The Special Commission on the United States Military Academy has completed its examination of the Honor Code, the Honor System, and conditions surrounding the Honor System at West Point, and submits its findings and recommendations.
 
The six members of the Commission are in complete accord with respect to these findings and recommendations.

The United States Military Academy has, throughout its long history, produced leaders of the highest character and quality. West Point remains a unique institution where young men and women, in a spartan military environment, learn the academic and military skills necessary to be a professional soldier. West Point must retain its unique nature. We strongly support the United States Military Academy. This report is presented with the hope that the Academy's great strengths will be revitalized and renewed.

The cadets we met at West Point were a remarkable group, with unquestionable devotion to the Academy, the Army, and the Nation. The failure of some cadets to adhere fully to the Honor Code cannot detract from the fact that the overwhelming number of cadets are honorable men and women who will, we are certain, become fine officers in the United States Army.

With these basic thoughts in mind, the Commission makes three statements of position.

First--The Commission unanimously endorses the Honor Code as it now exists.

Second--We believe that education concerning the Honor Code has been inadequate and the administration of the Honor Code has been inconsistent and, at times, corrupt. There must be improvement in both education and administration.

Third--The Commission concurs unanimously with the actions that you have taken to provide a "second chance" for certain cadets involved in the Electrical Engineering cheating incident last spring. Moreover, the Commission believes that the same consideration should be given to all other cadets who were involved in cheating, or tolerating cheating, on the examination in question.

The Commission recognizes that there is a body of opinion that believes your action resulted in a lowering of standards at West Point. We disagree. The cadets did cheat, but were not solely at fault. Their culpability must be viewed against the unrestrained growth of the "cool-on-honor" subculture at the Academy, the widespread violations of the Honor Code, the gross inadequacies in the Honor System, the failure of the Academy to act decisively with respect to known honor problems, and the other Academy shortcomings. Your action did not condone cheating; rather, it recognized that, in light of the grave institutional responsibility, the implicated cadets should be given another opportunity to meet the ideals of the Honor Code.

The time has come to end this unfortunate episode. The Academy must recognize that it is not treating a disease that can be cured simply by isolating those who have been infected. The Academy must now acknowledge the causes of the breakdown and devote its full energies to rebuilding an improved and strengthened institution. We see nothing to be gained by further action against these cadets and much to be lost by continuing with the divisive and unrealistic attempt to purge all who have violated an Honor Code that is perceived in widely differing ways. What is needed are reform and regeneration, not retribution.

We make several recommendations designed to correct institutional shortcomings we have discerned. Many of our recommendations have been made by other bodies in the past, but were not adopted. We urge that the conclusions and recommendations of this report receive your personal and prompt attention.

The Commission received complete cooperation from those members of the Corps of Cadets with whom we were privileged to meet; from the Department of the Army; from officials of the Academy; from members of the Tactical, Academic, and Athletic Departments; from graduates; and from officers who have served in past years in various capacities at the Military Academy.

Sincerely,  
FRANK BORMAN
CHAIRMAN  

 

 

COLONEL FRANK BORMAN, USAF (RET.), CHAIRMAN
President and Chairman of the Board,
Eastern Airlines, Inc., Miami, Florida
 

GENERAL HAROLD K. JOHNSON, USA (RET.)
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, July 1964-July 1968
President, Financial General Bankshares, Inc.,
Washington, D.C.
 

A. KENNETH PYE
Chancellor and Dean of the School of Law
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina
 

DR. WILLIS M. TATE
President Emeritus, Southern Methodist University,
Dallas, Texas
 

BISHOP JOHN T. WALKER
Bishop Coadjutor, Episcopal Diocese of Washington,
Washington, D.C.
 

MAJOR GENERAL HOWARD S. WILCOX
Chairman of the Board of Visitors, U.S. Military Academy;
President, Howard S. Wilcox, Inc.,
Indianapolis, Indiana

THOMAS E. KELLY III, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
U.S. Army Center of Military History,
Washington, D.C.
 

DENNIS GRAY, ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN
Claremont Men's College,
Claremont, California
 

ROBERT ALAN GARRETT, COUNSEL
Office of the General Counsel,
Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C.
 

HOMER J. HOLLAND, SPECIAL CONSULTANT
First National Bank of Chicago,
Chicago, Illinois
 

CW3 HARRY L. BACON, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
U.S. Military Academy
West Point, New York
 

The Commission wishes to express its appreciation to Dr. Hans Zeisel of the University of Chicago. The Commission also wishes to acknowledge and thank Ms. Sandra Christie, West Point, New York; Ms. Ruth Schwoegler, Chicago, Illinois; and Ms. Elizabeth Koger and Mrs. Sharon Standbridge, Washington, D.C., for their secretarial assistance.

PART ONE: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I         THE HONOR CODE

II       THE HONOR SYSTEM

III      THE EE304 CHEATING INCIDENT.

A.   Honor System
B. The Academy Environment
C. The EE304 Examination

V       RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Cadets Involved in EE 304
B. The Honor Code and System
C. The Environment at West Point
D. Military Defense Counsel

I        THE EE304 CHEATING INCIDENT

II       THE STATE OF HONOR AT WEST POINT

A. Academy Awareness
B. Nature and extent of Honor Violations

1. "A Cadet Will Not Lie, Cheat, or Steal
2. ". . .Nor Tolerate Those Who Do."

C. Disaffection with the Honor System

1. Cadet Honor Committee
2. Interference with "Cadet Ownership"

a. The End of the Silence
b. Reversals of Honor Committee Determinations

3. Honor Instruction
4. Application of the Honor Code

D. The "Cool-on-Honor" Subculture

A. Mission
B. Academic Curriculum
C. Academy Leadership

1.  The Superintendent
2.  The Academic Department

a. Dean of the Academic Board
b. The Academic Board
c. The Faculty

3. The Tactical Department

a. Commandant of Cadets
b. Tactical officers
c. Leadership Evaluation System
d. Office of Military Leadership

D. External Review
E. Cadet Schedule

We have been impressed by the importance attached to the Honor Code by cadets with whom we have spoken. They generally agree that the Code, insofar as it proscribes lying, stealing, and cheating, is sound and that it espouses ethical principles in which they have the strongest personal belief. Indeed, most cadets treasure the Honor Code. Many of those implicated in the Electrical Engineering 304 (EE 304) incident express support for its ideals.

