

Fort Leavenworth -- A Memoir

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September, 2001

Volume II

COMMANDANT'S WELCOME TO REGULAR CLASS

15 August 1973

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome the 1973-74 class, and at the same time to greet the faculty, both instructional and combat developments, whom I have not yet met.

Although I have just arrived here, along with the class, reported in only Monday, moved in yesterday, and have still not located all my socks - nevertheless, welcome! I wish for you an exuberant year. All of us -- the administration of this post, the instructional faculty, and the combat developments organization -- intend to do our part to make it so.

I have many friends in this class, among whom are those officers who came here with me from the 101st Airborne Division. I hope to see all my friends soon and to make many new ones among the student body.

I especially welcome the officers of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, and the officers from the 49 nations here this morning, who will study with us this year.

Let me name for you those 49 nations: Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Ghana, Great Britain, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Khmer Republic, Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. India and the Philippines will be added, as students from these countries join you in a few days.

And I might say, by the way, that if you United States students do not know enough about each of these countries to write two or three meaningful paragraphs of information on them, I suggest that you correct that deficiency, because I believe that to be a requirement of an educated Army officer.

The administration of the post, the Class Director, and everyone who has been in contact with this group of students have told me very genuinely that they are most pleased with the way in which you have come onto the post and settled in, and they predict that this is going to be a fine class. I am delighted to hear that.

With you students in the auditorium this morning are also the instructional faculty of our College, key members of the center staff, and the officers who work in what we call combat developments -- the Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity. This research institute, which has been ably commanded since April by my longtime associate, my classmate, and my friend, Major General Dennis P. McAuliffe, has recently been merged with the College into the Combined Arms Center, which is the new title of my command. General McAuliffe, his Deputy, Brigadier General Edward F. Gudgel, and the officers of the

Annex A

Welcoming Address

Combined Arms Developments Activity, or CACDA, will provide an integral part of your student experience this year. I, therefore, intend to call them the combat developments faculty.

What I am about to say to you this morning is for everyone -- the instructional faculty, the combat developments faculty, and the students. Because these three groups must be, and are, interdependent; each one needs the other two. And further, each of us is part student, part teacher, and part idea man for the future. In the next year, each of us, in every group, will contribute to a common effort.

What is that common effort?

I say that we can call it "controlled adaptation," to meet the challenge of our times.

Out in the La Brea tar pits, near Los Angeles, was uncovered the remains of a magnificent and fearsome animal, the saber-tooth tiger. Thousands of years ago he was King of the Beasts. He is now extinct. Why? Because he failed to adapt! He was a classic example of overspecialization. This saber-tooth tiger preyed on the mastodon, to which his long saber-like fangs were adapted. The mastodon disappeared; the tiger was vulnerable to smaller animals, and he, too, disappeared.

Now an Army is a living thing, and the US Army is no exception. Like all living things, it obeys one of the fundamental laws of nature -- the law of survival of the fittest. Our Army is confronted with the problem faced by living things since the dawn of time -- the problem of evolution, of adapting itself to changing conditions. At stake here is not simply the survival of our Army but the security of our country, the reason our Army exists.

The requirement, therefore, is adaptation. Controlled, intelligent adaptation.

To what purpose? My answer is: "So that our Army will be ready when called upon."

Readiness is why we serve. It is the greatest of our responsibilities. The duty of all of us in the next year is to see to it that in our spheres of individual and collective responsibility nothing is left undone that will make our Army as ready, a year from now and beyond, as the resources provided it will permit.

"Aren't we ready right now?"

My answer would be that without question we -- the Army -- are not now as ready as the resources provided to us permit. It would be most unusual in the history of human endeavor if we were. We are a human institution. We have our failings.

"What do we need to do, then?" And to this, my answer is that I do not know exactly what needs to be done. But together we are going to find out. Then we will do our utmost, within our Leavenworth sphere of responsibility, to help bring about the necessary action.

We will do so with all the brains we can muster and with a consuming sense of the urgency and the importance of this responsibility.

So let this be our collective mission: to get ahead, so that we will be ready -- to get ahead of the power curve, as the saying goes, so that we will be ready as an institution -- the United States Army.

And so that each of the parts of the Army that we have anything to do with will be ready. And ready as individuals. And with a sense of urgency. Because things are moving fast, and time is always short. And because our particular responsibility puts us at the heart of the Army, in a position of immense potential to do good.

Now what does it take "to get ahead -- to be ready?"

First, it takes a perception of where we are, and where we want to be.

Imagine two points. Point "A" is where we are. Point "B" is where we want to be.

Controlled adaptation is the systematic program that moves us from point "A" to point "B" and it applies to anything. I will give you one example, the radios, the nets, and the signal operating procedures in a maneuver battalion. "A" is where we are now, with a certain family of radios and a certain method of operation. Does "A" measure up? Does it measure up to the requirements of today and tomorrow?

"B" is where we want to be at some early time. Now what does "B" look like? What criteria should we measure it against?

For example, what should we have in the battalion, for the battalion to company, or company to platoon radio nets? Should we have built-in voice cipher equipment? What would it cost? Is it worth it? Is there another way to achieve acceptable communication security?

The radios and nets and operating procedures in a maneuver battalion is just one example. There are countless others -- in maintenance, in organization, in logistics and on and on.

I believe that out there in the student body there are captains and majors and lieutenant colonels just in from the field with useful ideas on these matters. We intend to put your minds to work vigorously on the current Army problems that are pressing us for solutions -- so that the Army as a whole can move from "A" to "B".

We want to hear what you have to say. I am a great believer in listening to captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels. They always have something useful to say, whether you buy the idea or not. But you have to come forward with your views. Stand your ground if you are rebuffed. And if the decision does not go your way, go back, rethink your idea, and come back again if you think it is justified.

That reminds me of a story. A lot of you might know John Vann, advisor extraordinary, who was killed last year in Vietnam. He once told me a story that is relevant to this business of younger officers speaking their minds.

