventeen Japs were killed in the launch "Mambejona". "Tito" was too far off for effective firing.

Japanese attempts to retake Balingasag failed and day by day the guerrillas increased their strength in number, arms and ammunition. The town of Salay was included in the Balingasag Sector when CIPRIANO BEREGAY with some men went to that municipality on the 18th Sept to end the Jap puppet government there.

In Oct 1942, Lieut PEDRO D. COLLADO made a trip to Misamis, Misamis Occidental to report to Col FERTIG. Thru COLLADO, the Balingasag Sector was then incorporated into the ever increasing Mindanao guerrilla organization. The spirit of unity which prompted these bands to join together for a common cause, without regard to personal glory, is one of the encouraging highlights of the early guerrilla organization.

TALISAYAN: Led by Pfc FAUSTO ORONDANG, PC, nineteen guerrillas took over the government of the Talisayan town the night of 19 Sept 1942. The puppet Mayor, FELICESIMO AGUILAR, was taken captive and the Jap overseer of the town was beheaded. The next day more men joined. The guerrilla band, leaving a few men in Talisayan, then proceeded to Gingoog and took that town on 20 Sept. Puppet officials were jailed. Then followed the taking of Quinogitan. Camiguin Island consisting of the municipalities of Catarman, Sagay and Mambajao under Lieut MANUEL CORRALES and FELINO DONESA whom OMONDANG COMMISSIONED AS Captain. OMONDANG's headquarters were at Talisayan.

The OMONDANG unit however, showed a defiant attitude to the guerilla forces headed by Col FERTIG. Upon order of Lt-Col ERNEST E. MC CLISH, then designated CO of the 110th Division which included a part of Bukidnon, all of Misamis Oriental, Surigao, Agusan and Davao Provinces, OMONDANG was disarmed and his men taken into the 110th Division. This was on 1 Dec 1942.

A G U S A N P R O V I N C E

BUENAVISTA: The first guerrilla shot, in the entire province of Agusan was fired in Buenavista.

2nd Lieut HILARION ANIASCO, PC and TIRSO GERONA, civilian volunteer, after organizing a small guerrilla unit, struck on 26 Sept 1942. A Japanese car on its way to Buenavista from Butuan to get fish and vegetables was ambushed near the road junction. Two Japs and one Filipino civilian guide were killed. The guerillas then took command of Buenavista, killing an additional five Filipino spy suspects in the interim. They then set up a guerrilla government.

The Jap garrison at Butuan, some fifteen kilometers away to the East, repeatedly attempted to retake Buenavista but were repulsed in a series of encounters. This guerrilla organization like many others grew in strength rapidly.

The Japs, a few days later bombed the town, destroying the Municipal Building.

CABADBARAN: Cabadbaran, under the leadership of Atty JOSE R. VILLANUEVA and 2nd Lieut BENJAMIN FAMADOR, escaped POW, also revolted. Early in Oct 1942, SINDAK, a Japanese hireling who had been terrorizing Cabadbaran for some time, was sent by the Jap High Command of Butuan to Cabadbaran with two Filipino policemen to arrest the escaped USAFFE Filipino officers and the Cabadbaran Chief of Police. The guerrilla group under Sergeant GREGORIO VENCE, later Liut, arrested SINDAK and his two policemen, confiscating their truck. The following day, SINDAK was killed.

Some days later, this guerrilla band swelled by the presence of Lt THOMAS R. BAXTER, later Capt; LT ROSAURO P. DONGALLO, later Major; Lt ALFREDO CAYTON, Lt PLENIO ATEGA and Sgt GREGORIO VENCE, fought a Jap patrol of undetermined number at kilometer four, Cabadbaran-Butuan road, inflicting some casualties on the enemy.

After this encounter, the DONGALLO brothers, THOMAS BAXTER and VICENTE ZAPANTA, who joined after the encounter, proceeded to Misamis Oriental on Japanta's banca and jointed Lt-Col MC CLISH at Balingasag, then busy organizing the 110th Division. VICENTE ZAPANTA, later Major and his wife actively participated in the organization of the 110th Division. ZAPANTA's banca "Athena" was a great help in the water traffic of the command.

Two other early guerrilla leaders actively participating in the Cabadbaran guerrillas were CRUZ RANARIO, later Captain, and Atty TERESA CORVERA, intelligence agent.

AMPAYON: Another group was formed in Ampayon by LOPE DESIATA, ex-policeman and joined Sgt LEON EBALLA, PC, now Lieut. This group later joined the Cabadbaran guerrilla command under the leadership of Lieut BENJAMIN FAMADOR, Lt. PLENIO ATEGA and Sgt GREGORIO VENCE.

LIBERTAD: In Libertad was also another group under Sgt SALVADOR CIENCIA, now Lieut; Sgt DEMA FELIS, now Lieut; Lt. VICENTE CEMBRANO, now Capt. This group was led by Pvt GEORGE ABAPO, PS, 3rd Lt BENJAMIN PIA, TIRSO GERONA, civilian volunteer and 3rd Lt ARTURO LEONARDO.

Sometime in Jan 1943, KHALIL KHODR, Syrian miner, was chosen by the different small guerrilla units which included that of Buenavista and Cabadbaran and the vicinity of Butuan, to head the movement. KHODR proved a good leader and organized a fairly large guerrilla unit. This unit later absorbed the guerrilla band in the Agusan River area headed by Lt LOU ROBERTON, Lieut ALFREDO CAYTON and that around Butuan led by Lieut CIENCIA. KHODR was subsequently made Captain.

JAGUPIT: A small band of USAFFE soldiers and officers organized a guerrilla group in Jagupit under the leadership of Lt CAYETANO SERRANO, Lieut ERNESTO RIVER (escaped POW) and Lt EDUARDO CURATO (escaped POW). This band later joined the forces in Cabadbaran.

Before the activation of the Agusan guerrillas into the fold of the 110th Division under Lt-Col ERNEST E. MC CLISH, there had been an attempt of various guerrillas to unify their command. One of these attempts was made in the conference held at Amparo. The guerrilla leaders present elected the following:

KHALIL KHODR was placed 2nd in command because it was intended that Colonel KANGLEON then confined in Butuan but definitely planning to escape was to head the united guerrillas in Agusan Section.

Chief of Staff	: 2nd Lt HILARION ANIASCO
G-1	: 2nd Lt VICENTE CEMBRANO
G-2	: Atty JOSE VILLANUEVA
G-3	: Sgt (now Lt) SALVADOR CIENCIA
G-4	: 1st Lt CELESTINO UDARBE (now Capt)
Fin Officer	: Lt PLENIO M. ATEGA
Commanding Officer:	Lt BENJAMIN FAMADOR

in the field

No Table of Organization was followed. The offices were simply created in the conference. But this plan was not carried out on account of the arrival of Capt WILLIAM KNORTZ, representative of Lt-Col MC CLISH, on 30 Dec 1942. Capt KNORTZ immediately recognized the Agusan guerrillas and on 14 Jan 1943, the 112th Inf Regt (later changed to 113th Inf) was incorporated into the 110th Division.

THE BUTUAN SIEGE

From 3-10 March 1943, forces in the 110th Division composed of the Misamis Oriental guerrillas (110th Inf) and the Agusan units (113th Inf), a total of some 2,000 men, stormed the Jap garrison at Butuan and laid a siege for eight days. MCCLISH was assisted by Lt-Col CLYDE C. CHILDRESS; MORGAN and his expeditionary force; ROSAURO DONGALLO, CO, Division Special Troops; KHALIL KHODR, CO, 113th Inf; Capt CRUZ RANARIO, Division "M"; Atty TERESA CORVERA, Woman guerrilla leader of Agusan; Lt CLYDE ABBOTT leading the 110th Inf troops.

More than half of the town was burned in the battle. The Jap remnants were finally driven to the Elementary School Building where they entrenched themselves and were about to surrender when Jap planes arrived and bombed and

strafed the guerrilla attackers. This was followed by Jap reinforcement of some two hundred well-armed men from Cagayan. Jap casualties in this battle were estimated to be close to a hundred. Twenty men were lost on the side of the guerrillas.

Butuan was not taken but the attack demoralized the Japs who, sensing that their stay in Butuan was precarious, moved to Cagayan, Misamis Oriental on 28 August 1943.

This Butuan siege like that of Malaybalay was among the few determined attempts in the early guerrilla days to dislodge the enemy, however poorly equipped were the attacking forces.

SURIGAO PROVINCE

MASGAD:

A guerrilla force was organized here by MACARIO DIAZ, Municipal Mayor of Surigao City who did not surrender to the Japs. DIAZ however, had only a few arms and a few rounds of ammunition. Some minor encounters between the DIAZ band and the Japanese took place around the area of Lake Mainit, particularly the Siana Mines. Some Japanese patrols from Surigao were encountered in hit-and-run attacks by the DIAZ guerrilla band.

OTHER GUERRILLAS

In Gigaguit and environs, Maj CEFERINO GARCIA, PC, organized another guerrilla band; SAMMY GOODE with a small following in Tago; JOSE MC CARTHY at Tanday; Capt TOMANING at Lianga and other small guerrilla units were organized almost simultaneously in mid-Sept 1942.

These bands were loose and attempts to unite them failed. It was only when Capt WILLIAM KNORTZ was sent over to Surigao by Lt-Col MC CLISH to organize a regiment that all the guerrilla bands were fused and united in June 1943. Such Americans as Capt THOMAS BAXTER and ANTON HARATIK did a great job in initiating the organization of small guerrilla bands in Surigao and Agusan before KNORTZ arrived. This was to be the nucleus of the 114th Inf Regt of the 110th Division, - later strengthened and made a potent, powerful striking force under Maj PAUL H. MARSHALL, (later Lt-Col), former Sgt in the Army of the United States who escaped from Davao Penal Colony in the early part of 1943. He was assisted by Capt (later Major) ROBERT SPIELMAN who had escaped with Lt-Col MARSHALL from Davao, the latter's Executive Officer. Lt-Col MARSHALL relieved MC CLISH as CO of the 110th Division on 22 Jan 1945. His unit was instrumental in driving the Japs from the Surigao-Agusan North area previous to the landing of American Forces on Mindanao.

DAVAO PROVINCE

LAURETA'S GUERRILLA BAND

Lt-Col CLARO LAURETA, then Captain, USAFFE, did not surrender to the Japs in Davao, but instead moved to the interior and organized a guerrilla band of his own and firmly resisted the Japs. He was formerly CO of the Camp Victa Co, PC, Davao. His original group consisted of about forty soldiers of his former command. He maintained his guerrilla unit along the Lubuganon River and enforced law and order in the settlement of some 4,000 civilian evacuees from Davao City. This was in the very early days after the surrender. The guerrilla band soon drew other soldiers.

Later minor guerrilla chieftains like Lt PEPITO in Saug; Lieut NAVARRO with some thirty men in Compostela, joined LAURETA.

SEVENTY FIVE JAPS KILLED

Even before the surrender and as early as 1 May 1942, LAURETA's unit intact after the disintegration of the Fil-American Forces in the Davao Sector, waged guerrilla warfare against patrols and small enemy garrisons. At 5:00 PM on 1 May 1942, Lieut NAPOLI, one of LAURETA's officers, with some soldiers surprised the Japanese garrison at Pagsabangan. The enemy suffered a loss of seventy three men killed including eleven Moros, and many wounded. The guerrillas had one man wounded.

On 15 May 1942, an enemy patrol of forty men under Lieut MORI was encountered at Barrio Mabaud, near Pagsabangan. MORI and a Jap soldier were killed. The guerrillas suffered no loss.

On 1 June 1942, at 10:00 AM, an advance guard of a unit of 250 Japs was encountered by the guerrillas in Barrio Magatos, Kapalong. Ten Japs were killed. No guerrilla casualties.

Simultaneously, the guerrilla outpost at barrio Talomo encountered a Jap contingent, part of a unit of 250, and after a brief exchange of fire, five Japs were counted dead with no casualties on the guerrilla side.

On 18 Sept 1942, a Japanese patrol of seven men searching for a Jap crashed plane in barrio Camoning, two kilometers from the guerrilla camp, was completely wiped out and their arms and ammunition were appropriated by the guerrilla attackers.

CAMBANOGYO ENCOUNTER-TWO JAPS KILLED

On 10 December 1942, an enemy patrol of forty men clashed with a guerrilla patrol of an inferior number at barrio Cambanogoy. The Japs retreated, leaving behind two of their dead.

The LAURETA guerrilla band, in the face of overwhelming enemy superiority - Japs in Davao calculated to be no less than fifty thousand men during that time - remained intact throughout the guerrilla period and continued to harass the enemy and to keep the civilian population united except in the heavily garrisoned Jap areas.

MATI-MANAY: JOVITA PEDRAYA, Sgt, USAFFE, took command of about 200 men formerly under Capt ASIS, his former Commanding Officer who was killed after he tried to force his men to surrender to the Japs. This was in June 1942. The territory occupied by the PEDRAYA group lay in the east coast of Davao and included Mati and Manay. This group was later made into the 111th Prov Bn under the 110th Division with Lt OWEN P. WILSON commanding and PEDRAYA, Executive Officer.

CATEEL-LINGIG: Small guerrilla units were formed in Cateel and Lingig under Lt TEODULFO VILLARIN. These also were later absorbed in the 110th Division but did no active fighting until Capt ANTON HARATIK took command in the latter part of 1943. Then small encounters were initiated with the enemy. This unit formed the nucleus of the 112th Prov Bn.

S U L U A R E A

On 24 Dec 1941, the Japs invaded Jolo and easily overcame the PC forces garrisoned there. The remnants of the dispersed PC forces formed the nucleus of subsequent guerrilla groups. There is very little to record on their activities.

TAWI-TAWI: When the war broke out, the PC Commander in the Tawi-Tawi area was 1st Lt ALEJANDRO PRESPECES. After the surrender, he was forced to move with his force of thirty armed men to Bato-Bato, due to inadequate supply of food and supplies.

Lt ANTON TAN, a school teacher and Reserve officer in Jolo, was with the Jolo USAFFE Force in December 1941. When the surrender came and the troops dispersed, he went to Sibutu to join the guerrillas.

Another guerrilla unit in the Tawi-Tawi area was led by "Colonel" TOME BITENG. Very little is known of this organization but it is believed that BITENG is an ex-USAFFE officer from Panay whose outfit is concerned mostly with shipping rice to North Borneo and profiteering on sugar trade between Negros and the Sulu islands. He kept his connections with the Panay guerrillas and was encouraged by them to seek an independent command. He never did cooperate in effecting the unification of guerrilla units in the area. He expressed willingness to take instructions from FERTIG's Hq but did not report when requested to do so.

SIASI-JOLO AREA: Capt L. P. MORGAN and his Expeditionary Force arrived in the environs of the City of Zamboanga sometime in mid-November 1942. He desired to organize the Sulu guerrillas so he sent for Lt ABDUL-RAHIM IMAO, a Jolo Moro, who at the time was at Zamboanga. A guerrilla unit was organized at Siasi in December 1942, under Lt IMAO.

On 25 Dec 1942, the newly formed unit attacked the Siasi Jap garrison, capturing thirty rifles. In early January 1943, the Jap garrison attacked the Siasi guerrillas but failed to disrupt them.

In the meantime, contacts were made with other guerrilla leaders all over the Siasi-Jolo area and in time the following sectors were organized:

Sisasi Sector	- Lt Komglam Tio
Tawi-Tawi Sector	- Lt Alejandro Prespeces
Silangkan (Jolo) Sector	- Lt Abdulrahim Imao
Maimbung (Jolo) Sector	- Lt A. Ali
Karunglang (Jolo) Sector	- Lt E. Agga
Lu-uk (Jolo) Sector	- Lt A. Datiles
Taglibi (Jolo) Sector	- Lt Ballesteros
Bilaan (Jolo) Sector	- Capt Arolas Tulawie

Since the surrender, the Japs stationed only a small garrison in Jolo. The guerrilla activities in the sector confined the Japs to Jolo town until mid-1943. At that time, the Jap garrison was reinforced and temporarily disrupted the guerrillas.

In January 1943, Lieut-Col ALEJANDRO SUAREZ who escaped from the Japanese custody in the Mindanao mainland, returned to Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, and unified the various guerrilla units operating independently in the province. He later commanded the 125th Inf Regt assigned to cover that sector.

CHAPTER IV

FORMATION OF REGIMENTS AND DIVISIONS

A. THE NEED FOR UNITY

The diverse guerrilla bands springing into existence and taking shape and form during the last quarter of 1942, were loosely organized, clearly wanting in discipline and manifestly in dire need of many necessary attributes that make up the requirements for fighting units. The guerrillas had no definite source from which to draw disbursements for the expenses entailed in their maintenance and operations or the various supplies or the payment of salaries and allowances. In fact, this deficiency was the root cause of a number of abuses committed by the guerrillas in some areas.

ENEMY HAD ALL THE ADVANTAGES

Ill-fed, clothed in rags, sick and without sufficient weapons and ammunition to use in resisting the gigantic war machine of an empire, the guerrillas had practically nothing to hold on to except the smoldering fire of hatred for the brutal conqueror that terrorized and subjugated their people. Most sadly lacking in education and training of any sort, and led for the most part by men whose visions were fenced within the narrow confines of limited understanding, could not be expected to look far ahead. Added to all this, was the sudden disruption of communication and transportation lines which made extremely difficult the transmission of plans and tactics of one group to another.

To cap it all, the enemy occupied almost all the strategic places, aggravating the hardship of contact between guerrilla bands. The result was that one guerrilla unit, isolated in its own chosen sector, constituted the law. It took advantage of its new-found power, and invariably was tempted to prey upon the already suffering civilians for the support and maintenance of the organization. Some of these guerrillas, found a welcome opportunity to square old accounts with persons who, in the normal times of the past, had somehow the upper hand in the run of affairs. This gave rise to unnecessary and uncalled-for retaliations.

The need for unity of action was clearer than ever. At no other time was the truism, "IN UNION THERE IS STRENGTH", made truer.

FERTIG UNIFIED COMMAND

Col WENDELL W. FERTIG, from his headquarters in Misamis, Misamis Occidental, knew all these facts and more. He knew, that if no strong move was made to unify the many guerrilla groups strung all over the island of Mindanao; internal and bloody friction among them would result over which the enemy would gloat with glee. His objective then settled down to the problem of unification.

The very first move he made was to arm himself with the powers, assumed or not, needed to clothe a recognized leader. The rank of "Brigadier-General" which was first applied by MORGAN to a fictitious character, was actually assumed by Col FERTIG when he accepted the leadership. The rank, though just an adopted one, lent more color to the Leader and enhanced the authority he exercised in those early guerrilla days. "WENDELL W. FERTIG, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMANDING," placed at the end of written communications from Col. FERTIG's headquarters was somehow enough to make small guerrilla leaders forget their dreams of power and glory and rally to the colors borne by the "American General".

Leadership, however, does not end in ranks, genuine or assumed. And Col FERTIG was one who did not dawdle on half-way measures.

The next stop was a move toward capturing the attention of Gen MAC ARTHUR in the great potentialities of the unified Mindanao Guerrillas, for the attainment of the final goal - total defeat of the Empire of Japan in a war of attrition. This of course, eventually would lead to recognition and recog-

dition would mean conferring upon the Mindanao guerrillas the status of being a part of a great Army of the United States, with the manifold advantages attendant thereto.

ESTABLISHES CONTACT WITH MAC ARTHUR

Accordingly, efforts were made in establishing radio contact with the US War Department or Southwest Pacific Area. Also three intrepid Americans, CHARLES SMITH, ALBERT SMITH and JOHN HAMNER, set out for Australia in a small sailboat, reinforced with an old motor placed in the hull which served more as ballast than as a driving force. Their mission was to contact Gen MAC ARTHUR and bring full data on the Mindanao Guerrilla possibilities and problems.

Both the radio and the sailboat trip ventures were successful, after harrowing experiences and anxious expectancy.

On 20 Feb 1943, Col FERTIG sent Gen MAC ARTHUR this radio message:

"The unification of scattered guerrilla forces so far into nine regiments is made with the end in view of eliminating dangerous friction between them and coordinating their efforts against the enemy. The present total strength of these units consists of 650 officers and 10,300 men. Regiments can quickly be expanded if arms are available. At present we have seventeen MG's, eighty-four BARs, twenty-three Colt MRs, 4000 rifles and twenty-one garands, exclusive of those in the 4th Philippine Corps. The shortage of ammunition is becoming acute. What we have cannot sustain the present harassing guerrilla activities."

Two days later, on 22 Feb 1943, Gen MAC ARTHUR sent Col FERTIS the following:

"Command areas will be progressively established based on existing military districts. Commanders of districts will operate under the control of this Headquarters (Southwest Pacific) and assignments will be made on the basis of performance. Lt-Col FERTIG (CE) is designated to command the Tenth Military District (island of Mindanao) x x x He will perfect intelligence not covering the Ninth Military District (Samar-Leyte) x x x No officer of rank of General will be designated at present".

As a tangible manifestation of Gen MAC ARTHUR's recognition of the Mindanao Guerrillas under Col FERTIG, on 5 March 1943, a submarine arrived and unloaded supplies for the Tenth Military District off Tukuran beach, Pagadian, Zamboanga. Aboard was Lt-Commander "Chick" PARSONS, MAC ARTHUR's representative charged with the mission of observing conditions in the Philippines, especially Mindanao, making report and recommendation on his findings and of helping Col FERTIG in the unification of the Mindanao Guerrilla. Also Lt-Col CHARLES SMITH, one of the three Americans who led successfully and braved the uncertain voyage to Australia from Mindanao on 5 Dec 1942 in a small sailboat.

AUTHORITY TO PRINT MONEY

On the heels of this recognition, there came the authorization from President MANUEL L. QUEZON for the appointment of a new Currency Board to print money for the financing of the organization and its corollary entities, including that for civilian relief. This was on 10 April 1943, and the authority follows:

"Following forwarded to you from QUEZON (for FERTIG from MAC ARTHUR): I hereby appoint new Currency Board with same authority as previous board as to military requirements and also unlimited amount for civilian relief. New Board Judge FLORENTINO SAGUIN, Provincial Treasurer FILOMENO PACANA and Provincial Auditor ISIDORO BARBASA."

In a radio message dated 16 April 1943, correction was made on the foregoing instructions. The word "unlimited" between "also" and "Amount" was changed to "limited".

The recognition of the FERTIG Command by Gen MAC ARTHUR, and the authorization by President QUEZON to print money for the support of the Mindanao Guerrillas, including the maintenance of the civil government and for civilian relief, and the steady flow of supplies from Southwest Pacific Area, did not come as a gift on a platter of gold. This recognition was the result of incessant labors and sacrifices of untold risks undergone by Col FERTIG and those who stood by him, in the welding into an effective fighting machine of what in the beginning were loose, irresponsible, roving, undisciplined men.

ADAPT PHILIPPINE ARMY T/O

It was originally planned by FERTIG to follow the Philippine Constabulary set-up of Districts, Sectors and Sub-Sectors. This, however had to be discarded in favor of the Philippine Army Table of Organization (Reserve Division), for the reason that the latter pattern admitted more room for expansion. Hence, Divisions following the PATO (Reserve Division) were evolved, composed of Regiments. The Regiments were evolved from Guerrilla units which were formed into battalions.

To effect the efficient administration, control and supervision of the different guerrilla units; enhance the unification program and hasten the formation of regiments and divisions, it was essential that a well-established, strong General Headquarters be maintained. Permanency of station was, however, out of the question in enemy occupied Mindanao and mobility of GHQ was compulsory. In fact on several occasions the Japanese attacked or bombed FERTIG's Headquarters, being especially active in the Agusan area. But wherever the location of the General Headquarters, Col FERTIG and his Staff, managed to administer the affairs of the organization smoothly. Headquarters was variously denominated; GHQ, CPG, CPZ, Cpz-W, CPZ-U and CPZ-L.

District Headquarters was first established in Misamis, Misamis Occidental. The site was not centrally located but did allow the maintenance of Communication by sea with all divisional areas. After the enemy invasion of Misamis Occidental on 26 June 1943, the headquarters was moved to Liangan, Lanao. This was in early July 1943.

As the Japanese efforts to stamp out the guerrillas became more and more intensified, Col FERTIG considered splitting the District Headquarters for security purposes. If one met disaster, the other could carry on. Lives were expendable but somehow the contingency of disruption due to enemy action had to be considered and met in advance, to forestall the possibility of complete annihilation. For this reason, Col FERTIG and a portion of his staff, transferred to Esperanza, Agusan Province some thirty five kilometers up the Agusan River from Butuan, on 15 Oct 1943.

The move from Liangan to Esperanza was mostly by sailboat through enemy infested waters. At that time, the Japs were garrisoning Iligan, Cagayan and Gingoog Bays. The sailboat was open to enemy attack from air and sea. The importance of that trip was augmented by the presence in the frail sailboat of the Commanding Officer, Col FERTIG himself, and the important records of the District Headquarters.

"A" CORPS FORMED

Col ROBERT BOWLER, Chief of Staff, headed the portion of the Headquarters left in Liangan, Lanao. Eventually on 1 Jan 1944, Col FERTIG created the "A" Corps for the supervision, administrations and control of the 105th, 106th, 108th and 109th Divisions, all garrisoning Western Mindanao, with Col BOWLER, after having been relieved as Chief of Staff, made Commanding Officer. This arrangement enabled Col FERTIG to dedicate most of his time in setting things right in the forces at Misamis Oriental (Eastern side), Agusan, Surigao and Davao - all then under 110th Division. Also followed his plan of having a second headquarters which would take over direction and communications if the other was jeopardized.

With the series of American landings in the Philippines which began in Leyte on 20 Oct 1944, easing enemy pressure on the Mindanao guerrillas, and the fact that the District Headquarters was transferred to Camp Keithley, Dansalan City, Lanao on 31 March 1945, the "A" Corps was dissolved on 1 April 1945, the reason for its existence having already grown effete.

B. SIX DIVISIONS FORMED (SEE MAP)

The Tenth Military District as of 1 May 1944, was composed of six divisions, namely: the 105th, 106th, 107th, 108th, 109th and 110th. It should be noted that in this organization, guerrilla groups operating in the area garrisoned by each regiment were absorbed into it. Hardly was there an instance of guerrilla units of one sector being transferred to garrison another.

105TH DIVISION

This Division originally garrisoned the area of Lanao Province from Kolambugan up to Panguil Bay to the Zamboanga boundary; the southern part of the province of Misamis Occidental and that part of the province of Zamboanga lying north and east of the Dipolo River. Also all Northern and Southern municipalities of Zamboanga to the vicinity of the City of Zamboanga.

Upon its activation on 28 Jan 1943 by virtue of GO #8, Par 4, GHQ, the Division comprised the 105th, 106th, 107th and 115th Infantry Regiments. Later, the 105th was replaced by the 121st.

FERTIG had planned to organize this division as early as Jan 1943 when he broached the subject of unifying the above regiments under the one command to Lt-Col CIRACO MORTERA, at the time the Commanding Officer of the 106th Inf Regiment, and who was to be first Commander of the Division.

MORTERA who assumed command on 28 Jan 1944, established the first headquarters of the Division at Labo, Misamis Occidental. On 11 Jan 1944, he was relieved by Col HIPOLITO GARMA, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary under Gen SHARP, and who had hidden in the mountains after the USAFFE surrendered.

On 2 Jun 1945, GARMA was relieved by Maj FELIPE P. QUEJADA, former PC Commander and guerrilla leader at Sindangan, Zamboanga.

a) 105th Infantry Regiment: This regiment garrisoned the sector around Kolambugan area extending to that part of the Kapatagan district at the Maranding-Malanbang crossing (Lanao Province), including the area garrisoned by its 3rd Battalion which covered the municipalities of Aurora (except that portion of the Dipolo River), Pagadian and Margosatubig (all of the province of Zamboanga), with Headquarters at Pagadian, Zamboanga. It was activated on 14 Nov 1942, by virtue of GO #L-4, GHQ. The 3rd Battalion area was formerly the so-called Pagadian Sector, Zamboanga Province under Major LASOLA. On 6 Dec 1942, by virtue of GO #L-14, GHQ, this 3rd Battalion was redesignated as the 1st Battalion of the 115th Infantry Regiment.

b) 121st Infantry Regiment: On 24 April 1943, by virtue of SO #62, GHQ, the 105th Inf Regiment was transferred to the jurisdiction of the 108th Division (Lanao Province). In its place, a new regiment, the 121st was activated which garrisoned the municipalities of Kabasalan, Siocon and the City of Zamboanga including the Island of Basilan. Maj MANUEL JALDON was designated Regimental Commander.

FERTIG deemed this arrangement necessary so that the 105th and 108th Divisions would each have compact and contiguous territory to garrison; the first, the peninsula comprising the province of Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga including the City of Zamboanga; and the second, the province of Lanao.

JALDON came from Western Misamis Oriental in Nov 1942, where he had been Commanding Officer of the 109th Regt. Trouble developed between him and Maj LIMENA in that area, and JALDON was transferred to the command for reasons explained elsewhere in this History. The 121st Inf Regt abolished by virtue of GO #187, GHQ, dated 6 Oct 1943. In its place was substituted the newly created 1st Separate Battalion, under the command, control and administration of the 105th Division. 1st Lt. DONALD LE COUVRE, an unsundered American enlisted man who had been with Col FERTIG for some time was designated Commanding Officer.

On 31 Jun 1944, by virtue of GO #B-57, Hq "A" Corps, WM (Western Mindanao), the 1st Separate Battalion, including all officers and men were placed temporarily under the direct supervision and control of Hq "A" Corps.

On 20 Aug 1944, by virtue of GO #B-81, the 1st Separate Battalion was abolished and the defunct 121st Inf Regt was reactivated, attaching it to the Hq "A" Corps, WM, for administrative and tactical purposes. LE COURVRE (then a Captain), was retained to command the unit.

- c) 106TH Infantry Regiment: On 12 Nov 1942, by virtue of GO #L-2, this regiment was activated garrisoning the Southern part of the province of Misamis Occidental and that portion of the province of Zamboanga lying North and East of the Dipolo River.

The units of the Misamis Occidental-Zamboanga Sector (under Lt-Col MEJIA) composed this regiment. Headquarters was established at Labo, Misamis Occidental with MEJIA the first Regimental Commander. Successive Regimental Commanders were Maj AMANDO CURAMING, Lt-Col CIRIACO MORTERA, Capt (later Major) PEDRO S. AQUINO, Capt (later Major) LUCAS NARANJO (Acting), Maj MARCELO BONILLA, Maj PEDRO ANDRES and Capt AURELIO M. MENDOZA (Acting).

- d) 107th Infantry Regiment: On 11 Nov 1942, by virtue of SO #L-1, GHQ, the 107th Inf Regt was activated, with Hq at Dipolog, Zamboanga. Maj (later Lt-Col) JUSTINO TEANO was made first Regimental Commander. Successive Regimental Commanders were: Maj PEDRO S. AQUINO, Capt. FEDERICO PADAYHAG, Capt JESUS SONGALIA, Maj MARCELO BONILLA and Capt FRANCISCO HAMOY (Acting).

The 107th Inf Regt garrisoned all the Northern municipalities of Zamboanga, namely: Dapitan, Maniway, Dipolog, Katipunan, Sindangan and the municipalities of Plaridel and Baliangao (province of Misamis Occidental).

- e) 115th Infantry Regiment: On 9 Dec 1942, by virtue of GO #L-20, GHQ, the 115th Inf Regt was activated with Hq at Pagadian, Zamboanga. Maj NICOLAS P. LASOLA was made first Regimental Commander. He was succeeded later by Maj ANGELICO J. MEDINA.

The 115th Inf Regt garrisoned the municipalities of Southern Zamboanga, namely: Aurora, Pagadian, Margosatubig, Kabasalan up to the environs of the City of Zamboanga.

On 25 Aug 1943, FERTIG, in a communication to Lt-Col MORTERA, CO, 105th Division, said:

"In two months of warfare, the 105th Division has made a most brilliant record than any of the Divisions organized under peace-time conditions. Who knows, the number of our Division may be carried over in the Philippine Army nomenclature, since they were conceived and born under the heat of battle, and now growing into the full flower of youth".

106TH DIVISION

This Division garrisoned the province of Cotabato and that portion of the province of Davao, south of Digos and consists of the 116th, 118th and 119th Infantry Regiments.

The first Commanding Officer of the 106th Division was Lt-Col FRANK MC GEE, AUS. He served in the first World War and was recalled to duty in 1941. He was in Bukidnon in May 1942 and went to the mountains East of Malaybalay after the surrender. When PENDATUN brought his guerrillas into Bukidnon in the later part of Dec 1942, MC GEE joined him. Lt-Col MC GEE actively participated in the siege of and attack on Malaybalay in which operation he was the foremost strategist among them all. He later proceeded to Cotabato.

When MC GEE arrived at Barurao, Cotabato in Nov 1943 to assume command of the 106th Division, his first concern was to look into guerrilla troubles at Upi. He sent for the DURAN brothers (HILARIO and TRANQUILINO), who were leading a guerrilla band reportedly oppressing the civilians. On 8 Dec 1943, the DURAN brothers accompanied by Lt SIMON F. MILLAN, later G-3 of the 106th Division, arrived at the Barurao Headquarters. The failure of the early guerrilla movement at Upi, according to the DURAN brothers, was due largely to the fact that the leaders of the movement had not been given ranks or due recognition by higher headquarters. Two other guerrilla leaders of another unit, VICENTE VALDEZ and Sgt LUCAS ACHAS, when called by MC GEE, advanced the same reason for the failure of the guerrilla organization at Upi.

MC GEE agreed to commission VALDEZ, ACHAS and the DURAN brothers and instructed MAGSAKAY to send PERFECTO GALON to take command of the Upi area. Before 17 May 1944, the two units, then unified, were recognized and designated "G" Co, 116th Inf Regt, by Col FERTIG's Headquarters.

a) 116th Infantry Regiment: The 116th Inf Regt garrisoned the Southern and Southwestern Cotabato. It was activated as of 18 Feb 1943 and placed under the direct supervision, administration and command of the General Headquarters, Tenth Military District, by virtue of GO #46, Par 15, dated 6 April 1943.

This regiment was formed out of the early guerrillas which sprung up in the Lebak-Salaman, Kiamba, Glan-Sarangani and Upi areas.

On 6 Feb 1943, a party consisting of Capt (later Lt-Col) JAMES R. GRINSTED, a 55-year old PC officer who saw many years of service in the Philippines and who was living in his plantation at Port Lebak, Cotabato at the outbreak of the war: Mr. ALFREDO DESAVILLE later commissioned as an officer; Moro IBUK and Moro MALANANG, set sail from Lebak, Cotabato via Pagadian, Zamboanga to confer with Col FERTIG at Misamis, Misamis, Occ.

FIRST PROVISIONAL BATTALION FORMED

As a result of the contact, the guerrilla band led by Capt F. MAGSAKAY (PC) was recognized on 19 Feb 1943 per SO #19 Par 1, CPG and designated the First Provisional Battalion. This was the nucleus of the 116th Infantry Regiment. Capt F. MAGSAKAY was designated Commanding Officer.

This First Provisional Battalion later became the Second Battalion of the 116th Inf Regt.

The Company at Upi was the latest addition to the 3rd Bn, 116th Infantry. It was designated the "G" Co and was only recognized on 17 May 1944.

When Sta Clara fell into the hands of the MAGSAKAY Force on 23 Nov 1942, Capt SONGALIA and 1st Lieut JUAN DE CASTRO were among those taken prisoner. Later, lacking officers to assist in the administration of his unit, MAGSAKAY released these two officers and gave them staff assignments. Hearing of the success of MAGSAKAY, Capt MACARIO GUBALLA (PC) wrote the former expressing his desire to join his unit. MAGSAKAY gave him a staff position also.

Sometime in Feb 1943, MAGSAKAY authorized SONGALIA and DE CASTRO to proceed to UPI for the purpose of organizing a guerrilla unit to add to MAGSAKAY's battalion. The organization formed by SONGALIA was simply a skeleton company and was designated by him as "4th Company".

DISSENSION DEVELOPS

SONGALIA was relieved of the command of the Upi sector and GUBALLA succeeded him. GUBALLA undertook to organize a battalion and created a "2nd Company" and "3rd Company" without regard to regulations and number of arms available. Loosely organized, ill-disciplined, and without strong leadership, nothing was accomplished. When the men could not be paid after some months of uncertain status, they committed acts that amounted to banditry and other forms of lawlessness.

By that time the relation between MAGSAKAY, SONGALIA and GUBALLA was strained, colored with misunderstanding and distrust of each other. SONGALIA proceeded to Col FERTIG's Hqs. GUBALLA severed his connections with MAGSAKAY's Battalion and sought direct recognition from the Tenth Military District Hq. But even before his enjoys could return from their mission, he abandoned his troops and joined the staff of the 119th Inf Regt which was then in the process of organization. That was on Oct 1942.

The guerrilla band led by "Capt" NICOLAS VILLAMOR somewhere at Malungon, Buayan, Sarangani Area, and one led by Capt ROMAN R. AQUINO, FA, merged on the 14th of December 1942 and were the nucleus of the 1st and 3rd Bns of the 116th Inf Regt. The merger was effected through the effort of Maj HERBERT PAGE, a retired American officer who had been with the PC for many years and who knew well the coast of Cotabato.

About the end of March 1943, Capt (Lt-Col) CHARLES M. SMITH, with three Americans and one Filipino Officer, arrived at Glan. They set up a radio

station in Bulao Mountains, Sugai, Davao. Then as a result of the conference between Capt SMITH and Maj PAGE, the latter began organizing a regiment.

On 29 Mar 1943, per GO #38, Par 2, CPG, the guerrilla units in Glan were designated the 2nd Provisional Battalion of the 116th Inf Regt, the 1st being that one in Lebak designated as such on 19 Feb 1943, under Capt MACSAKAY.

On 26 April 1943, Maj PAGE was called to active duty at the 10th Military District Hq. He sent an envoy to FERTIG's Hq at Misamis Occidental in the person of Lt ROMAN R. AQUINO, his Executive Officer. Aquino left for CPG on 29 April 1943 with Capt SMITH and party, returning to Glan on 29 May 1943, bringing with him some funds and instructions for Maj PAGE to complete the organization of the 116th Inf Regt.

Maj PAGE was designated Commanding Officer of the Regiment and established Headquarters at Glan, Cotabato.

b) 118th Infantry Regiment: The 118th Inf Regt was activated on 11 Sept 1943, by virtue of GO #30-F, Par 2, Hq 109th Division and was to include all troops located in the Midsayap and Upper Cotabato areas, including those units now under the 117th Inf in those areas.

The history of this Regiment is a composite of the accounts relating to the early guerrillas in Cotabato, of the erstwhile Bukidnon-Cotabato Force (BCF) and the early days of the 117th Inf Regt of the 109th Division.

Sometime in the later part of December 1942, the Hq of the BCF somewhere at Kibawe, Bukidnon was visited by Capt SAMUEL J. WILSON, USNR, who rendered invaluable service with the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board and later became Chief of Staff, 10th Military District. From him, PENDATUN and his officers learned of the existence of other guerrilla units fast being absorbed into FERTIG's command. The information brought by WILSON gave more inspiration to PENDATUN and his forces.

PENDATUN JOINS FERTIG'S COMMAND

Through him PENDATUN sent a personal note to FERTIG expressing the hope that sometime in the near future both would coordinate their activities. However, PENDATUN and some of his officers entertained doubt on the wisdom of this merger and were not keen on subordinating their organization to another group. That was the reason why initially the BCF, not fully understanding the true import of FERTIG's Mindanao Guerrilla Organization, approached the possibility of an alliance with misgivings and distrust. However, on receipt of a radio message dated 22 Feb 1943 from Gen MAC ARTHUR that Col FERTIG was the only recognized Commanding Officer of all Mindanao Guerrillas, understanding prevailed and the BCF was absorbed into the Tenth Military District.

Before the middle of Feb 1943, Lt-Col ROBERT V. BOWLER, a Reserve Officer called to active duty prior to the war and stationed at Bukidnon at the time of the surrender, with Father J. E. HAGGERTY, S.J., Rector of the Ateneo de Cagayan and who rendered great assistance to the guerrillas, arrived at PENDATUN's Headquarters. They were followed later by Commander PARSONS from Gen MAC ARTHUR's Hq, Southwest Pacific Area. Subsequently the BCF command was reorganized into the 117th Infantry Regiment with PENDATUN in command.

Maj PENDATUN was later relieved as CO of the 117th Inf and was designated Commanding Officer of the 118th Inf Regt, activated on 11 Sept 1943, under the 106th Division. He retained this command until succeeded by Maj TEODORO GARCIA on 16 June 1945.

The unit of DATU UDTOG became the 2nd Battalion, and the unit of DATU MAN-ITIL became the 3rd Battalion of the new organization. The MATAS unit finally fell into line on 21 Mar 1944 after many tedious negotiations.

e) 119th Infantry Regiment: On 10 Oct 1943, when Capt GUMBAY PIANG arrived at his Kabingo Hq, he immediately organized what was to be the nucleus of the 119th Inf. Regt. This was composed of USAFFE men and former reservists as well as members of the old PC and the Maguindanao Militia Force (MMF) as distinguished from the Maranao Militia Force (MMF) in Lanao Province.

By 16 Dec 1943, the organization of the proposed regiment was complete, at least on paper. For even before the real organization was completed, the

regiment was already included in the activated 106th Inf Regt, effective 16 Oct 1943.

Originally it was proposed that the 119th Inf Regt was to have been an independent and separate entity directly under the 10th Military District but in order to complete the strength of the 106th Division, it was necessary that the 119th Inf Regt be incorporated in it. This was effected in February 1944.

THIRD BATTALION DISORGANIZED

Due to the intense mopping-up operations of the enemy, especially by the Jap Bureau of Constabulary soldiers and the Japanese Kempei Tai in Dec 1943, the 3rd Bn of the 119th Inf Regt was ripe for disorganization. Lieut HADJI ATU MATABALAO, CO, 3rd Bn, 119th Inf Regt was arrested at his residence at Solom, Municipal district of Suppangan, Cotabato by Jap Kempei on 9 Dec 1943. All military records pertaining to the 3rd Bn in his possession were captured and arms confiscated. Other officers were arrested in succession. By 21 Dec 1943, 127 EM enlisted in the 3rd Bn surrendered to the Japs. Lieut PINDILILANG PIANG, Executive Officer of the 119th Inf Regt who was arrested on 25 December, has not been heard of since then. That was followed by the arrest of other officers of the 119th Inf. Regt. This trend of sad events led to the disbandment of the 3rd Bn except the "M" Company which at the time was fighting in the Dulawan Sector.

In May 1944, Capt MACARIO GUBALLA (PC) was ordered by the 106th Div Hq to organize a company in lieu of the disbanded unit. His temporary Hq was established at Patut, Municipal district of Buldun, Cotabato. Datu MAC-ABANGAN ALAMADA, influential Moro Chieftan and known to have hidden a good number of firearms was contacted and this cooperation obtained.

ENLISTMENTS CLOSED

By Oct 1944 GUBALLA had about accomplished his mission. Six full companies have been organized. But Oct 1944 was past the dead line (27 Sept 1944) for closing of enlistments in the Tenth Military District. So for those enlisted by GUBALLA or those who joined the 10th Military District after that date, nothing much could be done.

On 28 Jan 1945, by virtue of GO #9, CPZ, supplemented by SO #B 47, "A" Corps Hq, all officers of the 119th Inf MMF as of 27 Sept 1944, were automatically assigned to the 2nd Separate Battalion, 106th Division.

The reorganized 119th Inf Regt garrisoned Northern part of Dulawan, West of the Dansalan River, the Northeastern part of Awang; all of Dinaig, Tumbao, Kalanganan, Subpangan, Balut, Parang, Bugasan, Barira, Nuling, Buldun, part of Midsayap, West of the Libungan and Manuangan River and the municipality of Cotabato.

Capt PIANG (later Major) was relieved of command of the 119th Inf Regt on 23 Feb 1945 and was succeeded by Lt-Col JUSTINO TEANO (PC), formerly Chief of Staff of the 105th Division. PIANG was assigned CO of the 1st BN, 119th Infantry.

Lt-Col MC GEE was relieved by Col BOWLER as CO of the 106th Division on 8 May 1945. Col BOWLER was relieved by Lt-Col JAMES R. GRINSTEAD on 25 June 1945.

107TH DIVISION

The 107th Division garrisoned the area of Agusan and Surigao, South of an East-West line through Lianga, Surigao and including the province of Davao, extending to Davao City.

It was originally part of the 110th Division but was designated the 107th Division 1 May 1944, per SO #70, 30 April 1944.

It is composed of the 111th Provisional Battalion, 112th Provisional Battalion and 130th Inf Regiment.

First Division Commander was Lt-Col CLYDE C. CHILDRESS who in Jan 1945 was relieved of command and succeeded by Lt-Col CLARO LAURETA, ORGANIZER and first CO of the 130th Inf Regiment. In June 1945, Lt-Col CLARO LAURETA was succeeded by Maj TEOFILO RIVERA as CO, 107th Division. Maj TEOFILO RIVERA was then succeeded by Lt-Col FRANK MC GEE.

a) 111th Prov Battalion: This Provisional Battalion garrisoned places along the East coast of Davao. It absorbed guerrilla units North of Mati and at Manay, the latter with about 200 men under 1st Sgt JOVITO PEDRAYA, early guerrilla leader at Caraga, Davao. PEDRAYA favored by isolation and difficulties of transportation facilities, enjoyed freedom of movement and ruled his sector for some time until early 1944 when Lieut OWEN P. WILSON, later promoted to Captain, took command. PEDRAYA was his Executive Officer.

Lt. OWEN P. WILSON was an unsundered Sgt, USAC. He lived near Caraga, Davao, from the time of the surrender until Oct 1943 when he reported to the 10th Military District Hq. FERTIG gave him a radio and sent him to Caraga to organize intelligence net coverage on Southeast coast of Davao and head the 111th Provisional Battalion.

b) 112th Provisional Battalion: This unit was formed from the scattered bands in the Upper Agusan Valley and in Southern Surigao, especially Cateel and Lindig. Activated in the later part of 1943, it functioned as a Provisional Battalion under the 110th Division, with Capt ANTON HARATIK as CO, one of the early American guerrillas whose activities covered Misamis Oriental, Agusan, Surigao and Davao. He performed an excellent job of organizing and heading guerrilla units. On 1 May 1944, this Bn was placed under the 107th Division. In the first week of March 1945, the 112th Provisional Battalion was reincorporated into the 110th Division.

c) 130 Infantry Regiment: This regiment comprised the area in the Davao Province North of Davao City and East of the dividing range along the coast. It was activated in mid-1943, under the command of Maj CLARO LAURETA, later Lt-Colonel, one of the most active guerrilla leaders in Mindanao.

In early 1943, contact letters were sent to LAURETA from the 110th Div Hq. LAURETA reported personally to the Lc at Gingoog, Misamis Oriental in July 1943. Subsequently his unit was activated into the 130th Inf Regt, 110th Division.

Closer contact with higher headquarters was established when Col FERTIG moved his Hq to the Agusan Valley in October 1943.

The 130th Inf Regt, Tenth Military District, the nucleus of which was the original LAURETA guerrilla band, played an important role in the unceasing warfare against the Mindanao Japs, especially those in the heavily garrisoned Davao area.

d) Special Intelligence Detachment: Lt ADOLPH STERNBERG Jr. formerly Sgt, USAC, unsundered, joined the Mindanao Guerrilla in February 1944. Previous to this, he had been bed-ridden with a tropical disease for over a year. During his illness he stayed with Lt-Col CLARO LAURETA on the Libuganon River. When he recovered he reported to FERTIG's Headquarters. He was sent back to Davao as a Liaison Officer between the 130th Inf Regt and the 110th Division.

Shortly thereafter, he was placed in command of a guerrilla unit near Malativas, Davao, which was then activated as a Special Intelligence Detachment with about eighty armed men. STERNBERG's intelligence activities in the Davao area have been valuable and were performed with marked efficiency.

108TH DIVISION

This division was activated on 14 Dec 1942 and garrisoned the province of Lanao. It consists of the 105th, 108th, 120th Inf Regts and the Maranao Militia Force (Moro Troops), for short MMF. The first Division Commander was Lt-Col (later Colonel) CHARLES W. HEDGES. When Col HEDGES relieved Col FERTIG as CO of the 10th Military District on 30 June 1945, Major LAZARO SILVA succeeded him as Division Commander.

a) 105th Infantry Regiment: This regiment garrisoned the sector around Kolambugan area extending to that part of the Kapatagan district at the Mananding-Malabang crossing.

The guerrilla units which sprung up in this area became the nucleus of the 106th Inf Regt: Capt L. P. MORGAN's PC Detachment prior to the war which was intact: the militia companies organized by Lt. ANACLETO C. DINO, MORGAN's Executive Officer, assisted by Lieuts ARMANDO LAGDA and ENRIQUE L. HERNANDEZ upon instruction of MORGAN HIMSELF on 29 Sept 1942 and subsequently reinforced by orders from FERTIG on 27 Oct 1942; and the one at Lala, Kolambugan, Lanao led by EUGENIO D. TABAQUERO, later promoted Captain and designated AC of S, C-3, 108th Division.

In compliance with instructions from FERTIG, Maj MEJIA arrived in the area of the 105th Inf Regt in Nov 1942, to complete the organization of the different guerrilla units. MEJIA at the time was relieved as Sector Commander of the Misamis-Zamboanga Sector and assigned Deputy Chief of Staff to Col FERTIG. In addition to his duties as such, he was designated to temporarily command the 105th Inf Regt. He brought Lieut PATROCINIO GARCIA with him as G-1 representative from FERTIG's Hq, to assist in the complete organization of the regiment. Others who ably assisted Maj MEJIA were: Lieuts DINO, Regimental Adjutant and JOSE G. RECAIDO, S-1.

On 6 Jan 1943, the command of the Regiment was turned over to Capt NATALIO ECARMA. Maj MEJIA returned to Misamis Occidental to assume his duties as Deputy Chief of Staff of Col FERTIG. Successive Regimental Commanders were: Maj JUAN K. NAVARRO, Maj FELIPE QUEJADA, Capt GABRIEL MARIANO (Acting), and Maj PEDRO AQUINO.

b) 108th Infantry Regiment: This regiment garrisoned the area from the point where the Kawit River meets the sea to Easterly and Northeasterly direction to the Lanao-Misamis Oriental boundary thence following an imaginary line to the town of Momungan; thence following the Kawit River downstream to the point of beginning.

On 17 November 1942, an inspection party of Lanao was dispatched from Misamis Occidental under the command of the then Capt CHARLES W. HEDGES, Senior Aide to Col FERTIG. During the early part of the war, he was the Commanding Officer of the Motor Transport Company at Dansalan. His experiences before the war made him familiar with the local people, especially the Moros. The purpose of the inspection trip was to look into and report on conditions in the area. The party proceeded from Kolambugan which area was already under the activated 105th Inf Regt; passed along the coast as far as Buru-on and then turned inland. They visited Momungan, Matungao, Abata, Mentering, Pantao Ragat and reached within a few kilometers of Dansalan.

TROUBLE WITH BUSRAN KALAW

Most of their efforts were to determine the cause behind, and if possible stop the depredations reportedly being waged by men serving under BUSRAN KALAW, a Moro. BUSRAN had been appointed to organize the Bolo Battalion by Gen GUY FORT before the surrender. After the surrender, he secured arms and ammunition and with his followers, armed and unarmed, proclaimed himself Commanding General of Lanao.

In the conference held at Basak, BUSRAN attempted to show to the party that he controlled 5,000 armed men. He appeared reluctant to cooperate with the new movement and began to bargain for rank and position. Careful inquiries disclosed that BUSRAN's total armed men on which he could depend numbered only about eighty men.

When the inspection party returned to FERTIG's Hq in Misamis Occidental on 2 Dec 1942, it was realized that considerable difficulty lay ahead in the task of unifying the guerrilla commands in Lanao.

LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS

Generally speaking, former USAFFE officers did not complain when they were required to serve in their former rank. However, there was a number of cases of officers who reported for duty and claimed rank one or two grades higher than that which they actually held. Added to this was the fact that it was extremely difficult to find suitable officers to command units in the various towns and barrios. To replace them with bona fide officers was apparently an injustice to them, at the same time few of the civilian guerrilla leaders were capable of running an organization along military lines, their knowledge of military procedure and regulations decidedly limited.

Wherever possible, experienced officers were assigned with these units in subordinate capacities to put the administration of each in proper order. Some misguided Filipinos were over-ambitious without sound abilities to boot. Unfortunately, this weakness furnished a barrier to eaching an early understanding. However, tact and sound leadership in time brought them into the field.

On 6 Dec 1942, by virtue of GO #L-14, CPG, the 3rd Bn of the 105th Inf Regt (105th Division which included Pagadian in its garrisoned area, Zamboanga), was shifted to the 108th Inf Regt, 108th Division and became its 1st Bn. It garrisoned the area from Kolambugan to Rupagan with the exception of the area between Bacolod and Binoni which was garrisoned by Maranao units under JOSEPH SANGUILA.

The end Battalion garrisoned the area from Kawit to Agus River including Matampay and Matungao.

The 3rd Battalion garrisoned the area covered by the Bolo Battalion, and the areas covered by three companies at North coast of Lanao (Digkila-an) garrisoned at Sta Filomena and Lugait under Lieut PEDRO ANDRES.

The first Regimental Commander was Capt (later Major) FELIPE FETALVERO (Acting). Successive Regimental Commanders were: Capt (later Major) ARISTON TEJERO, Maj JUAN K. NAVARRO, Capt GABRIEL MARIANO (Acting), Maj LAZARO SILVA, Maj PEDRO AQUINO and Capt ONOFRE GOMONIT.

c) 120th Infantry Regiment: This regiment garrisoned the area of the Pangayawan River towards the point where the Pangayawan River crosses the municipality of Cagayan up the Misamis Oriental-Lanao boundary, included mainly the Lugait-Manticao-Initao area.

It was formed out of the guerrilla units organized by three PA unsundered officers: Capt JUAN K. TADURAN, later promoted Major, Capt ANGELES L. LIMENA, later promoted to Major, and 2nd Lieut PEDRO ANDRES (PA), later promoted to Major and made CO, 106th Inf Regt, 105th Division.

In mid-1943, by virtue of GO #113, CPG, the 3rd Bn of the 108th Inf Regt was transferred to this unit, while the 1st and 2nd Bns of the 109th Inf Regt, were activated as the 1st and 2nd Bns of the 120th Inf Regt.

The first Regimental Commander was Maj PEDRO ANDRES. Successive Regimental Commanders were: Maj LEOPOLDO BLANCO (Acting), Maj PEDRO AQUINO, and Capt GABRIEL MARIANO.

Maranao Militia Force (MMF): The Maranao Militia Force (MMF) composed of Maranao Moros, was organized in the period from December 1942 to January 1943 by Col CHARLES W. HEDGES. The organization of this unit was made with a double purpose: 1) Giving the Moros a sense of responsibility by throwing on their lap the burden of maintaining their own peace and order which had been so much reduced to a state of chaos, and 2) To create among the Lanao Moros a solid body of troops strong enough to engage the enemy in combat.

MORO CONTROL ESSENTIAL

At this time, predatory raids and other crimes perpetrated by the lawless gangs of Moros were so widespread and unchecked that a point had been reached where no Christian was safe in localities in or adjacent to Lanao. Slave traffic was carried on in undiminished scale and the Moros were bent, so it appeared to square accounts mostly imagined with the Christians living in the province, particularly those in the Kapatagan Valley.

In their own way, the Moros were dangerous because resourceful and capable in combat. They resented the presence of squatters and in their estimate, the Japs were the worst of the lot, and would not hesitate to fight for what they believed would lead to the protection and enhancement of their personal freedom. So under proper leadership and in properly organized fighting machine, the Moros were a foe not to be easily trifled with. Added to this is the great loyalty of the Moros to the American people. With the Moros thus made compact and an armed unit, the Japanese in Lanao squatted with the sword of "Damocles" over their already troubled heads.

FEW QUALIFIED OFFICERS

HEDGES collected most of the former members of the Bolo Battalion in Lanao. The only condition required was that any Datu who could enlist men with arms was allowed to form a company under him. These Moros with some sort of Qualifications were commissioned officers without any rigid physical examination nor deep inquiry into previous records of the inductee. At the start of it the MMF was intended as a purely Moro organization. But due to the difficulty met in securing enough Moro officers to run the organization, a few Christian officers were taken to serve in the MMF, at least pending availability of qualified Moros.

How did these Moros secure their arms? After the surrender, they ransacked the battlefields and waylaid civilians and former USAFFE soldiers for weapons. In some instances they bought them from scattered soldiers or simply asked for them as compensation for services rendered to soldiers escaping from the clutches of the Japs. By late 1942, they were able to collect a fairly large number of weapons totalling about 7,000 Springfields, Enfields and BARs. The efforts of BUSRAN KALAW of Momungan, Lanao and MANALAO MINDALANO, former member of the Bolo Bn, all early Moro guerrillas and later made officers of the organization, resulted in a unified force. The possibility of the guns pointed in the wrong direction was greatly minimized. Their act is a monumental tribute to their respect for the American people.

Other early leaders of the Moros in guerrilla activities were: DATU LAGUIN-DAB of Canassi, JOSE SANGUILA of Mumay and Madulum, ARUMPAC, Mayor of Lum-batan and BAGUINDA ALI.

The strength of this Force was as of 31 Jan 1945:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>
124th Regt, MMF, Hq Rupagan, Lanao		
CO: Capt MACAUGOG ARUMPAC; later		
Maj ANDUCO BAGUNDALE	36	1538
126th Regt, MMF		
CO: Maj BUSRAN KALAW	118	1124
128th Regt, MMF		
CO: Maj ANONCO BAGUINDA ALI; later		
Capt AROMPAC MACAUROG	100	951
129th Regt, MMF, Hq Taraka, Lanao		
CO: Capt IBRAHIM MACUD	78	1202
1st Provisional Regt		
CO: Capt BERASING MACARAMBON	63	938
2nd Provisional Regt		
CO: Capt M. OSMENA	53	533
2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th Separate Bns	71	1470
5 Separate Companies	5	307
	597	8841

In late December 1942, contact was made with Mr. EDWARD M. KUDER, one time superintendent of schools in Lanao Province. His comprehensive knowledge of the Moros qualified him as Director of Civil Affairs of the Province during the early stage of the guerrilla. He helped in no small measure in the organization of the MMF and contributed to the maintenance of peace and order among them.

109TH DIVISION

The 109th Division garrisoned that portion of Misamis Oriental West of the Tagoloan River, and the province of Buidnon. It consists of the 109th, 111th, 112th and 117th Inf Regiments. The first CO was Lt-Col ROBERT V. BOWLER. He was succeeded by Lt-Col JAMES GRINSTED on 21 November 1943. GRINSTED was assigned later as CO, 106th Div. Lt-Col CECIL WALTER succeeded him as CO, 109th Div on 25 June 1945.

- a) 109th Infantry Regiment: This regiment garrisoned that portion of the province of Misamis Oriental lying between Cagayan River and the Pangayawan River. It was activated on 14 Mar 1943.

On 28 Nov 1942, Maj JALDON who with some loyal officers and men took refuge in Himaya (a sitio of El Salvador, Cagayan) during the first week of Oct 1942, called a conference of all guerrilla leaders and civilians. The purpose of it was to unify all guerrilla units under one command and also, to

organize a civil government. In this conference, assignments were made and JALDON being the Senior Officer, was voted Commanding Officer.

Lieut ANGELES LIMENA who organized a unit of his own at Initao, Misamis Oriental, preferred to remain independent. He called his sector the West Misamis Oriental Sector with himself as leader. This sector lies West of the Alubijid River. LIMEAN also selected his staff and officers. JALDON established his Hq at Tuboran and LIMEAN in the vicinity of Alubijid.

In early December 1942, the West Misamis Oriental Sector was organized into the 109th Inf Regt with LIMENA as Commanding Officer. He was later relieved by JALDON pursuant to CO #11, Jan 1943. LIMENA refused to be relieved. This was the start of a clash between these two officers and their men which threatened to take a serious turn were it not for the timely and effective intervention of Col FERTIG.

JALDON AND LIMENA CLASH

On 12 February 1943, the forces of JALDON and LIMENA had a clash at Boli-song, Upper El Salvador which resulted in the death of T-3rd Lieut ZOSIMO ROA, JALDON's officer. The clash was brief after which LIMENA brought his forces to Initao.

Col FERTIG created a Board of Officers, Chairman of which was Lt-Col MORTERA, Commanding Officer, 105th Division, charged with the duty of investigating the JALDON-LIMENA imbroglio. JALDON retained the command of the 109th Inf Regt but was later transferred and made Commanding Officer of the 121st Inf Regt, 105th Division.

Per SO #54, Par 1, Hq 109th Division, issued on 25 Jun 1943, Lt-Col GRINSTEAD who succeeded JALDON, was relieved as Regt'l Comdr and assigned Chief of Staff, 109th Division effective 1 Jul 1943. Capt AKAS SULIEK was designated Commanding Officer, 109th Inf Regt. On 29 Jun 1943, just a few hours after SULIEK took command, he was shot to death by 1st Sgt PRUDENCIO SURALIO, a discontented soldier of the Hq & Hq Serv Co, 109th Inf Regt. After GRINSTEAD was given the authority by higher headquarters, he designated 1st Lt MARCELINO BARILLO as Acting Regt'l Commander, 109th Inf. Regt. Then BARILLO was relieved and Capt FIDENCIO M. LAPLAP, later Major, took his place as Regt'l Commander, 109th Inf Regt.

b) 111th Infantry Regiment: This regiment garrisoned that portion of Misamis Oriental between the Cagayan and Tagoloan Rivers and a Northern portion of the province of Bukidnon, and was activated in April 1944.

Small guerrilla units were organized in Imbatug and vicinities of Mambuaya, Talakag, Libona, Tankulan, Maluko and Sumilao as early as October 1942.

On 29 Oct 1942, Lt WALDO MC VICKERS with a few men took Talakag, heretofore, a Japanese-controlled area and forced the surrender of the police and puppet municipal officials. Maj ROBERT V. BOWLER took command of the unified small guerrilla bands and organized his staff.

In Oct 1942, at Imbatug, Lt LEOPOLDO BLANCO made progress in the collection of arms and ammunition and he had reassembled the reservists in that area in collaboration with Lt-Col ERNEST E. MC CLISH and Capt ONOFRE HIPE. With the help of civilians, a force was organized and formed the nucleus of the 2nd Bn of the 111th Inf Regt.

On 22 Jan 1943, SO #8, 10th Military District, was issued and designated Maj BOWLER, Commanding Officer of the 111th Inf Regt then composed of two Bns. The Talakag Forces formed the 1st Bn and the unit under Lt LEOPOLDO BLANCO formed the 2nd Bn. The units in Maluko and Sumilao districts later became the 3rd Bn of the Regiment through the mediation of MARIANO AVANCENA, a civilian volunteer who of his own accord, enjoined the officers in these districts to join the 111th Inf and placed themselves under the command of Maj BOWLER.

On 14 March 1943, GO #23, CPG, was issued activating the 109th Div to comprise the 109th Inf Regt and 111th Inf Regt and placed the command in the hands of Maj (later Col) BOWLER.

c) 112th Infantry Regiment: the 112th Inf Regt, latest to be organized sometime in Mar 1944, garrisoned Sumilao and the surrounding area with Maj WILLIAM MC LAUGHLIN, formerly

Instructor Chemical Warfare, Philippine Army, as Commanding Officer. As of Jan 1945, this Regt had eighty six officers and six hundred twenty six enlisted men. He was succeeded by Capt DANIEL JOVEN in May 1945.

d) 117th Infantry Regiment: This regiment garrisoned the Southern portion of the province of Budidnon, and was activated 14 Mar 1943. Maj WALDO MC VICKERS was assigned Regimental Commander.

About the time that the guerrilla movement was in progress in Misamis Oriental and Northern Budidnon, four groups each composed of loyal USAFFE officers and men and civilian volunteers, organized in Southern Bukidnon and Cotabato.

One group was led by Pfc VICENTE LEUTERO at Kibawe, Budidnon. The 2nd was commanded by Lt SALIPADA PENDATUN from Cotabato. The 3rd was formed by Capt ALIPIO JUNTILLA at Alaaib, and the 4th led and trained by Maj FRANK D. MC GEE at Kabangahan, Bukidnon.