One aspect of the Honor Code is not fully supported--the nontoleration clause, which as now interpreted requires a cadet to report and thereby cause the separation of another cadet for an honor violation. Many individuals are reluctant to place duty to community over loyalty to friends. This dilemma is particularly acute at West Point, where loyalty to friends is emphasized in other aspects of Academy life. Cadets generally recognize, however, that if the Honor Code is to have any meaning, they cannot ignore the dishonorable acts of others; some action on their part, to express disapproval of honor violations, is necessary. In this sense, the Commission fully supports the principle embodied in the nontoleration clause.

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Despite support for the ideals of the Honor Code, cadet compliance with the Honor Code, by the Spring of 1976, had become disturbingly lax.

The number of cadets who have resigned or otherwise been separated in connection with the EE 304 incident, 134 cadets as of December 6, 1976, does not, in our opinion, reveal the true extent of honor violations in EE 304. The Commission is convinced that many cadets who either collaborated or tolerated collaboration on the EE 304 take-home examination have not been detected or punished. The Commission is equally persuaded that scores of other violations of the Honor Code have gone undetected or unpunished and that, during recent years, a substantial number of cadets have been involved in dishonesty, toleration, and, on occasion, misconduct as honor representatives.

We agree with the remarks of Academy officers who served on the internal Review Panel or Officer Boards:
 

Even more disturbing is that this inadequacy was known to Academy leadership well before EE 304, but no decisive action was taken. In July of 1974, the departing Superintendent of the Academy provided the incoming Superintendent with a report concerning honor at West Point. The report, which had been prepared earlier by former faculty members, concluded that the Honor System was "in trouble" and that its reclaiming would be a "formidable task." This conclusion was fully supported in a 1975 Academy study which revealed widespread disaffection with the Honor System. Nevertheless, some Academy officials persisted, even after the EE 304 incident, in publicly proclaiming the health of the Honor System.

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A. Honor System

Perhaps the most fundamental of the Honor System's inadequacies has been the expansion of the Code well beyond its intended purpose. Cadets have been found guilty for isolated conduct which cannot fairly be characterized as having made them dishonorable. Recently, for example, a cadet who reported himself for stating that he had done 20 sit-ups, when in fact he had done only 18, was found guilty of violating the Honor Code. A similar incident had occurred in 1970. in July of 1974, a new cadet who reported himself for telling his squad leader, who "did not remember the particular incident," that he had shaved, when in fact he had not, was separated. In 1975, a third classman was found guilty by the Cadet Honor Committee of "intentionally deceiving" in that "he wore a second class dress coat to a motion picture" during the week (a regulation prohibited third classmen from attending weeknight movies).

If these cases were aberrations, our concerns would not be as great. They are, however, representative of a significant number of the approximately 180 non-EE 304 cases which have resulted in findings of guilt by the respective Cadet Honor Committees during the 1970s. The Honor Code too frequently has been interpreted and taught in a technical, highly legalistic fashion. As a result, the Honor Code's basic purpose--insuring that our military leaders are honorable men and women--has been obscured.

One of the more demoralizing shortcomings of the Honor System has been confusion and inconsistency in the interpretation and application of the Honor Code. There is evidence of a critical lack of agreement on these matters among the administration, tactical staff, faculty, Honor Committee, cadets, and alumni. For example, actions such as "bed stuffing," covering windows with blankets after "lights out," and keeping liquor in hair tonic bottles have at times been considered honor violations--depending upon who is construing the Honor Code. As an Academy Study Group noted, "Operational interpretations of the Honor Code vary widely and are modified frequently without the benefit of any regularized process...."

Far from being a statement of immutable principles, the Honor Code as defined has become a compendium of changing rules. The body which has been entrusted with the primary responsibility for interpreting and applying the Code--the Honor Committee--annually changes its leadership, thereby precluding development of a stabilizing institutional memory.

Equally troublesome is the fact that the Honor Code has been exploited as a means of enforcing regulations--a view shared by 76 percent of the Cadet Corps in 1974. Cadets and officers have taken the shortcut of placing a cadet on his honor rather than themselves assuming necessary responsibility for the enforcement of regulations. Consequently, the Honor Code, by merging with the extensive Academy regulations, has lost much of its unique meaning. It has become part of the "system to be beaten."

A rigid and narrow interpretation of what constitutes nontoleration has also been detrimental to the Honor System. Cadets who become aware of honor violations have no legitimate option other than to report the violator and to cause his separation with the possibility of enlisted
 
service. As already suggested, this sole option imposes demands on many cadets which they are unwilling to accept. Consequently, toleration has become widespread. Indeed, in 1974, 73 percent of the Corps stated that they would not report a good friend for a possible honor violation. Toleration weakens the Honor System by depriving it of a major element of enforcement. Furthermore, since the tolerator, in the eyes of the Honor Code, is as guilty as the violator, future violations by tolerators become more likely. In 1967 the Superintendent's Honor Review Committee, a group of 3 Academy officers charged with monitoring the Honor Code and System, prophetically advised the Superintendent:

Recognizing these problems, in early 1976, a majority of the Corps, but less than the required two-thirds, supported the end of the single sanction. Recently, after the EE 304 crisis, the Corps again voted on a proposal to eliminate mandatory separation. The proposal failed to carry by less than 1 percent. The Commission believes that Cadet Honor Boards and reviewing authorities should have available to them a range of other actions to recommend in addition to separation, including, for example, suspension, probation, or course failure.

