

## 2. DESTRUCTION CERTIFICATE

You are Brigade S1. The Brigade S2, a close friend, has received orders and is preparing to clear post. He is in the process of inventorying and turning over the accountability of classified documents to his successor. He explains that three one-page SECRET documents cannot be accounted for. You know that the S2 has been very conscientious in maintaining the classified document records. The S2 explains that he is certain that the documents in question were destroyed along with other documents two weeks ago. He prepares a destruction certificate for these documents, signs it, and asks you to countersign. A copy of the certificate is attached. You believe the S2 is telling you the truth.

### QUESTIONS:

1. What are the basic issues raised in this case? Can they be reconciled with "honesty" in actual practice? Explain.
2. Do you countersign the destruction document? Explain.

## 7. SENIOR PARACHUTIST

You are a captain, assistant adjutant to a Special Forcés group. The group commander has commanded the group for 16 months. He has a distinguished military record. Just prior to taking command of the group, the commander earned his jump wings at airborne school. However, he fractured his leg on his last jump. It is common knowledge that his immediate superior officer has instructed the group commander not to take any chances with respect to parachute jumping.

The group commander has been fulfilling his jump requirements by making water jumps in a lake or the ocean. The Group Adjutant, your rating officer, calls you into his office one day and gives you the paperwork for preparing orders on several members of the group for senior parachute wings. The group commander's name is on that list.

You know that the commander has not made a mass tactical jump nor has he attended Jumpmaster's School, both being AR requirements for the senior parachutist badge. The Adjutant is also aware of this. The Adjutant has signed the request for orders but you must sign the order itself. The Adjutant directs that you do so.

### QUESTIONS:

1. What is the issue here? Honesty? Standards? Compliance with regulations? Impact on the command?
2. What is your response to the Adjutant's order?
3. Would it make any difference if your name were also on the order?
4. What are the responsibilities of officers in each of the strata (as described in the introduction) in this situation?

## 15. COBRA STRIKE

You are the flight commander of a Cobra fire team providing support to the armed forces of a developing country. You are in communication with the US advisor to the unit you are supporting. He directs you to attack a target which he identifies as an enemy concentration at specific coordinates. You approach the target and determine that it is in a village occupied by men, women, and children. You observe no weapons and receive no fire. Based on your understanding of the rules of engagement (and of the rules of land warfare), you determine that you should not attack the target.

You inform the advisor of your decision. He, in turn, passes your message to the ground unit commander (you are OP CON to the unit). In about two minutes the advisor, senior in rank to you, returns to the radio. He says, "The unit commander has the final authority to clear fire missions in this area and he wants the targets hit. It's his responsibility. You are ordered to hit it."

Since you have no doubt that it is not an appropriate target you refuse to change your decision not to attack the target. However, in order to avoid a confrontation with the advisor, you simply declare a malfunction and low fuel state, inform the advisor, and return to your base.

The next day, reading the INTSUM, you discover that the target you had been given was attacked by artillery ten minutes after you left the area. Forty-five enemy were reported KIA. Since the coordinates describe exactly the area you reconnoitered, you suspect that a war crime may have been committed.

### QUESTIONS:

1. You did not speak the truth in declaring a malfunction. Was this action correct, considering the principle of integrity?
2. What is your action now, if any, with regard to the report carried in the INTSUM?
3. Have you contributed to a possible war crime?

## 16. WEAPON SYSTEM IN TROUBLE

You are a lieutenant colonel, an expert on a weapons system which has been having chronic and serious maintenance problems during the development phase. The most recent tests indicate that given another year or two for development and testing there is a chance that these problems can be rectified.

Your boss has a special interest in this system. You have concluded that, in fact, he perceives that his career depends on its success. Congress is trying to cut the defense budget during this fiscal year and is looking for a system or systems to cut. Rumors of problems with your system have caused Congressional interest. Members of the committee and some staffers are coming to visit your installation for a closer look and some questioning, and they have asked that you appear before the group because of your known expertise.

Your boss tells you not to say anything adverse concerning the system because: One, the system can be improved and fielded with a little more time for development and testing; two, if production is stopped, it will take five or six years to develop a suitable replacement system; three, the Soviets will gain technical advantages over the U.S. if we do not field this system.

After your introduction to the Congressional Subcommittee one of the committee members asks the following question:

I know the Army thinks this system to be important to national security, etc., etc. What I want to know is, are we having serious and chronic maintenance problems with this new system?

### QUESTIONS:

1. What factors do you weigh in making your response? Loyalty? Your own competence? Truthfulness? Outcome of response on national defense? Established position of DA? Other?

2. What is your response?

3. Does the "3 strata" hypothesis have any relevance here? Explain your answer.

COMMANDANT'S OPENING REMARKS  
TO INVITED PARTICIPANTS  
SYMPOSIUM ON OFFICER RESPONSIBILITIES  
28 MARCH 1974

Welcome.

This symposium is in part a rerun of a successful CGSC general officer symposium with students in May 1972. In part it derives from our desire to bring the student into contact with the outside world. And it is in part stimulated by what I have called "Commandant's Requirements" this year. Let me explain.

One of our CGSC objectives has been to increase student involvement in real world Army problems.

We have done this, among other ways, through: extracurricular student work groups which address current Army doctrinal problems; electives which engage the student in current Army activities; frequent guest lecturers who join the classroom with their own problems and perspectives; and participation by students in FTX's and CPX's of CONUS units away from our academic environment.

We have also made an effort to challenge the student.

One vehicle for challenging the student has been the Commandant's Requirements which were in your packet.

CR 74-1 invited the student to critique an article on the Experimental Armored Force, 1927-28.

