

Epilog -- My Last Visit, September 1988

to

Korea, 1976-78 -- A Memoir

by Lieutenant General John H. Cushman

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Epilog -- My Last Visit, September 1988

From 1978 to 1986 or so, I visited Korea three or four times for research on papers on command and control and other subjects, to visit various units and institutions, and to see old friends. During those years President Park Chung Hee had been assassinated, after which, in a matter of months, a military junta under General Chun Doo Hwan had taken power. Chun Doo Hwan had been succeeded by a Korea Military Academy classmate named Ro Tae Woo, who began taking steps toward relatively free elections that would lead to a transition to a civilian government.

My last visit to Korea was in September 1988, during Ro Tae Woo's administration; the Olympic Games would open that month. I was a member of a group of scholars/experts organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, to meet in Seoul with the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) for panel discussions of policy and strategy with respect to Korea. My subject was "Command Arrangements in Korea: Issues and Options," a subject on which I had written extensively.

CSIS had sent to KIDA for its distribution my paper, next under; it was made available to the press beforehand. That paper's first 18 1/2 pages were an exhaustive treatment of command arrangements, with some bold recommendations; they were followed on pages 19-20 by a recommendation that U.S. nuclear weapons be withdrawn from Korea.¹ Members of the press, in an interview with me requested on the morning of the conference's first day, focused on that paragraph. My remarks were audiotaped (perhaps they were videotaped, I don't remember); they were that day broadcast in news reports and were headline news that afternoon and the next day. I had created quite a storm; heretofore no U.S. officer, retired or not, had said that U.S. nuclear weapons were in Korea. The U.S. had operated according to a policy of "neither confirm nor deny."

My panel presentation was the second day. Next under my prepared paper is a text of that presentation as prepared for this epilog from notes that I made at the time (which I have cut and pasted for easier reading).² In the panel I elaborated on the nuclear question, including the issue of "neither confirm nor deny." Under that is a page from the 29 September 1988 Far East Economic Review reporting on the conference and highlighting my recommendation that U.S. nuclear weapons be removed from Korea.

¹In preparing this paper at home, in Bronxville, New York, I had written at length my ideas on the desired evolution of ROK/US command in Korea. Facing a deadline, I had added my views on nuclear weapons essentially as an afterthought, and sent the paper in.

²I surely did not use all these words precisely as written.

The episode had caused me considerable private concern.³ The final item is an addendum, written January 7, 1989, and distributed, as I remember, to KIDA and CSIS, to a couple of U.S. policy-making offices in Washington, and to the Korea command, that discusses the reaction in Korea to that paragraph.

I had long held these views on nuclear weapons in Korea (see page 26 of my Memoir). A few months later, Admiral William Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for their removal from Korea. Not long afterward President Bush did in fact remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Korea, as part of a decision to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons from the Army's arsenal worldwide.

³Upon my return to the United States, I wrote General Menetrey, who was an old friend (see page 12 of my memoir), and said that I regretted having added to his problems by raising the nuclear matter.

COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN KOREA: ISSUES AND OPTIONS

by

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&

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**Paper Prepared for the KIDA/CSIS Conference on the
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Command Arrangements in Korea; Issues and Options*

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Command arrangements between Republic of Korea forces and the United States forces committed to the defense of peninsula need to be looked at in a context. The foremost component of that context is the overriding need for peace on the Korean peninsula. Tension there can and will likely be, but war there cannot be.


The situation today between North and South is in flux. Possibilities exist for political, social, economic, as well as military measures toward reducing tensions. But given the North's hostility, unpredictability, and heretofore unwavering aims -- and its military strength even unaided by the USSR or China -- the best guarantee that there will be no war is the quiet and unambiguous ability of the South in coalition with the United States to convince the North day-in-and-day-out that it should clearly not start a war.

Coalition command arrangements are now a matter of lively public discussion in Korea. Koreans, proud of their hard-won world status, believe -- and many Americans agree -- that the Korean military should have a larger place in the scheme.

*This paper is prepared for the KIDA/CSIS Conference on the Future of ROK/US Security Relations, Seoul, Korea, September 11-13, 1988

Because much of the public discussion is poorly informed, it seems useful to shed some light on the history and current situation of command arrangements in Korea.

This briefing chart is from the Combined Forces Command (CFC) command post exercise of January 1988, called Focus Clear 88. It shows a command structure which ROK and U.S. forces might use to, together, defend ROK national territory if North Korea should attack. (CP TANGO is CFC's wartime command post/headquarters.)




*The bottom block with its wargame "kit" is simply the control mechanism that provides a realistic exercise to the forces.

"CFC" in the top box stands for the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. This is the air/land/sea command which the two nations have set up under an American commander in chief (CINC CFC) who is responsible jointly to the two countries' presidents for the defense of the ROK national territory.