Other shortcomings may be seen in the Cadet Honor Committee. Comprised of a limited number of first and second classmen, the Committee has been charged with almost exclusive responsibility for insuring the effectiveness of the Honor System. Some Honor Representatives have been considered overly zealous; others have been "cool-on-honor," a phrase denoting a lax attitude toward the Honor Code and System. The granting of cadet rank to the Honor Committee leaders has identified the Committee with the cadet chain of command and, therefore, the duty to enforce regulations. Such rank, we believe, is an unnecessary accompaniment to service on the Committee. By the Fall of 1974 only 41 percent of the Corps believed that the Honor Committee accurately reflected the Corps' attitude about the Honor System.

Many cadets have felt that the Honor Committee is part of the structure that has taken away "their" Honor Code. Significant changes in the Honor System have, in some instances, been made without the knowledge and approval of the Corps of Cadets. Furthermore, the dubious 11-1 acquittals, the lack of convictions for toleration, the absence of fundamental fairness in some Honor Board proceedings, and the rare convictions of first classmen have resulted in the perception of many cadets that the Honor System has been hypocritical, corrupt, and unfair.

The validity of this view was acknowledged by the current Cadet Honor Committee when it proposed several changes which were recently adopted by the Corps. The "due process" hearing is now at the Cadet Honor Board level; the Officer Board has been eliminated; a less than unanimous vote is required for a finding of guilty; and cadets other than Honor Representatives will participate in the investigation and adjudication of honor violations. We have some reservations about the specifics of these changes; however, we agree with their purpose.

Another problem has been the failure of Academy officers to participate fully in the Honor System. Responsibility for honor education, for example, has been placed almost completely in the hands of the Cadet Honor Committee; in 1974 less than 1 percent of the Corps believed that they had gained most of their knowledge about the Honor Code and System from tactical officers and professors. The Academic Department has made little effort in the curriculum to assist cadets in discerning and coping with the moral dilemmas that inevitably confront individuals in general and military officers in particular.

Because of preoccupation with the notion that reform must be initiated by the Corps if the Honor Code and System are to be accepted, the Academy had not assumed sufficient responsibility for insuring that needed changes were effected. The role of the Academy's officers had largely been confined to reporting honor violations or reviewing Cadet Honor Board adjudications.

The lack of officer involvement in the Honor System is consistent with the Academy's apparent policy of placing more responsibility on the cadets themselves in every aspect of cadet life. This lack of involvement contributed to the belief that the Honor Code and System belong exclusively or primarily to the cadets and that any participation by officers constituted interference. This, in turn, generated cadet antagonism when decisions by the Superintendent and Officer Boards differed from Cadet Honor Committee determinations.

These inadequacies have combined to foster cadet cynicism toward and estrangement from the Honor System, thereby weakening the System itself. There has developed within the Corps what has been referred to as a "cool-on-honor" subculture--a largely unorganized group of cadets who justify certain honor violations and "beating" the Honor System. This subculture and its accompanying peer pressure have influenced many additional cadets to commit honor violations. In some instances the Academy's Leadership Evaluation System has been used by cadets to enforce at least toleration of the subculture. With each violation, the subculture grew and its influence became more formidable.

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B. Academy Environment

The inadequacies in the Honor System cannot be viewed in isolation. if the System is to operate effectively, the total setting must be supportive. Factors such as the rapid growth in Corps size from 2,500 in 1964 to its current strength of 4,400, instability caused by the modification of some Academy traditions, and certain societal attitudes and turmoil may have militated against this support. While we recognize the influence of these factors, we believe other institutional problems were the primary causes of the erosion of respect for the Honor System.

There has, for example, been serious disagreement over the proper role of education in the mission of the Academy: Should West Point train combat leaders for immediate service in junior ranks, or should it provide the fundamental education and study to allow graduates (a) to assimilate quickly the special skills required for junior officer service in the basic branches of the Army, and (b) after experience and further study, to provide the senior military leadership on which the nation depends for its security. We are convinced that the acquisition of a college education within a military environment must, during the academic year, have first call on the time and energies of each cadet; military training should be concentrated in the summer months. The failure of Academy constituencies to agree on the relative importance of the educational component of the mission has hindered the development of an academic atmosphere which discourages dishonesty.

Development of such an atmosphere has also been impeded by the failure to determine priorities among competing claims on cadets' time. Prior to curriculum changes adopted this Fall, cadets needed far more credit hours to graduate than are required by most institutions of higher education. The academic pressures have been intensified by the increase, during the academic year, of military and physical training and cadet leadership responsibilities. In excess of two-thirds of the cadets surveyed in 1975 stated that they did not have sufficient time to satisfy overall demands. While cadets may not have been overworked, they clearly have been overscheduled. The result, as well described by a recent honor graduate, has been that:
 

Equally troublesome has been the failure to develop an appropriate state of discipline. In recent years, the Academy has delegated much of the authority for supervising cadets to the cadet chain of command. This has had the effect not only of increasing the time pressures on some cadets, but also of weakening the state of discipline. Confusion over the proper role of the company tactical officer has further contributed to this problem. By law, the tactical officer is the company commander. While all cadets and officers have some responsibility for discipline, the tactical officer must ensure that the Academy's high standards of discipline are met.

Finally, adherence to the Honor Code is more difficult when cadets perceive dishonesty around them. The standards of the Academy have appropriately been set at a level much higher than the lowest common denominator of society at large and, for that matter, of the "real Army."

While the so-called "double standard" can be disillusioning, its existence must be acknowledged. West Point, however, has always and must continue to set the standards for the Army. It is of utmost importance that every officer at the Academy lead by example; they, in particular, must aspire to the high ideals of the Honor Code if the cadets are to do so. The degree to which Academy officers at different echelons have, in fact, demonstrated such leadership is open to question. Clearly, cadets have perceived failure on the part of some.

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C. The EE 304 Examination

The nature of EE 304 as well as the method of administering the take-home examination contributed, perhaps most directly, to the occurrence and magnitude of the cheating incident.