CR 74-2 invited him to submit his ideas on how the Army's Recruiting Program could be improved.

Participation in CR's 74-1 and 74-2 was voluntary. In both, the student responses had a strong element bringing up problems of ethics. As a result, we decided that Commandant's Requirement 74-3 would address the question of honesty and would be mandatory for U.S. students. By the way, Lieutenant General Ray Peers was one of our lecturers on the subject of CR 74-3.

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Because this proved to be a very interesting and lively subject, we decided to continue CR 74-3 on a voluntary basis. We started off the continuation with an 8-paragraph strawman statement on "Honesty in the Officer Corps."

The idea of CR 74-3 was to examine this draft statement and to develop specific and concrete cases which would either test or refine the various paragraphs. Based on recommendations, we intended to revise this statement.

Students have been meeting on this activity, along with faculty members, and have entered into it with a good deal of enthusiasm.

The target date for completing this initial phase was 31 March, and led to the timing of this symposium. We never did get around to revising the 8-paragraph statement. No single such statement will really satisfy, so we held to what we started with.

So, here we are.

However, this symposium is on "officer responsibility" which is more than "honesty." It is duty, and mission, and perception. The 17 cases you received last night were put together with the total scope of officer responsibility in mind.

Most of these cases were taken from the more than 100 cases prepared by student-faculty work groups in our extension of Commandant's Requirement 74-3. Many good cases were not included, simply because we had to set some limit on what to discuss.

What has been our purpose in all this?

First, we wanted to make officers think about these issues.

Second, we wanted to receive their ideas and their evaluation of themselves, their profession, Leavenworth, and the Army.

Third, we wanted to direct their energies and ours toward improvement. In other words, we were looking for a way to join together toward (1) the elevation of our common standards, and (2) the elevation of our performance against these standards.

One thread that runs through my experience this year - including the Commandant's Requirements, and especially with 74-3 - has been the strong student desire for dialogue with senior officers, and most especially with general officers. That is why we have invited to this symposium 12 general officers, each of whom will be the senior officer on a panel tomorrow morning.

I should warn the general officers that they can expect to be challenged. These students are interested in this subject. In their average of about twelve years of officer experience, they have been around in different places in very interesting times, and I think they are prepared to mix it up with you.

I think you will find it stimulating, but you may find it somewhat combative. You may even find yourselves beleaguered.

Obviously you are visualized as fully capable of rising to the occasion, or else you would not have been invited.

Our guests also include a group of Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels from various places around the Army - the Pentagon, Army service schools, troop units, etc. You were invited because you are known as being concerned and articulate in the areas that we are discussing. You will be joined on these panels by members of the Leavenworth Faculty. You will probably find yourself identified as part of the establishment.

The academicians, also present today, have been asked to come, so as to provide the viewpoint of an informed person who is not part of the Army establishment, but who is concerned as to the Army's well-being. You may be able to assist in ameliorating some of the more heated discussions that arise.

Also on your panels will be some members of the student/faculty work groups who have participated in the recent discussions on Commandant's Requirement 74-3.

Right after this meeting, we will go into Eisenhower Auditorium where seats in the back of the main hall have been reserved for you. After the lectures and question periods of this morning, we will repair to the respective classrooms. I hope that each of you will pull up a chair, listen, and engage yourself in the discussion.

Tonight you will be meeting informally with students and faculty as you have supper throughout the Post. I suspect you will work for your supper.

Tomorrow the panels will go to work. You can establish your own format for your panel discussion. Panel members might want to get together ahead of time to figure out exactly how they want to operate.

I might mention we have just completed a survey of student career attitudes and expectations, which you will have handed to you as you leave this morning. It will compare the students' attitudes of this class with those of the 1972 class. I found it interesting and expect that you might also.

Now I think we have created ourselves a mixture that will bubble some as the chemistry interacts.

We've got, first, all these students with their vital juices flowing. We have these cases. We have set aside time in an academic setting to address these matters. And to this we have invited a bunch of outsiders - you.

What do we want to come of this? I'll try to answer that as best I can.

I would hope that, together, during this symposium and afterwards, we can address the questions, "Is there a problem?" and "If so, how do we go about improving the situation?"



How do we raise our standards?

How do we help create an environment of integrity as the routine order of things?

How do we as General Officers meet our responsibilities toward this end? How do our Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels, senior field grade officers, and how do our friends in the academic world, contribute?

Finally, how can we imbue our students and our faculty - and indeed every officer everywhere - with the need to stand his ground in terms of integrity, regardless of whatever temptation or environment might exist?

How can we get Leavenworth graduates, and officers in general, to accept that they must maintain their standards, notwithstanding the pressures that they may face? How can we orient them, motivate them, and inspire them?

Perhaps most important - how can we structure the environment so as to encourage them and reward them?

On this last point, however, I want to be clear. Certainly we have to understand the officer. We have to realize the pressures that he may be under. But we also have to be sure that he understands that, in the final analysis, nobody is forced to lie, or to act without integrity.

Very many of these decisions are not easy to make. But each man is his own man. He makes his own decision to compromise. When he succumbs to pressure, he is failing himself, and failing the system as well. Our officers have to realize that it is not possible to go through life without being tested.

At the same time, just as this officer has his responsibility to himself and to this institution that we cherish, we have our own responsibility to him.

I hope each of you here will help hold your, and my, and the students' feet to the fire and never let us, or him, forget our ultimate responsibility as an officer.