CFC has three field armies deployed along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), each with two or three ROK Army corps. Third ROK Army (TROKA) and First ROK Army (FROKA) are commanded by Korean four-star generals; day-to-day they have only ROK Army forces. Between the two ROK flank armies is the ROK/US Combined Field Army (CFA), commanded by an American three-star general; wearing another "hat" he also has opcon of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division (not shown on the chart) day-to-day. In this chart the VII ROK Corps, employed as CFC reserve, is not under a field army; it could be under one in a different situation.

The Air Component Command (ACC), whose commander also commands the U.S. Seventh Air Force and the nominal Air Force "component" of U. S. Forces Korea, in time of war consists of all USAF and ROKAF wings operating from bases in Korea. The Naval Component Command (NCC), commanded by a ROK vice-admiral, consists of the ROK Navy's three coastal fleets and the ROK Navy's Marine Corps divisions; the latter may come under one or the other field armies or corps in peace or war. There is also a ROK/US Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force (CUWTF) and a ROK/US Combined Aviation Force.

The sketch below shows the relative positions of the three field armies.



On the Focus Clear chart, page 2, these three field armies are shown under the "GCC." This means "Ground Component Command." However, unlike the NCC and ACC, this is not a separate headquarters. CINC CFC is himself the Commander, GCC, and his CFC staff serves as the GCC staff.

CFC/GCC and CFA are bi-national headquarters; both have ROK and U.S. officers intermingled throughout. The Deputy CINC CFC is a ROK Army four-star general; the Deputy Commander, CFA, is a ROK Army two-star general. Because, unlike the Americans, Korean officers assigned to these headquarters are bilingual, the work of these headquarters is mostly done in English. (Messages between these headquarters and ROK-only headquarters are usually in the Korean language.)

The ROK government has agreed that CINC CFC has day-to-day "operational control" of the ROK forces shown on page 2 for the mission of defense against North Korean invasion.*

Not under CINC CFC opcon but supporting his forces in war would be the U.S. Seventh Fleet, B-52 bombers of the Strategic Air Command operating from Guam, the Second ROK Army which is responsible for the defense of rear areas, the ROK Army's Logistics Command, the military intelligence apparatus of the US and ROK, and various other military, paramilitary, and civil forces.

*Some notes: (1) This differs from NATO, where national forces are not opcon to the coalition U.S. commander until a crisis, and then only by each NATO member's decision at the time. (2) The opcon grant is specifically for the planning and execution of operational plans for the military defense of the ROK. (3) The ROK Ministry of Defense through an all-ROK separate chain of command is responsible for "counter-infiltration" south of the DMZ. (4) The ROK government can remove any of these forces from CINC CFC opcon on due notice. (5) Day-to-day, the opcon forces do not include the Second ROK Army (SROKA) in the south or the ROK Special Forces Command.


To explain how the command arrangements in Korea are far more complex than we have been discussing, let me use the chart, next page. It shows CINC CFC wearing seven "hats."

The oldest of these hats is number (2), that of Commander in Chief, United Nations Command or CINCUNC. It dates from immediately after the North Korean Army attacked across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, and President Truman committed U.S. forces and took the cause to the United Nations Security Council. With the USSR boycotting because Nationalist China held the China seat, the Security Council quickly voted that its members should assist South Korea.

A July 7 Security Council resolution made the U.S. President its executive agent in carrying out the fight against North Korean aggression, recommended that member nations furnish forces to a military command under the United States, and said that the U.S. would name the commander thereof. On July 10 President Truman appointed General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo (and CINC Far East Command) as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. President Rhee immediately placed all ROK armed forces under MacArthur's command authority.

Three years later the fighting ended with an Armistice Agreement. Only General Mark Clark, CINC, United Nations Command, signed that agreement for the United Nations side;

Chains of Command in Korea



(Cdr 7th AF is also Cdr AFK and ACC)
 *thru Cdr USA element, CFA

	Army Forces	Navy Forces	Air Force Forces
Day-to-day cmd/opcon)	front line troops	3 fleets	combat air command
of CINCUNC/Cdr USFK/)	US: all (as CG, EUSA)	none	2 F-15s (as CINC CFC)
CINC CFC			

ROK President Syngmann Rhee wanted no part of a document which divided his country. The agreement created the Demilitarized Zone, established the Military Armistice Commission to oversee the provisions of the Armistice, and said that the truce would remain in effect until superseded by a political arrangement.

35 years later, the Armistice Agreement still divides the two Koreas, the U.N. Command still exists, and so does the original 1950 U.N. resolution, which cannot be changed without U.S. consent. In 1957, when the Far East Command was disestablished, CINUNC and his headquarters moved from Tokyo to Seoul.* Eight nations (Australia, Canada, Colombia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and United States) remain accredited, but only the United States provides other than ceremonial forces. The ROK is not a U.N. member.

