produced the then revolutionary all-metal, 200-mph Martin B-10 monoplane with retractable gear. This was followed by development of two very large bombers—the XB-15 (the size of the B-29) and the XB-19 (almost as big as the B-36), each of them a milestone in the Air Corps search for a big bomber.

Then, in 1935, the remarkable B-17 came on the scene. Lighter than the XB-15 but better powered, it was designed and built by Boeing at its own expense. The Air Corps Materiel Division called it "the most outstanding military airplane development of modern times."

Here was a vehicle by which the heretofore abstract theory of strategic airpower could be translated into practice.

In 1936, the War Department approved the purchase of thirteen Y1B-17s—enough for one experimental squadron. By August 1937 the squadron was operational at Langley Field.



Martin B-10



Boeing XB-15 (with Curtiss P-36 fighter)



Douglas XB-19A



Boeing UB-17

The impatient visionaries of bombardment aviation could scarcely await the painstaking, brilliant efforts of pioneer aeronautical designers and engineers. In 1930 they hailed the appearance of the all-metal, single-winged Martin B-10 bomber. It was quickly followed by the Boeing XB-15 and the then-mammoth Douglas XB-19. Then in 1935 there appeared the apple of the visionaries' eyes: the Boeing B-17 "flying fortress."

Fighting uphill for money all the way, the Air Corps was able to gain approval to order 26 more B-17s in 1937 and, by reprogramming other funds, an additional 13 in 1938. Also, in mid-1938 the Air Corps requested authority to start development work on a follow-on high-altitude bigger bomber (eventually to be the B-29). In the meantime, research and development on other types of aircraft was falling behind.

Then the roof fell in. In 1938 the General Staff decided that "no military requirements exist" for the follow-on bomber. Not only that, but the General Staff ordered that research and development in FY 1939 and FY 1940 would be confined to "aviation designed for the close support of ground troops and the production of that type aircraft." Further, General Malin Craig, Army Chief of Staff, ordered that B-17s would be eliminated from FY 1940 and 1941 procurement, and that the funds previously earmarked therefor would be diverted to procurement of attack aircraft and light bombers.

Major General Oscar Westover, Chief of Air Corps, objected to these decisions in the strongest terms. After considering his reclama, the General Staff reiterated General Craig's decision.

"In the future," the General Staff said, the Army Air Corps will be "guided by the desire of the War Department to obtain and develop aircraft suitable for the close support of ground troops to the same extent that now pertains with respect to types suitable for . . . strategic missions."

This was the General Staff's attempt to heal by command decision the split in equipment and doctrine that had developed after more than 15 years of emphasis on the bomber at the expense of ground support aviation.

Research and development on the follow-on bomber would, however, be permitted.

In 1926, Major Benjamin D. Foulois, later to become Chief of Air Corps, had testified before a Congressional committee that the General Staff was "chronically reactionary" and that "it has utterly failed to appreciate the full military value of this new military weapon, and, in my opinion, has utterly failed to accord it its just place in our military family."

To those airmen who had been born and bred on the doctrines of independent air operations and of bombardment as the decisive arm of airpower, and who found the 1938 War Department decisions incomprehensible, the words of Major Foulois rang true in 1938.

But even as the War Department's decision was made, the whole picture was changing. Europe was now on the edge of war. Rearmament was over the horizon. Plans were being made for a great expansion in aviation. When, in early 1939, the Air Corps was asked to recommend the guidance which should govern this expansion, the unequivocal position of the Air Corps was that "the basis of air power is the bombardment airplane."

By September 1939 the Air Corps had received official approval of its guidance, and was galloping, with the bit in its teeth, in this direction.

And so, as the 1930s ended, the split in land warfare was more real than ever, and it was solidifying on the eve of expansion. The story of this split in the 1940s and 1950s is a separate, although continuing, story.

Whose fault was it?

Answering that question is like trying to place the blame when what should have been a happy marriage breaks up. Both sides were right—and both sides were wrong.

It may have been inevitable. But it was also tragic.

Today, across the span of more than 25 years, it is perhaps difficult to realize fully the deep commitment and personal involvement of the Air Corps leaders and thinkers of the 1920s and 1930s in their machines and their ideas. As the history of humanity over the centuries makes clear, no strife is greater or more bloody than doctrinal strife—and here great doctrinal issues were at stake.

On one hand there were the exponents of a new and revolutionary idea—air warfare—familiar with its technology, convinced of its promise, and impatient with conservative thought. On the other hand there was the non-flying Army which wanted the flyers to work for them. Brothers wearing the same uniform, they fell out, and the result was deep cleavage within the family, not yet healed.

Young airmen who entered the Air Corps in the late 1930s breathed the air of Mitchell, Foulois, and the pioneer airmen at Maxwell Field, at the headquarters of the GHQ Air Force, and elsewhere as they served their first years. Today these young airmen are in charge of the United States Air Force. When they entered the Air Corps the split between their breed and the rest of the Army was wide.

As they served their careers out in the nation's air arm, the split would grow wider still before it began to shrink.

But shrink it must, and heal as well, or the United States will continue to be denied the quality of military tools for land-air warfare that it is within the capabilities of technology to provide.

(This is the first of three articles on the evolution of land-air doctrines and practices in the United States.)



THE SECOND TWENTY YEARS: 1940-1960

By PEGASUS

Our first article (July) described the post-World War I origins of the split between the Army's airmen and their non-flying brethren, and the growth of this split for two decades. This one will trace the split through the succeeding 20 years of war and peace, at the end of which these two breeds of fighting men, and their respective institutions, were farther apart than ever. The final article will describe how, since 1960, great progress has finally been made in mending this split—for the good of all—and will suggest more steps which can be taken.

We start with the basic conception that there is a military entity which can be called "land warfare," but which since 1918 would be more accurately referred to as "land-air" or "air-land" warfare.

This is warfare on or close to the land by forces which are a composite of land and air systems. These forces have the task and the means of operating against enemy land forces and of gaining control of the land and its people.

So long as there have been airplanes, this entity has existed in three dimensions.

However, in the U.S. military forces, this entity has, for a variety of reasons, never been treated as one for the closely knit development of forces and their doctrine and equipment in peacetime—even in the days when both its land and air elements were part of the Army. From the earliest days there have prevailed differing basic views on land warfare between the man in the Army who fought on the land and the man who fought in the air. Institutions did not adapt themselves to resolve these differences, and each side developed its own strongly held views on doctrine, strategy, materiel development, and allocation of resources. This has been the "40-year split"—a split which must, for the good of the country, be mended.