SYMPOSIUM ON OFFICERS' RESPONSIBILITIES  
28-29 March 1974

General Officers

MG Harold R. Aaron \_\_\_\_\_ ACSI, DA, Wash DC  
 MG Sidney B. Berry \_\_\_\_\_ Cdr, 101st Abn Div (Aml), Ft Campbell, KY  
 MG Kenneth B. Cooper \_\_\_\_\_ Asst Ch of Engr, DA, Wash DC  
 MG James F. Hamlet \_\_\_\_\_ Cdr, 4th Inf Div, Ft Carson, CO  
 MG R. G. Gard, Jr. \_\_\_\_\_ Cdr, USA Training Ctr (Inf) & Ft Ord, CA  
 MG Frederick J. Kroesen \_\_\_\_\_ Cdr, 82d Abn Div, Ft Bragg, NC  
 MG Herbert J. McChrystal \_\_\_\_\_ Dep Gdr, MASSTER, Ft Hood, TX  
 MG Stan L. McClellan \_\_\_\_\_ DCSPER, USA TRADOC, Ft Monroe, VA  
 MG Chester M. McKeen, Jr. \_\_\_\_\_ Dir, Rqmts & Procurement, USAMC, Alexandria, VA  
 MG Harold G. Moore \_\_\_\_\_ Cdr, USA Mil Pers Ctr & Ch, OPO, DA, Wash DC  
 MG John K. Singlaub \_\_\_\_\_ Cdr, USA RR VIII, Rky Mt Ars, Denver, CO  
 MG Adrian St. John II \_\_\_\_\_ Cdr, 1st Armored Div, USA Europe  
 BG Morris J. Brady \_\_\_\_\_ Dir, Special Readiness Study Grp, Ft Leav., KS  
 BG Marion C. Ross \_\_\_\_\_ Dir, Hum Res Devel, ODCSPER, DA, Wash DC

COL/LTC

COL Donald F. Bletz \_\_\_\_\_ Dir, USA Nat'l Sec Studies, USA War College  
 COL Frederic J. Brown III \_\_\_\_\_ ACS G1, DPCA, 101st Abn Div (Aml) & Ft Campbell, KY  
 COL Mary M. Clarke \_\_\_\_\_ Cdr, WC Ctr and School, Ft McClellan, AL  
 COL Arthur E. Dewey \_\_\_\_\_ ODCSOPS, DA, Wash DC  
 COL Charles W. Dyke \_\_\_\_\_ Mil Asst, Ofc of Secy of Army, Wash DC  
 COL Ernest R. Frazier \_\_\_\_\_ Ofc of Equal Opportunity Progress, DA, Wash DC  
 COL William L. Hauser \_\_\_\_\_ Ch, EPMS Work Grp, USA Mil Pers Ctr, Wash DC  
 COL Louis C. Menetrey \_\_\_\_\_ Cdr, 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div (Aml) Ft Campbell, KY  
 COL Joseph T. Palastra \_\_\_\_\_ PM, ISP, Department of State, Wash DC  
 COL W. F. Ulmer, Jr. \_\_\_\_\_ Cdr, 194th Armored Bde, Ft Knox, KY  
 COL Jack A. Walker \_\_\_\_\_ ODCSPER, DA, Wash DC  
 COL John W. Woodmansee \_\_\_\_\_ ATCD-PG, USA TRADOC, Ft Monroe, VA  
 LTC Zeb B. Bradford, Jr. \_\_\_\_\_ Company Ops Dept, USAIS, Ft Benning, GA  
 LTC Robert P. Dirmeyer \_\_\_\_\_ Student Det, USA War College  
 LTC Michael J. Malone \_\_\_\_\_ Dir, Comdt & Comm Studies, USA War College  
 LTC Frank J. Schober \_\_\_\_\_ Student Det, USA War College  
 LTC Peter L. Stromberg \_\_\_\_\_ Dept of English, USMA, West Point, NY  
 LTC William J. Taylor, Jr. \_\_\_\_\_ Dept of Soc Sci, USMA, West Point, NY  
 LTC Nathan C. Vail \_\_\_\_\_ Head of Ldrship Com, USAIS, Ft Benning, GA

ACADEMICIAN

Dr. Roger A. Beaumont \_\_\_\_\_ Assoc Prof of Org Sci, Univ of Wisc-Milwaukee  
 Dr. Joseph A. Blake \_\_\_\_\_ Assoc Prof, VA Poly Inst/State Univ, Blacksburg, VA  
 Mr. Bill Broydrick \_\_\_\_\_ Leg. Asst to Hon Les Aspin, Congress of US  
 Dr. (COL) Joseph C. Buford \_\_\_\_\_ Dept of Geography, Bowling Green St Univ, OH  
 Dr. William A. Conboy \_\_\_\_\_ Prof of Speech Comm/Hum Rel, Univ of KS, Lawrence  
 Dr. Calvin W. Downs \_\_\_\_\_ Assoc Prof of Speech Comm/Hum Rel, Univ of KS  
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 Dr. Stanford W. Gregory \_\_\_\_\_ Dept of Anthro/Soc, Kent St Univ, Kent, OH  
 Dr. Robin Higham \_\_\_\_\_ Prof of History, Kansas St Univ, Manhattan  
 Dr. (COL) Walter G. Jacobs \_\_\_\_\_ Prof of Govt & Politics, Univ of MD, College Park  
 Dr. Felix Moos \_\_\_\_\_ Prof & Dir, Ctr for E. Asian Studies, Univ of KS  
 Dr. (LTC) William V. O'Brien \_\_\_\_\_ Chairman, Inst of World Policy, Georgetown Univ  
 Dr. (COL) Anthony J. Pia \_\_\_\_\_ International Associates, Fairfield, CT  
 Dr. Robert L. Shelton \_\_\_\_\_ Prof of Speech Comm/Hum Rel, Univ of KS, Lawrence  
 Dr. Roger L. Shinn \_\_\_\_\_ Act Dean of Grad Studies, Union Theo Seminary, NY  
 Dr. Frank N. Trager \_\_\_\_\_ Prof of Int'l Affairs, New York Univ, NYC, NY  
 Dr. Gary L. Wamsley \_\_\_\_\_ Dir, Institute of Public Affairs, KU, Lawrence  
 Dr. Adam Yarmolinsky \_\_\_\_\_ R.W. Emerson Professor of the Univ, Univ of Mass