In 1971 the U.S. 7th Infantry Division was withdrawn from Korea. The 2d Infantry Division remained, but pulled back from the DMZ, retaining only a small sector with two guard posts overlooking the Panmunjom meeting site of the Military Armistice Commission. The U.S. I Corps headquarters at Camp Red Cloud became the bi-national Hqs, I Corps (ROK/US) Group;

*From the outset of the Korean War to 1957, the senior U.S. headquarters in Korea was Eighth U.S. Army. Its commander commanded all ROK Army forces during the war and the ROK Army forces on the DMZ since then, until the creation of CFC in 1978. Koreans still refer to the top U.S. officer in Korea as the "Pal Gun" (Eighth Army) commander.

its commander was given opcon of three ROK corps of the Third ROK Army, and of the 2d Division, and the mission of defending the Western Sector of the DMZ. It and FROKA were the front line "field armies."

In 1978, in order to give the Commanding General, Third ROK Army, a greater role in the defense of Korea, TROKA's Capitol Corps was assigned the westernmost portion of the I Corps (ROK/US) Group sector. Two years later I Corps Group was redesignated the Combined Field Army. Then, in 1984, as a further move to increase TROKA's role, the CG TROKA was made responsible for fully half of the former Western Sector, bringing about the dispositions shown on page 4. The former I Corps (ROK/US) Group sector was now split between two field armies, and three field armies defended the DMZ.

Meanwhile, a major change in the command structure had occurred. In 1978 the ROK and U.S. governments agreed to form the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. For 28 long years the U.N. Command -- a U.S. headquarters commanding mostly ROK forces -- had been responsible for defending the Republic of Korea. With CFC's creation, a ROK/US operational staff took over. CINCUNC was now CINC CFC as well, but his CINCUNC duties were only those called for by the Armistice Agreement and (wearing that hat) he had no forces other than the U.S. security unit at Panmunjom.

The CINC CFC reports jointly to the "senior national command military authorities" (NCMAs) of the two countries, each nation's President and Secretary/Minister of Defense. A mechanism known as the ROK/US Military Committee provides strategic guidance to the CINC, responsive to the basic decisions of the two Presidents and their respective defense ministers.

In addition to the positions of CINCUNC and CINC CFC, the U.S. commander in Korea is also (see chart, page 7):

Commander, Ground Component Command of the ROK/US CFC -- (3) on the chart. There is no separate GCC staff; the subordinate field armies report directly to CINC CFC.

Commander, Ground Component Command of the U.N. Command [(4)]. This exists on paper in the event a ground element from a nation accredited to the U.N Command should be reintroduced to Korea (e.g., in the outbreak of war). No separate GCC headquarters is visualized.

Commander, U.S. Forces Korea [(5)]. USFK is a U.S.-only "sub-unified command" of the U.S. Pacific Command. In the role of Cdr, USFK, his boss is CINCPAC.

Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) [(6)]. EUSA is the "army component" of USFK. Its heritage is distinguished, but its functions today are essentially administrative and logistical. As the U.S. Army's top officer in Korea, CG EUSA commands through the Service channel the Commander, CFA (wearing the hat of Cdr, US Army element, CFA), and the CG, 2d Infantry Division.

Finally, there is the position of Senior U.S. Military Officer Assigned in Korea [(7)]. Representing the Chairman, US JCS, the Senior Officer serves as the U.S. member of the ROK/US Military Committee in Permanent Session; the ROK member is the Chairman, ROK JCS. In concert, these two decide day-to-day matters concerning the combined command. They refer unresolved or other appropriate matters to the Plenary Session of the ROK/US Military Committee, consisting of the Chairmen of the two JCSs, the CINCPAC, another designated ROK representative, and the CINC CFC. In the Plenary Session, the CINC CFC is bi-national; in the Permanent Session, the same person, as Senior U.S. Officer in Korea, is U.S.-only.

The complex command arrangements and multiple-hatting described above and diagrammed on page 7 have evolved in three forums. Two of these are the two governments' internal political/military decision-making structures -- their defense ministries and Joint Chiefs of Staff and their military Services (and in the U.S. case, Headquarters CINCPAC in Hawaii). Within each nation, the parties to decision-making each have their own agendas and interests which must be reconciled.

The third forum, and the ultimate coalition decision-making authority, is the annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) called for in the 1954 ROK/US Mutual Security Treaty as negotiated at the end of the Korean War. The most recent SCM, held in Seoul in May 1988, addressed a dozen or so agenda items on ROK/US command arrangements. A few of these were resolved; decisions on the remainder were deferred for further study.* The 1989 SCM will take another look.