PENDATUN GATHERS BIG FORCE

At the request of LEUTERIO, PENDATUN on 27 Nov 1942, with one hundred men came from Kibawe to help organize the units in Bukidnon, and in less than ten days, with the help of Governor MANUEL FORTICH, two skeleton regiments were formed.

On 20 Dec 1942, these units were fused into the Bukidnon-Cotabato Force (BCF) commanded by SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, then voted upon by his officers as "Brig-Gen". The BCF functioned as a Division.

From 12 Jan to 6 Mar 1943, PENDATUN's forces laid a siege of Malaybalay for fifty three days, after taking the Casisang Concentration Camp, earlier vacated by prisoners of war.

Commander PARSONS who arrived in PENDATUN's area in May 1943, persuaded him to return to Cotabato with the Moro guerrillas who by that time had infiltrated to Bukidnon in great numbers.

The 117th Inf Regt then became a Christian regiment but never equalled the power and force of the 117th Inf Regt under PENDATUN, formerly the BCF.

Maj EDWIN D. ANDREWS, G-3 of PENDATUN, and Capt TOMAS GABILLI, G-4 of the same unit, were called to FERTIG's Hq at Misamis Occidental. Both reported about the middle of Jun 1943. GABILLI offered his services and was assigned Quartermaster, General Headquarters. ANDREWS chose to go to Negros.

On 15 Sept 1943, Maj NICOLAS GABUTINA was assigned Commanding Officer of the 117th Regt vice PENDATUN who was assigned to command the 118th Inf Regt in Cotabato.

On 31 Oct 1943, the Japs made a major push against the unit and in the early part of Nov 1943, the Regiment was badly shaken and so had to undergo reorganization.

For some time, the 117th Inf lost contact with the 109th Division Headquarters and all efforts exerted by the Div Commander, Lt-Col JAMES R. GRINSTAD, with Maj NICOLAS GABUTINA, Commanding Officer of the Regiment, failed. About the middle part of Dec 1943, Maj CRISPINO M. DE CASTRO, Chief of Staff of the 109th Div went to Alanib as per orders of the Div Commander, to assemble some retreating officers and men of the 117th Inf and to put them into form as a fighting unit again. Of the few enlisted men and officers that went to Alanib, a Provisional Battalion was organized under the command of 1st Lieut CIRACO GAYONAN. While this Battalion was still in the process of organization having at its disposal only about forty nine men and sixteen rifles, the enemy on 21 Dec 1943 attacked this unit and tried to disperse the men. A few officers and enlisted men in Alanib retreated to Basak with Lt GAYONAN and Maj CASTRO and some enlisted men and reorganized again. Contact was made with Maj NICOLAS GABUTINA by Maj CASTRO across the Pulangi River in the vicinity of Kipalma. Several officers and men were contacted during the time and instructions were given. The commander of the 117th Infantry was instructed to again reorganize his regiment. The officers and men who took refuge in the forest readily answered the call of reorganization and in three months' time, two Provisional Battalions of the 117th Infantry were formed, one at Alanib numbering of eighty rifles and a few ARs. Maj GABUTINA was relieved as CO of the regiment and was transferred to the 106th Division, per SO #54, Series of 1944, Hq 109th Div. Capt EALDO MC VICKERS took his place as CO, 117th Infantry. At this time the regiment assembled about thirty nine officers and three hundred seventy nine men and began harrassing the enemy again.

110TH DIVISION

This Division garrisoned that portion of Misamis Oriental East of the Tagoloan River, the province of Agusan, province of Surigao and that of Davao.

It was activated 20 Nov 1942, and comprised the areas covered by the 110th, 113th, 114th and 130th Inf Regt. The 130th Inf Regt was incorporated with and made a part of the newly-created 107th Div on 1 May 1944. For a short time in the latter part of 1942, the 111th Inf Regt was part of the 110th Div.

The first Div Commander was Lt-Col ERNEST E. MC CLISH. In Aug 1942, MC CLISH headed a guerrilla unit at Imbatug, Bukidnon. In Oct 1942, he went to Balingasag, Misamis Oriental with Lt ROBERT BALL, later promoted Captain, ANTON HARATIK (later Captain) and Sgt (later Captain) WILLIAM A. KNORTZ, to organize and unite guerrilla forces in that sector. They found guerrilla bands functioning independently under competent leaders.

MC CLISH and BALL went to FERTIG's Hq at Misamis Occidental shortly thereafter. FERTIG's decision was for MC CLISH to command the guerrilla units in Northeastern Mindanao and organize them into the 110th Div.

SHIFT IN PERSONNEL

MC CLISH returned to Misamis Oriental in Nov 1942 with Lt-Col CLYDE C. CHILDRESS, AUS, then Major, as Chief of Staff. BALL was left with FERTIG and later became Chief Communications Officer of District Headquarters until he was sent to Luzon in 1944 to organize intelligence coverage in that area.

MC CLISH on 20 Nov 1942, established Hq at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental and set to work on the organization of the 110th Div. The 110th Div Hq began with only five officers; Lt-Col ERNEST E. MC CLISH, Maj CLYDE C. CHILDRESS, Capt VIRGILIO S. AGUILAR, Lieut RICHARD THOMMES, later Captain and Atty FAUSTO DUGENIO, later made Captain.

MC CLISH continued as Div Commander till relieved by Lt-Col PAUL H. MARSHALL on 22 Jan 1945. As Chief of Staff, CHILDRESS was relieved when transferred to command the 107th Div on 1 May 1944, succeeded by Capt MARK WOLHFELD, Capt WOLHFELD was succeeded by Capt DUGENIO who was designated to the post on 12 Jul 1944. In the latter part of January 1945, after reorganization was made of the staff, it consisted of Div Commander, Maj PAUL H. MARSHALL; Chief of Staff and Adjutant General G-1, Maj JUAN A. RIVERA; Capt FAUSTO DUGENIO, G-2; Capt GAMINO FETALVERO, G-3; Capt FRANCESCO CONDE, G-4; and Capt BANJAMIN FAMADOR, Inspector General.

DIVISIONS COVERED LARGE AREA

When the 110th Div was organized in Nov 1942, it had almost one half of Mindanao to cover: Davao, a portion of Bukidnon, a big part of Misamis Oriental, Agusan and Surigao. The Div Commander, Lt-Col ERNEST E. MC CLISH, ably assisted by his Chief of Staff, Maj CLYDE C. CHILDRESS, later Lt-Col, started with the Balingasag guerrilla in the big task of organization; in two weeks absorbing the Talisayan guerrilla band - expanding to Agusan and Surigao with the invaluable assistance of WILLIAM KNORTZ, ANTON HARATIK, THOMAS BAXTER, WILLIAM MONEY and RICHARD THOMMES, all made Captains later - then bringing in the LAURETA guerrillas in Davao.

The headquarters of the 110th Div insistently hounded by the enemy, had to be constantly on the move - Balingasag to Medina, Misamis Oriental; Cabadbaran, Agusan; then back to Baang-Lungsod, then to Linugos, both of Gingoog, Misamis Oriental; to Rizal, Buenavista - Butuan - Tungao - Las Nieves - Bakingking - Bunaguit - then back to Las Nieves - all of Agusan.

JAP ACTIVITY INTENSE

In the months of July and August 1944, intense Japanese mopping-up operations drove the headquarters of the Div and its regiments to the jungles, with thousands of enemy troops combing the whole sector. The coming of the US Air Task Force in early Sept 1944, eased the enemy pressure and reorganization of whatever scattered units there were, was begun.

Lt-Col MC CLISH, now almost alone (with KNORTZ drowned on 11 Sept 1943) and CHILDRESS (transferred to head the 107th Div on 1 May 1944), did his level best to steer the organization through this difficult period. Able Regimental Commanders, Majors ROSAURO P. DONGALLO (110th Inf), PAUL H. MARSHALL

(114th Inf) and KHALIL KHODR (113th Inf) contributed much to the molding of the 110th Division into a fighting whole.

On 22 Jan 1945, Maj PAUL H. MARSHALL succeeded Lt-Col MC CLISH in the command. Maj PAUL MARSHALL, assisted by Maj JUAN A. RIVERA, Chief of Staff, shaped the whole Division into a condition fit to meet the demands of the day. Aided by US gunboats, soldiers of the Division drove the Japs in March and April 1945 from Talismayan, Misamis Oriental, the whole of Surigao Province and from the coast of Agusan, into the rivers and jungles of Upper Agusan.

a) 110th Infantry Regiment: This regiment extended from the Tagoloan River, Misamis Oriental to the Eastern border of the province. It was activated early in Nov 1942. It was composed of most of the different guerrilla units which sprang up in Eastern Misamis Oriental during early September 1942: Balingasag and surrounding towns led by Lieut PEDRO COLLADO, Pfc (later 1st Lieut) CLYDE M. ABBOTT, VINCENTE MERCADO and Sgt (later Lieut) ENTIQUIO CARPIO: Claveria under M/Sgt JAMES MC INTYE, USAAC: Malitbog under M/Sgt ALFRED FERNANDEZ, USAAC: and Talisayan led by Pfc FAUSTO OMONDANG.

DONGALLO RETRIEVES ₱143,000 PESOS

The first Commanding Officer of this regiment was Capt PEDRO D. COLLADO designated in Nov 1942, relieved by Capt FRANCISCO N. LUZ in Feb 1943 who also in June 1943 was succeeded by Maj ROSAURO P. DONGALLO. It was at the time of DONGALLO when the unit had been most active. DONGALLO as Lieutenant, was a Bn Commander in the 81st FA, USAFFE; fearless, calculating and cool. He is remembered for retrieving some ₱143,000 in emergency notes from the Provincial Building during the attack on Butuan, under constant Jap enfilading fire from a distance of some twenty meters. His regiment figured in the advance of the Americans on Malaybalay in May 1945 and subsequent mopping-up operations on the enemy in that sector.

b) 113th Infantry Regiment: This regiment garrisoned the area comprising the Northern portion of Agusan province. It was activated early in 1943 with Capt BENJAMIN FAMADOR as Regimental Commander (Acting), later Executive Officer when KHALIL KHODR assumed command.

The early guerrilla bands in Northern Agusan after, unification, formed the nucleus of the 113th Inf Regt.

At Cabadbaran was the force organized by the combined efforts of Judge JOSE R. VALLANUEVA, Atty TRANQUILINO ORTEGA, Capt CELESTINO UDAREE, SEGUNDO HEYES and FELICISIMO IRAY, VICENTE ZAPANTA (later Major) and his wife. After some time leadership passed to Capt BENJAMIN FAMADOR assisted by PLENIO ATEGA.

At Amparo was the small band organized by Lt JACINTO SUICO.

At Buenavista were independent guerrilla bands organized by HILARIO ANIASCO, Lieut SALVADOR CIENCIA and Sgt PEDRO BAJA.

In 1943, all the guerrilla units in Agusan were brought under the control of KHALIL KHODR, A Syrian mining engineer, highly intelligent and an able commander.

the 113th Inf Regt has a record of numerous encounters with the enemy. It figured prominently in the Butuan siege from 3 to 10 Mar 1943. It fought firecey with the Japs in their invasion of Butuan on 15 Mar 1944 and at Vit-us, some eight kilometers up the Agusan River from Butuan, two days later, in which encounter the enemy lost heavily and was not only repulsed but driven back to Butuan. With the fighting forces of the 113th Inf Regt encircling the Japs at Butuan after them, it took the enemy three months to successfully cross the Agusan River to the Ampayon side and four months to reach Upper Agusan when, with the assistance of US naval craft and planes, the Japs were driven to the swamps and jungles of Upper Agusan. After the operations of the US Air Task Force on 9 Sept 1944, this regiment gave the Japs in the province of Agusan no rest, constantly harassing them with effective, sweeping strokes.

c) 114th Infantry Regiment: This regiment garrisoned the Northern portion and most of the province of Surigao. It was activated in mid-1943 from different guerrilla bands which operated in the province of Surigao.

SAM GOODE, an American Mestizo, headed a semi-lawless group in Tago area in 1942 June. He was arrested early in 1943 upon orders of Lt-Col MC CLISH

and jailed. JOSEPH MC CARTHY who led a guerrilla band at Tandag, included the Tago group in his command, with GOODE out. MC CARTHY was later sent to Davao as 107th Div CM.

In Southern Surigao was another guerrilla unit led by Lt TEODULFO VILLARIN.

MACARIO DIAZ, Municipal Mayor of Surigao City, led a group of civilian volunteers and unsundered USAFFE soldiers which was called Filipino-American-Chinese Guerrilla Association (FACGA).

Other guerrilla units of lesser importance were organized by Sgt JUANI TO BAG-AO at Tubed; Sgt MONDANO at Mainit town proper; Pvt A. MANCIO's at Kitcharop; Maj CEFERINO CARCIA's and T/Sgt SIMEON SOMERA's which operated all along the road from Surigao to Bad-as; and Capt TOMMANING's at Lianga. These small groups were loosely controlled and behaved disagreeably in their sectors. Lacking in money to finance their units, they generally preyed on the civilian population for economic support. Discipline was bad. Mutual distrust and jealousy swayed even the coolest heads. Killings became rampant.

KNORTZ CONSOLIDATES UNITS

Capt WILLIAM KNORTZ was given the mission of consolidating these roving, undisciplined bands into a well-organized regiment. KNORTZ did a thorough job. Recalcitrants one after another submitted to the consolidation of the forces. The new Commander could not be trifled with nor balked. When words failed to reconcile the belicose elements to the rejuvenated whole, they were browbeaten into submission or outright disarmed and thrown into jail. In a month or two, the 114th Inf Regt was organized with KNORTZ as Commanding Officer and Maj CEFERINO GARCIA as Executive Officer.

In the later part of 1943, Sgt (later Lt-Col) PAUL H. MARSHALL and Sgt (Major) ROBERT SPIELMAN who had escaped from the Davao Penal Colony in April 1943, were assigned to the 114th Inf Regiment. MARSHALL took the place of KNORTZ who was drowned between Camiguin and Linugos (Misamis Oriental) on 11 Sept 1943, and SPIELMAN was made Executive Officer with GARCIA as Adjutant. Their energy and activity made the 114th a hard-hitting unit that stood its ground even when the number of Japs in Surigao reached some 20,000 men.

The Commanding Officers of the Regiment were in the order of succession: Capt MACARIO DIAZ, Capt WILLIAM KNORTZ, Lt-Col PAUL H. MARSHALL, Major ROBERT SPIELMAN, and Maj GAVINO FETALVERO.

* * * * *

The Division Hq transferred from Balingasag to Medina, Misamis Oriental on 20 January 1943.

In early May 1943, Lt Commander MELVYN H. MC COY, USN, Maj STEPHEN MELNICK, CAC, Capt AUSTIN C. SHOFNER, USMC, Capt WILLIAM A. DYESS, USAC, and 2nd Lt JACK HOWKINS, USAC, 2nd Lt M. DEBERVICH, USMC, 2nd Lt SAMUEL GRASHIO, AC, 2nd Lt LEO BOELEN, Sgt PAUL H. MARSHALL, CAC, Sgt ROBERT SPIELMAN, CAC, escaped from the concentration camp in Davao and for some time remained in the 110th Div to assist the guerrillas in various capacities.

The 110th Division played an important part in the supply system established on Mindanao. Fuel for the operation of radios and considerable quantities of rice were procured on the East coast of Surigao.

MARSHALL ably assisted by his Chief of Staff, Maj JUAN A. RIVERA, rehabilitated the Division into a peak efficiency. It became a well-oiled fighting machine with its administration work functioning smoothly and effectively.

125TH INFANTRY REGIMENT-SULU

This regiment garrisoned the area comprising the province of Sulu. This functioned under Col FERTIG's Headquarters in March and April 1943. Lt-Col ALEJANDRO SUAREZ commanded the 125th Regiment.

SUAREZ was Provincial Governor of Sulu in 1941. When the Japs landed at Taglibi, Jolo in Dec 1941, he was wounded in the fighting but escaped to the mainland of Mindanao and served with General FORT. He surrendered with the General, was taken to Cotabato by the Japs and appointed BC Commander of that province. In January 1943, he escaped to Tawi-Tawi.

Rudimentary free government was set up in the entire area, supply system organized and emergency currency printed.

The 125th Inf Regt was organized into three battalions: the 1st on Tawi-Tawi, with approximately 350 men; the 2nd on Siasi, with approximately 250 men; and the 3rd on Lolo with approximately 200 men.

Effective 17 May 1944, the area garrisoned by the 125th Inf Regt became a part of the "A" Corps, Western Mindanao, per GO #8-47, dated 19 May 1944.

But two days later, 19 May 1944, per GO #8-80, Par 4, pursuant to instructions from FERTIG's Hq, the 125th Regt was made to function directly under the GHQ, SWP. This arrangement was made necessary due to difficulties in matters of supply and communication with Mindanao.

Lt-Col SUAREZ guided the 125th Regiment through all hardships, especially in mid-1944 when enemy activity increased in tempo and intensity.

CHAPTER V

STAFF OFFICERS

A. TENTH MILITARY DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS

COMMANDING OFFICER:

Colonel WENDELL W. FERTIG assumed command of the Mindanao-Visayan Force (recognized by Gen MAC ARTHUR on 22 Feb 1943 and designated the 10th Military District) on 18 Sept 1942. He continued as Commanding Officer from then on till June 1945 when he took a well-earned vacation in the homeland after nearly three years of successful leadership in the Mindanao Guerrillas. Col CHARLES W. HEDGES, formerly Commanding the 108th Division, succeeded him.

AIDE DE CAMP:

Col CHARLES W. HEDGES, then Captain, was the first Senior Aide de Camp to Col FERTIG on 16 Sept 1942. 3rd Lieut E. C. REYES was assigned Junior Aide on 3 Dec 1942 until 25 Jan 1944. He was later designated Senior Aide to the Commanding Officer, relieving Col HEDGES on 27 Jan 1944. Lieut REYES gradually rose up to the rank of Major.

SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF:

When Col CHARLES W. HEDGES took command, Maj E. G. REYES was assigned as Secretary of the General Staff on 1 July 1945, having then been relieved as Aide de Camp by 1st Lieut MAC PONCE. The position of the Secretary of the General Staff was not filled 'til 18 Feb 1944 when 1st Lieut SALVADOR LANSANG was designated to the position. He was relieved as Secretary of the General Staff, 10th Military District by Maj E. G. REYES on 8 July 1945.

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Capt LUIS P. MORGAN was designated as Chief of Staff on 18 Sept 1942 until 2 Aug 1943. This office was vacant for nine months not until Lt-Col SAM J. WILSON was designated as such on 16 Apr 1944 and served for ten months. He was later relieved by Lt-Col M. W. WHEELER on 25 Feb 1945, presently serving in that position.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:

On 5 Mar 1943, Maj F. S. WORCESTER was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff. He was relieved from this assignment on 18 May 1943 by Capt L. ORENDAIN who served for three months. The position was left vacant for four months until the 27th of Jan 1944 when Lt-Col SAM J. WILSON was designated Deputy Chief of Staff. After serving for one year he was relieved as such and Maj M. M. WHEELER served in this capacity for six months and was later relieved by Maj HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST on 1 Jul 1945.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

Lieut PATROCENIO B. GARCIA was assigned as Asst AC of S, G-1 on 2 Feb 1943 and AC of S-C-1 on 1 Oct 1943. Relieved as AC of S, G-1 on 1 Jan 1944, the G-1 work was undertaken by the Adjutant General Service under Capt F. S. LAOMAN. On 8 Jan 1945, 1st Lieut VIRGILIO ALCANTARA was designated as Asst AC of S, G-1. On 1 Jan 1945, Maj F. L. LAGMAN was made AC of S-G-1 in addition to his assignment as Adjutant General, 10th MD. On 1 Apr 1945, Maj F. S. LAGMAN was relieved by Maj P. B. GARCIA as AC of S-G-1.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

On 6 Dec 1942, the G-2 Section was actually activated. 1st Lieut CHANDLER B. THOMAS was designated as Asst AC of S, G-2. On 1 Jan 1943, Lieut C. B. THOMAS, having been given sick leave, Capt LEO P. HIPE was assigned to take the place of the former. On Feb 1943, Lt-Commander FREDERICK L. WORCESTER, USER, was assigned as AC of S, G-2, while Capt LEO P. HIPE was made the Executive Officer. Lieut C. G. THOMAS was assigned Asst AC of S, G-2. On Apr 1943, Lt-Commander WORCESTER, having been sent on Mission, Capt LEO P. HIPE was then designated as Asst AC of S, G-2 as Lt C. B. THOMAS was also

sent in the field to build Farm Project No. 1. On 15 Sept 1943, Capt LEO HIPE was promoted to the rank of Major and at the same time designated as AC of S, G-2. He was relieved from his assignment on 10 Mar 1944. Capt JESUS MONTALVAN was assigned as Asst AC of S, G-2 on 16 April 1944. Capt JESUS MONTALVAN was given a furlough for one month beginning 24 Jun 1944, but he never came back, so that 1st Lieut SALVADOR LANSANG was assigned as Asst AC of S, G-2 on 10 Sept 1944 relieving Capt MONTALVAN who was assigned on duty with the G-2 Section.

Capt. HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST who arrived on 24 Jul 1944 from G-2, GH", SWPA and who has been working with Col W. W. FERTIG in the District Hq since then, was promoted to the rank of Major and subsequently assigned as AC of S, G-2. On 6 Dec 1944, Maj ROSENQUIST left for America on temporary duty leaving the position vacant, until 20 Feb 1945 when Capt SALVADOR LANSANG was assigned Actg AC of S, G-2. On Apr 7 1945 Capt SALVADOR LANSANG was relieved as Actg AC of S, G-2, leaving Lieut J. GEDDRAN in the G-2 office. On 1 April 1945, Maj ROSENQUIST on return from USA was designated AC of S, G-2 until he was sent on mission to Manila on 12 Jun 1945 leaving 1st Lieut JESUS CELDRAN in charge of the G-2 office. When he came back, it was found that Lieut CELDRAN was capable of carrying the G-2 work. He was promoted to the rank of Captain on 1 Jul 1945 and assigned as AC of S, G-2, relieving Maj ROSENQUIST thereat, who was then designated as Deputy Chief of Staff.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3:

On Sept 1942, the G-3 Section was activated. Capt LEO P. HIPE was designated as Asst AC of S, G-3 on 11 Dec 1942. Lieut HULINGANGA was also designated as Asst AC of S, G-3 on 15 Dec 1942. Both were relieved 12 Jan 1943 and 23 Jul 1943 respectively. On June 1943 Capt ROYCE WENDOVER was assigned on duty with the AC of S, G-3. On 5 Dec 1944 at Agusan, the G-3 Section was activated with Maj MANUEL JALDON as Chief of the section. The former was relieved by Maj ZAPANTA in May 1944 and the same month Capt NICK CAPISTRANO was assigned as Asst AC of S, G-3. He was relieved on 1 Apr 1945, leaving Capt P. DESTAJO in the section. Capt DESTAJO was designated as Asst AC of S, G-3 on this date. He was promoted to the rank of Maj on 16 May 1945 and designated as AC of S, G-3 on 16 July 1945.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4:

On 3 Dec 1942, the G-4 Section of the Mindanao-Visayan Force was activated with 2nd Lieut LEE REGALADO as Asst AC of S, G-4. On 23 Dec 1942, Capt PACIFICO DIVA reported for duty and was assigned as AC of S, G-4 of the District Hq on 18 Mar 1943. On 27 Mar 1943, Lieut LEO REGALDO was relieved of his assignment as Asst AC of S, G-4 while Lieut BEVERLY FARRENS took his place.

Maj PACIFICO DIVA was reverted to inactive status and relieved by Maj ONOFRE HIPE on 1 Apr 1945.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5:

There was no AC of S, G-5 in the District Headquarters at the start of the organization. It was not until 29 Nov 1944 when the activities of the civil government was growing rapidly that this section was initiated. Maj RAMON NOLASCO was designated AC of S, G-5 on that date, with Capt SALVADOR LANSANG as Asst to the AC of S, G-5.

FINANCE SECTION:

Initial organization of the Finance Section started with Capt CALIXTO DE LEON (now Lt-Col) acting under the instruction of Col FERTIG. On 1 Apr 1945, Maj B. MERCA became the Force Finance Officer. He was temporarily relieved as Force Finance Officer on 27 Jul 1945, and Lieut SEBASTIAN SALVACION was designated as Asst Force Finance Officer on the same date.

FORCE QUARTERMASTER SECTION:

On 18 Mar 1943, Maj PACIFICO DIVA, in addition to his duties as AC of S, G-4, was also assigned as Chief of the Quartermaster Section of the Force. He was reverted into inactive status. Upon the organization of the "A" Corps, Western Mindanao on 10 May 1944, Lt-Col TOMAS CABILI (now Col) was assigned as Corps Quartermaster until he was relieved as such on 2 Jan 1945 when he became Secretary of the National Defense of the Philippine Government. Meanwhile Capt CRUMP on 17 Nov 1943 was designated Force Quartermaster and re-

lieved on 15 Apr 1945. When the Corps was absorbed by the District Ho Maj IGNACIO CRUZ was assigned Force Quartermaster on 1 April 1945.

SPECIAL SERVICE OFFICER:

There was no Special Service Officer at the beginning of the organization, not until Lieut MANOLO REYES was assigned as such on 5 Jun 1945 who was later relieved on 5 Jul 1945 by Maj JUAN K. TADURAN.

ADJUTANT GENERAL SERVICE:

On 26 Nov 1942, the Adjutant General Service of the Mindanao-Visayan Force was activated. Lieut PATROCINIO B. GARCIA was assigned Asst Adjutant General. On 21 Nov 1943, Lt-Col MEJIA was designated as Adjutant General, but was relieved later on 13 May 1943. 1st Lieut F. S. LAGMAN (now Major) was then designated as Adjutant General of the Force on that date.

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL:

On 12 Nov 1942, Capt (now Major) RAMON NOLASCO was designated Judge Advocate General of the District Ho. The title of Judge Advocate General which was held by Maj RAMON NOLASCO was, on 29 Nov 1944, changed to that of the Staff Judge Advocate. Maj RAMON NOLASCO continued as Chief of the Section. On 1 Apr 1945, he was relieved by Maj JOSE MOJICA, then Asst Staff Judge Advocate. On 1 May 1945, Capt ERNESTO CASTANEDA was assigned as Asst Judge Advocate in place of the former.

FORCE SURGEON:

The first Medical Officer of the Mindanao-Visayan Force was Lt RICARDO MARTIN who was assigned on 29 Mar 1943. However, the office of the Force Surgeon was created when on 13 Dec 1943, Capt JAMES EVANS Jr., MC-AUS, was designated Force Surgeon. On 1 Mar 1944, Lieut CARLOS TURLA was permanently assigned to the office of the Force Surgeon. On 1 Apr 1944, Lieut TURLA was promoted to the rank of Capt and on the 8th of the same month, he was designated as Asst Force Surgeon. The Force Surgeon was at the same time the Force Radio Officer. On 1 Dec 1944, Capt TURLA was promoted to the rank of Major. On 17 Jan 1945, Maj JAMES EVANS was relieved of assignment and duty with the 10th Military District.

As 1 Apr 1945, the "A" Corps was dissolved. Maj CESARIO DE ASIS, the Corps Surgeon, was called to the District Headquarters and assigned Force Surgeon with Major TURLA as Assistant.

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT:

There was no office of the Headquarters Commandant at the start of the organization. On 27 Nov 1944, Maj F. S. LAGMAN was assigned as such, in addition to his duties as Adjutant General. He held the position until 11 Jul 1945 when Maj H. BUHAY was assigned as such.

INSPECTOR GENERAL SERVICE:

No Inspector General's Office was created until 13 Sept 1943 when Maj L. ORENDAIN was assigned as Force Inspector General. When the "A" Corps was organized, Maj ORENDAIN was transferred leaving the Force Inspector General's Office vacant. On 27 Apr 1945, Lt-Col LUIS DELGADO was announced as Force Inspector General.

FORCE RADIO SECTION:

The Force Radio Section started with Lieut R. BALL as C.O. He formally became CO of the Force Radio Section on 9 May 1943. He was succeeded by Maj JAMES EVANS who was Actg CO, FRS on 13 Dec 1943. When Maj EVANS was relieved from his assignment and duties on the 10th MD, Lt-Commander M. M. WHEELER took his place on 4 Sept 1944. Commander WHEELER became the Chief of Staff of Col FERTIG, with Capt GARLAND relieving him as the CO of the Force Radio Section on 6 January 1945.

FORCE ENGINEER:

Maj NICK CAPISTRANO, on 9 Feb 1944, was designated as Force Engineer. There was no Force Engineer before him, aside from the Division Engineers of the different Divisions of the 10th Military District.

S T A F F O F F I C E R S

"A" C O R P S

COMMANDING OFFICER:

Col ROBERT V. BOWLER was designated Commanding Officer of this newly organized "A" Corps on 1 Jan 1944.

CHIEF OF STAFF:

The first Chief of Staff who was designated as "Acting" was Maj R. E. STEELE, AIF. He served beginning 1 Feb 1944 until he was relieved by Col CHARLES W. HEDGES on 9 Oct 1945. The latter served until 17 Oct 1945.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:

Maj CHANDLER B. THOMAS was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff on 8 Nov 1944. He served until 30 Mar 1945.

AIDE DE CAMP:

Lieut AUGUSTO RIVERA was the designated Junior Aide de Camp to the Commanding Officer. He served until 22 Mar 1945.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

In Jan 1944, Capt ISIAS ARBOLEDA was assigned as AC of S, G-1.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

On 30 Jan 1944, Maj L. M. GILLON was designated as AC of S, G-2. He was sent on a mission on 30 Jun 1944 leaving Lieut E. CASTANEDA who was later designated as Asst AC of S, G-2. On 22 Aug 1944 to 12 Dec 1944, to 12 Dec 1944, Capt ANACLETO DINO was designated as AC of S, G-2. Maj C. B. THOMAS relieved Capt A. DINO as AC of S, G-2 on 12 Dec 1944. Capt A. DINO was then the Asst of Maj C. B. THOMAS. The latter was then relieved on 30 Nov 1944 by Capt E. CASTANEDA who became the Assistant on 30 Mar 1944.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3:

Capt ANACLETO DINO was designated AC of S, G-3 on 30 Jan 1944. He was relieved by Maj FELIPE FETALVERO on 22 Aug 1944. Maj FETALVERO served in this capacity until 19 Nov 1944 leaving the office to Lieut LORENZO EVIOTA who was then Asst AC of S, G-3. On 16 Dec 1944, Capt DONALD WILLS was designated as AC of S, G-3. He was promoted to the rank of Major. He served in this capacity until 30 Mar 1945 leaving the office to Lieut EVIOTA who was then the Assistant.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4:

On 10 Mar 1944, Lt-Col CABILI was designated AC of S, G-4. He held this position until 2 Jan 1945. On 6 Feb 1945, Maj ONOFRE HIPE was assigned as AC of S, G-4 with Lt CANUTO SILVA as his Assistant.

ADJUTANT GENERAL SERVICE:

Capt PATROCINIO GARCIA was assigned as Adjutant General. On 9 Mar 1944, Capt GARCIA was relieved by Lt-Col CIRIACO MORTERA. The former was designated as Asst Adjutant General.

CORPS QUARTERMASTER:

Lt-Col TOMAS CABILI, in his capacity as AC of S, G-4, was also designated Corps Quartermaster on 30 Jan 1944 with Capt PEDRO CELDRAN as his Assistant.

INSPECTOR GENERAL SERVICE:

On 10 Mar 1944, Maj L. ORENDAIN was designated as Inspector General. He was reassigned on 30 Mar 1945. Lieut JOSE MOJICA who was his Assistant, was left in the Inspector General's Office.

JUDGE ADVOCATE SERVICE:

Capt GERONIMO MARAVE was assigned as Staff Judge Advocate on 20 Feb 1944. He served in this office until 30 Mar 1945. Lt. A. GONZALES was assigned in the Judge Advocate Service on 13 Dec 1944 until 21 Jan 1945. Lieut E. CASTANEDA

was also assigned in the Judge Advocate Service on 21 Jan 1945 to 30 Mar 1945.

PROVOST MARSHALL:

On 1 Aug 1944, Capt AURELIO M. MENDOZA was designated Post Provost. Lieut LEONARDO BULAWIN was assigned Assistant to the former.

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT:

Capt VALENTIN ENCARNADO was assigned Headquarters Commandant in this Corps.

CORPS SURGEON:

Capt F. MACARANAS was, on 30 Jan 1944, assigned as Corps Surgeon. He was relieved by Maj CESARIO DE ASIS on 21 Sept 1944 to 30 Mar 1945.

CORPS FINANCE SECTION:

Capt BENJAMIN B. MERCA was assigned as Corps Finance Officer on 26 Jan 1944.

CORPS CHAPLAIN:

Capt NICOLAS ORTEGA was assigned as Corps Chaplain on 25 Mar 1944.

LIAISON OFFICER:

Lieut E. CECILIO was assigned Liaison Officer for Bohol; Maj GILLON was assigned Liaison Officer for the 10th Military District on 10 Dec 1944; Lt NAGUID JUANDAY was assigned Liaison Officer for lower units on 2 May 1944.

D I V I S I O N

B. S T A F F O F F I C E R S

105TH DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICER:

Lt-Col CIRIACO MORTERA assumed command of the 105th Division on 28 Jan 1943. In Feb 1943, he was sent to investigate the case of Majors LIMENA and JALDON in the 109th Division. In view of this, Lt-Col FABIAN MEJIA was assigned Acting CO of the 105th Division until his return effective the same date Col MORTERA left. In Jan 1944, he was relieved by Col HIPOLITO GARMA who in turn was relieved of this assignment in May 1945. On 2 Jun 1945, Maj FELIPE QUEJADA took over the command of the Division, until 7 Jul 1945 when this Division was dissolved.

CHIEF OF STAFF:

The Chief of Staff of the 105th Division was Lt-Col JUSTINO TEABO. He assumed position as Chief of Staff in Jan 1943 and relieved of this assignment in Jan 1945. Maj FELIPE QUEJADA became the Chief of Staff from April 1945 to May of the same year. From Jan 1945 to Mar 1945 and June 1945, Maj FELIPE FETALVERO was the Chief of Staff until the dissolution of the Div.

AIDE DE CAMP:

Capt WILLIAM TATE was the Senior Aide in the month of Aug 1943. Before that date there was no Aide to the Commanding Officer of the 105th Division. In April 1943, 2nd Lt JOSE VELONO was the Junior Aide until Jun 1945.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

There was no AC of S, G-1 of the Division, until Jun 1943 when Capt JOSE RECAIDO was designated as such. He was later relieved of this assignment in Feb 1944 and in Jun 1945, Capt ANDRES QUIACIT was assigned AC of S, G-1. In Mar 1943, Lt CELSO C. SONGOUYA was the Asst AC of S, G-1. He was relieved as such by Lt JOSE MABOLO in Jun 1943. From July 1943 to Dec 1944, Lt J. B. NAGAL relieved Lt. MABOLO as Asst AC of S, G-1. On 28 May 1945 to Jun 1945, Lt NARCISO ENGLIS was designated as Asst AC of S, G-1.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

The G-2 Section was activated with Capt FELIPE FETALVERO as the AC of S, G-2, in Jan 1943. In Jun 1943, he was relieved by Capt EMILIO MESIAS. In Sept 1943, Capt MESIAS was relieved by Capt FILOTEO BERNABE who was in turn

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relieved by Maj L. ORENDAIN on 27 Apr 1945 and who was in this position until 30 Jun 1945 when Capt ANACLETO DINO relieved him. Capt DINO was assigned AC of S, G-2 and later was relieved by Lt F. MANALO on 11 Jun 1944. For five months there was no Assistant to this Section, not until Dec 1944 when Lt LOUIS JOHNSTON, who became the Chief of the Section when Maj ORENDAIN was reassigned.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3:

In Jan 1943, Capt FELIPE FETALVERO was assigned as AC of S, G-3 with Lt GALLILEO ACOSTA as his Assistant. He was relieved of his assignment on 11 Jun 1945, leaving Lt ACOSTA and Lt BENJAMIN BERENGUER in the office of the G-3 Section.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4:

In Jan 1943 CAPT ANDRES ANCHETA was designated as AC of S, G-4 until Jun 1944 when he was relieved by Capt E. ABELIANOSA. Lt EMELIO MERCADO was assigned Assistant in Jan 1943, but was relieved a year after, leaving Capt ANCHETA as AC of S, G-4 until the Division was dissolved.

ADJUTANT GENERAL SERVICE:

In Jan 1943 Capt FELIPE FETALVERO was assigned as Adjutant General until Mar 1943 when he was relieved by Capt JOSE RECAIDO. Capt RECAIDO was relieved by Lt JOSE MABOLO in Dec 1944, who actually became the Adjutant General until Jun 1945. Lt J. B. NAGAL was assigned as Asst Adjutant General in Jan 1943 to Jan 1944 until he was relieved by Lt DEMETRIO CAGAMPAN. Lt CAGAMPAN later was also relieved by Lt FELIX OCHOTORENA who held the position until the dissolution of the Division.

INSPECTOR GENERAL SERVICE:

On Jan 1943 Capt FELIPE FETALVERO was assigned as Inspector General. He was relieved by Maj PEDRO AQUINO in Aug 1944. Maj AQUINO was later relieved by Capt JESUS SONGALIA until the dissolution of the Division.

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE:

Maj BENJAMIN GOROSPE was designated as Staff Judge Advocate in Feb 1943. He was relieved of his assignment in Feb 1945. Lt CRESENCIO GONZAGA was designated as Staff Judge Advocate in Mar 1945 to Jun 1945 when the Division was dissolved.

DIVISION QUARTERMASTER:

2nd Lt JESUS AGUILAR in Jun 1943 was assigned as Division Quartermaster until Sept 1944. For nine months there was no Div Quartermaster and in Oct 1944, Capt E. ABELLANOSA was designated as Div Quartermaster until 30 Jun 1945.

ORDNANCE SECTION:

The first Division Ordnance Officer was Lt MANUEL MANANQUIL. He was relieved by Lt MAXIMO LAO in Jul 1944. Lt LAO was relieved later by Lt ALFREDO ORTIZ until the dissolution of the Division.

DIVISION SURGEON:

There was only one Division Surgeon, Maj HERNAN LUNA. He was sent with the 1st Bn of the 61st Infantry to Del Monte.

DIVISION FINANCE SECTION:

Since the beginning of the organization, Lt CEZAR ZAMORA was the only Division Finance Officer from 2 Feb 1944 until the dissolution of the Division. He was, however, Asst Finance Officer since 29 Nov 1943 previous to his becoming DFO.

CHAPLAIN SERVICE:

Capt NICOLAS ORTEGA was designated Div Chaplain on 18 Jun 1943. When the "A" Corps was organized, Capt ORTEGA was assigned to the Corps. It was Lt JOSEPH GRIMLEY who relieved Capt ORTEGA on 20 Mar 1945.

ENGINEER BATTALION:

At the start of the organization of the 105th Division, Capt BENJAMIN LAZARO was designated Commanding Officer of the Engineer BN on 16 May 1943, whose Hq was in the 105th Division.

SIGNAL CORPS:

Lt LUIS GARCIA was designated as Signal Officer of the Division on 24 May 1943.

DIVISION PROVOST MARSHALL:

Lt FILOTEO BERNABE was designated Div Provost Marshall on 26 Jun 1943. Capt AURELIO M. MEMDOZA relieved him as such on 21 Sept 1943. Capt JOSE RECAIDO relieved the former on 13 Dec 1944. Capt FEDERICO PADAYHAG was then designated in April 1945 to Jun 1945.

106TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

Maj FABIAN C. MEJIA was the first Commanding Officer of this Regiment from 22 Dec 1942 until he was relieved by Maj ARMANDO CURAMING on 12 Nov 1942. This designation was held by Maj CURAMING until 28 Dec 1942 when he was relieved by Lt-Col CIRIACO MORTERA. Col MORTERA was later relieved by Capt PEDRO S. AQUINO on 29 Jan 1943. Maj LUCAS NARANJO later succeeded Capt AQUINO but was only designated as "Acting". He was then relieved by Maj ARISTON TEJERO who was designated as Commanding Officer. Maj TEJERO was later relieved by Capt FELIPE FETALVERO on 24 Sept 1943 who was then assigned as Commanding Officer. Maj LUCAS NARANJO later relieved Capt FETALVERO as Commanding Officer on 11 Oct 1943 until he was relieved by Maj MARCELO BONILLA who was assigned Acting CO on 7 Sept 1944. Later Maj NARANJO was again reassigned as Commanding Officer in place of Maj BONILLA who later was relieved by Maj PEDRO ANDRES on 6 Mar 1945. However, Maj PEDRO ANDRES was also relieved later by Capt AURELIO M. MEMDOZA on 28 May 1945.

107th INFANTRY REGIMENT:

The first Regimental Commander of the 107th Regiment was Maj JUSTINO TEANO on 11 Nov 1942. He was later relieved by Capt PEDRO S. AQUINO on 15 Mar 1943. Capt AQUINO was relieved by Capt FEDERICO PADAYHAG who later was also relieved by Capt JESUS SONGALIA. Capt SONGALIA was later relieved by Maj MARCELO BONILLA on 26 Jan 1945, who in turn was also relieved by Capt FRANCISCO HAMOY who was only assigned as Acting Commanding Officer.

115TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

The first Commanding Officer of this Regiment was Maj NICOLAS P. LASOLA on 12 Sept 1942. He was relieved later by Maj ANGELICO MEDINA on 29 Mar 1943. Maj MEDINA was later relieved by Capt FRANK W. MC CARTHY on 7 Jun 1945.

121ST INFANTRY REGIMENT:

Maj MANUEL JALDON was the first Regimental Commander of this Regt. He was later succeeded by Capt DONALD LE COUVRE on 20 Aug 1944.

S T A F F O F F I C E R S

106TH DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICER:

When the 106th Division was activated, Lt-Col FRANK MC GEE was designated Commanding Officer on 7 Oct 1943. He was relieved later by Col ROBERT BOWLER on 8 May 1945. Col BOWLER was also relieved later by Lt-Col JAMES GRINSTEAD on 25 Jun 1945.

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Maj NICOLAS GABUTINA was assigned as Chief of Staff at the start of the organization on 23 Jul 1944 until he was temporarily relieved by Maj M. ORBASE on 1 Jun 1945.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

Lt J. ESTRADA was designated as AC of S, G-1 on 24 May 1944 with Lt F. BRACEROS as his Assistant.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

Capt G. DE CASTRO was assigned as AC of S, G-2 in the early part of 1943 and was relieved in Nov 1944 by Lt ALEJANDRO LONTOK with Lt F. JUANDAY as his Assistant. His Assistant was later relieved in Jun 1945.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3:

Capt S. MILLAN was designated AC of S, G-3 on 29 April 1944 and was relieved by Lt NICANOR ENAGE in August 1944. Lt ENAGE was later relieved by Lt E. GUALDELANO in Nov 1944 to date.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4:

Maj DOROTEO SORIANO was designated AC of S, G-4 on 21 Jan 1943 and is holding the position to date.

ADJUTANT GENERAL SERVICE:

Capt P. MORALES was designated as Adjutant General on 1 Feb 1944 and still is the Adjutant General to date.

DIVISION QUARTERMASTER:

Capt L. VALDEPENAS was assigned as Division Quartermaster and is still to date.

INSPECTOR GENERAL SERVICE:

Capt G. DE CASTRO in Nov 1944, was designated as Inspector General until he was relieved by Maj GABUTINA on 26 May 1945. The latter is still the Inspector General at the present time.

DIVISION PROVOST MARSHAL:

Capt MELENCIO ORBASE was assigned as Division Provost Marshal in Jan 1945. 1st Lt F. SALAZAR was his Assistant, being assigned on 8 Jun 1945.

FINANCE SECTION:

Since the organization of the 106th Div, Lt M. REYES was the Div Finance Officer.

DIVISION SURGEON:

Capt R. RABAGO was assigned as Div Surgeon at the start of the organization until Sept 1944 when Lt B. DELA PUENTE was then designated to take his place as Div Surgeon in Oct 1944 to Jun 1945. He was relieved later by Capt SANTIAGO GALO on 27 Jun 1945 to date.

JUDGE ADVOCATE SERVICE:

Lt M. GALANG was assigned as Staff Judge Advocate in Dec 1944 to 29 Jun 1945. He was then relieved by Lt F. ABALOG on 29 Jun 1945. The latter is the Staff Advocate to date.

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT:

At the start of the organization of this Div, Capt N. MORALES was assigned as Headquarters Commandant and is still in that position to date.

SIGNAL CORPS:

Lt D. BROOKS was assigned as Signal Officer on 24 May 1944.

116TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

The first Regimental Commander of this Regiment was Maj HERBERT PAGE designated as such on 26 Apr 1945 until Jun 1945.

118TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

Maj SALIPADA K. PENDATUN was the first Regimental Commander of this Regiment. He was later relieved by Maj THODORO GARCIA as Regimental Commander 16 Jun 1945.

119TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

Maj GUMBAY PIANG was the first Regimental Commander of this Regt, designated on 1 Sept 1943 until he was relieved by Lt-Col JUSTINO TEANO on 23 Feb 1945.

S T A F F O F F I C E R S

107TH DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICER:

Lt-Col CLYDE C. CHILDRESS was assigned as Commanding Officer of the 107th Div when the Div was organized on 1 May 1944. He was relieved on 29 Dec 1944 by Lt-Col CLARO LAURETA. The latter was then relieved as Commanding Officer by Maj TEOFILO RIVERA on 25 Jun 1945.

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Capt SATURNINO SILVA was the Chief of Staff. He was later relieved by Maj TEOFILO RIVERA in Apr 1945.

AIDE DE CAMP:

Lt J. MC CARTHY was the first Aide de Camp to the Commanding Officer of this Div. He was relieved on 12 Sept 1944 by Lt RAFAEL DURAN who was later relieved by Lt RAFAEL GENOBIAGON.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

Capt RAMON BUHAY was the first AC of S, G-1. He was then relieved by Capt JOSE MANEJA who was later relieved by Lt RAFAEL GENOBIAGON on 1 Jan 1945. Lt HILARION POLISTICO finally became the AC of S, G-1, relieving Lt GENOBIAGON.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

Capt (later Major) VIRGILIO AGUILAR has been the AC of S, G-2 since 1 May 1944.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3:

Maj TEOFILO RIVERA was assigned AC of S, G-3 on 4 Apr 1945 and was later relieved by Capt RAMON BUHAY on 8 May 1945.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4:

Capt FLORENDO MANGAOIL was assigned as AC of S, G-4.

ADJUTANT GENERAL SERVICE:

Capt JOSE MANEJA was designated as Adjutant General. He was later relieved by Lt HILARION POLISTICO.

DIVISION QUARTERMASTER:

Lt JOSEPH MC CARTHY was assigned as Div Quartermaster. He was later relieved by Capt FLORENDO MANGAOIL.

INSPECTOR GENERAL SERVICE:

Capt RAFAEL GENOBIAGON was the Division Inspection General ever since.

JUDGE ADVOCATE SERVICE:

The first designated Staff Judge was Lt CLINENTE DE PERALTA. He had never been relieved.

DIVISION SURGEON:

Maj LUIS DE LECN was designated as the Div Surgeon until date.

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT:

Capt JOSE MANEJA was assigned as Headquarters Commandant.

DIVISION FINANCE SECTION:

Lt IRENEO BENAVIDES was designated as Div Finance Officer since the organization of this Division on 1 May 1944.

DIVISION CHAPLAIN:

Lt ANTHONY BEVERS was assigned as Div Chaplain and later relieved by Lt CONRAD COTE.

DIVISION PROVOST MARSHAL:

Capt JOSE MANEJA was designated as Div Provost Marshal. He was later relieved by Capt FLORENDO MANGALOIL.

130TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

Maj CLARO L. LAURETA was the first Regimental Commander, designated as such on 27 Apr 1943 until he was later relieved by Maj TEOFILO RIVERA on 15 Jul 1945. Maj RIVERA was in turn also relieved by Capt SATURNINO SILVA on 4 Apr 1945.

S T A F F O F F I C E R S

108TH DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICER:

The first Div of the 10th Military District was the 108th Div under the command of Capt CHARLES W. HEDGES (now Col). He was in command of this Div since 15 Dec 1942 until he was relieved by Maj LAZARO SILVA on 25 Jun 1945.

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Capt AMANDO CURAMING became the Chief of Staff of the Div in Mar 1943. He was relieved by Lt-Col FABIAN MEJIA in Jun 1943. The latter was in turn relieved by Maj ANGELES LIMENA on 1 Oct 1943. Maj REX BLOW later relieved Maj LIMENA on 23 Sept 1944. The former was also relieved by Maj LAZARO SILVA on 23 Apr 1945. Maj MALAMIT UMPA was relieved as Senior Aide and was designated deputy Chief of Staff.

AIDE DE CAMP:

Maj MALAMIT UMPA was the Senior Aide de Camp to the Commanding Officer, while Lt CRISTITUTO MAC PONCE was assigned as Munior Aide on 23 Apr 1943. He (Maj UMPA) was later relieved as Senior Aide and assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

Capt CELSO VALMORES was assigned as AC of S, G-1 at the activation of the 108th Div. He was relieved by Maj JUAN E. NAVARRO in Oct 1944. The latter was relieved by Maj REGULO BALA and held the position from Nov 1944 to May 1945. Capt VICENTE LAPLAP succeeded Maj BALA on 1 May 1945. Lt BIENVENIDO NERI was the first Asst AC of S, G-1, designated as such on 17 Apr 1944. He was succeeded by Lt JOSE NADORA as Assistant on 18 May 1945.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

Lt DEWITT GLOVER was designated AC of S, G-2 of the 108th Div. He was relieved by Maj REX BLOW on 23 Apr 1945. The latter was succeeded by Capt PAGAMDAMAN AGUAM on 25 Apr 1944 until Nov 1945. Lt BARTOLOME VILLANUEVA was designated as Asst AC of S, G-2. He was later relieved by Capt AGUAM as Asst on Dec 1944 to 25 Apr 1945. On 25 Apr 1945, Lt AUSTIN CAMON relieved the latter and on 2 May 1945, Lt ARTEMIO ENGRACIA relieved Lt CAMON as Asst AC of S, G-2.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3:

In Mar 1943, Lt JEREMIAS BARINAGA was designated AC of S, G-3. He was relieved by Capt JUAN K. NAVARRO in Jun 1943. In Oct 1944, Maj JUAN TADURAN

succeeded the latter. Maj TADURAN was relieved by Maj PEDRO ANDRES in Nov 1944 until Feb 1945 when the latter was relieved by Capt EUGENIO TABACUERO. Lt GERONIMO SABILLANO was assigned as Asst AC of S, G-3, at the start of the organization. He was relieved by Lt GREGORIO RUARO in Oct 1944 to Jan 1945. On 21 Feb 1945, Capt TABACUERO relieved Lt RUARO while the latter was, on 28 Feb 1945, relieved by Lt AURELIO QUIDLAT.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4:

Lt AVELINO JIMENEZ was assigned as AC of S, G-4 at the start of the organization. Maj RICARDO ABELLANOSA succeeded him in Sept 1943 with Lt PEDRO PERNIA as his Assistant. The latter was then relieved by Lt RUFO DANGARAN on 25 Aug 1944. Capt ELPEDIO MAMARADLO, on 11 Jun 1945, relieved Lt DANGARAN as Asst AC of S, G-4.

ADJUTANT GENERAL SERVICE:

The first Adjutant General was Maj REGULO BATA designated on 16 Jan 1943, with Lt CORNELIO SUGANO as his Assistant. Capt VICENTE LAPLAP soon relieved Lt SUGANO on 23 Apr 1945. The latter was relieved as Assistant by Lt DAMASO ALFORQUE in Dec 1944 to 28 Mar 1945. Lt ARSENIO QUIBRANZA soon relieved Lt ALFORQUE as Assistant Adjutant General.

INSPECTOR GENERAL SERVICE:

Maj JUAN K. NAVARRO was designated as Inspector General. His Assistant was Lt JESUS RUIZ.

DIVISION QUARTERMASTER:

Lt RUFO DANGARAN was designated as Div Quartermaster in Jun 1943. He was later succeeded by Maj RICARDO ABELLANOSA on 29 Mar 1944.

DIVISION PROVOST MARSHAL:

Lt VINCENTE OSTIA was assigned Div Provost Marshal in 1943. He was relieved by Capt FRANCISCO DONOZO on 17 Oct 1943.

DIVISION FINANCE SECTION:

The Div Finance Officer was Capt BASILIO DIAZ, designated on 13 Dec 1943.

JUDGE ADVOCATE SERVICE:

Capt VALERIO ROVIRA was assigned as Staff Judge Advocate on 15 Dec 1942.

DIVISION SURGEON:

The Div Surgeon was filled by Capt ANDRES BANZIL and Capt PACIFICO MENDOZA on 1 May 1944.

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT:

Capt PETRONILO RUIZ was designated as Headquarters Commandant.

SIGNAL CORPS:

Lt DOMINADOR LLANOS was assigned as Signal Officer of the Div on 18 Nov 1942.

105TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

Lt-Col FABIAN MEJIA was first designated Acting CO of this regiment on 18 Nov 1942. He was later relieved by Capt NATALIO ECARMA who was designated as Commanding Officer on 22 Dec 1942. Maj JUAN K. NAVARRO later relieved Capt NATALIO ECARMA on 20 Jan 1943 who was later relieved by Maj FELIPE QUEJADA. Maj QUEJADA was later relieved by Capt GABRIEL MARIANO who was designated as Acting CO on 10 Jun 1945.

108TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

Capt FELIPE FETALVERO was first designated as Acting CO of this Regiment on 26 Nov 1942. He was later relieved by Capt ARESTON TEJERO who was designated CO on 15 Dec 1942. Capt TEJERO was later relieved by Maj JUAN K. NAVARRO as CO on 20 Jan 1944. Later Capt GABRIEL MARIANO was assigned

Acting CO relieving Maj NAVARRO. He was in turn later relieved also by Maj LAZARO SILVA on 23 Apr 1945. Maj SILVA was succeeded by Maj PEDRO AQUINO as Commanding Officer on 10 Jun 1945.

120TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

Maj PEDRO ANDRES was the first designated Commanding Officer of this Regiment on 10 May 1943. He was later relieved by Maj LEOPOLDO BLANCO who was then assigned as Acting CO on 10 May 1944. Maj BLANCO was succeeded by Maj PEDRO AQUINO on 18 May 1945, when he was also relieved by Capt GABRIEL MARIANO.

124TH INFANTRY REGIMENT (MMF):

The first Regimental Commander of this Regiment was Maj ANANCO BAGUNDALE on 7 Mar 1943. Maj BAGUNDALE was relieved by Maj BUAT BAGUNDA ALI.

126TH INFANTRY REGIMENT (MMF):

Maj BUSRAN KALAW was the first and the last Regimental Commander assigned in this Regiment.

127TH INFANTRY REGIMENT (MMF):

Maj MANALAO MINDALANO was the first Regimental Commander assigned in this command.

128TH INFANTRY REGIMENT (MMF):

Capt AROMPAC MACAUROG was designated as Regimental Commander.

129TH INFANTRY REGIMENT (MMF):

Capt IBRAHAM MACUD was designated as the Regimental Commander in Sept 1943.

1ST PROVISIONAL REGIMENT (MMF):

Capt BENASING MACARAMBON was designated as the Regimental Commander.

2ND PROVISIONAL REGIMENT (MMF):

Capt M. OSMENA was designated as the Regimental Commander.

S T A F F O F F I C E R S

109TH DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICER:

When the 109th Division was activated, Lt-Col ROBERT V. BOWLER (now Colonel) was given the command on 14 Mar 1943. He was succeeded by Lt-Col JAMES GRINSTEAD on 1 Nov 1943 when he became the Commanding Officer of the "A" Corps, Western Mindanao. Lt-Col GRINSTEAD was relieved by Maj CECIL W. WALTER on 25 Jun 1945.

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Capt IGNACIO CURZ was the first Chief of Staff of this Division. He was relieved by Maj JAMES GRINSTEAD on 1 Jul 1943. Maj CRISPINO DE CASTRO soon relieved the latter when he became Commanding Officer of the Division.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:

Capt CIRILO RIVERA was designated as Deputy Chief of Staff.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

Capt NORBERTO GASENDO was assigned AC of S, G-1.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

Capt PRIMITIVO QUIEM was assigned as AC of S, G-2 on 16 Aug 1943 with Lt TAMAD MADYHIR as his Assistant. The latter was relieved by Lt FLORENCIO SUSUSCO who was assigned as Asst AC of S, G-2. Lt BIENVENIDO NERI was relieved later by Lt FELIMON ABRAO. The latter was relieved by Lt BENJAMIN TABIOS as Assistant on 30 Jan 1944.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3:

Maj ONOFRE HIPE was designated as AC of S, G-3 on 22 Apr 1943. He was relieved by Capt PATRECIANO DESTAJO later. Capt DESTAJO was later relieved by Capt AGUSTIN STA CRUZ on 26 Jun 1945 who was later also relieved by Lt PETER CATAYLO.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4:

Capt CIRILO RIVERA was designated AC of S, G-4 with Lt RICARDO RODRIGUEZ as his Assistant.

ADJUTANT GENERAL SERVICE:

Capt CRISPINO DE CASTRO was designated Adjutant General. He was soon relieved by Capt CARMELITO CATAYLO. Lt MANUEL ROA was the Asst Adjutant General, but was soon relieved by Lt JOSE FORTICH who was later relieved by Lt FILOMENO DENOSTA.

DIVISION QUARTERMASTER:

Lt JESUS ROA became the Division Quartermaster. He was relieved by Capt IGNACIO CRUZ on 25 Jun 1943. The latter was relieved by Capt ALBINO NOBLE.

INSPECTOR GENERAL SERVICE:

Lt-Col LUIS DELGADO was assigned as Inspector General in May 1942. On 5 Apr 1945, he was relieved by Capt MARIANO LEONES with Lt NICOLAS DENOSTA as his Assistant.

JUDGE ADVOCATE SERVICE:

Capt TEOGENES VELEZ was designated Staff Judge Advocate with Lt PEDRO MELENDEZ as his Assistant. The latter was relieved by Lt BEBIANO LUMINARIAS. Lt CIPRIANO VAMENTA later relieved Lt LUMINARIAS as Assistant Staff Judge Advocate.

DIVISION FINANCE SECTION:

The designated Division Finance Officer was Capt MARCELINO BUAL.

DIVISION SURGEON:

Maj EMILIO DAYPIT was designated Division Surgeon.

DIVISION PROVOST MARSHAL:

Lt MICOLAS DENOSTA was assigned as Provost Marshal. He was later relieved by Capt CRISANTO NAVARRA on 29 Mar 1944.

109TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

The first Regimental Commander was Maj ANGELES LIMENA, who was designated as Commanding Officer on 28 Nov 1942. He was later succeeded by Maj MANUEL JALDON. Maj JALDON was later relieved by Maj FIDENCIO LAPLAP in Nov 1943.

111TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

Maj ONOFRE HIPE was the first Regimental Commander of this Regiment, later succeeded by Maj MANUEL JALDON.

112TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

Maj WILLIAM MC LAUGHLIN was designated as Regimental Commander. He was later relieved of this assignment by Capt DANIEL JOVER on 25 May 1945.

S T A F F O F F I C E R S

110TH DIVISION

COMMANDING OFFICER:

Lt-Col ERNEST E. MC CLISH was assigned as Commanding Officer of the 110th Division on 20 Nov 1942. He was later relieved by Lt-Col PAUL H. MARSHALL on 22 Jan 1945 when he went to States.

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Maj CLYDE C. CHILDRESS was designated Chief of Staff of this Division on 20 Nov 1942. Capt MARK WOLFFELD was designated Acting Chief of Staff, relieving Maj CLYDE C. CHILDRESS on 10 May 1944. Capt FAUSTO DUGENIO later relieved Capt WOLFFELD on 12 July 1944, who held this designation until Sept 1944. Maj JUAN A. RIVERA succeeded Capt DUGENIO on 23 Jan 1945.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

Capt BENJAMIN M. FAMADOR was the first AC of S, G-1 of this Division. He was later relieved by Lt CESAR SANOCO on 7 Dec 1943, who in turn was later relieved by Lt DAVID SANDALO on 17 Jul 1945. Lt DAVID SANDALO was later relieved by Maj CEFERINO F. GARCIA on 7 Jun 1945.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

Capt VIRGILIO S. AGUILAR was the first AC of S, G-2 of this Division assigned since Dec 1942. He was later assigned as Asst AC of S, G-2 when Capt JACK HAWKINS relieved him some time in May 1943. Capt AGUILAR resumed AC of S, G-2 when Capt HAWKINS left for the United States. Later Capt VIRGILIO AGUILAR was relieved by Capt LUCIANO FIRMACION on 22 Feb 1944, who was later also relieved by Capt FAUSTO DUGENIO (then 1st Lt) on 2 May 1944. He held this designation until 13 May 1945 when he was relieved by Capt EDDY A. DEEN, having been transferred to Headquarters, 10th Military District.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3:

Maj WILLIAM DYSS was the first to be assigned as AC of S, G-3 of this Div. He was later relieved by Maj H. E. WOODRUFF, with Lt JOHN LEO HAULIHAN as his Assistant. Lt HAULIHAN was later relieved by Maj JUAN A. RIVERA after the position was left vacant for several months. Maj RIVERA assumed this designation on 30 Sept 1944 with Capt RUFFY as his Assistant. Maj JUAN A. RIVERA was later relieved by Capt CAVINO FETALVERO when the former was assigned as Chief of Staff. Capt FETALVERO was later relieved of this assignment by Maj ROBERT SPIELMAN on 1 May 1945 when he was designated as Commanding Officer of the 114th Inf Regt.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4:

Capt SAMUEL GRASHIO was the first AC of S, G-4 of this Division. He was relieved by Lt RICHARD THOMMES. The latter was relieved by Capt FRANCISCO CONDE on 5 Mar 1945. Capt THOMAS LAZARO was designated as Asst AC of S, G-4. He was relieved later by Lt WALTER E. MESTER on 7 Mar 1945.

ADJUTANT GENERAL SERVICE:

Maj DEONISIO VELASCO was the designated Adjutant General in the beginning. He was relieved by Capt BENJAMIN FAMADOR who also later was relieved by Lt CESAR SANGCO on 7 Dec 1943. Maj JUAN A. RIVERA later relieved Lt CESAR SANGCO on the first week of Jan 1945. Later, on the 7th of Jun 1945, Maj JUAN A. RIVERA was relieved from this assignment by Maj CEFERINO GARCIA.

INSPECTOR GENERAL SERVICE:

Maj BUENAVENTURA MORADA was designated as Inspector General of this Division. He was relieved by Capt BENJAMIN M. FAMADOR on 2 May 1944.

DIVISION QUARTERMASTER:

Capt FRANCISCO CONDE was the first Division Quartermaster. He was relieved later by Capt MELCHOR L. LLIDO on 7 Mar 1945.

JUDGE ADVOCATE SERVICE:

Lt EMILIO PELAEZ was the first assigned as Staff Judge Advocate of this Div. Designated as such on 16 Feb 1943, he has never been relieved since.

DIVISION FINANCE SECTION:

The designated Division Finance Officer was Lt JORGE ROSARIO on 10 Jan 1943. He was later relieved by Lt FERNANDO P. JONCKO on 6 Apr 1943 who in turn was later relieved by Capt MODESTO FABIA on 10 Feb 1944.

DIVISION PROVOST MARSHAL:

Capt LUCIANO FIRMACION was the Division Provost Marshal designated on 1 Jan 1943. He was later relieved by 1st Lt FAUSTO DUGENIO who later still was relieved by Lt JUANITO LABANDERA on 21 Jan 1945.

DIVISION SURGEON:

Maj GREGORIO HUERTO was the first Division Surgeon of this Division who was later relieved by Maj ANTONIO P. MUNOZ.

SIGNAL CORPS:

Lt WILLARD MONEY was the Division Signal Officer who was later relieved by Lt FRED TAYLOR on 22 Dec 1943.

DIVISION LIAISON OFFICE:

Capt MICHAEL DOBERVICH was the Division Liaison Officer who was later succeeded by Capt REECE OLIVER.

CHAPLAIN SERVICE:

Lt CALIXTO YAMBA was the Division Chaplain of this Division. He was later relieved by Lt ANTHONY BEVERS.

110TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

Capt PEDRO D. COLLADO was first designated Commanding Officer of this Regiment until he was later relieved by Capt ARSENIO LUZ who also was relieved by Maj ROSAURO P. DONGALLO.

113TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

Capt BENJAMIN M. FAMADOR was designated here as Acting Regimental Commander on 15 Jun 1943 until he was later relieved by Maj KHALIL KHODR on 30 Jan 1943.

114TH INFANTRY REGIMENT:

The first Regimental Commander here was Capt MACARIO DIAZ, who because of failure, was later relieved by Capt WILLIAM KNORTZ. Due to the death of Capt KNORTZ, Maj PAUL H. MARSHALL was designated in his place. Later he was relieved by Maj ROBERT SPIELMAN on 8 Jan 1945. Maj SPIELMAN was later called to the 110th Division assigning him as AC of S, G-3, hence Capt GAVINO FETALVERO relieved him as Regimental Commander on 1 May 1945.

CHAPTER VI

10TH MILITARY DISTRICT

RADIO COMMUNICATION NET

When Col FERTIG assumed command of the Mindanao Guerrillas on 18 September 1942, he was confronted with the problem of setting up and perfecting a good radio communication system, both for internal and external contact. Efficient administration of the units under his command and the transmission of vital information to higher headquarters especially relating to enemy troop disposition, ship movement and plane traffic, demanded the establishment of radio net. A move in this direction was immediately started.

By 30 Sept 1942, four Filipino radio men, ALFREDO BONTUYAN, GLICERIO LIM, GERARDO and ELENO ALMENDRAS, reported to Col FERTIG. They were commissioned Third Lieutenants in the United States Army Forces in the Philippines, and subsequently established themselves in Lala, Lanao.

FLORENTINO OPENDO, former Bureau of Aeronautics Radio Operator, living at that time in Dipolog, Zamboanga and reported having a radio transmitter buried near his home, was called - after an improvised radio set failed to function.

After OPENDO's radio transmitter was fixed and ready for use, all the radio men transferred to Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental where the set was established. At this time, three American radio men, ROBERT V. BALL, 5th Air Base Sq., USAC, WILLIAM F. KONKO, MTB Sq 3, USN, and WILLIAM JOHNSON of the MTB Sq, were commissioned Second Lieutenants. Another American, GEORGE HALL, USAC, having reported to Col FERTIG, was assigned to the Force Radio Section which at that time had just been activated.

Lt ROBERT F. BALL, was designated CO of the Force Radio Section (FRS).

AMERICA SUSPICIOUS OF OUR CALL SIGN

In the early days of Jan 1943, BALL, KONKO, JOHNSON, HALL, OPENDO and ELENO ALMENDRAS, by turns sat at the key day and night, without let-up, calling CQ, general call for any station, in the hope that some Allied station would hear them. For over a month, efforts spent in this direction proved futile. No contact was made. Later, however, it became known that all the calls were heard by monitoring stations in Washington, but the call sign used, KZOM, having been utilized by the former Air Corps stationed at Del Monte, Mindanao, suspicion was entertained that calling station from the Philippines was a decoy. This was confirmed by Capt CHARLES SMITH who, with Capt ALBERT Y. SMITH and JOHN A. HAMNER, had gone to Australia in a sailboat on 5 Dec 1942. Capt CHARLES M. SMITH came back to Mindanao in the first submarine that landed on 5 Mar 1943.

Sometime in the second week of Jan 1943, ROY M. BELL, formerly Physics professor at the Silliman University, Dumaguete, came with a small home-made radio transmitter which right then was utilized by Col FERTIG's headquarters in Misamis, Misamis Occidental, in contacting the big transmitter at Bonifacio which later was functioning smoothly after ROY M. BELL had done some repairs on it.

FIRST CONTACT WITH OUTSIDE

On 6 Feb 1943, contact was made with the station of Lt-Col PERALTA in Panay. PERALTA also had a guerrilla organization in Panay.

On 18 Feb 1943, contact was made with station KFS, San Francisco. Code words were arranged with the War Department through this station and contact was established with station KAZ, Gen MAC ARTHUR's net control station in Australia.

On 23 Feb 1943, the first message was received from Gen MAC ARTHUR, designating Mindanao as the Tenth Military District and assigning Col FERTIG Commanding Officer. For use with KAZ, the call sign WYZB was employed.

A guerrilla unit in Pagadian, Zamboanga, under Maj NICOLAS P. LASOLA had built a small radio and contact was quickly established between FERTIG's station WAM and LASOLA's WPX. At this time, the call ZAP, previously used, was dropped and substituted with WAM for the inter-island net and WYZB for contacts with SWPA.

Through radio contact, Maj LASOLA and his unit came under the Tenth Military District command.

Couriers coming from Malaybalay, Bukidnon brought the information that SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, another guerrilla leader, was operating in Budidnon. He was reported to have a radio, built by some Americans who were in his unit. Contact with PENDATUN was then established.

At this time, WAM at Bonifacio was designated as Net Control Station for the Tenth Military District with WPX, Pagadian, Zamboanga; WSK, station of ROY M. BELL, Negros; and WBA, PERALTA's station on Panay as branches.

SUB BRINGS NEEDED SUPPLIES

The submarine that landed at Pagadian on 5 Mar 1943, brought Lt-Commander "CHICK" PARSONS and five brand-new radio sets along with other vitally needed supplies. Commander PARSONS brought with him instructions from Gen MAC ARTHUR. The importance of gathering intelligence information on and about the enemy and its quick transmission to SWPA was especially stressed.

Accordingly, on 10 Mar 1943, Capt CHARLES M. SMITH with Lts JOHNSON and BALL went to Davao and established a radio station as close to the city as possible. Then they employed intelligence operatives to gather information inside the city, especially on harbor installations and ship movements. This information was sent to WAM and immediately relayed to GHQ, Australia. JOHNSON was left in Davao while BALL and SMITH returned to District Headquarters sometime in May 1943. On his return, BALL began to plan for the installation of more Coast Watcher Stations, under instructions of Col FERTIG, which were subsequently to cover every harbor and shipping lane in the Philippine waters.

ANOTHER RADIO CONTACT WITH AMERICA

In Feb 1943, two Americans, LLOYD WATERS, USAC and GLYN MITCHELL, USAC, worked under Maj CECIL WALTER in Anakan, Misamis Oriental, in putting into operation a 250-watt transmitting set which WALTER previous to the war had been using to contact Manila and the States. After some weeks of constant labor, contact between WALTER and the War Department through KFS, San Francisco, California, was established.

In May 1943, Commander PARSONS visited WALTER at Anakan, bringing with him instructions and codes from Col FERTIG. Soon thereafter, contact between WALTER's MRS and WAM, was established. WALTER and Col FERTIG were old friends both having worked for the same company prior to the war.

Another submarine landing was made at Pagadian in May 1943, bringing back Capt JOHN HAMNER with more radio equipment and other supplies. A week later, HAMNER with JAMES CAIN, Sgt. USAC, who had recently joined the FRS, went to Tawi-Tawi and there established a watcher station to take careful watch and report of enemy movements in the Southern shipping lanes.

Lt LINCOLN H. DA PRON, 14th Bombardment Sq., USAC, arrived at FERTIG's headquarters on 21 May 1943 from Col ROBERT V. BOWLER, then commanding the 109th Division, operating in the Cagayan-Bukidnon area. DA PRON returned to Misamis Oriental on 26 May with radio equipment and installed a radio set at Alubijid, a few kilometers from Cagayan, having an excellent view of the Cagayan harbor. This station was in addition to BOWLER's main Hq Station TAC. On 5 Jun 1943 DA PRON using call sign TAB, made the first contact with WAM. Lt JOHN WOOD, 101st Ordnance, and CLAYTON MANNERS, 19th Bombardment Group, took over operation of the station when DA PRON left early in July 1943 to join the FRS.

The Force Radio Section was gradually expanding. HENRY ROOKE, MTB Sq 3, USN, THOMAS MITSOS and HAROLD MARTIN, both previously with the 19th Bombardment Group, were commissioned Second Lieutenants and assigned to the FRS as code men.

JAPS FORCE WITHDRAWAL

On 26 Jun 1943, the Japanese landed a huge convoy of troops at Misamis, Misamis Occidental. One cruiser, 2 destroyers, 15 aircraft and several transports participated in the landing. The odds were too much for the guerrilla troops. They were forced to withdraw inland after putting up some resistance which proved futile. Previously, Col FERTIG foreseeing such eventuality, had engines and equipment installed in the interior. The radio was moved to that location. At times during the enemy operations, the radio was operating within 300 yards of Jap patrols, but never missed one contact with any of the net stations. Gen MAC ARTHUR, in a communication a few weeks later, highly commended the radio personnel for exemplary bravery under fire.

The presence of the enemy in the area, aggravated the food procurement difficulty. So by the end of July 1943, Col FERTIG's headquarters transferred to Liangan, Lanao - using bancas in crossing Panguil Bay, and under the very nose of the enemy in the middle of the night - leaving Lt KONKO behind to take over the control of the net while the move was being made.

Lt KONKO's station ERT, with the exception of traffic to SWPA, handled the entire net while the move-out was in progress. Traffic was relayed to WALTER's MRS at Anakan which in turn relayed all the traffic direct to KAZ. All incoming messages from KAZ were routed in the same manner.

WAM was installed in the first few days of Aug 1943, three kilometers inland from Liangan.

On 12 Sept 1943, another submarine landing took place at Liangan, just a few miles across from the Japanese garrison at Misamis. Seven tons of much-needed cargo were unloaded. The first American repatriates from the Philippines to the United States were shipped out on this trip. One of them was Lt FRANK NAPILLILO, who had been working with the FRS.

ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH US NAVY

One of the most important pieces of equipment unloaded by this submarine was a large Navy transmitter. This transmitter was immediately set up at the inland radio station by Lts DA PRON and ALMA B. MILLS. On 28 Sept 1943, direct contact with the Naval net control station in Australia was made. This contact enabled the FRS to send flashes on Japanese shipping direct to the Naval Intelligence and made possible also the sending of traffic direct to KAZ without relaying any more through MRS.

In the early part of Oct, BALL then recently promoted Captain, was sent by Col FERTIG to Agusan Valley to look for a more suitable location of the Force Headquarters. The barrio of Espenanza, thirty five kilometers from the coast up the Agusan River, was picked up for the new site. Engines were immediately installed and houses repaired in expectation of the move-out from Lanao. Col FERTIG accompanied by Lt LOWELL HOLDER, two weeks previously assigned with the FRS, followed Capt BALL on 15 Oct 1943.

Two more submarine landings took place in Nasipit and Cabadbaran, Agusan Province on 15 Nov and 2 Dec 1943 respectively. Approximately ninety eight tons of supplies were unloaded during those two weeks. Many radio sets were among the cargo. This enabled the FRS to establish an extensive coast watcher net all over Mindanao.

Lts MARTIN, MITSOS and DA PRON arrived Esperanza on 4 Dec 1943 from Lanao. With these three men and many more which Capt BALL assigned from the 110th Division, the Net Control Station was speedily set up and ready to resume control. A new call sign was assigned by BALL for use at the new location. This call sign WAT, was both for the inter-island and SWPA. Another call sign ZAV was used with the Navy. Three sets were put into operation; one for the Mindanao island net, another for SWPA and still another for the Navy. The men assigned were Lts WILLARD MONEY, WILLIAM LASAM, LAZARO HIDALGO, VINCENTE LASAN, TOMAS LOPEZ, SIXTO FERRER and ISIDRO PALACIO, MITCHELL and WATERS had formerly been operating WALTER's MRS at Anakan which was moved to Butuan when they were assigned to the FRS.

WAM, during the move, continued to be operated in Lanao as Net Control Station, under the care of Lts KONKO, CHIMELEWSKI, MILLS, ALMENDRAS, OPENDO,

LE COUVRE, GARLAND and FARRENS. When enough equipment was set up at Esperanza, WAM was left complete as standby station. The WAM personnel remained in Lanao with the exception of Lts KONKO, MILLS, LE COUVRE and GARLAND who were called to Esperanza where they arrived on 22 Dec 1943.

RADIO STATIONS EXPAND

With various strategic sites picked out for watcher net coverage, Lt WILLARD MONEY was sent out to put the sets into operation. Leaving Esperanza on 23 Dec 1943, he installed the first set at Mambajao, Camiguán, and left it under the management of Lt RICHARD THOMMES, a former USAC soldier previously assigned in Camiguán by Lt-Col ERNEST E. MC CLISH, the CO of the 110th Div, with headquarters at Butuan. MONEY proceeded to LIANGAN where he dropped off some new equipment for WAM. Then a Coast Watcher Net was installed by MONEY in the province of Cotabato that extended along the whole of the provincial coastline. With the increase of the number of stations in Western side of Mindanao, WAM was designated Net Control Station for Western Mindanao. All stations in the Western side directed their traffic to WAM. All traffic was then sent to WAT thru a different circuit.

Other stations were then established: MBA with Lt FERRER, guarded the sea lanes that extended into the Mindanao sea from the Surigao straits, SEVILLA at Balete, Surigao; MBN with Lt OWEN P. WILSON at Caraga, Davao; MBQ with Lt GILL at Lianga, Surigao and MBR at Nueva Campo, Surigao. The last three American officers were newly assigned to the FRS.

Approximately thirty stations then about completely covered the coastline of the entire island. Besides these stations on Mindanao, the FRS was in contact with eight stations in the Visayan islands. Ship movements were flashed to WAT from these stations and were in turn relayed direct to Navy Headquarters in Australia. In some cases, messages of this type were receipted for by the Navy within one hour of ship sighting by the watcher station.

ORGANIZE RADIO NET IN SAMAR

With the final installations of the net completed, Capt BALL was relieved by Maj JAMES L. EVANS who had arrived with Maj CHARLES SMITH, when the latter came back to Mindanao. BALL and SMITH went to Samar to organize the guerrillas and set up a radio net there. At this time, the FRS was augmented by more personnel. Lts ARTHUR HAGE, FREDERICK TAYLOR, JAMES SCHOEN, BERNARDO ADOLFO, GAUDIO PANGAN, GREGORIO SAN GILL, GREGORIO OLIVER and MELQUIADES CAROZ. The FRS personnel now consisted about twenty operators and sixteen code men with more than this number distributed in the watcher stations.

On 22 Dec 1943, the Japanese invaded the province of Lanao, forcing the radio station there to go off the air. The radio personnel managed to reach Misamis Occidental where they set up a sub-Net Control in the mountains behind the town of Misamis, after making their way through the jungles. Using the call sign CET, they again took over the control of all stations on the western half of the island.

In the later part of Jan 1944, WAT was moved further up the Agusan River to Talacogan. Reports from the watcher stations and all other intelligence information on the enemy situation were being flashed in such a volume that twenty four hour operation daily became imperative. Two stations were assigned to gather all the incoming messages from the net. Another net was utilized to flash reports to the Navy. Still another set was used to send out all the intelligence reports to GHQ, SWPA.

RADIO TRAFFIC GREATLY INCREASED

More stations were then established. These were as near as possible to the places garrisoned by the Japs in order to flash information on the number of planes and airfield the enemy had in operation; troop movements; heavy gun emplacements, truck convoys, troop concentrations, etc. This data was of utmost importance and along with ship sightings and plane movements, given priority. To confuse the enemy monitoring stations, the call signs of the net stations were frequently changed.

On 2 Mar 1944 Lt-Commander M. M. WHEELER of the United States Naval Intelligence arrived on Mindanao by submarine. With him were Lt S. SILVA and four

enlisted men of the 1st Philippine Division from the States. The four enlisted men were subsequently assigned to the FRS as operators and Lt SILVA as Ordnance Officer, Tenth Military District. Commander WHEELER was to make many trips along the coast of the island to gather important naval intelligence.

JAPS BOMB HEADQUARTERS INCESSANTLY

On 15 Mar 1944, huge Japanese contingents invaded Butuan, headquarters of the 110th Div - at the same time enemy dive bombers bombed the Agusan River Valley, bombing every barrio along the river banks in an endeavor to knock out radio installations and destroy guerrilla headquarters. These bombings and strafings continued for days. Over a two-day period, Talacogon was savagely bombed and strafed. No less than twenty bombs exploded right in the barrio. Radio houses, though not badly damaged, were riddled with bullets. One transmitter was hit but was immediately replaced. The continuous search, intense and persistent, conducted by Jap planes and ground troops to locate radio installations proved useless. No damage was inflicted in these enemy operations on the radio net. However, it was decided that in case of a shutdown by the Net Control Station at Talacogon, another should take its place at a moment's notice. So Lts WATERS and RUSSEL SMITH were sent to build a camp at Waloe, on a tributary of the Agusan River, installing engines and setting up the necessary equipment.

On 5 May 1944, at 11:35 AM, six Jap Betty bombers swept over Talacogon, bombing and strafing at a low altitude. After the enemy action, only one cow was found killed. All installations were intact.

EVACUATION PRUDENT TO WALOE

Immediate evacuation was ordered that day. It was thought that the next aerial attacks might not be so erratic. That afternoon half of the number of operators and code men went up the river to Waloe, arriving there at 8:00 PM and immediately began operating the radio equipment established by WATERS and SMITH. The remaining radio personnel in Talacogon dismantled all installations and moved to Waloe that night. By dawn of 6 May 1944, the barrio had been completely evacuated. A major move had again been made by the FRS without missing a single contact.

In the morning of 6 May 1944, the six Bettys came back and levelled Talacogon to the ground. Not a single building was left standing. This evidently led the Japs to believe that all installations force Headquarters were wiped out.

A few days later, Commander WHEELER arrived at Waloe from one of his trips to the coast. He was then designated CO, FRS, relieving Maj EVANS who was ordered by Col FERTIG to make a complete survey of the health situations of the various units stationed in Agusan, Surigao and Davao.

NEW CODE SYSTEM INTRODUCED

Commander WHEELER introduced a new code system which was put into use with all stations of the Tenth Military District. This in time proved most valuable. An aircraft warning system was then organized with all stations, using a special type of code. This was to facilitate speedy transmittal of plane traffic so that each station could send in a short message, not exceeding ten groups, all data regarding the type, speed, direction, altitude and position of a plane sighted. Such facts could be reported to the NCS and in turn relayed to a Fighter Command Station almost before the planes were out of sight of the spotter. This system proved invaluable when American fighters and bombers began working over the islands in Sept 1944. Plane sightings with this code system were being reported from watcher station to Net Control to Australia on the average of five and one half minutes after sighting!

In the new location, food problem became more acute. The Agusan River Valley was flooded during most of the year, making the planting of staple crops terribly hard. The produce of the natives was barely enough for their own needs. To procure dried fish and salt required a twenty-day round trip to and from the coast. Officers and men used to scour the surrounding country for food available. The Headquarters personnel, however, took it on the chin and smiled it off.

May 27-28, another American submarine was scheduled to land near Lianga, Surigao, but did not establish contact with shore party and supplies were unloaded in Tukuran, Zamboanga on 1 Jun 1944. Three Americans were unloaded on that trip; Maj HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST, Sgts MC GRATH and GEORGE FINNEGAN. The two enlisted men were weather men sent to report weather conditions to the Air Forces. Maj ROSENQUIST had the mission, among others, contacting the American Prisoners at Davao Penal Colony. But the Japs had already moved the prisoners from the Colony when ROSENQUIST arrived in Davao on 6 Aug 1944. Maj ROSENQUIST was then unable to perform this part of his mission.

These three Americans had to hike all the way through from Pagadian to Waloe, arriving there on 25 July 1944. Maj ROSENQUIST was assigned AC of S, G-2, for the Tenth Military District having come direct from G-2 Section, GHQ, SWPA.

During this period, it became evident that the Japanese were intent in tracking down the headquarters, with all possible means and persistence. They were reported converging in on Talacogon. It was not hard for them to get at Waloe in three flanks.

Shipping flashes were coming in thick and fast and the security of the radio was vital to Army and Naval Intelligence. Going off the air, happen what might, would be a calamity at this time. The flow of valuable intelligence traffic must continue.

At this time, the Sub-NCS in Western Mindanao was functioning efficiently under Lt JOHN SIMMONS, USNR, who landed by submarine on 5 Jun 1944. The call sign used was now SL9 and most of the other station call signs were also changed.

SL9 PREPARED FOR EMERGENCY TAKE-OVER

With the enemy closing in, Col FERTIG decided that SL9 should be prepared to take over the net control of the entire Tenth Military District, in the event the Waloe radio headquarters was forced to go off the air. Lt-Commander SAM J. WILSON, with a complete list of codes, key phrases and station records, left Waloe in July 1944 for SL9 to deliver the instructions and codes he carried. With SL9 prepared to take over at a moment's notice, 9LL, formerly WAT, could go off the air with the knowledge that the huge intelligence network of the radio stations would remain in operation.

RADIO TRAFFIC MUST CONTINUE

On 3 August 1944, Col FERTIG decided to leave Waloe and move to the interior. With the flow of intelligence reaching a peak volume and coming from strategic stations all over the island - ship movements, plane traffic, enemy troop movements and ever so much other data of essential value to the war effort, it was more important to keep radio contact than any one single factor.

Taking two deisel motors, radio equipment and a small supply of food, the first party left Waloe on the morning of 5 Aug 1944. This group consisted of Col FERTIG, Lts DA PRON, GARLAND, WATERS and HIDALGO and a number of soldiers. This group was to prepare the camp, set up motors, install other equipment and take over the net as soon as possible. After a ten-hour buroto trip, the party arrived at the prearranged site after dark, but there was no camp existing. An unfinished bamboo hut was all that stood in the midst of the virgin jungle far up the Umayon River. Plans had previously been made by Col FERTIG for the building of a camp at this site. But the laborers to whom the work was entrusted were uncivilized pagan natives about the only available denizens thereabouts and wholly unreliable.

Early the next morning, everyone set to work fast but methodically, getting radios set up and on the air. A small battery set was set up to keep contact with the headquarters at Waloe. Messages were received to the effect that the Japs were swiftly closing in on Waloe. Other messages stated that more Japs were heading for Waloe from the South. Urgency of setting up the radio patently apparent, speed on the work was accelerated.

On 10 Aug 1944, three sets were ready for operation. Near midnight of the same day, Commander WHEELER ordered the radios at Waloe off the air and the remaining Headquarters personnel started up river to join the first group.

The sets in this jungle camp were on the air that night. Again the change-over was completed without missing a single contact. During the next two days, the three sets were operated by only one operator on each net. And when on the morning of 12 Aug 1944, the rest of the Headquarters personnel arrived, it was a great relief to Col FERTIG and all the men.

There were only two huts hacked out of the jungle. Everyone then set to work establishing a camp. When the men were not on duty at the radio station, they were out in the jungle with bolos. Gradually large clearings were made and a camp of sorts was built.

FOOD AND FLOODS REAL PROBLEM

The radios were now working perfectly. However, other problems, keenly felt, began to force themselves on the group. The rainy season had begun, swelling the river twenty or more feet. The whole camp was deep in mud and water. Food in the area was impossible to get. No natives lived there and wild foods were not in sight. Everything had to be brought up the river by baretos - a twelve hour trip from Waloe. The biggest maneuverable baroto could only haul a small amount of cargo - and there were forty men at the camp! Waloe was bare of foodstuffs. To make matters worse, all the trails to the food areas were closed by the Japs swarming in all directions. About one hundred soldiers were busy day and night, procuring whatever could be found; corn, wild camotes, coconuts and even sage, an extract from the pulp of a certain palm tree.

As food was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain and slow process of starvation closing in on the camp, radio traffic was coming in faster and heavier. Jap shipping was out in huge force and ship flashes seemed to the group more important than food. Each might mean one Jap ship less and this was the goal towards which efforts in the past few years were directed. Fatigued by too much work, hunger gnawing at the vitals and living conditions bitterly unbearable, any group would have become irritable and the slightest provocation would have started a fight. But the morale of the group continued to be high for Col FERTIG proved a real and understanding leader during this trying period. There were three days when a small ear of roasted corn served the meal of one person each. Yet during those three days, at least eight enemy ships were reported sunk due to the flashes from the radio sets of that camp. That helped!

FRIENDLY PLANES SIGHTED

On 9 Sept 1944, a large formation of planes flew directly over the encampment. Some arguments arose as to whether they were American or Jap planes. Some claimed having caught glimpses of stars on the wings. Others were pessimistic having been schooled for three years in seeing always a red ball on the planes. But a couple of hours later, messages began pouring in from stations all over Mindanao. Friendly planes! One station reported the actual bombing practically play by play, of the town of Cagayan, capitol of Misamis Oriental. From then on, American planes were continually flying in large groups over the camp. This increased the work two-fold. As must have to happen, some of these planes were getting shot down. After reports on such incidents poured in, instructions by radio were flashed immediately to all stations to instigate rescue parties in search of survivors. In some instances, search parties were on the job one hour after a plane had been seen to go down.

Later in the month, the two deisels began to give trouble. Going at twenty four hour a day pace, they were just about to give out. Col FERTIG immediately ordered parties to locate other motors. One was found in an old useless river launch in the barrio of La Pas, about two days baroto trip down the river. The Japs having vacated by then the Agusan River area, Col FERTIG decided to move the Headquarters to La Pas.

MOVE TO LA PAZ

On 1 Nov 1944, Lt DA PRON took one small radio set and went down river to set up radio installations in this barrio. On 4 Nov La Paz was ready with motors, power line, antennae and houses for the equipment. Leaving the river camp for La Paz on 4 Nov, half of the personnel reached the new location on the 6th. Radios were installed without loss of time and the net

control was taken over by the net set-up the next morning. Another move without loss of contact. One station was working messages with the up-river location at the time of the turn-over. While this station was waiting for a receipt on a message just sent, a signal was given by the LaPaz set-up to take over. The station continued sending traffic without ever knowing that a change-over had been made. A few days later, the rest of the personnel arrived at La Paz and the operation was again back to normal.

AMERICANS LEAVE FOR REPATRIATION

12 Jan 1945 brought changes to the FRS, Five American officers who had been with the outfit since its activation left for Leyte to proceed to the States for a well-deserved rest. Capt MARTIN, Lts MITSOS, WATERS, HACE and LE COUVRE had all been away from home and overseas for over five years and were very anxious to be back to the homeland. Capt GARLAND was made Code Officer for the district. Capt MILLS was sent to Baculin, Davao to replace Lt WILSON who had been ordered to Leyte for hospitalization. Lt JOHN F. WOOD who had been operating a watcher station near Cagayan over a year and a half, was transferred to SL9, Western Mindanao, as Chief Radio Operator.

RADIO TRAFFIC INCREASED 164 PERCENT

Beginning with the American landings in Leyte, 20 Oct 1944, continual shifting of enemy troops was accentuated. Barges, bancas, ships, trucks and planes were being used by the Japanese in the transport of troops, aside from the usual method of hiking or using carabaos, horses and carts. So new areas heretofore without radio stations had to be covered. Good coverage of all seaports and highways was imperative, necessitating more and more mobile stations to be sent to the field.

Seven airfields have been built by the Tenth Military District, under the direction and supervision of Col FERTIG. These fields were scattered over the island and in operational use. There were other airstrips just as serviceable as the bigger airfields in other strategic locations. Planes bringing in supplies were landing on them. Planes in need of gas or repair or because the weather was bad or in any other case where they were in distress, were using these fields. The war was taking the fast tempo of augmented action and the FRS was in the thick of it. So sets were installed on each field for instant coverage of all traffic. In Nov 1944 radio traffic to the outside higher echelon had increased by 164% over that sent out in June 1944.

FERTIG GOES TO LEYTE

In Feb 1945, Col FERTIG flew to Leyte to discuss future plans for the District. Among them was the move of the FRS to a better location at Camp Keithley, Lanao Province. Lt FREDERICK TAYLOR previously assigned to the 110th Division, was called to La Paz to take over the control of the net. During the move out, it was decided that station SL9 would act as the NCS. 9LL would be the NCS for the stations on the eastern side of the island. They would relay all their messages to SL9 as that station had been previously doing with its traffic. After an assortment of equipment, enough was left for 9LL to continue efficient operation. The rest of the equipment was packed and moved to the east coast for transfer over a water route.

Personnel and equipment were to be picked up at Barobo, Surigao on 16 Mar 1945. As the trip from La Paz to Barobo required a good three days, the first echelon left headquarters on the 10th. All equipment had to be carried on the back and so the move was no easy matter. The sets and generators were not altogether light. Then upon reaching Barobo all would have to be taken to a small island about a mile off shore. The waters at Barobo were too shallow so the island had to be utilized in that lap of the move out.

At 8:00 AM, 16 Mar 1945, the boats were sighted. Most of the men had not seen US ships in three years. The sight was very welcome. At 2:00 PM, all men and cargo had been loaded and the ships were under way. The convoy passed through Surigao Straits and into the Mindanao Sea and arrived at the port of Iligan, Lanao on the morning of the 18th.

NEW HEADQUARTERS AT KEITHLEY

The location for the new headquarters was Camp Keithley, a former PC camp, about thirty six kilometers inland. All equipment and part of the personnel

were immediately sent by trucks to the camp. By the 22nd, the entire set-up was installed, although much of the equipment suffered some damages on the way. Using a new call sign, LW2, the NCS was taken over from the SL9 on the morning of the 23rd of March 1945. Five separate circuits were installed - one to work all the traffic from Eastern Mindanao (9LL), one for Western Mindanao (SL9) and one for Cotabato (NCS) under Capt MCNEY, (3PP6); one for the 8th Army and the USAFFE Headquarters and one for the Navy. For the first time there was enough space, housing and wire to facilitate the installation with remote control for transmitters. In the new set-up the entire section was considerably improved in layout and efficiency.

On 17 Apr 1945, the first American troops landed at Parang, Cotabato. The Tenth Military District was immediately attached to the Tenth Corps whose troops made the landing. Communication was established immediately between LW2 and YD44, Tenth Corps NCS.

A new phase of the Force Radio Section began with this invasion. Guerrilla troops were used with American troops to round up and cut off all Jap troops that tried to evade the advancing American element. Small portable radios were sent to all sectors, to accompany each advancing unit. From Davao to Agusan, Bukidnon, Cotabato and Zamboanga operators with these small sets hiked with the fighting troops and relayed back to headquarters the latest information on Jap movements. By these sets, Jap hideouts were located and our ground troops hounded them, ferreted them out and zooming, diving planes bombed and strafed them.

"MISSION ACCOMPLISHED"

With the Island of Mindanao now declared officially liberated, the Tenth Military District Force Radio Communications Net, BROUGHT into being with the PRIME PURPOSE OF RELAYING INTELLIGENCE DATA TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS, HAD ACCOMPLISHED ITS MAIN ASSIGNMENT.

The tangible results of this flow of traffic - enemy ship sinkings, destructions of military installations by American planes and the annihilation of enemy troops - have more than justified the sacrifices, hardships and the many problems attendant to keeping constant radio contact without interruption with higher Army and Navy Headquarters.

Nothing has been said in this report concerning the other jobs handled through the Radio Communication Net but the problems concerning administration control and the tactical disposition of 33,000 Mindanao Guerrilla troops have added the burden to the Radio Communication Net.

The map preceding this section graphically illustrates the many strategically located radio stations which comprised the Tenth Military District Radio Communications Net or Force Radio Section as it was more commonly known.

CHAPTER VII
MINDANAO INTELLIGENCE
ITS BEGINNING - DEVELOPMENT AND RESULTS
G-2 SECTION, 10TH MD COMMANDED

Three rugged years of concentrated efforts of the Intelligence Section of the Mindanao Guerrillas brought recognition in the form of commendation from the Highest Headquarters of the United States Army in the Pacific in which Major General A. C. WILLOUGHBY, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in communication dated 23 Jun 1945, to Colonel WENDELL W. FERTIG, said:

"It is desired to express the appreciation of the G-2 Section of this Headquarters for most valuable intelligence service rendered by the guerrilla organization under your Command.

"This service and its flow of reports and messages covered the following periods under the agencies indicated:

"From 1942 to June 1943, G-2 SWPA, through Allied Intelligence Bureau, Philippine Sub-Section;

"From June 1943 to March 1945, through Philippine Regional Section, G-3;

"After March 1945, G-2, Eighth Army.

"In the period through 1942 and during the early half of 1943, your Command was particularly helpful in laying plans for the location of radio posts and development of an intelligence net. Since the latter half of 1943, your development of these original plans has been ably carried out. Air, ground and naval intelligence data have been efficiently correct and therefore of great value in the preparation and successful prosecution of Allied plans in the Philippine area."

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN EARLY
INTELLIGENCE WORK

Funds, absolutely needed in the success of intelligence operations; capable, trained agents required to perform delicate missions and run the gamut of attendant risks; means of transportation and communication, essential in the facility of movement of secret operatives and transmission of information - were all deplorably lacking in the beginning. In fact, in the initial stage of the Mindanao Guerrillas, Col FERTIG, along with other manifold occupations, was his own Intelligence Officer.

The Intelligence Section of the Mindanao Guerrillas evolved from practically nothing. The Intelligence Department is something which, by its obvious importance in any Army organization, deserves foremost consideration and attention. An Army cannot become truly powerful, however heavily stacked with weapons and other vital supplies if it has not within its control an agency with which to obtain accurate knowledge on the plans, strength, location, identification and movements of the enemy.

INTELLIGENCE - FOR SELF-PRESERVATION

No Army, not even a guerrilla band can effectively fight, or even survive if the odds are against it, if it does not have some knowledge of the enemy - his troops, weapons and disposition.

This was especially true in the early days of the Mindanao guerrilla resistance movement where units numbered only a mere handful. They had to know the exact location of the enemy at all time, and if possible obtain some knowledge of his plans, his weapons and other factors which were important then to self-preservation alone. WILLIAM TATE with his small band in early September 1942 relied on the gossip of his troops and the civilians to learn necessary facts concerning the enemy.

DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE

To warn soldiers of the approach of the enemy, various means were availed of as signals. In Lanao, the use of "agong" or brass drums was popular. Along the enemy approaches were strategically located "agongs" caught up the announcement and relayed the awesome message to the Hq. In coastal places, "tambuli" was generally used. "Tambuli" (Tagalog) or "Budyong" (Visayan) are derived from Carabao or Cow horns or big sea shells. They are blown by mouth and echoing sounds that travel a long distance emanate from them. "Tagongtong" or "bamboo telegraph" was generally and more widely used, due principally to the quick availability of bamboos. They are made by cutting, seasoned bamboo poles to pieces, usually half a meter long. Tied with a rope, they are hung in various places along possible enemy routes. Upon enemy approach, the nearest "Tagongtong" is struck with an iron piece. In this way, no movement of the enemy could be made without the knowledge of the people, especially along the barrios where they passed. Everyone was enjoined to gather all information of the enemy, including the wildest of rumors, for transmission to headquarters for its evaluation and as basis for whatever action need be taken.

PHILIPPINES' STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE IN PACIFIC WAR

The Philippines in the theatre of the war operations in the Pacific, occupies a strategic position. The fact is inescapable that the Philippine Islands extending from Batanes to Siasi over a distance of some 900 statute miles, served as an essential link to bridge the gap between Japan and the East Indies, Malaya and even the Indian Ocean. Control by Japan of the Islands would, in effect make China Sea a private lake of the Nippon Empire. Properly garrisoned and defended, it constitutes a no mean bulwark to guard the approaches of East Asia against thrusts coming from the Pacific. MAC ARTHUR himself recognized this fact when on 4 Jul 1945 he remarked, in summing up the Philippine Campaign that the naval battle off Leyte Gulf was the turning point in the Pacific War.

ENEMY ROUTES COVERED

As much as the Philippines were a barrier to the Japanese in the march for conquest at the initial stage of the Pacific War, so also did it become an obstacle to hurdle in the path of the American Liberation Forces in the return of MAC ARTHUR - with one great difference, however, and that was: An organized Army of determined guerrillas had long entrenched themselves in the Islands, especially in Mindanao, a veritable fifth column, with carefully coordinated intelligence nets operating without let-up twenty four hours a day, covering all strategic locations: Overland routes as highway, roads, trails; Waterways, as sea-lanes, rivers, lakes, and vantage points everywhere for observations on aerial enemy activities. They covered surprisingly well the reporting of ship movements, enemy troop dispositions and aerial traffic. Radio sets dotted the whole Mindanao, so that in 1945, there were fifty-eight stations reporting intelligence to Headquarters for relay to higher Army and Navy sources for action. Because of this intelligence net and radio communication system, the American Forces knew many facts about the Japs that helped the subsequent actions by the Allies in prosecuting the war on Mindanao and other islands of the Philippines.

COAST WATCHER STATIONS - ROAD SPOTTERS

Watcher's stations, mostly coastal, were assigned the work of reporting immediately ship sightings, including - if possible - direction, tonnage, class, number, possible load, etc. Watcher's stations were also placed in strategic places along highways to report on troop movements and other information about the enemy on land.

A report by Col FERTIG to Gen MAC ARTHUR, dated 7 Jul 1944, showed in part the role played by the watcher's station in the scheme of intelligence operations:

"x x x The Commander Seventh Fleet was pleased to give us a "Well Done" for having located a major enemy fleet passing through the islands and out through San Bernardino Straits. Reports covered a period of thirty-six hours and were remarkably accurate; establishing the presence of nine aircraft, carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers and the usual

fleet train. Our reports allowed the Navy to calculate strength and speed, and undoubtedly contributed to the successful conclusion of the action, known as the "Battle of the Western Philippines". In addition to the spectacular nature of the above reports, our watcher station reports showed a large increase in both number of ships and total tonnage moving through the Islands. For the first time, use of escort vessels appeared to be the rule. Another effect of the submarine campaign is noted. The Japanese merchant vessels hide each night in a selected anchorage, sailing at dawn. Thus seventy-two hours are required to move a convoy from Davao to Zamboanga, a distance easily covered in twenty-four hours."

MINDANAO GUERRILLAS ENJOYED PEOPLE'S BACKING

Intelligence operations were, after the sad debacle met by the USAFFE in early 1942, conducted by various persons, groups of persons or organized bands of guerrillas - for internal security. USAFFE officers and men who had chosen not to submit to the demands for surrender by the Invader, had to have some of intelligence work by themselves, to know the definite intentions of the enemy to escape personal capture. Early guerrillas, operating independently of each other, had to know somehow the plans, movements and location of the enemy so they could know when and where to strike and at the same time prevent being caught unaware. Even civilians, after learning of Japanese brutalities, found it necessary to know enemy intentions and movements - to avoid contact and escape bearing the brunt of enemy atrocities. In effect, the very fondness for acts of barbarism on the part of the Japanese, forced both the civilians population and the early, loose, scattered guerrilla bands to organize into intelligence groups primarily for security.

When the Mindanao Guerrillas, going under the name Mindanao-Visayan Force was organized little by little into a unified command, it had the people's backing and support.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES EXPANDED

The increase in the number of FERTIG's guerrilla bands necessitated a corresponding intensification and diversification of intelligence activities. And aside from the usual intelligence activities, it was necessary to have some knowledge of the location of hidden arms and ammunition; hidden stuffs of Japanese and pro-Japanese cohorts, Jap spies and sincere collaborators and their actual intentions.

HIDDEN ARMS AND AMMUNITION:

After the surrender of 10 May 1942 of the Mindanao USAFFE, a great number of arms and ammunition fell into the hands of civilians by various means. These were badly needed by the ever increasing guerrilla army. To know where they were hidden and who hid them became an important undertaking for intelligence agents. Once known and confiscated, it would mean additional stock - for use against the enemy.

HIDDEN JAPANESE PERSONAL EFFECTS, ETC:

In certain areas in Mindanao, especially in places where in peacetime, the Japs had business operations, some of their personal effects were hidden, taken care of by Jap sympathizers, such as trucks, automobiles, radio sets, gasoline, canned goods, cloth, etc. As these were useful to the guerrillas, intelligence agents ferreted them out.

PRIMARY MISSIONS - "INTELLIGENCE"

The radio communication of Gen MAC ARTHUR recognizing the Mindanao Guerrillas of Mindanao and incorporating them into the Tenth Military District on 22 Feb 1943, emphasized intensification of intelligence coverage, not only of Mindanao but also of Samar-Leyte Area. This was necessary in view of the fact that the huge American Forces in the Pacific were approaching the Philippine Theatre of operations. No one single factor was to receive any greater effort than intelligence during the entire Mindanao Guerrilla period.

IMPORTANT MAIL - TO SWPA

On 14 Jul 1943, along with three American officers, escaped POW from the Davao Penal Colony, went four postal bags filled with mail from the Tenth Military District for GHQ, SWPA. These bags contained an assortment of reports and intelligence matters. The importance of this mail was summed up in a radio message from Gen MAC ARTHUR to Col FERTIG dated 18 Aug 1943:

"Intelligence Report, Tenth MD for April Won First Class Compliments from G-2, SWPA. Reports, Papers and Personal Knowledge Evacuated with Party have been a Great Value for Plans."

INTELLIGENCE NET COVERS ENTIRE MINDANAO

The Intelligence Organization of the entire Tenth Military District Command, covered the whole of Mindanao Island as the last of the Guerrilla Bands were finally absorbed into the unified control of Force Headquarters, and the Divisions organized covered the entire island territory.

DISTRICT G-2 SECTION: In the District Headquarters, as in any Army organization, was created the G-2 Section whose main function was the collection, collation and evaluation of all intelligence information from all available sources to forward with the least possible delay to the Headquarters of Gen MAC ARTHUR then in Australia.

DIVISION G-2 SECTION: In the different Divisions, G-2 Sections were also organized, similar in scope but provided with more field personnel, both Army and Civilian, mostly operatives or agents.

REGIMENTAL S-2 SECTION: The different regiments that composed a Division each had their own S-2 Intelligence Section with enough personnel, Army and Civilian, to scour for enemy information all over their allotted sectors. The same method of transmission of information availed of by the Division G-2 Section was used by the Regiments. Battalions too, had their S-2 Sections charged with the same work.

1,500 INTELLIGENCE AGENTS - FULL TIME JOB

Working in the different battalions, regiments, divisions and the Force G-2 Section were about 1,500 operatives or agents - about twenty-five percent of which were soldiers. This figure represents those operatives actively dedicating their full time to intelligence work. All loyal civilians (the percentage of disloyal ones very negligible), all soldiers and officers were in effect operatives, for in the Philippines, people were naturally curious and to turn that curiosity to advantage became an easy matter not only with the Japanese does the spy system work based on "Everyone can Spy- Everyone must Spy". Some mercenary elements sided with the Japs, yet the greatest bulk of the population covered the enemy in a network of intelligence. There could hardly be any movement on his part, unless performed in places absolutely inaccessible to foreign approach, that escaped notice and about which information was relayed through various means, reached to Army Unit Headquarters.

THE WORK OF SPECIAL AGENTS

This generally refers however, to the obvious facts like the estimated number of the enemy in certain garrisoned areas or the number of Japs passing through a certain locality. But the more important facts needed by MAC ARTHUR's Headquarters - enemy intentions; military installations; unit identification; first and last names and ranks of Commanding Officer; enemy material and equipment; locations and description of radio installations and radar; enemy documents; location, capacity and stocks of naval fuel storage; harbor installations, etc - all these needed a special kind of detective work, as well as courage, sacrifices and boundless risks.

HOW THIS INFORMATION IS GATHERED

To obtain accurate data on the enemy, various means were employed by those in charge of subsidiary intelligence nets. The most favorite of which and hardest to detect, is the planting of operatives right in the midst of the Japanese garrisons. Most of those employed in this manner were known to

have been uncompromising Pro-Japanese elements, but were at heart for and with the Allied cause. This was a difficult role to assume, with personal complexes and great risks.

One typical instance was the case of VICENTE MENDOZA of Cagayan, Misamis Oriental, who was trusted implicitly by the Japanese but in reality was working for the guerrilla command at Bukidnon and Balingasag. Others, to a lesser degree, aided him in this dangerous work, among them POMPOSA BACARISAS, a girl close to the Japs. Much valuable information has been furnished the Army by these intrepid agents. The Japanese, however, caught both and extracted the terrible penalty of torture and death.

THREE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES INSIDE DAVAO

Among the operatives planted in the midst of the enemy in Davao by Major VIRGILIO S. AGUILAR, Field Military Intelligence Officer for Davao, were SEGUNDO RUIZ, PRIMO BALATAYO and CIPRIANO MERCADO.

1) SEGUNDO RUIZ, a surveyor, was employed by the Zenetaka Gomi (Japanese concern engaged in working on the projects of the Jap Army), to take charge of the levelling of the second runway of the Licanan Airdrome. Being a trusted man of the Japs, he had access to different military installations. He was working at Licanan for two months prior to 2 Sept 1944 - on which day American planes first bombed and strafed Licanan. A considerable number of Japanese lives were lost and a number of planes destroyed on the ground, along with the destruction of military installations. Agents like RUIZ, made possible this effective bombing by furnishing accurate intelligence prior to such bombings.

2) PRIMO BALATAYO, graduate in commerce, was employed by the Japs as Assistant Manager of Maeda Gomi at Bunawan, Davao. He was respected by the Japs and was even allowed a car for his own use. On several occasions, Japanese officers brought him along and showed him different projects, constructed and under construction, by the Japs. Partly, at least, on his information furnished, the Sasa Airfield was heavily bombed on 2 Sept 1944. Thirty planes were destroyed on the ground. Two hundred and fifty Japs, along with 150 Filipino Pro-Japs, were killed while eating their noon-day meal in the Mess Hall. Military installations were effectively blasted.

3) CIPRIANO MERCADO was employed as Foreman by the Japs in constructing camps in the Akaname Plantation. After all, the camps were constructed and occupied by the Japs, MERCADO furnished the Field Military Intelligence Officer with complete data on the camps; including sketches showing their exact location, bivouac areas and installations. The same information was transmitted by radio to headquarters concerned. Soon after, sometime in March 1945, planes came and bombed and strafed the hidden camps, causing almost total destruction and the loss of many Japanese lives.

All three of these agents, escaped Japanese capture but in the case of CIPRIANO MERCADO, eight members of his immediate family were killed when overtaken by the Japs in Gatungan, two kilometers West of Bunawan, Davao.

BY SUBTERFUGE:

Another favorite method employed by operatives was subterfuge. A person, soldier or civilian, in the guise of being a harmless individual, would be sent into a Japanese-held territory using various pretexts: selling chickens and eggs, wine, etc or pretending to visit their relatives or friends who are Jap puppet officials, or in any ways. Their jobs were to carefully observe for later reporting all Japanese installations and activities in areas traveled. Much information had been gathered by the use of this method.

Women, too, played an important part in the intelligence nets - for they had a particular means of appealing to the vanity of the Japs and getting them to talk.

INTELLIGENCE PRIOR TO AMERICAN LANDINGS

Another example of the efficiency in the intelligence work of the Mindanao Guerrillas is the information furnished just prior to the landing of the American Forces at Parang and the subsequent advance on Malabang, Cotabato. From FERTIG to Commanding General, 8th Army, Information to 10th Corps, dated 13 April 1945:

"Evaluation of the Iilana Bay situation; unopposed LANDINGS MAY BE MADE AT any point from Pagadian, Zamboanga, along coast through Malabang to the Cotabato-Lanao Boundary. Nips that were between Malabang and Parang evacuated by baroto to Cotabato on 12 April. Our forces maintaining patrols between Malabang and Parang and will contact our radio station near Parang shortly.

"Latest intelligence information strongly indicate light resistance only at Parang proper although heavy bombings past few days and those to continue should eliminate targets and troops in that city. Nothing but light beach defenses (barbed wire entanglements) reported from Parang to Linek. I believe landings should be accomplished with little preparatory naval gunfire directed at beaches or inland north of Parang.

"Malabang Airfield in condition to take as many planes as you desire. Extremely dry weather in the past few days will cause dust nuisance. For continued use throughout operation, steel mats should be placed at once. The main seven thousand feet runway can be cleared of grass to give eight hundred feet of actual width. Civilian Mayor of Malabang is cleaning town but no civilians allowed to enter except workmen."

On 17 April 1945, American Forces landed, without opposition.

PROPAGANDA, A NECESSARY ADJUNCT.

The enemy, adept at cheap propaganda, found willing listeners at first among the gullible which, though constituting a negligible minority, if not made to understand the true picture of the war situation immediately, might contaminate the others into believing in the eternal "might" of "unconquerable" Japan. Most of them, in Jap garrisoned cities, due to strict censorship, did not even have any inkling of how the war was progressing. To remedy this situation, intelligence operatives not only went to Jap-occupied places to gather information on the enemy, but also to apprise the Filipinos inside the real turn of events, by word of mouth or sometimes by printed war news sheets.

In the early days, when the guerrillas had no source from which to draw funds for financial support or to fill up other information needs, the civilians had to be awakened to a sense of patriotism from their lukewarm attitude. Radio news had to be broadcast to the people by speeches or typewritten leaflets and the war situation explained to them in detail. The "cockpit" became a favorite gathering place and exchange place of information.

DAYS OF DARKNESS

The second half of 1944 saw the most intense mopping-up operations of the Japanese on the island of Mindanao. Thousands of enemy troops, withdrawing from Southwest Pacific fronts, converged in the Philippines. The victorious American troops were fast closing in on the retreating forces. The Philippines offered them a temporary haven from the terrible onslaughts dished out in the Marianas, Pelelieu, etc. It was at this time that the Mindanao Guerrillas, ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-armed and ill, gamely resisted in the face of overwhelming odds, continuously believing with almost blind faith that always "it was darkest before dawn". Some had to strike temporarily the protection of the jungles - yet always to strike the enemy whenever and wherever opportunity presented itself.

The situation, from the standpoint of the guerrillas, was appalling under the terrific surge of enemy pressure. But they found wider scope and more fields for thorough, intensified intelligence operations. Despite unnerving difficulties encountered in one form or another, intelligence work continued in increased pace and ever-surging tempo.

The answer to the question whether or not the Mindanao Guerrillas were successful in the pursuit of the primary mission - securing of intelligence, is found in the ruins of Surigao and Cagayan cities; in the hundreds of enemy ships resting at the bottom of the surrounding seas; in the charred remains of enemy installations; and in the mangled bodies of dead Japanese.

TRAGEDIES IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Many instances of dire happenings, in the form of tortures and death have occurred to intelligence agents. In their own way, they are as much deserving of recognition as those who fought decisive battles on the battlefields.

EXAMPLE NO. 1: - "Pvt SIMPLICIO LIBRES, "E" Co., 2nd Bn, 113th Infantry, temporarily assigned with Lt DE LOS REYES, 110th Division Special Intelligence Net, Sector No. 2, was captured by the enemy while enroute from Sector No. 3 to Lt DE LOS REYES' Sector at Nasipit. He was tied and blindfolded when found in Bancasi, Butuan, with five bayonet wounds and cracked skull, on 15 Nov 1944. Later investigations revealed LIBRES was killed by the Japs that passed that area on the 14th of Nov 1944, from Nasipit. He was then bringing a message from the CP of the 113th Infantry Regiment, 110th Div., to Sector No. 2, at Nasipit."

EXAMPLE NO. 2: - "On 17 Nov 1944, at 1:00 PM, a Jap patrol was able to ambush and capture one of the soldiers of the 113th Inf Regiment, sent on an intelligence mission, Pvt LACORDA. This was near the Davao road junction, in the vicinity of Butuan. He was later discovered to have been tortured to death, one leg was skinned to the bone from ankle to knee. He was then stabbed to death right through the heart with his own bolo."

EXAMPLE NO. 3: - "PRIMITIVO TALADUA, Intelligence Agent, G-2 Section, 10th Military District, after having arrived from Manila where he was assigned to gather some intelligence information, was caught by the Japs in Linabo, Plaridel, Misamis Occidental on 13 Feb 1944. Incriminating papers were found by the Japs in his person. He was brought to Calamba, nearby barrio, his hands tied tight with barbed wire. While being investigated, his nails were pulled out one by one and at the same time, a hot piece of iron was applied to his breast and forehead. After two days of incessant tortures, the Japs finding he would not tell what he knew about the guerrillas, they hacked his body with bayonets until he died".

EXAMPLE NO. 4: - "On 29 Sep 1944, at 10:00, CANDELARIA DELMO, a girl civilian operative of the "A" Corps G-2 Section, 10th MD, was captured by the Japs in Misamis, Misamis Occidental. Her body was battered with blows, after having been brutally abused by the Jap investigators. As she would not tell what she knew of the guerrillas, she was finally bayoneted till killed."

EXAMPLE NO. 5: - "Eight civilian operatives, led by SABINO SABERON, proceeded to Bayabas, some twenty five kilometers Southwest of Davao City, to obtain accurate data on Jap activities, defenses, dumps and other enemy installations, on 26 Jan 1945.

Suspected by Jap civilians of being Intelligence Agents, the party was attacked in Tuli, before reaching objective, on 29 Jan, killing two of them. The rest who fled were overtaken by the enemy near the junction of the Davao and Siao Rivers the next day. Two more were killed, three fled again to report the tragedy. SABERON, wounded, was brought along by the Japs and on the way, tortured and finally killed."

INTELLIGENCE EXPENSES - LESS THAN P 500,000

The total intelligence expenses for the Tenth Military District for the entire guerrilla period...Philippine Emergency Money, Old Philippine Treasury Notes, and American Dollars....amounted to less than one half million pesos and dollars!

This amount would hardly buy one seaworthy inter-island steamer. Yet this fund bought Intelligence information which, wholly or in part, led to the sinking of many thousands of tons of Jap shipping....to say nothing of the havoc wrecked by American forces - both ground and air, as a result of factual intelligence reporting.

8000 RADIO MESSAGES PER MONTH

The various reports immediately following, serve to illustrate just how the intelligence factors were broken down, and accomplished. Radio messages to higher headquarters during 1944, averaged anywhere between 8000 to 10,000 per month..and most of this was concerning intelligence.

There can be nothing but a tremendous satisfaction to all the people of Mindanao...whether soldier or civilian...who had a share, large or small, in contributing their part to this tangible war effort.

History will record the part played by the people of this Island in the progress of the war against the enemy...and the contribution of Intelligence will be included as a valuable and vital factor.

C O A S T W A T C H E R S T A T I O N S

In the theater of war operations in the Pacific, the Philippines occupied a strategic position. Gen MAC ARTHUR himself, recognized this fact when on 4 Jul 1945, he remarked in summing up the Philippine Campaigns that the Naval battle off Leyte was the turning point of the war.

ENEMY SHIPPING MUST BE OBSERVED AND REPORTED.

Realizing the importance of Mindanao, especially in its geographical relation to the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea and other Pacific Islands, the Tenth Military District established coast watcher stations in all strategic spots surrounding the island. As early as 1943, there were 17 coast watcher stations on the island...this was later increased to a total of 31. They covered all the important sea lanes and the radio stations are graphically shown on the map of Radio Stations, including in this History.

EYES OF THE U.S. NAVY

In the beginning these coast watchers served as security outposts for the guerrilla forces, but when the tide of war began to turn in our favor, these stations were multiplied and became the "Eyes" of the U.S. Navy which was fast sweeping Pacific Waters, and ever-nearing the Philippines.

Report of enemy ship movements were reported by "flash" radio messages...in code and in accordance with the Navy system of identification. The actual movement of a convoy of Japanese ships could be "flashed" thru its entire movement along either the west or east coast of the Philippines...for this Headquarters not only served Higher Headquarters with ship spottings for Mindanao...but also acted as the Relay Station for the entire Philippines.

During the month of Jun 1944 a total of 214 ship sightings for the Philippines was flashed to Navy Headquarters over our key station which had direct contact with Navy Intelligence at Perth, Australia.

BEATEN PATHS OBSERVED...JAP SHIPPING INTENSIFIED

Through the particular location of watcher stations it was possible to establish and plot "beaten paths" of enemy shipping, which proved of great assistance to the Navy, particularly submarines which would "catch their prey" in these established shipping lanes.

As the enemy situation became more acute, the Philippines came their haven or refuge, and also as a section of the Pacific for greater fortification. Ship traffic increased considerably in Jun 1944, and even as late as October a total of 405 ships were sighted in Philippine waters...especially the Visayas and Mindanao. Luzon at that time was covered by a separate relay station.

"WELL DONE" FROM THE NAVY

The work that the coast watcher stations contributed to the operations in the Philippines is expressed in a radio message from the Commander, Seventh Fleet, to Commanding Officer, Tenth Military District:

"YOUR FINE WORK HAS BEEN A LARGE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR
TO SUCCESS OF OUR ARMS IN THE PHILIPPINES."

* * *

SOME "FLASH" MESSAGES FROM COAST WATCHER STATIONS

1943:

15 Dec A CONVOY OF ENEMY SHIPS CONSISTING OF 5 FOX ABLES, 2 FOX TARE ABLE, 1 FOX TARE CHARLIE, 2 FOX TARE DOG, 1 SUGAR BAKER WAS SIGHTED AT 0420 GMT, POSITION 10 DEGREES 17 MINUTES NORTH AND 124 DEGREES 14 MINUTES EAST, HEADING SOUTHWEST AT MEDIUM SPEED.

1944 :

- 7 Jan. 28 FOX TARE CHARLIES WERE SIGHTED IN SURIGAO STRAITS TO EAST OF ESPERANZA AT 5:25 PM HEADING SOUTHWARD.
- 15 Jan. 1 FOX TARE DOG, 27 SUGAR CHARLIES AND 6 BIG UNIDENTIFIED VESSELS COMING FROM CEBU WERE SIGHTED AT 0315Z SLOWLY HEADING TO SOUTH-EAST. POSITION WAS GIVEN AS 0572415.
- 12 Feb. 20 COASTAL MOTOR VESSELS AND 1 FOX TARE CHARLIE THAT CAME FROM THE DAVAO DIRECTION WERE LYING OFF SACOL ISLAND AT 1300.
- 15 Feb. A BIG CONVOY OF 20 UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS WAS SIGHTED AT 0900 HOW TIME READING SOUTHEAST CELEBES SEA AT REGULAR SPEED.
- 8 Apr. AT 1115 ONE HEAVY CRUISER APPROACHING TICTUAN ISLAND FROM ZAMBOANGA TAKING AN EASTERLY DIRECTION. AT 1305 SAME HEAVY CRUISER REPORTED FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER CRUISER OF SAME TYPE FROM ZAMBOANGA GOING WESTWARD TO TICTUAN ISLAND.
- 8 Apr. AT 0830 ONE SHIP INSIDE LIANGA BAY WITH DESTROYER BEING TOWED. AFTER HALF AN HOUR STOP, IT PROCEEDED NORTH TO SURIGAO. IT WAS FOLLOWED BY ONE PATROL BOMBER.
- 19 Apr. TWO TRANSPORTS ESCORTED BY ONE DESTROYER SIGHTED AT 1730, 10 MILES OFF LEBAK COAST, COTABATO, GOING NORTH FROM SOUTH AT MEDIUM SPEED.
- 1 Jun. JAP TASK FORCE IN DAVAO GULF - ONE BIG AIRCRAFT CARRIER, 5 BATTLESHIPS, 6 DESTROYERS, 15 SUBMARINES, 9 TRANSPORTS AND ABOUT 15 SMALLER SHIPS.
- 7 Jun. 28 FOX TARE CHARLIES WERE SIGHTED IN SURIGAO STRAITS TO EAST OF ESPERANZA AT 5:25 HEADING SOUTH.
- 19 Jun. TWO COAST GUARD CUTTERS PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED AT STA ANA. CREW OF 25, ARMED WITH TWO CANNONS, THREE AA GUNS AND SEVERAL NGS.
- 19 Jun. TWO MERCHANT SHIPS ESCORTED BY THREE GUNBOATS ANCHORED AT GLAN, COTABATO.
- 13 Jul. TWO BIG TRANSPORTS (HEAVILY LOADED) AND 1 GUNBOAT FROM NORTH ENTERED GLAN AND ANCHORED AT WHARF.
- 18 Jul. 6 SHIPS FROM ZAMBOANGA PROCEEDING EAST WITH 1 DESTROYER LEADING, FOLLOWED BY 1 SUBMARINE CHASER, 2 LARGE MERCHANT SHIPS, 1 DESTROYER AND 1 FREIGHTER*TRANSPORT
- 1 Aug. ONE CRUISER AND ONE MERCHANT VESSEL ENTERED SARANGANI BAY HEADING EAST TOWARDS DADIANGAS.
- 24 Aug. 24 SHIPS BELIEVED LARGE LAUNCHES, SOME ARMED, SIGHTED ENTERING CAGAYAN, FROM WEST AT 4:00 PM.
- 19 Sept. 9 UNCLASSIFIED VESSELS, LARGES APPROX 500 TONS, ENTERING CAGAYAN HARBOR FROM WEST. 8 MERCHANT VESSELS REPORTED ARRIVED CAGAYAN PORT FROM NORTHEAST EARLY IN THE MORNING.
- Oct. DURING THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 1944 A TOTAL OF 405 SHIPS WERE SIGHTED BY COAST WATCHER STATIONS IN THE VISAYAS AND MINDANAO, AND REPORTED THROUGH TENTH MD HEADQUARTERS DIRECTLY TO THE NAVY.

M I L I T A R Y I N S T A L L A T I O N S

If there is anything which we can call an outstanding achievement of intelligence work on Mindanao, it is the accurate location of enemy military installations. It was in this work that our civilian operatives excelled because they knew the places very well, saw these installations themselves, in fact in some cases they helped in constructing them. Location of guns and their caliber, trenches, foxholes, dugouts supply and ammo depots, barracks and bivouac areas, all these were spotted and plotted in maps just as fast as they were made or even before they were finished. This information was specially valuable to our air forces. What happened? - Before the enemy could use these installations they were either destroyed or neutralized by bombing. What sur-

prised the Japanese most was the accurate bombing of installations which were hardly visible from the air like the tunnels they dug on the sides of mountains and hills. Bewildered, they suspected every Filipino as a "spy" and in the final phase of the Davao Campaign this resulted in the killing of several Filipino civilians including some of our operatives.

ENEMY DEFENSES KNOWN:

Long before the landing of American troops on the island they were already informed of what kind of defenses they would encounter and in what places they would meet them. It is interesting to note that when the American forces marched their way along the Davao South Highway towards the city in May 1945, they found the gun emplacements intact along the coast in the same places as reported by our intelligence net in March 1945.

"20 MARCH 1945 -- FIVE COASTAL ARTILLERY GUNS INSTALLED ALONG SHORE 100 METERS FROM SEA BEGINNING EAST OF KM 55 SOUTH HIGHWAY. GUNS ARE 130 METERS APART UNDER MANGROVE TREES."

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OTHER TYPICAL MESSAGES REPORTING ENEMY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

1944:

- 13 Nov. CONCENTRATION OF WAR MATERIAL IN RURAL HIGH SCHOOL AT KIDAPAWAN.
- 24 Nov. ENEMY AIR SPOTTER AND RADIO STATION LOCATED ON TOP OF SA AVEDRA HILL, ONE MILE WEST OF TAPUNDO PT, ON SOUTHEAST CORNER OF ISLAND.
- 1 Dec. FOUR LARGE CANNONS ARE LOCATED ABOUT 400 METERS NORTHWEST OF MATINA RESERVOIR. AT POINT 100 METERS WEST OF MATINA RUNWAY AND ONE KM SOUTH OF NATIONAL HIGHWAY ARE FOUR AA GUNS. FOUR MORE ARE LOCATED 300 METERS WEST OF SOUTH END OF MATINA RUNWAY.
- 6 Dec. GUNS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED EMPLACED AT INTERVALS FROM LAPASAN TO TAGOLOAN. SOME FIELD FORTIFICATIONS AND ENTANGLEMENTS ARE LOCATED ON SAME AREA.
- 23 Dec. CATEEL: JAPS HAVE PLACED ELECTRIFIED WIRE AROUND BARRIO AND ALONG COAST TO STA FELCINA. BELIEVE THIS ALARM SYSTEM ONLY.