Current as of: 18 Mar 74



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS  
ACTIVITY  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027

IN REPLY REFER TO:

ATCAADC

2 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: MG CUSHMAN

SUBJECT: Impressions of the Symposium on Officers' Responsibilities

The following impressions were gained during the two-day Symposium on Officers' Responsibilities on 28-29 March 1974.

Perception - Problems of integrity were perceived by student participants as being wide spread and on a "we-they" basis. This view was frequently reinforced by beliefs indicating that the "system" encourages dishonesty and punishes honesty. The more senior an officer is, the more likely it is that he has compromised his integrity in order to achieve success.

Climate - Pressures to succeed and an over-heavy schedule of requirements create situations that challenge professional integrity by making circumvention of established procedures the most likely way of accomplishing a series of tasks and satisfying superiors.

System - Perceived as generally not working without circumvention. Reports, supply procedures, dialogue with seniors, officers' efficiency reports and readiness reports were used as examples of frustration resulting from the application of some form of circumvention in order to achieve success.

Risk - Driving the foregoing was a desire for a high assurance of success. Most symposium participants did not appear to accept risk as a part of their profession. In a choice between a full exercise of professional responsibility that involved a degree of career risk and a compromise that increased apparent success, the compromise is generally seen as the most likely alternative. There seemed to be little acceptance of the possibility that one's professional stock would be likely to rise as the result of a well-founded stand on principle.

Definition - Discussions frequently centered on areas of judgment which were used to illustrate examples of the lack of integrity. The indication was that there may be a need to differentiate between integrity and judgment.

ATCAADC

2 April 1974

SUBJECT: Impressions of the Symposium on Officers' Responsibilities


Responsibility - In the "we-they" view of the student officer, the "they's" are in charge of the total professional environment. There is a less than complete acceptance of the fact that each of us is in charge of some part of the environment. There was little acceptance of the concept that the individual's integrity must be given up and that it cannot be taken.

Action - From the student's perspective, we have created an environment that encourages professional immorality. In the same light, it is clear that responsible members of the military can structure an environment that promotes morality by avoiding over certification; refusing to tolerate improper procedures; not overloading either persons or organizations with unduly heavy requirements or intense scheduling; make infractions of established and acceptable procedures a clear contribution to failure.

Cynicism - I noted an undercurrent of student cynicism. In several instances, I judged the officers to be poorly informed. Officers must be encouraged to seek the facts instead of merely assuming the worst.

Obligation - Whether or not it is a legacy of our current times is difficult to tell; however, the student participants of the symposium live in a different professional world from the more senior professionals represented by the visitors. Senior officers were generally regarded with diminished respect and admiration and frequent umbrage was shown toward general officers. I attribute this to a lack of vertical communication. Our leaders must learn to communicate facts, background information, and rationale for their decisions, policies, and activities in order to have them more completely understood and executed.

Although I must confess surprise at the prevailing attitudes as I saw them, I am convinced that the symposium had an overall stimulating affect on all participants. I believe that the expressions of the students came from a critical concern for their profession rather than a lapse in standards. The overall effect was a healthy one that bears repeating.



MORRIS J. BRADY  
Brigadier General, USA  
Assistant Deputy Commander



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
COMBINED ARMS CENTER AND FORT LEAVENWORTH  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027

5 September 1975

General W. E. DePuy  
Commander  
USA Training and Doctrine Command  
Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651

Dear General DePuy:

As we enter a new school year at Leavenworth, and as I complete a full two years as Commander, Combined Arms Center, it may be of some value for me to give you a report of the situation as I see it.

The thrust of my report is the strengthening of CACDA and thus of the Combined Arms Center's ability to perform the jobs which CACDA manages. I start, however, by describing current College activities because this contributes so much to and thoroughly underlies what CACDA does. As you could tell most recently from the briefings we are preparing under your direction for General Kerwin, it is hard to distinguish between what the College and CACDA contribute to any given project.

Our school year is off to a very good start. I have told you that I expect the instruction this year to be exceptionally good. So far it has been, and student response has been remarkably keen.

I am particularly pleased with our introduction to tactics. Our coverage of the Middle East War lessons, detailed treatment of Soviet weapons systems, organization and tactics, and how we handle the battlefield interaction of forces have excited the enthusiasm of not only the students, but the faculty as well. The Tactics Department seems uniformly pleased with their grasp of what they are saying and how they are saying it. The tactics instruction vibrates in full harmony with the thrust of TRADOC thinking and the recently received draft of FM 100-5. In two weeks we complete the fundamentals of tactics and get into the Middle East and Europe scenarios.



Annex I  
Letter to Depuy

Staff instruction is proceeding well. The new Command Post procedures of TC 101-5 are going over nicely. I inclose for your information the lecture with which Colonel Jess Hendricks introduced our staff instruction, in the first week of the course. It tells the direction we are going. Although somewhat philosophical in content, it has, I believe, great significance. Division commanders in our Army will need to take note that the Leavenworth graduates they will receive in the summer of 1976 will be trained under the approach to command post operations that is described in the lecture and in new Training Circular 101-5, as it says in bold type on page 14 of the lecture.

