

28 January 1974

SUBJECT: Conceptual Outline, Middle East Scenario, /5 Curriculum

(6) The 82d Airborne Division in Dom Rep (1965).

16. The next period will extend the historical insights from the foregoing case studies to division implementation of the light corps order for the counteroffensive in the contingency setting. Each division's plans and orders will be evaluated in detail in pursuit of the following objectives:

- a. To determine adequacy of the scheme of maneuver by war gaming the available courses of action.
- b. To assess the adequacy of combat service support planning.
- c. To weigh the adequacy of external and internal coordination.
- d. To visualize the command, control, and communication systems to be employed.
- e. To analyze the probable effectiveness of TC&D and EW plans.
- f. To determine if USAF support has been adequately integrated into planning
- g. To test the probable impact of enemy EW.

17. The concluding period in the Middle East scenario is a continuation of the preceding period but with the focus on the brigade and battalion level. A series of cases will be developed and made available to the student which show what happened at the brigade and battalion level in all divisions of the light corps when the division orders were executed. The case study method will be employed by each work group. The goal of the period will be to critique the tactics of the brigade and battalion commanders using the tactical lessons of all preceding cases as the touchstone for evaluation, with special attention to the lessons of the Yom Kippur War.

18. ~~Instructors~~ Instructors are granted the authority to let the scenario develop ~~in each group~~ in each group to test hypotheses which may be of particular concern to that workgroup. Instructors will be required at the conclusion of the scenario to submit an after action report which incorporates significant student thinking concerning tactics, doctrine, equipment, technique, organization, etc., for use in refining the scenario for subsequent years and for introduction into Living Model discussions as appropriate.

28 January 1974

SUBJECT: Conceptual Outline, Middle East Scenario, /5 Curriculum

19. The following is a tentative assignment of responsibility for development of the material discussed above, and a schedule for accomplishment of the work involved.

A team consisting of all departing instructors (McClean, Reese, McGaw, Benson, Carlson, and Eggleston), assisted by LTC Henrionnet, will develop the contrived cases to be studied. These include the initial situation, the JTF plan, the skit material for the initial situation, the Corps plans and orders, division plans and orders, and the war stories (zoom-in cases) which picture brigade and battalion execution of the division orders. These projects should be worked on sequentially, at least initially, with the following schedule as a guide: (McClean in charge).

Completion of initial situation, skit, and JTF plans	1 Mar
Completion of Corps plans and orders	1 Apr
Completion of Division level plans and orders	1 May
Completion of Brigade, battalion scenarios	1 Jun

20. The other major challenge is the development of the historical cases, including lessons learned, which support the scenario.

a. These cases will be researched and developed by two-man teams, as follows, under the coordination of LTC Green:

Yom Kippur War	Tate & Taylor (assisted by students in special elective)
Battle of Schmidt	} Green & Welling
Dominican Republic (1965)	
XVIII Abn Corps & 82d Abn Div	
St. Vith	
XVIII Abn Corps (WWII)	
Lam Son 719	} Witcher, Pursel & Benagh
Ben Suc (1st Div Opns)	
Opn Yellowstone (RVN)	
1972 SVN Counteroffensive (+An Loc)	
IFFV	

ATSW-TA-1

SUBJECT: Conceptual Outline, Middle East Scenario, /5 Curriculum

28 January 1974

Kursk (WWII)
Kasserine
Africa Corps
Sicily (82d Abn)

} Purdy & Berg

Arbela
Crusades
Jerusalem (70 AD)
Carthage
Lawrence & Allenby

} Potter & Leach

1948 Palestine War
1967 Arab-Israeli War
1958 Lebanon Incursion

} Bragalone & Jones

b. You will find that some of these cases are possibly being developed in connection with R3120, Nature and Characteristics of Ground Combat, or perhaps by Committee Two. Let me know if this comes to your attention.

c. The goal for completion of the cases is 1 June.

d. The model for a fully developed case is "The Defense of St. Vith," prepared by The Armor School.

e. Let me know if other useful cases come to your attention.



JESS B. HENDRICKS, JR.

Colonel, Armor

Chief, Committee One

Annex E -- Documents, Lt. Gen. Talbott's Visits

Incl Title

- 1 Personal Letter from General DePuy, 19 February 1974
- 2 Selected Charts from Commandant's briefing to the Team
- 3 Trip Highlights, Command and General Staff College
3-6 June 1974
- 4 My 6 June note to General Talbott
- 5 Personal Letter from Lt. Gen. Talbott, 22 April 1975
- 6 Summary of Team Findings, Visit of April 1975
- 7 Memorandum for Record by Maj. Gen. Cushman, Subject:
Action on Lieutenant General Talbott's Letter of 22 April 1975
- 8 Personal Letter from Maj. Gen. Cushman to General DePuy,
24 July 1975

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651

EYES ONLY

19 February 1974

Dear Jack,

Our conversation on the telephone Thursday has prompted me to write this letter. I have developed some concerns which I want to get off my chest and out of my mind as they now constitute a kind of low-level background worry.

Frankly, Jack, I am concerned about the depth and the quality of work being done at Fort Leavenworth. Let me be specific. At the Commanders Conference in December you presented your concept for "Shenandoah." To put it very mildly, I was at least disappointed at the performance. There was no substance to the presentation--in fact the concept had never gotten beyond what I would call the romantic stage. It did not serve Leavenworth well. However, I chose to write it off as an aberration--a one-time mistake.

More importantly, I am concerned about the quality of work at Leavenworth on the scenarios. I do not believe that you are giving it enough of your personal attention even though the scenarios require that you perform the role of the commander. I can tell you that the commandants of the branch schools are not terribly impressed with the work on scenarios at Leavenworth. Employment of the 101st Airborne Division in the first Middle East scenario, I thought, was unimaginative. I was surprised that your people had made insufficient effort to secure maps and photographs so that operations could be related to the real terrain. In some respects the quality of work done at Fort Knox has been superior to the work done at Fort Leavenworth.

You mentioned on the phone Thursday a course in systems acquisition as an elective. Such a course is taught at the Army Management Engineering Training Agency, to some extent at ALMAC at Fort Lee and at the Industrial College in a more general fashion. Even a 40-hour course would be much too thin if it did not include a familiarization with the various procedures, techniques and formats involved including tradeoff analysis, development plans, cost effectiveness analysis, parametric cost estimates, coordinated test programs, management controls and decision-making processes. It was this discussion which triggered my writing this letter and which brings me to the next point.


I am concerned that the electives which are being offered for the next school year may fall below the acceptable quality level. I say this hoping very much that I will be proved to be wrong. However, when I think about the

difficulty in the tactical electives alone, it raises my level of concern. If they are not excellent they will be counter-productive and they will bring down on Leavenworth much opprobrium from officers throughout the Army.