By 1939, after 20 years of peace, this split had developed and hardened. During these lean years, the U.S. Army Air Corps had in both its doctrine and its materiel development given priority to bombardment as the decisive employment of air, despite the disagreement of the Army at large.

In 1938, after a bitter struggle, the Army General Staff had told the Air Corps to be guided in the future "by the desire of the War Department to obtain and develop aircraft for the close support of ground troops *to the same extent that now pertains with respect to types suitable for . . . strategic missions.*" These words (emphasis supplied) expressed the view of the Army at large.

One year later, the Air Corps, when asked to recommend the guidance which should govern the great expansion of its forces which was about to begin, stated unequivocally that "the basis of air power is the bombardment airplane." By September 1939 the Air Corps had received War Department approval of its proposed guidance and was moving to put it into effect.

The basic document which set the framework for the expansion of the Army's air arm was AWPD/1, the Army Air Forces' estimate of requirements for a war against Germany and Japan, drawn up at the request of the President in 1941.

AWPD/1 was drafted in one week by a small

U.S. Land-based Air Power

B-17E. Billed as a precision bomber, the Flying Fortress carried the air war to the heart of Germany.



B-29. The Super Fortress dropped atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima and in the Korean War bombed below the Yalu.



P-40. The standard fighter when the bombs rained on Pearl Harbor.



P-38. The two-engined Lightning faded as improved single-engined fighter aircraft appeared.

P-47. The Thunderbolt was the workhorse of the last years of the war.

group of brilliant Air Corps officers who had been instructors at the Air Corps Tactical School in the 1930s where they had studied the writings of Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell, and had developed and refined the Air Corps theories of independent strategic bombardment. In AWPD/1 these airmen converted their theories to a specific strategic concept and a force expansion program.

The history of the AAF describes AWPD/1:

"The Army air mission was conceived as entailing three tasks: to conduct air operations in defense in the Western Hemisphere; to assist in the strategic defense in the Pacific; and to wage an unremitting air offensive against Germany and lands occupied by its forces—including, if necessary, the support of a final invasion of the continent.

"The air planners were less interested in the problems of the defensive in the Americas or the Pacific than in the war in Europe. The basic feature of their plan lay 'in the application of air power for the breakdown of the industrial and economic structure of Germany.' This involved 'the selection of a system of objectives vital to continued German war effort, and to the means of livelihood of the German people, and tenaciously *concentrating all bombing* toward destruction of these objectives. . . .' [emphasis in original].

"The planners considered it improbable that a large-scale invasion of Europe could be made before spring of 1944, which would coincide with the climax of the bomber attack, and they believed that 'if the air offensive is successful, a land

# of World War II and Korea



B-36. The last and largest of the prop-driven bombers. It came and went without seeing hostile action.



B-52. In the 1950's it was the prime carrier of the nuclear deterrent. In the 1960's the question was whether it was to be the last of the manned bombers.

P-51. Extra gas tanks gave it the legs to escort B-17's into the German heartland.



F-84. One of the series of jet fighter aircraft that saw service in Korea.

F-105. The post-Korean fighter appeared in the mid-1950's and is still in the inventory.

offensive may not be necessary.' Complete victory through air power alone, however, could not be assured, and provision was made for close support of ground forces in that assault. . . .

"The air planners had, in effect, drawn up a blueprint for the approaching war. From the vantage point of the present it is easy to find flaws in this plan. . . . The qualified faith in the ability of air power alone to conquer Germany proved ungrounded, and the force scheduled for support of the invasion was weak in fighters. But viewed solely as a program for the strategic bombardment of Germany, AWPD/1 was on the whole a remarkable document. . . ."

AWPD/1 shows clearly the nature of the fundamental thrust of the AAF at the start of World War II: namely, that strategic bombardment was primary. It should be neither surprising nor reprehensible that this was so. This basic view followed from 20 years of earnest concentration by Air Corps doctrinal experts on the independent and decisive role of airpower in the strategic bombardment form.

AWPD/1 naturally was modified as the European war wore on. For example, additional fighter groups were provided for escorting deep bomber penetrations over Germany. (In 1944 and 1945 many of these escort fighters switched to tactical support of the field armies, retraining in England and on the Continent for this mission.)

AWPD/1 was also modified by the Allies' decision to open a second front in Europe. This decision, with its new emphasis on close support, was met, as the World War II AAF history states,

with evident disappointment on the part of some" airmen. All concerned accepted the decision, and the AAF supported it, but the AAF history describes General Eaker's as a typical airman's reaction: namely, that "the original all-out air plan for the destruction of the German war effort by air action alone was feasible and sound, and more economical than any other method."

But where was the air element of the air-land battle in the early 1940s?

As the decade opened, the tactics and procedures for air-ground operations were, as a result of prewar lack of emphasis by both sides, rudimentary to non-existent. The German Blitzkrieg, with its highly effective air-ground teamwork, drew attention to the deficiency. In September 1940, Brigadier General Frank M. Andrews, the airman G3 on the War Department General Staff, studied the matter at the request of General Marshall. He recommended immediate air-ground tests for developing doctrine and equipment, and proposed that future corps and army maneuvers be conducted with "large elements" of GHQ Air Force.

Four months of tests were held in early 1941, and eight Air Force groups and seven Marine Corps and Navy squadrons took part in that year's fall maneuvers.

Despite such efforts, however, the complex structure of an integrated land-air system was not being formed in the days of expansion in the early 1940s. The countervailing influences were too great: the shortage of time and resources caused by the immense AAF expansion, the orientation of air programs primarily toward independent air, and the institutional separation of the AAF and the later Army Ground Forces. Consequently, despite the desires of many soldiers and airmen to achieve it, the necessary day-to-day teamwork by units and staffs in training and developing integrated forces for land-air operations never took place.

But a general framework of doctrine had to be developed, and in April 1942, FM 31-35 (Aviation in Support of Ground Forces) was published. This manual was a compromise by the two parties, neither of which really understood the other's problems and basic interests. At one extreme, some ground commanders wanted to direct the employment of supporting air, and even to "command" it as they did their artillery. The airman's view reflected his desire to use to the fullest the flexibility and range of the new air arm. He aimed to keep command separate, but to provide for coordination. FM 31-35 was unsatisfactory to both sides. The ground forces historian would later refer to its doctrines as "rigid centralization," while the air historian would call them the "subordination of air forces to the g... and to the purely local situation."