*One of those which was resolved reveals both the intricacies of command arrangements in the bi-national Korea situation and the justifiable ROK unhappiness as an all-too-junior partner in the coalition which defends their country. It had to do with the authority to declare hostile a North Korean or other aircraft approaching or entering ROK airspace. This decision must be made at the Air Component Command Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at Osan Air Base where radar tracks are instantaneously reported and displayed. The decision has long been the authority of the ACC commander, who is also the Commander, Seventh Air Force, and Commander, Air Forces Korea. (As shown on page 7, the three-star Seventh Air Force commander reports in that hat to the CINC, Pacific Air Forces in Hawaii. He is also the Commander, Air Forces Korea, reporting in that hat to the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, which is function 5 of CINC CFC/CINCUNC. But Air Forces Korea includes no USAF

Given the continuing ROK unhappiness with the present command arrangements, and in view of the virtual certainty that after the Olympics there will be powerful pressures from the ROK side to change those command arrangements in their favor, what are the issues? And what are the options for change?

The first issue, to be faced by ROK and U.S. decision makers alike, has to do with the new influence of the ROK body politic. Until a year ago, the two governments could deal with matters of ROK/US command relationships with little concern for the opinion of Korean intellectuals or of the man in the street. That has changed. Korea now has a remarkably free press. These matters are now openly discussed in news stories, in editorials, in academic venues, and by the public at large. Through the last days of the Chun Doo Hwan regime the ruling government party could control any debate on these matters in the National Assembly. Now the government's is a minority party; the temptation of the opposition to make political hay out of these issues is sure to be irresistible.

squadrons, day-to-day. The three air commands -- ACC, Seventh Air Force, and ACC -- share the same TACC at Osan).

In any event, the issue before the 1988 SCM was who should make the decision to declare an aircraft hostile in the absence from Osan, or the non-availability, of the American three-star triple-hatted commander. Before the SCM, that decision authority went to an American colonel in a U.S.-only chain of command. The SCM changed that; the decision authority now goes to a ROKAF three-star general who is himself double-hatted as second-in-command of the ACC and as the commander of the ROKAF Combat Air Command.

The current impassioned discussion by press and politician of the ROK Army's suppression of the May 1980 Kwangju uprising brings the matter of the American CINC's opcon of Korean forces painfully to the fore. In its new-found prominence, the National Assembly is about to follow American practice and hold a full investigation of the Kwangju affair. American authorities in Korea have long claimed that they took no part in the decision to use the ROK Army at Kwangju and that the action was under ROK Army command. But the Korean impression is that General John Wickham, then CINC CFC, discussed the matter with ROK military authorities and "released" at least some of the forces used at Kwangju from CFC opcon to ROK Army command. It may well be that, as documents and testimony shed light on Kwangju in the investigation, this Korean impression will be confirmed -- or at least not eradicated.

One segment of Korean opinion has long blamed Americans, especially the American military, of being in bed with military dictatorship, as they put it. Kwangju gives that element another drum to beat, which certainly complicates any discussion of ROK/US command arrangements. Recent indications that radical students and their cohorts are about to shift to the issue of U.S. nuclear policy and weaponry in Korea simply underscore how command relationships and politics in Korea are intertwined. All this follows from U.S. policy having succeeded in bringing democracy to Korea, but it does present problems.

Another issue (perhaps factor would be a better word) as these matters of ROK/US command arrangements are discussed will be the positions of CINCPAC and the U.S. military Services, issue by issue. Service and CINCPAC policies (read "politics") have been responsible for many, if not most, of the conditions Koreans have been unhappy with. A prime example is the lack of opcon by CINC CFC/CINCUNC/Cdr USFK, under any of those hats, of the USAF squadrons permanently based in Korea. This is a considerable sore point with the Koreans. The condition derives from USAF insistence on the "flexibility" of tactical air and its need for centralized control -- in this case by the Pacific Air Command in Hawaii, several thousand miles from where its employment is supposedly being planned. Koreans observe that the entire ROKAF Combat Air Command is opcon to CINC CFC, under his Air Component Command. They note that CINC CFC and his ROK/US staff are said to be responsible for planning and executing theater and air/land operations for Korea's defense. Then they see that the only USAF forces that CINC CFC has under his opcon day-to-day consist of two F-15s on strip alert during U.S. high-flying reconnaissance missions.

Likewise, while the ROK has placed under CINC CFC's opcon its eight ROK corps which have front-line defense missions, the U.S. -- for reasons which are quite obscure to the ROK -- has not done the same with its one combat formation on the DMZ, the U.S. 2d Infantry Division.