In our opinion, allowing 823 cadets 2 weeks to solve an out-of-class examination in a course for which the relevance had not been established by the Department and which was almost universally disdained by cadets as irrelevant and "spec and dump" (memorize and forget) placed unwise and unnecessary temptation before each cadet. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that, throughout the EE 304 course, cadets had been allowed and even encouraged to collaborate on home-study problems similar to that of the March 3 and 4 examination. Indeed, not only was one such problem due on the same day, but the second part of the examination also permitted collaboration. It became common practice for cadets--who had difficulty with their problems or who simply did not have the time or motivation to complete them--to go to the room of an individual known to be proficient in Electrical Engineering, take his EE notebook, and extract the needed information. Such action, which inevitably increased dependency on collaboration, had never been considered a violation of the Honor Code or, for that matter, any regulation.

We agree with the statement of a former Commandant of Cadets who advised the Commission:

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In the mandate establishing this Commission the Secretary posed eight questions. We have discussed these basic and essential queries elsewhere in this report. Nevertheless, in view of their importance, direct answers are provided at this point.

  A. Cadets involved in EE 304

The Commission has considered its primary responsibility to formulate recommendations concerning the institutional deficiencies it has found to exist. Unlike many other advisory bodies, however, this Commission has undertaken its work during the very crisis studied. It has thus been impossible to ignore the most fundamental question raised by this entire matter--what must be done with respect to the cadets involved in EE 304.

At the outset, we emphasize our strong support for the Secretary of the Army's August 23, 1976 policy to allow readmission of separated cadets. In recognizing the extraordinary nature of the situation, the Secretary, we believe, acted wisely and compassionately. The cadets did cheat, but were not solely at fault. Their culpability must be viewed against the unrestrained growth of the "cool-on-honor" subculture at the Academy, the widespread violations of the Honor Code, the gross inadequacies in the Honor System, the failure of the Academy to act decisively with respect to known honor problems, and the other Academy shortcomings. The Secretary's action did not condone cheating; rather, it recognized that, in light of the grave institutional responsibility, the implicated cadets should be given another opportunity to meet the ideals of the Honor Code.

The time has come to end this unfortunate episode. The Academy must recognize that it is not treating a disease that can be cured simply by isolating those who have been infected. The Academy must now acknowledge the causes of the breakdown and devote its full energies to rebuilding an improved and strengthened institution. We see nothing to be gained by further action against these cadets and much to be lost by continuing with the divisive and unrealistic attempt to purge all who have violated an Honor Code that is perceived in widely differing ways. What is needed are reform and regeneration, not retribution.

Under these circumstances, we must recommend, as to those cadets implicated in connection with the EE 304 incident, that:

We recognize that some of the implicated cadets undoubtedly deserved to have been expelled long ago. The Academy, however, has not, in its procedures, distinguished between such cadets and other highly motivated young men who became entangled in this affair. Failure to do justice to some should not be allowed to preclude mercy to others. All of the cadets should have a final opportunity to prove that they are indeed honorable or, conversely for some, to prove that they are not.

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B. The Honor Code and System

With respect to the Honor Code and System, the Commission makes the following recommendations:

C. The Environment of West Point

1.  A permanent and independent advisory board should be established to provide the continuing assistance that most institutions of higher education receive from their boards of trustees. Such a board, established by the Secretary of the Army, should (1) be non-political; (2) include members who recognize the proper mission of the Academy; (3) convene often enough to insure current knowledge of the institution; and (4) report to the Secretary of the Army its observations and recommendations.

2.  The West Point mission statement should be revised to insure that everyone understands the importance of education in the mission of the Academy. The acquisition of a quality college education within a military environment must have first call during the academic year on the time and energies of a cadet. Everyone must understand that this is the primary mission of the Academy from September to June. Military training should be concentrated in the summer months.

3.  The Superintendent should have responsibility for all aspects of the internal administration of the Academy, including resolving the competing demands made by subordinate authorities upon individual cadets. His selection should be based upon his interest in education and a demonstrated ability to provide educational and military leadership. He should be assigned to the Academy for a minimum of 5 years and should be consulted as to the selection and length of service of the Commandant of Cadets and Dean of the Academic Board.

4.  Permanent professors should serve on active duty for no more than 30 years, unless requested to continue on a term basis by the Superintendent with the approval of the Secretary of the Army.

5.  The Professor of Physical Education should be a member of the Academic Board.

6.  The Office of Military Leadership, a department concerned in large part with providing academic instruction in behavioral sciences, should be transferred to the Academic Department. The Director of that Office should be a member of the Academic Board.

7. There should be an expansion of programs which bring outside viewpoints to the Academy, e.g., visiting professors to and from the Academy.

8. The Academy must reaffirm the role of the tactical officer as a company commander and ensure that this role is uniformly adhered to throughout the Tactical Department.

9. Tactical officers should be selected from officers who have completed Command and General Staff College or equivalent education.

10. The Leadership Evaluation System should be reviewed to determine whether it is a constructive force in the cadets' leadership development.
 

We are disturbed by allegations that several military defense counsel suffered harassment and injury to their Army careers because of their vigorous defense of cadets. Inasmuch as the Secretary of the Army had commenced an investigation into these charges, we did not review these allegations in depth.

The defense function places counsel in an adversary relationship with West Point--the institution that seeks to discipline or otherwise punish his client. This adversary relationship is too often viewed as an act of disloyalty. A cadet client should feel secure that the legal defense presented is in no way compromised by the lawyer's fear of adverse personnel actions.

The present system of having the same officer teach law and act as defense counsel places him in the difficult position of attacking the basic policies of the institution to which he owes allegiance in his role as a faculty member. As a partial solution the Commission makes the following recommendations:

On March 3 and 4, 1976, the Electrical Engineering 304 instructors gave 823 second classmen a take-home computer examination which was worth approximately 5 percent of their semester grade. The only second classmen not given this exam were those cadets in the top academic sections of EE 304. The instructions which accompanied the examination were clear:

On April 4, 1976, the Electrical Engineering Department forwarded to the Cadet Honor Committee the names of 117 cadets believed to have collaborated on the assignment. Cadet Honor Boards were convened, and by April 21, 50 cadets were found guilty ("found") of either giving or receiving assistance; 2 others resigned without appearing before Honor Boards. On May 3, 1976, 10 military defense counsel representing the accused cadets wrote the Secretary of the Army, advising him that cheating at the Academy was "widespread;" that "upwards of 300 members of the Class of 1977" had cheated in EE 304; and that the Cadet Honor Committee "not only acted arbitrarily and improperly in some cases but that certain of its members affirmatively conspired and acted to conceal and cover up violations of the Cadet Honor Code."