I consider our other instruction (logistics, computer orientation, etc.) also to be quite good. We have introduced the student to the theory and practice of force structure design and development. However, I believe we have a good deal more work to do in developing this subject matter, notwithstanding that there has been considerable research here and elsewhere in the subject over the past two years. This is a subject that is, in general, not adequately understood, often even by experienced practitioners of the craft. Leavenworth, of course, should be the recognized center of expertise in this field; our proponency for the OPMS Operations and Force Development Specialty verifies this charge. More on that later.

We are moving strongly and in many ways to integrate the activities of the College and CACDA toward the mutual advantage of both and of the Combined Arms Center. The question of how to do this best, without disruption of either's primary function, is one that has been occupying my attention for some time, as you know. Morey Brady and Ben Harrison have been working hard with me on this but serious problems remain. The main problem is that assets are very short and there is that "seamless web" of interfaces - evident in the rich variety of projects that now engage us, either directly from TRADOC or from your other integrating centers.

We are now in the process of an orderly reorganization of the College, which will move the Management Committee, which teaches resource management and force structuring, from the Department of

Command to the Department of Logistics. We will retitle the Department of Logistics as the Department of Resource Management (DREM). DREM will have responsibility not only to teach combat service support (DISCOM and the COSCOM) as DLOG does now, but will add installation management and force structure design and development.

This reorganization will help CACDA and CAC. As I see it you look to Leavenworth for expertise in, and to contribute to the TRADOC program in, three major areas.

The first of these is "how to fight" - all the way from understanding and teaching how to fight at the platoon and company level, to proponency on how to fight the combined arms, and how to work together with tac air in the coordinated and integrated air/land battle. Under the new College organization, the Department of Tactics remains the College custodian and proponent of "how to fight," but it picks up joint airborne and amphibious operations as well. The new Director of the Tactics Department, Colonel Victor M. Robertson, arrives next week from the 25th Division. I expect Colonel Robertson to take up the all-important question of how to fight the air/land battle where Bill Louisell left off, and to become quickly the master of this subject. I hope you will have a chance to meet him on 12 September at the Fort Hood rehearsal. He arrives on 11 September and we may be able to get him down there the next day.

The second broad area in which we are required to be competent and to lead is in command, control, communications, command post procedures, and all aspects of how to control and coordinate the air/land battle. CACDA has substantially benefitted from the Department of Command's work in this area. One reason I moved the management instructional responsibility and expertise from the Department of Command to the Department of Logistics was to permit Colonel Hendricks, DCOM Director, and his people to devote their full attention to problems of command. I visualize that the next year or two will see a major forward thrust in command and control doctrine, and in its dissemination and understanding throughout the Army. If we can develop a good ARTEP to go with the next revision of TC 101-5, on which we are now working, and if senior commanders will use ARTEP to evaluate their division commanders the Army will have made a major step forward.



The recent two-day meeting of the TOS User Requirements Coordinating Committee (TURCC) was very profitable. It was followed immediately by a day-long session at which Brigadier Generals Gene Kelley and Bill Rolya worked with us on preparing a battle plan which addresses the all-important Electronic Warfare and Intelligence matters.

I explained to Brigadier Generals Kelley and Rolya that this week we are moving into an experimental corps JTF command post, in a warehouse building I made available to the Department of Command for this purpose. This combined "air/land battle" and "all-source intelligence" coordination center will be jointly manned full time by members of the Department of Command and other College departments, and by EW, Intelligence, and other experts from CACDA. Their purpose will be to develop the coordination procedures for the air/land battle. The College Air Force Liaison Section and Colonel Carter, TACLO, will both participate in this.

The revised TOS program and MASSTER Test 120 will be a chance for us to see how an automated division command post, using the TOS Operable Segment materiel, can compare in effectiveness with the manual command post of our new doctrine. We expect improvements in manual procedures throughout the year as we experiment further, so any ADP assisted CP of MASSTER Test 120 will have to be fast moving indeed to do better than the manual mode CP as we see it evolving.

The ASSIST computer hardware and software will, I think, provide an alternative to TOS as we now know it. ASSIST seems to offer the possibility for an ADP assisted integrated all-source intelligence operation at the corps level, with a support terminal at division. Gene Kelley, coming from ACSI as he does, is an enthusiast for ASSIST; we agree that it has excellent possibilities. Colonel Lynch of the ALFA Directorate was with us throughout this EW/Intell Conference and is fully familiar with our discussions at the conference with respect to ASSIST.

After "how to fight" and "how to command, control, and coordinate," the third area where CAC needs to be expert is the broad field of force structure development and force design for the total combined arms force.

to include its DISCOM and COSCOM components. Notwithstanding all the study that has gone into it, not only at Leavenworth but around the entire Army, the Army's theory and conceptual basis for the measurement of trade-offs and effectiveness of various force mixes remains rudimentary. The last two years of common scenario work has, however, given us a better grasp of this problem, to the point where we are now in a position to codify some of our thinking into field manual form. Writing of this manual is well along. I believe that this area offers great promise for forward movement in the next two years.

It is to focus attention on this force structure area and to provide for its better management that I combined the Management Committee of the Department of Command with the Department of Logistics into a single Department of Resource Management. This organization shift is going to take place over the next several months with minimum disruption to the conduct of the current course at Leavenworth. The head of DREM will be Colonel Fred Middleton, a well-rounded logistician who joined us in June from JCS J-4. In addition, I have assigned the primary responsibility for the conduct of force design and force development, as distinguished from the teaching of it, to CACDA's Concepts and Force Design Directorate. I have told Generals Brady and Harrison that I expect the Concepts and Force Design Directorate to be reinforced, not only from CACDA assets, but by the full management and logistics expertise, and indeed the "how to fight" and the "how to command and control" expertise, of the College. We will thereby put together a composite CAC team that will become masters of how division and corps forces are organized, how they are deployed, and how their structure is established, and measured, and evaluated.