At the time of the story he was telling me about, he was working as a captain in the logistics field in Europe -- in the headquarters there -- for a brigadier general. In his typical way, always bringing up ideas on how they could straighten out the whole thing, how they could improve, not just in his area but a lot of different areas that he had knowledge of, he was continuously badgering his boss. One day his boss said, "Vann, I want to tell you that I am tired of your coming up with how to do everything that is my responsibility and the USAREUR Commander's responsibility. You just concentrate on your job for a change."

And John said, "Well, General, I bet that's not how you got to be a general."

And the General said, "Yes, but that's how I got to be a major."

Well, John stood his ground, as most of you know who had worked with him. But be prepared for that kind of rebuff. I mean, that's the way the world works.

Now, as I mentioned, there are many examples of moving elements of the Army from "A" to "B". And the same idea applies to the Army as a whole, to the complex mechanism we know as "The Army in the field" or, more all-embracing, "The Army".

Now if, as an institution, we are not to drift, if we are to have an orderly conception of where we are, what we are to become and how to get there, somebody has to figure out for the Army as a whole, what is "A" and what is "B" and how to get from "A" to "B".

This has to be a very realistic, hard-headed calculation, based on facts and careful judgment and considering the real benefits to be derived.

Leavenworth has a part to play in that calculation. By "Leavenworth" I mean everyone here -- the instructional faculty, the combat developments faculty, and the students.

I have left something out of this particular equation, "A" to "B". What I have left out is talent.

Talent -- defined as both perspiration and inspiration.

Talent -- educated, trained, motivated, retained and working in the right places.

Leavenworth's job is to produce educated, trained, and motivated talent that the Army can put in the right places and use.

You of this class are the talent that will go out into the Army next summer. I trust and expect that you will depart here eager, motivated, personally proud of your lot, satisfied with your purpose in life and your prospects, and above all, prepared - "ready."

At that time the task will be to move the Army from "B" (well, "B-prime", because we're not going to hit "B" exactly) to "C" -- and to "D" and "E" and beyond. You will be needed. It will take then, as it does now, a special, enlightened effort, not a "ho-hum" or routine, not a time-serving or ticket-punching, effort, but superlative work by everyone. You included.

Our Leavenworth mission has been, for years, to prepare you for command and general staff positions at division and higher echelons of the Army. We will do that. You can count on it.

At the same time, we recognize that of the US officers, few, if any, will serve as principal general staff officers in their next assignment -- and none will likely command a division soon.

But, in assignments as staff officers, you will be required to put yourself in the shoes of a senior commander. Just as, for example, a Leavenworth-educated major in 1965, assigned after graduation to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, found himself the land warfare expert working with Navy and Air Force officers preparing the theater campaign plan. (That graduate, incidentally, is our Deputy Commandant, BG Harrison.) This type of experience is not at all uncommon.

It is the general staff officer's task to look at his subject or area of responsibility from the commander's point of view, to approach it as the commander would, if he had only that subject to consider. So it is, therefore, not inappropriate for you to be cast in the role of the commander or principal general staff officer of a division, corps, or higher command.

Last year's Leavenworth graduates are already out in the Army -- helping to move it from "A" to "B". Next year the Army will be waiting for you. We aim to use your year well to prepare you.

Last month, some 1973 graduates had just reported in from Leavenworth to the 101st Airborne Division. I met with them after dinner one evening and found it a very interesting evening. I think you might be interested in the jobs they are assigned to now. One is a brigade S1, four are battalion executive officers, one is assistant division G1, one is brigade S4, one is aviation group S3, and two are battalion S3's.

One of them was Major Hayes, who had worked for me previously at Campbell as my Assistant Chief of Staff back in the late 1960's. He was battalion S3, although he was moving to be the battalion executive officer. He said that

the first thing he had had to do was to write the battalion operation order for a division command post exercise we were having. Well, he got this requirement and looked at it. The last operation order he had to prepare was a corps order. Well, he figured out very quickly how to do it.

He said, where it said "20th Infantry Division" he just put in "A Company".

Well, with all that I've said, here is how I believe you should use the ten months that lie ahead of you. And I am going to give you some statements of guidance. It turns out that there are ten of them.

First: Study and master the Army as it is, in its current state -- a peacetime, 13-division, volunteer, Active Army, located out there in the real world on CONUS installations and oversea stations, grappling with the real problems of today and addressing them effectively, plus a Reserve Components structure of more than 600 thousand in troop units of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, essential to the Army forces in readiness needed to round out the Army under the total force concept should it be necessary. So study and master that Army as it is. That is where you are going to go when you leave here.

Study the Army as it would be if mobilized or employed, in any one of the situations of that spectrum of conflict or combat, to include situations short of combat. You will have ample opportunity to do this in map exercise after map exercise in the next year. This is the traditional Leavenworth way of teaching. It puts you in a situation, and asks you for your solution. Remember, however, that Leavenworth units are rarely understrength or poorly supplied; are almost always manned with leaders who do exactly what they are told to do; and have staff officers who have usually thought of everything. Now that is not a criticism of Leavenworth. We do this knowingly so as to get across the decisionmaking process which you can later adapt to the decision that confronts you. Just recognize as you go through these map exercises that the way it is in real life is usually quite different from that.

That reminds me of another story about the Leavenworth student who had this map problem in class. It was a particularly bad day for him. The first requirement was to judge the direction of attack for a division in its tactical situation. He said, I'll go around to the right.

The solution to the first requirement came back. Well, we're going to go around to the left.

The next requirement was to pick the objectives. He picked a couple of distant objectives. The solution to the second requirement was close-in objectives.

And the third requirement, he busted that one too, and the fourth as well.

When the fifth requirement came around, and here was this division surrounded by the enemy and in desperate straits, just about to be destroyed and it said, "You are now division commander, what do you do?"

His answer was, "If you had followed my advice on the first four requirements, you wouldn't be in this fix."