The 1986 defense reorganization legislation known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act aimed to strengthen the U.S. military operational chain of command and to make commanders' authorities commensurate with their responsibilities. One gathers that, in his efforts to have extended to his level of command those worthy purposes, CINC CFC has had the support of CINCPAC toward resolving the two issues just named, and others. The problem apparently is with the Pentagon.

Another important factor in the equation of ROK/US command relationships is what might happen in the sphere of North-South rapprochement. Both governments have recently proposed meetings of one kind or another. If the ROK can get through its Olympics without North Korea attempting sabotage through outright violence, the stage may be set for a constructive dialog between the two sides. North Korea has however always insisted that the withdrawal of all American forces from Korea must be part of any South-North settlement. Would the North accept a political solution which replaces the 1953 Armistice Agreement and at the same time permits U.S. (say) air forces and a U.S. command structure to remain in Korea?

Suppose that the North would not accept such, yet neither the U.S. nor the ROK governments would agree to the total withdrawal of American forces from the peninsula. Does this lock us in indefinitely to an arrangement in which the CINC CFC and the CINCUNC must be the same person, and that person must be an American?

General Louis C. Menetrey, the present CINCUNC, is the lineal descendant of General Mark Clark, whose is the only signature of the United Nations side on the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Like MacArthur, the first CINCUNC, Clark in 1953 was the agent of the President of the United States -- and General Menetrey is the President's agent today, legally responsible through him to the United Nations Security Council for carrying out the provisions of that Armistice.

If there should be a North Korean military challenge to the Armistice Agreement, can anyone but an American officer command the military response to that challenge? Can the use of American forces on the ground be entirely absent from that military response? My own experience in the U.N. Command's August 1976 response to the ax murders of two American officers in the DMZ led me then to conclude that only an American officer, with U.S. forces on hand and in support, could properly serve the President of the United States in a military response to a North Korean challenge to the Armistice Agreement.

But is this really so? The Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950, simply requested the U.S. President to "name the commander" of the United Nations force. What if the President at some future time named a ROK Army general as CINCUNC? And what if that general were also CINC CFC, wearing hats numbered (1), (2), (3), and (4) on page 7 -- and hats (5), (6), and (7) belonged to his American deputy?

Farfetched as that might seem,* it may be worth considering in the framework of a solution which withdraws all U.S. ground forces from Korea, leaving only USAF tactical air and some logistics and command and control (including intelligence) -- and at the same time establishes in Japan a "Northeast Asia Command." This would be sub-unified command, more autonomous perhaps than most such, commanded by a four-star officer who holds the title of CINC, but still under CINCPAC. Resembling to a degree the Far East Command of post-WW II and the Korean War, it could pull together the plans and operations of what are now five separate CINCPAC commands controlled from Hawaii -- the Seventh Fleet, under CINC Pacific Fleet; the Fifth and Seventh Air Forces, under CINC Pacific Air Forces; and two subordinate unified commands (USFK in Korea and USFJ in Japan).

Such a U.S. unified command, its headquarters on Japanese soil, could also help harmonize the plans and operations of the national forces of Japan and the Republic of Korea -- assisting in overcoming the Koreans' deep seated animosities to Japan

*Would America, its public and its military institutions, permit its tactical air, its logistics, and perhaps its ground and naval forces to be employed under a Korean commander? In World War II, American forces served under British high command in the Mediterranean and China-Burma-India theaters, but not since then under any nation. The issue is not only one of national pride; it is also one of professional qualifications. The ROK military is a comparatively young institution; it has fine combat leaders and logisticians but little training and no tradition in planning and directing air/land/sea operations over an entire theater. Can they produce a general, along with the supporting staff expertise, who can adequately lead a ROK/US coalition? My answer is yes, given a determined commitment to do so.

which derive from centuries of invasion and four decades of harsh colonialization which ended only in 1945.

A coalition's military structure always reflects a blend of military and political considerations. The goal in North-east Asia is peace and stability; that goal has both political and military dimensions. The ROK government is adapting to full democracy. President Roh Tae Woo is engaged in a delicate balancing act. Polls show that he is quite popular himself, but that his party is not. Confronted with a fractious National Assembly, with farmers and industry demanding that he not cave in to American pressure to reduce the ROK-US trade imbalance, and with students -- but not only students -- who want to know more about the details of command arrangements that were only recently off limits, the last thing President Roh needs is an American military establishment that resists substantial change in those command relationships, in his favor.

The first thing the U.S. should do -- no need to wait for the next SCM, it would take only the stroke of a pen -- is to place the great bulk of American forces based in Korea, including all USAF squadrons and the 2d Infantry Division, under the opcon of the CINC CFC. This would eliminate the most evident inequity in ROK/US command arrangements.