This thrust to strengthen our force design expertise and capacity will enhance considerably our ability to meet TRADOC requirements in such priority studies such as the Division Structure Analysis, the Anti-armor Capabilities Study, the Komer-Brehm Report Analysis, and the ARCSA - for all of which we are proponent - as well as permit us to enter intelligently into and comment on matters which are the proponentry of other centers or schools, such as communications, intelligence, division logistics, the Corps Automation

Requirements Study, the Administrative Contingency Model, and so on. I believe that the next few months will see an extraordinarily vigorous effort and a stronger expertise at Leavenworth for the handling of this type of activity.

In this regard, CACDA is moving ahead to improve its own SCORES/scenario development/force development capabilities. In anticipation of CACDA receiving some more spaces for SCORES Jiffy gamers, Morey Brady has shifted his personnel assets to create a second Jiffy game team; it is now training and will be working in two weeks. We will set up a third team with College instructors who will move to CACDA in December after the common curriculum first term teaching is completed; this team will be at work in January.

Some other representative actions of CACDA, among many, are:

- Improvements in our analytical capability, as evidenced in programing of DYN TACS-X for the HELLFIRE COEA, TETAM model validation using Carmonette, IUA and DYN TACS-X, and in-house development of the Individual Engagement and Sortie Effectiveness models, which supported the ASH, ASE, and HELLFIRE efforts. These are now well recognized and accepted models, as you know.

- A combat development program which is tuned up to be quickly responsive to current field requirements. Examples are our management of the AWADS test program making it available in time for Joint Training Exercise SOLID SHIELD 75, development of the TRADOC Smoke and Flame program, and initiation of the product improvement program for the Mule as a TOW carrier in the 101st Airborne Division.

- The ongoing development of a plan to prioritize our combat developments projects now being worked out with Bill Vinson's staff in order to use more efficiently our assets.

To conclude, I am delighted with CACDA's work and its prospects. On 17-18 September we will be hosting the SCORES General Officer Workshop. Many of your generals will be here, as you can see from the inclosed

attendance list. I suggest that you might find it useful to come to Leavenworth for a few hours on the 18th, to be briefed on what we have in the workshop, and to give your guidance to the assembled group at that time.

Sincerely,

Signed

J. H. CUSHMAN  
Major General, USA  
Commanding



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND  
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23051

1 - CC ✓  
1 - CACDA

ATCD-PM-S

17 OCT 1975

SUBJECT: Anti-Armor Systems Program Review

Commander  
US Army Combined Arms Center  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

*28 Oct*  
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*Arch*  
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*Support.*  
*Jtz*

1. Reference my visit on 29 Sep 75 regarding the Anti-Armor Systems Program Review. I have recommended to HQDA that the review be held in March 1976 at the US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I consider a review of Anti-Armor Systems important and timely in view of the development of new doctrine and tactics, the capabilities of current and future US weapons systems and the nature of the armored threat. This is a unique opportunity for the Army and for TRADOC to take the lead and tie together the whole spectrum of Anti-Armor systems including doctrine and tactics for employment.

2. The objective of the SPR is to provide the VCSA recommendations concerning the most effective Army weapons and organizations to defeat the Soviet threat. The agenda should follow the standard SPR topics (overview, threat, technology forecast, tactics/techniques on modern battlefield, training developments, Army Program funding, priorities/conclusions and VCSA summary). However, I expect the review and analysis to include the following:

a. First, analyses of current-1976 US and Soviet Weapons Systems based on evaluation of known capabilities/vulnerabilities/limitations and numbers of US vs Soviet weapons from company through corps level. Tactical and training considerations should also be addressed. For purposes of analysis, use the Europe 1 Scenario (assume 3 2/3 Division Available on D-day) and the Mid-East IIA Corps. D-day will be 1 July 1976; forces to be employed are those available as of 30 June 1976. Model different mixes to determine sensitivity of force (whatever size) to changes in the mix. Both scenarios will include USAF participation. Revised threat guidance will be provided. As a minimum, the following systems should be analyzed and discussed:

17 Oct 75

US

Mines  
LAW/ILAW  
DRAGON  
TOW  
SHERIDAN  
M-60  
COBRA/TOW

SOVIET


Mines  
SAGGER  
SWATTER  
RPG-7  
HIND A/B  
T-55  
T-62

b. Second, the same analyses should be conducted using future-1985 friendly/enemy systems, e.g., XM-1, AAH, T-72, RPG-15.

c. Third, you should develop recommendations based on your assessments of current and future weapons, capabilities, vulnerabilities and/or deficiencies and mix requirements which address:

- Procurement of new systems or PIP of existing systems
- Changes in numbers/mixes of weapons and recommended force structure to support the new weapons
- The required tactics and training.

3. I expect CACDA as the integrating center for the Combined Arms to conduct this important review as your number one priority project with full participation from the following TRADOC Centers/Schools: Aviation, Armor, Engineer, Infantry, and Field Artillery. I place particular emphasis on the modeling of different mixes to determine force effectiveness. The review will be conducted in accordance with AR 11-4 and TRADOC Supplement 1 thereto and TRADOC Pam 11-10, Guide for Preparation and Conduct of System Program Reviews. The operating budget of the Combined Arms Center has been increased by \$50K to defray the expense of this review. A tentative outline agenda should be provided this HQ by 30 Oct 75. Technical advice will be provided by the Combat Development Planning Group (ATCD-PG/COL Segal, X2964) and administrative assistance will be provided by the DCSCD Program Management Office (ATCD-PM-S/LTC Santa Barbara, X3972). Name, rank and telephone number of your CAC point of contact should be provided soonest.