Gain a historical perspective of at least some part of the Army in some detail. Study the military history of several situations in detail. One of last year's class members, Major David W. Hazen, was just assigned to the 101st Airborne Division. Last year he completed his requirement for the Master of Military Art and Science. He wrote his treatise on "Artillery in the Battle of the Kasserine Pass." We had a discussion about it. I am confident that because of his research into this World War II employment of artillery, right at the outset of the war when our artillery was adapting to its employment in combat, he knows a good deal more about artillery, and he is going to be a better battalion executive officer of the 2/320 Artillery. But not only that, he knows leadership. He knows how people react under stress. He knows what it's like when units are first engaged in combat. He knows how things really work. And he has improved his likelihood of successfully performing in high command, if and when he reaches such a position.

Learn the tools of your trade. Learn the estimate of the situation, the operation order, the intelligence annex, and the administrative order, the makeup and capabilities of the units of the Army -- the military police battalions, pipeline companies, medium artillery battalions, and so on. Learn force structure planning, personnel systems, maintenance systems, communications and data processing. Don't be satisfied to tell yourself in every case, "I know where I can find out." Study the details. Be a master of the tools of your profession. If you want to be a military architect, you've got to know military plumbing.

Now, in the next few months, up to January or so, you are going to be given much to study that might seem to be memory work, unsuitable for the CGSC level of education. I suggest that you address it by asking not only "what?" but "why?". Why is this the format of the estimate? It wasn't always such -- Caesar and Napoleon didn't use it. Why is this the format of the operation order? Why is this the organization of the engineer construction battalion? (By the way, I am sure that Caesar and Napoleon had a pretty good estimate, it just wasn't the precise format of the Leavenworth estimate.) Why do we handle ammunition supply in this particular way?... Don't simply try to memorize these things -- get behind them. That way you will really learn the tools of your trade.

Improve your ability to solve a problem - to analyze a situation, to decide the right thing to do, to lay out the actions that will get the right thing done, and then to get it done. You are going to be exposed to this process of problemsolving almost every day. Learn from each exposure.

You will soon confront the "school solution". Treat the school solution as the best solution that your instructor and his colleagues can come up with. We stand by it as one that will get the job done. There are others.

We would rather have your own workable solution, intelligently conceived, logically arrived at, and realistically based than for you, by some kind of guesswork, intuition, or pure luck, to arrive at the so-called "school solution". Because if it is your solution, and workable, and you are responsible for executing it, it will be more likely to succeed than the world's best solution, ineptly or half-heartedly executed.

Back in the 1930's there was an instructor here at Leavenworth named Major Huebner. He was a World War I member of the 1st Infantry Division and in World War II commanded the division in combat. But between the wars he was an instructor here for a time. I heard a story about one of his classes that bears on the "school solution".

In those years, Leavenworth was a two-year course, and the students had a period of a few weeks in which they reviewed the elements of the division. They had a period, for example, on the infantry regiment just so everybody would stand on the same ground as they went on into the division.

Major Huebner had the responsibility of writing a problem for the infantry regiment for the Leavenworth class. He told his colleagues on the faculty, "I'm going to write a problem that has as its solution to commit all three battalions at one time." And he did. He wrote it with the time and space considerations, the mission, the enemy situation, the terrain, and everything such as to lead one to decide that the only way to accomplish the mission was to get three battalions up on the line right off, instead of the normal two up and one back.

They kicked it around in the faculty, and it looked like a pretty good problem, so they presented it to the class.

In the first class he presented it to, only one man got it right, and he was a medical officer. Major Huebner thought he would find out from the student the logic behind his solution and let the rest of the class know how he had arrived at this particular solution. He asked the medical officer to explain how he concluded that he should commit all three battalions forward. The student stood up and said, "Well, Major, to tell you the truth, I thought there were four battalions in that regiment."

Improve your ability to write. Now, without being critical of the younger generation, because I think the situation was true in mine too, I must say that one of the greatest weaknesses that exists in officers that are at the level you're at today and below is in writing. Often disorderly writing comes from a lack of orderliness in thinking. It also comes from an inability to express yourself clearly. Leavenworth, by its problemsolving approach and other instruction, is going to give you a chance to improve your ability to reason logically. Thinking and writing just go together. I want you to use this year to improve yourself in both fields.

And, I might add, improve your vocabulary and the range of words you use. Get a good dictionary and, as the Editor of the Military Review mentioned yesterday, a thesaurus. Expand your vocabulary. Use the dictionary to improve your spelling, if you need it. Now, I must say that I've known even field grade officers who spelled words right. It's important to do it right and to spell it right.

Improve your standards. Our standards are that whatever we do, we do right. I expect you to leave this school with your personal and professional standards higher than when you came. We teach high standards here, not just in problem-solving and writing but of personal conduct; of honesty; of rectitude, of personal and professional ethics; and we not only teach them, we insist on their being practiced in daily student and faculty life. I need say no more on that.

Now, the next point (and I don't want you to smile to yourself knowingly). We want you to enjoy the year. I predict a great year for you, not the least of its features being the friendships you are going to make and the good times you are going to have. This is a great post, known throughout the Army as such. It can be a very pleasant year for you and your family. We want you to work hard, certainly, but we also want you to enjoy your family and your friends, to go fishing with your son, and to go horseback riding with your daughter, if that's your desire.

Participate with us of the faculty as we help move the Army from "A" to "B". We are engaged in it now, this year. We want you to join that effort. Soon you will learn how the faculty will ask you to join. Leavenworth has an enormous contribution to make, standing as it does at the heart of the Army.

I want to say to you -- both students and faculty -- that the Leavenworth contribution is not going to be accepted simply because it is from Leavenworth.

It is going to have to stand on the quality of its work, in the hard and testing environment of the real Army; the Army that is out there now -- alive, vibrant, practical, confronted with reality, skeptical of theory, and intensely interested in readiness that is real. Having just come from that Army, you can help keep us, the faculty, practical and realistic.