Because of my concern that Leavenworth is perhaps spreading itself too thinly in respect to next year's curriculum, I am asking General Talbott to make arrangements with you to conduct a comprehensive review of your next year's elective courses sometime in May or June. General Talbott will be prepared to spend whatever time is necessary in order to complete this review and he will be reinforced as necessary with qualified experts in the various specialties represented by the electives. He will then recommend to me appropriate action reference any courses which he feels fall below the threshold of acceptability. Needless to say, we cannot conduct such courses at Leavenworth no matter what commitments may have been made to individual officers nor to the Department of the Army in connection with OPMS.

I guess I would have to sum up my concern by urging you not to extend yourself nor your staff beyond that which can be done well. You can be sure that I want you to succeed at Leavenworth. I personally selected you for the job. I want you to take this letter, which is personal and private and will be seen only by General Talbott and no other, as guidance aimed at insuring that the reputation of Fort Leavenworth for solid, thorough, professional work is not only maintained but improved. I would have preferred to discuss this with you rather than writing but I feel an urgency to it all--anyhow we can discuss it further on my next trip.

Sincerely,


W. E. DePuy
General, United States Army
Commanding

Major General John H. Cushman
Commander
USA Combined Arms Center and
Commandant, USA C&GSC
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

OPMS SPECIALTIES

- * Air Defense Artillery
- * Armor
- * Field Artillery
- * Infantry
- * Engineer
- * Combat Communications-Electronics
- * Fixed Telecommunications Systems
- * Communications-Electronics Engineering
- * Law Enforcement
 - Criminal Investigation
- * Tactical/Strategic Intelligence
- * Counterintelligence/HUMINT
- * Cryptology
- * Personnel Administration
 - Personnel Management
- * Club Management
- * Finance
 - Education
 - Atomic Energy
 - Automatic Data Processing
 - Comptroller
 - Foreign Area Officer
 - Information
 - * Basic Entry Specialties
- * Audio-Visual Instructional Technology
 - Research and Development
 - Operations Research/Systems Analysis
 - Operations and Force Development
- * Missile Materiel Management
- * Munitions Materiel Management
- * Tank/Ground Mobility Materiel Management
- * Armament Materiel Management
- * Aviation Materiel Management
- * Construction and Marine Materiel Management
- * POL Management
- * Food Management
- * General Troop Support Materiel Management
- * Communications-Electronics Materiel Management
- * Chemical
- * Highway-Rail Operations
- * Marine and Terminal Operations
- * Traffic Management
 - Maintenance Management
 - Transportation Management
 - Supply Management
 - Logistics Services Management
 - Procurement
 - Logistics Management

OUR OBJECTIVE

- Recognize, and contribute to, OPMS.
- Facilitate the student's total development during a very important year.
- Turn out a traditionally qualified CGSC graduate, regardless of OPMS specialty.

BRANCH DISTRIBUTION, /5 CLASS

AD	51	JA	9
AG	35	MC	7
AN	1	MS	21
AR	85	MI	64
CH	6	MP	25
CM	16	OD	45
DE	4	QM	44
EN	45	SC	64
FA	166	DP	1
FI	11	TC	41
IN	233	VC	2
		WC	4

Total /5 Class: 980

ARMY STUDENT EXPERIENCE, 75 CLASS

*Average
Months*

COMMAND

Platoon	596	14
Company	870	15
Battalion	57	10*

STAFF

Battalion/Battle Gp	603	12
Brigade/Gp/Rgt	419	13
Division	241	12
Corps	94	11
Army	140	18
DA	74	28
Joint	132	22
Combined	17	26

VIETNAM SERVICE

None	22
One Tour	419
Two Tours	510
Three Tours	26
Four Tours	3

*Many majors who commanded for a very brief period.

MAJOR PROGRAM SELECTION

The first step in selection of the major program is self-evaluation. Each officer should review his professional development to date and consider his interests, strengths, weaknesses, and degree of proficiency in both branch and specialty areas. He should then consider how he can best contribute to the Army. With the foregoing in mind, and setting his own professional objectives, he should then select a major program. Selection of additional courses, beyond his major program, should be based on a similar self-evaluation.

Officer Personnel Directorate (OPD) branch advisory letters pertaining to OPMS areas were mailed to most students in April 1974. These letters should be considered during program formulation. The OPD letter should not, however, be interpreted as being binding or restrictive in nature. In this respect, counsel should be sought from OPD at any time it is believed necessary. Students should not consider their CGSC major a primary determinant of future assignments.

The selection of a major determines the CGSC instructional department responsible for providing course program planning assistance. This will be accomplished through designation, by the College, of a counselor from the major proponent department for each Regular Course student.

JHCNote: The College sent out a questionnaire to each selected student, explaining the majors program and asking him to respond with his tentative selection of a major. "Expected" below indicates a preliminary estimate of replies. "Army Needs" reflects the College estimate based on discussions with Department of the Army personnel offices. "Initial" tabulates the student responses as received. "Final" is what the College will seek through the counseling process in the first weeks of the course.

MAJORS SELECTION, /5 CLASS

MAJOR	EXPECTED	ARMY NEEDS	INITIAL	FINAL
Tactics	168	350	112	387
Logistics	101	150	153	147
Staff Operations	146	100	72	90
Opns & Force Dev	72	60	161	69
Joint & Comb Opns	16	20	38	16
Management	276	200	239	169
Strategic Studies	96	50	135	56
Security Assistance/Problems of Developing Nations	<u>110</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>46</u>
	985	985	980	980

TRIP HIGHLIGHTS
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
3-6 JUNE 1974

1. No electives are directed to be eliminated.
2. Special effort by the Commandant and Assistant Commandant personally will be required on a close and continuing basis to insure that the tactics instruction--both that in the common curriculum and that contained in the electives--will meet the high standards required by CG TRADOC.
3. The enrolling and counselling system must be organized and managed to insure a truly proper distribution of the /5 students in quality as well as quantity between the various "majors." The essence of the Army's Command and General Staff College must be kept in the tactics, force development, logistics and staff operations areas. The study of Strategy, Military History, and Security Assistance is fundamentally only supportive of the above majors and the quality and quantity of students majoring in these latter areas must clearly reflect this fact.
4. Reference paragraph 3, above, the counselling and rearranging of majors that is required must be done in such a way as to elicit continuing support and approval of the students being "managed." Also, while it was quite proper to provide the framework for majors within the college catalog, and there no doubt will be special cases where individual's qualifications, or even the lack thereof, might not quite fit the catalog pattern, those doing the counselling need to understand they should not be too hidebound and, as you deem appropriate in these special cases, counsellors should seek relief for the special cases.
5. The college needs someone to become an expert in Soviet tactical doctrine and enemy situations and tactical instruction need to be checked by this expert. It is important to "keep BLUE honest." Otherwise the overall sensing of tactics given our students will tend to be erroneous. (Obviously such a Soviet tactics expert could be used in SCORES or other areas as you deem appropriate.) But real expertise needs to be attained by someone in the college and applied to the tactical situations.
6. The organization and management of the college library causes concern. It is recommended that an expert from outside the college who is knowledgeable in library science, who is qualified to counsel on the internal management and organization of a large library be obtained. In terms of support of electives, it was the judgment of our group that the college library is only marginal in the Management and ADP electives.

