



The Army needs a clearly expressed statement of doctrine that will tell soldiers where it is going and how it plans to get there

WHAT IS THE ARMY'S STORY?

MAJOR JOHN H. CUSHMAN

A FEW months ago the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army urged every soldier to "Tell the Army's story clearly and loudly." I certainly agree with General Bolte that the Army's story needs to be told and we soldiers are the ones to tell it. But when I try to do it I find that I cannot speak very clearly because I do not know what the Army's mission is or how it plans to fulfill its mission. And this, I find, is true of my fellow soldiers. At a time when new weapons and new machines herald a revolution in warfare, we soldiers do not know where the Army is going and how it is going to get there.

This not only leaves us mute when we should be speaking up for the Army, but it is the basic cause, I believe, of much of the dissatisfaction that exists within the Army. Writing in the columns of this magazine a few months ago, an unnamed officer put it well:

"There is nothing wrong with our men, our officers, our units, or with our schools and training establishment. They are fine. What is lacking is a common goal and a

MAJOR JOHN H. CUSHMAN, Infantry, now a student at the Command and General Staff College, recently completed three years of troop and staff duty in Germany. He is a 1944 graduate of the Military Academy.

common program resolutely laid down from topside."

THE answers can only be obtained in a statement of the fundamental doctrine of the Army. The preparation of such a statement would not be a simple task. It would require a searching analysis of the Army's role in today's world by the best minds the Army can muster. But the result could well give the Army something to hold to in its work for the several years to come and it could give the American people a new point of view on national military policy. The latter need is manifest too, if I read the commentators rightly.

Such a statement of fundamental doctrine would not be something new. The Air Force, for example, has had such a statement since March 1953, when Air Force Manual 1-2 was published. The title of this unclassified manual is "United States Air Force Basic Doctrine." In it the Air Force presents persuasively and clearly its basic reason for being, along with the fundamentals of the employment of airpower. It sets the keynote for Air Force thinking. It has been distributed widely, and it provides everyone in the Air Force—top planners, development people, combat units, public information officers, ROTC instructors and all the rest—with a soundly presented doctrine on which to peg his work.

The Army can and should do the same thing. The statement need not be complex or profound. Its simplicity might even seem elementary. But the stark expression of basic truths would set a course for all of us.

The statement might begin with an outline of the fundamental conflict that divides the free world and the communistic world, and of the reasons why the United States is taking a leading role in the struggle against the communistic world.

Many weapons are used in this struggle. They include not only conventional armed force and partisan warfare, but also deceit, treason, and revolution. Our opponent is a crafty fighter who knows how to get the full use out of all these weapons.

THE statement might continue with a discussion of the role that the armed forces play in national policy, and the special position of the Army as part of the armed forces. The national security system is a coordination of various means, including military, political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, and moral forces. In order to serve the national aim, this "national weapons system" is coordinated at the highest levels of government.

The armed forces are an extension of the national power. Ideally, they are not used at all. The mere threat of their readiness should be sufficient for the attainment of national objectives. But if they have to be used, they will be most effective when they are integrated with the other elements of the national system, when they are used as a part of the overall plan.

The armed forces are composed of land, sea, and air elements. Each of these elements depends on the other two, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the operations in progress.

Both land and sea forces require integrated air ele-

ments for all operations. These elements are not necessarily a part of the air forces. Land forces operate most effectively with the closest ties with their supporting aviation, and for this reason United States Army doctrine could logically state that command of supporting aviation be assigned to the land force commander.

The objective of armed force is to impose the national will on the enemy. There are various ways of accomplishing this, but the most decisive and lasting way is to occupy the key centers of his territory and so eliminate his control therein. Of all armed forces, land forces are best suited to this task.

THE statement might continue with a discussion of the position of the United States in the world, and the effect of this position on the employment of the Army.

In relationship to the communist world, the geographic position of the United States is insular. It is preferable that our national power be employed at a distance. For this we must have control of overseas bases and sea and air lanes of communication.

The ability of the nation, with its allies, to project its armed power swiftly at long range, concentrating decisive forces at selected areas, is essential to the national security system. This ability is today more potential than real in certain areas of the globe. Converting it to reality should be a principal aim of national military policy. Advances in technology can increase the mobility of the armed forces and help attain this goal.

The world position of the United States and the effect of modern technology on the armed forces therefore make it probable that the Army will be used at long ranges from the homeland. It will be used in joint operations, in decisive actions, in furtherance of the national objective. It follows that the land element of these joint forces must be not only of appropriate size, but also ready for immediate operations.

THE statement might continue with a discussion of the possible shapes of war, and the role that the Army would have in each.

If armed forces should be used by the United States in the struggle with international communism, the open conflict will most likely take one of two forms. It will either be a major war between the centers of the two opposing sides, or it will be a group of so-called peripheral actions, or minor wars, not directly involving the principals of both sides.