Finally, take the year seriously. We are servants of the American people. They provide us with very substantial resources. We are responsible for the lives and welfare of their sons and their daughters. We exist for the defense of their freedoms. Ours is a serious calling. You are at the heart of it now.

We all have an exciting, challenging, opportunity-filled year ahead of us.

Let's go out and make the most of it.

26 September 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: STAFF AND FACULTY, USACGSC

SUBJECT: /5 Curriculum Planning as Viewed by the Commandant

Following is a summary and digest of the Commandant's remarks on 12 September 1973 to key College faculty, as to his views on the curriculum. It is provided for information and appropriate action. The objectives presented in this memorandum will form the basis for the Commandant's Guidance to be published in the Curriculum Plan for Academic Year 1975.

I have been doing a lot of thinking about the /5 curriculum, and I would like to share my thoughts with you. Before discussing specific objectives, I will offer a few general comments on the development of the curriculum. If some of this can be put into /4, let's do it.

This is an academic institution. We should, therefore, look at any idea on its merits. Under the concept of academic freedom, I would like everyone to participate in the discussion as to what is best for our curriculum.

The bulk of the work will be done by the departments. I must rely on the wisdom of the department directors. So as you develop ideas, you should always be guided by what is feasible in terms of lead time, man-hours of work, and the capacity of the faculty (also the realities of the Print Plant). Remember that whatever we come up with must eventually be implemented by authors/instructors, and most of it has to be printed at the Print Plant. Consider the problems and schedule of nonresident instruction also.

At the same time, we ought to elevate our sights, be imaginative, look for new departures, and insist on the highest quality, whatever we do.

Certain features will remain stable in /5. This includes: the organization of the departments; the eight "courses of study" and the general scope of each course; the basic curriculum plan for /5 (namely, three terms of approximately 14 weeks, 12 weeks and 12 weeks duration); and the concept of two blocks of instruction, i.e., a common curriculum and the electives.

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While our review and discussion of the curriculum will be based on our being an academic institution, we are also a military institution. I would hope that we could reach the ideal of a complete meeting of the minds, but I realize that I am going to have to make the final decision as to the direction and content of the curriculum. Each of you must feel free to suggest ideas about the curriculum, but once the decision is made, all must of course accommodate to the final guidance.

My major concerns will be: (1) the content of the curriculum as opposed to the mere form of it, and (2) the educational philosophy behind our work, that is to say the heart and soul of what we are trying to do, what we are imparting to the students.

All of our planning must be directed toward a few characteristics or objectives. I have discussed some of these with some of you. They are:

Real - Our instruction must be real, and deal with real matters and real issues. The student must sense from the very first day that the College is operating in an environment of reality. The manner in which every subject is approached must relate to the real world and must be relevant and meaningful in its own right. A theory or a doctrine we can put out, but those theories or doctrine should be perceived by the student as being derived from observations of reality and from practical and actual experiences, and applicable to the real world. I do not object to our problems using fictitious divisions, but all our instruction must deal with real-type situations.

Hard Work - Our profession is unique. We have a responsibility for the lives of men - and of noncombatants as well. In combat we are directed, even obligated, to take life. Life, including that of the enemy, is sacred. This is a most serious business we are in. The nation's security rests on what we do. This deserves our hard work and the hard work of our students. So this must not be a "gentleman's course," but one in which we daily challenge the student and make him work hard. Not the kind of useless work that seems like a rock pile, making little ones out of big ones, but relevant, meaningful hard work - work that the student instinctively recognizes as relevant and meaningful, and worth his hardest efforts.

Make Them Think - The student must think as he works toward these real and useful ends. Sure, he will have to memorize certain things, but he must also think, and we must critique his thinking. Having thought, we must make him communicate his thinking effectively, both orally and in writing.

ATSW-RI

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Develop Fiber and Depth - We want to turn out a graduate who is a man of character and depth, who has been convinced by his exposure in the classrooms of Leavenworth as to the dead seriousness of his profession, and who is willing to make up his mind, do his duty, and stand his ground.

The above is what I would like every graduate to encounter, and to leave with - the type of exposure I want each student to have.

As I have noted, we should modify /4 if we can. We should consider the use of electives in /4 as a means of developing material that might be suitable for the common curriculum in /5. So your thoughts should be on /4 as we look at specific requirements for /5.

I visualize the common curriculum of /5 as consisting of these following areas of content built into one or more of our courses of study:

Computers as an Aid to Commanders, Staffs and Managers. We must greatly increase the student's immediate immersion in the world of computers. The student should quickly be able to use the computer as a normal tool just as he would use a pen, accepting the computer as a routine aid to command, management, and staff activities. We must find a way to develop the man-computer symbiosis so that the officer is completely comfortable with the computer. We already have a practical language, BASIC, and some computer instruction. Let's have the student "solo" on the computer during his first week and have a "pilots license" when he graduates. The faculty must be qualified with computers too. Each course should utilize the computer in at least some of its lessons.

Organization of Forces - The student must master organization, from the Department of Defense down to the squad. He must know what the forces are, and how they fit together and operate. There is memory work involved here. Also, the student must be fully familiar with the concepts of force design and force development. Force design is accomplished in the field when you put a force together from available building block units. Force development takes place at DA level where you create the building blocks.

Staff Operations, Procedures and Techniques. We must drill the student in such fundamentally important matters as estimates, orders, annexes, movement plans, troop basis planning, etc. This is the kind of work Leavenworth graduates are expected to do upon graduation. They should be thoroughly prepared. An important point is that each department keep abreast of the staff procedures and areas of interest being covered by others, so that duplication is minimized and all ground is covered.