7. The use on a selected basis of the approach referred to as the "40+40 hour" system has some distinct advantages. This would be particularly applicable for a few selected students in areas where deeper study or research or time to produce for the college a written report of research accomplished during the first 40-hour period. In these cases a special elective can be created.
8. The use of the word "process" to define the materiel acquisition blocks of instruction is acceptable.
9. Recognizing General DePuy's strong direction that TRADOC and the Army service school system be completely supportive of the Army world-wide, that the first priority among these commands being supported needs to be USAREUR, and that USAREUR's highest priority is a completely integrated tactical doctrine for anti-armor warfare, the college needs to give unusual emphasis to its efforts in this anti-armor warfare area. In coordination with CACDA, the college, with the close and continuing personal involvement of the Commandant and the Assistant Commandant, must give this subject area its very best effort. This applies to both the anti-armor elective and to the proposed anti-armor chapter which is to become part of a field manual. With reference to the chapter, the draft chapter must be coordinated with General DePuy personally before it is sent to USAREUR for comment.
10. The involvement of the department heads in the actual teaching process is commended. It is our belief that in those departments where the head thereof was fully involved in teaching blocks of instruction, the morale of his instructors was better and the overall instruction was more finely attuned to the needs of the students.
11. The writing requirements of the college must develop the students' ability to be brief and succinct. This is not to say that there needs to be a revolution in the writing requirements, but in addition to style, grammar, punctuation, etc., etc., the ability to tell a superior in writing and in as few words as is practical what that superior needs to know about a particular subject is a critical need. There is no doubt in my mind the current writing requirements tend to encourage verbosity rather than brevity.
12. On a longer range basis, pre- and post-college training, preparation and feedback, need to be developed. A continuing thought along the line already initiated by the college along the lines of pre-attendance preparation and/or testing is worthy of considerable effort. In addition, some scientific approach providing feedback into the college on a continuing basis from relatively recent graduates needs to

be developed while the individual officer still retains sufficiently detailed memory of what he was taught in the college. His judgment as to how that college training has met his post-college professional requirements needs to be determined. The necessity for this to be scientific, sound, and on a continuing basis needs emphasis.

13. One of the most surprising aspects of the current curricula is that there is just one 2-day map maneuver in the current course. I can't help but feel that the elimination of map maneuvers is not unlike the one-time virtual elimination of outdoor training for the Infantry Officers Advanced Course (something that did in fact happen during the Vietnam war). A careful re-examination of the skills the Command and General Staff College graduate is supposed to have appears to be in order. Further, those teaching techniques, specifically here, the applicatory technique, that tend to have the most lasting benefit to the student, need to be utilized.

14. Reference the last point on teaching techniques, the lack of variety and innovation in such teaching techniques throughout the college was a particular disappointment. While no one suggests the elimination of Leavenworth's traditional platform mode of instruction, it is virtually the only one utilized despite the development over the years, and particularly recently, of many new approaches. The advantage of appropriate variety from the students' standpoint is obvious and innovation by the college in this regard is strongly encouraged.

15. If there is any area where the American Army officer needs help, it is in his ability to train. Of all of the areas emphasized by the TRADOC group, none should have greater emphasis than insuring the highest quality of training management instruction. In particular and in addition to the block within the Professional Development Course already identified for the instruction of training, training time must be inserted inside of all appropriate blocks. For example, part of the block on retrograde or on maintenance or on anti-armor warfare, etc., etc., must be specifically addressed on how might a commander best train in that particular subject. The latest and best methods (e.g., performance oriented, tactical exercise without troops, etc.) need to be exploited and the imagination of the student kindled.

6 June 78

General Talbott -

I have discussed with Ben your conclusion that the Strategic Studies and Security Assistance majors be eliminated, as majors, without change in the electives being offered in these areas.

I appreciate the reasoning behind this conclusion, but feel strongly that it should not be announced as a decision at this time.

First, I believe that we can accomplish the objectives we seek (namely, to insure that the essence of what Learmonth makes remarks tactics, logistics, staff, etc) through motivation of students, counseling, guidance, and arbitrary limits.

Second, the sections of DSTRAT which carry these majors contain some of our most gifted officers. To announce, without further discussion, that these majors are eliminated would have a most serious effect on faculty recruiting - not simply in these sections but I think throughout the College.

I am confident that we can do what you want, and would like to discuss with you "how."

I get this to you now, because you will shortly be talking with Gen DePuy.

J. H. H. H.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 22061

ATTNG-SC-C

22 APR 1975

Dear Jack,

The purpose of this letter is to provide you some of the principal findings of our group, some of which I discussed in my debrief of Ben and your staff at the conclusion of my 8-10 April 1975 visit. The inclosure should indicate those areas of principal concern. Additional findings and recommendations were identified to your staff by team members during the course of visiting the respective academic departments. Several points concerning policy and administration, however, require your own early attention, and I highlight these below.

The first concerns grades. There is clear agreement among all of the visiting group that the College has not found the solution to the proper way to grade the students. A major revision is necessary. I ask that you give this very close scrutiny, since the grading system is very important in the eyes of your students, and, in fact, too many are becoming obsessed with it. I questioned the advisability of providing grades to HQDA and asked Ben to look into this and give me a recommendation. His recent letter to Stan McClellan carried the recommendation that the grades not be forwarded. We shall act on that recommendation promptly.

At the conclusion of last year's visit, I did not direct the elimination of any electives. However, I am now convinced the College has spread itself too thinly by offering too many electives. The numerous electives not only add to scheduling difficulties and instructor loads, but also strain your quality control mechanisms to the point that some offerings are of questionable merit. (I might add they perhaps contribute to your printing plant backlog problem as well.) A substantial reduction, on the order of ten to twenty percent, will improve the quality of instruction overall. I leave to you to determine which electives to eliminate, or if appropriate, consolidate.