On May 23, 1976, the Superintendent appointed the internal Review Panel (IRP) to "... investigate and examine all relevant evidence of violations of the Cadet Honor Code and other [USMA] regulations... arising from the EE 304 Computer Problem..." and to "...recommend for referral to Boards of Officers all cases for which [it] determines that there is probable cause of a violation." The Superintendent, in an August 26, 1976 letter to Academy staff and faculty, explained his decision to establish the IRP as follows:

The names of 150 cadets, in addition to the 50 already found by the Honor Committee, were ultimately referred to Officer Boards by the IRP. Eighteen cadets resigned, and 103 were found guilty. Twenty-nine of the 103 cadets had initially been found not guilty by the Cadet Honor Committee. The cases of all found cadets were reviewed by officials at the Academy and Department of the Army, including the Superintendent and Secretary of the Army.

Academy regulations require that any cadet found guilty of an honor violation be separated from West Point; no other penalties are allowed. Separated cadets, if they are first or second classmen, may also be required to serve on active duty as enlisted men. On August 23, 1976, the Secretary of the Army announced a plan whereby any cadet who had cheated in EE 304 and who resigned from the Academy would be eligible for readmission to the Academy after 1 year; the requirement of enlisted service would be waived in each case. As of December 6, 1976, 134 cadets have resigned under the provisions of this plan; 49 of these cadets either had not been referred to or had not been found guilty by the Officer Boards.

On September 16, 1976, the Cadet Honor Committee received 159 documents which had been prepared by cadets implicated in EE 304 to demonstrate the scope of the problem. These documents alleged that 259 cadets had cheated in EE 304. Allegations were made against 72 cadets who had not previously been investigated as well as 37 who had been found innocent.The affidavits also implicated several hundred cadets in honor violations other than those arising out of EE 304; of this group, 191 had already graduated from West Point. The Honor Committee is investigating the charges against cadets who are currently at West Point.

As of December 6, 1976, 134 cadets have resigned or otherwise been separated in connection with EE 304. In terms of background and performance at the Academy, these cadets came from a cross section of the Corps. Some companies had many implicated cadets; others had few. All but 3 of the 36 cadet companies had at least one. In most cases, only a small number of individuals worked together--often roommates or friends. There was, in other words, no widespread organized effort to cheat. Some of the cadets implicated had violated the Honor Code on several prior occasions; others had done so rarely or, perhaps, not at all. According to the Superintendent, in his August 26, 1976 letter to the Academy staff and faculty:

The EE 304 instructors regularly gave Assigned Study Problems (ASPs) to be completed outside the class. Indeed, between March 3 and 18, 1976, the cadets were given 5 ASPs; 1 was due on the same day that the March 3 and 4 exam was due. The EE 304 instructors authorized and even encouraged cadets to collaborate on ASPs. As a result, many cadets did not work the ASPs; they relied upon copying another's work and studying it before class in preparation for the periodic quizzes. One faculty member observed:

During the last quarter century there have been repeated incidents of academic dishonesty involving significant numbers of cadets. In 1951 the Academy separated 90 cadets characterized by an Academy investigative board as having been part of an "organized ring or conspiracy" which had existed for "several years." A witness before the Commission alleged that the Academy uncovered a cheating incident two years later involving 174 cadets, but separated no one. The Commission did not investigate the allegation.

The 1964 Report of the Superintendent's Honor Review Committee, composed of 3 Academy officers charged with monitoring the Honor System, refers to "the problems of last spring which culminated in the separation of a group of cadets" and notes that "there exists the feeling on the part of some that not all of the guilty may have been detected and eliminated." No further details are provided. According to a senior officer serving at, that time in the Tactical Department:

In the Winter of 1972-73, the Cadet Honor Committee suspected that possibly 100 cadets were cheating. By late Winter, the Committee still had a feeling that cheating existed but, according to an Academy official, that it "had been unable to get hold of it." Twenty cadets were ultimately separated for cheating in Physics.

The EE 304 episode may be viewed as part of what has become a recurring pattern during the preceding 25 years. The incident is even less surprising when one considers the state of honor at West Point during the past few years. Specifically, violations of the Honor Code, including toleration, have become increasingly widespread, yet few have been detected or punished. Disaffection with the Honor System has, for a variety of reasons, become even more pervasive. It was in this environment that 823 second classmen approached their EE304 computer examination. Before discussing the situation, we consider the Academy's awareness of the general problem.

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A. Academy Awareness

At the completion of his term, the 1969 Honor Chairman wrote in the Cadet Chairman's "Honor Book" that although "great support for the Honor Code still exists within the Corps," a "significant number of cadets are 'alienated from the Code" and that "many cadets currently feel that the Honor Code works against them rather than for them." The Chairman of the 1971 Superintendent's Honor Review Committee advised the Superintendent that he:

In July of 1974, the departing Superintendent provided the incoming Superintendent with a report concerning honor at West Point. The report, which had been prepared for him in 1970, made the following observations:

"This past year has been very difficult. The Honor System is in transition, and has come very close to falling altogether. Although we may perhaps have arrested the demise of the System, there is still a great deal more to be done to restore a healthy one."

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B. Nature and Extent of Honor Violations

As the Study Group's survey suggests, violations of the Honor Code, including toleration, have not been uncommon.

"Cadets have participated in violations of the Honor Code by exchanging information during the time break between class hours. This information has been passed openly between regiments and usually always in hallways of academic buildings but also possibly at prearranged meetings in the hostess' office.

"Some cadets have established prearranged times during written partial reviews (WPRs) and term end examinations to meet in the bathroom to exchange answers for an examination which was in progress.