ATSW-RI

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The U.S. Strategic Situation. Our instruction must develop the function of military forces, and specifically the nature and function of Army forces, in peace and war. The student must be able to answer to his own satisfaction such questions as: What is the world like today?; Why do we have an Army?; What is its nature, function and essential characteristics?; How does the Army fit into the world? and Why are we here studying these things? As in all subjects, it is not enough for the instructors to say that such and such is "important." By his own perceptions, the student must be intellectually convinced of the importance of the subject.

Decision Making and Problem Solving. This must include such elements as information gathering, systems analysis, logic and reasoning. I know that all courses now have decision making and problem solving in the lessons. It may be that the student is asked to make so many decisions or solve so many problems that he loses sight of the process itself. Let's have a coherent approach to this, and get to the essence of it for the student - not simply the mechanics but the heart of what it means to address a tough problem and solve it. And to carry the solution through, as well.

Nature and Characteristics of Ground Combat. What is the Infantry function? The Cavalry function? Fire? Maneuver? Communications? And so on. The nature and function of the various elements of ground combat can be developed through the examination of historical examples. See to it that the student studies the past and understands the present, in real terms. Regardless of branch, he'll be a better field grade officer if he does.

The Nature and Characteristics of Logistics. Likewise for logistics, which is indeed a function of ground combat, but which should be further covered in detail. The function of maintenance would be an example. Cover the nature of the maintenance function and the way in which maintenance and its performance in the field has evolved over time, and what it is like now. An approach such as this would be preferable to an organizational chart and listing approach. It would give depth to the student's understanding.

Taking Care of the American Soldier. We must get across to the student how he is to meet his responsibilities to the American soldier - how to bring him into the Army, how to administer him right, how to pay him properly, how to meet his needs, how to train and discipline him, and how to use his precious time well. These are officer obligations that must be understood by our students and done right.

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The Military Officer and Contemporary American Society. This is highly important. Here we must include such topics as community relations, recruiting, dealing with the press and the public, relations with academia, minority groups, drugs, alcohol, etc.

Management of Medium-sized Enterprises. We must convey to the student how to deal with specific typical problems found in medium-sized activities, the kind he will be expected to run as a field grade officer. Examples might include: how to manage the DIO or Special Services; how to recognize problems and identify their essential features, and solve them; how to audit; how to deal with civilian employees.

Selected Historical Examples. Our students must study history in detail, both "good" and "bad" examples. To cover more history, a number of situations might be assigned to the work groups of a section. Different historical studies would be researched, developed and presented by small teams from the work group. These examples would be used to develop lessons learned in connection with specific teaching objectives in tactics, strategy, logistics, etc. Some examples of history that would seem valuable might be:

- Jackson's Valley Campaign
- Field Marshal Haig's Somme Offensive - 1916
- Korea - The First Year
- The Fall of the Philippines
- Rommel's Desert Campaigns

The above are the elements which I conceive should be included in the common curriculum. If we do this I believe we will have the start toward an educated field grade officer.

The electives program then gives each student an opportunity to look at subjects in depth, toward branch proficiency, toward OPMS specialization, and toward his own personal and professional enrichment. /4 electives can help us in developing new lessons for the /5 curriculum.

For example, some subjects we might look at in our tactics electives are:

- An elective in which the infantry, armor, or artillery student analyzes and learns what really happens on the battlefield. I would call this "Battlefield Interactions of Maneuver Units." I would consider involving Combat Developments Experimentation Center (CDEC) in presenting this.

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SUBJECT: /5 Curriculum Planning as Viewed by the Commandant

- An elective on generalship. How does the division commander address the chaos inherent in battle and bring order to it, making the situation bend to his will? Look at history as you study this.

- An elective on "operations on a grand scale."

- Why not consider an elective on ADP assistance to analysis of campaigns of the past? A group of students with an interest in military history and computer science could develop the software for progressive displays of a given battle or campaign. We would then walk a student through the battle and offer him the opportunity to make periodic analyses, and even decisions. Jackson's Valley Campaign could perhaps be done this way.

These comments are designed to give you my thinking as to what I believe should be the spirit of the curriculum. Let's proceed now with the course design. I will continue to meet with you and with your officers so that we can continue our discussions as we go along.

(The Commandant then opened the meeting to discussion.)



B. L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Commandant

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PAMPHLET
NO. 1

18 September 1973

This pamphlet contains the prepared text of a presentation on Doctrinal Literature made by the Commander, Combined Arms Center, to the TRADOC Commandants' Conference on 5 September 1973, and should be considered as guidance for the Combined Arms Center.


THE CGSC APPROACH TO WRITING DOCTRINAL LITERATURE

My presentation today will be some straight exposition of how the Command and General Staff College is performing its newly assigned doctrinal mission, plus some ideas -- food for thought.

I find that Fort Leavenworth is taking a typically professional and workmanlike approach to doctrine.

By Fort Leavenworth, I mean "both faculties" -- the instructional faculty of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and the Combat Developments faculty of the Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity (CACDA).

Since April these two have been combined into the Combined Arms Center. They are in fact a single "faculty" (Figure 1).



xxx Operational control

Figure 1. Instructional/Combat Developments Faculties

MG McAuliffe is Deputy Commander of CACDA and BG Harrison is Deputy Commandant of the CGSC. Both are here with me at this conference.

Writing doctrinal literature is the task of the instructional faculty, and the author/instructor does the writing. We recognize that this approach is different from some of your schools, where sections are set aside with only the mission of writing doctrinal literature.

Now let me turn to some ideas on doctrine.-- food for thought.

First, what is doctrine? That which is taught? That's one definition. Here is another definition:

"Doctrine is an enlightened exposition of what usually works best."

It tells you how things should normally be done. That's why we teach it. Let me try another definition:

"Doctrine is an enlightened exposition of what has usually worked best."

Is that what we should teach in changing times, or should we follow this definition?

"Doctrine is an enlightened, tentative, exposition of what will usually work best."

Selection of the one to use is an individual decision. The word enlightened is used in all three for a reason -- to keep it from being sterile dogma.

The current Army and Joint Dictionaries define doctrine as follows:

"Doctrine is fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."