I understand and sympathize with your desire to move the College toward the syndicate method of instruction -- small groups, instructor led. But it is plain that having 50% or so of your curriculum in this format taxes your faculty -- especially your tactics department -- beyond the point of reasonable return. Moreover, we heard repeatedly that such a teaching

Annex E, Incl 5

strategy was often inappropriate for those topics on which few, including faculty, were well versed, e.g., EAD tactics. The perception of students is that they are "a mile wide, an inch deep." I do not believe we can afford to go all the way to a syndicate system; you probably should cut back the current work group exercises from ten to twenty-five percent.

No department has made greater progress or is trying harder than the Tactics Department. Much good work is going on and I would urge that you reinforce that success. The whole tactical area is so dynamic these days, however, and the pressure on the tactics instructors is so great, that you must take special care with this department. The grade and experience of instructors to be assigned (captains are of little use), the necessity for a better than average cut on quality of instructors, the overall workload, to include the writing of field manuals, all constitute a special challenge for the College. Above all, the College absolutely has to be the Army's prime source of expertise on tactics, especially weapons-oriented tactics, and on general staff procedures. Other subject areas, no matter how important, have to be subordinated to these two. And of these two, weapons-oriented tactics has to be number one. The quality of such expertise must be obvious to all. Therefore, no department should be supported better or receive more of the Commandant's and the Assistant Commandant's time and support. The members of this department should not be over-extended, or some of the tactics instruction will be in danger of degenerating into "the blind leading the blind."

I expressed at the College reservations about Course 3141 (Contingency Force Operations - Middle East). My concern is that the portrayal of a light corps force to the Middle East is not consistent with our HLC Middle East Scenario results. It may tend to implant in the minds of the students the erroneous judgment that this somehow is the preferred corps. As long as students are going to spend two and a half weeks on a Mid-East operation, it would seem sensible to exercise them on some variation of the recommended corps. A further example of divergence from the HLC Mid-East Study is the selection of an armored brigade as a component of the force. Your department feels it is a more effective force considering strategic deployment requirements versus fire power availability. Our HLC Mid-East Scenario came to a different conclusion and employed an armored cavalry regiment. We have stopped looking at heavy corps and light corps as such, but rather corps that are tailored for the task. I have discussed this with General DePuy and we are agreeable to leaving the course stand for this coming year, but want to see it adjusted to the Scenario version in subsequent offerings.

On behalf of the team members and myself, let me again express my appreciation for the courtesies and support provided us by you, Ben, and your staff. The completely frank and open discussions were most helpful.

I trust our visit and subsequent recommendations will prove beneficial to the College. I am prepared to help in any way that I can.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

~~ORWIN C. TALBOTT~~

1 Inclosure
As stated

ORWIN C. TALBOTT
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Commanding General

Major General John H. Cushman
Commandant
US Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

SUMMARY OF TEAM FINDINGS

1. Staff Operations: No changes. The college should examine the possibility of making the exercise in the TOC two-sided. This change would enable the entire section to participate rather than half at a time. Consideration should be given to using actual Soviet or PRC forces in map exercises. CGSC must have an officer who knows, intimately, Soviet tactics, doctrine and equipment. This officer must be a zealot who can keep the Blue tacticianers honest, so that Blue tactics don't mirror blue. This is a full time task. This officer would be chief of the Red Team, which General DePuy has directed that each school establish.
2. Management; Computer Science; Systems Management: The advanced ADP course should be deleted as an elective, if students are required to design and develop ADP applications programs. Faculty does not possess required level of ADP expertise to support such a course. Management library reference and source materials are marginal.
3. Tactics; Joint and Combined Operations: Naval History and the Role of Seapower should be combined into one 40-hour block. Otherwise, students should be restricted to one. 80 hours is considered to be a bit too much. NATO officers should not be excluded from classified nuclear tactics classes; change the classification of the tactical nuclear elective to NATO Secret.
4. Logistics: Adequate and appropriate. /4 student comments on the degree of difficulty of certain logistic courses resulted in easing the /5 courses. The Material Acquisition Management Course and the Advanced Material Acquisition Management Course should be changed to read "Process" rather than "Management."
5. Strategic Studies; Security Assistance; Political Science: The Security Assistance (SA) major duplicates much of the FAOC taught at DA. The courses, however, are very professional and the instructors appear to be well qualified; they are being taught at the proper level. The Strategic Studies (SS) and SA majors took up too much of the students' time to the detriment of tactics instruction. The majors should be eliminated, but the elective subjects should be retained; primarily offered to allied and sister service students. Only a very small group of Army officers should be allowed to take those majors.
6. Profession of Arms; Administration: Adequate and appropriate.
7. Education; History; Speech Communications and Human Relations; Curriculum Support Courses: Instructional techniques are too old fashioned. The lack of innovative classroom procedures places CGSC in a follower rather than leader role. Except for the period when the

is in residence, he is otherwise ignored. No attempt is being made to determine the level of qualification of the individual prior to attendance; he is forgotten upon graduation. The faculty utilizes few modern, advanced educational techniques; instruction is instructor centered. Evaluation and testing is inadequate and should be completely revised and updated.

ATSW

5 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Action on Lieutenant General Talbott's Letter of
22 April 1975

1. Friday morning, 2 May 1975, I discussed Lieutenant General Talbott's letter of 22 April (inclosed) with General DePuy in his office in the Pentagon.

2. My first subject was the second paragraph of Lieutenant General Talbott's letter, as to grades. I told General DePuy that I wanted to be sure that I was operating with a correct understanding of what he wanted. He read Brigadier General Harrison's 18 April memorandum to the faculty (Inclosure 2). He asked what Lieutenant General Talbott's letter meant about forwarding grades to the Department of the Army. I explained what we had done and why, and he understood. I went through the same series of charts that I used with the students in my Symposium remarks on 30 April (Inclosures 3 through 7). I showed him part 14 of the academic report form, and the description of "superior" from Army Regulation 623-1. I showed him the distribution of Section 14 grades for last year's class; he took note of the "superior" percentage figures and understood my point. I said that the students did not like to be told they were not superior, that Lieutenant General Talbott had received his impressions primarily from talking to students, and that he was sympathetic to them. I told General DePuy my policy for the grading system and that I was going to hold to it but that I wanted to be sure that I would be supported by TRADOC. We discussed how the departments would administer 31-35 percent "A's," and whether any one section of more than the usual number of gifted students might not get a good deal more than 35 percent, with the department making up for it in other sections which got less. I said that was the concept of the grading system and a matter for departments to administer, but on the whole, the average would be

ATSW

5 May 1975

Subject: Action on Lieutenant General Talbott's Letter of
22 April 1975

about a third "superior" or "A" for this year. He got the picture. He told me to go ahead and I would have no difficulty with him on the matter of grades. He will support me, I am certain, and therefore we will not concern ourselves further with Lieutenant General Talbott's statement that a "major revision is necessary." We will use the same grading policy next year, except that we may drop it to 26-30 percent "A's."