"One cadet indicated that, in his company, an attitude prevailed which would prevent lying to another cadet but would support lying to members of the Staff and Faculty because the latter is viewed as 'beating the system.'

"Marking of the absence card and signature in departure books is viewed as a portion of the Honor Code frequently violated. Many of the cadets I interviewed consider this to be a matter of regulations as opposed to making any type of official statement.

"Cadets in charge of quarters and room inspection frequently, in a few companies, gave oral and signed false reports. Additionally, cadets in charge of quarters often mark absence cards for cadets they know to be on an unauthorized absence."
 

"Information given both to IRP and Law Department personnel indicates that there have been widespread violations involving lying, stealing, and toleration. For example, it is apparently not uncommon for cadets to mark their cards indicating an authorized absence and then deliberately go off limits. Others allegedly lie to help friends. This appears to be most common at honor investigations, honor hearings, and Officer Boards. There are also allegations of stealing to include calculators, stereo equipment and books, plus items taken from the Cadet Store, PX, Book Store, and cadet activities such as the parachute club. Reference books are apparently either stolen from or deliberately hidden in libraries in order to gain unfair advantage over classmates. Beyond these, there are a variety of allegations about cadets deliberately manipulating LES ratings, revealing confidential times for inspections, misusing credit cards, conveniently overlooking absentees, miscounting repetitions on PT tests, etc., etc. Finally, there is the almost certain presence of widespread toleration of all of the above."

"I believe this recent cheating episode is only the tip of a much larger, more complex iceberg. The diffuse, unconnected, nonconspiratorial character of the cheating indicates to me we happen to have lighted on one particular skeleton in our academic closet. Statistically, it is unreasonable to assume the Class of 1977 is anomalous, an unhappy convergence of reprobates and bounders. That simply does not make sense given our admissions procedures. Moreover, I find it difficult to believe that Fortune guided us to 21 percent of a class the first and only time it ever cheated so that we could purge the miscreants and maintain unsullied the purity of the institution. If I am correct in so arguing, then there is something much more fundamentally wrong."

* * *

"Cheating was not confined to EE 304 nor to the Class of 1977. Early indication that this was the case was amply corroborated in testimony throughout the summer that the specific incidents implicating Class of '77 members in the EE 304 problem were only the first manifestation of widespread problems with honor, the Honor Code, and the Honor System. Even though it would be fair to say that the vast majority of the persons called before the subpanels [of the IRP] perjured themselves regarding the EE 304 matter and other related incidents, sufficient evidence was forthcoming that there were wide scale incidents involving academic cheating in other courses at other times."

* * *

"I am convinced that the cheating which took place on the EE 304 computer problem is much more widespread than most people would like to believe. By this mean, I believe that cheating has taken place long before the EE 304 problem was given out. Cheating, to certain degrees, has become a way of life and cadets aren't sure what is cheating and what is not. Of those who have not cheated or collaborated, many (I would say most) have tolerated this situation.... I now wonder if there is a single cadet at USMA now who could say he had not in any way broken the Honor Code."

* * *

"Although a large portion of the Class of 1977 is currently facing dismissal for cheating, there is no reason to assume that this is the only time members of this class have cheated on a large scale nor to assume that there have not been cases of comparable size in this class and classes previously and presently here."

* * *

"The Class of 1977 is not unique. The isolated yet widespread nature of cheating on the EE problem suggests that collaboration and toleration are common at West Point. This condition seems to be the result of a long term erosion of the Honor Code. Undoubtedly, other classes have been, and still are involved in cheating on a scale at least equal to '77. The Honor Code and System seem to have become a part of a game. Cadets are not concerned with being honorable. Some are concerned with finding ways to get away with as much as possible while staying within the bounds of the letter of the Code as they interpret it. Others simply are concerned with not getting caught."

* * *

"It appears to me that this situation indicates that large numbers of cadets either did not accept the Honor Code or did not consider collaboration on academic exercises to be a violation of 'their code'."

* * *

"Testimony given before my IRP convinced me that we are seeing only the tip of the cheating iceberg by looking at the EE 304 exercise. It is totally illogical to assume that this was the first time that the majority of these cadets engaged in unauthorized collaboration. It is equally illogical to assume that the Class of 1977 is the only class involved in such activities . . . .I am convinced that many cadets, both in the Class of 1977 and in other classes, had been cheating prior to the EE 304 incident. This was not a spontaneous capitulation to pressure; rather it is a disease which has spread and is only now being diagnosed. The attitudes and perceptions influenced by major events over the past three years may have been exacerbated by a variety of other circumstances, some of them peculiar to EE 304."

* * *

"At no time did I get the impression that the EE 304 problem created a unique situation. It may have involved cadets who had previously remained aloof from--or even unaware of--other unauthorized group efforts; but, it seems apparent that collaboration was not uncommon or unusual among certain cadets. Nor Sir, am I any longer inclined to think that the problem was confined to the Class of '77.... [P]rior to serving on an Officer Board I was personally convinced that reports of widespread cheating were little more than legally useful propaganda, perpetrated by clever defense lawyers. I no longer believe that to be the case."

The Honor Committee, however, has interpreted nontoleration as the "willful failure to report" an "observed or known" honor violation. Cadets are thus required to report themselves, as well as fellow cadets. The cadets' responsibility has been further defined by the Honor Committee in its honor orientation booklet:

"If you observe a situation in which you believe that an honor violation might have occurred, you are encouraged to confront the individual you suspect. Your discussion with the cadet should clearly point out how you believe an honor violation has occurred and provide the suspected cadet an opportunity to explain the situation. Situations will arise often which immediately may appear to be a violation of the Honor Code, but after hearing the facts of what actually occurred or what was intended by the other cadet, you may be convinced that a violation did not occur. If you remain convinced that a violation did occur, you should encourage the other cadet to report it to your Company Honor Representative. You, in turn, must report the suspected violation to your Company Honor Representative who will ensure that the violation is investigated following Honor Committee procedures described elsewhere in this booklet. After the investigation is completed, you will be informed personally of the outcome of the investigation. The key point to remember is that you must be completely convinced that an honor violation did not occur or you must report the circumstances to the Cadet Honor Representative." (Emphasis added)
 

The Honor Committee has explained, also in the orientation booklet, the importance of the nontoleration clause:

"The subject of turning in someone on a violation is very sensitive. All of the cadets I have met that have expressed their views complain that it is very hard to turn in a friend. Part of this comes from being taught as a youngster not to tell on your friends so as to help them out when they make a mistake. Coming to West Point one is asked to do just the opposite by the Honor Code. If this is good or not is another question. This does however put pressure on a cadet. He has to decide to either go along with what he has been taught and violate the Honor Code or he has to go against what for eighteen years has been told and abide by the Honor Code. For a few cadets this is a hard decision to make."