Something is missing in this one -- the thought process.

I for one think we went backwards from the definition of the Army Dictionary of 1953 which was as follows:

"Principles and policies applicable to a subject which have been developed through experience or by theory, that represent the best available thought, and indicate and guide but do not bind in practice. Essentially, doctrine is that which is taught. A doctrine is basically a truth, a fact, or a theory that can be defended by reason. Doctrine refers to those principles and

policies which have been developed by experience or by theory which represent the best available thought on the subject in question, and which should be taught or accepted as basic truths."

This is how I would define doctrine in one long sentence:

"Principles and policies applicable to a subject, developed through experience or by theory, that represent the best available thought that can be defended by reason, which indicate and guide but do not bind in practice, and which require judgment in application."

This is the short sentence that I would generally use:

"Doctrine is an enlightened exposition of what usually works best."

How do you know what usually works best, especially when new equipment is being fielded?

Military doctrine consists of the fundamental truths of the military art. The search for valid doctrine is, at its root, a search for the truth. Doctrine is developed through experience or by theory; it results from intelligent evaluation of the past and the logical and creative application of lessons of the past to present and future projected conditions. It comes from the interaction between, on one hand, the practical experience gained from battle, exercises, tests, and war games; and on the other, the intellectual activity of the military professional at his desk and in the clash of ideas with other professionals.

Doctrine comes from either inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning, or both. Inductive reasoning considers a great number of specific cases and draws conclusions that apply in general, i.e., what usually works. Deductive reasoning goes from fairly well established principles or truths and derives conclusions that apply under specific conditions, from the general to the specific, as to what usually works. Which is best for developing doctrine?

The best kind is a mixture but with a stronger emphasis on detailed analysis of specific cases, and hence inductive reasoning.

So we must figure out what usually works best, or what we tentatively believe will usually work best, by a practical detailed examination of all the actual or realistically contrived cases we can find or set up.

That's why CDEC, and MASSTER, and field exercises, and tests, and scenarios, and computer games, and other observation of how things work in practice -- that's why these are so important. That's why a study of past experience is also so important.

What we seek is doctrine that can stand the test of actual combat and that gives the Army, in the best way we know how, "an enlightened statement of what usually works best."

Now that we know what we are after, how do we go about doing it at Fort Leavenworth?

The approach at Fort Leavenworth is:

Keep it simple, staying with fundamentals.

Update as necessary.

Rely on the intelligent judgment of competent commanders and staff officers to apply the doctrine in the field, without telling them unnecessary details.

For example, FM 61-100, The Division, contains 63 pages of a sample infantry division SOP. A sample SOP is appropriate for instructional material but it is not doctrine and should not be in a field manual. It is available at Leavenworth for any division commander or staff officer who wants or needs it.

Field manuals are assigned to the CGSC instructional departments as follows:

Department of Command

FM 31-40	Tactical Cover and Deception
FM 101-5	Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedures
FM 101-40(J)	Armed Forces Doctrine for Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment and Defense (input from other services)
FM 105-5	Maneuver Control

Department of Logistics

FM 101-10-1	Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organization, Technical and Logistics Data
FM 101-10-2	Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organization, Technical and Logistics Data - Extracts of Non-Divisional TOE
FM 101-10-3	Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organization, Technical and Logistics Data (Classified)

Department of Tactics

FM 31-10	Denial Operations and Barriers
FM 31-55(T)	Border Security/Anti-Infiltration Operations
FM 31-60	River-Crossing Operations
FM 31-81(T)	Base Defense
FM 61-100	The Division
FM 100-5	Operations of Army Forces in the Field
FM 100-15	Larger Units: Theater Army-Corps
FM 100-30(T)	Tactical Nuclear Operations

Department of Strategy

FM 20-10 Military Support of Civil Defense

FM 31-11(J) Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (input to USN)

FM 31-75 Riverine Operations

FM 31-76(J) The Landing Force (input to USN)

FM 44-11(J) Joint Air Defense Operations for Overseas Land Areas (input to USAF)

FM 57-1(J) US Army/US Air Force Doctrine for Airborne Operations

FM 100-26 The Air-Ground Operations System

FM 100-27(J) US Army/US Air Force Doctrine for Tactical Airlift Operations (input to USAF)

To write these manuals we call on the instructional faculty. Understanding how closely related combat developments and doctrine must be, we also call on our combat developments faculty. We stipulate the closest working coordination between the instructional/doctrinal faculty and the combat developments faculty.

In addition to these two faculties, we have a third asset, the students. There are 1,100 in the regular class, with an average of 11 years' service, from all branches of the Army, with all varieties of experience, including 28 from the other services and 97 foreign officers.

We intend to engage the students deeply into our doctrinal and combat developments efforts. This month we will complete an inventory of student expertise and interest, and next month students will begin their participation in earnest.

It is in the spirit of those remarks that we have approached the writing of doctrinal literature. This is the way we seek the doctrine that will give the Army, in the best way we know how:

"An enlightened exposition of what usually works best."

The proponent agency for this pamphlet is the Chief of Staff, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:



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28 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Instructors, Committee One, DTAC

SUBJECT: Conceptual Outline, Middle East Scenario, /5 Curriculum

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide an expanded conceptual outline of the scenario for which Committee One will be responsible in the /5 curriculum. This outline is followed by assignment taskings for the further elaboration of the scenario and the development of the associated components, such as situations, issue material, historical and hypothetical cases, etc.
2. The setting for our scenario is the Middle East, with the majority of activity situated in the Kingdom of Jordan. A scenario different from that of the Living Model and Shenandoah will be developed to avoid classification and sensitivity. Aggressor units and doctrine will be used, deployment schedule modified, unit designations altered, etc. We will be alert, however, to the evolution of the Living Model and its sequences and will, as appropriate to our learning objectives, adapt Living Model situations to our scenario so as to profit from the insights deriving from the Living Model project, and vice versa.
3. Section IV, Corps Contingency Force Operations, of FM 100-15 (Test), Larger Unit Operations, contains doctrinal guidelines for the type force we will employ. Some of the characteristics of this force and its employment are as follows:
 - a. Deployed for short-duration, limited objective, limited war conflicts.
 - b. No existing US base in the area of operations.
 - c. Nonactive nuclear environment.
 - d. Structured as a light Corps on the principles of simplicity, austerity, flexibility, and realism.
 - e. Heavy reliance on strategic airlift for rapid deployment and resupply.
 - f. Requires early achievement of air superiority, continuous tactical air support, and logistic resupply by air lines of communication.