In any event, North Africa in 1942 and 1943 was to rewrite the doctrine. This was the first experience of the United States in combined and joint operations in a land theater. With an air and ground command structure that was complicated at best, the compartmenting of aviation was simply not possible. The same aircraft—too few on hand to begin with—had to be used one day in attacks on the enemy's ports, the next day in attacks on his troops and lines of communication, and a day later against his shipping. Some form of more centralized control was required.

The solution adopted was the British answer, which had been arrived at during operations in the Western Desert since 1940. Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur V. Coningham, who had commanded the Western Desert Air Force, stated the desert-evolved doctrine: "The Soldier commands the land forces, the Airman commands the air forces, both commands work together and operate their respective forces in accordance with a combined Army-Air plan, the whole operations being directed by the Army Commander."

In February 1943, when Coningham took command of the U.S.-British North African Tactical Air Force, the desert-evolved doctrines gradually went into effect.

In July 1943, there appeared FM 100-20, which stated that "land power and air power are coequal and interdependent forces; neither is an auxiliary of the other. . . . Control of available air power must be centralized and command must be exercised through the air force commander. . . . The command of ground and air forces in a theater of operations will be vested in the superior commander charged with the actual conduct of operations in the theater, who will exercise command of air forces through the air force commander and of ground forces through the ground forces commander."

Thus the tactical air forces won their independence in 1943. These split land and air forces worked together well, even brilliantly, not only in Europe as the war went one, but in the Pacific and in the China-Burma-India theater as well. Because of the rudimentary training of both the armies and the air forces in teamwork before deployment, the doctrines and techniques were largely improvised overseas. Even at their best, as in the Patton-Weyland relationship in France, the performance of Kenney's forces under MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific, and the sustained air logistic support of land forces in the CBI theater, the merging of land and air resources was a local response in which men on the scene made the best use of what they had been provided.

The constant reiteration during the 40 years between 1920 and 1960 of the doctrine of an independent and decisive role for air power exacerbated the split between the airman and the soldier

These were not integrated forces, bound together by doctrines worked out together in time of peace, dovetailed to a close fit ahead of time by men and institutions which held before them a common view of the mission and a common concept that an air-land framework of forces was required for execution of that mission. They were jury-rigged adaptations made on the spot.

And the great question was: Without the immediate field commander, without the pressure of the wartime mission and the plenitude of wartime resources, would these two forces work and grow together in peace? Or would the wartime land-air system come apart?

The *strategic* airman's view throughout the war remained that strategic bombardment was decisive and that the role of traditional surface forces was secondary. At the end of the war, as the redeployed Eighth Air Force was going into Okinawa, Japan was to receive double the bomb tonnage that had fallen on Germany. After the war, the view of the commander of Eighth Air Force, Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle, was that "The Army had the forces to make the invasion of Japan successful. The Navy had the transport to make it possible. The B-29 made it unnecessary."

In 1946 the great tactical air forces and land armies melted away. By December of that year, the Tactical Air Command consisted of only six combat groups. With shrinking resources, with the atomic weapon, and with the institutional autonomy of the air arm, within the independent air force the priority was naturally, probably inevitably—and in their own eyes quite properly—assigned to air in its decisive, strategic, and independent role.

In other words, it was back to the 1930s all over again.

Then in 1947, the Air Force, which had been independent in fact, became independent by law. When it left the Army, all of the AAF, including tactical as well as strategic air, went with it.

The Army's rationale for this separation was later expressed in 1949 by General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff: "The Army acceded to the independence of the Air Force. This involved two things: First, the surrender of tactical aircraft designed primarily for close support of ground operations, and second, the loss from immediate Army control of the air transports required to move our airborne divisions. We did this with our eyes open, on the theory that we were part of the team for national security, and that when we needed tactical air support or transport for airborne operations, the Air Force member of the team would be prepared and willing to supply our needs. I can assure you that the Army's acquiescence in relinquishing tactical air was not arrived at idly or without doubts and misgivings in some quarters. But General Eisenhower, General Bradley, and I had much to do with supporting this move, because we had all seen in action the great flexibility of tactical air forces."

The independence of the Air Force institutionalized the "split" in land-air warfare. It made the smallest details of doctrine, procedures, and force structures into issues of "roles and missions," involving the prestige and prosperity of executive departments of the government. With this further separation, and in the prevailing environment of the late 1940s, the divisive forces of peacetime were too great to allow the strong teamwork of wartime to stay alive.

In 1948, the Tactical Air Command was divested of all its units and became a planning headquarters of 150 men. From time to time, Air Force fighter and transport units worked with Army forces, primarily on maneuvers such as Exercise Swarmer in 1950. But on the Air Force side, each exercise was run by a temporary headquarters which consisted of personnel borrowed from other units and which was dissolved after the maneuver, in the words of the official USAF history, "scattering its practical experience without continuity from one maneuver to the next."

When Korea struck in 1950, the air and land elements of the air-land team were once again assembled in the field, and relearned the lessons of World War II. The split between soldier and airman closed again under the pressure of battle, unity of command, and the growth in resources during the Korean war.

As in World War II, there were magnificent performances by tactical air. Army commanders attested to its value and quality on several occasions.

Back in the United States the Tactical Air Command was restored to a major USAF command which by the end of 1953 had grown to 21 wings. The USAF Air-Ground Operations School was set up in 1950. CONARC and TAC issued a joint training directive on air-ground operations for use in the school and in joint exercises. With the activation of numbered air force headquarters under Tactical Air Command, continuity of experience became possible by airmen participating in joint exercises.

But in 1953 the Korean war ended and the period of strategy known as the New Look began, with its emphasis on air-atomic forces, and its de-emphasis on conventional land forces, and with its tightened defense budgets. Under the powerful influence of these outside forces, the patched-up union of the Korean war period began to come apart again.

For one thing, TAC went nuclear, emphasized the nuclear-armed Composite Air Strike Force, absorbed the remaining fighters of Strategic Air Command, and became as some described it, a small-scale SAC. As General Thomas D. White, then Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, stated in 1955, "development of nuclear weapons and inflight refueling has diminished the former sharp distinction between strategic and tactical air forces."