The next step -- already considered by the 1988 SCM but its decision deferred -- would be to enlarge the responsibili-

ties of the ROK Deputy Commander, CFC, by making him the commander of the Ground Component Command. At the same time, TROKA could be assigned the entire Western Sector and CFA could be disestablished; this would be much sounder operationally than the present arrangement where the Western Sector is split between two field armies. The CFA commander and ROK/US staff could become part of the new GCC's staff (staying at Camp Red Cloud near Uijongbu, if that should be desired), and the CFA commander could become the deputy to the ROK GCC commander.

(Militarily, it would be questionable to set up a Ground Component Commander separate from the Deputy CINC CFC. The two should be one person, operating in wartime from the CFC main command post. Otherwise the intervening command headquarters between CFC and the two front line armies would hamper responsiveness and command direction.)

Another immediate move should be to get rid of the nuclear issue, by making the flat statement that nuclear weapons are no longer necessary for the defense of Korea -- and acting accordingly. General Menetrey has already said that he envisions no situation that would call for the employment of nuclear weapons. It is time to dismantle the obsolete structure of weapons storage, special weapons support teams, emergency action consoles, and permissive action links that has been

put into place over the past thirty years. It exacerbates the North's tendency to reckless behavior; it is not needed to deter them from invasion; it raises justifiable anxieties in the South (which radical elements are about to exploit); and the actual use of nuclear weapons in war would be an appalling catastrophe even to the victor.

To say again, the coalition seeks peace and stability, and the best guarantee that there will be no war is the quiet and unambiguous ability of the South in coalition with the United States to convince the North day-in-and-day-out that it should clearly not start a war. Each of the measures suggested -- opcon of Korea-based U.S. forces to CINC CFC, expansion of the duties of the Deputy CINC to include commanding the Ground Component Command, placing the Western Sector under one field army commander, and getting rid of the structure for nuclear weapons use -- contributes to that quiet and unambiguous strength.

But that strength also derives from the ability of the two nations' forces to operate as a team. Theater, air/land/sea, warfare and its command and control call for harmonized planning and execution. As the ROK/US command structure evolves it is crucial that there be preserved the unity of effort in planning, training, exercising, and -- should it become neces-

sary -- in the conduct of operations that has characterized the structure of ROK/US coalition operations since its inception almost forty years ago.

* * * * *

In Korea the United States is a victim of its own success. Our aim was to help the South's economy prosper, and look at what has happened! We wanted to help build the ROK armed forces, and now see the result. We have tried to assist them in achieving democracy, and see where we are. Given the marvelous achievements of the Korean people through their own hard work and intelligence, there is reason for confidence that their success story will continue to full political, economic, social -- and military -- maturity.

It is time to give them one more hand, by taking another step in the evolution of ROK/US command arrangements and the structure of mutual security that has for thirty five years provided the military shield to the Republic of Korea's growth.

Panel Remarks, September 1988

Transcribed here is the substance of the remarks that I made at the panel the second day of the CSIS/KIDA International Conference, September 12-13, in Seoul. My subject was "Command Arrangements in Korea: Issues and Options." This is reconstructed from notes that I made at the time and have since cut-and-pasted; those notes are assembled and attached hereto.

* * * * *

Command arrangements between Republic of Korea and United States forces need to be looked at in context. The foremost component of that context is the overriding need for peace on the Korean peninsula. Tension there can be, but war there cannot be.

Another component of that context is that the long range objective must be a unified Korea ("dong hae mulgwa Paekdusani"¹) -- independent, prosperous, in charge of its own destiny, in a Northeast Asia that enjoys peace and prosperity and of course in a world that is in the same condition. This might take 100 years.

The situation today between North and South is in flux. Possibilities exist for reducing tensions. But given the North's hostility, unpredictability, and heretofore unwavering aims -- and its military strength even unaided by the Soviet Union or China -- the best guarantee that there will be peace is the quiet and unambiguous ability of the South in coalition with the United States to convince the North day in and day out that it clearly should not start a war. Do not doubt that military strength. I commend to you General Menetrey's² speech of last night. He was describing objective reality.

Coalition command arrangements are now a matter of lively public discussion in Korea. Koreans, even those who firmly believe in the ROK/US coalition, justifiably believe that the Korean military is too much the junior partner. An example is the inequity in Headquarters CFC's³ jurisdiction over the USAF fighter squadrons based in Korea and over the US 2d Infantry Division. Neither of these come under CINC CFC,⁴ while all eight front-line ROK corps and the entire ROK Air Force Combat Air Command do. Aside from being politically inept on the part of the United States, this condition is militarily unprofes-

¹Words from the ROK national anthem ("east sea to Paek mountain [on the Yalu]") that mean the length and breadth of the Korean peninsula, or the whole united nation.

²General Menetrey was the U.S. commander in Korea.