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- g. Employed as part of a joint task force.
 - h. Employment of naval gunfire, tactical air support, air defense and early warning systems, electronic warfare, and marine amphibious units from naval operating forces may be critical to success of the operation.
 - i. Requires skillful execution by disciplined, well-trained units, to achieve decisive results with a minimum of forces.
 - j. Emphasis placed on economy of force, mobility, surprise, and the bold aggressive employment of decisive offensive actions.
 - k. Operations characterized by flexibility, imaginative leadership, intuitive planning, and skillful and decentralized execution.
 - l. Austerity of communications personnel and equipment, strict communications discipline, and extensive use of air and ground messenger service.
 - m. Combat service support characterized by effective support with a minimum investment in resources.
4. As reported to Director, DTAC, 14 January, we would have 36 hours for instruction related to our scenario. This 36 hours would follow two 4-hour blocks devoted to historical cases (also our responsibility), the Yom Kippur War and Jackson's Valley Campaign. These two periods plus the periods on organization and nature and characteristics of ground combat, which also precede the scenario, will help us lay a foundation of tactical considerations before the scenario begins. We will address the preparation of these two classes separately.
5. As the initial period, we have allocated 4 hours (one hour in Marshall Auditorium, three hours in Section Classrooms - with Air Force participation) for an initial analysis of the light Corps in a contingency setting. The period objectives might logically include:
- a. To analyze the organization of the contingency force, the considerations which went into its structuring, and the capabilities and limitations associated with it.
 - b. To analyze the scenario situation, including the area of operations, political background, aggressor forces and actions, mission of the US JTF and the Corps, USAF mission and organization, staff estimates, deployment schedule, air and naval situations, etc.

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c. To examine the systems available for combat service support, communications, and administration.

6. Prior to attending the first period of the scenario the student would have been issued DTAC Case Books which contain the historical examples we want to analyze in the framework of our scenario. The student will also have a copy of the troop list, a 1:1,000,000 map of the area of operations with some analytical information on the reverse side. He will also have available to him the general situation, the organization, mission of the JTF, the JTF Oplan with the mission for the Corps, and the deployment schedule. The hour spent in Marshall Auditorium will be devoted to a "skit" in which key Corps staff estimates are presented to the rest of the Staff, C/S, and CG.

7. The workgroup discussions which follow will address the following kinds of questions: (These questions are tentative and are subject to continuing refinement.)

a. What are the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of the Joint Task Force and the Contingency Corps? What changes would you make in its organization based on the situation as you understand it?

b. What are the kinds of training and preparation that would precede the deployment of the Corps force?

c. Will the deployment schedule meet the requirements of the mission and generate adequate combat power fast enough?

d. What are the command and control headquarters that will be involved? What is their relationship to each other? What communications means support the command and control function?

e. How will the Contingency Force attain air superiority? How significant will USAF close air support be in this situation?

f. How will the combat service support system function? What will the role of the Air Force be in the Army CSS system? How can the CSS managers keep the inventory of replacement end items and repair parts at a minimum level in theater?

g. What will be the impact of the area of operations on the accomplishment of the Corps mission?

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h. What are the capabilities and doctrines of the Aggressor forces employed against us? Which of these capabilities are the greatest concern to us and how can we best react to them? What if certain capabilities change (improve)?

8. Since meaningful discussion of many of these questions will require background and knowledge not available to all students it will be desirable to identify in advance student expertise which can be drawn upon to help make the discussions professionally rewarding. Where possible such student expertise should come from the workgroup but they may be drawn from other divisions as necessary. These student experts can make brief presentations to the workgroup or can be given the opportunity to research a particular subject in depth in advance to insure their ability to contribute the desired information.

9. The next period in the scenario sequence is devoted to an examination of selected historical examples relevant to the area of operations. Four hours of workgroup discussion are available to analyze the examples to make the following kinds of teaching points: (Again, these are tentative, a start point only.)

a. Combat situations cannot be solved by rule or by applying the memorized solution of other tactical problems.

b. In war obscurity is normal. Late, exaggerated or misleading information, surprise situations, and counter-orders are to be expected.

c. Surprise is the key to victory. It is an essential element of a successful attack.

d. Adherence to the principles of war (surprise, simplicity, maneuver, economy of force, mass, offensive, security, objective, cooperation), adapted to the situation, characterizes successful commanders.

e. Open warfare demands mobile, elastic tactics, quick decisions, and quick maneuvers.

f. Resolute action by a few determined men frequently has a decisive effect in battle.

g. A leader must meet existing situations with prompt and unequivocal decision. He cannot wait for the ideal situation to develop.

h. Optimism and tenacity are essential attributes to battle leadership.

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i. The order must clearly express the will of the leader and must fit the situation. Usually it should be brief and simple.

j. Leaders must verify the execution of their orders. The more untrained the troops, the more thorough and detailed this supervision should be.

k. The effect of use of sophisticated, technologically complex, weapons and systems is to generally increase training time and to make the loss of certain personnel with highly developed skills critical.

l. The primary consideration of a leader in battle is the control of his unit.

m. Headquarters locations should be as far forward as the situation will permit. They should be mobile and have rapid and reliable communications with the forces they control.

n. A unit must be engaged in accordance with a definite, though not inflexible, plan. It must not be allowed to drift aimlessly into battle.

o. Effective fire opens the road to victory. Barring surprise, movement alone is not enough. There must be fire and movement.

p. In an attack reserves are used to further success rather than to redeem failure.

q. The flank attack, however conceived, succeeds in proportion to its menace to an opponent's rear.

r. In many of history's recorded battles the loser held a relative advantage up to the climax of battle and the onset of panic. The casualties of the loser occurred less as a cause than as an effect of their defeat.

s. A review of the history of ground combat in the Middle East shows a thread of commonality of concern with the same terrain features, the same effects of weather, and recurrent characteristics of the peoples of the area.

t. It is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.