In addition, the mid-1950s saw a bitter dispute among the services, and especially between the Air Force and the Army, over strategy, force levels, and roles and missions. During this period the Army, with its major efforts in big missiles and space, caused deep resentment in the Air Force, which considered that the Army was active in fields not rightfully its own. In this same environment, the Army and the Air Force all too frequently went their own separate ways in developing forces and doctrines for warfare in the theater of operations.

In the mid-1950s the joint Army-Air Force boards for airborne operations, air-ground operations, and air defense were disbanded. They had proven incapable of resolving the issues of doctrine which confronted them. The only place where these unresolved issues could be addressed was in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They were largely not resolved in this arena either, and the split widened each year.

These were the years when the Army attempted to find means within its own resources to perform functions of tactical air. The surface-to-surface missile, the drone reconnaissance plane, and the mobile air-defense missile were developed for use with the field army. Army aviation got its big start. Many in the Army were predicting that as time went on these and other means would greatly reduce the Army's dependence on tactical air and might even eliminate it entirely.

Despite these divergencies of the Army and the Air Force in the CONUS, joint exercises were held, and a revised CONARC-TAC manual for air-ground operations was written and published in 1958. As they had since 1945, Army and USAF forces worked together overseas under unified command. Fortunately, many professionals of both services were deeply concerned at the widening split between the Army and the Air Force and realized that the land-air battle could not be fought without the closest teamwork between the two.

But the split was there, and in the years 1958-1960 it was not narrowing.

As the decade ended, Air Force Manual 1-2 (United States Air Force Basic Doctrine) was published (1 December 1959). It was written in the spirit of the airmen of the Air Corps Tactical School of 20 years earlier.

"The aerospace is an operationally indivisible medium consisting of the total expanse beyond the earth's surface. . . . The aerospace forces of the Air Force—the fundamental aerospace forces of the nation—must be employed in accordance with the precept that neither the forces nor their field of activity can be segmented and partitioned among different interests. . . .

"Of the various types of military forces, those which conduct operations in the aerospace are most capable of decisive results. . . . They provide the dominant military means of exercising the initiative and gaining decisions in all forms of international relations, including full peace, cold war, limited wars of all types, and general war. . . ."

Thus, from the Air Corps Tactical School of the 1920s to AFM 1-2 of 1959, the doctrine had been constant: the independent and decisive role of air.

With each decade of peacetime the split between the airman and the land soldier had widened. In two wars the split had been patched together in the field, only to open again as resources dwindled in time of peace.

Since World War I land warfare had been in reality "air-land" warfare. Yet never in four decades did the two parties look at the matter as a single problem and concentrate their common efforts in a sustained and systematic way so as to take advantage of technology and develop the integrated forces to accomplish the single mission.

In the 1960s, however, a new combination of forces would operate toward closing the split, although much more remains to be done.

(The actions since 1961, and some proposals for the future, will be the subject of the concluding article.)



THE HEALING YEARS: 1961-1965

By PEGASUS

The two previous articles (July and August) described how, from almost the earliest days of the airplane, the soldier and his airman brother-in-arms developed differing basic views on land warfare. They described how institutions, first within the Army and later in the Army and the independent Air Force, never adapted themselves so that the two breeds of fighting men could work together and resolve these differences in order to accomplish the common mission of *air-land* warfare.

As a result, land warfare—which since 1920 in reality has been "air-land" warfare, in three dimensions, waged by a composite of *land and air systems* has never been treated as an entity. There has been little effort in peacetime to knit together a common doctrine. This has been the "forty-year split."

The previous articles described how, in World War II and Korea, the land-air team came together for a time under the pressures of war and performed well in the field. They also described how, with the conflicting pressures of peace after both wars, it came apart again. The year 1960 found the split in doctrines, in materiel, and in basic concepts, wider than ever before.

But with only this much of the story, the story is incomplete. This final article will describe how since 1961 the forty-year split has fortunately begun to mend.

What were the basic causes of the forty-year split?

The fundamental and primary cause was doctrine.

As described in the first article, the doctrinal split began with the post-World War I development of air doctrine at the Air Corps Tactical School at Langley Field and later at Maxwell Field. There the brilliant and visionary minds of airmen went to work under the influence of Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell, and the doctrine of the independent air arm took shape.

As we have seen, by the end of the 1930s the prevailing view of the airman was that the bombardment airplane was "the basis of airpower," that strategic bombardment would be decisive in war, and that the role of traditional surface forces would be secondary.

During this same period the Army at large, in its school system and within the General Staff, was slowly adjusting to the new weapon of war: the airplane. Finally, in 1939 the General Staff held that equal priority should be given to strategic bombardment and to support of the land armies.

The second article described how, while neither side was entirely monolithic in its doctrinal views, the split between the two schools of thought carried forward from 1940 through two wars and the peacetime years to 1960.

These doctrinal divergencies were greatly exacerbated by peacetime shortages in resources—in the twenties and thirties, and again in the years 1946-1950, and 1953-1960. In years of scarcity the priority within the air arm was assigned to what airmen believed to be decisive: the employment of air in its independent and strategic role. And the soldier disagreed.

In the period after World War II and Korea, the airman's priority was also in line with the basic thrust of U. S. national policy.

Thus, the primary cause was doctrinal, magnified by shortages in resources.

General Paul D. Adams of U.S. Strike Command—*the catalyst for ending the forty-year split between the Army and Air Force. Says General Adams: "A man can't spend 25 or 30 years in one of the Armed Services without having a big imprint of that service on him; nonetheless we constantly search for objectivity. . . . I think you would be truly amazed at the constructive effort which comes automatically when a man conscientiously accepts the principle of joint combat force employment. There is enthusiasm here. It comes from the satisfaction of seeing definite progress being made in solving difficult problems together. . . ."*

But the gulf between the two doctrinal viewpoints flowed in turn from another basic cause of the split. This was the failure of the two sides to communicate adequately with each other over a period of 40 years. Except in wartime and in rare instances in peacetime where they served together —as on the faculty and as students at Fort Leavenworth in the 1920s and 1930s—the two breeds of fighting men did not learn each other's language, or identify with each other's mission and situation. Nor, under the existing circumstances could they share a common experience.