1945:

- 10 Mar. GUN EMPLACEMENTS: PIN POINTED IN DAVAO SHEET NR 4732-II: ONE 12-INCH GUN AT 371.562. ONE AT 377-572, AND ANOTHER AT 285-570.
- 14 Mar. REF DAVAO SHEET NR 4752-II. FOOD DEPOT AT 536-658.2. REVETMENT 3 METERS THICK AND 50 METERS LONG CAMOUFLAGED WITH GRASSY SOD. LOCATED AT 345.6-320. REF BUNAWAN SHEET NR 4732-I. FOOD DEPOT IN 3 BLDGS AT 318-687. GAS DRUMS SCATTERED IN PILES AROUND THESE BLDGS.
- 20 Mar. TRENCHES, FOXHOLES AND AIR RAID SHELTERS UNDER HIGHSPEED CONSTRUCTION ALONG TAGUPOT ROAD AND BUNAWAN RIVER.
- 31 Mar. REF SHEET NR 4732-II PIN POINTED TARGETS DAVAO AREA: HOUSES ON BOTH SIDES LAPANDAY ROAD OCCUPIED FROM 325-663 TO 313-681. BAR RACKS AND TUNNELS FROM 312.5-621.
- 2 Apr. LARGE TUNNEL WITH 16 OUTLETS LOCATED 25 METERS EAST OF DAVAO RIVER AND WEST OF KM 15-5 LAPANDAY ROAD. ELECTRIC MACHINERY IN TUNNEL WORKING DAY AND NIGHT. CONTENTS CANNOT BE GOTTEN DUE TO STRICT RESTRICTIONS. LOADED CANVAS COVERED TRUCKS ENTER TO UNLOAD.
- 6 Apr. ENEMY AT TALAKAG ENCAMPED IN MIXTURE OF TENTS AND IMPROVISED SHELTER 150 METERS SOUTHWEST BY WEST OF BRIDGE OVER KABANGLASAN CREEK NEAR TALAKAG ON TALAKAG-LINGON TRAIL. THEY ARE IN OPEN TERRITORY. WILL PROBABLY TAKE SHELTER FROM RAID IN KABANGLASAN CREEK ABOUT 100 METERS SOUTH OF CAMP. FIELD GUN LOCATED NEAR DESTROYED OVEN 80 METERS NORTHWEST OF SAME BRIDGE. OTHER TENTH WEST AND NORTH OF GUN. FOXHOLES ON BOTH BANKS OF CREEK NEAR BRIDGE AROUND TALAKAG

80

PLAZA AND IN TREES HALF KM SOUTH OF FARM 8.

- 15 Apr. TROOPS ARE BIVOUACKED AT POSITION 194-221. ARTILLERY PIECES HIDDEN UNDER FRUIT AND BANANA TREES AT NURSERY. RECOMMEND BOMBING AND STRAFING WITHIN RADIUS OF 600 METERS OF POINT INCLUDING FOREST AREA SOUTH OF NURSERY. ALL THESE PLACES ARE ON KORONADAL HIGHWAY.
- 19 Apr. CARMEN FERRY: REF PIKIT SHEET NR 4532-III. CULVERT ON ROAD AT 36.4-64.28 USED AS AIR RAID SHELTER. MOTOR POOL WITH 33 TRUCKS AT 38.57-65.1. 30 JAPS OCCUPY DONE HOUSE AT 38.8-62.3. GAS DUMP AT 38.52-64.19.
- 13 Jun. JAPS IN ABTALEL AREA HAVE CONSTRUCTED TRENCHES. 18 TRUCKS AND MANY DRUMS OF GASOLINE, SEEN AT MOTOR POOL WHICH IS NOW LOCATED IN THE WOODED AREA SOUTHWEST OF FOOT OF NUFOL HILL.
- 15 Jun. AT TAMUGAN AND GIMALANG SECTORS THE ENEMY IS BUSY LAYING MINES ALONG ROADS AND TRAILS.

ENEMY TROOP DISPOSITION

MOST IMPORTANT PHASE OF INTELLIGENCE:

No one single phase of intelligence, except documents, was more difficult to obtain and evaluate than enemy troop disposition - important to our own guerrilla troops who for the most part had to avoid open combat with large forces - and important to higher headquarters which must know enemy troop disposition at all times - in every battle zone of operation.

EVALUATION DIFFICULT:

To know of troop movements - whether it be small patrols, or large columns - was not difficult in itself - but to have some fairly accurate ideas as to numbers was something again. The Filipinos were decidedly weak in their reporting of anything pertaining to figures - but by process of evaluation, based on this characteristic, one could not arrive at some fairly decent estimate.

TROOPS SHIFT FREQUENTLY

Japanese troops were constantly shifting - even in the heavily garrisoned Davao area. Conditions on Mindanao were not conducive to easy travel so the spotting and reporting of troop movements was made somewhat easier. Our radio stations were strategically located near the heavily garrisoned enemy locations to facilitate rapid reporting of movements - either overland or by water route. It was particularly important in late 1944 and early 1945 to know the number of troops being shifted to and from Mindanao - either in support of campaigns against the American forces to the north - or the Mindanao as a retreat from such campaigns.

MANY RADIO MESSAGES

Daily throughout the reporting of Mindanao intelligence, troop movements represented a considerable volume of radio traffic. Just a few representative messages are reproduced below - they cover many sections of the island - and are indicative of the wide range of intelligence coverage.

1944:

- 11 Jan. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. 1900 JAPS ARRIVED CAGAYAN FROM ILGILO.
- 11 Feb. 1000 JAPS ARRIVED ZAMBOANGA FROM NORTH.
- 7 Apr. DAVAO. 4 LARGE TRANSPORTS UNLOADED TROOPS AT DAVAO CITY ESTIMATED AT 2000.
- 16 May. SURIGAO. ELEMENTS OF JAP 30TH DIV ARRIVED SURIGAO FROM CEBU.
- 15 Jul. ESTIMATED 2000 JAPS ARRIVED DAVAO FROM PALAU FOR MONTH OF JUNE AND FIRST TWO WEEKS OF JULY.
- 4 Aug. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. TRANSPORTS ARRIVING CAGAYAN BROUGHT 3000 TROOPS. 1000 TROOPS IMMEDIATELY WENT SOUTH THRU THE SAYRE HIGHWAY.

1944:

INDICATIONS SHOW THEY CAME FROM LUZON AND VISAYAS: CONSIST OF AIR CORPS GROUND PERSONNEL AND YOUNG INF RECRUITS.

- 1 Sept. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. FROM 15 to 30 AUGUST ESTIMATED 6000 TROOPS ARRIVED CAGAYAN FROM VISAYAS AND LUZON. THREE TROOPS APPEAR TO BE FROM SWPA BUT HAVE RESTED IN THE NORTH.
- 10 Sept. BUKIDNON. 3000 TROOPS MOVING SOUTH THRU SAYBE HIGHWAY, HIKING AT NIGHT AND RESTING IN FOREST DURING DAY.
- 18 Sept. COTABATO. REPORTS INDICATE THAT APPROX 2000 TROOPS OF THE HARADA BUTAI COMING FROM COTABATO DIRECTION ARE DISTRIBUTED TO VARIOUS SECTORS AS DIGOS, MINTAL, BAYABAS, MALAGOS, AND TUGBOK.
- 19 Sept. SURIGAO. JAP TROOPS APPROX 3000 PASSED THRU AGUSAN FROM SURIGAO. SOME TOOK SHIPS IN NASIPIT FOR CAGAYAN.
- 11 Oct. AGUSAN. ESTIMATED 2000 JAPS HIKED FROM NASIPIT TO TAGOLOAN. UNESTIMATED NR LEFT ON 6 BARGES WITH SUPPLIES.
- 27 Oct. 4 SHIPS WITH ESTIMATED 500 JAPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR LEYTE. ADDITIONAL 600 JAPS BELIEVED FROM BUGOTAGOLOAN AREA LEFT CAGAYAN ON SHIPS FOR SAME DESTINATION.
- 28 Oct. BUKIDNON. CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF TROOPS IN TRUCKS MOVED FROM SOUTH TO NORTH ALONG THE SAYRE HIGHWAY. THEY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SHIFTED TO LEYTE.
- 17 Nov. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. ESTIMATED 2200 JAPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR NORTH BELIEVE LEYTE. ALMOST NIGHTLY DEPARTURE OBSERVED SINCE NIGHT OF 6 NOV. USUALLY ABOUT 500 EACH NIGHT USING LAUNCHES AND BARGES
- 20 Nov. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. 2 SUGAR CHARLIES AND 16 BARGES LOADED WITH TROOPS LEFT CAGAYAN BELIEVE BOUND FOR LEYTE.
- 4 Dec. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. STRENGTH IN CAGAYAN AREA INCREASED AT END OF NOV. TROOPS CAME FROM THE SOUTH. BELIEVE WAITING TRANSPORTATION.
- 14 Dec. BUKIDNON. MORE THAN 1000 JAPS FROM BUKIDNON PASSING BUGASAN ENROUTE TO BUTUAN, COTABATO.
- 19 Dec. ZAMBOANGA. JAPS HAVE MOVED ALMOST ALL TROOPS FROM TETUAN, GUMAGA AND P RESAMAYOR TO PASONANCA.
- 27 DEC. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. GEN MOROZUMI WITH STAFF AND A LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS LEFT CAGAYAN FOR SOUTH.

1945:

- 22 Jan. SURIGAO. APPROX 400 JAPS INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN LEFT MAGPAYANG, SURIGAO FOR BUTUAN. TROOPS ARRIVED BUTUAN ON 22 JANUARY.
- 30 Jan. 200 ENEMY TROOPS SHIFTED SOUTH FROM CAGAYAN AREA AND A SMALL NUMBER ALSO WENT SOUTH FROM MALUKO-DALWANGAN.
- 12 Feb. ESTIMATED 1500 JAPS MOVED FROM LASANG TIBONGCO SECTOR TO P ADADA-DIGOS SECTOR, DAVAO.
- 18 Feb. COTABATO. APPROX 1000 JAPS ARRIVED PARANG FROM COTABATO CITY AREA. THEY ARE BIVOUACKED SOUTH OF WATER TOWER, IN BARRACKS AND SCHOOL BUILDING.
- 21 Apr. COTABATO. OVER 1000 JAPS OF ARMY, NAVY AND ARTILLERY UNITS MOVING NORTH ON DULAWAN-KORONADAL HIGHWAY.
- 20 Mar. COTABATO. OVER 700 JAPS ARRIVED BULUAN 18 MARCH, FROM SOUTH WITH 4 TRUCKS OF AMMO AND GASOLINE.
- 25 Mar. BUKIDNON. TROOPS ALONG SAYRE HIGHWAY ARE MOVING SOUTH. SINCE 15 MAR APPROX 2500 JAPS HAVE GONE SOUTH FROM IMPASUGONG AREA.
- 24 Mar. MISAMIS ORIENTAL. ESTIMATED 400 JAPS WITHOUT ARMS LANDED IN CAGAYAN AREA FROM BARGES. ENEMY TELLS CIVILIANS THEY ARE FROM ILOILO.

JAPANESE DOCUMENTS...HIGH PRIORITY

In a letter to Col FERTIG of 5 May 1944 from Gen WILLOUGHBY, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, the primary intelligence requirements were expressed as follows:

"Location of specific enemy units. We can identify them thru documents - we know their strength and organization. The full name and rank of the commander occasionally furnished the clue to the particular tactical unit. Identification of units from a regiment up to a division is extremely important as that data gives us definite indication of the enemy's combat ability. Enemy documents furnish the clue to the solution of enemy units and their dispositions. Such documents should receive high priority. Diaries, bulletins, orders, etc., of the enemy reveal much more than believed possible."

This was no easy assignment for not only did the Japanese carry away their dead, almost with fanatical persistence, but we had no interpreters and therefore no way of deciding the importance to higher headquarters of documents when captured. In the earlier days, and even up to the landing in Leyte of 20 Oct 1944, transportation facilities between headquarters was most infrequent...so those documents captured, lost their timeliness due to slowness of delivery.

Through many agents, to all outward appearances, loyal to the Japs but secretly working for our cause - it was possible to obtain the names of Commanding Officers, and occasionally learn the identity of units.

Notwithstanding these drawbacks, a certain amount of captured material made its way to higher headquarters, and in a few instances, loyal Chinese friends were able to give some translations which occasionally proved of value.

SOME DOCUMENTS FOUND HIGHLY VALUABLE.

Documents captured from two Japanese aviators in Oct 1944 near Butuan, Agusan, and captured items obtained after the Allied air strike at Surigao in Sept, proved to be of exceptional value...the former contained late cryptographic material especially desirable. The latter contained a lot of data on the 1st Japanese Division which at the time had been unlocated but believed to be in the Philippine Islands. These items were delivered to 6th Army on Nov 1944 when their importance was discovered. In this connection the following quotation from letter received from Sixth Army Japanese Translation Section is quoted:

"Receipt is acknowledged of a number of Japanese diaries, documents, maps, equipment and manuals, as delivered to this section by Capt. H. A. Rosenquist, AC of S, G-2, 10th M.D.

"It is suggested that all such materials be immediately classified as to its source, date obtained, and other information which will be of assistance to this section in its evaluation of such material. All should be separated and labelled accordingly.

"This type of Japanese captured material contributes greatly to the progress of the war effort. Our special appreciation goes to your forces for these excellent contributions. Keep up the good work."

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SOME RADIO MESSAGES SENT HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

1944:

- 6 Nov. 20 JAP MANUALS PAYBOOKS AND PERSONAL LETTERS CAPTURED IN SURIGAO. IMMEDIATE ANALYSIS REVEALED VERY VALUABLE ORDER OF BATTLE AND ORGANIZATION INFORMATION OF THE JAP 1ST DIV.
- 13 Nov. JAP AVIATOR THREW AWAY PACK CONTAINING NAVY CODE BOOK, AVIATION NAVIGATION INSTRUMENT, ENEMY IDENTIFICATION BOOK & AVIATOR'S REPORT. THESE FORWARDED TO SIXTH ARMY.

1944:

- 8 Dec. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEALED THAT ENEMY IN MALABANG HAD A STRENGTH OF 500 WITH 2 MORTARS, 1 HEAVY AND 1 LIGHT MG: THEY LOST 46 KIA BUT THEIR MORALE HIGH AND WILL FIGHT TO THE LAST.
- 18 Dec. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEALED THAT 74TH INF REGT STATIONED AT KIBAWA. IT REVEALED THEY HAD 1800 ARMS & APPROX HALF A MILLION AMMO.

1945:

- 2 Jan. LETTER, WRITTEN BY CO SRD CO, 32ND BN, 54TH INF BRIGADE TO HIS COMMANDING OFFICER, CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA UNITS STATED THAT THEIR UNIT WAS SHORT ON AMMO AND MEDICINE AND REQUESTS FOR EVACUATION.
- 28 Mar DOCUMENT CAPTURED FROM 1 JAP MESSENGER PIGEON IDENTIFIED THE 177TH INF REGT.
- 9 Apr DOCUMENT, 1 CARDBOARD BOX FULL, WILL BE PUT ON LCI FOR FORWARDING TO 8TH ARMY. SOME DOCUMENTS OF OFFICIAL NATURE APPEAR TO BE PAYROLLS. SHOULD PROVE VALUABLE.
- 12 Apr DOCUMENTS, DIARIES AND DOG TAGS PICKED UP BY AMER PT BOATS AT BALINGASAG.
- 15 Apr. VARIOUS JAP TRAINING MATERIALS, PHOTOGRAPHS, REFERENCES, BOOKS AND MAPS FORWARDED TO HIGHER HQ. THESE WERE CAPTURED IN MALABANG.
- 18 Apr. JAPS MAPS OF MATAMPAY AREA (BLUEPRINT) AND NURUPI TOWNSITE (TOPOGRAPHIC) FIELD MEMORANDA, WAR DIARIES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA AND FORWARDED TO HIGHER HED.
- 19 Apr. 11 JAP BOOKLETS, 1 PIECE OF THIN WOOD WITH JAP CHARACTERS AND LOOSE PAPERS CAPTURED BY GUERRILLA TROOPS DURING DIPOLOG OPERATIONS FORWARDED TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

E N E M Y A I R F I E L D S

The Philippines are strategically located to render convenient airstrikes against allied positions in the Pacific area. They also afford protective screening for their own lines of defenses and operation on areas bordering the China Sea.

MINDANAO AIR POWER OF ENEMY MUST BE WATCHED

For offensive reasons as well as purely defensive, it was important to the American forces that close and careful surveillance be given by intelligence agents and this Headquarters to enemy airfields...construction of new fields; improvements of old; locations of revetments, military installations relating to airfield use, and last but equally important a constant report of plane traffic on fields in operation.

AGENTS WORK RIGHT ON FIELDS

The Japanese needed, and needed badly, Filipino laborers, mechanics and others to work on their airfields...many hastily constructed or improved, when they began to realize the fast tempo of the American forces advances, under the shrewd tactics of Gen MAC ARTHUR. It was therefore possible to place many agents on jobs with the Japs. At Licanan Airfield one such agent was a surveyor. He drew all the airfield plans...and always made a copy of them to smuggle out through another agent...perhaps a loyal truck driver. Through this means, the intelligence was getting so fine that we even knew how many truckloads of gravel were needed to fill one crater hole, and how many laborers were needed to complete the job. At Matina Airfield, it took 200 laborers one full day to fill one bomb crater!

The following excerpts from a few radio messages serve to illustrate how GHQ, SWPA...and the American Air Force...was informed on every phase of airfield activity:

1 9 4 4:

- 8 Jul HANGARS AT SASA AND NAVY YARDS CAMOUFLAGED WITH COCONUT AND NIPA. ALL AIRFIELDS PROVIDED WITH AA PROTECTION. GASOLINE STORED AROUND EDGE OF FIELD.
- 18 Jul MALABANG HAS 80 PLANES SHELTERS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF RUNWAYS NEAR SEA EXTENDING NORTH. BUAYAN HAS 10 RUNWAYS, ANOTHER EAST DIRECTION ARE 12 AA GUNS, 37 MM AND 8 INCH CANNON.
- 25 Jul JAP SEAPLANE BASE NOW AT MALALAG IN ADDITION TO PADADA.
- 24 Nov JAP PLANE ASSEMBLY AT BATUTITIK. OVER 90⁺ PLANES ASSEMBLED THERE: HIDDEN AND DISPERSED AS FAR AS 2 KMS FROM FIELD. FIELD LOCATED 2 KMS WEST OF BATUTITIK BARRIO.
- 10 Dec 27 JAP PLANES HIDDEN IN TUNNELS AT MINDANAO FIELD AT ZAMBOANGA. 7 TORPEDO PLANES, ONE FIGHTER, ONE DIVE BOMBER AND 17 TWIN ENGINE BOMBERS.
- 23 Oct FIVE ZEKE FIGHTERS PASSED NIGHT AT LUMBIA MISAMIS ORIENTAL FIELD, WENT SOUTH NEXT DAY CAME FROM NORTH. HABITUAL FOR NIP PLANES TO LAND AT DUSK AT LUMBIA AND TAKE OFF EARLY NEXT MORNING.

1 9 4 5:

- 9 Feb REMAINING 5 PURSUITS AT LUMBIA NOW LOCATED IN COCO GROVES JUST EAST OF TALAKAG-CAGAYAN ROAD AT KM 8. THIS IS ALONG EAST BOUNDARY LUMBIA FIELD.
- 10 Feb NO PLANE ASSEMBLY SHOP AT LICAMAN AIRFIELD. PLANES ARRIVE ALREADY IN FLYING CONDITION. SMALL PORTABLE REPAIR SHOP COMPOSED OF 3 LATHES, 6 FEET, 10 FEET AND 12 FEET. 2 SMALL HAND BLOWERS FOR BLACKSMITHING AND IRON WORK. REPAIR DONE AT HANGAR ON RUNWAY WHERE NEEDED.
- 17 Feb AIRPLANE REPAIR SHOP LOCATED WEST SIDE NR 1 RUNWAY LICAMAN AIRFIELD APPROX 90 METERS FROM SOUTH END RUNWAY CITED. 2ND LIKE SHOP SPOTTED APPROX 100 METERS NORTH OF 1ST CITED.
- 12 Feb FOUR ENEMY PLANES WARMED UP AT LUMBIA TODAY. THEY ARE HIDDEN IN DENSE WOODS 1500 METERS AT 15 DEGREES FROM MUNICIPAL BUILDING LUMBIA.
- 22 Feb BETWEEN LIBBY FIELD AND NATIONAL ROAD ARE 28 PLANE SHELTERS BUILT OF WOOD AND STONE. 28 PLANES COUNTED BY AGENT ON 12 FEB. GAS BURIED AT ALL FOUR CORNERS OR ROAD JUNCTION. GOING FROM LIBBY FIELD AND CROSSING NATIONAL ROAD.
- 2 Mar 27 PLANES AT LICAMAN AIRFIELD DAVAO AND 82 AT MATINA AIRFIELD.
- 31 Mar 6 PLANES HIDDEN AT BALUAN, 100 METERS EAST OF CREEK AND 700 METERS FROM SARANGANI BEACH. BALUAN IS JUST NORTH OF BUAYAN. JAPS ARE VERY CAUTIOUS THIS AREA. FILIPINOS RESTRICTED.

R O A D S P O T T E R S

Only two highways on the island of Mindanao offered suitable road surface for mechanized units - the Sayre and National Highways...and even these were by no means ideal for heavy traffic or bulky vehicles. It was an easy matter then to keep a careful check on enemy vehicle traffic; also troop movement on these two highways.

LOOKOUT AT SUMILAO:

In August 1944 a 24-hour lookout post was established in a strategic position at Sumilao, Bukidnon, which overlooked the Sayre Highway. Traffic to and from Bugo on the Mindanao coast, through Del Monte to points south on Sayre Highway...Malaybalay, Valencia, etc., had to pass this point in the highway.

A radio station was located as near the lookout position as security would permit and radio messages were sent daily...sometimes as "flashes" when the occasion demanded. During the month of Nov 1944 alone a total of 216 Japanese trucks were observed going north; 255 counted going south. A few of the typical daily radio messages are reproduced below:

25 Oct. '44 18 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 12 WENT SOUTH. CARGO UNIDENTIFIED

25 Oct. '44 99 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH LOADED WITH TROOPS. 31 TRUCKS WENT NORTH EMPTY.

6 Dec. '44 17 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH LOADED WITH TROOPS: 60 TRUCKS WENT NORTH LOADED WITH UNKNOWN CARGO.

18 Apr. '45 64 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 49 SOUTH.

28 Apr. '45 ENEMY TRUCK TRAFFIC CONTINUES. FOR PERIOD OF 3 DAYS A TOTAL OF 42 TRUCKS WENT NORTH AND 101 TRUCKS WENT SOUTH. OF THESE 68 MOVED BY DAY AND 75 BY NIGHT. TRUCKS GOING NORTH USUALLY EMPTY WHILE THOSE GOING SOUTH ALL LOADED WITH TROOPS.

LOOKOUT AT BANCUD (15 Kms. South of Malaybalay):

A lookout position in this spot, while covering the same Sayre Highway, gave the opportunity for a double check and an indication of the activity at Malaybalay proper. Apparently many of the trucks reported from Sumilao post never did go farther than Malaybalay for during the same month of November only 127 trucks were reported as going north; 57 as going south, from the Bancud lookout position.

LOOKOUT ON NATIONAL HIGHWAY...DAVAO AREA:

It was much more difficult to maintain lookout positions in the very heavily garrisoned Davao area. However an observer was stationed at Km 20, North of Davao City, along the National Highway. Reports were rendered daily by radio, supplemented by written report covering more details. The following traffic for period of 24 days from 13 Dec 1944 to 5 Jan 1945 as follows:

GOING NORTH:

OFFICERS - 65; TROOPS - 773; JAP CIVILIAN LABORERS - 365; FILIPINO LABORERS - 56; TRUCKLOAD OF PULVERIZED ROCK - 58; TRUCKLOAD OF BOARD - 71; TRUCKLOAD OF FOODSTUFF - 65; TRUCKLOAD OF GALVANIZED IRON - 7; TRUCKLOAD OF FUEL - 4; TRUCKLOAD OF SCRAP IRON - 1; TRUCKLOAD OF FURNITURE - 2; TRUCKLOAD OF UNIDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT - 7; AND A TOTAL OF 415 CARGO TRUCKS AND 49 CARS.

GOING SOUTH:

OFFICERS - 65; TROOPS - 720; JAPANESE CIVILIAN LABORERS 239; FILIPINO LABORERS - 104; TRUCKLOAD OF PULVERIZED ROCK - 46; TRUCKLOAD OF BOARD - 23; TRUCKLOAD OF GALVANIZED IRON - 4; TRUCKLOAD OF FOODSTUFF - 20; TRUCKLOAD OF SCRAP IRON - 2; TRUCKLOAD OF OIL DRUMS - 5; TRUCKLOAD OF FURNITURE - 2; 25 JAP CIVILIANS AND A TOTAL OF 375 CARGO TRUCKS AND 41 CARS.

ENEMY PLANE TRAFFIC

In July 1944...about a month prior to the first bombing in the Philippines by American planes...instructions were received emphasizing the need for "flash" reporting of enemy air traffic. An established procedure or reporting was given...and this disseminated by radio to all divisions...all stations. This included not only Mindanao but the Visayas as well, in accordance with orders from GHO, SWPA.

FLASHES IN AUSTRALIA...5 MINUTES AFTER PLANE SIGHTINGS

With the net control station of the Tenth Military District on a "24-hour stand-by" and with a separate circuit direct to American Air Force Headquarters, enemy plane traffic could be flashed from original spotter, through intermediate net, then from net control to the Air Force...in an average of 5 minutes. Messages were in code, but in clear text...short but complete...and followed the following procedure:

"20 JULY 44 - YOU WILL REPORT TO FTAW IMMEDIATELY UPON DETECTION INFO CONCERNING AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS IN THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE: AIRCRAFT WARNING INDICATOR, YOUR CALL SIGN, MESSAGE LETTER TIME OF OBSERVATION, HOW DETECTED, DISTANCE, DIRECTION, COURSE, NUMBER OF PLANES, TYPE, IDENTITY, ALTITUDE. AIRCRAFT WARNING INDICATOR IS AW REPEATED TWICE TO INDICATE FLIGHT REPORT FOLLOWS. YOUR NORMAL STATION CALL SIGN. MESSAGE LETTERS START WITH A FOR FIRST REPORT THEN B AND SO THRU ALPHABET TO Z WHEN A IS USED AGAIN.. TIME IS REPORT BY 2 NUMBERS INDICATING MINUTES PAST HOUR WHEN FLIGHT DETECTED, THE HOUR IS SHOWN BY THE DATE TIME GROUP OF THE MESSAGE HEADING CONSEQUENTLY HOUR USED IN HEADING MUST BE SAME HOUR AS THAT WHICH FLIGHT DETECTED. METHOD OF DETECTION INDICATED BY IV FOR FLIGHT SEEN AND IA FOR FLIGHT HEARD. DISTANCE IN MILES SHOWN BY 2 NUMBERS 00 BEING OVERHEAD AND 99 UNKNOWN. DIRECTION FROM YOUR STATION INDICATED BY SINGLE NUMBER, 1 FOR NORTHEAST, 2 FOR WEST, 7 FOR NORTHWEST, 4 FOR SOUTH, 5 FOR SOUTHWEST, 6 FOR WEST, 3 FOR SOUTHEAST AND 8 FOR NORTH. ZERO MEANS FLIGHT OVERHEAD AND 99 INDICATING TAKING OFF OR LANDING, DISTINCTION BEING MADE BY PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF SUBSEQUENT NORMAL REPORTS. COURSE IS INDICATED BY SINGLE NUMBER AS FOR DIRECTION, ZERO INDICATING FLIGHT CIRCLING. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT EXPRESSED BY 2 NUMBERS, ZERO ZERO INDICATES NUMBER UNKNOWN. TYPE AIRCRAFT EXPRESSED BY SINGLE LETTER. P FOR FIGHTER, B IS BOMBER, C FOR TRANSPORT AND X MEANS TYPE UNKNOWN. F FOR FRIENDLY, H FOR HOSTILE AND X FOR UNKNOWN. ALTITUDE IN THOUSANDS OF FEET EXPRESSED BY 2 NUMBERS, 00 MEANS HEIGHT UNKNOWN. FOLLOWING IS A SAMPLE REPORT:

'AWAW WOO ABLE ZERO THREE ITEM VICTOR ZERO
SEVEN THREE FOUR ZERO NINE BAKER HOW ZERO FIVE'

AWAW IS WARNING INDICATOR, WOO IS STATION CALL SIGN, ABLE IS MESSAGE LETTER, ZERO THREE SHOWS THAT FLIGHT DETECTED 3 MINUTES PAST HOUR USED IN MESSAGE HEADING, ITEM VICTOR MEANS FLIGHT SEEN, ZERO SEVEN THAT FLIGHT 7 MILES FROM YOUR STATION, FOUR INDICATES PLANES PROCEEDING SOUTH, ZERO NINE SHOWS PLANES IN FLIGHT, BAKER MEANS TWO ENGINEER BOMBER, FIVE INDICATES 5000 FOOT ALTITUDE."

A FEW OF THE RADIO FLASHES

Translated from code to understandable English, there follows a few of the many hundreds of plane flashes sent thru the 10th MD radio net.

1943:

19 Dec. 5 ENEMY BOMBERS ESCORTED BY 19 PURSUITS PASSED OVER MISAMIS ORIENTAL. IN THE AFTERNOON 17 FIGHTERS PASSED SAME AREA FLYING FROM NORTH TO SOUTH.

1944:

20 Jan. 50 PURSUITS PASSED OVER SULU SEA GOING NORTH.

23 Mar. FLIGHTS OF 6 TO 9 BOMBERS FROM PATAG AIRFIELD PATROLLING MACAJALAR BAY FOR LAST 3 DAYS.

1944:

- 1 Apr. FLIGHT OF 11 HEAVY BOMBERS, ALL TWIN ENGINED, AND 4 SINGLE MOTORED FIGHTERS, PASSED MALITA HEADING TOWARDS DAVAO.
- 6 Apr. ONE JAP BOMBER WAS OBSERVED FLYING AT ABOUT 200 FT GOING NORTH-EAST OVER CABADBARAN AT 8:00 AM SIGHTED FROM MAGALLANES, AGUSAN.
- 18 Apr. 11 RED PURSUIT PLANES PASSED CAGAYAN. INSIGNIA: WHITE SKULL AND CROSS BONES BOTH SIDES OF FUSELAGE AND ON WINGS. APPEARED TO BE NARAJIMA PURSUIT
- ONE BOMBER ESCORTED BY 4 FIGHTERS PASSED OVER PANGUIL BAY AT 9:30 AM.
- 11 Jun. 9 PATROL PLANES, SINGLE ENGINED, APPARENTLY WITH FIXED LANDING GEAR OBSERVED PASSING OVER TALAKAG, BUDIDNON, GOING NORTH.
- 14 Jun. ONE BOMBER ESCORTED BY 6 PURSUITS PASSED EAST TO SOUTHEAST OVER OPOL, MISAMIS ORIENTAL.
- 22 Jun. 16 PLANES, BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS, PASSED NORTHWEST TO SOUTHEAST OVER CAMIGUIN ISLAND.
- 27 Jun. 8 PLANES, ZEKE TYPE, PASSED OVER LAS NIEVES, AGUSAN.
- 2 Jul. LARGE NUMBERS OF JAP PLANES, BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS PASSED OVER BALINGASAG, ORIENTAL MISAMIS.
- 14 Jul. 1000 - 1 MEDIUM BOMBER FLEW OVER OPOL TO NORTHWEST. 1430 - 1 MEDIUM BOMBER FLEW OVER OPOL TO WEST.
- 16 Jul. 1230 - 5 FIGHTERS PASSED OVER CAGAYAN, MISAMIS ORIENTAL TO NORTH.
- 17 Jul. 1100 - 3 MEDIUM BOMBERS ESCORTED BY 7 PURSUITS ARRIVED DAVAO FROM NORTH.

B O M B I N G R E S U L T S R E P O R T E D

FIRST BOMBING - 6 AUGUST 1944: The very first bombing of a target in the Philippines by American planes, occurred 6 August 1944, when two bombs were dropped in Davao area - one near Santa Ana wharf, killing three Jap navy men; the other in the water nearby. This however, was no criterion of the bombing and strafing effectiveness to follow - and the months of September and October 1944 in particular, saw many American planes in action on Mindanao, insistently pinpointing enemy military installations, ships, airfield, planes, troops and many other targets which this Headquarters had reported by radio to G-2, CHW, SWPA, over a period of months.

The need for factual reporting on bombing and strafing results was equally as important as sending data on new targets. All intelligence agents were instructed to give high priority to this new phase of intelligence reporting. Many hundreds of radio messages on bombing results were received from the many strategically located radio stations on Mindanao. A few, taken at random from our Intelligence Summaries are quoted below; along with an interesting report of the bombing effectiveness in the Hinatuan Bay, East Coast area on 9 Sept 1944.

1944:

- 10 Sept: AMERICAN BOMBERS BOMBED AND STRAFED LANDING FIELD AND TRUCKS ALONG NATL HIWAY SURIGAO X RESULTS DASH 49 VESSELS SUNK, INCLUDING 6 TRANSPORTS, 30 MOTORBOATS, 1 LANDING BARGE, 1 QUEEN BOAT X TRANSPORTS LOADED WITH SOLDIERS, KNOWN TO BE ABOUT 1500 WITH BUT FEW SURVIVORS WHO WERE KILLED IN WATER BY LOYAL CIVILIANS IN BAROTOS HITTING THEM OVERHEAD WITH PADDLES X 50 MULES DESTROYED AND 12 SALVAGED X 19 TRUCKS DISABLED ON HIWAY X BOXES OF AMMO, FOOD-STUFF, GASOLINE DRUMS AND SOME FIELD GUNS DESTROYED AT WHARF.
- 14-15 Sept. PILOTS QUARTERS, MOTOR POOL, TWO LARGE WAREHOUSES, TWO SHIPS FUEL TANKS UNDER ACACIA TREES, ALL ZAMBOANGA, DESTROYED BY AMERICAN PLANE BOMBINGS.

1944:

- 24 Sep. SURVIVORS OF MUNKEIN MARU, NOW CONFINED, STATE THAT THEIR SHIP WAS DAMAGED BY PLANES AND SUNK BY SUBMARINES ON 9 SEPT. THEY CLAIMED 400 WERE ON SHIP WITH BUT FEW SURVIVORS.
- 27 Sep. 3 TRANSPORTS SUNK BETWEEN BONGO ISLAND AND COTABATO CITY. 600 NIPS DEAD AND 200 NIPS SURVIVED X 22 CAPTURED BY OUR TROOPS AT ONE SPOT X.
- 18 Oct. 11 PLANES DESTROYED SUPPLY DUMPS AT TAMONTAKA, COTABATO AND 1 LAUNCH AND 2 BARGES NEARBY. 2 LAUNCHES BURNED AND MANY JAPS.
- 2 Dec. 16 TRUCKS AND 2 BOMBERS BURNED, 50 NABY TROOPS KILLED AT MATINA AIRFIELD.

1945:

- 13 Apr. TWO SUBMARINES SUNK AT PANAKAN WHARF THESE WERE TIED UP AT WHARF EFFECTIVELY CAMOUFLAGED, REPORTED BY OUR AGENTS AND AIR PHOTOS SUBSEQUENTLY PINPOINTED X PERISCOPE WAS CAMOUFLAGED AND HIDDEN BETWEEN GASOLINE DRUMS.
- 14 May 6 JAP TORPEDO BOATS WERE SUNK OFF PISO PT BEACH THIS SAME AREA STRAFED RESULTING IN DESTRUCTION OF 2 FUEL DUMPS AND 2 AMMO DUMPS. THESE TARGETS WERE CONSTANTLY REPORTED FROM DEC '44 UNTIL DATE THEY WERE DESTROYED.

N O T E DURING THE MONTHS OF AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 1944, MILITARY TARGETS IN DAVAO CITY ONLY WERE BOMBED YET DUE TO ACCURATE REPORTING OF TARGETS OVER ONE HALF OF CITY IS STILL INTACT, YET ALL MILITARY TARGETS WERE DESTROYED.

"JAP CONVOY ANNIHILATED IN HINATUAN BAY, SURIGAO"

"At about 5 o'clock in the morning of 9 Sept 1944, planes were heard from the town on Bislig. From the eyewitness view point, three groups of planes approx fifty in number were seen over the bay. A few minutes later, explosions were heard and the planes were seen diving by twos. Smoke then rose up from behind the point of Maribojoe. The whole bay of Bislig can be viewed clearly on top of a mountain in sitio Papay. The eyewitness, together with other people went to this favorable position and from there saw big ships, steel vessels with two funnels, some in flames and some covered with thick and black smoke. There were twenty-six of these vessels including two that looked like destroyers and approx fifty small vessels. The planes continued bombing and strafing for three or four hours which returned the fire. One plane was shot down. During this attack, the large steel ships remained out in deep water and the smaller vessels which were 200 to 250 ton wooden ships, powered with diesel engines, scattered for shelter behind Macaburum and Mawis Islands. At about 9:00 or 10:00 AM, six US warships were noticed on the horizon, heading towards Hinatuan Bay. A few minutes later, the ships moved to the warships - two big ones and four smaller ones. When they were opposite Maribojoe Pt, they opened fire on the Japs vessels, some of which were already burning. All were hit, and subsequently sunk. The warships withdrew and headed south. Only fifty survivors managed to reach Mawis Island. They were picked up by a Jap launch. Not a single Jap ship escaped the bombing and shelling."

R O A D S A N D T R A I L S

JAPS ATTEMPT TO KEEP NEW TRAILS SECRET:

Among the varied activities undertaken by the enemy in an all-out effort to strengthen their defenses, especially in the Davao area, was the construction of roads and trails to the interior and in the interior sectors.

These were calculated to hasten the movement of troops and equipment in the event of American Landings and subsequent withdrawals. These new trails and roads were so linked together in the Davao area, that they provided an orderly withdrawal of troops and equipment to alternate interior defense positions.

Construction of these trails were naturally meant to be secret...but to construct a road, build a bridge, or erect a building in the Philippines without the knowledge of the native people would be something next to impossible. Trails were made rather narrow, and advantage taken of overhead foliage, to prevent spotting by reconnaissance planes. However, in spite of all precautions, there was not a new Japanese trail that was not subsequently reported by loyal civilians and our agents.

MAPS VALUABLE TO AMERICAN GROUND FORCES:

Very few accurate maps were available for use by American tactical forces and none of them indicated the trails and roads built since the days of Pearl Harbor. Consequently guerilla maps furnished by the Intelligence Section were of great value...and actually reproduced for distribution to all units concerned. Such a map is the one of the "DAVAO INTERIOR SECTOR" included with this report. This shows a maze of roads and trails non-existent on any map in the hands of the American forces. Neither did reconnaissance photos bring out all these trails...but this map obviously became important in the Davao...Kibawe-Talomo Trail encounters.

In other sectors on Mindanao, the enemy attempted to construct similar trails of withdrawal and secondary positions. The Malungon Trail, connecting Sarangani Bay area with that of Padada or southern Davao is a good example. However, this trail was never used effectively, due to the enemy being cut off from Digos due to rapid advance of American forces.

Following are a few radio messages released to higher Headquarters concerning new trails, roads and important changes:

1944 4:

- 26 Oct. FROM LIBONA, BUKIDNON, NIPS HAVE BACK TRAILS TO SOUTH.
- 31 Oct. ROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION NORTHWESTERN DAVAO AREA PASSES THRU GUMALANG, UPPER BIAO, MONGON KULAPU AND UPIAN TO BALATUKAN WHERE IT CONNECTS WITH THE PROVINCIAL ROAD THAT WAS CONSTRUCTED BEFORE THE WAR. PACK ANIMALS ARE USED FOR CARRYING EQUIPMENT FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION PURPOSES.
- Oct. NIPS IN CAGAYAN IMPROVING BACK TRAILS THRU LIBONA, MAMPAYAG, DALWANGAN, AS POSSIBLE MEANS OF RETREAT.
- Oct. NIPS HAVE ESTABLISHED ESCAPE ROUTE THRU PASONANGA RIVER TOWARDS WEST COAST. THEY ARE ALSO MOVING SUPPLIES TO CAPISAN.

1945:

- 10 Feb. ALL BRIDGES BETWEEN SANTIAGO AND MAGPAYANG BEING REBUILT.
- 18 Feb. ENEMY FINISHED ROAD CONNECTING SASA AIRFIELD WITH KM 8 CABANTIAN BUHANGIN ROAD
- 26 Feb. NEW ROUTES OF WITHDRAWAL ENEMY TROOPS SOUTH DAVAO AREA INFORMED OF WIDENED TRAILS ABOUT 6 METERS WIDE, 1 FROM MATINA SECTOR (KM 2.6) GOING NORTH TO CATALUNAN GRANDE THEN TO MINTAL COMPLETED ABOUT 31 JANUARY. 2ND FROM SIBULAN (KM 30 SOUTH HIGHWAY) PASSING EAST OF INAWAYAN, EAST OF CATIGAN DIRECT TO BAYABAS THEN TO MANUEL PLANTATION (ABOUT 4 KMS WEST OF NAMING).
- 28 Mar. BRIDGES FROM KM 64 to 66 (AGUSAN-SURIGAO BOUNDARY) UNDER REPAIR.
- 16 Jun. A NEW 17 KM TRAIL HAS BEEN COMPLETED FROM TULI TO SALAYSAY ALONG NORTH SIDE OF KIBAWA-CALINAN ROAD AND ANOTHER 11 KM TRAIL FROM JUNCTION OF TULI AND SUWAWAN RIVER TO UPIAN MOUNTAINS.

COMPOSITE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

When the Americans landed at Leyte, 20 Oct 1944, they considered sending a force to Surigao, to protect that flank. However, the 6th Army called for a representative of the Tenth Military District, to present facts on that forward and the rear areas as well.

Maj HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST, AC of S, G-2, who had just spent some time in the Surigao area obtaining marine and land mine information before the landing of American forces in Leyte, was dispatched by Col FERTIG to Leyte by PT boat.

A complete report was prepared and submitted to G-2, 6th Army. It is reproduced herewith for it graphically illustrates the intelligence reporting all over the island which made this report possible. On the basis of this report, and the ability of FERTIG's guerrillas to hold the enemy in check, it was decided not to make a landing in Surigao.

UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES Headquarters Tenth Military District

In the Field
7 November 1944

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

a. MINDANAO as a Whole: The Island of MINDANAO is being divided into a forward and a rear area for purposes of discussion, and forward area comprising all territory N of a line running E and W from LIANGA (SURIGAO) to, but not including, CAGAYAN (MISAMIS ORIENTAL), and the rear area comprising the remainder of the Island. As of 30 Oct 1944 enemy strength in MINDANAO was estimated as follows:

AGUSAN.....	350
BUKIDNON.....	4,400
COTABATO.....	16,000
DAVAO.....	25,000
LANAO.....	500
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL.....	100
MISAMIS ORIENTAL.....	3,500
SURIGAO.....	1,800
ZAMBOANGA.....	5,700
Total	<u>57,350</u>

b. Enemy Activity in Forward Area: Enemy garrisons as of 30 Oct. were located as follows:

AGUSAN	150
NASIPIT.....	150
BUTUAN.....	60
MISAMIS ORIENTAL	
TALISAYAN.....	100
ANAKAN.....	50
SURIGAO	
SURIGAO TOWN.....	200
MABUHAY.....	500
ANAMAR.....	250
BADAS.....	100
MADRID.....	400
TANDAG.....	100
Total	<u>1,910</u>

Garrisons at NASIPIT, BUTUAN, TANDAG and MADRID are at present confined or being attacked by guerrilla troops of the 119th and 114th Regt, of the 110th Division. The enemy garrison at ANAKAN was reported as having moved to CAGAYAN by barge. At present those garrisons are on the defensive as a result of the orders from the Headquarters of the Tenth Military District to confine and eliminate them. These guerrillas can contain the enemy by land, but the sea approaches remain open to him; by the use of barges and motor launches the Japs can, therefore, freely move their troops. The enemy garrisons are limited in their function to very short patrols. There are four airfields in the forward area: At SURIGAO, BADAS, MALPOK (near BUTUAN)

and ANAHAN (near GINGCOG). These are fighter strips, but they are not in use.

c. Enemy Activity in Rear Area: Since the first of September the Japs have been concentrating on a strong defense of the BUKIDNON VALLEY area, including the SAYRE HIGHWAY leading to DAVAO, COTABATO and CAGAYAN seaports. Indications were that the Japs moved many troops S (7,000 from SURIGAO during the months of August and September) to establish a highly mobile island reserve straddling the N, S and W approaches to the above named ports. Enemy troops are therefore in a position rapidly to reinforce strategic points as these are threatened except in AGUSAN and SURIGAO. The most recent troop movement was that to the city of KABAGAN (COTABATO) of approximately 8,000 troops. This movement may account for the sudden drop of 8,000 troops in the strength estimates for BUKIDNON. Besides the movement of 120 truck loads of troops to the N along the SAYRE HIGHWAY, the enemy continues to move troops to the S. According to a PW from the 41st Regt, 30th Div, captured at CAGAYAN (LEYTE) 31 October, the 41st Regt arrived at CAGAYAN 24 October from the S and left CAGAYAN on three unidentified destroyers 26 October, arriving at ORMOC (LEYTE) on 27 October. In DAVAO PROVINCE the tendency has been to bivouac away from the city, from military installations and other bombing targets; such troops are concentrated in areas to the W of DAVAO CITY near MT APO. No explanation can now be given for the increase in troop strength (an increase of 3,600 during the month of October) in ZAMBOANGA, all concentrated in the vicinity of ZAMBOANGA CITY. Guerrillas occupy or control over three-fourths of this province.

d. Installations, Fortifications, Supplies:

(1) Roads and Trails: When still in control of the AGUSAN and SURIGAO areas, the enemy improved the MAYGATASAN TRAIL, thus providing an outlet from BUTUAN via the AGUSAN RIVER to LIANGA, and at the same time providing an outlet from DAVAO by means of the National Highway via the AGUSAN RIVER to the MAYGATASAN TRAIL.

(2) Bridges: In the forward area the greater number of the bridges, most covering culverts and small rivers, are either usable or can be replaced. The enemy recently destroyed the bridge between SURIGAO and IPIL (SURIGAO). The large bridge at MAGPAYOS, south of BADAS (AGUSAN), was destroyed by the flood of 20 October. The bridge at SANTIAGO (AGUSAN) is out, one bridge between MADRID and LANUZA. These bridges can be repaired where necessary through the cooperation of the local inhabitants. The small bridges would require little time, the larger much more, for repair, depending upon the available materials.

(3) Fortifications: The usual practice of the enemy is to install barbed wire entanglements, foxholes, and trenches around the garrisoned area. Each garrison has one or more .30 cal MGs covering the main approaches. The recent reports state that there are barbed wire entanglements along the shore from the wharf to the river's mouth in SURIGAO CITY. There was also an unconfirmed report that land mines are planted on the beach at the mouth of the SURIGAO RIVER. Defensive areas have recently been strengthened from Km 1 to Km 3 (immediately S of the city proper).

(4) Artillery: It has been reported that two 75-mm guns are located within SURIGAO CITY and three at PT BILAA. However, the Japs have recently evacuated PT BILAA and the whereabouts of these guns is not known. A report stated that they had been removed to MADRID but it was not verified. The Japs make constant and effective use of knee mortars and 81-mm mortars in keeping guerrilla units at a distance. There are no known AA guns in the forward area.

(5) Armor: Reports indicate that three tanks are located at BUGO near CAGAYAN.

(6) Underwater Obstacles: A marine mine field was reported extending from PT BILAA in a northerly direction to a point 100 yards off shore. Boats beyond this point proceeded without escort. Local inhabitants found some floating mines on the E coast shores of SURIGAO. These mines were 1 yard in diameter, with eight acid detonators, were painted black, loaded with citric acid powder, and laid at a depth of from two to three years. Some mines had red flags to indicate position; they are reported by these inhabitants to break away from their moorings easily.

(7) Supplies: In SURIGAO PROVINCE only 80% of the Japs are armed, the rest having lost their equipment during large scale bombings of 9 September or being survivors from ships sunk during recent naval battles. In this province the enemy is better equipped with food supplies than in AGUSAN where it had become necessary to rely on local sources, especially on fish from native fishermen.

2. GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES: During the month of October, following approval of GHQ, SWPA, aggressive action was taken to contain and where possible, to eliminate enemy garrisons. In the forward area at present, as suggested above, the garrisons at NASIPIT and BUTUAN AGUSAN) are, except for the sea approaches, definitely surrounded. In SURIGAO PROVINCE enemy is being engaged at MADRID, but reinforcements have been received here, and consequently guerrilla activity is limited to harassing attacks only. No large scale offensive action has been taken against the Headquarters garrison at MABUHAY, principally because of a lack of sufficient mortars and mortar ammunition.

During the first nine months of 1944, a total of 3,916 Japanese were killed by guerrilla forces of the Tenth Military District.

From the time of the original organization of guerrilla units in the Tenth Military District, special emphasis has been placed on the following activities:

a. The establishment of coast watcher systems.

b. The building of intelligence nets for the obtaining of data including facts about troop concentrations and movements, air and water-borne traffic, and airfield installations. Radio communications were installed for the dissemination of such intelligence whenever the equipment was available. Moreover, the guerrilla units established food projects, and so contributed substantially to the solution of the food problem in a number of areas.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES: The enemy is capable of:

a. Maintaining a static defense of MINDANAO: Although there does not seem to be any logical reason for the Japs to maintain a static defense of MINDANAO, there have been some indications of recent enemy movement to the S. This would seem to indicate that the Japs intend to continue their policy of keeping a mobile inland reserve for the defense of the Island.

b. Defending the N and the NE coast: There have been no indications that the enemy intends to defend the N and the NE coast. Troops have been moved N to CAGAYAN but none has been moved to the E from there. Some enemy troops have been landed along the E coast of SURIGAO PROVINCE at TANDAG and MADRID but these were small in number and some may have been survivors from ships that were sunk.

c. Evacuating troops to BORNEO via ZAMBOANGA: It is possible for the enemy to evacuate his troops to BORNEO via COTABATO and ZAMBOANGA. The constantly fluctuating enemy strength in ZAMBOANGA would suggest that this province has been used as a staging area for troops. Then enemy has been known to stage troops through ZAMBOANGA to COTABATO, and thence to BUKIDNON or DAVAO. Obviously this route could also be used in reverse. During the months of September and October enemy strength in COTABATO PROVINCE increased by approximately 10,000 troops. These probably were scheduled to reinforce the mobile inland reserve in BUKIDNON. It may be that since the American landing on LEYTE they are being held until the enemy can decide which course of action to follow.

d. Moving troops N to CAGAYAN and attempting to reinforce LEYTE: The enemy has already moved the bulk of the 41st Regt. 30th Div, N to CAGAYAN and by boat to LEYTE. During the last week in October a total of 120 truck loads of Japs were seen moving N to CAGAYAN; these probably were the 41st Regt and an additional 600 troops that left CAGAYAN by boat for an unknown destination (probably LEYTE). However, there have been no further indications of any attempts to strengthen CAGAYAN or to send troops there from the S.

e. The evacuation of troops by the enemy from CAGAYAN to the WESTERN VISAYAS remains a capability of the enemy, but no reports have been received that would indicate such a maneuver.

/s/ Harold A. Rosenquist
/t/ HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST,
Captain, FA.,
AC of S, G-2

CHAPTER VIII

Operations

MINDANAO GUERRILLAS

From the very first sporadic resistance movement against the enemy in early September 1942 until 5 July 1945 - when MINDANAO was officially declared liberated - guerrilla troops participated in many hundreds of operations against the enemy. Some were purely defensive, others definitely offensive. Records actually indicate a total of 2894 encounters for the period, but this figure includes minor clashes of patrols, which by far represent the majority of operations.

MOST IMPORTANT OPERATIONS: Twenty-eight of the more important operations are recorded in detail in this history. As indicated on the map they cover the entire island and are indicative of the combined resistance movement everywhere. No one sector, no one division, can lay claim to being the best. To be sure each had its "best" operation, according to their own analysis of results accomplished.

TACTICS DIFFERENT - PROBLEMS SIMILAR: While the tactical operations of each division varied according to Commanding Officers and terrain, several factors definitely affected all guerrilla forces wherever located:

- 1) Lack of Ammunition and Weapons: Especially during operation up to the landing of American Forces on LEYTE on 20 Oct 1944, very few units were adequately equipped with mortars, machine guns and automatic rifles and hand grenades, to conduct any large scale operations against the Japs. Theirs was truly, "guerrilla" fighting, the "hit and run", the "ambush" tactics, with but very few operations of out and out, open combat. Operation reports constantly refer to withdrawals due to ammunition running low or out completely; even when some situations were entirely favorable to the guerrillas. Those submarines which did arrive with vital supplies, could hold only so much tonnage which must include radio equipment, medicines and other essentials as well as weapons and ammunition, both bulky and heavy. And dispersed among 33,000 troops, with preference to the men on the front lines, the allotment of weapons and ammunition to each unit was never adequate for anything more than sporadic fighting. However the units recognized difficulties in getting supplies into enemy-occupied territory and made no complaint, simply recorded the shortages in their operation reports with the resulting effects.
- 2) Lack of Clothing: It is a well known axiom that "an Army travels on its stomach" and while food was always an immediate problem to be taken care of in the best way possible as the local situation permitted; the troops definitely lacked clothing and no way of solving the shortage. Very very few had more than one suit, and that mostly tattered after months of jungle and river travel, without benefit of change. In the MALABANG operation alone, as late as March 1945, not more than twenty-five percent of the troops in operation had a complete uniform - yet this operation continued for two months, mostly through a rainy season. Again the troops did not complain as a whole, but this problem must necessarily reflect on the fighting initiative of the men.
- 3) Lack of Medicine: Malaria was the predominant sickness of the troops, with an average of ten to twenty percent on the sick list continually. This problem was met to a large extent in 1944 when many thousands of Atabrine tablets arrived by submarine and were distributed to units as fast as travel conditions would permit. Next to malaria, tropical ulcers were needful of attention. Malnutrition took some toll especially when food became scarce in certain areas where Japs had control of all the food sources.

ENEMY CASUALTIES

In spite of the obstacles mentioned above, and following the guerrilla style of hit and run warfare as directed by Gen MAC ARTHUR, the MINDANAO guerrillas were able to inflict a preponderance of enemy casualties as compared to those suffered on the guerrilla side. Complete records for the entire guerrilla resistance period are not available, and in arriving at casualty reports, Commanding Officers were requested to have verifications of enemy dead and wounded before submitting such reports. This was followed with some degree of consistency.

8316 JAPS KILLED:

From 1 Jan 1944, (when casualties were first catalogued according to some sound basis) to 17 Apr 1945, (when American Forces landed at Parang); guerrilla troops of the 10th Military District killed a recorded enemy personnel amounting to 7655. And from 17 Apr to 5 Jul 1945, (when Mindanao was officially declared liberated) and in conjunction with operations of American Forces, Guerrilla troops accounted for 661 Japs, making a total of 8316 for the entire period.

1.

THE ATTACK ON MISAMIS

30 OCTOBER 1944

Misamis was considered the most strongly fortified garrison of the enemy in the province of Misamis Occidental. Since their wide-scale invasion on Northern Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga on 26 June 1943, they had entrenched themselves and found security in a four hundred year old moss covered Spanish fort situated on a promontory by the sea, appearing like an impregnable landmark that guards the gateway of the town from the Pangul Bay. Historically known as the "COTTA" this fort is about five meters thick and five meters high of solid brick and encloses a ground area of one hundred meters square. Records of old say that the Spanish conquerors constructed this stronghold with the use of slave labor, and when finished served as an effective structure of resistance against frequent and daring Moro attacks and depredations.

For two and a half years, the Japanese invaders held this fort until on 10 Dec 1944 they were attacked by seven US planes in coordination with guerrilla ground troops.

43 DAY SIEGE

Before the arrival of the planes, the seige on Misamis by the guerrilla forces started on 30 Oct 1944 and continued for a period of forty-three days. The entire command of the 106th Inf Regt participated except the 1st Battalion. The following officers coordinated in their respective assignments, namely: Maj MARCELO BONILLA, CO, 106th Inf Regt, Capt DONALD WILLS, personal representative of the CO, "A" Corps, Lt T. SINCLAIR, USNR, Capt S. JULIGANGA, Acting CO, 2nd Bn, 106th Inf, and 1st Lt PEDRO YLAGAN, CO, 3rd Bn, 106th Inf.

The strength of the enemy which garrisoned Misamis town proper on the initial day of the attack was estimated to be ninety Japs, all a part of the Mori Butai and Takayama Chutai, and armed with two stock mortars, two .30 caliber machine guns, grenades, automatic rifles, and rifles.

On 30 October, the following guerrilla units were disposed according to plans before the attack, as follows: The Combat Co of the Hq Bn on the West; four companies of the 2nd Battalion at the Northwest; and three companies of the 3rd Battalion at the Southwest, in such a manner that the entire town block was covered. At the East direction is the sea.

Initial contact with the enemy was made at exactly 5:30 AM with the use of two new US mortars emplaced at Bucagan Hill which had been easily captured by the guerrilla that morning. The attacking force moved slowly forward towards Misamis and by nightfall dug in rather than run unnecessary risk of advancing through open terrain.

PLATOONS WELL PLACED

The next day 30 October, the slow moving but well-planned advance resumed. "F" Co made initial contact with Jap outpost No. 2 stationed at the Misamis Institute Building; "E" Co reached a group of banana plants just two hundred yards from Jap outpost No. 1, with its first platoon some five hundred yards Northeast of Jap outpost No. 1, and the second platoon occupying both sides of the Clarin-Misamis road with Jap outpost No. 1 only a few yards away, and the third platoon about seven hundred yards away from Jap-held Misamis Institute. The soldiers of "H" Co, 2nd Bn Reserve were deployed at the swamp area North of the "cotta". At 3:30 PM, "I" Co, of the 3rd Bn, watching the Southwestern sector, assaulted the enemy guarding Bucagan Hill driving them to town. "L" Co reached Jap outpost No. 4 near a chapel by the road to

Tangub town. "K" Co occupied a line on the left of "L" Co and was only a few yards away from the Jap-held Misamis Institute Building.

The guerrilla troops crept slowly through the marshes for it faced direct fire that varied from moderate to intense, as well as fire from enemy snipers.

At dawn of 1 November, the attack raged in earnest. The Combat Co and "G" Co stormed the Misamis Institute Building; "K" and "L" Cos moved in towards Jap outpost No. 4. The Combat outfit of the 3rd Bn and "L" Co dislodged Jap outpost No. 5, while Jap outpost No. 3 was silenced. Along the road to Clarin, Jap outpost No. 1 was set on fire by men of "E" and "F" Cos. The guerrillas in perfect order pressed the retreating enemy taking quantities of valuable supplies left behind. The attacking force advanced to the premises of the convent, right inside the town, with the "Cotta" only about half a kilometer away.

At 11:00 AM, an officers' conference was hurriedly called by Maj BONILLA who was authorized to take the necessary measures in demanding surrender of the enemy who by that time were all inside the "Cotta".

OFFER SURRENDER TERMS TO JAPS

Terms of surrender were sent to the Japanese Commander but were denied. So, the besiegers built up a line two hundred meters from the "Cotta" in the form of an arc extending from the concrete wharf to Catadman beach, thus making the Japs inside virtual prisoners. During lulls, the device of scaling the slippery walls of the "Cotta" with bamboo ladders was tried but was finally given up as futile. Then on 10 Dec 1944, seven US Lightning planes hovered about the "Cotta" machine-gunning the trapped enemy within, and dropping incendiary bombs of death.

When the planes left, the ground troops intensified the siege. The enemy answered with their machine guns and automatic rifles. Lt DOMINGO ABUAN was wounded and two soldiers of "I" Co instantly killed. Dusk came and with it heavier mortar shell fire and rifle fire from the enemy as if making one final desperate effort to fight back. The guerrillas held their front line. Exchange firing lasted until 11:00 PM.

JAPS ESCAPE

Shortly after daybreak, 11 Dec 1944, the guerrillas fired several times at the "Cotta" and receiving no reply, rushed inside only to discover that the Japs who withstood the gruelling fire succeeded in escaping somehow out of the "Cotta" under cover of darkness. Only eight dead bodies, one dying soldier, eighty-six burnt rifles, six boxes of ammunition, and ten canvases of corn were all that remained.

Investigations showed that after the enemy had fired their last mortar shell they escaped through the ladders left by the guerrilla themselves when they attempted to scale the walls.

In their flight, they followed the shoreline back of the "Cotta" passing Maningeol, Clarin, Sinacaban and on towards Sinonoe, twenty-two kilometers away from Misamis and nearer Jimenes.

SEVEN JAPS SURRENDER

Lt SOFRONIO AVANCEÑA, CO "E" Co, upon learning that the escaping Japs had passed his sector (Clarin), led a patrol of fifteen men in pursuit. They overtook the enemy at Sinonoc beach who were pulling off in three bancas. AVANCEÑA'S men and those of "I" Co, 107th Inf Regt under Lt R. PENARANDA fired at them. One banca was badly hit and sinking. The Japs in it tried to swim towards the other bancas only to serve as targets to the men on the beach. The second banca, with a load of about twenty seven men, next received the brunt of concentrated fire. In the meantime, Capt HAMID ARACID with ten men grabbed another banca and hurried in pursuit of the fleeing bancas. The third banca with fifteen men was well under way and could not be caught. Seven Japs who could not get into the two fleeing bancas waved a white piece of cloth and were captured by the HAMID group.

Total number of Jap casualties were ten killed and seven captured. On the guerrilla side, two killed, and one wounded.

2.

THE SIEGE ON KABACAN

25 OCTOBER 1942

Kabacan, in the heart of Cotabato, was garrisoned by the Japanese in 1942, and the government run by puppet officials. The guerrilla movement all over Cotabato was at fever heat and the enemy garrison at Kabacan must be taken at all cost.

The siege started on 25 October 1942. All the puppet policemen including the Chief of Police and puppet Mayor surrendered en masse after due warning. They gave up all of their arms and ammunition, and they then volunteered to support with the guerrillas.

68 JAPS KILLED OUT OF 76

Early in the morning, the Japs coming out of the Kabacan garrison were ambushed. Twelve of them were killed including one Jap officer and one Filipino BC officer - Lt BALANAG by name. The siege continued for fourteen days, carried on night and day. On 7 Nov 1942, another twelve Jap soldiers and one Filipino BC were killed. Maj BUYAO, Lt RAYMONDO F. FLORES, and Sgt MENEDSEN KAMBANG on the guerrilla side were wounded slightly by hand grenades.

Out of the seventy-six Japanese soldiers in the garrison, sixty-eight were verified definitely killed. The garrison was about to fall when a reinforcement of 250 Japanese troops arrived. Our troops were forced to retreat due to diminishing supply of ammunition, the constant complaint of all guerrilla units due to lack of means of getting ample supplies into enemy-occupied territory.

The guerilla force, a strength of one company, was commanded by Maj UDTOG MATALAM and Maj BUYAO.

3.

THE INVASION OF GLAN

2 MAY 1943

On 2 May 1943, Glan, Cotabato, was invaded by a contingent of one hundred Japs and seventy Moros believed to be the followers of SINSUAT (a prominent Moro in Cotabato) and pro-Jap volunteer guards. They used several launches and one gunboat supported by a plane, effecting landing on two points: Glan-Paidu and Glan proper. It was the first real encounter between the guerrillas in Glan and the enemy.

Lasting for three days, it was carried on from the coast and to the hills of Glan. Guerrilla leader NICOLAS VILLAMOR and his one hundred men retreated to Malita a nearby town, leaving the units under Capts ROMAN AQUINO and V. S. BILBAO, both guerrilla leaders of Glan, to take charge of the defense of the area.

Maj HERBERT PACE took personal command of the situation. The beach encounter which was hotly fought caused many enemy casualties. Continuous sniping in the hinterland of Glan increased the number of enemy casualties, total of which remained unverified. No casualties were suffered by the guerillas. However, being outnumbered and underarmed, they retreated to their headquarters at Tubal Mts., thus allowing the enemy to occupy Glan without further opposition.

4.

THE CARMEN OPERATION

9 MAY 1945

Pocketed in the town of Carmen, Cagayan, Misamis Oriental, in May 1945, were about 650 Japs. The offensive drive which coordinated with the simultaneous landing of American troops in Cagayan on 10 May 1945 was participated in by the following guerrilla units. The 120th Inf Regt of the 108th Div Command under Maj LEOPOLDO BLANCO occupied the left flank; the 109th Inf Regt took charge of the frontal attack; and the 111th Inf Regt covered the right flank. Maj PEDRO AQUINO acted as Liaison Officer between the 108th Div and the 109th Inf Regt, Capt EUGENIO S. TABACUERO, G-3, 108th Div, as Supervisor of the operation and representative of the Division Headquarters.