3. I then took up electives. General DePuy asked whether we had too many. I told him that I did not know. I said I was fairly sure we needed to reduce the number of electives in Tactics. I said that this year there had been a complete rewrite of our Tactics instruction and a number of electives didn't work out as we had hoped. I told him that, notwithstanding this, the Tactics instruction this year had been far superior to last year, and that we had finally gotten the College into the real world in comparison to the Alice in Wonderland tactics of previous years. I said that next year's Tactics instruction would be of surpassing excellence, but that we would probably have fewer tactics electives. On the other hand, I said that the total number of electives in the College might be about the same as this year. I said I objected to any requirement to make a particular percentage cut as stated in Lieutenant General Talbott's letter. I said I would require each department to analyze its own situation, see what was needed to do a good job within resources, and then we'd see how many electives that amounted to. He said that was all right with him, do it that way. So we will.

4. I then spoke about the percent of instruction spent in work groups, and we had the same kind of discussion. I commented that Lieutenant General Talbott's letter recommended a cut in work group exercises of 10 to 25 percent. I said I objected to that kind of guidance, that I would rather analyze our own problems and see how it came out, rather than decide in advance on a specific percent cut in work groups. I said I was satisfied with the present rough percentage, and that I thought we knew what we were doing.

ATSW

5 May 1975

Subject: Action on Lieutenant General Talbott's Letter of
22 April 1975

5. I told General DePuy that I preferred not to answer Lieutenant General Talbott's letter. I said that last year I had answered it, and he had then answered me back, and I had decided not to continue the correspondence. I said that I would consider the letter as a useful and important TRADOC document, but that I did not want to be bound by it. General DePuy said that was all right with him and that I would have no problem with the Commander, TRADOC.

6. The net result is that we go ahead and do our best job to run the College and will not consider Lieutenant General Talbott's letter binding. We will certainly not discuss my conversation with General DePuy further with anyone except the DRI, DER, and department directors. They will keep this memo completely to themselves, no further discussion of it with anyone. We will retain the best of working relationships with Lieutenant General Talbott and the TRADOC people who come to see us. There will be no hint of a confrontation. We will simply do our job as best we know how and let the grading system, numbers of electives, and percentage of effort in work groups come out of that. I therefore want to show Lieutenant General Talbott's letter and this memorandum to each department director, the DER and the DRI, but to make no copies or further distribution outside my office, except one copy to the Deputy Commandant.

Incls

J. H. CUSHMAN
Major General, USA
Commandant

24 July 1975

General W. E. DePuy
Commander
USA Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651

PERSONAL

Dear General DePuy:

General Talbott visited Leavenworth today for our contract signing, and then spent an additional two hours being briefed on the College curriculum. He had requested that we inform him as to the action taken by us in response to his visit in April. We therefore dealt with the grade system, the electives, and the amount of instructor-led small group activity. In the latter two - electives and small group work - General Talbott had established some percentage goals for reduction.

We satisfied him, I think, on our approach to grades. As to electives, we had reduced tactics electives considerably, kept logistics electives unchanged in number, and increased in other departments for a net increase overall. As to instructor-led small group work, we cut both tactics and logistics; other courses either stayed the same or increased, with a net "no change" overall.

I explained to General Talbott that we understood his guidance and the logic behind it. I said that I believed that, notwithstanding the statistics, which of themselves do not tell the full story, we have accomplished his intent and have organized the most effective instruction toward mission accomplishment, carefully considering the resources. In other words, we are not spread too thin and are teaching only what needs to be taught, using the most effective methods possible.

Frankly, I don't believe that General Talbott sees it that way. Rather he may well see it that we have not followed guidance. If so, I very much regret that this is his perception. Leavenworth is determined

to follow TRADOC guidance, and we are determined to use the means available to us in the most effective way toward achieving the mission in accordance with the TRADOC intent.

I concluded the briefing by summarizing the ways in which the Leavenworth curriculum would be better in the 1975-76 school year. As I mentioned to you in your last visit, I visualize a highly successful year which builds on the progress made last year and improves over last year in every aspect. We have worked hard, and I believe well, to do so. I hope that by visiting often and making your own objective assessments, you and the TRADOC staff will, over the next year, conclude this is the case.

General Talbott also expressed doubts as to whether we are properly following your guidance as to emphasizing the battalion and brigade level of tactics instruction. I am convinced that we are, and will be ready to brief you on this and any other part of the curriculum when you visit in September.

On other subjects - Major General Cooper will visit us on 1 August and we will brief him on SCORES, Defensive Tactics, Command and Control, and other subjects relative to Europe. Also, Tuesday, 29 July, on the way to Fort Benning for a leadership conference, I will visit the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell and will brief our curriculum. Specifically, I will describe our integrated tactics instructional scenarios (Middle East and Europe) with the idea that the Air Staff College and we can both make use of the same tactical scenario to our mutual benefit.

Sincerely,

J. H. CUSHMAN
Major General, USA
Commanding

THE ESSENCE OF TACTICS IS THAT THERE IS ON THE SMALL SCALE TERRAIN OF THE BATTLE, A LIFE AND DEATH CONTEST BETWEEN TWO SIDES, EACH DETERMINED WITH DEADLY WEAPONS TO DESTROY OR OVERCOME THE OTHER.

NOW THIS STRUGGLE IS FOR OBJECTIVES OR PURPOSES WHICH ARE ESTABLISHED IN A LARGER SCHEME. BUT, LET US PUT ASIDE FOR NOW THE QUESTION OF THAT LARGER SCHEME. LET US DEAL WITH WHAT HAPPENS ON THAT FAIRLY SMALL FIELD OF BATTLE AS THE BRIGADE, OR BATTALION, OR SMALLER UNIT GOES ABOUT ITS TASK WITHIN THAT SCHEME.

WE MUST ABOVE ALL GRASP THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TERRAIN. TERRAIN IS ENDLESSLY VARIABLE. EVEN ON THE FLATTEST AND MOST MONOTONOUS GROUND - THE STEPPES, OR ARCTIC WASTES, OR THE DESERT, THERE IS SOME VARIATION - ROADS OR TRACKS, HABITATIONS, SOME KIND OF PLACES WHERE THERE ARE OBSTACLES OR AIDS TO MOVEMENT. IN MOST OF THE WORLD WHERE OUR FORCES

MIGHT FIGHT, THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF VEGETATION,
AND RELIEF, AND ROUTES, AND PLACES WHERE PEOPLE LIVE.
AND IT'S ALL DIFFERENT.