W. E. DePUY  
General, United States Army  
Commanding

Copies furnished:  
(See next page)

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL  
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651

ATTNG-AS-TD

22 OCT 1975

*Dep Comdt -  
Action. ppls.  
JH2*  
28 Oct 75  
Dear Jack,

As you know, I am deeply concerned about the ability of our colonels and lieutenant colonels to lead their commands in the first battle of the next war.

We don't know as much as we should about the critical tasks these commanders will have to perform or about their decision making problems. I want you to begin an extensive front end analysis of this problem by taking over all the TRADOC command and staff simulations. These include FIRE FIGHT (CATB), the Dunn-Kempf game (CGSC), FIRST BATTLE (CGSC), LONG THRUST 75 (CATB), WHITE KNUCKLES (CGSC), CATTS (TSA), and the Combined Arms Map Maneuver System (USAARMS). You should expedite development of these and related simulations. The output of this effort will suggest changes in our doctrine and point out those areas in which we must emphasize tactical training.

Second, using in part what you learn from the simulations above, design a refresher course in tactical leadership for command selected colonels and lieutenant colonels of the four combat arms.

Finally, I want you to develop a Brigade ARTEP (without troops). Using this, we can train and evaluate the Brigade Commander, Battalion Commanders and their staffs. As a longer term project, you should develop the same kind of ARTEP for the division. These ARTEP's should be based on a thorough front end analysis of what the essential command and staff actions are, what standards are appropriate, and how performance should be measured.


The payoff for this will come through better command and staff training and performance in units. The graduates of your refresher courses will be more able commanders and your ARTEP will give them the tool they now lack to improve their own performance and that of their staffs and subordinate commanders.

Inclosure 1 is a matrix covering the major developmental efforts in CPX/Gaming simulation.

Within thirty days from the date of this letter, request you provide me with your plan to accomplish this. I am interested in what milestones you suggest and what dollar and manpower resources you believe you need by fiscal year, to accomplish the mission.

I will send a copy of this letter to the commandants of the Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, and Air Defense Schools and task them to support you as required.

Sincerely,



W.E. DeRUY  
General, United States Army  
Commanding

1 Incl  
As stated

Major General John H. Cushman  
Commandant  
US Army Command & General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027



# THE FORTY-YEAR SPLIT

THE  
FIRST  
TWENTY  
YEARS: 1920-1940

By PEGASUS

In 1919 the enthusiastic young airmen of the United States Army came home from the Great War. They had had only seven months of combat. Their small force had dropped only 136 tons of bombs. They had flown mostly in planes built by the French and the British. But this small band of pioneers had a vision of a radically new way to wage war.

With their return, there began the "forty-year split." This was the split that developed between those who fight on the land and those who fight in the air. The split widened during each succeeding decade and only now in the 1960s has it begun to mend.

On the one hand there were Army airmen who were convinced of the decisive value of air in its independent strategic bombardment role and who firmly believed that its use with the traditional surface forces was secondary.

On the other hand there was the non-flying Army who believed that bombardment was not decisive and that equal priority should be given to the development of the airplane, to support the land Army.

During the 1920s and 1930s the split widened as reduced budgets forced decisions between the two points of view. At the end of the thirties, the airmen almost lost, then won their case.

During these four decades the split was to keep the United States from developing instruments of land-and-air warfare that exploit technology to the fullest possible degree. The story of the split has been often told and from several points of view. But today, as the United States faces the often agonizing problems of how—and even whether

it can project its capacity for land combat to trouble spots worldwide, the broad outline of the story needs to be re-examined.

If we, in 1965, can see what this split is, how it grew, and what it has meant, perhaps we can better understand what we have to do about it.

Land warfare, which since 1914 has really encompassed "air-land" warfare, is combat conducted on and above the surface of the land by military forces which have the task and the means of operating against defending land forces and gaining control of the land and its people.

These land military forces are made up of a matrix of systems, equipment, and units. Into the nineteenth century, their speed was governed by, at best, the horse. The railroad gave these forces strategic mobility and, in some cases, operational mobility. Then in the twentieth century there came the internal combustion engine and with it the tracked and wheeled vehicle, and the airplane.

In their processes of evolution, military institutions and fighting forces follow a kind of biological law. They grow, they feed on the soil of new inventions and the light and rain of new ideas, they respond to intelligent cultivation, and if they cannot cope with their environment they fail.

After World War I, military forces for land warfare faced a future which included the tank, the wheeled vehicle, and the airplane. If they were to prosper in this environment, they needed to be able to exploit the entire range of these and other inventions. But in the United States, in the 1920s and 1930s, the split took place and healthy growth

Annex K t to be.