At 9:06 AM, 9 May 1945, the general offensive began. Slight resistance was offered except at Iposan bridge where the enemy put up a strong and fanatic defense.

On the first day of the attack, the guerrillas managed to reach the Cagayan River but had to withdraw to West of the Ipanan River by order of Higher Headquarters to avoid possible mishaps from imminent American operations the following day.

On 10 May 1945, at 9:45 AM, just after the landing and bombardments of enemy installations and garrisoned areas by American troops, the guerrilla units launched another offensive and crossed the Ipanan River, gaining control this time of the Ipanan bridge, meeting with very slight resistance.

On 11 May 1945, at 8:30 AM, the 120th Inf Regt advanced in coordination with the 109th Inf Regt to West of the Cagayan River.

The operation lasted four days with the enemy suffering twenty-one casualties definitely killed, one wounded in action, and eighty probably killed or wounded. On the guerrilla side, one was wounded in action.

5. THE ATTACK ON VIT-US LINE

16 MARCH 1945

The Vit-us line was established by the guerrillas eight miles up the Agusan River to prevent possible enemy infiltration into the Ho area of the 110th Division and that of the 10th Military District located at La Paz.

The Japanese made two attempts to break through this line; first, on 16 March 1945; and again on 17 March 1945.

At dawn on 16 March 1945, an estimated strength of 250 Japs advanced from Butuan and in the attempt to capture Amparo, attacked the Vit-us line. Strong resistance was offered by the units of the 1st Battalion, 113th Inf Regt, but the enemy succeeded in breaking through. In the afternoon, however, the guerrillas turned the tide and recaptured their former positions.

On 17 Mar 1945, the enemy made another try at the Vit-us line, and again forced withdrawal of guerrilla troops. However, with the aid of a 37mm gun, the enemy was driven from its position and returned to Butuan. In their initial attack on this day, the guerrilla defenders were forced to withdraw. Their objective to reach Amparo was thwarted. Enemy casualties undetermined; none on the guerrilla side.

6. THE MACALIBRE AMBUSH

7 SEPTEMBER 1943

The encounter at Macalibre, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental on 7 September 1943, was easily considered the most outstanding encounter during the year in the area of the 107th Inf Regt.

On the morning of 4 Sept 1943, the Japs which had garrisoned Dipalog, Zamboanga since 26 Jun 1943, evacuated and proceeded eastward for Oroquieta, capital of Misamis Occidental, passing along the National Highway. Their strength at the time was 120 soldiers, heavily armed.

Intelligence operatives of the 107th Inf Regt learned of this enemy movement and a pursuit party consisting of one company was immediately organized. "L" Co of the 2nd Separate Battalion, stationed at Calamba, Plaridel, Misamis Occidental. The party consisted of 3rd Lt (later Capt) PATRICIO ATAY, CO, "L" Co, 3rd Lt ROMAN NAMATA, Executive Officer and Platoon leader, and 3rd Lt DIOSDADO CAJIGAS, Junior Officer and platoon leader, with forty-three soldiers and four enlisted men from the Medical Service Co.

OVERTAKE ENEMY

Behind by one day, the pursuers avoided the National Highway and followed every possible short-cut. Determined to overtake the enemy, they hiked the long night through, reaching Salimpono 7 Sept 1943. From the information gathered from agents, they learned that the Japs were resting at Mahayabay, Calamba, ten kilometers away, and would not leave the place until early that afternoon. Without losing time, the guerrillas continued their march. The plan was to get ahead of the enemy and locate a good spot for concealment and ambush. A vantage point overlooking Macalibre bridge was reached at

4:30 PM, 7 September 1943, after a continuous march of thirty four hours from Dipolog. The place selected was a rolling country. The horse-shoe shaped road formed a cut leading to the bridge. On the hillside overlooking the horse-shoe shaped road the men were positioned. Instructions were issued and the stage now set. In the meantime, while waiting for the Japs the guerrillas relaxed and ate wild papayas and sugar-cane.

A kilometer down the road rested the Jap contingent.

JAPS TAKEN BY SURPRISE

At exactly 5:30 PM, the enemy was sighted moving towards the bridge in mass formation. The guerrillas allowed the leading platoon to reach the cut of the road leading to the bridge, and then, firing commenced. The targets were just five to fifteen meters away. The enemy met fire from .23 caliber thirty rifles, one BAR and ten shotguns. Exchange of fire lasted one-half hour. Approximately, thirty Japs were killed and many wounded. On the guerrilla side, one dead - Corp JUAN LUMACANG, and none wounded. Two volunteer guards, however, CALIXTO LAGOYA of Baliangao and FELIPE PANTIOSA of Dipolog who joined the party were wounded. But ammunition was expended in this operation and the guerrilla were forced to withdraw, allowing the remaining Japs to proceed to Oroquieta.

The enemy buried some of their dead at the scene of battle while the remainder, including the wounded, were taken to Oroquieta. The guerrillas expended 579 rounds of ammunition, cal .30 and thirty-three shotgun shells. Recovered were one Jap rifle with a few rounds of ammunition, two tents and two mortar shells.

7. GUERRILLAS AMBUSHED NEAR KM 4. SURIGAO NATIONAL ROAD

12 JULY 1943

On 12 Jul 1943, the Combat Co, 114th Inf Regt led by Lts THOMAS R. BAXTER and ALBERT MC CARTHY, was ambushed by the enemy near KM 4 of the Surigao National Road. Lt. MC CARTHY was killed while Lt. BAXTER suffered from bullet wounds. He then proceeded to kill four Jap soldiers by actual count, with his .45 automatic while in a prone position. Sgt. POTUGUES and PVT ALBERTO CATUBIGAN were also killed, and Pfc SILVINO TENEBRE and Pvt SANTOS SANTIAGO, wounded. The enemy suffered eighteen dead and six wounded.

8. SPIELMAN LEADS THE ATTACK ON PLACER

10 OCTOBER 1943

On 10 Oct 1943, a combined force of the Regimental Co, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 114th Inf Regt, led by Lt ROBERT SPIELMAN and other Regimental Officers, attack the Japs entrenched at Placer, Surigao Province. Enemy casualties could not be determined but it was certain that their loss was heavy. Lt. SERGIO RAGAS, Sgt BUTIONG, Corp V. REYES, Pfc ANICETO UNDANGA, Pvt SEVILLA and Pvt PIEDAD of the guerrilla forces were wounded.

9. THE LABO ATTACK

30 JUNE 1943

Labo is a barrio six kilometers away and North-Northwest from Misamis, Misamis Occidental. It was garrisoned by about one hundred Japs after their invasion on 26 Jun 1943 when they used no less than 1,500 troops, nine planes, one light cruiser, seven inter-island vessels varying in size from 250 to 700 tons. The Hq of the 106th was located at Labo, until evacuated due to this Jap offensive action, at one time it was also occupied by the Headquarters, 105th Div. To the guerrilla forces, Labo had a special strategic importance and they wanted it back! The Japs were housed in four big buildings, exact locations of which were previously determined by intelligence operatives.

Under cover of darkness on 30 Jun 1943 Capt LUCAS NARANGO, with three officers and sixty-four EM, divided themselves into three groups and in this formation closed in on the buildings where the Japs were quartered. At the appointed hour, early on 1 Jul 1943, the guerrillas directed concentrated volleys of fire on the Jap-occupied buildings. Taken completely by surprise, the Japs could not return fire for about thirty minutes. By that time Jap reinforcements loaded in two trucks had arrived and saved the Labo garrison from

annihilation. In that encounter the guerrillas suffered no casualty. Later verification proved the Japs lost thirty lives in that encounter.

10. THE MALIBANCAO ENCOUNTER

16 JULY 1943

The source of water supply for Misamis and Labo was the Malibangcao spring. As the guerrillas cut the pipe line from Malibangcao, the Japs in the town of Misamis sent a patrol of one hundred men to this place in the night of 15 Jul 1943 to investigate the condition of the reservoir.

Capt LUCAS NARANJO, after having been informed of this movement, prepared for an ambush.

The guerrilla force consisted of Capt NARANJO, 1st Lt. FROILAN F. RAMIRO, T-3rd Lt EPIFANIO MOLASCO and thirty-four riflemen of "A" Co, 106th Inf Regt. The plan was to strike the enemy patrol on its return from Malibangao.

NARANJO, with Sgts POTENCIANO SATURRE and ERIBERTO BALINDRES, armed with machine rifles and two riflemen: Pfc TEOFILO EZARAN and Pvt MAGDALENO NARANJO, marched ahead of the party and waited at a storehouse by the roadside.

About 11:00 AM, 16 Jul 1943, they observed the approach of three enemy scouts so hid inside the storehouse. The guerrilla main body following hastily deployed in a line fifty yards from the road.

Two of the three Japs sat in front of the storehouse where NARANJO and his men were hiding. While the third remained near the road. NARANJO, SATURRE and BALINDRES refrained their fire until the main Jap column was near. NARANJO then gave the order to commence battle by firing at the three enemy scouts who were easily eliminated. Exchange of fire was intense and terrific.

When NARANJO finally ordered withdrawal for lack of ammunition the enemy had lost forty men dead and an undetermined number wounded. SATURRE and NARANJO were wounded and Corps MAXIMO LINGATONG and ASSEIMO MEJIA captured by the enemy.

11. THE BATTLE OF BAGA

24 AUGUST 1944

On 24 August 1944, Maj LUCAS NARANJO, CO, 106th Infantry, with eight men, headed towards Labinay and Pulao, Tangub, Misamis Occidental, to ambush an enemy patrol of 150 well-armed men. At 10:00 AM, while nearing Pulao, at a place called Baga, the enemy was spotted. NARANJO and men established a well camouflaged line barely two meters from the road and prepared for the first group of the unsuspecting enemy. At a signal, the guerrillas let loose a barrage of fire wiping out the entire group of some twenty Jap soldiers. The rest of the Jap patrol rushed to the scene of encounter. In the meantime, NARANJO withdrew his men about twenty meters from the first line. When the Japs were near enough NARANJO threw a hand grenade which killed ten more of the enemy. The guerrillas had the edge due to the protective and favorable terrain and they knew every inch of it. Coconut trees served as protective shields. But the enemy pressed the guerrillas without thought of life. Close range firing ensued which lasted about an hour. NARANJO was finally, for the second time in connection with an action, forced to withdraw due to lack of ammunition which was never over plentiful.

Total number of enemy dead was conservatively estimated at fifty. On the guerrilla side one killed and one wounded.

12. TAGOLOAN-BUGO OPERATION

27 APRIL 1945

With a mission to eliminate the Japs at Bugo-Tagoloan area, Oriental Misamis, the CO, 10th Military District was authorized by the CO, Tenth Corps, USA, to attack the area. This was a Victor 5 Operation participated in by the 1st Bn, 110th Inf Regiment, 110th Division.

On 27 April 1945 at 1700 hours, acting upon the above-mentioned orders, these

units crossed the Tagoloan river and occupied the towns of Tagoloan and Baluarte without any enemy resistance. Patrols were sent out towards the outskirts of said places but no enemy groups were encountered. Enemy positions in that sector, on this same day were bombed heavily by US planes. To escape annihilation, enemy troops attempted to cross the swift Tagoloan river by fording the river at Nabolod, a site some distance upstream.

The enemy was attacked by our men while crossing. Six of the enemy was killed; none on our side.

SIXTY JAPS AMBUSHED

On 28 April 1945, troops of "A" Co of the 1st Bn, while on combat patrol towards Kimaya, ambushed an enemy patrol of sixty soldiers at Tacpon in the vicinity of Sta Ana, inflicting a casualty of twenty-five on the enemy. The rest of the Japs dispersed into small units of twos and threes, which were later hunted down one by one by our patrols. This enemy patrol came from Claveria where the Japs were on a foraging mission.

On the same day, four enemy stragglers were cornered and killed by "A" Co troops at Inablayan.

On the 1st of May 1945, the 2nd Bn of this command was pulled out from its old defense sector to reinforce the 1st Bn in guarding the Tagoloan river perimeter. The 1st Bn formed the perimeter from Sabaya to the Tagoloan Ferry, while the 2nd Bn occupied the defense positions from the ferry to Balacanas. On this same date the Japanese re-occupied Tagoloan and Baluarte.

American planes strafed and bombed Tagoloan, Natomolan and Malaiba. On 7 May orders were issued for the 1st and 2nd Bns to be ready to cross the Tagoloan river and to proceed to the beach areas of the shoreline from Baluarte to Bugo. Mission of said unit was to form a beachhead for the expected Allied landing and incidentally to clear the areas in the rear of said beachhead. The following day 8 May, at 1700 hours, acting upon these orders, these units crossed the Tagoloan river and occupied Tagoloan and Baluarte without opposition. Patrols were sent out towards the outskirts. Early the next morning the patrols separated into three columns for a three-pronged attack on the enemy at Bugo, to establish a beachhead. A number of Japanese were encountered in the vicinity of Bugo. In the encounter six of the enemy were killed and the guerrilla suffered three wounded and two killed.

The beachhead was taken but the Japs, called for reinforcements from Alae which arrived by truck and our troops withdrew to Baluarte. Later, upon orders, all troops withdrew north of Tagoloan River - to avoid bombings and shelling by American planes and ships just prior to the landing of 10 May 1945.

13. GUERRILLAS BREAK THROUGH CABADBARAN LINE

31 MARCH 1945

Sometime in the last days of March 1945, orders were issued by the CO, 110th Division for the transfer of location of the Headquarters of the 110th Div from Las Nieves, Agusan to Gingoog, Misamis Oriental. During the period, the entire area of Agusan Province was infested by the enemy which controlled not only the main line of communication, but even the small trails. The problem of moving the headquarters through the enemy line was therefore a highly risky proposition.

Maj JUAN E. RIVERA, Chief of Staff, however, decided that the orders must be carried out without vacillation. Under his leadership, all records and personnel of the Division Headquarters moved successfully through this dangerous area, as a result of the heroic and nerve-wracking attack on the enemy garrison at Capudlosan, Cabadbaran, Agusan. This was on 31 March 1945.

HEADQUARTERS SERVICE TROOPS TACKLE ENEMY

The enemy had an approximate strength of thirty men with the advantage of favorable terrain. The attacking force consisted of Maj RIVERA, Capt FAUSTO DUGENIO, Div G-2, Lt JUANITO LABANDERA, and ten enlisted men. The encounter lasted about an hour with a storm raging at the time, and was fought at the point blank range of six meters.

The enemy suffered twelve casualties, dead, and the rest fled, leaving a battered flag, arms, ammunition, medicines and other equipment. Our casualties, one wounded.

14.

THE TALAKAG OPERATION

18 JUNE 1944

This regiment garrisoned that portion of Misamis Oriental between the Cagayan and Tagoloan Rivers and a Northern portion of the province of Bukidnon. From 18 June 1944 to 29 June 1944, the entire regiment was under enemy pressure by a force of approximately 900 attacking in different points. This force succeeded in penetrating as far as Talakag, Bukidnon - the place of the 109th Division Headquarters.

About 6:30 AM, on June 18, 1944, the area of the 1st Battalion was fired at by the enemy but ineffectively with two field guns, expending thirty-two shells. The fire was directed towards Macahambus, Tagpangi, Cabula, and Masasin. This move was soon found out to be but a preparatory step to an attack on the 111th Inf Regt troops.

Two hours later, an estimated number of 150 Japs moved out from Lumbia towards Macahambus. Guerrilla outposts at Bagalangit and other outposts west thereof fired on this party but after a brief skirmish withdrew. The enemy then outposted their own line and the main body bivouacked. At 11:30 AM, the fight was over with Bagalangit lost to the guerrillas. At the time of the attack, the 1st Battalion was disposed in depth with its rear elements as far back as Tignapoloan and it could not be concentrated soon enough to meet this thrust of the enemy. However, it was promptly moved forward, and on the night of 18 Jun 1944, two companies were in position in the hills around Bayanga with another rifle company between Dansolihon and Monique. This enemy offense was at first thought to be only an outpost action but by mid-morning, the guerrillas felt sure that it was a seriously intended drive. Consequently "I" Co of the 112th Inf Regiment which was in station at Dagumba-an and acting as Division Reserve, was moved to a position in readiness between San Isidro and Balobal.

During the night of 18-19 Jun 1944, another force of enemy infantry, estimated at 250 men, proceeded from Lumbia to Batinay where they were observed by the outpost of the 109th Inf Regiment. This movement was promptly relayed to the 111th Infantry outpost at Tagpangi who transmitted the information to the 1st Battalion Commander and then withdrew towards Monique without any fight. The enemy stopped at daylight; cooked chow, and then advanced slowly towards Tagpangi. It was not until 2:00 PM that guerrilla forces encountered this group about two kilometers southeast of Tagpangi. The guerrilla forces there were the company that was stationed near Dansolinon reinforced by the retreating Tagpangi outpost.

HIT AND RUN WARFARE

At the time of the encounter, about two-thirds of the enemy moved along the main trail. The other third moved cautiously along the ridges. It appeared that the enemy had hoped that the guerrillas would attack the main body and be crushed with their flank column. The guerrillas in fact struck at the main body of the enemy but the skirmish was a hit-and-run affair. An undetermined number of casualties was inflicted on the enemy and caused some confusion. The guerrilla unit then retreated towards Monique keeping just out of touch of the enemy who followed.

During the morning, 20 Jun 1944, the enemy deployed near Bayanga but made no effort to advance. The only engagement was a brief clash between the guerrilla reconnaissance patrol and the enemy outpost.

JAP PLANES ARRIVE

About 3:00 PM, four Japanese dive bombers which appeared over Bayanga, severely strafed that area for about an hour. This attack did no material damage but it did affect the morale of the sadly equipped guerrillas. Faced with this death-dealing menace and the threat of the flanking attack from Monique, the entire 1st Battalion withdrew to the neighborhood of Mambuaya to establish its two companies in position there.

The enemy force from Tagpangi after leaving Monique joined the other force at Bayanga and both forces withdrew to the Bayanga Cemetery where they bivouacked for the night.

CIVILIANS EVACUATE TALAKAG

On 20 Jun 1944, about 10:00 AM, two training planes strafed Talakag. The Division Commander had just ordered the evacuation of civilians and the evacuation of his own rear installations and this strafing had little effect except to speed up compliance with the evacuation order. "I" Co of the 112th Inf Regt moved to the Cagayan River to protect the crossings over Kibulawan. During the morning, however, a force of the enemy estimated at 250 Korean troops and 150 Filipino BCs forced their way across the Agusan River in the neighborhood of Camp 12. This force was supported by six enemy planes. After a considerable skirmish, "M" Co, 111th Inf Regt which was attacking, was forced to withdraw and moved southward in the direction of Tigbao. The remainder of the 3rd Battalion reinforced by a platoon from the 112th Inf Regt was concentrated in the area to protect against any drive in the direction of Mampayag. After the skirmish, the enemy group divided the part pursuing "M" Co and one group moving towards Libona. The first group spent the night in a concrete starch factory at Camp 8.

At dawn, 21 Jun 1944, elements of the 3rd Battalion attacked this last unit in an indecisive engagement. The remainder of the battalion moved forward to protect against a drive to the south. The enemy however, continued to patrol Camp 12 area, Libona, Santa Fe and Camp 8, and no other engagement took place in this area during the day.

ENEMY ON MARCH

The 1st Battalion had lost contact with about 150 of the enemy, later reported to have crossed the river near Cabula and proceeding southward along the east bank of the Cagayan River. At this time, the 2nd Battalion was concentrated near Imbatug and had no force in position to interrupt this advance. The battalion did however, send troops towards Langawon but they arrived too late to be of service. This force of the enemy recrossed the Cagayan River near the mouth of the Taguiti River coming in at the rear of the Guerrilla Mambuaya position. At the time, an enemy advance was made from Bayanga. The 1st Battalion, caught between two forces, withdrew and took position with two companies at Dansolihon but with the other company still in the vicinity of Monique. Immediately after this, the enemy force proceeded to Uguaban and attempted to cross the river at that point. One machine gun of "D" Co of the 111th Inf Regt which was in position there, repulsed this plan and the enemy withdrew. It made no further attempt to cross that night. This was the last appearance of the 1st Battalion in this action.

Important supplies and communications were then being sent from the coast to the Tignapoloan area and the battalion was left to protect that trail. It was never attacked again by ground troops and a combat patrol that operated along the road between Bayanga and Ugiaban encountered no enemy.

TALAKAG BURNED

At 7:00 PM, the Div Commander, Lt-Col JAMES GRINSTEAD, ordered his headquarters and the town of Talakag burned. He then took the few rifles that were in this area and some of his Staff and joined "I" Co of the 112th Inf Rgt in actual combat operation. This company had taken up a position at Balaon.

On the morning of 22 Jun 1944, the enemy at Ugiaban began desultory firing from mortar and machine guns which continued up to about 2:30 PM. Under cover of this, they succeeded in infiltrating a sizeable group between Ugiaban and Kibulawan, and by 2:30 o'clock this force endangered the guerrillas advance position at Balaon. In addition, another group had crossed the river and were in position for a frontal attack. The guerrilla forces then withdrew to a second position slightly north of Balobal and reinforcements were sent to it.

By the time this movement was completed, the enemy attacked in full force and after an hour of rather severe fighting the guerrilla forces were forced out of position. GRINSTEAD's plans of operation was based on the use of veteran troops, but actually they were not. To be sure they held their position

till the fighting was next thing to hand to hand combat, but they were shaken badly enough to make it impracticable to occupy a third position south of Balobal. The engagement was ordered broken off and troops retired to Malinao. While this was going on, the 3rd Battalion made another attack on the enemy at Camp 8 but they were also forced to withdraw. The enemy spent the night in the neighborhood of Libona.

OUR TROOP MORALE LOW

On 22 Jun 1944, this enemy force moved forward towards Patpat which is south of Imbatug. About 8:00 AM, they came upon the outpost line of the 2nd Battalion somewhat unexpectedly and a brief skirmish followed. The 2nd Battalion at that time was concentrated somewhat behind this position and it was withdrawn to a previous selected withdrawal position with attempting serious defense of the Bubunawan River crossing. This move appeared to have been an error and resulted in a slackening of morale which reduced the efficiency of the battalion very materially. The enemy then patrolled this area rather intensively burning the Battalion Headquarters at Patpat and the Regimental Headquarters at Salimbalan. Part of the enemy spent the night in Imbatug which they entered without opposition while part were near Patpat.

AGAIN BOMBED AND STRAFED

On the Talakag front, a patrol of "I" Co, 112th Inf Regt, contacted the advance guard of the enemy just as they were proceeding through Balobal. In this engagement it appeared that both forces were too badly surprised to fire and the guerrilla force promptly withdrew to Malinao. After this, the enemy rested until air support arrived. About 10:00 AM, three dive bombers flew over the area in two separate trips. In one of these, the Tignapoloan area of the 1st Battalion, 111th Inf Regt and the area around Talakag was severely bombed and strafed. In the other trip, the Imbatug area received the same treatment. Under cover of these attacks the force at Balobal proceeded to Talakag along the main highway and entered the town about 11:30 AM. Heavy flanking detachments came through Malinao and along the Kalawaig River. During the afternoon, four dive bombers repeated the bombing and strafing all over the area and the following morning two others did the same. No more planes came after that.

The enemy at Imbatug patrolled throughout the area between 23 and 25 June 1944. On this date the BCs were withdrawn to Cagayan while the Japanese troops proceeded by way of Dangol and entered Talakag on the afternoon of 27 Jun 1944. During this period several small groups of the 2nd Bn, 111th Inf Regt engaged the Japs in numerous harassing attacks. These inflicted some casualties on the enemy but were not heavy enough to affect their conduct in any way.

NEW LINES FORMED

The Regimental Commander had ordered the 3rd Battalion to take over the area of the 2nd Battalion and a large part of the battalion had moved in but did not arrive until 26 Jun 1944 when it was too late to stop the Japanese force. However, both battalions were combined and took positions along the Tumala-ong River facing south and covered the crossings. This was done with the plan of re-engaging the enemy when returning to Cagayan.

An enemy patrol sent on 27 June 1944 to Cagayan, was driven back to Talakag, and on 29 Jun 1944, a minor engagement was fought against the retreating enemy in the vicinity of Lingating. In this case the enemy was so much superior that this action was merely another hit-and-run guerrilla fight. In the meantime, the force at Talakag patrolled the area intensively until joined by the other group on 27 June 1944.

ENEMY WITHDRAW

On the 28 Jun 1944, the whole party retired towards Cagayan and re-entered Cagayan on the afternoon of 29 Jun 1944. In Talakag there was not much resistance to these patrols. Those along the Cagayan River were so strong that the various guerrilla attempts to trap them had to be abandoned. The unit around the Kalawa-ig River was forced to cross that river and never again entered the action. The Division Commander and some members of his staff left the Malinao-Maigtang area on the night of 26 Jun 1944 and by that time the majority of "I" Co had been re-assembled along the Cagayan River near Dagumbaan.

On 29 Jun 1944, this company was moved back into position at Balobal and the guerrilla MP Detachment reoccupied their old position at Talakag. Immediately after the skirmish on 29 Jun 1944, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions resumed their original positions while the 1st Battalion moved back to Mambuaya and there assumed its original position.

The enemy troops were mostly Koreans under Japanese officers. Approximately 400 operated through the area of the 1st Battalion. About 150 of these were engaged at Ugiaban but by the time the force entered Talakag it had increased to approximately 500. The force which operated through the 2nd and 3rd Battalions was about 250 Japanese and 150 BCs.

CASUALTIES

Estimated number of Japs killed was fourteen and thirteen wounded, at least two of these killed being officers. Since the termination of the fight however, eight bodies of Japanese soldiers were found floating in the Cagayan River near Cagayan. These must have been lost during the activity along the Cagayan and Bubunawan Rivers. In spite of the great amount of ammunition expended by the enemy, the number of casualties inflicted to the guerrilla forces was only three men killed and one officer and two men wounded.

Throughout the entire engagement, the guerrillas were as usual short of ammunition to make a reasonably decent fight. At the beginning, the 3rd Battalion of the 111th Inf Regt had only seventeen rounds of rifle ammunition for each rifle. The other battalions were only a little better off. Only in "I" Co, 112th Inf Regt was there any reasonable quantity of ammunition - about seventy rounds per man.

15. THE MINA-ANO ENCOUNTER

17 JANUARY 1945

Mina-ano in Agusan Province, lies between Cabadbaran and Butuan towns. The Mina-ano encounter was noteworthy because it was a valiant though futile stand of the guerrillas to prevent the Japanese from Surigao in reaching Butuan.

The Division Special Troops, upon learning of the enemy move to proceed to Butuan, acted swiftly transferring from Tagabaca to Mina-ano where dug-in positions were hastily made. The defensive line extended to three hundred yards on the right side of the road (towards Cabadbaran) occupied by the Combat and "A" Companies, and one hundred fifty yards on the left side of the road occupied by "B" Co. Lt LUIS P. DONGALLO, new CO, Division Special Troops, directed the operations.

ENEMY SURPRISED

On 17 Jan 1945, at 6:30 AM, contact was made with the enemy force of 200 to 250 men which marched along the national highway from Cabadbaran to Butuan. The advance element was but 200 yards from the established defense positions and the main body only 150 yards immediately behind. The .50 cal MG of the 2nd Bn of the 113th Inf Regt emplaced on the road cutting the Division Special Troops defense line, the bazookas and two automatic rifles which supported the .50 cal MG, simultaneously fired at the advanced Jap troops. Fifty to sixty Japs fell from this fusillade. The survivors fought desperately, pulling away their dead. Exchange of fire lasted three hours. More Japs fell; none on the guerrilla side for they were well protected and had the advantage of prepared positions. Overwhelmed by fire superiority, the Japs were forced to retreat. But at thirty minutes past noon, enemy reinforcements of almost the same number as the first group arrived and reorganized at the rear.

A REAL FIGHT

The guerrilla observers noted them making flanking movements, Flank guards immediately attacked to thwart their plans. What followed was a stirring spectacle of heroism against heroism, the only dividing space between the fighting units being the fifty-yard wide Mina-ano Creek. Three times, the enemy drove for an assault; three times the guerrillas check them holding their ground. But at 6:30 o'clock that evening, the ammunition supply of the guerrillas could not possibly be replenished, so an order for withdrawal was given. Eleven rockets of the bazookas were fired to cover the withdrawal to Damognay, a sitio two kilometers away.

ENEMY SUFFERS HEAVILY

The strength of the participating guerrilla units were as follows: Combat Co under Lt CRISANTO SALVALEON, had fifty nine men; "A" Co under the direct command of Lt LUIS DONGALLO, CO, DST, had thirty eight men; and "B" Co under the command of Lt AVELINO S. PAJO, Adjutant, DST, had twenty nine men. Attacked was one .50 caliber MG squad of the 2nd Bn, 113th Infantry.

Casualties of the enemy was estimated to be from 110 to 160 killed and wounded. One soldier of the Combat Co, Corp ABUNDIO QUIRAO, was wounded.

16.

THE MANICAHAN OPERATION

17 JANUARY 1945

Manicahan lies twenty kilometers from the City of Zamboanga and was important to the Japanese because a considerable quantity of their supplies had been conserved there. Enemy garrison consisted of 250 men guarding the Manicahan bridge; one hundred at the school building, one hundred in the heart of the town. Other Japs were stationed at Sabanita-Asinan, Sakol Island, Mercedes, and Zamboanga City - totalling between 4000 to 6000. They were fully equipped with tanks, trucks, howitzers, SMS, MGs, grenade projectors, automatic weapons, rifles, etc. Intensive patrols were conducted. Positions were well entrenched and fortified; affording a good defense, field of fire and observation.

GUERRILLAS TAKE OFFENSIVE ACTION

Offensive operations against the enemy began on 17 Jan 1945, at 7:55 AM. The guerrillas advanced towards Manicahan utilizing all available cover. The 81mm emplaced at Upper Corote shelled enemy emplacements at the Manicahan National Highway junction and at the school building. "I" Co crossed the river and gained the position heretofore occupied by the Japs at the school building. The guerrillas held this until heavy enemy reinforcements arrived from Sakol Island and Po-ok in "kumpits" and "vintas" (native boats). Likewise, another Jap reinforcement from Asinan-Subanita engaged the Combat Co who were on their way to the alternate position where the 81mm had been transferred. The Combat Co withdrew at 9:00 PM, and the "I" Co to their first line of defense at Km 26. One Combat Co group of "I" Co was left to delay any enemy action. In the meantime, other Combat Co groups of the "E", "G" and "F" Cos harassed and ambushed enemy replacements along the highway. Enemy casualties were then sixty seven dead and wounded. On the guerrilla side, one killed.

FIGHT AT BRIDGE

On 18 Jan 1945, enemy strength at Manicahan increased considerably overnight - about 600 to 700. Enemy pressure and lack of adequate ammunitions caused our troops to withdraw to Matamut. Replacements were effected, and again the different units moved to their respective zone of operation. One combat group of "I" Co was sent to reinforce the group at the bridge. In the concerted action which followed, the guerrillas in spite of hard fighting, failed to dislodge the enemy. Actions this date accounted undetermined number of Japs killed; no loss on the guerrilla side.

On 19 Jan 1945, one combat group of "I" Co was stationed at the edge of the ricefield at Matamut to snipe and attract fire from the bridge and crossing while the Combat Co and the rest of "I" Co made for other Jap positions. Snipers hiding on trees hampered the movements of the guerrillas. There was only desultory firing this time. At 10:00 PM, the guerrillas withdrew to their defensive positions. The day's activity accounted for twenty-two Japs killed; none on the guerrilla side.

HARASSING EFFECTIVE

On 20 Jan 1945, enemy reinforcements again arrived at night, and morning found about 500 at Manicahan junction and about 200 at the bridge. Two combat groups of "I" Co were detailed to Matamut and two others at the bridge, while two officers and thirty seven men of the Combat Co tried for the junction. The Combat Co guerrillas succeeded in removing the barbed wire entanglements on their way and gained enemy positions in their first line of defense. However, the enemy had plenty of reinforcements which caused the guerrillas to withdraw to their defensive positions. All the while, combat groups of "E", "F", and "G" Cos engaged in an all day and night harassing

and ambushing engagements with the enemy along the National Highway. The enemy suffered heavily on this date. Our casualties, one officer killed, four wounded, and one missing.

This entire operation - a true hit and run guerrilla tactic disturbed the heavily garrisoned Japs considerably and the death toll was exacting in favor of guerrilla troops.

17.

TALISAYAN OPERATION

22 MARCH 1945

This operation was undertaken to eliminate and wipe out the Japs garrisoned at Talisayan, Misamis Oriental. Amphibious in nature, the operation was participated in by units of the 110th Infantry Regiment, 110th Division (Guerrilla) with an original strength of 200 men but which increased to 350 when call for volunteers was issued. The US Navy Task Group 70.4 coordinated in the movement.

Plans of operation were laid out in a conference between Major PAUL H. MARSHALL, Commanding Officer of the 110th Div (Guerrilla) and Maj HERVEY HARCOURT, Inf, Capt T. R. DANIEL, Inf, Capt WILLIAM V. PRITZ, Inf. Lt WILLIAM GRIFFIN, USNR, and Lt ALBERT E. ELDRIDGE, USNR, of the Task Group 70.4. The Talisayan enemy garrison was selected as the target of an amphibious operation because of its value as a barge staging base midway between Cagayan and the Mindanao Sea. Reports indicated that the garrison had an approximate strength of 250 Japs in the town center with an outpost of seventy in a barrio two kilometers to the south.

GUERRILLAS COACHED ON AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS

MARSHALL, following instructions, proceeded to Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, and undertook the training of the guerrillas to be utilized as a landing force. Rigid training lasted ten days.

On 20 Mar 1945, two LCI's supported by two LCS's of Task Group 70.4 arrived at the barrio of Lagonglong, seven miles north of Balingasag. This task Group proceeded immediately to Talisayan arriving there at dawn the following day.

ENEMY SHELLED - 138 JAPS KILLED

On 22 March 1945, enemy positions were heavily shelled by the LCS's preparatory to the landing of troops. The landing was supported with heavy firing but no resistance was offered by the enemy. Instead, they took to the hills. By 6:00 AM, the attacking force occupied Sipaca and the barrios of Sipalong and Bugdang. The ammunition dump at Sipaca was blown up by supporting shell fire. Two armored barges complete with diesel engine and two trucks were captured. Sixty sacks of polished rice, canned goods, and an excellent automotive repair shop were also taken.

The operation proceeded exactly according to plans that the Air Force was requested to cancel all bombing and strafing missions in the Talisayan area.

Enemy casualties for the whole operation - 138 Japs KIA. No casualties were suffered by the guerrillas and the 70.4 Task Force.

NOTE: It should be mentioned here that this Talisayan operation was the first amphibious guerrilla offensive against the enemy - made possible thru the splendid cooperation of the US Navy. It was the first of several successful operations in conjunction with Task Group 70.4.

18.

ATTACK ON MT BLIK AREA

18 JUNE 1945

COMBINED AMERICAN-FILIPINO OPERATION

Combined American and guerrilla operations in the area of the 106th Division forced the remains of the enemy, as elsewhere, to flee to the mountains. To the Mt Blik area, Cotabato, 300 to 400 Jap troops sought refuge. But not on their trail were the combined American and guerrilla forces.

STRATEGY PLANNED

On the night of 17 Jun 1945, Capt DEMPSTER D. DROWLEY of the American Troops of "B" Battery, 222-AAA, S/L Bn, presided over a conference of officers at the Sibutu Schoolhouse where the disposition of troops, plans of attack and enemy positions were studied, planned and decided upon. Accordingly, 1st Lt MORTON with thirty American troops together with 2nd Lt FORTUNATO CABALES, Inf (PA), 3rd Lt PRIMITIVO TORRES, Inf (PA) and the "F" Co, were assigned Southeast of Mt Blik to attack the enemy on the right flank.

They started out for their position at 2:00 AM on 18 Jun 1945. 2nd Lt VICENTE VALDEZ, Inf (PC) with twenty-five enlisted men of "G" Co and ten American troops left Sibutu soon after the conference to occupy their position about 200 yards east of the Mt Blik base from where they were to attack the enemy's left flank. Sgt VENANCIO DIMLA, Inf (PC) with ten guerrillas of "C" Co together with Sgt SINGLETON and four other American troops were assigned to the back trails south of the enemy's positions in the afternoon of 17 Jun 1945, their mission being to pick up enemy stragglers retreating that way. The Combat Co remained in its previous post guarding the Corporan-Litengan-Ranao Pilayan trails to prevent the enemy from going to Ranao Pilayan where food-stuffs were plentiful. Lastly, Capt DEMPSTER with Capt MACARIO CUBALIA, Inf (PC) and 2nd Lt BENJAMIN ENERIO, Inf (PA) together with fifty Americans and ten guerrillas of "G" Co were to carry on the frontal attack. They left Sibutu at 4:00 AM on 18 Jun 1945.

Action started at 9:00 AM, 18 Jun 1945, and lasted til 2:00 PM.

The group of Lt VALDEZ attacked the enemy's left flank and Sgt DIMLA with Sgt SINGLETON ambushed and killed eleven retreating Japs.

But there was a hitch in the plans. Lt MORTON's group and Lt CABALES' "F" Co lost their trail which caused them much delay.

The enemy occupied three strategic positions of vantage on high ground and they easily gained fire superiority from their entrenchment over our troops.

TWO AMERICANS KILLED - THREE GUERRILLAS WOUNDED

Two American soldiers were killed, namely: Sgt ALBERT G. MOSIER and Sgt. ROBERT L. MILLER, while two others were missing for a number of days, namely: Corp CARROL F. JONES and T/4 METRO A SCHURESKO. These two showed up during the last week of June 1945 at Dalican, haggard, ragged and hungry after wandering in the jungles of Mt. Blit. A native Tiruray found and guided them home and they were hospitalized in Cotabato. Of the 119th Inf unit, three EM from "C" Co, 2nd Bn, were casualties, namely: Pvts MELCHOR SALVADOR and CARLOS MODOC, wounded; while Corp ALFREDO CAOILI sustained a right knee dislocation from a bad jump during the confused retreat. There were also four civilian bearers (native Tiruray cargadors) wounded who were given medical treatment at Cotabato, while six were missing. On the enemy's side, twenty one were verified killed and an undetermined number of wounded.

The enemy's arms consisted of one 90mm mortar, machine guns, BARs, .25 cal rifles and hand grenades. The American and guerrilla weapons consisted of two 60 mm mortar, six bazookas, BARs, TSMCs, carbines and a good number of the old enfield rifles.

19.

THE PAGADIAN ATTACK

5 NOVEMBER 1944

The attack on Pagadian was undertaken to disperse the eighty to one hundred Japs entrenched in the heart of the town, who were heavily armed with one 50 cal MG, BARs, rifles, cal 25, and one stock mortar.

The attacking guerrilla mobile units had an average strength of fifty men and four officers in the nearest line of approach, and another fifty men as reserve appropriately distributed in the cordon of outposts covering the east, north and west of the town. These mobile units occupied different houses in strategic places at varying distances from 150 to 500 meters away from the municipal plaza in such a manner that a semi-circle was formed with the enemy literally imprisoned within. Directly south of the town is the Illana Bay.

The mobile unit groups stationed in the different outposts alternated with each other in occupying the organized ground from 100 to 150 meters away around the enemy positions. The tour of duty of each mobile unit was twenty-four hours so that the Japs were kept under continuous watch by the guerrillas.

6 JAPS KILLED

On 5 Nov 1944, at 5:00 AM, "D" Co mobile unit under Capt C.I. CANTOY, Lt L. ASUELO and Lt M. CAMPO rushed unobserved to the concrete municipal building situated at the plaza. Here, the guerrillas entrenched themselves and fired on the radio station building, twenty five to thirty meters away. Three Japs standing at the doorway were easy targets.

About 6:30 AM of the same day, a Jap was observed looking out of the house of a certain CABRALES by name of "B" Co. He was a direct hit. A few minutes later, two Japs bringing boards were seen at another nearby house belonging to FLORENDO. They were fired at, one being hit.

At 8:30 of the same day, two Japs bringing a kettle were seen creeping from the radio station. They were fired at simultaneously by Corp D. RAMOS, Pfc A. ARMADA, and Pvt A MEDINA with 1 BAR and TSMGs killing them outright.

At 9:00 AM, operative BUARON detected a moving object among the bushes, apparently a Jap, but before he could fire, the Jap rushed to the radio station. A Jap peering through a small opening at the window of the station retaliated just missing BUARON's head.

JAPS COUNTER-ATTACK

At 8:30 AM, the Jap counter-attack began. Their .50 cal MG emplaced at DATOC's residence about a hundred meters from the radio station riddled the municipal building with bullets, and shelled it three times.

Two were direct hits, splinters of which wounded Pvt ARTEMIO MERIDA. An order of retreat was issued to withdraw to a nearby coconut grove.

GOOD FIRE SUPPORT IN RETREAT

In the meantime, Jap riflemen had advanced to the east side of the municipal building, opened fire on the guerrillas rushing out the back door of the municipal building. But the guerrilla combat men posted north of the plaza, returned the Jap fire, thus supporting the withdrawal of their comrades.

7 November 1944: - Lt MORO LAO, Battalion Executive Officer with S-2 operatives with rifle grenades shelled the various Jap positions as did the combat men with six mortar shells.

8 November 1944: - At 4:30, Lt LAO with S-2 operatives shelled the radio station from behind hitting the roof at the western side destroying it.

About 8:00 PM, same night, Pfc ROLLEN, Pmts BUSTIDA and ACAIN, all of "D" Co approached the radio station and threw three grenades. Damage undetermined.

11 November 1944: - Early morning, rifle grenadiers led by Lt LAO, shelled the Japs sheltered in the houses of HOFILINA, DATOC and the Southern Mindanao Institute School building. The balcony of the school was hit, while the fire directed at DATOC's hit the trench mortar. The Combat Co also shelled the Jap garrison at 8:00 AM, 10:00 AM, and 12:00 noon with stock mortar.

12 November 1944: - In the morning, the Jap positions at CABRALES, FLORENDO and EQUIPADO were shelled by rifle grenades. At night, the guerrillas dug foxholes very close to the radio station. At the same time, the Special Mobile Unit and some enlisted men of Cos "C" and "D" under Capt CANTOY and Lt LAO, shelled the municipal building to attempt to dislodge the Japs sheltered thereat.

13 November 1944: - By 6:00 AM, the municipal building was abandoned by the Japs and the guerrillas occupied it.

JAPS STUBBORNLY RESIST

At 7:30 AM, the Special Mobile Unit under Lt LAO, launched another attack on the radio station from newly gained positions. The building was badly battered but the Japs held to their position.

14 November 1944: - Again, Lt LAO's men machinegunned the radio station. Grenadiers likewise did their part but the Japs resisted stubbornly.

15 November 1944: - An all night operation was launched by Lt LAO's Special Mobile Unit assisted by Co "A" under Lt N. BUYCO. But the Japs resisted with their stoke mortar and BARs.

16 November 1944: - The guerrillas continued the offensive with more determination. The radio station and DATOC's house where the enemy was well-entrenched, received the brunt of concentrated fire. But no amount of firing could dislodge them.

JAPS BURN RADIO STATION

At 6:30 PM, the Japs appeared to have withdrawn from the radio station earlier in the afternoon and concentrated their own firing at the municipal building where the guerrillas had garrisoned. Then firing ceased, followed by shouts and suddenly the radio station was aflame. The house west of the Southern Mindanao Institute Building was also aflame. It was strongly believed that the Japs were cremating their dead.

17 November 1944: - At 7:30 AM, guerrillas of "B" Co near AMOROSO's house, killed a Jap carrying a piece of board. The rest of his companions who were inside the house scattered for cover to return fire.

18 November 1944: - At 10:00 AM, the Jap position in the town was shelled four times by the mortar squad. In the afternoon, the Japs launched a counter-attack on "B" Co sector at Lumbia. The guerrillas resisted but at first with their ammunitions running low, a withdrawal seemed wise. The Japs succeeded in occupying the nearest approach of the guerrillas to the former's position.

In the evening, "D" Co combat mobile unit and the left flank of "A" Co, advanced to about thirty yards from the Southern Mindanao Institute Building and entrenched themselves in foxholes.

19 November 1944: - The following morning, their newly entrenched positions, the guerrillas continued the attack.

From 7 to 8 AM, the Japs shelled the positions of the Combat Units of "A" and "D" Cos eight times, and that of Cos "C" and "B" three times. Pvt ATILANO CAPOI who went out of his foxhole to get drinking water was hit with shrapnel. The men of "B" Co taking advantage of the counter-offensive, launched by the Japs, re-occupied the line of nearest approach on the Lumbia side.

At 2:30 PM, the Japs taking advantage of the heavy rain crawled from their shelters at CABRALES, EQUIPADO and BALLESTEROS towards the area of Co "C" mobile unit.

SPEEDBOATS AID GUERRILLAS

25 November 1944: - At 5:30 AM, two speedboats which had been unloaded sometime before by US submarines at Tukuran Bay, armed with 22mm cannons, strafed the eastern side of the town. The maneuver was handled by Lt SINCLAIR (NOIC) assigned on duty with the "A" Corps, Western Mindanao, 10th Military District, expending a total of 180 rounds in three drums with some incendiary and tracer bullets. The Japs retaliated with a few bursts of their .50 caliber machine gun but all their firing was overhead. The guerrillas sought in ground positions, fired also. It was a sight to see the Japs being fired at from all directions.

JAPS DISPERSE - 6 KILLED

At 7:30 AM, soon after the strafing, eight Japs were seen heading towards the east from the town. The guerrillas fired at them killing four.

About the same time, another group of Japs proceeded to FLORENDO's neighborhood. One went up to a house while the others busied themselves cutting banana fruits. The guerrillas killed both.

The Japs burned the house of SERGIO ANGON, ANTONIO FLORENDO, VENANCIO GEMINIANO, FELIX BALLESTEROS, GREGORIO ABARRA, and CONRAD UBAS.

28 November 1944: - At 5:30 PM, a stocky Jap was seen coming from CABRERA's house by Corp BUANAELOR of "A" Co. He fired, felling him.

In this twenty-five day attack, the Japs suffered a total of sixteen dead, and an undetermined number of wounded. None were killed on the guerilla side with one wounded.

20.

JAPS ATTACK LIANGAN

19 DECEMBER 1943

The Liangan attack was a serious threat directed against the Headquarters of the 108th Division which at the time was located at Liangan, about four kilometers from the coast of Iligan Bay. It began on 19 Dec 1943 at midnight.

The guerrilla troops at this time were disposed as follows: At the southwest of Liangan, the Combat Co covered the Tugar-Dalikanan-Lauswagan area; "F" Co guarded Kawit and the Lisdon Creek; "K" Co, the Tacub-Dalikanan area. At the Northeast of Liangan, "L" Co covered the Samburan-Laparan-Lapayan area; "I" Co, the Agus-Timuga-Buru-un-Linamon area; and other units scattered all over the Agus-Liangan area.

Adjacent units protected the rear of Liangan, namely: the 120th Inf Regt covered the right flank, the 2nd Battalion of the 108th Inf Regt and the Commando Battalion, 108th Div, the left flank, while the 126th and 128th Maranao (Moro) Militia Forces protected the rear.

ENEMY LANDS IN FORCE

At midnight, 19 Dec 1943, enemy forces estimated at 600 landed with the use of modern landing barges and launches at Sigapog and Maigo, Southwest of Liangan. "F" Co force could offer but slight resistance against a superior enemy. One guerrilla soldier was killed here.

About 2:00 AM, another force landed at Dalikanan Creek with the use of two launches; another at Lisdon Creek with the use of one launch. Both forces proceeded to Kauswagan, twelve kilometers Southwest of Liangan. The Combat Co of the Hq Battalion, 108th Infantry Regt contacted the enemy at Tugar Creek. After thirty minutes of sporadic firing, the guerrillas withdrew. The enemy occupied Kauswagan at daybreak. At 10:00 o'clock that same morning, the guerrillas came back on the enemy with mortar fire, BARs and rifles. In the encounter which lasted about an hour, twenty Japs were killed, and one of the guerrilla side.

At 6:30 AM, three AIF officers, two Americans, six guerrilla officers, and a number of guerrilla soldiers proceeded to Maigo to check up the report that a contingent of the enemy had reached the west side of Maigo River. It was found out later that forty Japs had crossed the Maigo River about 3:00 o'clock dawn and had proceeded to the interior.

ONE LAUNCH DRIVEN OFF

At 11:00 AM, another launch attempted to land at a point east of Liangan Bridge. Here, Lt (later Capt) FRANCISCO DONOZO with five men attacked and drove them off in a brisk contact.

At 1:30 PM, a Jap soldier was observed signalling from the beach 400 meters west of the mouth of Liangan River. Immediately, the combined units of Capt P. AGUAM, Capt (later Maj) LAZARO SILVA, Capt FRANCISCO DONOZO, three AIF officers, fifteen other guerrilla officers and men together with a small force of fifty Japs located at the place where the Jap soldier was observed relaying a signal. The encounter was bitter, with the enemy driven back to Barongison Creek; eighteen Japs were killed. Two wounded on the guerrilla side.

LT WAGNER KILLED

The Japanese troops walked into Liangan about 3:00 AM, 21 Dec 1943, unopposed by our troops which had withdrawn across the Tonob Creek earlier in the night. At dawn, "G" Co opened fire on the Japs on Liangan from the east side of the Liangan River. Exchange of fire lasted for several hours. At the same time, the three AIF officers sniped at the Japs in Liangan from across the Tonob Creek. During this action, Lt WAGNER, AIF was shot through the head and killed instantaneously. The Japs crossed Liangan River at 10:00 AM and occupied the school building. During their stay here, they were continuously harassed by guerrilla snipers.

Before the Japs occupied Liangan, the supplies, arms and ammunition stored at the Division Headquarters were distributed to the men right after shooting was heard from the direction of Maigo on 20 Dec 1943. Those that could not be distributed were thrown into the bushes at the back of the house occupied by Col HEDGES, the then Division Commander. A message was received at Ho from the reconnaissance patrol that one group of Japs had followed the trail across Maigo River leading to the location of the Division Headquarters. Sgt (later Lieut) ROBERT K. MC CLAREN was dispatched with a patrol of eight men to contact the enemy. Enroute, he met a civilian who stated that there were Japanese soldiers occupying a house about two kilometers away, with more but 200 yards from Col HEDGES quarters.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS VACATED

Capt (later Maj) STEELE, AIF, joined in the defense of the Headquarters with the use of mortar fire. The fight that ensued was a heroic but futile stand against an overwhelming number of well armed Japanese soldiers who emerged from all directions. At 5:00 PM, the enemy was in complete control of the Division Headquarters. The guerrilla forces withdrew in disorder to the hills in the vicinity to harass the enemy all night long.

On 22 Dec 1943, at 4:00 AM, the Japs landed at three more points - at Agus, Timuga and Buru-un. Lt. LEONARDO ABADIANO with fifteen men from "L" Co of the 3rd Battalion, engaged the enemy at Agus; Lt ANTONIO PICARDAL with eight men from "L" Co engaged the enemy at Timuga; and Lt ANDRES ANTONIO, CO of "L" Co with eleven men engaged the enemy at Buru-un. These encounters lasted no more than thirty minutes after which the guerrillas withdrew to prepare positions. The enemy suffered twenty casualties, dead. On the guerrilla side, one dead.

JAPS WITHDRAW

On 23 Dec 1943, the Japs withdrew from Buru-un through the Ditucalan outpost. On 24 Dec 1943, all the Japanese troops withdrew from all other areas using barges. All points occupied by them were immediately re-occupied by the guerrilla troops afterwards.

21. THE "PRIVATE ROAD" ENCOUNTER

The "Private Road" encounter came to be so called because it happened on a "Private Road" leading to a hacienda occupied by a Japanese enterprise before the outbreak of the war.

At 6:00 AM, 3 Mar 1945, a group of thirty to forty Japanese were encountered by the outpost of the Combat Co of the 110th Division Special Troops at the Tagibo steel bridge between kilometers 9 to 10 along the Butuan-Cabadbaran Road (Agusan Province). The outpost fought for one and a half hours, then withdrew to join its company in a prepared line of defense. The Japs pursued the guerrillas but did not reach their main line of defense. They later deployed in the vicinity of the Tagibo steel bridge until 6:00 PM.

MORE JAPS ARRIVE

Just after dusk, a Jap column of ninety to one hundred men with four cartloads of supplies and an artillery gun dragged by a white horse appeared into view along the national highway from Cabadbaran proceeding to Butuan. There was tenseness all over the guerrilla line as every man waited for the order to commence firing. When the column reached the left-most sector of "A" Co which was the center flank of the DST defense, every gun, BARs, TSMGs, carbines and enfields simultaneously fired. A bloody fight followed. The Japs who were

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deployed in the vicinity of Tagibo steel bridge opened fire at the Combat Co entrenched in the left flank of the DST defense and tried to locate its left-most flank but failed. The Japs from Cabadbaran tried to encircle "B" Co which was at the right flank of the DST defense but were driven back with heavy fire.

From 6:30 PM, 3 March to 2:00 AM, 4 March, the Japs desperately fought to save their supplies left in the road. They were able to drag the carts only a few yards. They dared not approach the artillery gun which was in the field of fire of "A" Co.

CAPTURE JAP FLAG AND GUN

At 2:30 AM, 4 March, a message was sent to the CO of the 2nd Battalion, 113th Inf Regiment at Antongalon (adjacent unit of the DST) for reinforcement but none arrived. However, at 3:30 AM, the enemy fire markedly weakened. The .30 cal MG emplaced on the right flank of "B" Co and the bazookas which were reserved, were moved to the defense positions of "A" Co and brought into action. Later a group of picked guerrillas rushed to the road and captured the artillery gun and the Japanese flag.

At 6:00 AM, 4 Mar 1945, a carbine platoon under 3rd Lt PLACIDO ABELLANA, CO of "D" Co, DST, was organized to scout the area. At 7:30 AM, the 81mm gun opened up followed by bazooka rockets. The carbine platoon then advanced. One squad of the Combat Co under Sgt MACARIO JUMAYA, captured a cartload of Japanese supplies, while Lt ABELLANA with his carbine platoon captured two others.

Total number of enemy casualties could not be determined, but were believed heavy. Two dead Japs were found in the battle ground after the Japs retreated. The guerrilla units which numbered 151 men were intact, unscathed.

Captured materials in the "Private Road" encounter were as follows: One artillery mountain gun, one Jap rifle, cal.25, one enfield rifle cal .30 (No. 58015), five mortar shells (for Jap knee mortar), one Japanese flag, two cases of ammunition, twelve sacks of Saigon rice, twenty cans of canned beef, one Jap pack, one sack of salt, eight meat cans, three carabaos, one horse, two woolen blankets, one Jap cap, one fork, one spoon, four bayonets, two pairs of shoes, five aluminum cooking pots, three Jap grenades with pouches, one leather pouch, one Jap saber, three bolos, one pair of Knaki trousers, three carts, three boxes of Toyo powder, one Jap shirt, two Jap bags, five hundred pesos Japanese money, one pocket book with Japanese writing, and several materials with Japanese inscriptions.

22. GUERRILLA RESISTANCE HELPS TEN ESCAPING AMERICANS FROM DAVAO CONCENTRATION CAMP

6 APRIL 1943

Ten American officers concentrated in May 1942 in the enemy concentration camp at Davao Penal Colony, were saved by guerrilla troops from being recaptured by an enemy patrol in an engagement on 6 April 1943.

A Jap patrol of 120 men and five officers dispatched to recapture these ten fleeing Americans was spotted by a guerrilla unit consisting of twenty men at Km 10, Kinamayan-Anibongan Railway; while still two kilometers away, the guerrillas took strategic positions in preparation for an ambush. At the precise moment, the enemy advance guard was completely annihilated and several casualties on the main body inflicted. Accounted enemy losses were twenty-five soldiers, two officers and one physician, dead, and numerous wounded. No casualties were suffered on the guerrilla side. About 300 rounds of cal .30 ammunitions, a couple of bayonets, canteens, haversacks and biscuits were captured. The enemy was equipped with plenty of automatic weapons and hand grenades.

The enemy withdrew about 7:00 PM loading their dead and wounded in four trolley cars.

Due to the deep mud on both sides of the railway, darkness, and an exhausted supply of ammunition, the guerrillas withdrew to a nearby forest. It was found out later that the Americans who escaped from the hellish enemy camp were only a couple of hundred yards inside the forest from the scene of encounter. The resistance offered by the guerrillas at an opportune time

prevented the Jap patrol from going beyond the Anibongan-Kinsmayan railway in pursuit of the Americans who were later assisted by troops of the 107th Division. They were: Commander MELVIN MC COY, Maj (now Col) STEPHEN M. MELINICH, Capt WILLIAM F. DYESS (deceased), Capt (now Major) AUSTIN S. SHOFNER, 1st Lt (now Major) JACK HAWKINS, 2nd Lt (now Major) MICHAEL DOBERVICH, 2nd Lt (now Capt) LEO A. BOELEN, 2nd Lt (now Major) SAMUEL C. GRASHIO, Sgt (now 1st-Col) PAUL MARSHALL, Sgt (now Major) ROBERT SPIELMAN.

23.

NASIPIT OPERATIONS

18 APRIL 1945

The Combat Bn, 113th Inf Regt, 110th Division, stationed at Butuan, Agusan, with a total strength of 363 officers and men, aided by the 3rd Bn, 113th Inf Regt and supported by Navy Task Group No. 70.4, two LCIs Nos. 363 and 249 escorted by two LC's Nos. 9 and 10, conducted an amphibious operation in Nasipit as per authority from the CO, Tenth Military District, mission to eliminate the Jap garrison at Nasipit.

ENEMY POSITIONS SHELLED

On 18 April 1945 at 0300 hours, the Combat Bn, a special unit organized to operate against Nasipit from the sea, left its embarkation point, Tinigbasan, just across Butuan Bay, for its objective. Two LCIs, Nos 363 and 249 escorted by two US gunboats Nos. 9 and 10 were utilized to bring the unit to its destination. On the pre-dawn darkness of 18 April 1945, when the targets were visible, the gunboats No. 9 and 10 shelled Nasipit, particularly Punta and Talisay areas, the designated place of debarkation.

The shelling was terrific. Shells and rockets were hurled into the enemy positions, with intense MG fire. The shelling lasted for one-half hour. The LCIs bearing the troops then headed for the beaches with barking guns.

Finally at 0730 hours, 18 April 1945, the troops landed, wading through sea water to the beach.

RESISTANCE LIGHT

"A" Co supported by "C" Co, landed at Punta. Beachhead was immediately established and "A" Co under the command of 1st Lieut JUAN CALO, swept the whole area to Kinabhangnan bridge on the National Highway from the beach killing fourteen Nips on the way. At 0900 hours, Kinabhangnan bridge and vicinity were in the hands of the invading forces.

While "A" Co and "C" were establishing beachhead at Punta on the North side of Nasipit, "B" Co under the command of 2nd Lieut ALEJANDRO MONTILLA effected a landing at Talisay of Nasipit proper from CCI No. 363. Immediately upon gaining the beachhead, "B" Co operated towards the junction of Nasipit-Carmen road, portion of the National Highway.

The 1st and 2nd platoons operating West of Nasipit proper met slight resistance which was immediately crushed. The 3rd platoon followed the National Highway to Nasipit proper. At 0800 hours, Nasipit proper fell and the 3rd platoon continued its movement towards the road junction to the rest of the company at 0830 hours when the road junction fell, after clearing the place of Jap snipers. "A" and "B" Cos made junction at Kinabhangnan bridge.

"C" Co immediately took over and occupied Punta, Nasipit proper and Talisay areas and mopped up the area for stragglers and supplies.

The objective was gained and taken, and ground was organized from Kinabhangnan area to road junction Nasipit-Carmen on the National Highway for any counter-attack.

From the 19th until the morning of the 20th, the Japanese launched a heavy counter attack which was repulsed.

The remnants of the Nips garrison at Nasipit were killed in the mopping operation altho a few were successful in reaching Kiagta, another Jap garrison but in Buenavista. Guerrilla forces killed twenty-four Japs in this operation.

6 FEBRUARY 1945

Plans for the attack on Malabang, Lanao started 6 February 1945 but the general attack was not made until 8 Mar 1945 - it lasted for thirty-three days! The operation was undertaken to eliminate and wipe out the enemy in its garrison.

The guerrilla forces in the engagement were: the Expeditionary Battalion of the 108th Division, composed of "A" Co - 105th Inf Regt, "B" Co - 108th Inf Regt, "C" Co - 120th Inf Regt, and "D" Co - Commando Battalion, 108th Div; the 127th Inf, MMF; the 128th Inf, MMF; and the 2nd Separate Battalion, MMF; a contingent of the 105th Inf Regt and 126th Inf Regt as reinforcement.

Preliminary steps in preparation for the battle was undertaken from 1 to 6 March. Sectors for the participating units were defined: grounds organized and improved; and reconnaissance patrols sent out to gether fresh information about the enemy. US planes struck on the 6th of March heightening the morale of the men but causing considerable confusion on the part of the enemy.

The full offensive scheduled on 8 March was postponed. Activities during the day were nothing but an interchange of sporadic firing.

9 March was a day of lull. The enemy was apparently busy strengthening its position. The guerrillas worked on similar lines but took care to re-intensify its combat and reconnaissance patrols. Occasional bursts of mortar and heavy machine gun fire from the enemy broke the lull the next day but the guerrillas held their fire for a better opportunity. Combat and reconnaissance patrols went on as usual.

COORDINATED AIR-GROUND ATTACK

On 12 March, American planes struck at Fort Corcuera and that sector of the airfield occupied by the enemy. Ground operation coordinated with the movement; air runs were dependent on ground information. Elements of MAG 24 and GSAP Team #3, 13th Air Force supported the operation.

The activities on 13 March were confined to combat and reconnaissance patrols. There were contacts with the enemy but results were of no consequence.

On 14 March, some of the guerrilla units tried to advance but were held back. One enemy plane bombed the mouth of Matling River then headed Cotabato-ward. The guerrilla harassing units moved into action when the plane cleared but no gains were made.

Afternoon of 16 March, an order was issued in the guerrilla camp in preparation for the general attack the following day. Calmly, the men made preparations; positions for the mortars and heavy MGS were shifted to better locations to support the expected attack. Two mortar bursts from the Air Force was the signal to commence hostilities.

MAIN OFFENSIVE BEGINS

On 17 March, at 7:30 AM, the general advance was launched. Firing was heavy in all sectors, with mortar, MG, and rifles, on both sides. Enemy resistance was strong, especially in the sector of the Expeditionary Battalion near the airfield. The Expeditionary Battalion, 1st Provisional Regt, MMF, and the 127th Inf Regt, MMF, succeeded in gaining some ground. The 128th Inf Regt, MMF, remained passive, except for harassing patrols made during the attack. Firing was heavy til nightfall. Enemy casualties were not determined but believed heavy.

Japs opened fire at guerrilla positions early on the morning of 18 March. The fighting which ensued was again heavy.

The Expeditinary Battalion and the 1st Provisional Battalion, MMF, opened the counter-attack on 19 March directed at the airfield area. The 127th Inf Regt, MMF, followed. More grounds were gained; enemy rifles, helmets and documents were captured.

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AIRFIELD GROUND GAINED

US planes struck again on 20 March. 400 yards of ground was gained by the Expeditionary Battalion and a connecting trench in the airfield on the side of the Matling River was captured after a heavy resistance by the enemy. The 1st Provisional Regt MMF on the right of the Expeditionary Battalion also gained ground adding more of the airfield area which it had already occupied. The 127th Inf Regt, MMF also gained ground driving the enemy northward into the town proper.

On 21 March, the guerrilla units consolidated the grounds gained. Enemy fire was very strong during the day. The enemy attempted a counter-attack but were repulsed with heavy losses.

Mortar and heavy MG fire were delivered heavily on enemy positions on 22 March. Combat and reconnaissance patrols against the enemy were intensified.

A Jap plane dropped a bomb on a guerrilla position on 23 March but no damage inflicted. Sniping, harassing and reconnaissance patrols towards the enemy line continued.

OFFENSIVE INCREASED - BOTH AIR AND GROUND

On 24 March, US planes wrought havoc on the enemy location. During the run, the 128th Inf Regt, MMF sent harassing patrols to the rear of the enemy as a ruse, while other units slowly advanced in coordination. In the afternoon, more planes came. As pre-arranged, the guerrillas after the airstrikes and taking advantage of the enemy's confusion moved forward. It was a most precise moment and so Major REX BLOW sent a letter of surrender to the Japs garrison Commander (copy following). This was refused.