The land soldier, generally, failed to see the great changes and the great opportunities opened up by the airplane. The airman, generally, failed to see the continuing need for land forces in their new form as an air-land team. Both sides failed to work together sufficiently and to discuss and resolve the common problem of land-air warfare.

This lack of communication was itself aggravated by the institutional separation of the two schools of thought as time went on, and as the Army's air arm first gained increasing autonomy and then separated entirely. For example, the split between the Army Air Forces and Army Ground Forces during the Second World War certainly simplified the problem of expansion and training of these two great parts of the Army, but at the same time it further separated the soldier and the airman in their mission of developing and testing doctrines and organization.

When the Air Force was separately established by statute, cooperation became even more difficult.

Finally, during these forty years there was lacking a command authority over these two parties which had both the wisdom to see the outlines of the split and its potential dangers, and the means, the desire, and the will to take basic action to remedy the situation. The Army Chief of Staff made an effort to do this in his 1938 decisions on the Army budget, but this decision alone could not bring the two sides together.

To summarize, the causes of the forty-year split, were: basic doctrinal divergencies, exacerbated by shortages in peacetime, but deriving essentially from a failure to communicate and share experiences, which was in turn made worse by institutional separation of the two parties, and the lack of a command authority with the necessary insight authority and desire.

What has this 40-year split cost the United States?

One cost certainly has been inefficiency, stemming from sheer lack of compatibility of U. S. land and tactical air forces over the years.

In 1963 Secretary of Defense McNamara called attention to the "lack of balance" which had come about as the different services based their "planning and force structures on their own unilateral views of how a future war might be fought." He went on to say that "a clear example of this lack of balance is the amount of airlift furnished by the Air Force for strategic deployment. This nation did not have the capacity to airlift the forces, particularly the Army's, that had to be moved. . . .

"Another example is the imbalance between the Army's ground forces and the air support provided by the Air Force. . . . Closely related to the foregoing is the problem of balance in our inventories of weapons, equipment, and particularly, combat consumables. . . . The Air Force, planning primarily in terms of a short nuclear war, did not provide sufficient stocks of combat consumables for a conventional limited war. . . . On the other hand, the Army had been basing its requirements calculations on plans for a large-scale conventional war of long duration."

Certainly the problems described by Mr. McNamara would have been fewer had there been no forty-year split.

But there has perhaps been an even more serious cost—one possibly less susceptible to documentation and "proof," but one which is real nonetheless.

This has been the cost of the failure over the years to exploit fully the potential of the air to contribute to the land-air battle, and thereby to provide in a timely way the integrated systems for air-land warfare appropriate to the needs of the nation.

Fortunately in the years since 1961 a healing condition has appeared. The Kennedy Administration, with its new strategy of "multiple option," brought a new commitment to increasing U. S. land and tactical air forces, and thereby struck a blow at two of the major causes of the forty-year split: conflicts over doctrine and over priorities for allocation of resources.

This new environment was highly favorable to both elements of the air-land team. Army divisions were increased from 14 to 16 (another is to be created before the end of 1965). Air Force tactical fighter wings grew from 16 in 1961 to 24 in FY 1966.

The "program package" decision-making concept instituted by the Secretary of Defense put the Army's land forces and the Air Force's tactical air in the same package (and Air Force strategic air in a different package). Thus the burden of establishing priorities between tactical air and strategic air became less that of the Air Force planners and more that of the Secretary of Defense, using his own analytical staff and with inputs from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services.

In 1961, the U. S. Strike Command was created, commanding all combat-ready Army divisions and Air Force tactical air wings in CONUS, and providing a permanent Army-Air Force headquarters with a continuing mission of joint training and doctrinal development for forces assigned.

However imperfect it may have been, STRICOM finally ended the forty-year institutional void between the soldier and the airman in day-to-day training and doctrinal development. Its contribution has been great indeed.

Concurrently, the war in Vietnam was growing hotter. Army and Air Force officers and units were once again in the field, where the pressure of combat caused them to work together toward a common mission. This was another force for closing the split.

As a result of these and other actions and pressures, teamwork and mutual understanding improved within the Army-Air Force team, both in the United States and overseas, substantially from 1961 to 1965. In this environment, important progress has been made by the Army and Air Force staff in resolving divergencies.

For example, the Army and the Air Force have recently reached agreement in two major areas of past divergence: joint air-ground coordination, and airspace control over the combat zone.

In agreeing on the system for air-ground cooperation, which had been worked out over a period of more than two years, both the Army and the Air Force gave ground on points on which they had previously stood firm.

Thus the split has indeed mended substantially since 1961 and we can expect that with time it will mend even further.

On the foundation of improvement since 1961, the services will certainly take further measures to attack the underlying cause of the split: differences in doctrine.

I would suggest that they might attack this problem of doctrine by an indirect approach, one which may not pay off immediately but which might give excellent promise of long-term results.

This indirect approach derives from the nature of doctrine.

The Army dictionary defines doctrine as "principles, policies and concepts, applicable to a subject, which are derived from experience or theory, compiled and taught for guidance. It represents the best available thought that can be defended by reason."

Note that doctrine is "derived from experience or theory." It would therefore seem possible to improve agreement in doctrine by improving the sharing of experience and the development of theory.

As one measure of improving the *sharing of experience,* the Army and the Air Force could establish a comprehensive program of officer exchange. This could include officers from captain to colonel.

To improve the development of theory, the Army and Air Force might, as one possibility, establish a new doctrinal and education institution, responsible jointly to the two departments and service chiefs. This institution would have the responsibility for the single problem of land-air warfare in the theater of operations—tactics, logistics, and the rest.

The fundamental purpose of these two actions would be to address the two underlying causes of the forty-year split:

- The failure to communicate and share experiences.
- The institutional separation of the two schools of thought.

If we can deal with these two problems, we can improve the environment for developing doctrine, we can thereby speed the mending of the 40-year split, and we can eventually heal it permanently.

If we can successfully attack these basic problems, we can end the split forever.