³The ROK/US Combined Forces Command, of which the commander in chief (CINC) was General Menetrey.

⁴Although General Menetrey did command them in his capacity of Commander, US Forces Korea.

sional. CFC is supposed to plan for all forces. It is not General Menetrey's doing, and the United States should correct it immediately.

Now, I believe that one objective of the coalition should be (in due time, say the next five years) that the CINC CFC will be a Korean. (Here I referenced a long footnote in my paper). A step toward making CINC CFC a Korean would be to enlarge the responsibilities of the ROK Deputy Commander, CFC, by making him the commander of the Ground Component Command. I spell this out in my paper.

But CINC CFC and CINCUNC⁵ are now one person. It must be that way, as we learned vividly in our 1976 response to the North Korean ax murders of two Americans in the DMZ. The forces used in a military response to a challenge to the Armistice agreement are the same as those used to defend against invasion.

The title CINCUNC stems from the July 7, 1950, resolution of the United Nations Security Council, which made the U.S. President executive agent for the United Nations in the defense of Korea.⁶ Only CINCUNC on our side signed the 1953 Armistice. The ROK is not a UN member.⁷

Your government seeks a constructive dialog with the North that might lead to a replacement of the Armistice with a political settlement. North Korea has however insisted that the withdrawal of American forces from Korea must be a part of any rapprochement. This is a sticking point. Make no mistake, for the foreseeable future U.S. air, naval, logistic, and intelligence support is essential for the defense of Korea.

Suppose that the ROK government would not agree to the total withdrawal of American forces from the peninsula, but the dialog continued. In the interim, can CINCUNC also be a Korean? I say Yes! The Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950, simply requested the U.S. President to "name the commander" of the United Nations force. What if, when the first ROK general became CINC CFC, the President also named him as CINCUNC (I referred to my paper's proposition that there be a Japan-based multinational Northeast Asia Command, under which CINC CFC/CINCUNC would function⁸)

⁵Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.

⁶President Truman designated General MacArthur CINCUNC, and ROK President Syngmann Rhee gave MacArthur operational command over the ROK armed forces engaged in the ROK's defense.

⁷Both North and South Korea later became members of the United Nations.

⁸This was an unrealistic proposition. I later modified it to provide that the American CINC of my proposed Northeast Asia Command, stationed in Japan, would be CINCUNC (as had MacArthur, whose CINCUNC headquarters had been colocated with his headquarters, Far East Command, in Tokyo, in 1950.)

(I then read the paragraph beginning on the bottom of page 19 of my paper, which had caused such comment in the Korean press.)

Another immediate move should be to get rid of the nuclear issue, by making the flat statement that nuclear weapons are no longer necessary for the defense of Korea -- and acting accordingly. General Menetrey has already said that he envisions no situation that would call for the employment of nuclear weapons. It is time to dismantle the obsolete structure of weapons storage, special weapons support teams, emergency action consoles, and permissive action links that has been put into place over the past thirty years. It exacerbates the North's tendency to reckless behavior; it is not needed to deter them from invasion; it raises justifiable anxieties in the South (which radical elements are about to exploit); and the actual use of nuclear weapons in war would be an appalling catastrophe even to the victor.

That one paragraph worries my ROK friends very much (but I stand by it).

I also say that the long-standing policy of "neither confirm nor deny" the presence of nuclear weapons in Korea is out-of-date. Its original aim was, in part at least, "deterrence" or "to create uncertainty" (on the part of North Korea).

A sovereign people with a democratic constitution will simply not permit its chief executive or defense ministry, or another nation's military on its soil, to say for very long "We can neither confirm nor deny" a matter so profound as the presence of nuclear weapons (in its territory). We don't do it that way in NATO, and we can't do it much longer in Korea. Writers with access to unclassified sources, and through the Freedom of Information Act, have established that there clearly are nuclear weapons in Korea and, whether correct or not, their storage and other arrangements.

U.S. nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent to North Korea. They can do this from offshore, with modern delivery means and weapons. The combined ROK/US forces on

the ground, and their rapid U.S. reinforcement, are sufficient, without nuclear weapons, to deal a devastating response to North Korea.

(I concluded with the final paragraphs of my prepared text.)

You have my paper. ~~It~~ hereby release it for quotation
I will read key paragraphs, ~~from my papers~~

adding ~~ed~~ remarks as I go.

NOTES FOR PRESENTATION

~~August 10, 1988~~

Sep 13

Gen Menches +

Don't need any verbal
confidence from me
but I'm going to
to give them
me anyway.

Command Arrangements in Korea; Issues and Options*

Lieutenant General John H. Cushman
U.S. Army, Retired

Command arrangements between Republic of Korea ~~forces~~ and the United States forces ~~committed to the defense of peninsula~~ need to be looked at in a context. The foremost component of that context is the overriding need for peace on the Korean peninsula. Tension there can ~~and will likely~~ be, but war there cannot be.