AIRFIELD CAPTURED

The airfield was completely captured. The Expeditionary Battalion and the 1st Provisional Regt were then massed facing the Matling River and the only Jap OP at Matling River bridge.

All units continued to press in. The 1st Provisional Regt, MMF, ordered to undertake the repair of the road towards Cotabato was relieved by the 2nd Separate Battalion, MMF.

JAP PLANE ACTIVE

On 27 March, a Jap plane bombed and strafed guerrilla positions but no damage was scored. The Expeditionary Battalion and the 2nd Separate Battalion engaged enemy OP at Matling River which offered heavy resistance.

On 30 March, a US Navy whaleboat owned by the guerrillas, armed with one 20mm and one heavy MG, shelled enemy positions from 300 yards off the beach while the guerrilla forces tried to inch forward.

ENEMY LOSSES ONE-HALF ITS GROUND

By the end of March, enemy-held ground was reduced to half of its original area from the start of the operations. A conference was held in the guerrilla operation headquarters on matters dealing with the necessity of reinforcement to bring the operation to a speedy conclusion. Contingents of the 105th Inf Regt and 126th Inf Regt, MMF were called to be placed against the most strong points of the enemy.

1-6 April were spent in the laying out of plans for the final drive. Contingents of the 126th Inf Regt, MMF arrived and were placed directly under the Expeditionary Battalion. Contingents of the 105th Inf Regt also arrived and were placed in the airfield sector between the Expeditionary Battalion and the 2nd Separate Battalion, MMF. Minute details for the final assault were studied under the continuous rain of enemy fire.

AMERICAN FORCES LANDING SOON

The series of US plane strikes started on 8 April. The remaining OP of the Japs west of Matling River at the bridge point was blasted. After the run, all units pressed the attack. Although not much ground was gained, the day's

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engagement was one of the most hard-fought. After the air run, the Expeditionary Battalion and the 2nd Separate Battalion and the contingent of the 105th Infantry Regt wiped out the last line of enemy resistance west of the Matling River and drove them to the town proper, while the 127th and 128th Inf, MMFs carried on harassing patrols to divert the attention of the enemy.

On 9 April, more planes came, using Napalm bombs. Most of the guerrilla units gained grounds and drove the enemy into a small pocket of the town portion towards the beach. Orders to launch the final assault the next day was issued.

FINAL ASSAULT-JAPS FLEE

More Napalm bombs were dropped on 10 April. The final assault was launched at exactly 1:15 PM after the planes had done their part. Firing was heavy in all directions and this continued til midnight, with all guerrilla units closing in. The Jap fought savagely and succeeded in breaking through the 127th Inf and 128th Inf, MMF lines midnight and fled by the use of dug-out canoes and others by foot to Parang, Cotabato Province.

At early dawn, 11 April, the Expeditionary Battalion was ordered to garrison Malabang.

LANAO PROVINCE NOW CLEARED OF JAPS

The occupation of Malabang by the guerrilla troops marked the end of Japanese control over Lanao Province and opened up a way to easy landing of American Liberation Forces from Malabang to Parang on 17 April.

The commanding Officers who took part in the important engagements during the operation were: Maj REX BLOW, AIF, Ground Control Officer, Maj LAZARO D. SILVA, Inf, CO, Expeditionary Battalion, Maj MALAMIT UMPA, MMF, CO of all MMF elements, and Capt LEO KELLETT, AC, Liaison Officer between the air group.

The enemy suffered a heavy but undetermined number of dead and wounded. It was the consensus of all Unit Commanders that only a conservative estimate would be 250 - between fifty and one hundred escaped south to Cotabato! The guerrillas suffered seventeen dead, twenty-one wounded. Many documents and much enemy equipment was captured. Intelligence data gained was most helpful to American Forces just prior to their large scale landing at Malabang and nearby Parang on 17 April 1945.

* * * * *

When the Malabang operation approached a climax, a letter was delivered to the Japanese Commander with surrender terms. It is reproduced below:

TENTH MILITARY DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS 108TH DIVISION

In the Field
23 March 1945

To: The Japanese Garrison Commander,
Malabang

1. No doubt you are by now informed of the progress of the war. In case you are not - American Forces have captured Zamboanga and your garrison is now nearest to American Forces, and no doubt, your turn to be annihilated will come very soon.

2. However, we have discovered you have women and children inside your garrison and as an American - I cannot but keep sympathizing with them in their predicament - as the nearing action will mean certain death for all - as you must know that cannot be avoided.

3. However, I am now making the following offer for you to consider:

a. Surrender of all your soldiers and civilians direct to me.

b. If you wish to accept this offer - indicate to us in the form direction of the Matling River with a white flag raised on

a stick. Bring with you no more than 4 men who will carry their rifle with muzzle towards the ground. Contact one of our officers who is in the line and will immediately send for me and we will discuss terms on the landing field.

4. I will personally guarantee your safety and if surrender is made, you will of course be concentrated and treated according to International Rules.

5. However, be warned that any attempt at treachery will have dire results for you in the future - you must know that you have very little chance of receiving any reinforcement or supplies, as you have probably noticed our submarines and launch patrol in waters of your shores. We also have unlimited air support now and bombing will be continued.

6. This note will be shown across to your lines by our men and you can send a reply in the same manner.

For the Division Commander:
/s/ REX BLOW

25.

DIPOLOG OPERATION

10 APRIL 1945

This operation was undertaken to prevent the enemy from pushing into Dipolog. The 108th Expeditionary Battalion with a strength of five officers and seventy-eight men aided the 107th Infantry Regt, 105th Div, and the Headquarters Company Service Troops of the 105th Division.

The 108th Div Expeditionary Battalion left Iligan on an LCI No. 361, on 6 April 1945 arriving at Katipunan, Zamboanga on 7 April, 1945.

On 8 April 1945, instructions were received from Maj DONALD WILLS and Maj MARCELO BONILLA who were then in charge of the operation. Maj WILLS showed them the map of the Japanese occupied area. On 9 April 1945, the Expeditionary Battalion left with Maj BONILLA and Lieut LUBATON, S-3, passing his Advance Command Post for Dinoman Valley. The troops then bivouacked at the school-building and established security. The enemy could be seen at the nearby hill.

ATTACK CAREFULLY PLANNED

The morning of 10 April 1945, the troops succeeded in getting through the Jap's first line of defense which our troops occupied in turn. This location was about 300 yards from between the hills. Security was again established and maintained.

At noon of 11 April 1945, Lieut ALVIOLA of the 107th Infantry, with his .50 cal machine gun arrived. He then supported the advance to Barren Hill supposed to be the second line of defense of the Japs. Lieut CABALLERO and Lieut CANOY were stationed in the right flank, with Lieut BERGIA and PICARDAL at the left flank. Fight lasted for about one and a half hours. The area was taken and line maintained until 13 April, 1945.

PLANES HELP

On 14 April 1945, nine US planes bombed and strafed enemy. Assaults were then made at the Bushy Hill nearby, where Japs established their line of defense. This assault should have been successful had the Combat Company of Maj BONILLA which was supposed to be the reserve company, appeared. The men did succeed in reaching the top of the hill, but were stopped there and withdrew shortly thereafter. This troop had to withdraw due to the superiority of fire of the enemy. One, Pvt CALLSAGAN of the Exp Bn was killed in the morning of 15 April 1945 by a sniper who was able to follow the withdrawal.

On 16 April 1945, the force moved back to Dinoman and waited for orders from Maj WILLS and Maj BONILLA. Patrol was sent to contact the two. On 17 April 1945, S-2 (Regiments Intelligence Section - 107th Regt) reported that the enemy moved to Dohinob Diet. Lieut CABALLERO with four enlisted men was sent out to verify the report. They came back with a report that the Japs were actually occupying the place. Six planes bombed and strafed the Japanese occupied area.

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After breakfast on 18 April 1945, the troops left for Japon to contact the enemy, but were late. The enemy was followed but the Jap move was too fast for them. Results: April 11 - 2 KIA on our side; April 14 - 2 KIA and 6 wounded on our side; April 15 - 1 KIA on our side. Enemy casualty was undetermined.

The operation in Dipolog was a success. The enemy was not able to proceed to the town proper, thus unable to occupy the airstrip, two kilometers north of the town. The combined troops of the 107th Infantry Regiment, 105th Headquarters Company Service Troops, and the 108th Expeditionary Battalion, not only proved good fighters, but also proved to be disciplined soldiers.

26. THE EPIC BATTLE OF TAGUM

10 NOVEMBER 1945

On 10 November 1944, about 3:00 AM, no less than 400 Jap regulars and marines riding in Q-boats, launches and boats, landed at Madaum under cover of darkness. The men of Cos "G" and "H" deployed along the beach of Madaum discovered the presence and immediately fired at them, inflicting some casualties. The Cal .50 MG sunk one launch and damaged others in the early part of the encounter. The fight along the beach continued until daylight with the enemy still unable to gain a foothold. The guerrillas centered their fire on the Japs alighting from the boats and those wading the waist-deep water, while the machinegun fired at the launches and Q-boats which were mounted with mortars and cal .50 MGs.

ENEMY FINALLY ESTABLISH BEACHHEAD

The stiff and stubborn resistance offered by the guerrillas, prevented the enemy from establishing a beachhead until 7:00 AM when fresh reinforcements from Davao City arrived and the assault was shifted to Galinan beach, two kilometers away penetrating through the sitio of Gogon at Madaum. The Japs then occupied Madaum up to Hijo River; after a hotly contested battle. The enemy despite heavy losses in men, continued to advance, and the guerrillas, in danger of being encircled due to numerical inferiority, withdrew from the beach and from Madaum. While the fight was in progress at Madaum, another Japanese force of about 200 effected a landing at Busaoan, after receiving resistance from the OP of the Combat Co of twelve men under a non-commissioned officer.

GUERRILLA TROOPS RE-POSITIONED

As a result of the occupation of Madaum up to Hijo River, the companies of the 2nd Battalion with the Combat Co were withdrawn in an orderly manner and disposed of as follows: Cos "G" and "H" maintained a line of defense along the Utley-Apokon Road; a portion of the Hq & Hq & Service Co of Co "E" and of Combat Co were deployed at Canukutan bridge; Combat Co and Co "E" from Km 48 junction to Km 50, Bincungan-Magugpo Road; Co "K" at Apokon Road up to Magugpo crossing, while Co "M" was at Bucana.

Late in the afternoon, these companies were withdrawn and disposed of as follows: Cos "H" and "G" at Magugpo crossing; Co "E" deployed along Apokon Road; Co "F" at Magugpo-Pagsabangan Road; Co "I" from Magugpo crossing to Km 56, Davao-Agusan Road; Combat Co at Km 60 to Km 62, Davao-Agusan Road, Co "K" at Km 57 to Km 60 of the same road, with outguards deployed along possible routes of enemy approach.

11 NOVEMBER 1944

On 11 Nov 1944, the enemy with fresh reinforcements from Davao, was discovered moving along the Bincungan-Magugpo Road to the National Highway. Our men immediately opened fire and killed two Japs. From 1:00 PM until dawn the next day, the fight continued with the guerrillas tenaciously holding their positions. Early in the morning of the following day, however, the Japs used trench mortars and pushed back the guerrillas who withdrew to Km 59, Davao-Agusan Road. Again the Japs pursued the guerrillas at Km 58, Davao-Agusan Road, and another hot encounter took place in this area. The guerrillas withdrew to Km 60, and from here to Km 62; established a strong defensive position which the enemy failed to penetrate. The enemy withdrew and did not advance any further.

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During the whole operation for the period from 10 to 13 November 1944, the total number of Jap casualties were undetermined but, definitely over 100, with many wounded, especially at the time of the initial attempts to take beachhead when our troops were in an enviable and excellent firing position. On the guerrilla side, one was missing or killed and three wounded.

27.

ISING OPERATION

1 MAY 1945

The 130th Regt with a strength of eighty-nine officers and 1292 E/m, aided by the 111th Prov Bn, launched the Ising, Davao offensive on 1 May 1945 following orders from the Commanding Officer, 10th Military District, as instructed by the Commanding General 10th Corps. The mission was to dislodge the enemy from Ising proper and clear the National Highway of this isolated garrison - the only Jap unit between Km 30 and the guerrilla troops. The entire operation lasted for twenty nine days and proved costly to the Japs which were driven back to Nanyo and away from the highway.

DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS

Combat Cos, "G", "I", "K" and "M" of the 130th Inf Regt crossed the Tagum River to establish positions between that and the Ising Rivers. "I" Co was ordered to Busaon vicinity for rear and left flank security. Movement began at 1400 hours on 2 May 1945, supported by an 81mm mortar from rear positions - purposes being to cut enemy reinforcements from Km 36. An enemy outpost was contacted about 2500 in advance of new positions by friendly scouts and this outpost opened up with a .50 cal MG.

Cos "M" and "I" formed the left flank and made an advance across the Ising River, "A" and "K" Cos formed the right flank and established positions on north bank of Ising River. At 1700 hours, the 1st Battalion made first contact with the enemy.

HEAVY FIRING

Combat Co and "G" Co also became engaged with the enemy about the same time, at Km 36 and two of our troops were killed, and six wounded in the encounter. This was on 3 May. On 4 May, Combat Co and "G" Co, contacted a larger force at same location which had approached from Panabo. Co "E" and GSS (General Service School) Bn, which acted as reserve, contacted the enemy at 0630, with heavy exchange of fire towards the evening. One KIA, three WIA and one MIA our side.

5 May, firing began very early in the morning, at 0230 hours. Cos "C" and "D" advanced from their positions, with "D" Co outflanking the Japs and attacking from the rear in hand to hand fighting. One .50 cal MG was captured by the Japs from our troops but it had first been put out of action. This battle lasted until 0430 hours with the enemy pouring in reinforcements and our troops withdrawing.

AMERICAN PLANE SUPPORT

An airstrike by American planes on 5 May, forced the enemy to withdraw to their main line of resistance. Heavy fire was changed after the air strike, with one KIA, three WIA and two MIA. The regiment then changed disposition of troops to counter-attack enemy attempting to push thru our lines. Combat Co was recalled to establish its position to left of "H" Co - this was 6 May 1945. On the 7th air support again helped but with stiff resistance by Japs, one was KIA and five WIA. On 8 May, all fronts closed in on enemy positions, with all heavy weapons in action. The 3rd Battalion with Combat Co was able to cross the Ising River. The 1st Battalion affected another crossing at Lucutan River, and both flanks moved forward. The Japs stubbornly held their positions and our units were forced to withdraw to their previous positions - this time due to lack of ammunition. In this encounter, two were KIA and five WIA, as yet no estimate of enemy casualties from the Ising operation. On 9 May, Japs took offensive and crossed the Ising River but were driven back to their positions.

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ENEMY ON OFFENSIVE

13 May, the Japs broke through the left flank of our troops and actually affected encirclement, but the unit was able to break thru to a new defense line along the north bank of Tuganay River. Cos "A", "K" and "M" were now established on this same river bank. Other units crossed the Tagum River for a third line of defense - should the enemy succeed in crossing the Tuganay River.

On 14 May, the 1st Battalion moved to new position along the Tuganay-Anibongan RR with "M" Co going to Km 41. Other units remained on north bank Tagum River and along the road leading from it. The enemy attempted to cross the Tuganay River at 1800 hours but was repulsed.

AMERICAN UNITS BRING SUPPORT

For the next several days, guerrilla troops merely held their positions, repulsing every enemy attempt to dislodge the units. Ammunition was low and the food supply inadequate and it would not be practical to launch offensives against the Japs at this period.

The 2nd Battalion, 19th Inf Regt of the 24th Division, USA, was in the meantime pushing steadily forward along the highway from Sasa, thus forcing the Japs to make some decision regarding their troops or be cut off from reinforcements.

At this time another airstrike assisted in the operation and the enemy began its withdrawal, offering only a few delaying actions before moving to the west towards Nanyo. A combat patrol joined forces with the American troops, one kilometer south of Ising - and the operation was ended.

MANY CASUALTIES

Our casualties had been rather high for this operation, much more than any previous encounter since the first action against the Japanese in the Davao area in September 1942. The final count was as follows: sixteen KIA; thirty-nine WIA; two MIA; eight IIA and one DIA.

Three Japanese PW were taken in the operation. It would however be impossible to accurately determine the enemy casualties. A great many were wounded and many more killed as a result of the frequent Japanese offensives.

28. IPONAN-CAGAYAN OPERATION

9 MAY 1945

Just before the landing of American forces in Mindanao on 10 May 1945, there were still Japanese pockets totalling about 300 men in the area west of the Cagayan River. In coordination with the plans of the American Forces, the guerrilla troops launched a general attack of these isolated Japs' pockets with the end in view of driving the enemy from this area, occupy Cagayan proper, and afford protection to the right flank of the beachhead established by the American forces in the Bugo-Agusan area.

Units participating in the operation were the 109th Inf Regt, composed of thirty-nine officers and three hundred fifty E.M and 120th Inf Regt, 108th Division, composed of one officer and three hundred fifty E/M. The 111th Inf Regt, 109th Div which joined the operation on 10 May 1945. The attack began 9 May 1945 as planned, and ended 12 May 1945.

PATAG AIRSTRIP CAPTURED

The general offensive of Iponan, Bulua, Patag, Bonbon and Bayabas, started on 9 May 1945. On the same day, the enemy at Iponan were reinforced by approximately 100 Japs at 10:00 in the morning. The enemy reinforcements possible came from Carmen or Calinogan. The enemy resisted the fight, but at 11:00 of the same day, the 1st Battalion of the 108th Inf Regt under Capt ANDRES BACAL, captured the strip at Patag and the enemy was reported to have withdrawn to Carmen Hills. In the afternoon of the same day, the 120th Inf Regt was able to cross the Iponan River as planned.

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PLANES STRAFE

Fighting continued at the Iponan River from early morning of 10 May 1945 til 10:00 AM. At 2:00 PM of the same day, the entire 120th Inf Regt was moved out West of Iponan River, per instruction of the higher headquarters, leaving the three battalions of the 109th Inf Regt across the river without support from the left rear of the enemy. CO of the 109th Inf Regt was ordered to pull out his troops West of Iponan River and fighting continued. At the same date, at about 7:30 in the morning, American troops landed between Cagayan and Bugo. Planes were seen flying low strafing Patag strip. Instruction was received that the plans of the troops clearing the areas West of the Cagayan River still stands. So the CO, 109th Inf Regt was directed to move out immediately with Kauswagan and Carmen as the objectives. Fighting continued and at noon of 11 May 1945, our troops occupied Kauswagan and Carmen. The 111th Inf Regt met them in Carmen the same day.

The Japanese numbered 300 at the west bank of Cagayan River, stationed at Baloloang, Carmen Hill, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, and Iponan. 200 of them immediately moved east of Cagayan River. They withdrew further passing Baloloang, Indahag, Kiliog, Libona and proceeding to Santa Fe.

On 11 May 1945, the 109th Inf Regt was ordered to push towards west side of Cagayan road. Route of approach was made in three points, namely; 2nd Battalion from beach to highway; 3rd Battalion and Combat Co in National Highway and 1st Battalion from Highway to Patag. Movements started at 8:00 AM and with initial point at Iponan River. At 10:00 AM, the entire Regt was at its objective - Cagayan River. The whole west side of the Cagayan River bank was occupied by this Regt without opposition.

CAGAYAN OCCUPIED

On 12 May 1945, this regiment was ordered to occupy Cagayan and at 9:00 in the morning of the same date, the 109th Inf Regt crossed Cagayan River in three points, namely: 2nd Battalion at Julao-Julao; 3rd Battalion at Jap wooden bridge; and the 1st Battalion at steel bridge. The whole town was occupied at 9:30 AM on 12 May 1945. All ground defenses were established. The defenses were as follows: 2nd Battalion from Macabalan to Old Provincial Building to Ateneo; and the 1st Battalion with the Combat Co attached from Ateneo to Macasanding to east bank of Cagayan River. Strongholds were made at Camaman-an and at Macasanding for possible route of Jap counterattack. Mopping operation was ordered and after the search, Cagayan was declared clear from enemy occupants.

The mission as stated in the first paragraph was completed successfully. The enemy casualties were undertermined, while on our side, one Corp BCNIFACIO JABONAN was wounded.

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CHAPTER IX

FINANCING THE MINDANAO GUERRILLAS

For a period of five months immediately before 16 Sept 1942 when the movement of rearmed resistance began and rapidly gained momentum all over Mindanao, the provincial and municipal coffers were practically empty.

The financial problem, however, could not be side-tracked. The issue had to be met squarely. In the beginning, this problem solved itself in the form of voluntary contributions in cash or in kind, in the extensive and intensive food-production program; in the commandeering of equipment, food-stuffs and other supplies backed up with the official announcement that every item taken by the Army would be paid for and, finally, the printing of Emergency Currency Notes which paved the way for the stabilization of the economic life of the people.

Immediately after the surrender of the USAFFE in Mindanao on 10 May 1942, the retreating unsundered USAFFE officers and men who found their way into Misamis Occidental, were taken for rations in a temporary camp at barrie Guba, Clarin, where the provisions for soldiers were stored. When the supply was almost exhausted, instructions were issued to the men to return to their respective homes. Excepted were the personnel of the 1st Company, PC, Misamis Occidental.

These movements were made upon orders of Maj FABIAN B. MEJIA, PC, Provincial Inspector for Misamis Occidental at the outbreak of the war. Major MEJIA did his best to alleviate the deplorable condition into which the unsundered officers and men were thrown.

MEN WITHOUT FUNDS

Many of the soldiers and officers came from Luzon, Visayas and some from Mindanao. How were they to reach their homes in the absence of necessary transportation facilities? Most of them did not have any clothes except the tattered ones on their bodies. Most of them were not paid just before the surrender. Consequently, they had no money to spend.

They asked Maj MEJIA that they be paid their salaries for a month's period at least, that of April 1942. The Provincial Inspector did not object to making payments provided proper vouchers were accomplished. The amount available was, however, inadequate. The situation of the men was so tight that they even went to the extent of going from house to house in order to get something to eat. And then, a new turn of events developed - robberies and thieveries. The Provincial Civilian Relief Administration (CRA), a pre-war government entity, helped to remedy this deplorable state of affairs. Part of its funds was then allotted for the chartering of sailboats to return the officers and men residing of the Visayas and Mindanao to their respective home areas.

Then came 16 Sept 1942. Unsundered officers and men who had been laying low in the mountains and civilian volunteers from all walks of life including the men from the professions, flocked to the recruitment stations. The number of recruits increased to unexpected proportions and then, came the big question: How should the organization be maintained, especially in the matters of feeding the troops?

NO IMMEDIATE PAY ASSURED

The militia Organization in the provinces of Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga were organized in the latter part of September 1942 into the Occidental Misamis-Zamboanga Sector with Maj MEJIA as Sector Commander. His greatest problem was the garrisoning of the different places under his sector and furnishing the men the necessary needs. These men were made to understand that there were no available funds as yet to pay them, and no steady supply of food with which to feed them. That the services they were performing were voluntary, at least for the present - although they could have plenty to expect in the future.

Major MEJIA, under instructions from FERTIG, disapproved the Commandeering of foodstuffs and other supplies. But despite the precaution taken, commandeering took its course and with it all the attendant evils.

CIVILIAN COOPERATION SOUGHT

MEJIA called into conferences all the prominent people of the province of Misamis Occidental and caused the holding of community assemblies. Through these media, the people were informed of the sad state of the local treasuries and the imperative necessity of resorting to voluntary contributions in the form of cash or in kind. They were made to understand that the Army must be fed, if it must be expected to succeed at all. In clear, unequivocal terms the purposes and aims of the organization were stressed, the fight against the Japs and the suppression of lawlessness emphasized.

The point was well driven home; the people responded favorably. Committees were created in all towns composed of municipal mayors, municipal treasurers, secretaries, councilors and other influential persons. Voluntary contributions were properly receipted for by local persons and turned over to the municipal treasurer who in turn delivered the receipts to the corresponding army authorities. As the guerrilla movement grew, the same methods of appeal to the masses and manner of collection were adapted.

EMERGENCY NOTES PRINTED

In some municipalities in Mindanao, local governments printed very crude emergency notes in small denominations as medium of exchange the circulation of which was valid only within confines of the municipalities printing and issuing them. The purpose was served all right. The notes were in due time collected and put out of circulation.

One of Col FERTIG's first acts when he assumed command of the Mindanao guerrillas was the activation of a section that was to take charge of the finances of the organization. He asked Capt CALIXTO DE LEON, an unsundered PA officer, later made Lt-Col, to organize it. Capt DE LEON set himself to the task.

PAY SCALE ADOPTED

Capt. DE LEON organized a Finance Section but at that time, in the beginning, the only disbursement of funds authorized by the Commanding Officer was the payment of cash advance allowances to the officers and men effective as of 1 Oct 1942, per GO #1-3, par 3, dated 14 Nov 1942:

Officers

Majors & Field Grades	- \$150.00 per month
Captains	- 100.00 per month
1st Lieuts	- 80.00 per month
2nd Lieuts	- 70.00 per month
3rd Lieuts	- 60.00 per month

Enlisted Men

Master Sergeant	- 20.00 per month
First Sergeant	- 18.00 per month
Technical Sergeant	- 18.00 per month
Staff Sergeant	- 15.00 per month
Corporal	- 12.00 per month
Private 1st Class	- 11.00 per month
Private	- 10.00 per month

Later the Commanding Officer authorized the payment of \$.20 to each man per day for the purchase of viands and \$.25 for the purchase of rice or corn. Total for viands and rice or corn was later increased to \$.70 per man a day.

Voluntary contributions from the civilian population was finally stopped on 11 May 1943 by virtue of Circular #70, issued by Col FERTIG on which occasion he publicly thanked the loyal citizens who voluntarily and generously gave what they could for the maintenance of the soldiers.

FUNDS ALLOTTED FOR PROJECTS

Besides paying the cash allowances and cash rations for the officers and men, the Finance Officer disbursed funds, as specifically authorized by the Commanding Officer. Among these were the expenses entailed in the construction airfield, commonly known for security reasons as farm projects, the maintenance and operation of distilleries for the manufacture of oil and alcohol; and the operation of land and water transportation.

By 1943 the guerrilla movement in Mindanao had assumed an impressive magnitude in organization. Col FERTIG felt the time had come to make it imperative that money should by all means be printed. The growing undertaking, already attaining astonishing headway must be sufficiently and soundly financed.

The imminence of defeat before the time of surrender to the Japanese led the Philippine authorities to burn a great many of Philippine Treasury Notes. Hence the USAFFE forces, especially those in the Visayas and Mindanao, were unable to receive monetary assistance from the outside. So it was necessary that President QUEZON issue an order to print Emergency Currency Notes for the various Visayan and Mindanao provinces. Consequently, President QUEZON authorized the printing of Emergency Currency Notes sometime in January 1942.

MONEY PRINTING PROBLEMS

Several provinces therefore were ordered to print currency notes usually in small denominations to relieve the situation they were confronted with. In the provinces there was very little equipment for printing. The principal center of the printing industry was Debu and Mindanao. The supply of paper, printing ink and types were limited. There was no instructions for a uniform design and the only available photoengraving equipment outside of Manila was in the City of Cebu where the cuts for the Debu Emergency Currency Board were made.

It was the plan to furnish Visayas and Mindanao with the currency notes issued by these Emergency Currency Boards.

A uniform water-marked paper was made by the Bais Paper Mills, Negroes Oriental, especially for the work. This paper was used by the Cebu Emergency Currency Board and the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board during the short time these boards functioned - that is, before Cebu was taken by the Japs in April and Mindanao in May 1942.

JAP MILITARY NOTES CIRCULATED

Before the guerrilla forces occupied various areas in the Visayas and Mindanao, the Japanese Military Notes were being circulated along with the old Philippine Treasury Notes. This was the policy which was enforced by the Japanese Military Authorities.

All Philippine Emergency Currency was confiscated whenever possible by the Japs and those found with the Emergency Currency Notes were severely punished.

The guerrilla forces issued orders prohibiting the circulation of the Japanese Military Notes. It was therefore necessary in some localities that civil authorities issue emergency currency. This was done in some cases by means of amateurishly-made rubberstamps, wood engravings and printer's type. The emergency notes printed were small denominations such as P.05, P.10 and P.20. They were printed by means of small printing press, typewriter or were mimeographed or with the simple use of hand stamp. In some provinces like Misamis Occidental, the balance of the unprinted and unspent money authorized to be printed by President QUEZON, were printed and circulated.

EMERGENCY NOTE PRINTING RESTRICTED

On 27 Mar 1943, Lt-Col FERTIG, by virtue of the authority vested in him as Commanding Officer of the Tenth Military District, by the Commanding General of the US forces in SWPA, issued a proclamation whereby he revoked the authority granted by the Provincial Boards of all provinces in Mindanao embraced in the Tenth Military District, to print Emergency Circulating Notes. And by the same authority, he revived the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board.

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As the former members served the enemy or could not be located, it was necessary to appoint new members and these appointments were confirmed by the President of the Philippines on 10 Apr 1943. The members were composed of Judge FLORENTINO SAGUIN, Chairman; F.D. PACANA, Provincial Treasurer of Misamis Occidental and I. BARBASA, Auditor of the same province.

Currency printed by this board was legal tender and hence accepted in circulation throughout the guerrilla-occupied areas in Mindanao and in certain areas in some of the Visayan provinces. This relieved the tight financial situation. The emergency notes were circulated at par with the old Philippine Treasury Notes. Counterfeiting existed but in very negligible scale. Every effort was made by the Tenth Military District to curtail this evil.

QUEZON AUTHORIZES TWENTY MILLION PESOS

President QUEZON authorized the printing of emergency notes in the amount of twenty million pesos and this amount was about covered in the subsequently printed emergency notes. Metal coins were practically out of circulation. The owners either hid them or if not, the Japs confiscated them.

The money needed by the Army and the existing provincial and municipal governments of Mindanao and Sulu for their expenses were advanced by the Mindanao Emergency Currency Board with the prior approval of the Commanding Officer of the Tenth Military District.

To lessen and minimize the expenses in running the local governments, municipal and provincial positions which were not absolutely necessary and could very well be dispensed with, were simply not filled in. Aside from this, only one-half of the salaries were paid, with the understanding that claims for the unpaid balance may be collected later under proper claims. This arrangement was later modified and the paying of salaries was based on a table of graduated scale. No kick was registered as even the Tenth Military District personnel were receiving comparatively much less than the government employees.

FINANCE OFFICERS APPOINTED

As sufficient funds became available, Division Finance Officers were designated in the different divisions then created whose duty it was to handle the finances of their respective divisions, and much later, each regiment designated its own finance agent officer.

In January 1944, the "A" Corps, Western Mindanao, was established consisting of the 105th, 106th, 108th and 109th Divisions. Lt-Col DE LEON remained as the Force Finance Officer while Maj BENJAMIN B. MERCA was designated Corps Finance Officer. In October 1944, a Force Auditing Section was organized headed by Lt SCHMEIKES and later by Lt S. S. SALVACION. This section was abolished in April 1945.

On 31 Mar 1945, the "A" Corps was abolished. Lt-Col CALIXTO DE LEGON was relieved as Force Finance Officer and assigned as Liaison Officer between the Hq Tenth Military District and the province of Sulu.

Before the President QUEZON left the Philippines in March 1942, he created two central emergency currency boards - one in Cebu for the Visayan provinces and another in Dansalan, Lanao, under the name of Mindanao Emergency Currency Board or MECB.

First members of the MECB were Commissioner TEOPISTO GUINGONA, as Chairman; Mr. UBALDO D. LAYA, Provincial Treasurer for Misamis Oriental, and Mr. T. ALAGABAN, Auditor for the province of Lanao. This board functioned in Dansalan, Lanao, for about a month only, due to enemy invasion of Mindanao during the later part of April 1942.

LAYA, under orders of General ROXAS, left Dansalan for Misamis Oriental on 1 May, 1942. His place in the board was temporarily taken over by the Municipal Treasurer of Dansalan, JULIAN ABERILLA.

MECB HAS DIFFICULTIES

Events happened after 1 May 1942. On 2 May 1942, the Japs occupied Dansalan. Information received by LAYA from SAM J. WILSON when they met in Talakag, follows: WILSON from the Headquarters of Gen FORT at Bubong, Lanao, was to contact General ROZAS at Cagayan, but could not do so due to the blowing of the Cagayan bridge just when WILSON was about to cross it. The latter said that the MECB records, supplies and a few pieces of its equipment including a hand cutting machine, as well as some printed and numbered but uncut notes of P 2,00 denomination had to be hurriedly evacuated from Dansalan in the dead of the night on 1 May 1942 by truck toward Tamparan, Lanao, under the charge of DONATO DACUSIN, Treasurer of Sulu, who acted as Executive Officer and Secretary of the MECB. DACUSIN was murdered by the Moros while on the way to Tamparan on or about 5 May 1942. WILSON who furnished this information did not make any mention as to what happened to the funds in the hands of DACUSIN. It was presumed however, that the money was taken by the Moro criminals.

The MECB resumed functioning for the first time at barrio Matugas, Misamis Occidental from 5 April 1943 to 26 June 1943 where a total of P 3,021,520.00 were printed.

The MECB encountered many hardships during its existence. The intense enemy patrols to locate the mint - and so the transfer from one place to another of the press and other printing paraphernalia - the dismantling, setting up and dismantling again - lack of food - sickness suffered by the personnel. Yet somehow, the MECB acquitted itself more than creditably, doing wonderfully well in turning out the much-needed currency notes to finance the gigantic undertaking of running an Army of some 33,000 officers and men and of alleviating the conditions of the people of Mindanao as a whole. Total economic collapse and disintegration of the guerrilla forces was definitely avoided.

Invasion by the enemy on 26 Jun 1943 of the province of Misamis Occidental caused the transfer of the printing outfit to Liangan, Lanao, where it began to function from 5 Sept 1943 to 1 Nov 1943; turning out a total of P2,689,400.00. At this time, Mr. UBALDO D. LAYA, former member of the MECB was requested by Col FERTIG to join. He reported on 5 Sept 1943 and immediately took charge of the work and supervised the printing.

PRESS CALLED "RICE MILL"

The printing press was called the "rice mill" to maintain secrecy. It was located at the edge of a forest. About it, Col FERTIG, in a personal note to Commander JOSEPH WILLINGHAM, USN, dated 18 Sept 1943, wrote:

"Our mint consisted of a small nipa shack in a corn-field, and I believe that it is probably the most unique mint now functioning under the supervision of the government of the United States."

The Liangan site considered insecure, another transfer was effected, to Upper Agusan, this time up the Agusan River. In Esperanza, Agusan, printing started 13 Dec 1943 to 25 Jan 1944, where a total of P4,970,630.00 was turned out.

ENEMY SEEKS MINT DESTRUCTION

Enemy pressure caused transfer again to Loreto, Upper Agusan River, where work was resumed 15 Mar 1944. On 5 Jul 1944, for the first time the personnel of the mint discovered that printing money, though legally, was not at all healthy. Enemy planes swooped down, bombed and strafed Loreto. The first bomb hit and destroyed the personnel quarters of the mint; the second bomb fell on an empty house in front of the office building; the third fell way out of town and the fourth fell on the river bed just in front of Loreto. There were no casualties, however,

Total amount printed at Loreto up to 25 Oct 1944 was P3,651,445.00.

Total amount printed at Matugas, Liangan, Esperanza and Loreto up to 25 Oct 1944 - P14,342,995.00.

In Oct 1944, negotiations were made to set up a branch printing press at Dipolog which was imperative due to increased enemy pressure in the province of Agusan and vicinity. This was also made to have the "A" Corps some accessibility to the mint. The press of ANGEL SOTTO was rented. The work began in Sept 1944 up to April 1945. Over P7,000,000.00 were turned out by this mint.

The printing of Philippine Emergency Currency is a Philippine Government undertaking. No army officers and men were employed with the exception of Lt-Col SAM J. WILSON who acted as technical adviser and liaison officer of the Philippine Government and the Tenth Military District.

INFLATION DANGERS

The subject of finance is interwoven with the economic problems which beset the guerrilla movement. Efforts were exerted to minimize the increasing difficulties of living, by rigid control of adverse economic factors.

Inflation of prices in the free areas. Sky-high prices of commodities of prime necessities was partly controlled by the organization of the Food Supply Administration on 23 Dec 1942 and the Trading Post Administration organized later, both under the control of the Director of Civil Affairs for the province concerned. The primary purpose of the FSA was the distribution of food and commodities to the civilian population at a reasonable and fair price by control of supply and distribution.

The personnel employed was granted limited police powers to enforce compliance with regulations issued by the Administration. All officers of the USFIP and the military police were required to assist in the performance of their duty. In order to coordinate the efforts of the FSA and the USFIP, Capt LEON GATMAYTAN, former Superintendent of Schools for Misamis Occidental, was assigned on detached service with the Tenth Military District, as General Manager.

The FSA was authorized to buy all imports and to control the exports. In no case were exports allowed to get into enemy-occupied areas.

TRADING POSTS ESTABLISHED

The primary purpose of the TPA was the establishment of trading posts in each municipality to encourage the distribution of food to the consumer at a limited profit. Efforts were exerted to control the prices of the prime necessities of life like rice and corn.

Much later the FSA and TPA were entirely severed from all connections with the USFIP and made an entirely civil government undertaking. Mr. GATMAYTAN continued as its General Manager.

The workings of these organizations were far from perfect and their efficiency not faultless. Yet these entities had supplies and civilian population with food within their limited reach, and had saved the Army hundreds of pesos in the purchase of food which otherwise would have cost much more.

FARM PROJECTS SPONSORED

Community farms and victory gardens, poultry and hog raising projects, sponsored by the Army and civil officials, were intensified everywhere. In spite of the presence of plant pests and animal diseases; floods and draught, and on top of it active enemy patrols which seemed to have conspired together during a period of turmoil and distress, the products produced improved the food situation impressively and led to the lowering of prices.

Carabao sleds, carts, sailboats and launches were some of the means utilized in the transportation of foodstuffs from one place to another. In two or three sectors, trucks were used but only for short distances as most of the roads and bridges were unserviceable - either blasted purposely in the early days of the war or destroyed by action of the elements, and never repaired.

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HOME INDUSTRIES ENCOURAGED

In all places, the civil government waged a campaign directly supported by the Army for the development of home industries.

Weaving was encouraged. Cloth was manufactured from cotton, ramie and abaca fiber. Finished products were in great demand which, of course, could not be met because of the limited production. Cigarettes, crudely manufactured, substituted for American brands - though a poor substitute, were in big demand. The biggest handicap was lack of paper.

Salt, soap, coconut oil, and alcohol from tuba were produced in sufficient quantities to supply civilian and army needs. The intensified stimulus for the production of food products included the tending of home gardens, and the employment of unarmed soldiers in Army farm projects. It is consoling to note that even during the dark days, Mindanao had been able to share food with the adjacent areas in the Visayas, like Leyte, Cebu and Bohol.

INFLATION NO CONCERN OF JAPS

The enemy did nothing to check the rise in prices of commodities. The circulation of Japanese emergency notes in unlimited quantities and absolutely worthless, caused the sky-high rise of commodities. At one time, the price of one cavan of palay was reported to have been no less than P1,000.00 in Cagayan and a little less in other Jap-held towns. The currency of the Japs was never accepted in the free areas. Yet, as the free areas were immediately outside the Jap-held towns, the inflation therein affected the guerilla-held territory.

NO TAXES COLLECTED

Due to intensive enemy activity and the subsequent unstable factors affecting the living conditions of the people, little attempt was exerted by the civil government to collect any taxes, except in some cases in internal revenue tax collection on tobacco and market fees which, of course, is not worth mentioning.

TROOP MORALE STIMULATED

The landing of the American Liberation Forces under Gen MAC ARTHUR on Leyte on 20 Oct 1944, closed the darkest period in the Philippine History.

Executive Order No. 22, issued in Nov 1944, by President SERIO OSMENA, published a new schedule of pay and allowances for officers and men of recognized guerrilla organizations. This had tremendous effect on raising the standard of living of the soldiers and officers...those who had spent three years in indescribable hardships, fighting the enemy in jungles and plains, rivers, lakes and seas; leaving family and other loved ones behind. This order raised the morale of all the people. This, however, was not actually followed. Executive Order of the President dated 10 Mar 1942 was made effective. And so beginning 17 Apr 1945, the day American Forces started the Mindanao Campaign of Liberation, the officers and men have been paid in Philippine Treasury Certificates, commonly known as Victory Notes. The following schedule of salaries was followed:

<u>Officers</u>			
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Annual Pay</u>	<u>Monthly Pay</u>	<u>Quarters Allowance</u>
Major General	P16,000.00	P1,333.33	P200.00
Brigadier General	12,000.00	1,000.00	200.00
Colonel	8,000.00	666.67	200.00
Lieut-Colonel	7,000.00	583.33	200.00
Major	6,000.00	500.00	160.00
Captain	4,800.00	400.00	140.00
1st Lieutenant	4,000.00	333.33	100.00
2nd Lieutenant	3,000.00	250.00	80.00
3rd Lieutenant	2,400.00	200.00	60.00

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Line and Medical Service Enlisted Men

Master Sergeant	P1,032.00	P86.00	P16.00
Technical Sergeant	840.00	70.00	16.00
1st Sergeant	840.00	70.00	16.00
Staff Sergeant	720.00	60.00	16.00
Sergeant	612.00	51.00	12.00
Corporal	444.00	37.00	12.00
Private 1st Class	264.00	22.00	8.00
Private	216.00	18.00	8.00

The following represent the trial balance sheet for the Tenth Military District since its organization on 16 Sept 1942 to 31 May 1945:

a. RECEIPTS

Cash Advances from MECB - - - - -	P15,315,998.29
Cash Advances from FFO (Capt P. F. CEDDRAN, Actg FFO) - - - - -	3,710,650.00
Cash Advances from the Provincial Treasurer, Occidental Misamis - - - -	923,000.00
Cash Advances from the Province of Lanao - - - - -	1,300,000.00
Cash Advances from the Province of Zamboanga - - - - -	700,000.00
Miscellaneous - - - - -	1,455.00
Plus: Transfer of accountability from Actg FFO & MECB- - - - -	97,200.00
TOTAL - - - - -	P22,048,303.29

b. DISBURSEMENTS:

Cash Loan to American, Swiss and Other Foreign born citizens - -	P29,360.00
United States Pensioners - - - - -	71,683.15
Cash Advances; Transferred Accounts; SWPA Personnel; Army & Navy Personnel; Reverted PC & USAFFE Officers' Allowance; Allotments; Officers' Additional Allowance; American Officers' Additional Mess Allowance; and Miscellaneous Accounts Receivable - - - - -	11,387,306.10
Expenditures - - - - -	10,331,015.62

TOTAL - - - - - P 21,819,364.87

c. CASH ON HAND AS OF 31 MAY 1945 - - - - 228,938.42

GRAND TOTAL - - - - - P 22,048,303.29-22,048,303.29

d. The expenditures of P10,331,015.62 were distributed as follows:

Hq 10th Military District - - - -	P358,647.47
Force Radio Section - - - - -	36,697.08
105th Division - - - - -	1,212,131.28
106th Division - - - - -	740,221.92
107th Division - - - - -	565,044.24
108th Division - - - - -	2,059,694.40
109th Division - - - - -	2,186,740.21
110th Division - - - - -	3,198,074.95
75th Inf, 7th Md - - - - -	42,868.33
41st Inf, X Corps - - - - -	174,550.60
125th Inf Regt - - - - -	20,000.00
Provinces - - - - -	165,941.40
Miscellaneous - - - - -	168,518.20
TOTAL - - - - -	P10,929,130.08

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FINAL PHASE

REDEMPTION OF EMERGENCY NOTES

The printing, issuance and disbursements of the Philippine Emergency Currency Notes were authorized by Commonwealth President MANUEL L. QUEZON, who, in turn, had the full authority to do so, empowered as he had been by the National Assembly of the Philippines, by virtue of the Emergency Powers Act.

The role played by the Philippine Emergency Currency Notes in the life of the guerrillas and that of the civilian population could not be less emphasized. The money circulated as legal tender and on the strength of the assurance of redemption after the termination of the emergency, has helped in no small measure in maintaining the economic stability of the people during the darkest period in their history. Primarily, however, the basic employment of the Emergency Currency was in the war effort actively engaged in by the Mindanao guerrillas, especially in the gathering of intelligence information for the evaluation and use of Higher Headquarters. This phase, as time has proved, has been well-done and markedly successful.

It speaks well for the people - soldiers and civilians alike, that they accepted without reservation this form of monetary exchange, completely trusting in the rectitude of their own government and that of the United States.

C H A P T E R X
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT

Before the normal processes of government could be established over Mindanao, Col WENDELL W. FERTIG believed, and rightly so, that military governments must be set up, to prepare a firm ground upon which civil authority could stand and steadily function.

On 16 Feb 1943, Col FERTIG issued a proclamation establishing, in behalf of the United States of America, the Commonwealth of the Philippines in those areas under military control.

Civil government has been progressively established in those places where the guerrillas were organized.

DIRECTORS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS: The Commanding Officer, 10th Military District, directly administered the civil affairs of all the different provinces, seeking advice from his Judge Advocate General and Staff on legal matters, and from the Director of Civil Affairs whose office was created later on the different provinces and who also served, in addition to other duties, as Liaison officer between the Army and the civil government. The following were the Directors of Civil Affairs for:

Davao)
Agusan)-- Mr. P. A. PELAYO
Surigao)

Misamis Oriental-- Mr. JOSE VALDEHUEZA

Misamis Occidental)
Zamboanga)-- Mr. FLORENTINO SAGUIN

Bukidnon-- Mr. CARLOS FORTICH

Cotabato-- Mr. M. A. CONCHA

On 10 Oct 1944, however, Col FERTIG ordered the abolition of the office of the Director of Civil Affairs in the province of Zamboanga, Misamis Oriental, Misamis Occidental, Suriagao, Agusan and Davao, with the exception of Lanao, Cotabato and Bukidnon, which were abolished at a much later time when conditions obtaining therein justified the action.

GOVERNORS: Agusan was placed under the military control of the 110th Division since its activation on or about 20 Nov 1942. Senior Board Member JOSE AZOTE was designated as Actg Governor of this province by the Guerrilla Command. The other officials subsequently chosen were:

Board Member-----	JOSE P. SATORRE
Provincial Treasurer-----	QUIRICO BATTAD
Provincial Auditor-----	FERNANDO ORONDEZ
District Engineer-----	PASTOR LOZADA
Actg District Health Officer-----	Dr. GALO FRANCO
Actg Division Superintendent of Schools-----	BERNARDINO CARINO
Actg Provincial Fiscal---	GABRIEL BANAAG
Provincial Agronomist----	PEDRO ROSALES

During the incumbency of JOSE AZOTE as Actg Governor, the seat of the government was in the interior of Buenavista. In the later part of 1943, Mr. JOSE ROSALES was installed as Governor of the province in place of JOSE AZOTE. The Japs left Agusan on 28 Aug 1943, but came back in large numbers on 15 Mar 1944, occupying one after another, Nasipit, Buenavista, Butuan, Cabadbaran and environs. The civil government officials, in the intense enemy mopping-up operations that followed, surrendered one by one. The guerrillas arrested the erring officials sometime in the later part of 1944. They, however, were released and reinstated due to the lack of men to take their

places, but this action was without prejudice to the subsequent filing of charges against them when the Commonwealth Government shall have been restored.

In Surigao, on 1 August 1943, the Commanding Officer, 10th Military District, appointed Mr. PHOTOLICO EGAY as Actg Provincial Governor. The following were the other civil officials of the province:

Secretary to the Governor-----	Mr. T. J. GERALDINO
Actg Provincial Treasurer-----	Mr. FELIX ALA-AN
Actg Asst Prov Treasurer-----	Mr. T. APARICIO
Actg Provincial Auditor-----	Mr. G. LAURENTE
Actg Cashier & Deputy-----	Mr. G. GALEON
Actg District Engineer-----	Mr. V. TIZON
Actg Asst District Engineer-----	Mr. JOSE EGAY
Actg District Health Officer-----	Mr. N. BUENDIA

The following were the Mayors of the different municipalities as appointed by the Commanding Officer, 10th Military District:

Mayor of Bacuag-----	Mr. JUAN ALVARES
Mayor of Bislig-----	Mr. SEMON MONTERO
Mayor of Cantilan-----	Mr. JOSE ABREZA
Mayor of Carascal-----	Mr. PATRICIO CASTRO
Mayor of Dinagat-----	Mr. LORENZO BAURA
Mayor of General Luna-----	Mr. JOSE GONZAGA
Mayor of Gigaquit-----	Mr. TIMOTEO OMAI
Mayor of Hinatuan-----	Mr. CANDIDO VIOLA
Mayor of Lanuza-----	Mr. SERIO VETE
Mayor of Lianga-----	Mr. SATURNINO PATERNO
Mayor of Lingig-----	Mr. G. SILVOSA
Mayor of Loreto-----	Mr. ANDRES OLACO
Mayor of Mainit-----	Mr. ROSALEC MONGADO
Mayor of Numancia-----	Mr. RICARDO PLATIL
Mayor of Placer-----	Mr. MARCELO PATAGAN
Mayor of Surigao-----	Mr. JUAN ALOYON
Mayor of Tago-----	Mr. TOMAS PAREJA
Mayor of Tandag-----	Mr. JAIME SERNA

In the province of Misamis Oriental, a civil government was also established. Due to the presence of the enemy along the Bukidnon-Misamis Oriental National Highway and capital town of Cagayan, the province of Misamis Oriental was divided into Eastern and Western portions.

The civil government of Western Misamis Oriental which covered the sector from West of Tagoloan River to the boundary of Misamis Oriental and Occidental was organized by virtue of the instructions issued by Col FERTIG on 11 Dec 1942. PEDRO S. BACULIO was proclaimed the Military Provincial Governor. The Deputy Provincial Governors for the Eastern and Western Misamis Oriental were VICENTE B. DE LARA and FRANCISCO G. YSALINA, respectively.

In Misamis Occidental, ANGEL MEDINA, former Board Member, was appointed as Actg Governor in place of PORFIRIO VILLARIN, pre-war Governor, who had served under the Japanese government and at that time in Manila. Most of the provincial officials, whether elective or appointive, were restored to their respective positions by the Commanding Officer, 10th Military District.

In Lanao, the civil government started with the appointment on 18 Nov 1942 of Mr. MARCELO T. PAISO as Military Governor by Col FERTIG. This designation was changed to Provincial Governor on 1 Mar 1943. The temporary seat of the provincial capital was located at Kauswagan, Iligan. Pre-war Mayor LEO GARCIA of Iligan, having surrendered to the enemy, was replaced by JORGE RAMIRO on 13 Nov 1942. Seat of the government was at Dalipuga. RAMIRO was later relieved by PEDRO FORTUNADO. When about to assume office on 28 Nov 1943, FORTUNADO was captured by the Japs at Tuminobo. NARCISO ADEVA, the Provincial Secretary succeeded him temporarily on 14 Dec 1943. ADEVA later asked for relief, so he was succeeded by ACUILLINO GONZAGA.

On 1 Dec 1942, DATU SAMPIANO was appointed Mayor of Free Malabang, pre-war Mayor NAGUIB JUANDAY having surrendered to the enemy. DATU SAMPIANO later also surrendered to the enemy and so PANANSARNA COMMANDER was appointed to succeed him on 24 Feb 1944. Unfortunately, PANANSARNA was killed during the enemy action in the encounter at Wawian, Calibao, on 8 Mar 1944.

On 1 Dec 1942, Pre-war Mayor RIGA MAMBUAY who did not surrender to the enemy assumed his post. The rest of the civil officials appointed were:

Chief, Lanao Public Hospital-----	Dr. ALIPIO VILLACORTA
District Land Officer-----	ALEJANDRO ORDONA
Chief, Malaria Control Unit #4,-----	
Bureau of Health-----	Dr. GAUDENCIO R. VILLANUEVA
District Forester-----	ANGEL C. LALLONGA
Division Superintendent of	
Schools-----	EDWARD M. KUDER

In Zamboanga, the civil government continued to function even after the surrender on 10 May 1942 with the seat of the government transferred to Dipolog from Zamboanga City. The Japanese installed Actg Governor FELIPE AZCUNA as Chief Executive of the province. However, on 18 Sept 1942, the guerrillas seized the local government in Dipolog and reestablished the Commonwealth Government therein. On 7 Oct 1942, Judge FLORENTINO SAGUIN was appointed by the guerrilla high command as Military Governor. Judge SAGUIN, however, was relieved at the end of the year 1942 to become DCA for Zamboanga and Misamis Occidental and congressman-elect MATIAS RANILLO was appointed Provincial Governor. The other officials appointed by the military authorities were:

Board Member-----	GUADALUPE ADAZA
Provincial Treasurer-----	LAZARO ALFABETO
Provincial Fiscal-----	LEONCIO S. HAMOY
Actg District Health Officer-----	DR. PABLO S. HAMOY
Actg Provincial Auditor-----	IRINEO BARBASA
Actg District Engineer-----	J. PULIDO (Asst Civil Engineer)
Actg Provincial Agricultural Supervisor-----	SIMEON ESTOCAPIO
Secretary to the Governor-----	FLORENTINO A. CAD

In Bukidnon, Lieut WALDO MC VICKERS (now Major), with a handful of men, seized the local puppet government of Talakag on 29 Oct 1942, and re-established the local Commonwealth Government. Dr. CARLOS A. FORTICH was then appointed Governor of Free Bukidnon with the seat of government at Mailag. The other officials appointed for Free Bukidnon were:

Board Member -----	LOPE DAMASCO, Actg Governor for sometime; TITO MACAYABAS, later replaced by AMANDO NCBLE
Actg. Provincial Treasurer-----	Dr. FELIPE O. CEBALLOS, later replaced by GUILLERMO TABIOS
Provincial Auditor-----	SANTIAGO MACEREN, surrendered to enemy and later replaced by RAMON FERNANDEZ
Acctg District Health Officer-----	DR. CORAZON A. CID
District Engineer-----	ANTOLIN F. DIAZ
Actg District Engineer-----	ENRIQUE GUERRERO
Provincial Secretary-----	CIRIACO ALVAREZ, replaced by FELIPE CEBALLOS, JR.
Provincial Agricultural Supervisor-----	FERNANDO TORRES
Deputy Governors-----	CENON PAULICAN for Maramag, Kibawe and Pantukan, later surrendered and served the puppet government; MELECIO ALCUITELA for Tankulan, Libona, Talakag, Imbatug and Malitbog
Special Deputy Governors-----	CECILIO LUMINARIAS
	ALIPIO URBINA, CATALINO DAMASCO
Asst Prov. Treasurer-----	ALFREDO R. ESPLADADA

Justices of the Peace----- JESUS MURILLO for Talakag and
 Acting for Imbatug, Maluko,
 Libona and Sumilao.
 Judge DELFIN ROFILENA (Davao
 City), Acting for Malaybalay

Local governments established in all municipalities and municipal districts were placed under the 109th Division, except the municipal district of Malitbog which was placed under the 110th Division. However, due to enemy offensive on the last days of Oct 1943, in the area garrisoned by the 117th Inf Regt, where the seat of the free government was located, the civil government was disrupted. On account of the difficulty in getting a civil government function, the CO, 109th Division on 15 February 1944, issued a proclamation declaring that part of the province under a state of martial law. Major TELJENES VELEZ, Staff Judge Advocate, was designated as Military Lieutenant-Governor, in addition to his duties as SJA, 109th Division. A sub-provincial board was made of the Lieutenant-Governor as presiding officer and the sub-provincial Treasurer and Deputy Governor as members thereof. The following were the officers of the sub-province:

Sub-Provincial Treasurer----- CECILIO ESCALERA
 Sub-Provincial Auditor----- RAMON FERNANDEZ
 Secretary to Governor----- ENGRACIO MELENDEZ

These sub-provinces however, were abolished on 6 Dec 1944. The civil government, after this was reorganized with the seat at Talakag and later due to Japanese attack of that place, the seat was moved to Taglimao, municipal district of Lumbia, Misamis Oriental, to which the Division Headquarters was transferred.

In the province of Cotabato, the provisional civil government was organized with the following officials appointed by the Headquarters, 10th Military District:

Governor----- M. A. GENCHA, also designat-
 ed as Director of Civil Affairs.
 Board Members----- TOMAS MANAWIS
 JOSE L. GUERRERO
 Acting Treasurer----- TOMAS FALGUI
 Acting District Engineer----- CAYETANO MACARAIG
 Acting Provincial Fiscal----- FRANCISCO ALTEA
 Acting Provincial Auditor----- LEONCIO ALDAWA
 Division Superintendent of
 Schools----- JOSE HOMBREBUENO
 District Health Officer----- DR. JUANITO NATIVIDAD

The local governments were reestablished in guerrilla areas as fast as conditions permitted.

The unsundered USAFFE men who settled in some of the municipalities of districts restored the local government officials. In the municipal district of Manay for example, (north of Davao City) the old Mayor surrendered to the enemy and had been killed, so Mr. E. MAPAYO, a resident of this district, was elected as Mayor.

It is worthy to mention that Atty. BONIFACIO JAMIRO, Deputy Governor-at-large of that sector, did his best to restore local officials of his districts. This was made possible with the help of Major (now Lt-Col) CLARO L. LAURETA, then the Regimental Commander of the 130th Infantry occupying the Davao Sector.

In the later part of 1943, the two made possible the organization of the local government of the following districts, with Mayors appointed who were then temporarily appointed, later concurred in and approved by the Commanding Officer of the 10th Military District:

Monkayo----- Mr. FELICIANO CERVANTES - Mayor
 Mr. RAMON CABALUNA - Deputy
 Governor for both Monkayo
 and Compostela
 Compostela----- Mr. JUANITO REGANIA - Mayor
 Cateel----- Mr. GREGORIO DACUYCUI

Caraga-----	Mr. LORENZO CALIBAPA
Manay-----	Mr. E. MAPAYO - Mayor
Baganga-----	Mr. RICARDO REYES - Mayor
Mati-----	Mr. PRIMITIVO GABONG
Camansa-----	Mr. BARTOLOME PACLAING - Mayor

The Provincial Government Officials composed the following:

Provincial Governor-----	Mr. PANTALEON PELAYO
Deputy Governor-at-large-----	Mr. BONIFACIO JAMIRO
Deputy Governor of West Coast-----	Mr. RAFAEL SANTOS
Actg Provincial Fiscal -----	Mr. MARCELO BOLANDRES
Actg Provincial Auditor-----	Mr. MIGUEL BORDEOS
District Engineer -----	Mr. MARCELINO PAYOMO
District Health Officer-----	Dr. BENITO ENRIQUES

AGRICULTURE:

The war brought about keen struggle for existence. Agriculture was given more

attention.

In Agusan, rice, corn, vegetables, camote, etc., were planted in the cultivated forest areas. Even sago flour, which very few people used to take and only in time of famine, became a much sought-for food.

But unlike other provinces of Mindanao, Surigao never suffered the shortage of food supply. Under the supervision of Mr. PANTALEON DE LOS REYES, who was appointed as Provincial Agriculture Supervisor, land cultivated for rice and corn, increased by three thousand hectares, making the total 35,000 hectares.

In Misamis Oriental and almost all provinces occupied by the guerrillas, Army Communal Farms were under cultivation. These were cultivated by civilians in the so-called "pagina system". All the produce were for the Army. Evacuees were permitted to cultivate abandoned parcels of land and to them went the produce. Short-season crops were produced intensively. However, in spite of favorable weather conditions during the period from Feb 1943 to Nov 1944, food shortage occurred due to heavy flood in free Cagayan which cost the lives of forty-seven persons and the loss of approximately 200 to 300 cavans of rice and corn in 1943. Locust infestation in Jun 1943 in Free Cagayan and the municipal district of Lumbia, destroyed approximately sixty percent of the standing crops.

In Zamboanga, farming suffered a great set-back during the period from June to November 1942 due to the heaviest and most destructive locust infestation. Almost all the palay and crops were destroyed by the pests. Intensive locust campaign was undertaken. After that calamity, came plague of rats, crop eating birds, insects and worms, as damaging as the locust infestation. The rice situation was very alarming; that of corn was less terrible. Not until the year 1944 was the situation very much improved.

In Misamis Occidental, agriculture suffered the same fate as that of Zamboanga - crops destroyed by locusts and rats. Small portions of lands were cultivated in this province.

In Lanao, most of the arable lands along the northern coast of the province and along the Illana Bay were abandoned. Most of the Christian inhabitants in these places sought refuge in Misamis Occidental and other safe places to escape Moro banditry, and because of Jap invasion, food problems became more acute. Farmers stopped farming and way to get food from the outside was barred by the pressure of the enemy. When flood occurred in the Mandulog District and Eastern Free Iligan farms were laid waste and several human lives lost.

In Bukidnon, before the war, cattle industry was flourishing, but this was virtually wiped out. People, like the other provinces above mentioned, resorted to agriculture going to the limit of cultivating forest areas. The same thing was with Cotabato except that there was shortage of food, mostly because of little harvest in view of the fact that the enemy was able to get hold and cart away a big part of what was harvested, coupled with the destruction occasioned by the existing emergency.

In Davao, food was the problem of each and everyone, Army and civilians

alike. The people who evacuated in the virgin forests, just as the people of other provinces, began clearing the forest for camotes, bananas, taro, etc. Rice and corn were planted, later. Later the food production campaign was started, extended and intensified.

COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES:

In the provinces of Agusan, Sugigao, Oriental Misamis, Occidental Misamis and Zamboanga, merchants frequented the market place to sell their goods and commodities. Business was retail. Articles sold were rice, corn, soap, salt, fish, sugar, vegetables and other foodstuffs. Slow-moving bancas were used by them in plying between Agusan and the Visayas. Productive industries consisted in the manufacture of tuba, nipa wine and nipa shingles. Weaving industry was lucrative.

In Lanao, periodic trips were undertaken by trades from Bohol, Negros, Siq-uigor, Cebu and Camiguin, bringing in sugar, clothing, dried and salted fish, some medicine, and other stuff. On their return, they brought with them, rice, corn and other foodstuffs, lacking in their places. Normal trade relation existed between Lanao and Misamis Occidental. This trade relation, however, between these two provinces and from other islands in the Visayas, were at times paralyzed due to active enemy patrols, both by land and sea. The Japs had the practice of hooking away the sail-boats encountered at sea, confiscating the cargo, and making prisoners of the crew. Because of this, business declined and later, markets and retail stores were closed. Then sudden rise of the prices of commodities inevitably followed.

Unlike the other provinces above mentioned, Cotabato and Davao whose coastal areas had always been occupied by the enemy, and Bukidnon which is very far away from the coasts, could not fully well survive in inter-island commerce. Salt and fish for example, are hard to obtain. Native cloth "pinocpos" and "saguran" derived from buri palm, which were brought in by some bancas from other provinces, were hard to secure. Some inhabitants however, were depending on selling the rice and corn or tobacco which they planted, although most of the time, could hardly be the basis of their commerce due to the fact that the Japanese at times, find time to lay their hands on the produce.

PRICE FIXING AND ANTI-PROFITEERING COMMITTEE:

Due to enemy occupation of the Philippines, importation and exportation were at stand still. Profiteering became rampant in Mindanao especially in Agusan, Surigao, Misamis Oriental and Misamis Occidental, Zamboanga, Lanao, Budidnon, Cotabato and Davao.

For the benefit of the civilians especially and the army as well, Col FERTIG ordered the creation of the Provincial Emergency Control Board or the so-called Price Fixing and Anti-Profiteering Committee, for each province occupied by the Army and which was empowered to fix, control and determine the retail and wholesale prices of all goods, including foodstuffs within the province. This Board consisted of the Provincial Governor as Chairman; the Provincial Treasurer, Division Superintendent of Schools, Provincial Auditor and District Engineer as members. In every province, severe penalties were imposed on violators. However, due to absence of policemen at the time this body was created, Unit Commanders of the Tenth Military District were given authority to enforce the orders promulgated and adopted by the Board. Considerable benefits were derived in its activities by the suffering public.