TERRAIN IS WHERE THE SOLDIER LIVES AND OPERATES.
THE TERRAIN IS THE SOLDIER'S BEST FRIEND. IF HE USES
IT WELL, IT WILL PROTECT HIM. IT ALSO LIES THERE
LIKE A BOOK TO BE READ. THE TACTICIAN WHO KNOWS HOW
TO READ IT - HOW TO USE IT TO HIS OWN ADVANTAGE AND
THE ENEMY'S DISADVANTAGE - WILL LIVE LONGER. HIS
UNIT WILL GET THE JOB DONE WITH FEWER CASUALTIES.

SO MUCH FOR TERRAIN.

THE COMBAT TAKES PLACE WITH DEADLY WEAPONS,
SO THE NATURE OF THE WEAPONS EXERCISES A DECISIVE
INFLUENCE ON THE TACTICS.

A LITTLE MORE THAN TWENTY YEARS AGO, WHEN I
WAS STATIONED IN GERMANY, I TOOK ABOUT TEN DAYS' LEAVE
AND MADE A TRIP IN MY CAR AROUND SOME BATTLEFIELDS

THAT I HAD BEEN READING ABOUT - IN GERMANY, BELGIUM, AND NORTHERN FRANCE.

NEAR A BELGIAN VILLAGE, I FOUND THE PARTICULAR LOCATION OF A ROMAN FORTIFIED POSITION. A BELGIAN PRIEST CONFIRMED THAT, YES, THAT WAS WHERE EVERYONE AGREED THAT BACK IN CAESAR'S TIME, THE ROMANS HAD BUILT THEIR POSITION. THE WALLS HAD BEEN FOUND.

THE POSITION WAS BEAUTIFULLY PLACED ON A HILL NEAR WHERE TWO NATURAL ROUTES CAME TOGETHER - IDEALLY LOCATED TO DOMINATE AND CONTROL THESE ROUTES.

NEARBY, NO MORE THAN 800 METERS AWAY, WERE THE TOPS OF OTHER HILLS WHICH ROSE WELL ABOVE THAT FORTIFIED SITE, AND WHICH INDEED COMMANDED IT.

I CITE THIS EXPERIENCE BECAUSE I REMEMBER WELL HOW THE SIMPLE IDEA THAT WEAPONS DETERMINE TACTICS CAME TO ME WITH GREAT CLARITY AT THAT TIME. THE ROMANS DID NOT FEAR THAT ADJACENT HIGH GROUND.

THEIR ENEMY HAD NO WEAPONS THAT COULD MAKE USE OF IT.

HOW DIFFERENT TODAY. IN YOUR INSTRUCTION SOON BY THE DEPARTMENT OF TACTICS, YOU WILL HEAR OF THE LESSONS OF THE 1973 MIDEAST WAR.

THE LETHAL, ACCURATE, LONG-RANGE TANK CANNON OF TODAY HAS CHANGED THE NATURE OF WAR.

TERRAIN, WEAPONS, AND NOW "MEN."

THERE ARE MEN IN THIS EQUATION, ON BOTH SIDES - ORGANIZED INTO UNITS, MANNING WEAPONS, MOVING - STATIONARY, ACTING TOWARD THEIR PURPOSE ACCORDING TO SOME SCHEME OF CONTROL.

I WILL SPEAK NO FURTHER OF THE MANY SUBJECTS THAT ARISE BECAUSE WE ARE DEALING WITH MEN - MATTERS LIKE DISCIPLINE, TRAINING, SUPERVISION, MOTIVATION, INTELLIGENCE, THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, AND SO ON.

BUT HOW DO WE DECIDE WHAT TACTICS TO USE IN BATTLE?

THERE IS NO SECRET FORMULA.

LET US SAY THIS: THAT THE TACTICIAN WHO UNDERSTANDS THE REALITIES OF THE BATTLEFIELD'S WEAPONS AND UNITS, AND TERRAIN, WHO HAS THE INSIGHT TO VISUALIZE THE OUTCOMES OF THE POSSIBLE INTERACTIONS OF THE FORCES, WHO CAN PUT TOGETHER THE MEANS, WHO CAN MAKE SIMPLE DECISIONS THAT GIVE THE HIGHEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS, WHO HAS THE ABILITY TO READ THE BATTLE AND ADAPT IN EXECUTION, AND AT THE SAME TIME THE IRON WILL NEEDED TO CARRY THROUGH HIS DESIGN, AND WHO HAS THE BURNING DESIRE TO SUCCEED IN HIS MISSION AT THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM COST IN LIVES AND WOUNDS TO HIS MEN - THAT THAT TACTICIAN WILL MOST USUALLY SUCCEED.

WAR IS A MATTER OF CHANCE, SO LUCK HAS ITS CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE.

TELL ABOUT "GRANT'S MULES."

BUT THE GOOD TACTICIAN MAKES HIS OWN LUCK.

HEL BUT HOW DOES THE TACTICIAN KNOW WHAT TO DO?
I ONLY WISH THERE WERE SOME GOOD SET OF RULES TO
GIVE YOU.

AT BUT THERE IS ENDLESS VARIATION IN SITUATIONS.
NO TWO ARE ALIKE. SO THERE CAN BE NO TEMPLATE TO
PLACE OVER THE PROBLEM, THAT REVEALS THE SOLUTION.

S YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE TO LEARN THE INSIGHTS
ALL BY YOURSELF.

MEMORIZING THE RANGES OF WEAPONS, AND MASTERY
OF OTHER SUCH DETAILS IS VITAL.

READING WILL HELP YOU.

THINKING, AND PONDERING ABOUT IT WILL HELP.

PRACTICE IS NECESSARY - PRACTICING, OUT ON
THE GROUND WITHOUT TROOPS, OR WITH TROOPS.

LISTENING - HAVING OTHERS CRITIQUE YOUR
TACTICS - EXCHANGING VIEWS WITH OTHERS - THIS HELPS.

OPEN-MINDEDNESS - A WILLINGNESS TO LEARN,
AND OBSERVE.

LET ME OPEN THE DOOR A CRACK AND TELL YOU WHAT
I HAVE FOUND TO BE USEFUL TO THINK ABOUT.

-- MAXIMIZE YOUR ADVANTAGES AGAINST THE ENEMY'S
DISADVANTAGES.

-- COUNTER HIS ADVANTAGES - NEUTRALIZE OR
HOBBLE THEM. TAKE THE NIGHT AWAY FROM THE VC, FOR
EXAMPLE.

-- MAKE HIM DO IT YOUR WAY.

-- MAKE YOUR UNIT WORK WITH MUTUAL SUPPORT.
BRING EVERYTHING TO BEAR ON THE ENEMY. THE OVER-
WATCHING TACTICS YOU WILL HEAR ABOUT HAVE THIS
CHARACTERISTIC. SO DOES THE FRONTAL PARAPET TYPE
OF DEFENSIVE POSITION.