* * *

"I have found that most of the cadets to whom I have spoken feel that to lie, cheat, or steal is wrong and that they are able to accept that portion of the [Honor] Code. The 'toleration clause,' however, evokes mixed feelings. Although it is generally accepted that the 'toleration clause' is essential to the enforcement of the Code, cadets still find it difficult to accept. Having come from a society which teaches that to 'tell on someone' or to 'fink on someone' is wrong, and then having been told constantly during the first weeks at West Point to work together, and to cover for each other, cadets find it hard to accept the 'toleration clause.' It seems to run contrary to all that they have previously been taught."

"Just about everyone whom I spoke to agreed that it is reasonable to expect a cadet to not lie, cheat, or steal. However, several cadets questioned the reasonableness of the toleration clause. Throughout a person's life, society dictates that a person does not 'squeal' on his buddy for minor offenses such as lying. West Point is one of the few places in modern society which not only looks favorably upon reporting a friend for lying, it demands it."

"The Committee is convinced that toleration is the greatest single threat to the current health of the Honor System. Almost all cadets interviewed agree that 'no toleration' is not completely supported by the Corps. Several cadets stated that toleration is widespread. At least two cadets stated that witnesses who testified against other cadets at Honor Committee Hearings were subsequently harassed and subjected to pressure by fellow cadets because of their testimony. The Committee believes this problem deserves the urgent attention of the new Honor Committee."

Notwithstanding widespread toleration, very few cadets have been found guilty of toleration. During the 10 years preceding the EE 304 incident, only 2 cadets were found solely for this offense; 5 others were found in 1 year for toleration and other offenses. Convictions for tolerating violations thus accounted for less than 2 percent of the total convictions.

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1. Cadet Honor Committee

The Cadet Honor Committee, formally recognized in 1921, is responsible for the "supervision and administration of the Cadet Honor Code and Honor System." The Committee consists of 1 first classman elected from each company (Honor Representatives), 4 Regimental Honor Representatives, a Secretary, 2 Vice Chairmen, and a Chairman. Each company also elects one second classman every tall as an apprentice. When the Committee was first established, the position of the Chairman of the Honor Committee was, according to the Academy's 1921-22 Bugle Notes (newspaper), automatically filled by the senior class president. Furthermore, all of the upper classes were represented on the Committee.

The Academy's 1937 Howitzer (yearbook) described the Committee as "not a law-making body, not a court to try [offenders];" the Committee "functions only as an advisory and instructive council." However, after tracing the history of the Committee, the 1968 Honor Chairman wrote:

By the Spring of 1976 many cadets had lost confidence in the Cadet Honor Committee. As one faculty member who sat on the IRP remarked, "it is the strong perception of the Corps that its Honor Committee is undeserving of confidence." This conclusion is consistent with the Study Group's survey which revealed that only 41 percent of the Corps believed the Cadet Honor Committee accurately reflected the Corps' attitude about the Honor System.

The Cadet Honor Committee constitutes only 2 percent of the Corps. A few representatives are usually considered overly zealous--the "guys with the black hoods" in the cadets' vernacular. One group of cadets not implicated in EE 304 advised the Commission that the Cadet Honor Committee "placed themselves upon a pedestal above the rest of the Corps of Cadets, resulting in a 'holier than thou' attitude among some of them, and perhaps a loss of reality for others."

Many cadets, with good cause, believe that some members of the Honor Committee were corrupt. The cadet who gave the Class of 1977 its honor orientation was himself implicated in an honor charge. Based upon medical advice, the Academy chose not to pursue this charge and allowed him to graduate without a commission. As one cadet remarked, "I feel that [my] class [1977] saw the case as a big cover up and lost a lot of faith in the system at that point." Affidavits executed in connection with the EE 304 episode contain allegations against 23 cadets on the Honor Committee. The Superintendent, in setting forth his several reasons for the creation of the IRP, explained:
 

"[C]harges of improper influence and the existence of 'tainted' members of cadet honor boards in the initial hearings in April were being partially substantiated by recorder interviews of accused cadets and by board witnesses. There was possible involvement of large numbers of the Class of 1977, including an undetermined number of Honor Committee members."

The Special Assistant to the Commandant for Honor in an August 20, 1976 memorandum further noted:
 

"For a number of years it has been customary for some companies (probably at least three) to elect honor representatives who take a liberal view toward the interpretation of the Honor Code. In at least one company, a group of cadets combined to campaign for and were successful in electing an honor representative who openly and blatantly participated in and tolerated violations of the Honor Code. He also attempted to assist his friends should they appear before an Honor Board."

"It is not at all uncommon to have a company elect a representative who the other members know will act to keep the company out of trouble, one who is indifferent to the Honor System or one who has been involved in various violations prior to his election. This certainly does not apply to all representatives, but the condition is widespread enough as to cast serious doubt on the workability of the system as presently constituted."

"Many cadets claim that the entire Honor System has lost credibility due to improprieties on the part of members of the Honor Committee. Some cadets were apparently elected to that body on the basis of a campaign promise to take care of their friends. Others, once elected, apparently circumvented established procedures to suit their own whims."

"The most generous interpretation of evidence at hand is that the process of selection of Honor Representatives for their probity has been a failure. The current membership of the Honor Committee may include persons whose philosophy is quite antithetical to the Honor Code."