However, due to the lack of supplies which actually existed that time, and basing on the hardships, sacrifices and risks in obtaining them, control of prices could hardly be made effective. In view of this and to solve this problem, the Food and Supply Administration was created. This body was given P50,000 with which to operate and was charged with the intensification of food production and diversification of crops; dealing in rice and corn and other prime commodities during the emergency; controlling the supply to prevent profiteering; maintaining warehouses and rationing stock according to local demands; exercising a legal personality in the making of and entering into contracts and the promulgating of such regulations as to effectuate its authority. This, at least ameliorated the condition of supply and at least helped in the control of prices.

THE TRADING POST ADMINISTRATION (TPA):

The Trading Post Administration, was created to meet the economic

and social needs of the civilian population during the emergency; to stabilize the prices of commodities of prime necessity; to promote the development of local industries; to serve as a market for the produce of the people; to extend help to the needy; to serve as rehabilitation centers during and even after, the emergency. This Post, however, deals in buying the produce of the farmers and selling the same with no more than ten percent profit on every sale for overhead expenses and handling, and at ration basis.

In the province of Agusan, were two branches in Butuan, two in Buenavista, four in Cabadbaran, one in Nasipit and one in Jabonga. The manager of which was Governor JOSE ROSALES. In this province, The Trading Post Administration was started with an initial capital of P10,000.00. The province of Misamis Oriental started with an initial capital of P5,000.00 and managed by Mr. PRIMO SANTIAGO with its central office opened on 13 Oct 1944 at El Salvador, Tagnipa. Branch was in Cagayan-Alubijid-Initao area. Misamis Occidental had its central office at Calamba, Plaridel. This was managed by Mr. ROXAS. Just as the three aforementioned provinces, Lanao Province had its own TPA with stores established at Baroy, Lolambugan, Bacoled, Kauswagan, Tacub and Dalipuga with Central Office at Kauswagan. This was managed by Congressman SALVADOR T. LLUCH. Unlike the above named provinces, Surigao, Zamboanga, Bukidnon, Cotabato and Davao, did not have this TPA established. However, stores similar to the TPA and the aim of which is the same - to ameliorate the living conditions of the people - were established. Some had the Trading Center and others had the so-called Communala Stores established which equally helped the public a lot.

PEACE AND ORDER:

Peace and order, locally, during the guerrilla movements in the above-named provinces, was not a serious problem. Peace and order was maintained by the Sector Commanders with the organization of the regular guerrilla units, until later aided by the municipal police when the latter assumed their duties. Justice of the Peace Courts were later appointed in some of these provinces by the Commanding Officer of the 10th Military District, although most of the offenses committed being between Army personnel and civilians. Prison compounds were maintained by Army authorities.

However, none of these provinces had been exempted from the state of confusion and disorder when frequented by enemy patrols or mopping-up operations.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SANITATION:

In all these provinces of Mindanao occupied by the Guerrilla Forces, lots of people suffered from malaria, which ranks first among all other sickness, and tropical ulcers due to lack of medicine, clothing, proper nutrition and scarcity of food supply.

In the province of Agusan, sixty percent of the people were either actually sick with malaria or had the disease in its latent stage, and many succumbed to the disease due to utter lack of medicine.

In the Province of Surigao, death rates were very high in almost all the municipalities and its surrounding areas. The government and Army, seeing the death rate very high, resorted to the establishment of the District Health Office on 1 Oct 1943. This greatly extended help to the civilian populace.

The same disease and sufferings were then prevailing in the provinces of Misamis Oriental, Misamis Occidental, Lanao, Bukidnon, Zamboanga, Cotabato, and Davao.

All efforts and necessary measures, however, were exerted in all these provinces to fight the disease - surroundings and houses were kept clean and sanitary.

It was not until the early part of 1943, when medicine began reaching this island from Australia, that a semblance of a rising barometer was noted in the health condition in these provinces. Health conditions became ameliorated, some of the medicines that arrived having been given to the provinces mentioned above.

EDUCATION:

Education during the guerrilla days were practically abandoned. The enemy was busy patrolling in many areas so that opening the schools was risky. An attempt

however, to open schools in the provinces of Agusan, Surigao, Misamis Oriental, Misamis Occidental, Lanao, Zamboanga and Bukidnon, was made. The services of teachers was purely voluntary. These schools did not function for a long time because of enemy action.

CIVILIAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION:

To carry into effect the spirit of the telegraphic instructions of Gen MANUEL ROXAS, dated 8 Apr 1942, concerning relief work, The Civilian Relief Administration was created. The continuation of the relief was considered absolutely necessary to aid the needy who were unable to gain their own economic support. Congressman EUGENIO S. DEL ROSARIO of Misamis Occidental, was made the Director of Civilian Relief Administration by Col WENDELL W. FERTIG.

Later the position of the Director of Civilian Relief Administration was abolished. However, the Provincial Relief Committees provided for in the instructions of General ROXAS dated 8 Apr 1942 continued to function as relief agencies. It had the sole power to authorize the disbursements of relief funds. In each province the Provincial Relief Committee, was composed of the Provincial Governor, as Chairman; the Provincial Treasurer, Provincial Auditor, Division Superintendent of Schools and District Engineer, as members.

In the province of Agusan, for lack of funds, application for relief filed in 1943 were acted upon only in March 1944.

In the province of Misamis Oriental, Father HAGGERTY, Civilian Relief Administration Representative, distributed cash benefits which were extended to wives and children of soldiers killed or missing in line of duty, and to all others entitled thereto.

In the province of Lanao, there were 182 beneficiaries, sixteen were civilian indigents, and the rest were families of soldiers. Fifty-nine of the 293 dependents were children of the civilian indigents. Due to lack of funds, many beneficiaries have not been paid regularly since November 1943. In the rest of the provinces, beneficiaries had not also been paid due to the same reason - lack of funds.

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C H A P T E R X I
A. J A P A N E S E A T R O C I T I E S

It would be practically impossible to record here all the atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese on the island of Mindanao. Their acts of barbarism and brutalities are now too well known to the world for any special comment here. However, some of their third degree methods, their treatment of soldiers and civilians alike and their handling of Prisoners of war are made a matter of record.

THIRD DEGREE

Inquisitorial methods of fiendish tortures were invariably employed by the Japs in their barbarous treatment of prisoners in an effort to obtain information.

Water: A person is first tied securely with a rope to a bench, face up and mouth forced wide open by inserting between the teeth a piece of wood. The Japs then directed water from a hose at full blast to the open mouth of the prisoners. Before long, the victim is rendered unconscious. When he regains consciousness he is made to confess his guilt. If he answers in the negative, or owns it even if he is not, a more heinous fate awaits him. This procedure caused the death of many suspects.

Electricity: The prisoner is made to sit plumb on a bucket full of water charged with electricity. The shock is so terrific that the victim either pleads guilty or, in most cases, to stop the inhuman torture, admits his guilt even if in reality he is innocent.

Fire: The prisoner is required to strip off naked, after which a lighted cigar is applied to his private parts; or he is made to step on live charcoals; or the glowing end of a heated piece of iron is pressed on his belly.

Beating: The victim is made to stand erect, after binding his hands behind him. Then two husky Japs begin beating him all over the body with sticks. When he falls down unconscious, he is revived by applying fire to the pit of his stomach. If he remains adamant, the procedure is repeated.

Rounded Stick: The wife of the prisoner is disrobed before her helpless husband who is tied to a chair, and in the presence of a number of tittering Japs, a rounded piece of stick is forcibly inserted into herself. The hateful torture is only stopped when the husband, maddened by the cries of his wife, breaks down.

Food: The prisoner is given no food and only little water.

Nails Pulled: The prisoner is securely tied to a chair. A Jap begins pulling out the victim's nails one by one with a pair of pliers.

Hanging: The victim is hanged by his thumbs.

Salt: The prisoner is stripped naked and bound hand and foot. His thighs are slashed with a razor and salt is applied to his wounds.

JAPANESE BRUTALITIES - TO CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS

On the island of Mindanao there are recorded acts of brutalities on the part of the Japanese against the population, some apparently for no reasons; others because it was the only way the Japs could get information regarding guerrilla troops or obtain the names of leaders of the resistance movement.

That so many of the sufferers chose to maintain their integrity, come what might, in the face of terrific punishment to themselves and loved ones, speaks well for the faith of the people in its government; in the guerrilla resistance movement, in the cause of freedom from oppression.

(1)

On 3 Jan 1944, at Bururan, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, soldiers and enlisted men of the 109th Inf Regt were caught unawares at their own quarters near the Hc early in the morning. Upon inspection made by Maj FIDENCIO M. LAPLAP, CO, 109th Inf Regt, the dead bodies of the following were found buried in the 30 caliber MG emplacements at the beach of Tag-nipa, El Salvador, the next morning:

- a) 1st Lieut FEDEL SASA - with 9 bayonet wounds mostly through the heart, and the face severely smashed.
- b) 2nd Lieut EUFRORIO JABULIN - with 6 bayonet wounds, mostly through the heart. The eyes were badly smashed; left arm broken; all parts of the body bruised and tattooed with wounds.
- c) Sgt GREGORIO MACAPAYAG - with one wound through the heart (left breast) 2 wounds below the heart and face blackened by severe butt strokes.
- d) Corp G. SAQUIN - with 3 wounds through the heart; the breast battered by blows.
- e) Pvt E. ELING - with 4 wounds through the heart and hands tied behind.
- f) CHONG ING (civilian) - bayoneted through the heart 4 times.

(2)

In the evening of 24 Dec 1945, there were no less than 4,000 people in the town of Sagay, Misamis Oriental, to celebrate Christmas Eve and hear the Midnight Mass. They had a play shown to the public in the plaza. While the affair was thus going on, the Japanese soldiers were stealthily placing themselves in the shadows, waiting for the fun to stop and the people to go to church and then return home. It was when the civilians were going home that the Japs seized them one by one, giving preference to the women. The girls were held prisoners for three days during the stay of the Japs in the town.

- a) FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, Commonwealth Mayor of the town, was caught and bayoneted without cause.

(3)

On 11 Mar 1945, the latest Jap atrocity which can hardly be paralleled in brutality and grotesqueness were the tortures and murders, for an unknown reason, of three innocent civilians, namely, a couple, GABRIEL DEVINA, 55 years old and EUGENIA PASQUA DE DEVINA, 50 years old, and PASCUAL PERITO, 20 years old, of Calut, Butuan, Agusan, who were caught by the Japanese patrol. Their dead bodies were discovered by Agents of the 113th Inf Regt near TOIENTINO's house at EM 1.5, Butuan. The following were noted:

- a) GABRIEL DEVINE's lifeless form was tied to a banana tree. His head, completely severed from the body, was just 5 meters away from his feet. His body bore 5 bayonet wounds through the breast and abdomen.
- b) EUGENIA DE DEVINA's corpse was hanging by the neck in a nearby tree. A bayonet wound in the middle of her breast and in the ribs immediately below the right nipple stood out as glaring evidence of torture before or during hanging.
- c) PASCUAL PERITO was tied to a nearby tree and his head on the ground. Two bayonet wounds in the abdomen indicated tortures before execution.

(4)

This happened in the area of the 117th Inf, 109th Division. A member of a Jap patrol asked a Manobo boy, about 7 years of age, the whereabouts of the Provincial Governor. The boy at the time was pounding palay. The poor boy did not know the whereabouts of the Governor and told them so. Not satisfied with his answer, the Japs performed the painful ordeal of cutting one leg of the boy and took off his eyeballs. Civilians who were captured and who failed to give the information they desired were kicked, slapped and butt stroked, regardless of sex and age. (The report has no date but it was embodied in the inspection report of the area of the 117th Inf made by Maj CRISPINO M. DE CASTRO, Chief of Staff, 109th Division, dated 1 Feb 1944. The incident must have taken place in the month of January 1944).

(5)

On 8 Dec 1943, about 300 Japanese soldiers and 100 B.C.s led by Capt KIYO, UNO and NISHIKAWA, penetrated Elang, Cotabato proper, area of the 2nd Bn, 118th Inf. Regardless of age and sex, civilians were captured and used as shields in the encounter with the guerrillas. In this way many civilians were wounded and some died. During their stay at Elang, they killed Mrs. EMILIO GUNOG and her three children and ten other civilians, for no apparent reason at all. Then they went on looting the people and abusing women and young girls. Jewelries, money and other valuables were appropriated whenever found in houses they sacked. Houses along the trails they passed were burned. They captured around 700 civilians, men and women, tied them up with ropes and brought them to Kaban under the guise "segregating them from the out-laws".

(6)

Sometime on 27 Feb 1945, a fighter plane crashed through enemy action in Pantukan, Davao. The Japs, bent on capturing the pilot, Maj MAY, surrounded the barrio with Jap and Filipino soldiers. When they failed, they arrested civilians suspected of helping the pilot in escaping. These people were then investigated, tortured and several were killed. In one instance, a man strongly suspected was slightly bayoneted at the sides of his body, tied to the floor with his hands stretched up. Two Japs sat on a big piece of log placed over his belly, rolled over his body, causing his blood to spurt out through the wounds. This procedure was repeated when answers to questionnaires were not satisfactory. The man could endure the torture and loss of blood caused his death before the Japs were through with their investigation.

(7)

On 6 Dec 1944, in upper Tambongan, Davao, NARITA FERNANDEZ with her 18-year old sister, went to a nearby place to gather "kangkong" leaves for viand. Suddenly they saw 5 Japanese soldiers approaching them. While running for safety the two sisters were separated. Having been chased, NARITA, unfortunately fell into the hands of the Japanese. Her hands were then securely tied together with "lopis" (abaca strings). Firmly bound, she was led to the house of one NITO (INING) some 40 meters away from the place where she was caught. The house was left vacant by the occupants who happened to notice the presence of the Japanese.

Inside the house 2 Japs, armed with pistols, untied her and started to undress the girl, whereupon she shouted and resisted in an effort to escape. As a result they gagged her with their dirty handkerchief and pointed a bayonet at her abdomen threatening to kill her if she continued to resist. In spite of all her efforts to escape she fell a helpless victim of rape. They did the act one after the other without even giving time for the poor abducted girl to rest. Satisfied of their animal desires, they left her weak and half conscious; while they laughed at their vain glory.

(8)

On 1 Feb 1945, a group of 5 Japs raped a married woman, MARIA JAMBOY, in Baypan, Cabadbaran, Agusan. This woman died a few days afterwards as a

result of the physical torture she suffered. On the same day, a Jap patrol caught an unarmed civilian, ANACLETO DUETES, at Calamba, Cabadbaran, Agusan. For no cause he was bayoneted and he died instantly.

(9)

On 11 Feb 1944, MANUEL AWATIN, 60 year old butcher by profession was caught at barrio Del Pilar, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, together with 14 others who were lined up by a deep river bank. They were investigated as to the whereabouts of the guerrilla soldiers, their strength and the people feeding the guerrillas and facilitating their movements. Two among the groups were mothers, one carrying a child in her arms. The Japanese snatched the children from their mothers' arms and smashed their heads against a coconut tree trunk. For failing to give the needed information, they were all bayoneted. The dying bodies were pushed over the high cliff. AWATIN was able to escape by turning around when he was bayoneted so that instead of being hit at the back through his stomach, he was hit at his elbow. He then stumbled down the steep bank towards the river.

(10)

On 20 Nov 1944, 14 armed Japanese soldiers pushed towards Inambakan, Cotabato, and as usual brutally killed civilians on their way without any reason at all. At this particular place one soldier and four civilians were killed. Proceeding farther to Baiulao, an old woman and a small girl suffered the same fate after they were brutally battered, tortured and sent to their doom without any cause whatsoever.

(11)

On 13 Feb 1944, in a suburb of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, ESTEBAN COMPANIA was tortured to death for refusing to give information regarding the much sought-for electric generator. His feet were tied together and the loose portion of the rope passed over the lower part of a roof truss. He was raised up and the rope released instantly for several times, his head smashing on the floor each time. He was left dead, his smashed head beyond recognition.

(12)

On 15 Oct 1944, a liberator flew very low over Butuan, Agusan, dropping leaflets. The Japanese were very careful not to let anybody pick up and read those leaflets dropped by the Liberator plane. Civilians were warned and driven out of the area wherever leaflets fell. However, some civilians eager and just simply happy for the coming of American aid, took the risk. Some were caught and punished without mercy. Later pockets of civilians and BCs were inspected and those found possessing a copy of these leaflets were shot at once.

(13)

On 26 Sept 1943, in Polo, Zamboanga, Japanese soldiers burned the "Tabo" (market) and several houses, without reason and arrested several civilians. They machine-gunned the barrio for 15 minutes and fired 5 mortar shells, killing some civilians.

(14)

On 23 Sep 1943, an enemy patrol reached Cabugacak, near Nanapa, Butuan, Agusan, and surrounded the home of Dr. MARIANO ATEGA. They accused him of cooperating with the guerrillas, then grilled and manhandled him. He was struck with the blunt side of the swords and bayonets or with the butt of a rifle, during the investigation. As ATEGA had nothing to tell, the Japs finally left him, half dead. The victim was once a Provincial Governor for Agusan and is one of its respected citizens.

(15)

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On 23 Feb 1944, a Japanese patrol found TIMOTEO SU and one Chinese companion in the former's house in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental. For having been found in possession of a radio receiver and battery charger, and portraits of Generalissimo CHIANG KAI SHEK, both were tied inside the house and the house then burned.

(16)

On 7 Oct 1944, at 4:30 PM, Lieuts ADOLFO SANCHES, BAJA, DOMINGO LOPEZ and GEORGE were brought to the old cemetery near the barracks formerly occupied by the 113th Inf Regt near Butuan, Agusan. They were strongly tied. The Jap escorts brought spades and forks. Upon reaching the place, these guerrilla officers were made to dig their own graves. They were then bayoneted and shoved into the hole while still alive.

(17)

On 9 Mar 1945, a small Japanese patrol came across a man of 35 years old and a boy of 18 years old fishing near Kiagta Hill, Agusan. These innocent civilians were suspected as spies by the enemy due to the army blanket found in their possession. They became victims of torture before the Jap patrol put them to death.

(18)

On 18 May 1944, the Japanese, without warning or cause, burned the barrio of Carmen, Nasipit, Agusan, resulting in the destruction of lives and property. The Japanese brutally shot and bayoneted mercilessly innocent civilians regardless of sex or age, killing over 50 and wounding many others.

(19)

On 27 Dec 1945, 300 Japanese soldiers searched and ransacked all houses in Guinsiliban, Sagay, Misamis Oriental. During those days the Japanese soldiers were very particular on capturing anyone wearing blue denim cloth, believing that the wearer was a soldier of the Philippine Army. ENRIQUE ABESA was caught wearing such clothes, and although not a soldier, he was tortured and killed without further investigation. Another resident of the community, PIO ROLA, was killed by the Japs after they ransacked his house and gotten many of his valuables.

(20)

On 6 Mar 1945, four civilians passed by Mindanao, Agusan. Upon reaching the bridge, these civilians were caught by the Japanese and were ruthlessly killed for no reason at all.

(21)

From 2 to 9 Feb 1944, INAYO VELEZ, a civilian, was butt-stroked and was not allowed to eat or drink for six consecutive days for failure to give information on the whereabouts of the electric generator owned by ex-mayor BERNARDO NERY of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental. On the sixth day he was saved by another man who was able to locate the generator.

(22)

On 19 Feb 1944, at Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, FRANCISCO DOMINICE was roasted alive by the Japs for being known as a soldier. His hands were tied at the back and his feet were also tied together. A long pole was passed through the openings of his arms and legs and the pole was supported at the end. A fire was built under DOMINICE, burning him to death.

(23)

On 14 Oct 1943, Capt HABACON and Lieut PATIODAS left Buena-vista, Agusan, for Cebu, after accomplishing a certain mission to the 110th Division. For an unknown reason they came back on or about the 15th of the same month and landed 2 kilometers west of Sakel (between Buenavista and Nasipit), not knowing that the Japanese had already occupied the shores. Caught by surprise, they were soon captured including their arms, ammunition and money. They were mercilessly and brutally tortured, bayoneted and buried while still alive.

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(24)

On 23 Feb 1944, LOGA TAN and his wife were captured in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, by the Japanese. After the wife had been abused in the presence of the husband, both LOGA and the wife were bayoneted to death. The Japs took from his possession a bag containing some ₱17,000.00, in Philippine Treasury Notes, coins and emergency notes.

(25)

On 21 Feb 1944, in a barrio near Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, a Japanese patrol found a Chinese hiding in a box. Instead of letting him go out of the box, the Japanese built fire around it. The Chinaman was burned to death.

(26)

May 1945:

- a) Filipines evacuated away from areas near bombing targets sent by Jap military authorities to designated zones. In several instances, girls from 14 years old and up were held up by soldiers, detained and sent to houses where they were raped by the soldiers.
- b) In Biao and Talomo River, Davao City, families were killed without any cause. Girls killed after they were raped by the soldiers. This was related by three girls of 15, 19 and 23 years of age.
- c) Japs patrolling for food killed harmless civilian evacuees when caught by surprise in their evacuation houses. One incident which happened in Malabog, Davao City, interior sitio about 23 miles northeast of Davao City, wherein a group of Ilocanoes were surprised by the Japs in their houses. One among the group was a woman in the family way, mercilessly bayoneted in the abdomen, killing her instantly. A leg of the child came out of the wound.

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

Those who, in the beginning, believed that Japan was waging a civilized warfare notwithstanding the Pearl Harbor Treachery, were doomed to disappointment when after surrendering to the enemy they received from him all kinds of treatment except fair and human. The Japs, never really civilized - their national mentality essentially wicked - and embarking upon a war more for spite than for the redress of a righteous grievance, accentuated by the dictates of brazen cupidity, never showed any signs of having a universal grasp of the fundamental bases of International Law. Fanatics to the bone, they had not given thought to the Golden Rule and its manifold amplifications. Convinced by one-sided propaganda that there was not the remotest possibility for Japan to be defeated, they did whatever they liked, believing blindly that in the end they would dictate the terms anyhow!

DAVAO PRISONERS OF WAR

By international comity, a prisoner of war is only in a little less category than a guest. Restraint and nothing else is about the only imposition to be made on him; restraint so he could not in any way assist his compatriots in the war effort. But the Japs could not think this way. A prisoner to them is a slave as the warlords and their mercenaries were wont to consider him in the medieval ages.

In Davao, as in any other places where the Japs had prison compounds, the War Prisoners were rationed during mealtimes with one-third cup of either too hot or too cold rice porridge each. Those of them who did not have the fortune of owning some semblance of a receptacle were forced, by hunger, to cup their hands to receive their share of the food, only to drop it if the boiled rice was still hot.

Clothing was very scarce. The prisoners had to economize on whatever clothes they had originally. As time went on they had to split one pair

of trunks into pieces to serve as G-strings to avoid going around completely naked.

Comfort, as has been well-provided for in American concentration camps for Axis prisoners, was absolutely unheard of in Japanese prison compounds. A room ordinarily unfit for the accommodation of a dozen persons were crammed with two score prisoners. At the start when the Japs had not relaxed their vigilance and cruelty, the prisoners stayed in one room close together, ate there, sat there, slept there, passed water and moved their bowels there - and most of them died there!

On 4 Mar 1944, some four hundred prisoners were herded to work unceasingly in different projects in and around Bunaway, Davao. The prisoners were not allowed to rest. Anyone seen slowing down in his labors was knocked on the head with the butt or barrel of the Japanese rifle. In going to the field and coming back to the camp, the prisoners were all tied together with a strong, long rope. In the place where they worked they were told not to go over the lines indicated by the ropes fencing the site. One prisoner who tried to retrieve a tool which slid outside of the rope boundary was fired at and though missed, had the scare of his life. Hunger, sickness or fatigue were no excuse from working. The prisoners were dealt with as if they were less deserving of good treatment than animals.

The work lasted two months. Whatever little clothing the prisoners had before the work started in the Lincanan Airfield and the Quarry near the Tibungko Lumber Company and Pier, in Bunawan, were torn into rags not long after. Some had to tie dirty sacks around their waists to serve as clothing. The sight was sickening.

Sometimes, the prisoners who were driven to work without stopping, fell exhausted. Yet this was not accepted as an excuse for relief. This and the fact that they were constantly on starvation diet worsened matters. Many became terribly ill and a considerable number of them died.

18 AMERICANS ESCAPED FROM DAVAO PENAL COLONY

Ten Americans successfully escaped from the Davao Penal Colony on 3 Apr 1943. This party consisted of the following:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1) Lt Comdr MELVIN MC COY, USN | 6) 1st Lt JACK HAWKINS, USMC |
| 2) Maj STEPHEN MELLNICK, USA | 7) 1st Lt MICHAEL DOBREVICH, USA |
| 3) Maj WILLIAM DYESS, USAC | 8) 2nd Lt PAUL H. MARSHALL, USA |
| 4) Capt SAMUEL GRASHIO, USA | 9) 1st Lt LEO BOELENS, USAC |
| 5) Capt AUSTIN SHOFNER, USAC | 10) Sgt ROBERT B. SPIELMAN, USA |

They were taken out by submarine in June, September and November 1943 except BOELENS (later killed in guerrilla action) and MARSHALL and SPIELMAN who chose to remain behind and fight with the guerrillas.

This escape was followed by that of Sgt ROBERT L. PEASE and Pvt OSCAR B. BROWN ON 25 Oct 1943.

The third and the last to be made was a party of 11 on 27 Mar 1944. Of this party six got safely away, namely:

- | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1) Capt MARK WOHLFIELD, USA | 4) Lt HOWARD WATSON, USA |
| 2) Lt JAMES N. MC CLURE, USA | 5) Lt A. T. BUCKOVINSKI, USA |
| 3) Lt JAMES HAYBURN, USA | 6) Lt M. H. CAMPBELL, USA |

Ensign BOONE was killed in the attempt and 4 were recaptured and returned to the Penal Colony for perhaps a fate worse than death. These were Captains WOHLER and FANSLER, Lts WRIGHT and CARMICHAEL.

Each and every prisoner had to undergo horrible experiences, detailed reports of which have already been forwarded to the War Department. One experience, that of

JAP ATROCITIES BROADCAST TO THE WORLD

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"The MILLNICK MC COY Party was the first escapees from a Japanese Prison Camp to bring news to the outside world of the barbarous attitude of the Japs towards Prisoners of War. Their stories, complete in all the gory details, are a matter of record in the War Department....."

B. AMERICAN PLANE DISASTERS IN MINDANAO

After many months of anticipation and watchful waiting, the first American planes to return to the Philippines bombed Davao on 6 Aug 1944. This was followed by an ever increasing number of air strikes directed at targets on the island of Mindanao.

It was inevitable that some of these flights should result in plane disasters. Anticipating this, Col FERTIG on 20 Aug 1944, directed the following message to all guerrilla units for dissemination to the lowest echelon and for distribution to civilians everywhere:

"Recent bombing of Davao area indicates heavier blows to come. Request all subordinate units and friendly civilians to assist distressed American airmen who may be shot down or crash landed, in reaching main Hqs. Name and serial number to be submitted here at once. Volunteer guards can assist in this important work."

Shortly thereafter, the Mindanao guerrillas were to play a tangible part in the rescue of distressed American airmen as the following records will indicate.

93 AIRMEN RESCUED

From the 10th of Sep 1944 to Jun 30, 1945, ninety-three American airmen were rescued on the island of Mindanao and shortly thereafter returned to military control. The bodies of forty-five others were recovered, identified and buried with full military honors where possible. It is known that in addition to this number, there were others who were rescued but whose return to military control was so quick that records were not available concerning such personnel.

FRIENDLY AIRFIELDS IN OPERATION

At the time of the first bombing of Davao on 6 Aug 1944, guerrilla troops had seven airfields. These while not officially operational were in such condition that they could receive planes for emergency landings and take off. Dipolog Airfield alone became known to the 13th Air Force as a haven for landing in case of emergency. This was especially important for this field was in the line of flight of planes on missions to Northern Philippines from Morotai. On 17 Dec 1945, seven P-47s made an emergency landing at Dipolog due to lack of gas. A C-47 landed the next day and all took off safely after refueling.

GUERRILLAS EXTENDED ALL FACILITIES TO ASSIST PILOTS IN DISTRESS: JAPS KILLED CAPTURED AIRMEN IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1 Sept 1944: - ARTHUR MILLER, Jr., ASN 17079124, Specification 3155, was one of the three American airmen who bailed out from a Liberator shot down on 1 Sept 1944 over Catalunan, ten miles south of Davao City. A guerrilla operative declared he actually saw ARTHUR MILLER brought alive by the Japs to the Kempie Hq in the city on that day. His clothing and equipment were exhibited in the Bureau of Education Building in the city. However, in an announcement made in Davao Times, 2 Sept 1944, the Japs claimed the three airmen were all dead when found.

1 Sept 1944: - Four American airmen were reported captured by the Japs in Davao City after they were forced down during the bombing of Davao on 1 Sept 1944. Nothing was heard of them since. It was believed they were tortured, then killed.

10 Sept 1944: - ALFRED NEAL RUFFORM, ASN 321066 P 3440 USNR, died instantly when his plane crashed in a friendly territory in Bukidnon. The guerrillas buried him with military honors near Sankapan.

10 Sept 1944: - Lt ODIMCREE DAVIDSON, O-3009373, USN and Lt JAMES EVERETT, O-326093, USNR, were killed when their plane No. 1306 crashed in Cotabato.

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23 Oct 1944: - An American plane crashed in Manabay, Misamis, Misamis Occidental, on 23 Oct 1944. The crew were all killed. Bodies identified were WILLIAM PEEL, LLOYD W. JOHNSON, ASN 6662184, B. L. LYSORD and M.O.T. (initial on arm). All bodies were buried with military honors.

3 Nov 1944: - 1st Lt LEO NEW, Pilot of a P-38, landed wheels up at Farm No. 2, Domingag, Aurora, Zamboanga, on 3 Nov 1944. He was not injured and was picked up by a Rescue plane in Dipolog, Zamboanga.

7 Nov 1944: - The survivors of two Liberator bombers that crashed in Calamba-Dapitan area, Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga, respectively on 7 Nov 1944 were as follows: Flight Officer PETER TROVOVICH, O-124460, 1st Lt JOHN MC FARLANWIL, O-742592, 2nd Lt EDWIN FORTEVERUE, O-554701, 2nd Lieut PATERSON, O-764422, 2nd Lt WILLIAM HAROLD WISE, O-772913, Sgt ROBERT MAURICE PRESNELL, 14014842, and RAMSEY. They were all picked up by a Catalina at Sawang, Dapitan. T/Sgt LLOYD S. CUNNINGHAM was found dead and was buried in Clarin Settlement, Plaridel, Misamis Occidental. There was no information on other missing crew.

8 Nov 1944: - The following airmen were survivors of a B-24 shot down in North Davao on 8 Nov 1944: 1st Lt KENNETH C. ANDERSON, O-866170, pilot, 2nd Lt L. B. CORLISS, O-713355, co-pilot, 2nd Lt S. P. PIUSZ, O-701285, navigator, H. I. MOSHER, ASN 15119897, M/Sgt DOBOS, ASN, 18232936, CHARLES G. STEIGER, ASN T-124050, and J. N. VALENCIANO, ASN, 35895276. They sustained minor injuries. They were rescued by guerrillas and later were picked up by a rescue plane.

8 Nov 1944: - S/Sgt LEROY CARTWRIGHT, ASN 35217251 and Sgt JOHN KIRK, ASN 3364881, both of 13th Bomber Command, bailed out and landed safely in Binuangan, Compostela, Davao, on 8 Nov 1944. They were rescued by the guerrillas and brought to the headquarters, Tenth Military District at La Paz, Agusan and sent out by PBY on 6 Dec 1944.

15 Nov 1944: - Capt RICHARD LEE WEST, O-667025 and 2nd Lt ARTHUR RALPH SCHELL, O-756482, pilots of P-38, were forced down in Dapitan, Zamboanga, on 15 Nov 1944 due to lack of gas. They were not hurt. They proceeded to Dipolog Field and were picked up by a rescue plane.

11 Dec 1944: - A US Navy Plane S-46512 Squadron VPD-71, crashed two hundred yards West shore of Sarangani Bay. Those who were killed in the crash were Lt RICHARD WAYNE SHELLEY, Lt WILLIAM HAREY AUBURN and Lt ARTHUR JAMES PRESPIN. The survivors were: Ensign JOHN MARTIN KERNER, 337271, CARL STAFFORD, 6342031, ROBERT EARLY MIDDLE BROCKS, 2750058, JAMES KNOX ALLEN, 8779402 and ROBERT ISLEMASON. They were rescued by units of the 116th Inf Regt. On 23 Dec 1944, they were picked up by a rescue plane and brought to Morotai.

13 Dec 1944: - 1st Lt STEWART B. SMITH, O-695103, 40th Fighter Command Force, landed in Dipolog Field, Zamboanga, on 13 Dec 1944 due to a lack of gas. On the following day, a Catalina brought in gas and SMITH made a good take-off.

13 Dec 1944: - A P-47, piloted by 1st Lt IRA WEAVER, O-697307, 40th Fighter Squadron, 35th Fighter Group, bailed out safely from his plane and landed in Balangiyay, Bukidnon. He had been from a mission in Cebu. His plane had engine trouble. He was later picked up by a rescue plane.

17 Dec 1944: - Lt W. S. ROSENELL, O-805121, Pilot of P-38 of 67th Fighter Command, forced landed on Dipolog Field on 17 Dec 1944. He reported that his companion Lt ISEINHOWER, was last contacted over Bongeogan, Lila, Sobol.

18 Dec 1944: - The following P-47 pilots of 40th Fighter Command who landed in Dipolog Field on 18 Dec 1944, due to lack of gas, were: Capt LINSFRED W. POTEET, 1st Lt STEWARD SMITH, 1st Lt R. HOW, 2nd Lt JOHN ROSEWICE and 2nd Lt LOUIS BUSH. On the following day, a C-47 brought in gas and they took off safely.

18 Dec 1944: - 1st Lt ALBERT GALT and 1st Lt S. W. ROSE, Pilots of two P-38s landed in Dipolog Field on 18 Dec 1944 due to lack of gas. Two days after, a Catalina brought in gas, and the pilots took off.

20 Dec 1944: - A B-25 landed on Dipolog Field on 20 Dec due to lack of gas. Lt WHITE, the pilot said he was on a mission over Borneo. He took off on the following day but came back to field because his lifecraft became loose and the tail assembly was not in good condition. The plane was repaired and it finally took off on 7 Jan 1945.

24 Dec 1944: - A Liberator Pilot, JOHN JONAS of 307 Bomber Group, made a forced landing on Dipolog Field on 24 Dec 1944. The plane had hydraulic lines shot away by ground fire on his mission over Borneo. All crew were safe. On the following day, a C-47 brought in an engine officer and took out the crew of the Liberator. The Liberator plane was repaired and it took off for Morotai on 2 Jan 1945.

1 Jan 1945: - A C-46 crashed near Hikdop Island, Surigao, on 1 Jan 1945. The survivors were: Lt LAURENCE PARREL, ASN O-829130, Lt WILLIAM HART, ASN O-677411, LOUIS SWOLENSKI, ASN 32379931, RICHARD BOCHORSK, ASN 32842796, and Corp WILLIAMS THOME, ASN 12172739. They were rescued by guerrilla intelligence units and were picked up by a rescue plane at Loreto, Dinagat, Surigao.

10 Jan 1945: - 1st Lt WINSTON WILLIAM BROWN, and eight other survivors were rescued by guerrillas in Sindangan, Zamboanga, after their Liberator was shot down by an enemy plane on 10 Jan 1945. None of them was badly hurt. On 13 Jan 1945, they were picked up by a Catalina.

12 Jan 1945: - A B-25, piloted by Lt OLIVER D. FILLEY, O-823827 of 71st Squadron, 38th Bomber Group, made an emergency landing in Dipolog Field. The right engine of his plane was dead when he landed. He was from a mission over Fabrica, Negros Occidental. A repair crew repaired his plane and he took off on 19 Jan 1945.

15 Jan 1945: - Two crashed planes believed to be piloted by Lt K. S. SHERWOOD, O25750 and Lt C. E. BROOKS, O-7237, were found in the mountains of Malimono, Surigao on 15 Jan 1945. Body of one pilot found and was buried beside the plane while the other could not be found.

16 Jan 1945: - A Marine Corsair plane crashed in Del Monte, Bukidnon, an enemy occupied area. Later, it was reported that the pilot was captured by the enemy and tortured to death at Impalutao, Bukidnon.

20 Jan 1945: - A US plane, piloted by WILKIN N. ESCREEG, was reported shot down in Bunawan Vanser Factory in Davao on 20 Jan 1945. The pilot was reported dead when found by the enemy. The plane was later reported as twin-engined, Model No. 4P51, Serial No. 15112, possibly a Mitchell Bomber.

21 Jan 1945: - A US fighter plane was reported crashed at sea, two miles west of Samal Island on 21 Jan 1945. The crew was later picked up by a Catalina.

26 Jan 1945: - A Catalina of the 13th Bomb Group, landed at Iligan, Lanao, with a damaged tail. The crew were all safe, and were picked up on 28 Jan 1945.

26 Jan 1945: - An American plane crashed and burned ten miles Northeast of Carrascal, Surigao, on 26 Jan 1945. The only survivor rescued was Sgt STRAWN who had a fracture on his left arm and a dislocation of his right shoulder and multiple abrasions. He was attended to by the Regimental Surgeon, 114th Regt, and later picked up by a rescue plane in Claver, Surigao. A paper found had the following names of crew No. 378; STANLEY TYSIESKY, O-2060417, CHARLES TRUSEL, O-771158, JACK LUSCUM, O-75047, JOHN PERENGER, O-777927, DAVIS, 38538774, SKELTON, 18164216, KONDIECZNY, 36892250, SEI, 38352947, and PARKS, 35892276.

30 Jan 1945: - A C-46, ZA-118, crashed at Alba, nine kilometers west of Tago, Surigao, on 30 Jan 1945. Pilot Lt T. WILKINS, crew and passengers were all safe. They were later picked up by a rescue plane in Barobe, Surigao.

18 Feb 1945: - An American Liberator plane crashed in Anibongan, Davao, near an outpost of the 107th Division. The following members of the crew bailed out and were rescued by the guerrilla units: T/Sgt CANTU, 38250119, T/Sgt SWAIN, 17275673, S/Sgt CORMAN, 13122507 and S/Sgt FORTUNATO, 35518155. All were uninjured except one who had ankle dislocation. Search parties were sent out to locate the other missing crew; patrols even went to enemy territory. Finally all of them were found, as follows: Capt PENROSE, O-408937, found extremely weak due to exposure and hunger; Lt DAVID ROLFE, O-820177, Lt JAMES SMITH, O-696256, Lt WELLY COWELL, O-708413, Lt JOHN TAMPE, O-739668, and S/Sgt MURPHY, 35172587. All the members of the crew were picked up at Madaum, Davao.

20 Feb 1945: - A Marine Corsair, piloted by 1st Lt B. L. HENRY, O-2856 of Air Group 12, Marine Fighter Squadron 218, crashed into the sea off Gorda Point, southwest of Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, on 20 Feb 1945. A rescue party was sent by a guerrilla unit in the area. The pilot was rescued unhurt and later was picked up by a rescue plane in Balingasag.

22 Feb. 1945: - A four-engined bomber was reported crashed into the sea near San Ramon, Zamboanga. Nothing was heard of the fate of the crew.

27 Feb 1945: - Maj PHILIP B. MAY, O-6680 of Squadron 211, Group 12, Marine Air Group, was rescued from the enemy territory by guerrilla units in Davao area and was later picked up by a rescue plane in Madaum, Davao. His plane crashed near Licanan Field on 27 Feb 1945.

4 Mar 1945: - An American plane was seen forced down in Butuan Bay after the raid of Cabadbaran on 4 Mar 1945. The pilot was seen bailing out. Operatives reported that a Catalina picked up the distressed pilot.

9 Mar 1945: - An American Liberator crashed in an area near Karkum, Maranding, Lanao, on 9 Mar 1945. All the members of the crew were found dead. Those who were identified were SAMUEL A. STEWARD, 33278743-T-420, M. V. LIPPSON, 21134-T-423, CHARLES C. KECELMAN, 22412-T42-440, GEORGE MUHL, 373409-5743-440, and E. GRAY, 3957382-T-433-44. They were buried in Lanipao, Baroy, Lanao, by guerrillas and civilians.

28 Mar 1945: - 2nd Lt HARRY CHAPMAN, pilot of Corsair No. 496, accidentally crashed on another Corsair No. 827, piloted by Lt GRAVER HALZ on 28 Mar 1945, in Dipolog Field, Zamboanga. Pilot HALZ was instantly killed and Pilot CHAPMAN was slightly wounded. Both pilots belonged to Marine Air Corps Station in Zamboanga.

31 Mar 1945: - The B-25 No. 757 of 75 Bomb Squadron, crashed in Labo Airfield, Misamis Occidental on 31 Mar 1945. The plane overshot the field and fell into a river at the north end of the strip and it immediately caught fire. All the members of the crew were rescued, namely: Maj ROBERT THORNDYKE, 1st Lt M. A. ROSE, 1st Lt JORDAN B. WHEELER, 2nd Lt CHARLES O. CRESSEY, T/Sgt RALPH W. COLEHARDT, T/Sgt BRYAN W. MOYLAN, T/Sgt FRED DAVIS and Sgt ARTHUR CALDWELL. There were no fatalities but all sustained injuries. They were attended to by doctors at the strip aid station and later were picked up by a C-47 and brought to Leyte Hospital.

2 Apr 1945: - 1st Lt WILLIAM M. ALLEN reported that his plane was forced down in Carrascal Bay, Surigao, on 2 Apr 1945. All members of the crew were safe and were later picked up by a rescue plane.

13 Apr 1945: - A B-25 was crashed and burned in Bolison near Sulawan Point, Misamis Oriental, on 13 Apr 1945. Lt JOHN CLAYTON, O-26685; Sgt EUGENE WHEELER, ASN 493903 and two others were all injured and were brought to Iligan Hospital and later brought to Zamboanga. A fifth member of the crew, Sgt BARNEY ALLEN, was found dead and was later buried in Gitagum, Misamis Oriental. Three other members of the crew were picked up by a Catalina at Gitagum, Misamis Oriental.

14 Apr 1945: - A Mitchell bomber was reported down in Koronadal area on 14 Apr 1945, after accomplishing a bombing mission in Koronadal, Cotabato. The guerrillas unit in the vicinity were alerted and search parties were sent out to locate the plane. After covering a wide area, the search parties reported that they did not find any trace of the missing plane.

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17 Apr 1945: - HARRY CHAPMAN, Corsair Pilot of 1st Air Wing Marine Air Group, was rescued by units of the 106th Division after his plane was forced down near Pikit, Cotabato, on 17 Apr 1945. He was evacuated and sent to his unit.

27 Apr 1945: - The B-24 No. 49840 was crashed in an area eight miles South of Intavas, Bukidnon. All members of the crew were found dead. The only ones that could be identified were NICOLAS SIEFERT, 36597717 and JOSE GUERIS, 35598841. The corpses were all buried by guerrillas in the area.

2 May 1945: - 2 SBDs of Mag 24 were reported down, two miles south of Lake Lannao. The guerrilla units in the vicinity were alerted and a combine guerrilla and MAG 24 rescue parties were sent out to locate the crashed planes and rescue the ill-fated crew. To facilitate the rescue, two L-5 strips were constructed so that L-5s could help in the search. After eight days of criss-crossing the jungle where the plane was believed to have crashed, the rescue parties, with the aid of transport planes, dive bombers and flying cubs, and the unlimited cooperation of the Moro inhabitants in the vicinity, finally rescued Lt JAMES L. WARE and Sgt. ROBERT L. JOHNSON, pilot and gunner respectively, of one of the crashed SBDs. They were found in the midst of an almost impenetrable jungle in Latokan Mts, Lanao province. Both sustained injuries and were safely evacuated to their base. Patrols were sent to locate the other SBD but it could not be found. It is presumed that the crew of this SBD met death.

2 May 1945: - On 15 May 1945, a message was received from MAG, Zamboanga that on 2 May 1945, a PBJ plane from MAG, Zamboanga, crashed just south of Diklon Field No. 1, Bukidnon. The guerrilla commander in the area was immediately informed of the mishap and he ordered to effect a search for the lost plane. At 0905 hours, 17 May, the guerrilla commander reported that they located the plane and complete report was sent to the Hq of the 8th Army. Eight bodies were recovered and were buried in the 108th RCT cemetery.

16 May 1945: - Corp FRANK BURNS bailed out from his plane in the vicinity of Kubugan, Dipap, Midsayap, Cotabato, at 1645 hours, 16 May 1945. Search parties were then sent out to rescue him but he could not be found.

16 May 1945: - One SBD plane was found crashed in Soloon, Misamis Oriental, at 1510 hours, 16 May 1945. No identification was possible as the plane was totally burned. Several patrols were sent out in the vicinity to rescue the crew who might have bailed out before the crash. After covering a wide area, a patrol finally rescued the pilot, Lt CRUTCHFIELD, USMCR. He was picked up in Taglimao by an L-5 and was brought to his base in Malabang. Patrols were sent out to search for the gunner, Sgt SHELLY, who also bailed out, but he could not be located.

21 May 1945: - The C-47 Plane No. 3958, piloted by Lt LEON HUNNINGS, ASN -831198 of the 66 Troop Carrier Squad, based at Pitor Strip, Morotai, cracked up in Gingoog Strip, Misamis Oriental, on 21 May 1945. Evidently the pilot thought the strip was Anakan Field; unfortunately it was the Gingoog strip which is good only for L-5s. The plane was badly damaged but the crew was safe, and part of the load was salvaged. Their unit in Morotai was notified and they were picked up by a rescue plane in Anakan strip, Gingoog, Misamis Oriental.

29 May 1945: - One SBD No. 323 hit a tree and crashed near Misamis, Misamis Occidental, at 1300 hours on 29 May 1945. The plane was believed to be a MAG 24. The pilot and the gunner were killed. No identification was possible.

14 Jun 1945: - MAG 24 advised this Headquarters of a plane that crashed in Iligan Bay, Lanao. All guerrilla units in the vicinity were alerted and native boats and launch patrols were sent out accordingly. Survivors were rescued and were picked up by a rescue plane.

20 Jun 1945: - PBJ No. MB-4 crashed and burned in enemy occupied Koronadol Valley area on 20 June. Intelligence operatives were sent to rescue survivors. Six airmen were rescued by our operatives and were brought to Sigil for pick up. Survivors were finally picked up on 22 June.

20 Jun 1945: - PBJ No. MB-9 water-landed at vicinity 5 degrees 45'-124 degrees 50' on 20 June. Guerrilla patrols on native boats were sent to rescue survivors. On same day, four survivors were rescued and were picked up by a seaplane.

22 Jun 1945: - Lt THOMAS CALDWELL, O-779358, 12th Fighter, 18th Group, 13th Air Force, landed in Punta Flecha on his life raft at 1300 hours, 22 June. He was immediately rescued by the soldiers of the 2nd Bn, 115th Inf Regt, 10th Military District, and was brought to the Battalion Surgeon.

23 Jun 1945: - On 23 June 1945, Lt ALFRED FITCH and Sgt ROBERT BROWN, survivors of a crashed B-25 arrived at Hq of 106th Division at Kabakan, Cotabato. Their plane crashed on a plateau in the vicinity of Tuli on 29 May. They hiked their way thru the forest for twenty-five days going south then southwest of area of crash, then west around the north of Mt Apo and finally reached Kidapawan on 22 June. From there they were brought to Headquarters, 106th Division by our soldiers. They belong to MAG 32, 611th Marine Bombing Squadron, Zamboanga. They believe they are the only survivors of the crew of eight.

AN UNUSUAL RESCUE

Following story by Staff Sergeant JOHN L. SLOCUM of Creek Neck, L.I., New York, a Marine Corps Combat Correspondent, formerly of the N.Y. Daily Mirror, concerns a rescue made possible with the help of Moro troops of 10th Military District.

"Mindanao, P.I. - - - (Delayed) - - - A flight that started as just another routing Marine dive bombing mission has brought back results that may benefit America for years to come. Oddly enough not a bomb was dropped nor a bullet fired at the Japs.

The original target was a Nip bivouac area that unfortunately was protected that morning by a blanket of low-hanging clouds. The flight leader, opposed to hit or miss tactics, ordered the planes to return home with their bomb load.

Two of these planes, the now obsolete SBDs that distinguished themselves in the Solomons, Admiralty and Philippine campaigns, never made it back to the base. A pilot and a gunner met their deaths. Another pilot, Marine 1st Lt JAMES L. WARE of Athens, Pa., was seriously injured and his gunner, Sgt ROBERT L. JOHNSON of Wichita, Kan., suffered a broken arm. Both planes crashed into the thick, almost impenetrable jungle of Mindanao.

A rescue party was immediately arranged and 20th century ingenuity called upon transport planes, dive bombers and flying cubs. Such essentials as food and clothing were dropped by chutes. A doctor and a medical corpsman crash landed in the bed of dried up lava flow on an inactive volcano near the wreckage. They were to push through the jungle to administer first aid and plasma to the wounded men.

In spite of all this 20th century progress, it was not advanced enough to cope with this problem.

Marine Officers then faced a problem that had often crossed the minds of American military officers on Mindanao. Fate had made them dependent upon the natives of this island, and the natives of this island are known the length and breadth of civilization. They are Moros, or Filipino Mohammedans. Their fighting ability has long been recognized by the United States. They are an isolated, independent race with a fierce pride that tolerates no intrusion on their privacy or beliefs.

The Marine Officers headed into the hills. The trustworthy jeep went as far as it could, the rest of the way they travelled on foot. Eventually they reached the Moro leaders, told the story, sat back and waited. After a short pow-wow the Moros promised to help, and that help was unstinted until the rescue had been accomplished successfully.

The Moros' approach to the problem consisted of the ancient method of plodding through the jungle, crossing water obstacles in small hand made boats, climbing the mountains of rugged rock with their bare feet. Side by side the two factions worked. It was the meeting of the fighting men of two

civilizations bent on an errand of mercy. It proved to be mutually beneficial.

For eight days, Moro DIMASINPIN AMENTAO worked with Pharmacist Mate LAWRENCE ALLEY: ITO-MAMA and Sgt LESLIE LAMBERT: HERBERT RENSHAW and BAO SULTAN sa Butig. They moulded into a successful combination.

After the crash had been reported a message was dispatched to Col WENDELL W. FERTIG, U.S.A., Commanding Officer of the Tenth Military District, to ask for scouting parties.

Early the next morning Marine Lt Cols KEITH BARR MC CUTCHEON of East Liverpool, Ohio, and JOHN H. EARLE, Jr., of Ballston Spa, N.Y., flew to Col FERTIG's headquarters. Upon arrival they found the scouting parties had left. In the wake of the Lt-Cols came Marine Capt DEAN MASTEN of Pittsburgh, Pa., and 1st Lt SIDNEY H. TAYLOR of Deland, Fla.

MASTEN and TAYLOR traveled by jeep and on foot until they found Moro Maj MANALAO MINDALANO. After a brief meeting, the three officers and a working party of Moros started toward the mountain. At its base they found a fairly level tract of land and on the order of Maj MINDALANO the Moros cleared the area and made a small airfield.

At this point PhM 3/c LAWRENCE L. ALLEY of Antonite, Colo., crash landed in the lava bed cleared by the Moros with 1st Lt LEO J. DELTON, Army cub pilot. Behind them came another Army cub pilot, S/sgt HERBERT R. RENSHAW, dropping supplies.

A hasty inspection of the wounded men convinced ALLEY that a doctor was needed as quickly as possible. That called for another crash landing. This time Army 1st Lt L. R. ADAIR was at the controls and Lt (jg) LESTER D. ODELL (MC) USNR, of Iowa City, Iowa, was the passenger. Dr. ODELL had made one unsuccessful attempt to reach the wreck by the overland route through the jungles.

After examining the two wounded men, Dr. ODELL ordered still more supplies, but the weather was closing in. Disregarding this handicap, Army 1st Lts JESSE N. RAY and R. D. DEWEY made the trip in a transport C-47. In spite of the mountain terrain and the weather, they made six passes over the area to drop plasma, radio equipment and spare parts for the cracked up cubs.

On the ground the Moro workers of Maj MINDALANO, who affectionately call him "Old Electric Whiskers", were pushing through the jungle. Overhead, aviators delivered the supplies, but the wounded pilot continued to grow worse. If the rescue was to be successful it had to reach a speedy climax.

At this point Army Maj FRED W. SINOW landed his cub at the emergency airstrip and conferred with MASTEN and TAYLOR. He said he planned to make a successful landing in the cleared lava bed and evacuate the pilot. His only request was that planes be flown over his head to spot his position in case he crashed.

Maj SIMON took off, followed by Marine dive bombers. After circling to inspect the area he banked his plane and headed in. If he failed the only alternative was a stretcher-bearing safari through the jungle. But he did not fail. With an exhibition of flying that thrilled the Marine pilots overhead, he landed with his cub intact. Moros and Americans cheered.

The wounded pilot was put aboard and Maj SIMON, in another exhibition of flying skill, made a successful take-off and headed for the Marine Field hospital. Back he went to land and take off with the gunner, then back for the third time to take out the corpsman.

It was a lot of work but it saved the lives of two Americans. The credit couldn't be placed on any one pair of shoulders, but it could be distributed among the Moros and Americans. They worked for a common cause. They met and learned to know each other. The Moros proved beyond a doubt that they are Pro-American.

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From an immediate result all American pilots flying over Mindanao know they are over friendly territory and friendly people. From a long-range point of view, this friendship should grow.

It is most apparent that both the Moro and American people have met an old friend and made many new ones."

C. 187 AMERICAN GUERRILLAS ON MINDANAO

1. CLYDE M. ABBOTT

ASN 6553635, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to Tenth Military District on 15 Oct 1942. Born in Cuba, New Mexico, on 30 Oct 1917. Second Year High School; speaks English and Spanish; 6 years as Pvt, USAC: Commissioned 2nd Lieut, Inf, Tenth Military District, USFIP, on 28 Nov 1942; promoted 1st Lieut, Inf, on 27 Feb 1943; served as 1st Lieut until he proceeded to the Replacement Depot on 14 Jan 1945. Executive Officer, 110th Infantry, 1 Dec 1942; responsible for mutual understanding of the civilians and the Army - settling troubles between civilians and the Army. Responsible for locating suitable places for intermediary radio stations in the 2nd Battalion area, 110th Infantry. Ordered to proceed to USAFFE Headquarters on 10 Jan 1945.

2. MICHAEL J. AMRICH

ASN 6895873, Private, USAC. Evacuated 2 December 1943.

3. ROBERT ANDREWS

ASN 19115375, Corporal, Allied Air Force. Reported to the Tenth Military District on 26 Feb 1945. On DS with the Force Radio Section, Tenth Military District, for two months. Evacuated on 26 Apr 1945.

4. ROBERT B. BALL

ASN O-888819, Captain, Signal Corps. Reported to Tenth Military District on 3 Dec 1942. Pfc in the Hws, 5th Air Base Group. Captured by the Japs; escaped and joined the Mindanao Guerrilla. Commissioned 2nd Lieut, Inf, USFIP, on 3 Dec 1942. Commissioned temporary 2nd Lieut, AUS, Ho, USAFFE, on 4 Jan 1944. CO, Signal Detachment and Radio Officer on 24 Dec 1942. CO, FRS, Tenth Military District, on 8 May 1943. Promoted 1st Lieut on 26 April 1943; promoted Captain, Signal Corps, on 11 Sept 1943. Sent on mission to the areas garrisoned by the Tenth Military District on 30 Dec 1943. Relieved as CO, FRS, Tenth Military District, on 13 Dec 1943 to report to Maj CHARLES, CE, AUS, for assignment.

5. HOWARD BATES

Private, Air Corps; died 10 July 1942.

6. THOMAS R. BAXTER

ASN 19014929, Captain, Inf. Reported to the Tenth Military District, 1 Dec 1942. Born in Mt. Trumble, Arizona, 24 Dec 1916; High School Student; a Private in the 89th USAAC; promoted to Sgt, USAAC. Commissioned 2nd Lieut, Tenth MD, on 1 Dec 1942; promoted 1st Lieut, 1 Oct 1943; promoted Captain, CO, Anakan Sector, 110th Division; Liaison Officer for the Commanding Officer, Tenth Military District, with the 13th Air Force, USAFFE, and ordered to report to Commanding General, USAFFE, in March 1945.

7. KENNETH L. BAYLE

ASN 6296797, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to the Tenth Military District on 1 Jun 1943. Born in Plainview, Texas, on 11 Nov 1921. High School graduate; 10 months in 131st Field Artillery, Texas. Enlisted in USAAC on 16 Nov 1939. 2nd Class Aircraft Mechanic; Graduate Air Corps Teach. School of Engineer; 14th Bomb Squad, 19th Group, AC. Commissioned 2nd Lieut, Tenth Military District, USFIP, on 7 Nov 1943. From Pfc, AC, assigned in FRS, Tenth Military District. Evacuated on 27 Feb 1944.

8. JULIAN BENAC

ASN 19051297, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to the Tenth Military District. Born in Allison, New Mexico, on 3 Jun 1919. Enlisted USAC on 10 Jan 1941 as Pvt; Mechanic, 32nd and 30th Bombard Squad, 19th Bombardment Group. Commissioned 2nd Lieut Inf on 1 Jun 1943, Tenth Military District. Executive Officer, 112th Regt, 109th Division.

9. LEO A. BOELENS

ASNO-426888, Capt. Inf. Reported to the Tenth Military District, on 15 May 1943. Reported and assigned to the 110th Division, Tenth Military District, after his escape from the enemy concentration camp. Commissioned 1st Lieut on 15 May 1943; Agent Officer, Farm Project (Landing Field) No. 1; transferred to Hq, Tenth Military District; promoted Captain 1 Sept 1943. His former organization was the 21st Pursuit Squadron. Killed in action in Balingbing, Kolambugan, Lanao on 22 Jan 1944.

10. ALEXANDER RANKIN BONNER

ASN 6583746, Capt Inf. Reported to the Tenth Military District on 1 June 1943. Born in Calgary, Alt., Canada, on 31 Jan 1920. ACTS graduate on 2 Aug 1944. Enlisted in the Army on 20 Nov 1939. Reported to the Tenth Military District and commissioned 2nd Lieut on 1 Jun 1943; promoted 1st Lieut on 16 Aug 1944. Commanding Officer, MT Bn, 10th Military District. Promoted Capt. Inf on 6 May 1945. Ordered to report to the 4th Replacement Depot USAFFE on 5 May 1945.

11. ROBERT V. BOWLER

ASN o-294619, Colonel, reported to the Tenth Military District in Nov 1942. Born in Medical Lake, Washington; Major, assigned Commanding Officer of the 111th Inf Regt, on 15 Nov 1942. Promoted Lt-Col on 14 Dec 1943; Commanding Officer, 109th Division, on 14 Mar 1943; Chief of Staff, Hq, Tenth Military District; promoted Colonel on 1 Mar 1945; Liaison Officer for Commanding Officer, Tenth Military District, with Tenth Corps on 24 Mar 1945; Commanding Officer, 106th Division, on 8 May 1945. Placed on temporary duty with Hq, Tenth Corps on 23 June 1945.

12. DURWARD L. BROOKS

ASN 6281619, 1st Lieut. Reported to the Tenth Military District on 1 Jun 1943. Born in Lohn, Texas, on 14 Feb 1916. Sgt, Air Corps, 28th Bombardment Squadron, 19th Group. Commissioned 2nd Lieut, Tenth Military District, USFIP; Signal Officer, 106th Division; attached to Radio Section as Code Officer on 8 Sept 1944. Promoted 1st Lieut 16 Aug 1944. Enlisted USA on 31 Nov 1937 to 26 Jan 1939. Graduated Clark Field Radio General School. Ordered to report to 4th Replacement Depot on 5 May 1945.

13. OSCAR G. BROWN

ASN 18046073, Private USAC. Born in Oakland Avenue on 22 May 1942. 440th Ordnance Co.; High School graduate. Enlisted at Fort Logan, Colorado. Left for SWPA on 28 Dec 1944.

14. EDWARD W. BROWNING

ASN 13034981, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to the Tenth Military District on 1 Jul 1942. Born in War Eagle, West Virginia on 20 Apr 1920. 4th year High School. Enlisted in the Army on 13 Jun 1941 in Ronaki, Virginia, as Pvt, 30th Squad, 19th Bomb, arrived Manila 27 Oct 1941 and stationed at Clarks Field; Mindanao 1 Jan 1942, station at Bugo. Did not surrender. Commissioned 2nd Lieut from Sergeant on 1 Jul 1943. Assigned to 109th Division on 10 Aug 1943; Corps Radio Section "A" Corps on 5 Aug 1944. On duty with G-3, Tenth Military District on 27 Oct 1944. Ordered to proceed to Hq, USAFFE, on 19 February 1945.

15. ANDREW THOMAS BUCKOVIENSKY

ASN O-890200, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to the Tenth Military District in May 1944. Born in Greesburg, Penn. 2nd Lieut Inf 101st Field Artillery, 101st Division on 10 May 1942, station at Aroman, Bukidnon. Requested repatriation. Assigned to 106th Division due to poor health; ordered to proceed to Leyte on 15 December 1944.

16. ANTHONY BUJNOWSKI

ASN 6828122, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to the Tenth Military District on 1 Aug 1943; on duty with 109th Division for one year and five months. Evacuated on 4 January 1945.

17. JOHN F. CAIN

ASN 6906281, 2nd Lieut Inf reported to the Tenth Military District on 5 May 1944. Assigned in the FRS, Tenth Military District.

18. TIMOTHY C. CASEY

ASN 6954402, 1st Lieut, Inf, reported to the Tenth Military District on 1 Jun 1943. Born in Akron, Colorado, on 12 Feb 1920. Enlisted Pvt, 351st Ordnance Co, 19th Bombardment Group at Fort Logan, Colorado, 24 May 1940; promoted to Pfc in March 1941; to Corporal in December 1941. Commissioned 2nd Lieut 1 Jun 1943, Tenth Military District; promoted 1st Lieut 16 Aug 1944. Chief Water Transport, 106th Division; Code Officer, Radio Station. Ordered to report to 4th Replacement Depot on 27 Apr 1945.

19. MARVIN HEAD CAMPBELL

ASN O-890421, 2nd Lieut Inf, reported to the Tenth Military District 6 May 1944. Assigned Ordnance Officer, 106th Division for 8 months. Evacuated 21 Feb 1945. Born in Meansville, Ga., 17 Mar 1912. Enlisted as Pvt in "A" Troop, 11th Cavalry on 25 November 1938. Discharged and reinstated 31st Inf, "A" Co, 26 Feb 1940. Transferred to 808 MP Company (Manila) in September 1941; 3 years High School. Commissioned 2nd Lieut, Inf USAFFE, 51st Regt. 51st Division 5 Mar 1942, Bataan. Reported to 118th Regt, 106th Div, 6 May 1944; Agent Officer for 106th Division; transferred to "A" Corps Headquarters. Ordered to report to Commanding General, USAFFE 21 Feb 1945.

20. LUCIEN V. CAMPEAU

ASN W2115938, 2nd Lieut, Sig C, reported to the Tenth Military District on 1 Jun 1944. Warrant Officer, AUS, 5217 Reconnaissance Battalion, appointed 2nd Lieut, Sig C, 1 May 1945. Instructed to report to the Ho, 8th Army, 19 March 1944.

21. REID C. CHAMBERLAIN

ASN 265983, USMC, 1st Lieut, reported to the Tenth Military District on 15 Jan 1943. Born in Parkin, Arkansas, 1 Apr 1919. Trained 1 year in the Infantry and 9 months in anti-aircraft. Commissioned 2nd Lieut, Inf, 5 Jan 1943, Tenth Military District, USFIP; promoted 1st Lieut on 1 Oct 1943; 3 years and 6 months active duty with the Marine Corps; 2 years Reserve Marine Corps. 4½ years High School. On duty with the Tenth Military District. Repatriated 14 Nov 1943.

22. GERALD G. CHAPMAN

ASN O-1686506, 2nd Lieut OS, reported to the Tenth Military District on 28 Mar 1943. S/Sgt, 440th Ordnance Company Aviation Bombardment. Commissioned 2nd Lieut, AUS, Ordnance Dept, 24 Dec 1944. Advance Echelon, USAFFE. Radio Section, Tenth Military District Headquarters.