-- WATCH YOUR SECURITY, YOUR PROTECTION -
BE ON GUARD.

-- BUT DON'T PARALYZE YOUR MOVEMENT TO GAIN
SECURITY.

-- DON'T TAKE ANYTHING FOR GRANTED.

-- CAMOUFLAGE TODAY IS CRITICAL TO SURVIVAL.

LEARN FROM OTHERS - I HAVE LEARNED FROM:

-- SAM CARTER, MAJOR, INFANTRY, PASSED OVER
FOR LIEUTENANT COLONEL - MY FIRST INFANTRY BATTALION
COMMANDER. I WAS HIS S3 ON MY FIRST INFANTRY
ASSIGNMENT, IN GERMANY IN 1952. HE HAD BEEN A
COMPANY OFFICER IN THE 1ST BATTALION, 18TH INFANTRY -
THROUGH NORTH AFRICA, SICILY, AND WESTERN EUROPE,
AND HE KNEW TERRAIN AND WEAPONS LIKE A BOOK.

-- B.H. LIDDELL HART, AUTHOR, INFANTRY CAPTAIN
IN WORLD WAR I, CRITIC, COMMENTATOR, BRILLIANT YET
SIMPLE, AND EXTRAORDINARILY STIMULATING.

-- WILLIAM E. DE PUY, I LEARNED FROM HIM WHEN HE WAS A LIEUTENANT COLONEL AND COLONEL. AND I'M STILL LEARNING.

-- HAMILTON H. HOWZE, WHEN HE WAS ADC OF THE 2D ARMORED DIVISION. GEORGE C. MARSHALL - IN INFANTRY IN BATTLE.

-- BOB VON SCHLEMMER, CLYDE TATE, BARRY SOTTAK, AND OTHERS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF TACTICS.

THEY WILL GIVE YOU YOUR TACTICS COMMON CURRICULUM AND ITS ELECTIVES.

WHAT WE WANT IN THE COMMON TACTICS CURRICULUM AND IN ALL TACTICS ELECTIVES IS -

-- A GROUNDING IN THE BASICS AND A STIMULATING, EXCITING SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE.

-- IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT TACTICS AND TRAINING IN TACTICS IS ALL ABOUT.

THIS IS YOUR COMMON TACTICS CURRICULUM.

(VG ON)

DESCRIBE.

THIS IS HOW 3121 IS ORGANIZED.

(VG ON)

EXPLAIN.

THIS IS THE TACTICS MAJOR.

(VG ON)

I PROMISE YOU IT WILL FASCINATE YOU, WHETHER
YOU TAKE A MAJOR OR ONLY A FEW ELECTIVES.

AND THAT'S THE END OF MY INTRODUCTION TO TACTICS.

①

Role of CAC -

briefing class
for Gen Deputy
at AUSA, Sheraton Hotel

"User" (TOS - TAP)

Represent Corps & Div Cdr

Responsible for Staff Doctrine

Integrating function - incl Log & Admin ✓

② Nature of the Computer - Powerful, rapid
fantastic memory - does only what it's told

③ Nature of C + C in Land combat

Chain of Command

Uncertainties

Judgement

Precision is

desirable, is sometimes

inherent, sometimes a variable, so

④ Interoperability Chart - (Army Only)
of central
systems costs (flip on)

⑤ Interoperability (Joint)
Chart - GATO, etc (cost flip on)

⑥ Relation to Commo Systems -
(TOS Chart?)

TRITA
etc

⑨ Lead Time Considerations

Hardware

Software

DA/OSD products

- ⑩ "Cultural" problems - unfamiliarity - complexity
hesitancy - unhappy experiences -
suspicion - overzealous salesmen -
Result - very little out the end of the pipe

Issues

①

"Large central" vs "mini" computers

"Near real time" vs "hierarchical review"

"Data links (computer to computer)" vs
"hierarchical (TDC to TDC) command"

"Digital input at source" vs "at of center"

"Large system" vs "incremental approach"

Time - "wait for big system," or
"get something into the field."

- (12) CGSC approach to instruction -
- (A) Singer Librarian } "Solo" } in 15
"Pilot" }
etc
 - (B) Gun Dynamics
 - Set up TOC DEVLOS
- (C) [Work on FAE TOS TAP # 2
" " New 101-5 A → B]

Designed to get College faculty +
Students in a "hands on" mode -
comfortable + familiar w/ ADP -

- (13) CAC approach to Combat Developments -
- (A) Embrace ADP
 - (E) Keep options open, get (F)
 - (B) Keep in touch w/ everybody -
Schools
Troops
Developers
ARTAPS linkage Services
Logistics applic
Personnel applic
CSC
 - (C) Involve CAC + troops in software (101-5)
 - (D) Get CSC element at L'wath
 - (E) Get something to troops ASAP

- (7) Gen O Review 9-10 Aug - Decisions
TOS² is Test Bed - not Re
Seek alternatives
Milestones are guides only
Go from A → B, then B → C
Go slow - it is costly
"Hands on" testing
-

- (8) Momentum of Corporate ^{and Large System} Identification -
Lack of Alternatives & ties
you down. History is ^{sometimes} "written
in advance." Clarity of vision is hard to achieve.
Mistakes made
early are costly. Both hardware
& software decisions are ^{often} binding, as
Deployment takes time.
(So "History" slips a little)

32
A
(a) Tentative Outline ROL, from all
of this -

Criteria of the ROL -

- General purpose
(military) ADP
- Incremental application
 - ~~Real time data link~~
 - Hierarchical review (TOC to TOC)
 - Early incremental availability to troops
 - Let real time data ^{LS displays,} units, & low level digital input systems be fitted in later - keep options open
 - Orint + instructate schols through CAI + troops in software, as we go.
 - Cost / effective step by step.

Annex H --Symposia on Officer Responsibility

These are a few representative documents from the first
Symposium on Officer Responsibility, March-April 1974

<u>Incl</u>	<u>Title</u>
-------------	--------------

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1 | The Third Commandant's Requirement, November 1973 |
| 2 | Four typical "cases" addressed in the Symposium |
| 3 | Commandant's Opening Remarks to Invited Participants |
| 4 | List of Invited Participants |
| 5 | Major General Morris J. Brady's Impressions of the
Symposium |

THE COMMANDANT'S REQUIREMENT

... a call for reflective military thought, and for action through expression

The first Commandant's Requirement was concerned with the problem of innovation, especially as applied to the military. A prevalent theme of the responses was the need for institutions to create an environment in which thought and new ideas are encouraged. The College is endeavoring to create such an environment.

The second Commandant's Requirement dealt with the problem of attracting volunteers for the Infantry. The responses to this requirement included many constructive proposals for improving the Army in the eyes of the prospective soldier and for improving the recruiting effort.