And the Army, the Air Force, and the nation will be better off for it.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
COMBINED ARMS CENTER AND FORT LEAVENWORTH
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027

ATZLCG

10 September 1975

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction: Manning of Experimental Air/Land Battle Facility

Deputy Commander, US Army Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Deputy Commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

1. The concept of the Combined Arms Center experimental air/land battle facility is briefly described below:

Manager:	Colonel Hendricks Director, Department of Command
Participation:	Staff Operations Committee, Department of Command TACLO USAF Section, CGSC Joint and Combined Operations, DSTRAT EW and Deception Division, C&C Directorate ISTA Branch, CCS Directorate Student Electives, CGSC Instruction
Initial Task:	Analyze requirements for the coordination of the air/land battle.

2. This research, instructional, and experimental facility in Building 684 became available for occupancy on 2 September 1975. This Letter of Instruction establishes the minimum manning level for this facility and identifies the individuals who will fill positions in this facility.

3. The persons named in this Letter of Instruction are those members of the Combined Arms Center whose background and

ongoing projects are most closely related to the purposes of the experimental air/land battle facility. Some of the personnel listed are identified as detailed on a full-time basis while others are listed as part-time participants. Full-time is understood to mean that the experimental facility will be the official duty location of the personnel so listed. Personnel whose place of duty is the experimental facility retain responsibility for their current assignments, to include instruction, projects, TDY, etc., and remain responsive to their existing chain of command. Personnel listed as being part-time members of the experimental facility will have their normal place of duty elsewhere and will visit the facility as necessary to fulfill their commitments to that facility. Facilities for storage of classified material, up to SECRET, will be available.

4. No change in OER rating scheme is involved. The purpose of grouping these particular officers in the experimental facility is to enhance air/land battle control and coordination and to provide through their presence in the experimental facility an operating context which is directly relevant to their normal duty functions. For officers listed as being full-time participants in the experimental facility, development of air/land battle procedures is considered their prime mission for the period through 1 July 1976.

5. The initial manning of the facility, effective 10 September 1975, is stated in Inclosure 1 in terms of the position occupied, name of the officer, department/directorate, and status in terms of full-time or part-time assignment. Additional manning changes will be by separate correspondence.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOSEPH D. HYNES
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

1 Incl
as

10 September 1975

MANNING OF EXPERIMENTAL AIR/LAND BATTLE FACILITY

POSITION	NAME	DEPARTMENT/ DIRECTORATE	STATUS
XX Corps Rep	COL C. J. Tate	DTAC	Part-Time
10 AF LO	COL C. H. Carter	TACLO	Part-Time
Chief of Staff	COL B. L. Sanders	DCOM	Full-Time
	Air/Land Battle Center		
A/L Battle Coord	LTC R. R. Redhair	DCOM	Full-Time
Asst Coord	LTC E. F. McGushin	DSTRAT	Part-Time
Asst Coord	LTC R. G. Maxson	DTAC	Part-Time
Asst Coord Air	LTC E. W. Gale	DSTRAT	Part-Time
Intel Coord Asst	LTC R. W. Leister	CACDA	Full-Time
Intel Coord Ops	MAJ M. T. Chase	DCOM	Part-Time
Intel Coord Air	LTC J. E. Caudill	DCOM	Part-Time
Intel Coord Air	MAJ L. L. Shlenker	DCOM	Part-Time
FSE	LTC R. A. Bragalone	DTAC	Part-Time
Avn	LTC T. H. Bilbrey	DSTRAT	Part-Time
ADA	LTC J. T. Butterfield	DSTRAT	Part-Time
Signal	COL N. F. Hubbard	CACDA	Part-Time
Signal	LTC T. W. Hummel	DCOM	Part-Time
Signal	CPT C. D. Cochran	DCOM	Full-Time

(continued)

MANNING OF EXPERIMENTAL AIR/LAND BATTLE FACILITY (continued)

POSITION	NAME	DEPARTMENT/ DIRECTORATE	STATUS
EW	COL L. W. Powers	CACDA	Part-Time
EW	LTC J. M. Hoyt	CACDA	Full-Time
Tac Air Spt (Ops)	MAJ M. D. Goold	TACLO	Part-Time
Ops NCO	SFC C. Aleman	DCOM	Full-Time
	All Source Intelligence Center		
Intel Coord	COL L. W. Bindrup	CACDA	Part-Time
Asst	LTC H. C. Pickens	DCOM	Full-Time
SIGINT	MAJ R. M. Weikle	CACDA	Full-Time
ASA	MAJ J. Bircher	DCOM	Full-Time
MI	MAJ A. Guenzburger	CACDA	Full-Time
MIBARS	LTC A. P. Sarnecki	CACDA	Full-Time
R&S	MAJ H. J. Towler	DCOM	Part-Time
R&S	CPT F. Stepaniak	CACDA	Full-Time

John H. Cushman
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Retired
4 Revell Street
Annapolis, Maryland 21401

(This copy is identical to my letter of 9 Dec 91 except for the footnote on page 8. JHC)

9 December 1991

Lieutenant General Wilson A. Shoffner
Commanding General
U.S. Army Combined Arms Command
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Dear General Shoffner:

Thank you for your invitation last month to talk to the SAMS class on joint operations. I accomplished that mission three days ago -- to, as always, my great pleasure. This was my eighth such session; my first having been almost exactly seven years earlier, 7 December 1984.

(Incidentally, in that first class, as for last Friday and for each class in between, in its first few minutes I displayed a chart which read:

> A Military Principle:
>
> XXII. No consideration should be permitted as an excuse for failure to perform a fundamental task.
>
> Report of the Congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

...saying that this principle, along with others phrased by the Joint Committee's report, was taken from an annex to the 1949 version of FM 100-5, where it was the Army's response to the Committee's recommendation that the U.S. armed forces use the Committee's findings for their education. (I have always believed it desirable that FM 100-5 include that timeless annex from 1949; you may want to consider the idea for the 1993 version.)

As much as I have enjoyed these annual sessions with SAMS, I have decided that yesterday's will be the last one. I am seventy years old, I am tapering off (ramping down is the new expression) my activities although not my interests, and I do not expect to be as up-to-date in joint command and control matters in the future as I have been to now.

Before I close this particular chapter in my life, however, I want to share with you certain convictions about your project for FM 100-5. My involvement with FM 100-5 -- other than reading again and again the 1949 version, a classic, when I was a major -- began

in 1956 when the College began a rewrite and I was secretary of the rewrite committee. (In the outline which I proposed was a chapter called "Air/Land Warfare;" believing that there was no longer any such phenomenon as "land warfare," I wrote that chapter's first draft, which did not survive.)