The several 11-1 acquittals also suggested improprieties. In their 1970 report on honor at West Point, former faculty members advised the Superintendent that there "have been outright flagrant cases of disregard for the imperatives of the Code, with guilty cadets absolved by the Honor Committee when there was incontrovertible evidence that a violation of the Honor Code had occurred." Similarly, the Cadet Honor Committee's current Vice Chairman for Investigations recently informed the Corps of Cadets:
 

"There have been cases of board fixing that can be documented. Not only for the past year but for the past several years. For example, during the Electrical Engineering controversy this past summer, 30 of the 35 cadets were found guilty by Officer Boards who were previously found not guilty by the Cadet Honor Committee. Testimony arising out of the Officer Boards and the Internal Review Panel this summer has indicated that many of these were tampered with at the Honor Committee Board level. One cadet found guilty in the EE 304 controversy had previously been exonerated by 8 Cadet Honor Boards in his cadet career. Strong evidence also from the summer indicates that he was protected by friends an the Honor Committee."

Many cadets also believe that the Cadet Honor Committee is part of the structure that has taken "their Code" away from them. As noted by the Commandant of Cadets in a memorandum concerning the recent "honor problem," the "Honor Committee processes were... surrounded with an aura of secrecy." Furthermore, the Committee has in some instances made significant changes in the Honor System without the knowledge or approval of the Corps. During a February 1976 speech urging adoption of discretionary sanctions, the 1976 Honor Chairman informed the Corps:
 

"It may be of interest to you to know that, if you vote for the Honor Committee to in some cases consider alternatives to resignation, it would not be the first time that the Honor System functioned in such a manner. Of the many examples, I could give you, let's use a recent one. The Honor Committee of the Class of 1972 voted in a discretionary clause without the knowledge of the Corps. The Class of 1973, again without the knowledge of the Corps, dropped the procedure."

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The Corps and the Honor Committee have never had any punitive authority. Honor Committee findings of guilt have always been subject to officer review, including administrative board action and Uniform Code of Military Justice proceedings.

Nevertheless, for several years, cadets have been told and they have believed that the Code and System are "theirs;" the belief that the Corps "owns" the Code and System has persisted. In his May 28, 1976 address to the Association of Graduates, the Superintendent stated:

"The cadets want full responsibility for the Honor System. That is a healthy attitude. No Superintendent can run the Honor System. No Commandant of Cadets can. No Dean of Academics, no Association of Graduates, no outside group can run the Honor System--only the Corps of Cadets themselves can do so." (Emphasis added)

The concept of cadet ownership can be attributed to several sources. For many years, Honor Board findings had in fact been final determinations. Very few were appealed; even fewer were reversed. In a case where the decision was reversed and the found cadet "returned to the Corps," the "silence" (described below) was available to enforce the Board's determination.

Cadet ownership is also related to the lack of officer involvement in the Honor System. In an August 24, 1976 speech, the Superintendent noted:

"Some of my predecessors and some of the Commandant's predecessors have literally told Tactical Officers and I guess Superintendents have told Academic Officers to remain aloof of the Honor System because 'that belongs to the cadets and it's theirs,' and the implication is exclusively."

During the 1970s a series of events occurred which made serious inroads on the concept of cadet ownership. Undoubtedly the most significant of these events were the abolition of the "silence" and the number of reversals of Cadet Honor Committee determinations by Boards of Officers and the Superintendent.

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The Academy, anticipating a court challenge to the silence, prepared a statement of its position in the Summer of 1973:
 

"The present officials at USMA... believe that if the 'Silence' is outlawed it is tantamount to telling the cadets that they can no longer aspire to a code" of honor that is any higher than the Uniform Code of Military Justice. They believe: 'The Code works only because the cadets operate it.... Denial of such authority inevitably would deny responsibility for the operation of the Code. It would also mark the end of the Honor Code as an effective instrument at USMA. Specifically, the silence is the ultimate power available to the Corps to insure its effectiveness.'"

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b. Reversals of Honor Committee Determinations

From 1965 to June of 1973, 305 cadets were found guilty by the Cadet Honor Committee. Of those, only 15 chose to exercise their right to go before Boards of Officers. The others immediately resigned. Of the 15, only 3 were found not guilty. Thus, In over 99 percent of the cases, the Honor Committee's initial finding was in fact the final determination.

Commencing in the Fall of 1973, cadets In larger numbers began to request de novo hearings before Boards of Officers. During the academic year 1973-74, of the 25 cadets found guilty by the Cadet Honor Committee, 10 sought review by Officer Boards. Five were found not guilty. Thus, in one year the Cadet Honor Committee was reversed by Officer Boards more times than it had been in the previous 8 years. This trend continued in 1974-75 when, out of 24 cases in which cadets were found guilty by the Cadet Honor Committee, 14 requested Boards of Officers, and 7 were found guilty. Two of those 7 were reversed by the Superintendent. In 1975-76 (excluding EE 304 cases), 14 of 24 found cadets requested Boards of Officers. In 4 of those cases, the Cadet Honor Committee was reversed. Thus, for the first time in the history of the Honor System, large numbers of found cadets were being returned to the Corps. Coming immediately after the abolition of silence, the one means the Corps believes it had to express disapproval of the returned cadets, this new pattern has caused great unrest in the Corps. As one group of cadets explained in a memorandum for the Commission:

"The Corps felt that the honor that was supposed to be there was not there. Cadets who the Corps felt had violated the Code were able to remain at the Academy and graduate. If this was the case, someone could possibly figure honor was not as important as it was purported to be. The general attitude about honor and the Code was relaxed in that cadets would not concern themselves much with watching out for honor violations or preventing honor violations. Cadets of the upperclass at that time were not unknown to make jokes about honor and in some ways not believe in it. This... was because the Honor System, as far as some of the Corps felt, was not doing what it stated it should do to enforce the Honor Code.... [T]he Corps was being shortchanged because cadets they felt had violated the Honor Code were still at the Academy."

During the period of these hearings, the cadet was placed in transient barracks and allegedly isolated and mi