## PIONEER AGENTS PROVOCATEURS AND INNOVATORS OF AIR POWER

Catalyst



Maj. Gen. BENJAMIN D. FOULOIS

Influential Exponent

*The "chief publicist and catalytic agent" of the U. S. Army's air arm, Billy Mitchell seized upon the theories of Lord Trenchard and Giulio Douhet to advance the airman's vision of a new way to wage war.*



Brig. Gen. BILLY MITCHELL

Tactical Innovator



Maj. Gen. CLAIRE CHENNAULT  
(When an Air Corps captain)

*Foulois had grown up with the Army's air arm from its beginning in 1907, and was Chief of the Air Corps from 1931 to 1935. His vision of air warfare was long and lasting. In 1919 he told a Congressional Committee that he had predicted in 1907 that "future wars would see large fleets in the air operating well in advance of the troops, and . . . these fleets [would] have a decisive effect on all future operations." In the 1960s, he was still a peppy exponent of independent air power.*

*As the chief instructor in fighter tactics at the Air Corps Tactical School, Chennault was one of the few officers in the Air Corps willing to do battle against the big-bomber barons of the 1930s. Regularly efforts would be made to drop the fighter course from the curriculum and Chennault would have lost it had it not been for the support of ground officers who saw a need for "fighters for close support of ground troops and to protect observation aircraft engaged in regulating artillery fire."*





GEN. JOHN J. PERSHING

*"Aviation is not an independent arm and cannot be for a long time to come, if ever."*



GEN. CHARLES P. SUMMERALL

*"Some more of this damned aviation nonsense," he said as he turned his back on a paratrooper drop at Brooks Field in 1928.*

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## FOUR CHIEFS OF STAFF STRUGGLED WITH THE RISING EXPECTATIONS

The reason for this, although deep, was simple. It lay in the vision brought back from the wars by the pioneer Army airmen. This was the vision of independent air operations.

This vision was first implanted in the minds of the Army's airmen in France by Hugh M. Trenchard, commander of the Royal Flying Corps and later the first Chief of Air Staff of the newly independent Royal Air Force. In Brigadier General Billy Mitchell of the U. S. Army Air Service, Trenchard found a brilliant pupil, and Mitchell became the "chief publicist and catalytic agent" of the U. S. Army's air arm in the formative years of its doctrine.

These two—Trenchard and Mitchell—plus Giulio Douhet, the Italian air theorist—were the most influential idea-men in the development of United States Army Air Corps thinking in the 1920s and 1930s.

The center of this thinking was the Air Corps Tactical School, located first at Langley Field and moved in 1931 to Maxwell Field. Here the brilliant and visionary minds of airmen went to work, and despite the then primitive capacity of the aviation industry, despite the unpopularity and even disapproval of their doctrines elsewhere in the Army, the doctrine of the independent air arm took shape.

By 1920 the Air Corps Tactical School was teach-

ing that bombardment aviation was the basic element of an air force. In 1926, the school was setting forth the doctrine that the primary mission of air forces was to destroy the enemy's capacity for waging war by neutralizing his air force and attacking his vital centers.

In the early 1930s instructors at the Air Corps Tactical School were saying:

"The air force . . . is capable of taking action which precludes the necessity for seizing and holding the enemy's territory. . . ."

"Aircraft will bring about more efficient warfare. But air forces must be used as a weapon and not as an auxiliary to continue the old methods of warfare. Air forces must be given the principal role. . . ."

"It has been pointed out and repeated many times by students of the old school that aircraft, like all other means, are auxiliary to the 'queen of battles' but if we will expand our vision . . . we may see that no modern nation can wage war without the resources behind the fighting front. . . . The airplane gives us a weapon which can immediately reach this internal organization and thereby defeat the nation. What more could be desired?"

By 1935, the Air Corps Tactical School was stating that "the principal and all important mission of air power is the attack of those vital objectives in a nation's economic structure which

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193



GEN. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

*In the 1950's General Stratemyer said that MacArthur "knows all there is to know about the use of air power." But in earlier years MacArthur and the airmen were rarely in agreement.*



GEN. MALIN CRAIG

*"In the vital and decisive prewar years, [he] went to no pains to conceal his hostility toward the heavy bomber," wrote a historian of the period.*

## TIOND SOMETIMES UNREASONABLE DEMANDS OF AIR POWER ENTHUSIASTS

will tend to paralyze the nation's ability to wage war and thus contribute directly to the attainment of the ultimate objective of war, namely the disintegration of the hostile will to resist."

**B**ut what was the thinking in the rest of the Army in those days? In 1920, General Pershing, then Chief of Staff, set the tone for the Army at large when he went before a Congressional committee and testified: "Aviation is not an independent arm and cannot be for a long time to come, if ever."

Following up this view, a 1926 Army training circular on aviation laid down the authoritative position: organization and training of air units was to be "based on the fundamental doctrine that their mission is to aid the ground forces to gain decisive success."

The Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth was the source of doctrinal thinking on the land battle. Leavenworth instructional material of the 1920s left little doubt that the task of aviation was to assist the land army. Its mission, like that of the artillery, was to provide support for the advance of the infantry.

As the years went by, the influence of air officers on the Leavenworth faculty had some effect, and the Army's air arm gained more scope and authority. For example, in 1936, after the 1935 establishment of the GHQ Air Force, which

gathered all Army combat aviation under a single command, Leavenworth instructional material expressed the doctrine that "air forces constitute a highly mobile and powerful combat element which, in cooperation with other arms or independent thereof, conducts the air operations required for carrying out the army mission."

The Leavenworth text recognized that there would be air operations "beyond the sphere of influence of ground forces . . . in furtherance of the general strategic plan," and "operations in immediate support of the ground forces. . . ."

But to the thinkers at the Air Corps Tactical School, who were after a strategic revolution rather than a tactical revolution, this was pale stuff indeed.

Differences among school faculties were, however, differences among theories only. The real differences were in Washington, where the theories clashed as the Army was making up its mind on how to spend the limited money available for airplanes and for their research and development.

**T**he issue which finally split the Army airmen from the rest of the Army—or, more accurately, revealed the nature and depth of the already existing split—was the procurement of aircraft in the years 1935-1939.

Air Corps emphasis on bombers had by 1931