May I make my points on FM 100-5 by using charts from SAMS classes of recent years? The one below is one I have often used:

- o Deriving from the American Army's unique tradition and experience, comes the...
- o U.S. Army officer's distinctive, inherent, essentially untaught, and underutilized genius, which is...
- o The ability to understand a complex social/military/political situation...
- o And to pull together diverse elements into a coherent common effort toward mission accomplishment.

These are lines from another:

- o Multiservice (all-Service) operations should be second nature to the Army and its officers.
- o Coping with the intangibles and nuances of force employment in political-military situations should be second nature to the Army and its officers.
- o Thinking like theater and JTF commanders should be second nature to senior Army officers and to the Army's doctrinal and teaching institutions.
- o The very future of the Army depends on its taking the lead in rational, objective, command-oriented articulation of all-Service concepts of employment and of command and control.

I have long said at SAMS that the Army should go back to its 1953 (SR 350-1) definition of doctrine:

"The compilation of principles and policies applicable to a subject, which have been developed through experience or by theory, that represent the best available thought and indicate and guide but do not bind in practice... A doctrine is basically a truth, a fact, or a theory that can be defended by reason."

Last year I showed a chart which offered an approach to writing "joint" doctrine, i.e., doctrine for theater forces and for multiservice task forces within a theater. I said that such doctrine should emphasize:

- o The mission accomplishment responsibility of the operational commander [By this I meant that, regardless of whether his command authority is full command, or

opcon, or tacon, or even something less than tacon, and despite any contrary attitudes of a commander who had full command before chopping his forces to the operational commander, the operational commander is responsible for mission accomplishment. He therefore takes the authority to direct the operations necessary to meet that responsibility.]

- o Systems outlook [By this I meant that Service/national elements of similar functions should be looked at as systems and employed in harmony as such by the commanders of mixed formations.]
- o Teamwork [How to achieve teamwork with disparate forces and less than full command. One principle: in general, it is better to allow forces which have been brought up to work together under Service/national command to continue to operate under such command.]

These three bullets come together in the figure below.



A Joint Force as a System of Systems

The same bullets also come together in the figure, next page, used in that class and earlier. (The figure interprets ideas from General DePuy's "Concepts of Operation: Heart of Command, Tool of Doctrine," in Army, August 1988, and quotes two of its paragraphs. I have adapted it to reflect its application to an all-Service formation.)



I believe that if you were to ask LTG Shalikashvili and MG Garner if these two figures applied to their successful execution of Provide Comfort, their answers would be yes.

And it has long seemed to me (1) that these ideas conform to the definition of doctrine I quoted earlier ("the best available thought"), (2) that they apply to joint and combined operations equally well as they do to Army-only operations, (3) that they can be articulated by the Army in a form that the other Services, the CINCs, and the Chairman, JCS, with his Joint Staff can accept, and (4) that joint and Army doctrine can then converge, to the benefit of all. So why not rewrite FM 100-5 to meet the needs of all?

On Friday I was disappointed to learn that the new FM 100-5 will not be so written. I gathered that will not be written for theater and JTF commanders/staff officers, nor will it be all-Service in application. I expressed dismay, making my all-Service applicability point by saying that, even though the following is true and will likely remain so...

> **When a force consists of elements of the Navy and the Marine Corps only, that force will be governed by the regulations of the Department of the Navy. (Joint Pub 3-04)**

...the Army's new FM 100-5 should be written so as to make it possible to say that

> "...such a Navy/Marine force requires for full effectiveness its adherence to the doctrinal principles laid out in this manual [because they have been developed through all-Service experience, they represent the best available thought, and they can be defended by reason.]"

I offered my briefing oficer, LTC Reitz, some sample text which I thought could be included in the new FM 100-5. It dealt with the employment of theater and force air and went like this:

> "Air" means fixed wing, rotary wing, VSTOL -- anything that flies. It can also mean cruise missiles, and even long-range SSMs.
>
> No force can succeed, nor indeed survive, without controlling the air (in this paragraph, a different meaning from "air" above) to some substantial degree; the theater commander's first aim is air superiority; next is air supremacy.
>
> Air is echeloned; some wide ranging fixed wing is directed from theater level; other, limited in range, both fixed and rotary wing, operates permanently or temporarily at lower echelons. Even a battalion can have "air" and wide-ranging air can be tasked in packets to operate closely with lower-echelon formations.
>
> Efficiency and rapid responsiveness to conditions requires centralized management of air at theater level. This will usually involve the permanent, semi-permanent, or temporary assignment of air (usually rotary wing) at lower echelons.
>
> Much, if not most, fixed-wing fighter/attack air is multi-role capable. The challenge is to decide how much air goes to which roles.
>
> Strongly-held views based on Service doctrine, Service culture, and Service command prerogatives will always be present. The CINC/JTF commander is responsible for results. He must have an accurate personal appreciation of the nature and employment of air -- in each Service's force's operations, in multiservice operations, and in the theater as a whole -- and he must think beyond Service concerns with a systems approach.
>
> Typical practice in a theater is to write each day an "air tasking order" that spells out what each single or multiaircraft mission -- from reconnaissance, to close air support, to defensive fighter cover, to deep ground attack accompanied by air defense suppression packages, to air refuelers -- will do, with what ordnance, at what place, and at what precise time or period of time.
>
> But the ATO must not be entirely mission-by-mission tasking. It should also allocate air in multi-mission "bunches" by multi-hour time frame (an example being that air tasked to provide close air support and deeper air interdiction to corps or JTF).

Air is usually employed in two linked applications ("linked" because in the same day the same aircraft could be re-roled from one type application to the other). One might be "deep air" and "air defense" -- this would be relatively independent of the land forces' (JTFs, corps, and divisions) action, although affecting it to be sure. The other might be "closer-in air" -- a mixture of the close air support and battlefield air interdiction critical to the land action. Deep air/air defense is usually more predictable than closer-in air. But, for the latter, land force commanders can forecast the type targets (thus permitting air commanders to name the ordnance, which is hard to change on short notice) and the probable weight of effort by when (such as by four hour time slots) and where (the general area of application) close-in air would be needed the next day (the where and when are easier to change). Air is then jointly wielded where it will do the most good.

I'm not satisfied with the above formulation, but it may give you the idea. My problem is that I saw no evidence that anything like it will be in the new FM 100-5, and that I believe that for the guidance of Army officers who may serve as multiservice commanders and staff officers, as well as to contribute to the formulation of joint doctrine, something along those lines should be in the manual.