Responses to both requirements, and especially to CR 74-2, included a number of comments on very fundamental matters of the Army today. These spoke of the need for reforms in attitudes and methods of operation. Sample comments are:

"... it is my intent to identify what I perceive to be a very real problem in the Army today; i.e., the tendency to try to make every endeavor appear successful regardless of the true facts. I believe this is done primarily to please the commander and because of a fear of failure."

"A young man today wants to be part of an Army that he can rely on, that he has faith in and that he can trust. He is open, involved, curious and suspicious. He is not afraid to say why. We have got to be ready with the answers. We must start telling the truth. Honesty and integrity seem to be slipping through the cracks. We are an Army preoccupied with the system of equality and fair play in PIO releases, but not in practice."

This third Commandant's Requirement, I believe, is relevant to this problem. Inasmuch as it affects each officer, and is so fundamental, I am asking each U.S. student and faculty member to answer the requirement. Allied officers may participate if they desire.

Responses to the requirement are to be turned in to section leaders or department directors not later than 0800, Monday, 19 November 1973.


J. H. CUSHMAN
Major General, USA
Commandant

D

SITUATION I

You have been for six months a battalion commander in a stateside division, in a routine peacetime/garrison/training situation. You consider that your performance has been reasonably good in the job, but you would like to do better.

There has been an increase recently in AWOL's in the division, including in your battalion. A very strong "counter-AWOL campaign" is under way, divisionwide. Unit statistics on AWOL's are being maintained at division, and are reviewed daily by the chain of command.

One of the statistics being kept is "new Morning Report AWOL's per battalion." The division commander has recently stated that he will require a personal explanation in his office from any battalion commander whose command has more than "X" (exact number is not germane to this requirement) new Morning Report AWOL's in any one month. Two or three of your fellow battalion commanders have been through this experience in the past few days, and they report that it is not pleasant.

It is now the 23d of the month. Your companies have reported a total of "X minus one" new M/R AWOL's, and none in the last six days. Your S-1 is keeping track of the AWOL situation daily, and your company commanders know the statistics. At the weekly commanders' meeting two days ago, you again came down hard on AWOL prevention, as you were directed to do by your own commander, and you let your commanders know you are shooting for "X or less" this month.

It is now 0915. Your executive officer has just come in and reported, essentially as follows:

"Sir, we have an interesting situation in headquarters company. As you know, they had two men who were on leave (their last day of leave being the day before yesterday) who failed to return at yesterday's morning or afternoon formations. This morning, these men were not back yet and were both picked up on the morning report as 'Leave to AWOL.' The company morning report was turned in a few minutes ago to the battalion PSNCO.

"The PSNCO then noticed a mistake in the headquarters company morning report (the numbers didn't reconcile or something, nothing to do with those AWOL's, however) and he returned it to the company commander for a routine correction. It is due back here at 1000 hours.

"Through the grapevine, the S-1 has learned that these two missing men have now showed up, returning to the unit area this morning just after the morning formation. They are now out with the unit in training, present for duty.

"Naturally, we are wondering what Captain _____, commander of headquarters company, is going to do with his morning report in view of the fact that these men returned this morning."

REQUIREMENT: (Place your answers on the answer sheet, App 1.)

1. How do you think a typical company commander in today's Army would probably deal with this matter, inasmuch as he now has another opportunity to submit his morning report? Limit your answer to 25 words or less.

2. If you were the battalion commander, what would you expect your headquarters company commander to do? Limit your answer to 25 words or less.

(If you consider that you need more information for either or both the above, describe the additional information you need, and why.)

SITUATION II

You are the Chief of Staff of a stateside command in a typical peacetime/garrison/training situation. Your commander is Major General "X." He is regarded as an able commander.

You noted a few weeks ago that the civilian chief of the Training Aids Division had been in to visit General "X" three times or so. It somehow came to your attention that General "X" who is also a hobbyist, had been showing the training aids chief the workings of a music box that he was interested in restoring and putting into a case.

In a later visit to the Training Aids Shop you noticed that an employee in the shop was working on a case, evidently for a music box.

General "X" has received PCS orders. At a recent dinner party you attended in his quarters he pointed out, on a living room table and with evident pleasure in its workmanship, a renovated music box. The case of this music box you clearly recognized as the identical one you had seen earlier in the Training Aids Shop.

It is also evident, from the dinner party conversation, that when the packers come to General "X's" quarters the following week this music box will be moved with General "X's" household goods to his next station. You do not think that others present know the source of the music box case.

You are satisfied that the work on the music box was not paid for by General "X" and was done on government time.

REQUIREMENT: (Place your response on the answer sheet, App 2.)

What do you do, if anything? Explain (no more than 100 words) your reasons for action (or inaction). If you decide on action, state in a few words or a few short paragraphs specifically how you would proceed.

CASES

Case 1, "Ammunition Report," is a relatively simple situation in which the company commander has to decide whether he should correct a previous report which he has now determined was incorrect. Case 2, ✓ "Destruction Certificate," presents a personal dilemma. Case 3, "Suitcase Claim," sets up decisions as to whether another officer's honesty should be questioned, and how. In Cases 4 through 7, "Service Position," "War College Thesis," "Low Cost Booze," and "Senior Parachutist" -- there enters the matter of a more senior person who is directly affected and who obviously affects the officer concerned.

The next two -- "Boots in Trees" and "Prime Training Time" are about training and leadership at the brigade and battalion level. Here the question may be more a matter of accuracy (which may mean "honesty") of perception, than of ethics. Case 10, "Bunker Line," raises matters of the responsibility of an officer to his men and mission in combat.

Case 11, "How to Pass the TPI," illustrates what many officers consider to be a commander's typical response to the "can do," pressure-intensive, environment in today's units. "Free Haircuts," Case 12, raises questions of integrity, but also of standards. The next three cases, "Ammo Boxes," "Province Senior Advisor," and "Cobra Strike," all ✓ have to do with examples from combat or advisory duty.

Case 16 is about a ✓ "Weapon System in Trouble"; it sets up a dilemma as to how an officer who is technically competent should answer controversial questions about the weapon. Finally, Case 17, "Lieutenant Fredericks," tells the story of a new Second Lieutenant and his first impressions of the Army based on incidents of his initial weeks of troop duty.

Some of these cases are invented. Others are taken from actual situations, but modified so as to keep from revealing the unit or individuals involved. The latter may also be modified as to the circumstances, so as to raise a slightly different lesson or dilemma. Each case, however, is considered by the student-faculty groups who worked on this list of cases as "true to life."

Each case should be read by all students before the symposium starts. Since time may not permit discussion of all cases, each work group has been asked to discuss certain specific cases; but all cases will eventually be discussed or referred to during other sessions of the symposium.