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10. Among the specific cases which might appropriately be assembled and distilled to support this four hour period are the following which will be included in the DTAC Case Book:

- a. Alexander the Great at Arbela (331 BC).
- b. Titus siege of Jerusalem (AD 70).
- c. Defeat of the Crusaders at Carrhae (1104) (Parallels to defeat of Crassus by Parthian horsemen on same battleground eleven centuries earlier). Successful tactics of Richard the Lion Hearted (1191).
- d. British operations against the Turks, WWI (Lawrence and Allenby).
- e. The Battle of Kasserine (1943).
- f. The Palestine War of 1948.
- g. The Six Day Arab-Israeli War (1967).
- h. The Syrian/Iraqi Invasion of Jordan (1970).

11. The next period (4 hours) is devoted to an analysis of anti-armor tactics through the study of historical cases. The cases will be selected to illustrate:

- a. The individual soldier's ability to defeat armor (Yom Kippur War, German use of the panzerfaust in WWII, US soldiers at Bastogne and St. Vith during the battle of the bulge . . .).
- b. Tank versus tank combat (Yom Kippur, the Battle of Kursk, SVN Counteroffensive 1972).
- c. The antitank gun (Battle of San Pietro, Kasserine, . . .).
- d. The antitank obstacle (Yom Kippur War, Russian front WWII . . .).
- e. Close air support tank killing capabilities (Yom Kippur War, . . .).
- f. The attack helicopter in the armor defeating role (Lamson 719, An Loc . . .).
- g. Aggressor armor tactics and doctrine (Yom Kippur War, Battle of Kursk . . .).

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12. The tactical lessons learned from the foregoing discussion of historical examples of anti-armor tactics will be applied in a four hour period which employs the Light Corps and supporting USAF elements in anti-armor operations in the contingency scenario previously established. We will provide the student a contrived case where we zoom in on aspects of an Aggressor armor force attack, the plans and orders issued by the airborne, airmobile, and cavalry division to meet the Aggressor thrust, and the execution of these plans and orders by the brigades, battalions, and smaller units of the force. The following questions are illustrative of those upon which we might seek to center student discussion:

- a. Were the anti-armor tactics employed by each force within that force's capability in light of the situation as depicted?
- b. What other options were open for defeating enemy armor?
- c. Was the use of aerial antitank systems consistent with the air defense potential of the Aggressor and the air defense suppression capabilities of friendly forces?
- d. Were combat service support considerations adequately introduced?
- e. Were all the lessons of the historical examples adequately taken into account?
- f. Were Aggressor's tactics and reactions realistically played?

13. The next period is devoted to an analysis at the workgroup level, using the case study method, of historical cases of corps level tactical operations with special relevance to the Middle East scenario.

- a. The objectives of this period include:
 - (1) Developing an appreciation of the considerations which affect tactical planning at Corps level.
 - (2) To illustrate the interaction between combat service support considerations and tactical capability.
 - (3) To show how US forces have adapted to insertion into combat and insurgency situations, providing insights into the training and discipline necessary for success in combat.

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(4) To assess the meaning of austerity as applied to our light corps by study of the operations of other "austere" forces in the North Africa/Middle East theater and elsewhere.

(5) To derive appropriate tactical lessons from the cases studied.

b. Among the cases to be included in this analysis are the following:

(1) The Battle of Kasserine (1943).

(2) The Africa Corps (1941-42).

(3) The Lebanon Incursion (1958).

(4) XVIII Abn Corps, WWII.

(5) XVIII Abn Corps, Dom Rep (1965).

(6) IFFV in Vietnam (1965-66).

14. The next period continues the examination of Corps level tactics and permits the assessment of the applicability of the insights gained from the preceding analysis of Corps cases to the light Corps in the contingency setting. The situation for this period will be one in which an Aggressor armor thrust has been defeated and the Corps is planning a counterattack which, if successful, will end the contingency operation. Student workgroups will be provided a complete Corps plan for its offensive operation. The period will be devoted to a critique of the plan, with emphasis devoted to:

a. Scheme of maneuver.

b. Fire support plan.

c. Provisions for close air support.

d. Combat service support planning.

e. Tactical cover and deception plan.

f. EW plan.

g. Command, control, and communications visualized.

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h. Air defense suppression planning.

i. Enemy reaction anticipated.

15. From the Corps level we next move to examine the division as a major tactical formation. The first step in this examination, as at the Corps level, will be work group case study of selected historical cases.

a. The objectives of this period are:

(1) To increase the understanding of time and space factors relevant at division level.

(2) To isolate factors which heavily influence the success of airmobile operations.

(3) To evaluate the combat potential of the airborne division.

(4) To review the impact of a combat situation of resolute action by a few determined men.

(5) To assess the role of personal leadership on the battlefield at division level and below.

(6) To examine the impact of division level tactical operations of combat service support considerations.

(7) To strengthen the understanding of the interrelation of fire and maneuver in division tactical operations.

(8) To identify tactical lessons illustrated by the historical examples selected.

b. Some of the cases which might be studied include:

(1) The Battle of St. Vith (1944).

(2) Lam Son 719 (1970).

(3) Operation Yellowstone RVN (Dec 67-Feb 68).

(4) Ben Suc Operation RVN (1st Inf Div).

(5) The 82d Airborne Division in Sicily (1943).