I told LTC Reitz that I would even try to rewrite the USMC omnibus agreement, which reads...

The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission...

Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the Joint Force Commander in the exercise of operational control to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort in accomplishing his overall mission or to maintain integrity of the force...

...to read, so as to apply to the Army/Air Force and still be acceptable to the Marines:

Force commanders assigned air assets for temporary or semi-permanent use will retain direction and control of that air, the mission of which is the support of the force. During operations of larger forces, the organic or semi-permanently assigned air assets of a subordinate force will normally be employed in support of the force mission...

However, because he is responsible for force mission accomplishment and force integrity, the force commander at a higher echelon has the authority to assign air missions to, to redirect the air efforts of, and to direct coordination among, his

subordinate commanders who have organic or semi-permanent air. This may require ordering the detachment of an air unit out from under its Service (or Special Operations Command) command chain.

In Friday's SAMS class I also made an appeal for the Army to take the lead in writing forcible entry doctrine. I began with this chart (slightly modified here):

Joint Operations and the Future of Force Projection

- o President Bush, at Aspen on 2 Aug 90, laid out the requirements for future force projection forces, calling for forces "...in existence [and] ready to act... [with] speed and agility..." "forces that give us global reach..." troops that are "well-trained, tried, and tested -- ready to perform every mission we ask of them..." "a new emphasis on flexibility and versatility..." "...readiness must be our highest priority."
- o No one or two Services has/have the charter for force projection; it takes all Services, each bringing its own capabilities, mutually reinforcing.
- o The Army needs to catch up on:
  - Airborne/airlanded/air assault capability
  - Rapid reaction sea-lift
  - Light armor and other new light technology
  - Self-deployability of Army aviation
- o The new FM 100-5 needs a new doctrinal combination:
  (1) Joint rapid reaction forward deployment, with speed and mass
  (2) Joint forcible entry, with tailored organizations, skill, and teamwork

And I offered an outline of a doctrine for forcible entry:

- o Forcible entry recognizes a kind of operation -- a lodgment in the face of armed opposition -- but not a single method. The method can be amphibious (a forcible entry launched from sea-based platforms), or airborne (an entry striking from the air), or air assault (likewise), or a combination of any two or all three -- the combination being the more likely.
- o Do not graft onto amphibious doctrine some words from airborne/airlanded/air assault operations. Write new forcible entry doctrine which combines amphibious with the other two under one commander (with outside support from theater air, theater intelligence, space capabilities, the fleet, and airlift/sealift).
- o Recognize that, other than (perhaps) special operations forces, Army forces will never make another amphibious operation. Amphibious assault today calls for helicopter assault ships, LCACs, and other special purpose amphibious materiel. This materiel is limited in numbers; Marine units trained in the use of this materiel

are and will remain plentiful; and modern amphibious assault is therefore de facto the Marines' special preserve.*

- o Emphasize mixed forces' teamwork at low echelons (Provide Comfort is the prototype, not Desert Storm). Redefine the JTF with a single logistics command (Provide Comfort and Desert Storm are the prototypes). And organize standing JTFs in unified commands and train each as a team.

This brings me to my final point, the urgency of Leavenworth taking a lead in exercising joint task forces built around Army formations.

You are now building a magnificent National Simulation Center; I have watched its development from the beginning. (Indeed, in 1975 I built a rudimentary such simulation-based facility for the exercise of both CGSC students and the commanders/staffs of corps and divisions of the Army, called the "Air/Land Battle Coordination Center," in a wooden building behind the Post Exchange; my successor did away with it.)

I urge you to visualize that this facility, which will be a national asset contributing to President Bush's vision earlier quoted, will be equipped to exercise all-Service task forces. One typical such, from my SAMS classes over several years, is shown below.

JTF 19

47th AASLT Div (Reinf)	11th Air Division	(according to phase of opns)	
47th AASLT Div	21st TacFtrWng	19 MEB (MPF)	PHIBRON 4[1]
(-one bde)	102d TFS A-10	GCE	45 MEU
Bde, 102d Abn Div	103d TFS F-16	ACE	(BLT plus)
1/82d FA Bn (155mm)	104th TFS F-117	CSSE	4 amphib ships
Btry, 1/7 ADA Bn (Hawk)	33d TacAlftWg (3 sqdns)		6 frigates/
51st Engr Cbt Bn			destroyers
other (avn, sig, MI, etc)	Other USAF units[2]		
JTF Logistics Command	Joint Special Opns TF	Other units[3]	
Elements 21st COSCOM	Advisory Team 32		
22d, 33d, 42d Aerial Ports	22d Ranger Bn		
(DS)	1st Bn, 17th SF Gp		
	17th SpecOpnsSqdn		

[1]Opcon to JTF 19 during amphibious phase only. Other (8th Fleet) Navy elms in spt include CTG 81.1 (USS America and 7 combatants; CTG 81.2 (Amphib Gp); CTG 81.3 (Patrol Force) w/12 aircraft; CTG 81.6 (LogSupGru) w/8 log ships; others.
[2]Includes elements 10th TASS and an array of airborne collectors which also support JTF 19.
[3]Other forces in support include 10th Air Force, theater/national intelligence assets, theater logistics, etc.

*I was wrong here, as shown when Army heliborne forces made ship-to-shore assaults from aircraft carriers Eisenhower and America in 1994's Haiti force projection (but nothing has come of it doctrinally). JHC

Following USEUCOM's experience in organizing and executing Provide Comfort, in which LTG Shalikashvili was forced to jury-rig his organization, CINCEUR has directed USAREUR and his other Service components each to organize a core group around which could be built a joint task force for future operations. I urge that Leavenworth, with participation from the other Services' training/simulation establishments, assist the commanders of EUCOM and USAREUR by providing through your NSC the all-Service commanders and staff officers of the Army-based JTF a BCTP-like training experience -- and that you aim to do the same for other CINCs and their Army component commanders.

Sincerely yours,

John H. Cushman
Lieutenant General
US Army, Retired

P.S. Please do not take the trouble to respond to this substantively; I will feel better about it if you don't. I have discussed the forcible entry ideas herein with General Peay, and am sending a Xerox of the first page, only, to Colonel McDonough.