23. CLYDE CLEMENT CHILDRESS

ASN O-371217, Lieut-Col, Inf, reported to Tenth Military District on 20 Nov 1942. Born in Ft. Worth, Texas, on 22 Jul 1917. Junior Officer of "C" Co, 31st Inf, Manila on 8 May 1941 to 25 Aug 1941. On DS with the 2nd Bn, 61st Inf, PA. Machine Instructor at Dingle, Iloilo, Philippines, from 1 Sep to 30 Oct 1941; Bn Comdr, 2nd Bn, 61st Inf, PA, Lanao on 10 May 1948. Capt, 61st Inf, PA. Chief of Staff, 110th Division, Tenth Military District, from Nov 1942 to May 1944; Commanding Officer, 107th Division. Promoted to Maj, Tenth Military District on 20 Nov 1942; Maj AUS on 20 Dec 1943, Ho USAFFE; Lt-Col, Tenth Military District on 20 Sep 1944. Relieved CO, 107th Division, 29 Dec 1944.

24. NOEL R. CHIOTA

Private. Died on 14 April 1943.

25. BRUCE CHAPMAN

Private 1st class, AUS. Died 14 April 1943.

26. MICHAEL CHUCKRAY

ASN, 668-55, Radio Technician, Seventh Intelligence Fleet. Reported to Tenth Military District on 1 Jan 1945, assigned DS with FRS, Tenth MD. In charge of Radio Maintenance Section, FRS.

27. EDWARD O. CHMBILEWSKI

2nd Lieut, Sig C, reported to the 10th MD on 6 Dec 1942. Assigned Radio Operator, FRS, 10th MD for 1 year and 2 months.

28. JACK ROLAND CLARKE

ASN 6936730, 1st Lieut, Inf, reported to the 10th MD, 23 Apr 1943. Born in Topeka, Kansas, 24 Feb 1919. High School graduate; Civilian pilot; Pvt, USAC, 13th Bombardment Squad, from 20 Dec 1939 to 3 May 1941. Commissioned 2nd Lieut, Inf, 10th MD, on 23 Apr 1943; promoted 1st Lieut, 31 Jan 1944. Commanding Officer "I" Co, 112th Inf, 109th Division in Dec 1943. In charge of Radio Station TAB, 109th Division, March 1944. Executive Officer, 112th Inf June 1944 until ordered to proceed to GHQ, USAFFE, on 18 Feb 1945.

29. JOSEPH PHILLIP COE

ASN 7000444, 1st Lieut, Sig C, reported to the 10th MD on 29 Oct 1944. Born in Coleman, Alabama 27 Jan 1920. High School graduate; Staff Sgt, USAC, 91st Bombardment Squad. Survivor of POW Transport, sunk off Sindangan, Zamboanga, in September 1944. Joined Mindanao Guerrilla with FRS, 10th MD. Commissioned 2nd Lieut, Sig C 24 Nov 1944; promoted 1st Lieut 20 Apr 1945. Requested repatriation and left 20 April 1945.

30. EARL A. COOK

ASN 6130149, Pfc AC, reported to the 10th MD, 19 Oct 1945, assigned in 108th Division; evacuated on 22 Jan 1944.

31. RICHARD L. COOK

ASN O-377258, 1st Lieut. reported to 10th MD on 20 Sept 1944. 1st Lieut, 59th Inf (PS)USA. Survivor of POW Transport, sunk off Sindangan, Zamboanga in Sept 1944; on duty with G-3 Tenth MD; promoted 1st Lieut 21 Jan 1942; left for GHQ 6 Dec 1944.

32. ROBERT MYRES CRUMP

ASN O-1688141, Capt Inf Reported to the 10th MD on 8 Nov 1943. Born in Brazil, Indiana, on 5 Jun 1915. Degrees: B.A., M.A. Volunteered for service 9 Dec 1941 as civilian. Commissioned 2nd Lieut 10 Jan 1943; assigned Transportation Officer, Hq Bamar Prox Brigade. Reverted. Served the 110th Division, 10th MD, and called back to active duty as 2nd Lieut, Inf, 10th MD on 1 Jul 1943. Assigned as Asst FOM, 10th MD, 17 Nov 1943. Commission of 8 Nov 1945 confirmed by Hq, USAFFE, 4 Sep 1944. Promoted 1st Lieut 9 Mar 1944 and Capt on 1 Apr 1945. Ordered to report to 4th Replacement Depot 15 Apr 1945.

33. BILL EMERY DALLERBACK

ASN 17027499, 2nd Lieut Inf. Reported to the 10th MD 1 Jun 1943, assigned Radio Operator, 109th Division for 6 months. Evacuated 22 Jan 1944.

34. LINCOLN HALL DA PRON

ASN 6980094, Capt, Sig C reported to the 10th MD on 23 Jun 1943. Born in St. Paul, Minn., on 10 Aug 1916; High school graduate. Studied journalism; 3 years service in the Air Corps as Sgt. Joined Air Corps in 1939. Commissioned 2nd Lt on 23 Jun 1943. Promoted 1st Lt on 19 Jan 1944; Capt on 18 Jan 1945. On duty 109th Division and FRS, Tenth MD. Ordered to report to 4th Replacement Depot, Hq, USAFFE on 30 Jun 1945.

35. GEORGE B. DAVIS

ASN 295828, 2nd Lieut Inf. Reported to the 10th MD on 1 Oct 1943. On duty with 125th Inf.

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36. MARVIN H. DE VRIES

ASN 2233318, 1st Lieut, USN Sig C reported to the 10th MD 16 Dec 1942. Commissioned 2nd Lieut 16 Dec 1942. Assigned with MT Co, Hq 10th MD; assigned with 108th Division, 10th MD on 25 Sep 1943; to FRS, 10th MD 3 Nov 1943. Promoted 1st Lieut 11 Sep 1943. Evacuated 27 Feb 1944.

37. FRANK DIVINO

ASN 19038803, 2nd Lieut Inf. Reported to the 10th MD 1 Oct 1943. Assigned in the FRS 10th MD for 1 year and 3 months. Born in Garfield, Utah, 6 Feb 1921. Enlisted at "MARCH" Field, California on 3 Mar 1941 in the QMS, 89th LM Battalion. Pvt in USAC. Commissioned as 2nd Lieut 1 Oct 1943. Assigned to duty with 110th Division 10th MD 2 Oct 1943. Transferred to duty with FRS 1 Nov 1943. Evacuated 6 Feb 1944.

38. MICHAEL DOMERVICH

Capt, Infantry. Reported to the 10th MD 11 May 1943. Born in Inventon, Minnesota on 10 Oct 1915. A years college R.O.T.C. B.S. in Agricultural Engineering. Commissioned 1st Lt, Marine Corps 1 Jul 1939; promoted Capt, USFIP, 10th MD, 11 May 1943; Liaison Officer and FFO. Evacuated on 14 November 1943.

39. VINCENT K. DOUGLASS

ASN 6579268 Capt, Sig C reported to the 10th MD on 1 Dec 1942. Born in Dalles, Oregon on 8 Apr 1914; High School graduate; Air Corps Mechanic; Sgt, 30th Bombardment Squad. Commissioned 2nd Lieut, USFIP, 10th MD, 1 Dec 1942. Assigned Provost Marshal 2nd Bn, 111th Inf Regt. Assigned in the Communication Section, 109th Div on 2 April. Promoted 1st Lt on 17 Dec 1943; changed his branch of service to Sig C on 10 Jan 1945; assigned Signal Supply Section in charge 109th Division on 3 Jan 1945; promoted Captain. Ordered to proceed to 4th Replacement Depot, Hq, USAFFE.

40. FRANK W. DUFF

ASN 6296419, 1st Lieut QMS, reported to the 10th MD 1 Apr 1943. Born in Childress, Texas on 9 Jun 1918. S/Sgt USAC on 4 Oct 1939. Commissioned 2nd Lt, Inf, 5 Jan 1943; Branch of service changed to QMS, 1 Apr 1943. Promoted 1st Lieut 1 Apr 1943. Acting S-4, Imbatug Sector 9 Nov 1942 to 5 Jan 1943; Procurement Officer, Hq 10th MD, 18 Mar 1943 to 2 Aug 1943; G-4, 108th Division from 2 Aug 1943 to 13 Sep 1943; Finance Officer, Farm Project (Landing Field) #1 from 13 Sep 1945 to Oct 1945. Ordered to proceed to SWPA on 14 Nov 1945.

41. WILLIAM E. DIESS

ASN O-22526, Major, Inf, reported to the 10th MD on 15 May 1943; on duty with 110th Division; evacuated in July 1943.

42. BRUCE G. ELLIOT

ASN 3762211, USN. Reported to the 10th MD, 8 Jul 1943. Born in Garden City, Kansas in 1923; Coxswain, USN, USS "TANKER". Arrived 8 Aug 1943 from Palawan. Surrendered on the fall of Corregidor on 6 May 1942 and concentrated in Princesa Concentration Camp, Palawan. Escaped and re-concentrated to the 10th MD. Assigned on duty with 125th Inf Regt. Evacuated on 27 February 1944.

43. JAMES L. EVANS JR.

ASN O-556781, Maj MC. Reported to the 10th MD on 13 Dec 1945. Born in Philadelphia, Pa., on 6 Dec 1912; MD, Bachelor of Science in Biology and English, licensed Radio Operator; commissioned 1st Lieut ORC June 1937, promoted Captain (permanent) July 1941, 2nd Corps Area; Post Surgeon, Ft. Tilden, N.Y., on 31 Jan 1941 to 20 Jun 1948. Detachment Commander and Chief Neuropsychiatric Section, 5th Station Hospital, Australia from 13 Feb 1942 to July 1942; Surgeon and Adjutant, Ho Base Section 6, Australia from July 1942 to 25 Jan 1943; Chief of Record Section, 3rd Medical Supply Depot, Base Section 5, 25 Jan 1943. Assigned by the GHQ to the 10th MD and was designated Acting CO, FRS, 10th MD; promoted Major, AUS by GHQ, USAFFE, 28 Jan 1944; ordered to proceed to GHQ, USAFFE for sick leave on 17 Jan 1945.

44. BEVERLY PERPY FARRENS

ASN 6953549. Reported to the 10th MD on 16 Feb 1943. Born in Marysville, Missouri on 30 May 1917. Pfc in the Air Corps, 14th Bombardment Squad, 19th Group. Commissioned 2nd Lieut in the 10th MD on 16 Feb 1943; promoted 1st Lieut, Sig C on 8 Mar 1944; Capt on 1 May 1945. Assigned G-4, Hq 10th MD on 16 Feb 1943; to Force Radio Net on 1 Oct 1943. Ordered to proceed to 4th Replacement Depot on 30 Jun 1943.

45. FRED SIMS FAUST

ASN 6929112, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD on 19 Feb 1943. Born in South Carolina 27 Aug 1921. High School graduate. Commissioned 2nd Lieut 19 Feb 1943; promoted 1st Lieut 1 Oct 1943. CO, 110th Division Special Troops. Commended for his attack on Buenavista, Agusan, inflicting 40 to 50 wounded or killed. Repatriated 10 Jan 1945.

46. FREDERICK A. FEIGEL

Capt, QMS, reported to the 10th MD on 1 Oct 1943. Born in Louisville, Ky, on 5 Jan 1901; served as civilian in the 81st Inf, USAFFE. Commissioned 1st Lieut on 1 Oct 1943, QMS, in the 10th MD; promoted Capt on 15 Feb 1944. Assigned in the QMS and then 107th Division; Chief of Staff and G-4 on 4 May 1944. Killed in action on 26 Jul 1944 while on inspection trip.

47. ALFRED FERNANDEZ

ASN 6517769, 1st Lieut. Reported to 10th MD 1 Dec 1942. Born in Hilo, Hawaii on 8 Jan 1905. M/Sgt, USAC. CO, 1st Bn, 110th Inf Div. Ordered to report to SWPA, 17 Dec 1944.

48. WENDELL W. FERTIG

ASN O-254976, Colonel, Corps of Engineers, led the Mindanao Guerrilla on 18 Sep 1942 and organized the 10th Military District (MD). Relieved by Colonel Charles W. Hedges on 23 Jun 1945.

49. GEORGE FINNEGAN

ASN 121394211, 2nd Lieut, Sig C. Reported to the 10th MD on 1 Jun 1944. Born in Geneva, New York 13 Mar 1921. S/Sgt, USAAF: Commissioned 2nd Lieut, Sig C, 4 Dec 1944. On DS with FRS, 10th MD. Ordered to proceed to Hq, Far Eastern Air Force Weather Group, 26 Apr 1945.

50. PAUL R. FLOWERS

ASN 19049569, Pvt USAC. Died 27 July 1942.

51. JAMES LEONARD GARLAND

ASN 7003822, Capt, Sig C. Reported to the 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943. Born in Erwin, Tennessee on 1 Mar 1921. High School graduate; graduated USAC Technical School, Hickam Field, Hawaii. Pfc in the Air Corps. Commissioned 2nd Lieut, Inf, 1 Jun 1943; promoted 1st Lieut, Inf, 1 Jun 1944; Capt on 18 Jan 1945. Change of branch of service to Signal Corps on 18 Jan 1945; on duty with 109th Division 1 Jun 1943; FRS on 25 Oct 1943; Officer in Charge Message Center FRS on 6 Jan 1945; Commanding Officer, FRS and Communication Officer, 10th MD on 30 Jun 1945.

52. GLEN E. GAMBER

ASN 13024686, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD on 15 Jan 1943. Assigned Code Officer, 110th Division for 10 months. Evacuated 17 Jan 1945.

53. ROBERT E. GENTRY

ASN O-288840, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD, 1 Nov 1942. CO, "D" Co, 115th Inf, for 5 months; on duty with G-4, 10th MD, for 5 months. Repatriated 15 Feb 1944.

53. PAUL A. GILL

ASN 6570724, 2nd Lieut, Sig C. Assigned on duty with FRS, 10th MD for one year. Evacuated 7 Feb 1944.

54. PAUL A. GILL

ASN 6570724, 2nd Lieut, Sig C. Assigned on duty with FRS, 10th MD for one year. Evacuated 7 Feb 1944.

55. DEWITT GLOVER

ASN 3758436, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD, 6 Dec 1942. On duty with Hq 10th MD. Repatriated 29 Sep 1943.

56. JOHN W. GRANT

ASN 6999542, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943. Assigned to 109th Division. Died on 1 Nov 1943.

57. SAMUEL GRASHIO

ASN O-412503, Capt, Inf. Reported to the 110th Division, 10th MD in May 1943; assigned in Farm Project (Landing Field) #1, 10th MD on 1 Jul 1943. Born in Spokane, Washington on 1 Apr 1918. Two years in college. Commissioned 2nd Lieut 26 Apr 1941, AC. Promoted 1st Lieut 11 May 1943; Captain 1 Sep 1943. Proceeded to Hq USAFFE, 29 Sep 1943.

58. JAMES R. GRINSTEAD

ASN O-888857, Lt-Col, AUS. Reported to the 10th MD on 19 Feb 1943. Born in Ridgeway, Mo., 5 Nov, 1897. Served in "M" Co, 1st Inf, Oklahoma, 1st Artillery as 1st Lieut from Dec 1919 to 1921. Assigned in "D" Co, 15th Inf, Headquarters, Company, 31st Inf, from April 1923 to 1926 as Private, Corporal, Sergeant and Staff Sergeant; with Philippine Constabulary from April 1926 to November 1931 as 3rd Lieut, 2nd Lieut, 1st Lieut and Captain. Student of the Philippine Constabulary Academy; on duty with the Provincial Commander, Lanao; with the Intelligence Division, Manila; participated in Mindanao and Sulu campaign. Resigned in Nov 1931 to engage in business; established a coconut plantation in Malabang, Davao, Salaman, Cotabato. Reserve Officer in the United States Army; 2nd Lieut March 1924 to 1926, 1st Lieut from March 1926 to 1941. Battle campaigns; Mexican Border in 1913, AEF in France - April 1918 to January 1919 in St. Meheil and Mousse-Argonne.

High School graduate, 1914; University of Kansas, September 1914 to April 1917; called to duty as Capt, Inf 19 Feb 1943. Captaincy in AUS confirmed by Hq, USAFFE 16 Feb 1944; promoted Major, Inf June 1943, confirmed by USAFFE 5 May 1944; promoted to Lt-Col 2 Nov 1943.

Assignments: Temporary assignment with the Headquarters, 10th MD on 19 Feb 1943; to the 109th Division on 25 Mar 1943; Commanding Officer, 109th Inf Regt, 109th Division on 7 Apr 1943; Chief of Staff, 109th Division on 25 Jun 1943; Commanding Officer, 109th Division 1 Nov 1943; Commanding Officer, 106th Inf Div, PA, 10th MD, 25 Jun 1945. Commended as good organizer and had the finest intelligence coverage in Mindanao.

59. CYRILL A. GROSH

ASN 19028955, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD on 1 Nov 1942. Assigned to 110th Division as contact man for one year. Evacuated 16 Nov 1943.

60. JAMES D. HABURNE

ASN O-890327, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD 9 Feb 1944. Assigned Code Officer, FRS, 10th MD. Repatriated 2 Dec 1944.

61. ARTHUR R. HAGE, JR.

ASN 7022833, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD on 9 Feb 1944. Assigned Code Officer, FRS, 10th MD. Evacuated 29 Dec 1944.

62. JAMES E. HALKYARD

2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD in Dec 1942. Evacuated in Jan 1943.

63. GEORGE O. HALL

ASN 6938070, 1st Lieut, Sig C. Reported to the 10th MD on 5 Jan 1943. On duty with FRS, 10th MD for 2 years and 8 months. Evacuated 20 Jan 1945.

64. CHARLES HANSEN

ASN O-600183, Capt, OS. Reported to the 10th MD 11 Apr 1943. Born in Syracuse, N.Y. on 4 Mar 1890; High School graduate. Studied M.E. University of Syracuse; Commissioned USA, Reserve Capt, OS in August 1919; called to active duty on 8 Dec 1941 but unable to report. Reported to 110th Division 10th MD, 11 Apr 1943, assigned Procurement Officer; assigned Liaison Officer 110th Division on 11 Dec 1944. Evacuated 10 Jan 1945.

65. ANTON J. HARATIK

ASN O-1686153, Capt, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD on 1 Dec 1942. Born in Philipps, Wisconsin on 4 May 1916; High School graduate. Airplane Mechanic, 19th Bombardment Group, Ho & Ho Co, as Pvt. Joined the USFIP, 10th MD, and commissioned 2nd Lieut on 1 Dec 1942. USFIP; commissioned 2nd Lieut, AUS on 11 Jul 1944; promoted 1st Lieut on 1 Oct 1943, USFIP; promoted Capt, USFIP on 1 Jan 1944; assigned Agent Officer, 110th Div, 24 Dec 1943; CO, 112th Prov Bn, 107th Inf. Rated an excellent Commanding Officer by his Chief.

66. FRANK HARAYDA

ASN 6978648, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD on 16 Nov 1943.

67. JACK HAWKINS

Capt, Ing. Reported to 10th MD 11 May 1943. Born in Teston, Texas on 25 Oct 1916. Graduated from U.S. Naval School; commissioned 2nd Lieut (Reg) USMC 1 Jun 1939; promoted 1st Lieut (Reg) 2 Dec 1941; served in 4th Marine Shanghai from 17 Jul 1940 to 27 Nov 1941; served in Bataan and Corregidor during this war and captured by the Japs on 6 May 1942. Reported to 10th MD and promoted Capt 11 May 1943; assigned with G-2 Section, 110th Div, 10th MD. Proceeded to GHO, USAFFE, 14 Nov 1943.

68. ELMER R. HAYES

ASN 19024031, Corp, USAC. Reported to the 10th MD on 1 Jan 1944. Assigned in 110th Div. Evacuated on 15 Dec 1944.

69. CHARLES WILLIAM HEDGES

ASN O-540796, Colonel, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD on 2 Oct 1942; born in Springdale, Washington 14 Sep 1896; Mechanic Engineer Certificate and License, 3½ years in the United States Army from 1917 to 1920; Capt, Inf, AUS, USAFFE on 18 Nov 1943; promoted Major, USFIP 18 Nov 1942 and Lt-Col, USFIP, 13 Dec 1942; promoted to Colonel, Inf, 16 May 1945. Helped Col FERTIG in organizing the Guerrilla, 10th MD; Commanding Officer, 108th Division, 13 Dec 1942 and at same time Deputy Chief of Staff, 10th MD on 14 Oct 1943. Chief of Staff, "A" Corps, West Mindanao (WM), 10th MD on 9 Oct 1944; Commanding Officer, 10th MD, relieving Col Fertig.

70. TRUMAN HEMINGWAY

ASN 6081224, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD 1 Dec 1942. Assigned with the Coast Watcher Station FRS 10th MD for 10 months. Evacuated on 20 Oct 1944.

71. EARL G. HILLIARD

ASN 19000241, 1st Lieut, Inf, reported to the 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943. On duty, Corps Radio Station, "A" Corps, Western Mindanao, for 6 months. Evacuated on 15 Jan 1945.

72. JACK W. HOFFMAN

ASN 636779, 2nd Lieut, Inf, 1 Jun 1943. Assigned in 109th Div for one year and six months. Evacuated 25 Dec 1944.

73. MC E. HOKE

ASN 16041689, 2nd Lieut, Sig C. Reported to 10th MD 1 Jun 1944. Officer in Charge, Weather Control, Corps Radio Station, "A" Corps, Western Mindanao. Evacuated 26 Apr 1945.

74. EARL C. HOMAN JR.

ASN 6946985, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD 1 Nov 1943. Assigned in the FRS for one year and five months. Evacuated 28 Feb 1944.

75. LOWELL G. HOLDER

ASN 6983959, Capt, Inf. Reported to 10th MD 24 Feb 1943. Born in Evansville, Indiana on 12 Apr 1921. High School graduate of AC Technical School; enlisted in the AC, 13 Nov 1939 as Sergeant. Reported to 10th MD 24 Feb 1943 and commissioned 2nd Lieut on 25 Feb 1943. Promoted to 1st Lieut on 19 Jan 1944; promoted Capt 1 Apr 1945. Also assigned JO in the MT Co, 10th MD Ho on 24 Feb 1943. Also a Code Officer on 27 Nov 1943 and assigned to Davao area in March 1944. Ordered to proceed to the 4th Replacement Depot, Ho, USAFFE on 26 Jun 1945.

76. JOHN L. HOULIHAN

ASN 212469, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD in Dec 1942. On duty with 110th Div, G-3 Section for six months. Evacuated 14 Nov 1943.

77. FORREST A. HOWARD

ASN 19002853, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 6 Jan 1943. On duty for nine months with 109th Div; with Corps Radio Section, "A" Corps, Western Mindanao for nine months. Evacuated on 12 May 1945.

78. WILLIAM H. JOHNSON

USN SN 2832703, 1st Lieut, Sig C. Reported to 10th MD 3 Dec 1942. Assigned with the Coast Watch Station, FRS, 10th MD in Zamboanga area for 2 years and 2 months. Evacuated 9 May 1945.

79. JOSEPH ST. JOHN

ASN 6909351, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 26 Jul 1943; detached service 9th MD, Radio Section.

80. ERLING H. JONASSEN

ASN 6937757, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943. Co, Sig Co, 109th Division.

81. THOMAS WALKER JURIKA

ASN O-890348, Capt, OMC. Reported to 10th MD, 3 May 1943. Born in Zamboanga, Philippines on 9 Jan 1914. High School graduate; two years College, USA. Commissioned 1st Lieut, OMC, 19 Feb 1942 by Philippine Dept, USA. Assigned U.S. Army Transport Service, Philippines. Promoted Capt, 5 May 1943 in the USFIP, 10th MD. Assigned in the 108th Div, 10th MD on 3 May 1943; on SD with GHQ, 10th MD 5 May 1943. Assigned in the Ho, 10th MD, 5 Nov 1943.

82. ALBERT ROY KIRBY, JR.

ASN 6291177, Sgr, USAC. Reported to 10th MD on 12 Apr 1943. Born in Colorado Springs, Colorado on 29 Sep 1919; High School graduate; 3 years in USAC Bomb Squad, as Flying Chief Crew, in Charge of Motor Maintenance, 110th Div on 6 May 1943. Killed in action 3 Sep 1943. *MD*

83. JOHN KOLODIE

ASN 6877573, Pvt, OMSC. Evacuated 2 Dec 1943.

84. JOHN KORYSINSKI

ASN 16021372, 2nd Lieut, Inf.

85. WILLIAM F. KONKO

ASN 2831701, 1st Lieut, Sig C. Reported to the 10th MD 26 Dec 1942. Assigned Radio Operator, FRS, 10th MD for 1 year and 8 months. Evacuated on 29 Dec 1944.

86. WILLIAM A. KNORTZ

ASN 6909312, Capt Inf. Reported to the 10th MD and commissioned 2nd Lieut on 1 Dec 1942; promoted to 1st Lieut on 12 Jan 1943; promoted to Capt, 10 Feb 1943. Assigned Agent Officer, 114th Inf Regt. Died 11 Sep 1943.

87. RICHARD B. LANG

ASN 6571980, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD, 1 May 1943. On duty with the 107th Div for 8 months; 110th Div for 1 year. Evacuated on 5 Jan 1945.

88. DONALD J. LA COUVRE

ASN 13011259, Major, Inf. Reported to 10th MD, 1 Dec 1942. Born in Bulgar, Pann., on 19 Feb 1916; attended Ordnance School, FA, Hawaii; AC Aviation Mechanic; Clarks Field, Philippines, Pvt, AC; Commissioned 2nd Lieut, Inf, 10th MD on 1 Feb 1943; promoted 1st Lieut, Inf, 1 Oct 1943; promoted Captain 19 Aug 1944; promoted Major, Inf, 15 Apr 1945. Assignments: 9 Mar 1943, Observer in areas of 3rd Bn, 115th Inf, 105th Div; Ex O, FRS, 10th MD on 14 Oct 1943; CO, 1st Sep BN; CO, 121st Inf Regt, on 20 Aug 1944; ordered to proceed to CINCAFPAC on 17 Jun 1945.

89. LEONARD LE COUVRE

ASN 13009106, 1st Lieut, Sig C. Reported to 10th MD, 29 Jan 1943. Assigned as Code Officer, FRS, 10th MD. Evacuated on 5 Jan 1945.

90. JOHN L. LEWIS

ASN 3455913, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD 12 Dec 1942. CO, MTC, 10th MD for 1 year. CO, CTC, "A" Corps, Western Mindanao for 2 months. Evacuated 3 Apr 1945.

91. WILLIAM WATT LOWRY

ASN O-268916, Capt, ON. Reported to the 10th MD, 13 Apr 1943. Born in Brooklyn, N.Y. 1st Lieut, CE; changed his branch of service when he reported to the 10th MD from CE to Inf, 13 Apr 1943; promoted to Capt, 1 May 1943; assigned on SD with Hq 10th MD. In charge of Farm Project (Landing Field) #2, Balingbing, Lanao. Died 19 Jun 1943.

92. RAY J. LOZANO

ASN 18155440, 2nd Lieut, Sig C. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jun 1944. Weather control Officer, 121st Inf, for 9 months. Evacuated 4 Apr 1945.

93. ANDREW MANCUSO

ASN 32028092, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD on 1 Dec 1942. Assigned to 110th Div for 2 years and 2 months. Evacuated 10 Jan 1945.

94. CLAYTON A. MANNERS, JR.

ASN 6914375, 1st Lieut, Inf, reported to 10th MD 1 Jun 1943. On duty with 109th Div for 3 months. In charge, Manticao Farm Project (Landing Field). Evacuated on 29 Apr 1945.

95. ALDO F. MACCAGLI

ASN 6980070, Pfc. Assigned to 110th Div. Evacuated 15 Nov 1943.

96. WILLIAM MADISON

ASN 36048730, S/Sgt. Reported to 10th MD on 26 Feb 1945. Assigned in the FRS, 10th MD. Evacuated 26 Apr 1945.

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97. PAUL H. MARSHALL

ASN O-1686161, Lt-Col, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 11 May 1943. Born in McCows, Kansas on 27 Jun 1911. High School. Commanding Officer, 114th Inf for 1 year and 4 months; Commanding Officer, 110th Div for 5 months.

98. HAROLD D. MARTIN

ASN O-888847, Capt Sig C. Reported to 10th MD 16 Dec 1942. Born in Mayfield, Kentucky 7 Jul 1919. High School graduate. Enlisted USAAC on 28 Nov 1939; attended Army Air Corps Technical School for 17 months as Air Mechanic; Sgt, 1st Class, Air Mechanic in the USAAC. Commissioned 2nd Lieut in the 10th MD on 16 Dec 1942. Promoted 1st Lieut, USFIP 1 Sep 1943 and Capt, USFIP 1 Oct 1944. Commissioned 2nd Lieut AUS by GHQ, USAFFE, 9 Feb 1944; promoted 1st Lieut AUB by GHQ, USAFFE 24 May 1944.

99. ERNEST E. MC CLISH

ASN O-296967, Lt-Col, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 19 Nov 1942. Born in Willburton, Oklahoma on 22 Feb 1910; College graduate; senior ROTC graduate; commissioned 2nd Lieut in April 1932 Reserve. Promoted to 1st Lieut in 1934; Capt in Aug 1939, permanent grade. Major on 23 Dec 1941; Lt-Col AUS 20 Nov 1942, USFIP, 10th MD; Lt-Col (temporary) AUS on 2 Dec 1943; promoted Major by Gen WAINWRIGHT to Lt-Col, AUS by GHQ, USAFFE; assumed command of 110th Div, 10th MD on 20 Nov 1942. Relieved CO, 110th Div 23 January 1945.

100. JAMES MC CLURE

ASN O-990193, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Oct 1944. On duty G-2 Section, 10th MD for 2 months. Evacuated 2 Dec 1944.

101. MELVIN H. MC COY

Lt-Comdr, USN. Proceeded to Ho, USAFFE in July 1943.

102. FRANK D. MC GEE

ASN O-3865, Lt-Col, Cavalry. Reported to 10th MD 10 Jan 1943. Born in Claremont, S.D., USA on 6 Sep 1889; US-M.A. (West Point) 1915; 1st Lieut in 1916; Captain in 1917; Major in 1918 - National Army; Major, USAFFE on 23 Dec 1941. Did not surrender. Commanding Officer, 2nd Inf Regt, Bukidnon-Cotabato Force on 10 Jan 1943. On SC with the 109th Div, 10th MD, 30 Jul 1943; Commanding Officer, 106th Div on 7 Oct 1943. Promoted Lt-Col on 1 Jul 1943; confirmed by USAFFE on 20 Dec 1943; on temporary duty with Tenth Corps Ho on 8 May 1945. Commanding Officer, 107th Inf, Pa, 10th MD on 1 Jul 1945. Killed in action 7 Aug 1945.

103. CHARLES E. MC GRATH

ASN 13081616, 2nd Lieut, Sig C. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jun 1944. Assigned Weather Control Officer, FRS, 10th MD for 10 months. Evacuated 26 Apr 1945.

104. WARREN L. MC FADDEN

ASN 19028883, Pfc, USAC. Died on 10 May 1942.

105. WEYMAN L. MC GUIRE

ASN 6266335, 2nd Lieut, MAC. Reported to 10th MD on 13 Dec 1942. Assigned Medical Supply Officer, 105th Div for 11 months; Medical Supply Officer, 10th MD. Evacuated 26 Mar 1945.

106. JAMES E. MC INTYRE

ASN 6582459, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Dec 1942. Assigned Bn Comdr, 110th Inf, for 2 years. Evacuated 17 Dec 1944.

107. WILLIAM F. MC LAUGHLIN

ASN 0-890331, Major, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Oct 1942. Born in McKeesport, Pa. on 1 Aug 1918; attended High School in Chemical Warfare from 1937 to 1939; CM, 1939-1940 - Inf, 1943; Instructor Chemical Warfare, PA; Ex O, 3rd Bn, 103rd Bn, 103rd Inf 1 Jan to 28 Feb 1942 as 2nd Lt; promoted 1st Lt on 14 Mar 1943, 10th MD; promoted Capt on 1 Nov 1943; Major on 24 Sep 1944; promoted temporary 1st Lt AUS, by GHC, USAFFE, 11 Jul 1944. CO, 112th Inf Regt, 109th Div; ordered to proceed to HQ, USAFFE on 28 May 1945.

108. JAMES MC NEIL

ASN 658285, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Dec 1942. Assigned as Code Officer, Radio Section, 110th Div. Evacuated on 20 Apr 1945.

109. STEPHEN MELLNICK

Major, CAC, passed the 110th Div before leaving for Australia in July 1943 without any personal record.

110. LEONARD L. MERCHANT

ASN 62255032, 2nd Lieut Inf. Reported to 10th MD 1 Jun 1943. Assigned MT CO, 110th Div. Evacuated 26 Jan 1944.

111. WALTER R. MESTER

1st Lieut. Reported to 10th MD on 19 Feb 1943. Assigned S-4 113th Inf for 1 year and 6 months. Evacuated on 27 April 1945.

112. ALMA BUD MILLS

ASN 6581151, Capt, Sig C. Reported to 10th MD 1 Aug 1943. Born in Evans-ton, Wyoming in 1920; High School student. With the Army Air Corps since 16 Oct 1939 as Corp; commissioned 2nd Lieut Sig C. 10th MD on 1 Aug 1943; promoted 1st Lieut on 19 Jan 1944; promoted Capt on 23 Jan 1945. Assigned in FRS, 10th MD, on 19 August 1943; on duty with FOM, 10th MD.

113. LEONARD MINTER

ASN 6223333, Sgt, USAC. Evacuated 29 Sep 1943.

114. GLYN W. MITCHELL

ASN 6275077, Capt, Sig C. Reported to 10th MD on 24 May 1943; on duty with the FRS, 10th MD for 2 years; served in the Davao area. Proceeded to 4th Replacement Depot on 25 Jun 1945.

115. THOMAS MITSOS

ASN 6914252, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD 16 Dec 1942. Assigned Code Officer, FRS for 2 years. Evacuated 29 Dec 1944.

116. WILLARD LANDIS MONEY

ASN 6998768, Capt, Sig C. Reported to 10th MD in Dec 1942. Born in Point of Rocks, Maryland in 1923. Sgt in the USAC, 14th Bombardment Squad. Commissioned 2nd Lieut in the 10th MD on 1 Dec 1942; promoted 1st Lieut on 12 Jan 1943; promoted Capt on 1 Apr 1945. Assigned in FRS, 10th MD 1 Nov 1943. On duty with "A" Corps, Western Mindanao on 22 Jun 1944; Radio Officer of the 106th Div on 1 Jan 1945 to 22 Jun 1945.

117. FRANCIS NAPOLILLO, JR

ASN 2580667, 1st Lieut, Sig C. Reported to the 10th MD 16 Dec 1942. On duty with FRS, 10th MD for 10 months. Evacuated on 29 Sep 1943.

118. BERNARD S. NEMURA

ASN 36006198, Pvt. Died 26 Feb 1943.

119. WILLIAM L. NEWMAN

Pvt, USAC. Died in November 1942.

120. FRANK O. NOEL

ASN 2419049, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD 26 Nov 1942. On duty with Div Provost Marshall, 110th Div for 10 months. Evacuated on 29 Sep 1943.

121. LEO O'CONNOR

ASN 14025849, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 15 Mar 1943. Assigned to the FRS, 10th MD for 8 months. Evacuated on 14 Nov 1943.

122. ELWOOD H. OFFRETT

ASN 3681644, 1st Lieut, CMS. Reported to 10th MD on 26 Oct 1942. On duty with G-4, 10th MD for 10 months. Evacuated on 29 Sep 1943.

123. REECE AGUSTUS OLIVER

Capt. Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 19 Apr 1943. Born in Akron (Fulton Co) Indiana on 1 Aug 1891. High School Graduate and Post Graduate work in Education. Attended Cadet Officer School, Philippine National Guard 5 Jul 1918. Commissioned 1st Lieut and assigned Adjutant, 1st Field Signal Bn, Philippine National Guard. Aide-de-Camp to Brig-Gen DENNIS P. QUINLAN, Camp Claudie. Promoted Capt, Supply Co. Assigned in the 1st Brigade Hos, Philippine National Guard. Principal Teacher of various High Schools and Div Supt of Schools, Bureau of Education. Offered his services in any capacity to Col BEN CHASTAINE, CO, Prov Samar Brigade on 15 Jan 1942 and recommended to Gen SHARP for commission when the order of general surrender came before any reply could be made. Commissioned 2nd Lieut in the 10th MD and on 19 Apr 1943; promoted 1st Lt on 25 May 1943; promoted Capt on 1 Jan 1944. Assigned in 110th Div 19 Apr 1943.

124. PAUL A. OWEN

ASN 2716816, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 26 Mar 1943. Evacuated 29 Sep 1943.

125. HERBERT PAGE

ASN O-1053, Major Inf, reported to 10th MD on 26 Apr 1943. Born in Petersburg, Va. on 17 Sep 1877; speaks English, Spanish, little Tao-Sug Moro. Graduated Constabulary, 1906, Manila. Pvt. Corp, Acting Sgt Major, Field Co "A", 8th United States Inf, 4 Aug 1904 to 24 Sep 1907; 3rd Lieut, 3 Oct 1907, promoted 2nd Lieut 1 Jul 1908; resigned 20 Oct 1911; active duty ~~2nd Lieut 1 Jul 1908; resigned 20 Oct 1911~~ as 3rd Lieut on Sep 23 1913; 2nd Lieut on 1 Apr 1915; 1st Lieut on 5 Jun 1917; Capt on 29 Jul 1919; retired a Major, 13 Feb 1941. Recalled on 26 Apr 1943 to 10th MD; CO, 116th Inf Regt, 25 Apr 1945. Appointed Acting Justice of the Peace ex-officio, Glan and Kiamba, Cotabato 9 Nov 1943. Terminated on 30 May 1945. Ordered to report to the 4th Replacement Depot for processing 11 Jul 1945.

126. CHARLES "CHICK" PARSON

Lt-Comdr, USN, reported to 10th MD on 17 Mar 1943. On duty with 10th MD, G-2 Section.

127. FRANK Y. PATTEN

Seaman, 2nd Class, reported to 10th MD on 4 Sep 1944. On DS with Special Intelligence Detachment. Evacuated on 30 Mar 1945.

128. ROBERT L. PEASE

ASN 19052905, 2nd Lieut, CMS. Reported to 10th MD 17 Jan 1944. Assigned to CMS, 107th Div, for 11 months up to 28 Dec 1944.

129. DALCUA A. PHILLIPS

ASN 6414313, Radio Mechanic, 2nd Class. Reported to 10th MD 7 Jan 1945. On DS with the FRS, 10th MD for 4 months. Evacuated on 11 May 1945.

130. POLILUYKO, NICHOLAS D.

ASN 7021439, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 18 March 1943. Radio Station Incharge, Dipolog, Zamboanga.

131. MICHAEL PRITZ, JR.

ASN O-890333, 1st Lieut, Inf. On duty 110th Div. Killed 3 Sep 1943.

132. LEE C. RAGSDALE

ASN 19013450, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD 3 Dec 1942. Assigned to the G-4, 10th MD. Committed suicide on 15 Aug 1943.

133. ILIFF RICHARDSON

Major, Inf, reported to 10th MD on 1 Nov 1943. Born in Denver, Colorado in 1918; on DS with 9th MD for 8 months; on duty with 10th MD, 10 Sep 1944.

134. LOUIS ROBERTSON

ASN 19017768, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD 1 Apr 1943. Assigned as Provost Marshall, 113th Inf.

135. CHARLES E. ROBINSON

ASN 35706008, Radio Mechanic 2nd Class. Reported to 10th MD on 7 Jan 1945. On DS with the FRS, 10th MD for 4 months. Evacuated on 11 May 1945.

136. HAROLD A. ROSENQUIST

ASN O-278037, Major, FA. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jun 1944. Born in Providence, R.I. on 27 Nov 1903; speaks French. Recalled to Active duty 8 Jun 1942 as 2nd Lieut, AUS; promoted Capt 29 Jan 1944; assigned USAFFE in Oct 1943; ordered by Hq USAFFE to report to 10th MD, assigned Acting AC of S, G-2, 1 Jun 1944. Promoted Major, JA, 1 Nov 1944; AC of S, G-2, 10th MD, 1 Apr 1945; relieved of assignment. 10th MD and ordered to proceed GHQ, SWPA, to C-in-C, 5 Jan 1945. Reassigned on temporary duty with 10th MD through request of Col FERTIG per letter order, 22 Mar 1945, USAFFE Hq; Deputy Chief of Staff, 10th MD.

137. LEWIS C. ROYBAL

ASN 6961559, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943. Assigned in 106th Div. Evacuated 22 Jan 1945.

138. ELWOOD A. ROYER

ASN 6893017, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 12 May 1943. Assigned to the 110th Div. Evacuated 11 Mar 1944.

139. HENRY C. ROOK

ASN 2622774, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 16 Dec 1942. On duty Farm Project (Landing Field) No. 2 and stayed for 6 months. Assigned in FRS and served for 2 months.

140. LEE. R. RUTHERFORD

ASN 18029967, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943. Assigned to Corps Radio Section, "A" Corps, Western Mindanao for 7 months. Evacuated 25 Dec 1944.

141. JOHN E. RUZIECHEI

ASN 19002877, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943. Assigned to Corps Radio Section, "A" Corps, Western Mindanao for 4 months. Evacuated 1 Jun 1944.

142. JACK LAWRENCE SAMPLES

ASN 18046030, Capt. Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943. Born in Loveland, Colorado on 3 Aug 1919. High School graduate; one year ROTC, one year college. Pvt 3rd Special, 400 Ordnance. Commissioned 2nd Lieut in the USFIP, 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943; promoted 1st Lieut on 15 Feb 1944; promoted Capt Inf on 1 Apr 1945. Assigned in the FRS, 10th MD on 24 Oct 1943. CO of the Force Ordnance Co on 3 Nov 1943. Ordered to proceed to Hq, USAFFE on 8 Apr 1945.

143. WALTER W. SANDERS

ASN 6937917, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943. Assigned CO, Sig C, 109th Div and Radio Section.

144. JAMES E. SCHOEN

ASN 6657691, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Dec 1942. Assigned in the FRS, 10th MD for 2 years and 4 months. Evacuated 5 Feb 1945.

145. PETER SCHUR

ASN 6718063, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 7 Nov 1942. Assigned as S-2, 107th Inf, 105th Div for 1½ years. Assigned Regtl S-3 for 6 months. Evacuated 22 Dec 1944.

146. AUSTIN CONNER SHOFNER

Major, USMC. Reported to 10th MD on 11 May 1943. Born in Chattanooga, Tenn. on 3 Mar 1916. Graduated University of Tennessee. Professional Marine. Attended Marine Officer Basic School from August 1937 to May 1938; with the USS "Oklahoma" from August 1938 to June 1939; with the Fleet Marine Force in Jun 1939 to May 1941; with the 4th Reg. Luzon, Shanghai, etc., in May 1941. Commissioned regular in Aug 1937; reported as Capt, USMC, Apr 1943 with 110th Div. Major in the 10th MD, USFIP.

147. JOHN DAVID SIMMONS

USN SN 120868, Capt, Sig C. Reported to 10th MD 24 Jul 1944. Born in Columbus, Ohio on 16 Dec 1919. Degree: B.A. graduate, one and one-half years graduate school. Speaks English and Papuan. Graduate of Naval Reserve Midshipman School. Commissioned Ensign D-V (G) USNR. Two years in Southwest Pacific, attached to Staff, Com, 7th Fleet, duty on board ship and with radio station in New Guinea. Given the equivalent grade in the Army as Capt, Sig C, Reserve Force, USFIP, 10th MD, 18 Dec 1944. Ex O., FRS and Communication Officer of the "A" Corps, Western Mindanao on 7 Jul 1944. Ordered to proceed to Hq, Seventh Fleet at the instance of letter dated 14 May 1945, issued by Hq, Seventh Fleet.

148. THOMAS LOWRY SINCLAIR

ASN 117873, Capt. Inf. Reported to 10th MD 15 Oct 1944. Born in Yangchow, China on 24 Feb 1914. B.A. Graduate. Speaks Chinese (Mandarin), French. Two months in South China guerrilla from Jul to Aug 1939. Commissioned Ensign, Y-V (3), United States Navy Reserve on 1 Nov 1941. On active duty 19 Jan 1942. Ordered to proceed to GHQ, USAFFE 20 Feb 1945.

149. CHARLES SMITH

ASN O-888471, Maj, CE. Called to the Hq USAFFE 23 Dec 1943. (No further record).

150. JAMES S. SMITH

ASN 19038509, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 20 Nov 1942. Assigned in the District Motor Pool for 3 months and transferred to 110th Div, serving thereat for 8 months. Evacuated 2 Dec 1944.

151. CSCAR F. SMITH

ASN 1604078, Pvt, USAC. Reported to 10th MD on 1 May 1943. On duty with 110th Inf Regt for 1 month. Evacuated on 14 Nov 1943.

152. RUSSEL HOWARD SMITH

ASN 6291002, Capt, Sig C. Reported to the 110th Div, 10th MD on 1 Sep 1943. Born in Farmingdale, South Dakota on 16 Nov 1919. 1st year college. Sgt in the AC. Commissioned 2nd Lieut on 1 Oct 1943, USFIP, 10th MD; promoted 1st Lieut 1 Oct 1944; promoted Capt on 6 May 1945. Assigned in the 110th Div on 2 Oct 1943. Asst Div Prov Marshal, 110th Div, 18 Sep 1943; assigned in the FRS, 10th MD on 1 Nov 1943. Ordered to proceed to Hq, USAFFE on 11 May 1945.

153. ROBERT B. SPIELMAN

ASN 0-1686152, Major, Inf. Reported to 10th MD 11 May 1943. Born in Leigh, Iowa in Jun 1921; 1st year C.E., Texas. Enlisted 17 Sep 1940; served Luzon campaign up to 24 Dec 1941; in Corregidor from 25 Dec 1941 to 6 May 1942. Commissioned 2nd Lieut in the 10th MD, 11 May 1943. Promoted 1st Lieut 1 Oct 1943; promoted Capt 1 Nov 1944; promoted Major 15 Apr 1945. Assigned as Asst G-3, 110th Div, 12 May 1943; AC of S, G-3, 110th Div, 1 May 1945; CO, 114th Inf 8 Jan 1945; ordered to proceed to 4th Replacement Depot 15 Jul 1945.

154. JOHN E. SPRUILL

ASN 629476, Sgt. OS. Reported to 10th MD, 7 Dec 1942. Designated Mess Officer, American Mess for 6 months; Ordnance Supply Officer, 10th MD for 9 months; evacuated on 22 Jan 1944.

155. ROBERT E. STAHL

ASN 32236898, 2nd Lieut Sig C. Reported to 10th MD on 15 Dec 1943 with Col SMITH.

156. JOHN W. STARKY

ASN 18036776, 1st Lieut. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943. Assigned on duty with 109th Div for 1 year and 7 months. Evacuated 5 May 1945.

157. ADOLPH ERNEST STERNBERG, JR.

ASN 6587239, Capt. Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Feb 1944. Born in Sidney, Nebraska on 9 Sep 1917. Speaks English and German; High School graduate; carpenter; 4 years, USAC Mechanic, Crew Chief and Engineer; Sgt in the 20th Bombardment Squad, 19th Bombardment Group, USAC. Joined the 10th MD on 28 May 1942. Commissioned on 1 Feb 1944 as 2nd Lieut; promoted 1st Lieut, 1 Nov 1944; promoted Capt on 15 Apr 1945. CO of the Special Intelligence Detachment, 107th Div, 10th MD on 1 Feb 1944. Assigned to Radio Section and Utility, Hq, 107th Div on 1 May 1944. Ordered to 4th Replacement Depot on 27 Apr 1945.

158. TOMMY STEWART

ASN 19050535, Pvt, USAC. Reported to 10th MD on 19 Jul 1943. Assigned in Signal Company for one month. Evacuated on 14 Nov 1944.

159. OSCAR E. SWANSON

ASN 6507759, Capt, Inf. Reported 1 May 1944. Born in Sweden on 18 Jul 1900. High School student; 10½ years in the USAC; Sgt in the USAC, 66th Service Co. Discharged 1 Feb 1935; called to Davao by Col R. S. HILLSMAN on 14 Dec 1941. Served as Technical Adviser Aeronautical and Ordnance on 10 Jan 1942 to May 1942 with Gen SHARP; commissioned 1st Lieut on 1 May 1944; promoted Capt on 15 Apr 1945. On duty with 107th Div, 10th MD on 1 May 1944. Assigned Transportation Officer, QMS, 10th MD on 10 Jan 1945. In charge of the QMS Service Depot at Bahi and Bahi Landing Field from 1 Jan 1945 to 15 May 1945. Ordered to 4th Replacement Depot on 25 May 1945.

160. ROBERT O. SNYDER

ASN 13016435, 1st Lieut, Sig C. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943. Assigned in the FRS, 10th MD; served for one year and 11 months. Evacuated on 1 June 1945.

161 FREDERICK MARSTON TAYLOR

ASN 6581597, Capt, Inf. Reported to the 10th MD 1 Jun 1943. Born in Fort Scott, Kansas 16 Aug 1921. Graduate in ACTS; 3 years and 8 months in the Air Corps. Reported to CO, 10th MD on 3 Nov 1943. Temporarily assigned to the Div Signal Unit, 110th Div. Commissioned 2nd Lt. 11 Jun 1943. Promoted 1st Lt. 20 Feb 1945; promoted Captain 1 May 1945. CO, La Paz Military Area 5 Mar 1945; relieved as CO, La Paz Military area on 17 May 1945.

162. CHANDLER B. THOMAS

ASN O-418183, Major, AC. Reported to 10th MD on 4 Nov 1942. Born in Seattle, Washington on 11 Nov 1916. Degrees: B.A., Washington University 1937; graduated Army Air Corps 29 May 1941 with the 14th Bombardment Sq., 19th Group, promoted to 1st Lieut, 10th MD on 21 Dec 1942; promoted Capt, Hq, USAFFE, 24 May 1944. Promoted Maj 18 Nov 1944; assigned Asst AC of S, G-2, 10th MD on 6 Dec 1942; in charge of Farm Project (Landing Field) No. 1, 10th MD on 19 May 1943. DC of S, "A" Corps, on 12 Dec 1944. On duty with G-2, 10th MD on 30 Oct 1944. Liaison Officer for the CO, 10th MD, with the 13th Air Force, 31 Mar 1945.

163. RICHARD LEONARD THOMMES

ASN 19032233, Capt, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 28 Nov 1942. Born in Lastrup, Minnesota on 6 Apr 1919. High School graduate and 5 years in Pre-Divinity. Speaks German, English and Latin. Pfc in the 38th Reconnaissance Sq., 19th Bombardment Group. Commissioned 2nd Lieut, Inf, USFIP, 10th MD, 28 Feb 1943. Promoted 1st Lieut 11 Feb 1944; promoted Capt on 15 Apr 1945 and assigned as CO, Hq Bn, 110th Inf. Assigned to FRS, 10th MD on 1 Nov 1943. Ordered to proceed to Hq, USAFFE on 8 Jun 1945.

164. CARLYLE G. TOWNSWICK

ASN 6938081, 1st Lieut. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943. Communication Officer, "A" Corps, Western Mindanao and 109th Div. Evacuated 12 May 1945.

165. FRANKLIN J. TRAMMEL

ASN 6465880, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943. On duty with 109th Division, Corps Radio Section "A" Corps. Evacuated 1 Jun 1944.

166. TRACY S. TUCKER

ASN 19016176, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Feb 1943. Assigned on duty with 109th Div. Evacuated 29 Sep 1943.

167. JOHN LINCOLN TUGGLE

USN SN 265-74-29, Capt, Inf. Reported to 10th MD, 6 Dec 1942. Born in Chesterfield County, Va. on 3 Mar 1916. 6 years United States Army Mechanic 1st Class B., Sc 3. Commissioned 2nd Lieut in the 10th MD on 6 Dec 1942; promoted 1st Lieut on 1 Oct 1943; promoted Capt on 16 May 1945. Assigned in GHQ, 10th MD on 6 Dec 1942. Assigned to the 108th Div; designated Agent Officer, Farm Project (Landing Field) No. 2, 10th MD on 3 Sep 1943; Acting Administrator, Farm Project No. 2, "A" Corps, 8 Oct 1944. On 13 Jan 1945, assigned to Labo Landing Field. Ordered to proceed to Hq, USAFFE on 12 May 1945.

168. GLEN TURNER

ASN 19030146, Pvt, USAC. Corps, Casual EWP.

169. FRED W. VARNEY

ASN O-953161, Capt. CMC. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jan 1944. Commissioned 1st Lieut, QMS, AUS, on 1 Jan 1942. Discharged by Col BEN H. CHASTAINE on 9 May 1942 with instruction to report for duty at Anakan where he served continuously until called to 110th Div, 10th MD on 1 Oct 1943. Promoted Capt on 1 Jan 1944 and confirmed by GHQ, USAFFE: on 13 Sep 1944 assigned to the FRS, 10th MD.

170. CECIL E. WALTER

ASN O-1686140, Major, CE. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jan 1944. Born in Portland, Oregon 21 Feb 1891; degrees: Economics, Engineering and Forestry. Called to active duty on 1 Jan 1944 as Capt, Hq, 10th MD; rank confirmed by GHQ, USAFFE. Promoted Maj CE, 10th MD on 6 Dec 1944; promoted Lt-Col on 1 Jul 1945; Liaison Officer for CC, 10th MD, with the 108th RCT on 15 May 1945. CO, 109th Div, 10th MD on 25 Jan 1945.

171. LOYD WATERS

ASN 6298002, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD 1 Dec 1942. Assigned in the FRS, 10th MD for one year and nine months. Evacuated 29 Dec 1944.

172. HADLEY C. WATSON

ASN O-890290, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 28 Apr 1944. Assigned in the Hq, 10th MD. Evacuated 28 Dec 1944.

173. HOWARD R. WATSON

ASN 6581144, 1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD 1 Jun 1943. Assigned in the 109th Div for one year, in charge of the Code Section, Corps Radio Section "A" Corps, Western Mindanao Net Control Station for 6 months. Evacuated 8 Apr 1945.

174. ROYCE F. WENDOVER

Capt, CE. Reported to 10th MD on 26 May 1943. Degree: B.S., Oregon State College. Born in Logging, Kansas on 6 Nov 1897. Joined Philippine Scouts USA at Zamboanga on 7 Mar.

175. ROY E. WEEBON

1st Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Oct 1943. Communications Officer, FRS, 10th MD. Died on 25 Jan 1944.

176. MAJOR M. WHEELER

USN SN 149981, Lt-Comdr, USNR. Reported to 10th MD on 4 Mar 1944; Lieut - DVS USNR; promoted Lt-Comdr, USNR 26 Sep 1944. Promoted Maj, USFIP, 10th MD, Sig C, 15 Sep 1944; promoted Lt-Col, GSO on 1 Jun 1945. Assigned in FRS, 10th MD on 4 Mar 1944 and CO FRS on 1 Jul 1944. Designated DC of S, 10th MD on 1 Jan 1945; C of S, 10th MD on 1 Mar 1945.

177. PERRY T. WHITLEY

ASN 627596, T/Sgt USAC. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Dec 1942. Assigned in the 110th Div; Asst in charge of the Machine Shop, 10th MD. Evacuated 17 Dec 1944.

178. WILLIAM W. WILLIAMS

ASN 6576079, 2nd Lieut, Inf. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jun 1943. Assigned in FRS, 10th MD for five months. Assigned on duty with 109th Div for one year and three months. Evacuated 8 Feb 1944.

179. DONALD H. WILLS

ASN O-389373, Major, Cavalry. Reported to 10th MD on 1 Jan 1944. Born in Lynchburg, Va. on 23 May 1918; degree: BSC. Graduated 4 years Virginia Military Institute; 1 year 14th Cavalry Graduate; Cavalry Motor School 1 year - 26 Cavalry, Philippine Scouts. Called to active duty in Jun 1940. Promoted Capt, Cav on 22 Oct 1944; promoted Major Cav on 20 Mar 1945; Prisoner of War who jumped overboard prison ship off Coronado Point, Zamboanga. AC of 3, G-3, "A" Corps, 16 Dec 1944. AC of S, G-3, 10th MD, on 1 April 1945. Ordered to report to 4th Replacement Depot, USAFFE, on 27 April 1945.

180.

OWEN PAUL WILSON

ASN O-888985, Capt, Sig C. Reported to 10th MD on 21 Dec 1943. S/Sgt, AC, born in McCrory, Arkansas on 23 Dec 1911. Enlisted in the AC in 1937. Finished the Air Base Radio School. Radio Com Teletype operator course graduate. Instructor in the 10th Group Radio School. Chief of Section (Radio) until the surrender, Commissioned 2nd Lieut, 10th MD on 21 Dec 1943. Promoted 1st Lieut on 1 Oct 1944; promoted Capt, Sig C, on 15 Apr 1945. Assigned 107th Div on 22 Jun 1944. CO, 111th Prov Bn, 110th Div, on 15 Jan 1944. Assigned to FRS, 10th MD on 10 Apr 1945.

181.

SAM J. WILSON

USN SN 71404, Lt-Col, CSC. Reported to 10th MD on 21 Feb 1943. Born in Philadelphia, Pa., on 18 Feb 1897. High School and Economics Business Courses: U.P. and Columbia University; attended Naval Training Station 5 months Special Naval Course in Howard University in May 1918 to 1919. With USN in May 1917 to Apr 1919 (sub-chaser). In Oct 1932, a Lieut in USNR; on active duty 8 Dec 1941 in Manila, Philippines, assigned to the Censorship and Naval Intelligence. In addition, he was detailed on SD with Brig-Gen

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HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY
APO 442

AG 384

A-5

17 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Clarification of Status of U.S. and Allied Prisoners of War.

TO : Commanding General, Advance Detachment, USAFFE, APO 501.

1. In compliance with paragraph 13, USAFFE Circular 86, attached papers are forwarded.

2. There follows a summary of the information obtained by this headquarters concerning these papers:

Lists compiled by WO E. G. Byers, USN, an American Prisoner of War who worked for Japs in Bilibid Prison Records Section. Prisoner of War was released and prior to returning to the United States left attached records with an officer of the headquarters. They were copied from Japanese prison records.

3. No further explanatory information is available.

For the Commanding General:

1 Incl:
Roster of PW's.

W. A. Mixtack
W. A. MIXTACK
Major, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

35

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: DOD, sec. 83, 84
BY: [signature] DATE: 11/17/86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 1 -

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ARCHIVES FILE NUMBER 30

TITLE ESCAPED PRISONERS OF WAR

ORIGIN BILIBID

DATES

AUTHENTICITY

SOURCE COMPILED BY WO E. G. BYERS USN

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

File: 30

Title: Escaped Prisoners of War

AGRP-19

Origin: Bilbld

Classification:

Dates:

Authenticity:

Source: Compiled by WO E. G. Byers USN

Extracted by

Date

Microfilmed

Date

Screened

Dr 1 82

BANKS, Coleman C.	Pvt	A 9-38-43
BAKER, Joseph R.	Capt	A 9-38-43
BRAZELTON, Karl J. Jr.	S/Sgt	A 1-7-44
CAMONAYAN, Raymondo M.	S/Sgt	A(PS) 1-7-44
CARR, Francis A.	Capt	A 1-25-44
CHAZ, Pedro	Sgt	A 1-25-44
EDOLEMAN, George A.	Pvt	A 7-17-44
ELDER, John L.	2dLt	A 1-25-44
ELDOHER, Alfred H.	Pfc	A 9-30-43
ELDER, Guy O.	BrigGen	A 11-2-42 DEC.
FURMAN, Arthur P.	1stLt	A 1-7-44
FURMAN, Gordon C.	2dLt	A 1-25-44
GADUANO, Edigio C.	S/Sgt	A(PS) 1-7-44
GOLDSBOROUGH, Edwin G.	CIV	Amer 1-25-44
GONZALO, Daniel R.	Sgt	A 1-25-44
GORNAN, Sidney H.	S/Sgt	A 9-30-43
HEUSER, Lewis G.	S/Sgt	A 1-7-44
HUBBARD, Mark E.	CIV	Amer 11-9-44 (JMP) ?
JONES, Thomas S. <i>2d Lt</i>	Capt	A 6-11-43
KLUGE, Herman C.	1stLt	A 9-30-43
KROWITZ, Herbert	Sgt	A 9-30-43
LANGLEY, Jack E.	CIV	Amer 1-25-44
LEE, Gordon L.	Pvt	A 9-30-43
LINDBLOM, Henry G.	CIV	Amer 11-9-44 (JMP) ?
MILLER, Anthony	Sgt	A 9-30-43
MOSES, Martin	LtCol	A 9-30-43
MUSGROVE, Thomas J. Jr.	Cpl	A 1-25-44
NANK, Robert (N)	Pvt/MD	A 7-17-44
NORRIS, James R.	Capt	A 7-17-44
NORRIS, Arthur K.	LtCol	A 9-30-43
PRADGER, Ralph B.	Maj	A 1-25-44
RENN, Jack	Pfc	A 9-30-43
RICHARDSON, Robert A.	Pvt	A 9-30-43
SAUTER, Frank J.	1stLt	A 9-30-43
SCHROER, Albert E.	Pvt	A 9-30-43
STAMPER, Fred H.	Cpl	A 6-23-44
STEPHENS, Edgar (N)	Sgt	A 7-17-44
THOMAS, Roy E.	1stLt	A 7-30-43
THORP, Claude A.	LtCol	A 9-30-43
WISE, Preston K.	2dLt	A 9-30-43 K
ZIAJA, Ernest J.	2dLt	A 9-30-43
CHRISTINE, James	Pvt	A 9-30-43

THE ABOVE NAMED PERSONNEL WERE LAST SEEN IN THE CUSTODY OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY POLICE.

A Nisei, born in Hawaii, in the U.S. Army intelligence, also a POW of the Japs, was the witness at the execution (beheading) of all these personnel whose date of 9-30-43 is shown.

This man lives in Fremont, Calif and is a friend of ours, if you want his name & address, let me know.
Leon Beck

ESCAPED PRISONERS OF WAR

1.	ADAMS, Otis E.	Cpl	A
2.	BOELERS, Leo Arthur	2ndLT	A
3.	BUKOVINSKY, Andrew T.	2ndLT	A
4.	BROWN, Oscar Burton	Pvt	A
5.	CAMPBELL, Marvin H.	2ndLT	A*
6.	CARON, Albert (EVA C. 2144)	Opl	A
7.	DOERFINGER, Michael	1stLT	A
8.	DYESS, William E.	Capt	A
9.	FALAGAN, Jesse I.	Pvt	A
10.	FULLET, Bert C.	Lt	N
11.	GOURGET, Stanley F.	Sgt	A
12.	GRASHIC, Samuel G. (97412)	2ndLT	A
13.	HABURIE, James D.	2ndLT	A
14.	HAWKINS, Jack	1stLT	M
15.	HOUSE, Sterling	Pfc	A
16.	HUMPHREYS, Raymond J.	Cpl	A
17.	HUNT, Charles Franklin	T/Sgt	A
18.	JOHNSON, Cletus W.	Pvt	A
19.	KELLEY, Ernest O.	Cpl	A
20.	KONKA, Chester Aloysis	Sgt	A
21.	MARSHALL, Paul H.	Pfc	A
22.	MELCHIRE, James Edwin	2ndLt	A
23.	MC COY, Melvyn H.	LtComdr	N
24.	MC GEE, John H.	LtCol	A
25.	MC GOWAN, George Stanford	Sgt	A
26.	MELNIK, Stephen M.	Major	A
27.	PEASE, Robert Lee	Pvt	A
28.	PEYOR, Ray S.	Mile	N
29.	SATTEN, Eldred I.	Cpl	A
30.	SHOETER, Austin C.	Capt	N
31.	SPIELMAN, Robert B.	Sgt	A
32.	STEELE, Earl E. (EVA C. 2144)	Pfc	A
33.	STOBAUGH, Nolan	Pfc	A
34.	SWIFT, William D.	Cpl	M
35.	TODD, Frank H.	Capt	A
36.	WATSON, Hadley C.	Capt	A*
37.	WILLS, Donald H.	1stLt	A
38.	WOLFE, Mark M.	Capt	A

* Met up with these two men
on Leyte. Come home on the same
ship. They were on Mindanao
since your name is listed here,
thought you might like to have the
list. You may want to share with AGO.
since it shows many POWs who escaped on
Mindanao.