It is probable that a major war will begin with intercontinental air warfare. Both sides will use weapons of mass destruction. It is also likely that the enemy will launch a powerful land attack aimed at the occupation or control of the entire Eurasian continent.

In this case the Army would have a dual role. It would assist our allies in defending critical areas, and it would also prepare an intercontinental striking force for decisive action in the enemy heartland. The base of operations for this striking force would be either in the United States or in other areas under friendly control. The striking force would use every technological development

available to improve its mobility, shock firepower, range, and endurance. At the appropriate time it would strike at the enemy heartland, eliminating enemy control and forcing the national will upon him.

A peripheral, or limited, war might well be fought without mass destruction weapons. The key to success in a peripheral action is the swift application of decisive power at a critical point. The goal is the attainment of limited objectives. A decision is obtained by the use of hard-hitting, flexible, mobile formations with built-in endurance. As in a major war, the application of armed force is made more meaningful when it is part of a coordinated plan that uses all the means available to the nation in support of the common aim. The use of local forces and political influences assumes great importance in both peripheral and major wars.

THE statement could include a brief discussion of the principles of war and their basic application to the employment of the army in the light of advances in technology. This section would be a guide to those engaged in the development of weapons and equipment. It would show how technology can enhance the combat effectiveness of the Army by improving control, mobility, and firepower.

Also appropriate would be a short section describing the soldierly qualities demonstrated by outstanding units and individuals, from the dawn of military history to the present. It would emphasize that these qualities are more than ever in demand today, and it would discuss the methods by which they can be developed and encouraged.

The basic Army doctrine that is finally produced need not be identical to the suggestion above. But as long as it is a clear and reasonable position that is backed by the authoritative voice of the United States Army, it would give new meaning to our existence and lend new urgency to our work. Its influence for the good would be enormous.

And there is another dividend to be gained from such an analysis.

One of life's most frustrating experiences is to have the desire to act decisively in a situation, but to lack the means at hand. This state of affairs can be unpleasant enough in the more prosaic fields of endeavor; it can be disastrous when it occurs in the field of national policy. Yet even the best run nations are sometimes faced with it.

One way to prevent this condition is to be ready with the tools before the need develops. Figure out in advance what may be needed, then build it. This is hard to do on the national level, but it is the only way to be sure that we will not be caught with two pair when we need four of a kind in the international poker game.

The Army must anticipate the way in which it may be used five or ten years from now. A sound estimate, made by the general staff and supported by unwavering command action, will provide guidance for the Army from top to bottom. It will also do much to prevent future frustration or defeat in another Korean bonfire or a world conflagration.

The Sensitive Adjustment of Men to Machines

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conflicting requirements of a large standing army and a democratic society. Technological warfare has generated very formidable training requirements. These are incompatible with short terms of service. A way must be found to make the service more attractive so that men will make a career out of the military and preserve their experience.

How do we cultivate and preserve personal and group effectiveness on the battlefield? This question introduces a host of specific psychological problems. Let me cite but three:

(1) The development of more powerful weapons has progressively enforced the separation of soldiers from their fellows, until tomorrow a battlefield may well be a lonely place. How can the psychologist help man's sense of purpose and social obligation to survive this new isolation?

(2) There is much that needs to be known before we can fully understand the dynamics of fear. Such an understanding will permit us to protect our troops from its debilitating effects and to capitalize upon its effect on any enemy.

(3) Shortly after the end of World War II, much publicity was given to the Army's trend toward "democratization" within its ranks. Perhaps the most widely publicized feature was the abolition of off-base saluting. Now we have a reversal of this trend—a movement back toward the traditional "spit and polish" approach. Such shifts in policy indicate a lack of knowledge concerning the most effective structure of military organizations—concerning the type of education, organization and leadership which will cause men to fight effectively with a feeling of common purpose and mutual pride.

While these problems of morale have been pondered by military men for hundreds of years, they remain basically psychological problems. Psychologists can bring to them both their technical know-how and their abilities to obtain information which is not now available.

ANOTHER problem with which the psychologist must be concerned is the effect of technological warfare on military leaders. Officers are required to make decisions about equipment, about operations, about training. Sound decisions require a high degree of technical competence. With all due respect to our present generation of officers, they do not have the technical training to make decisions in these areas with confidence. They are uneasy; they must depend on civilian technical advice and are unhappy in their dependence. How should the next generation of officers be prepared?

THERE are over 2,000 psychologists participating in military problems: some are in uniform; some are government employees; others are with civilian organizations and universities. If the cold war become hot and global, the time scale for a military decision will be expressed in days or at the most weeks. There will be no time for research. The necessities of science will become luxuries. If the psychologist is to serve his country, it must be while the war is still cold. We can only hope that these efforts will contribute in some way to prevent it from ever getting hot.