(A)

but Another
Other components of that context ~~are~~ is that

The long range objective must be a unified Korea, ~~its independence~~ ~~in charge of its own destiny~~

"song hae mulgwa Paekdusan" - independent, prosperous, in charge of its own destiny ~~its existence~~

in a Northeast Asia that ~~is~~ also ~~at peace~~ enjoys peace + prosperity

+ of course in a world that is in the same condition might take 100 years

(2)

I used these cut-and-pasted notes to make my panel remarks, but I remember that, in view of the discussion that I had raised, I concentrated on the text beginning the fifth page down, on nuclear weapons.

JHC

igangsan
samchulle
pungyni
ways
Kisik
Duk
Choong's
vision

(A)

The situation today between North and South is in flux. Possibilities exist for ~~political, social, economic, as well as military~~ measures toward reducing tensions. But given the North's hostility, ^{its might, its} unpredictability, and ^{to} heretofore unwavering aims -- and its military strength even unaided by the ^{Soviet Union} USSR or China -- the best guarantee that there will be ^{peace} ~~no war~~ is the quiet and unambiguous ability of the South in coalition with the United States to ^{deter convince} ~~convince~~ the North ~~day in and day out~~ that it should clearly not start a war. (STET)

(B)

(B) Do not doubt that military strength. I commend to you General Menetrey's ^{speech of} last night. ~~And to the skeptics I tell you that~~ He was General Menetrey is describing objective reality.

~~If you don't understand the North's strength you don't understand the situation.~~

(C)

Coalition command arrangements are now a matter of lively public discussion in Korea. Koreans, ^{even those who firmly believe in} proud of their hard won ~~the ROK/US coalition, justifiably believe~~ world status, believe -- and many Americans agree -- that the Korean military ^{is too much the junior partner.} ~~should have a larger place in the scheme.~~

*This paper is prepared for the KIDA/OSIS Conference on the Future of ROK/US Security Relations, Seoul, Korea, September 11-13, 1988

An example is the inequity in ~~command~~ ^{CINCPAC CFC} headquarters [↓]
jurisdiction ~~of~~ over the USAF ^{fighter} squadrons based in Korea
and over the 2^d Inf Div. Neither of these

come under CINCPAC, ^{while all} yet eight front line ROK
corps and ^{ROKAF} the entire ^{on the part of the US} Combat Air Command do.

Aside from being politically inept, ^{condition} ~~are open to General Mervyn~~, and ~~has~~ CFC is
responsible CFC is supposed to ^{all pros.} ~~plan for~~. This is militarily
unprofessional. It is not ^{all pros.} General Mervyn's doing +
The US, ~~can court this with the stroke of~~
~~should court it~~
~~a pen + should do so immediately. as a symbol~~

one objective of the coalition.
Now, I believe that ~~CINCPAC CFC~~ should ~~be~~
^{say the next 3-4} ~~say~~ that the CINCPAC will
~~be~~ in due time, ~~say~~ that the CINCPAC will
~~should~~ be a Korean, ~~and that this should~~ ~~could~~

*Would America, its public and its military institutions, ^{US} permit its tactical air, its logistics, and perhaps its ground and naval forces to be employed under a Korean commander? In World War II, American forces served under British high command in the Mediterranean and China-Burma-India theaters, but not since then under any nation. The issue is not only one of national pride; it is also one of professional qualifications. The ROK military is a comparatively young institution; it has fine combat leaders and logisticians but little training and no tradition in planning and directing air/land/sea operations over an entire theater. Can they produce a general, along with the supporting staff expertise, who can adequately lead a ROK/US coalition? My answer is yes, given a determined commitment to do so.

11 & 51 up 10000 ...
would be to enlarge the responsibilities of the ROK Deputy Commander, CFC, by making him the commander of the Ground Component Command. ^{this} At the same time, ^{I spell out - the my paper} TROKA could be assigned the entire Western Sector and CFA could be disestablished; this would be much sounder operationally than the present arrangement where the Western Sector is split between two field armies. ~~The CFA commander and ROK/US~~

But CINCUNC + CINCCFC are now one person.
as we found learned vividly in our ¹⁹⁷⁶ response
It must be that way, ~~because the same forces~~

~~which are used to~~
to the North Korean ax murders of two Americans
in the DMZ, the forces used in a military response
to a challenge to the Armistice agreement are ~~the~~
~~also~~ the same as those used to defend against
invasion. Two separate people cannot command
one force.

The title CINCUNC
~~But can CINCUNC be a Korean? That~~
title stems from the ~~to~~ July 7 1950 resolution
of the U.N. Security Council. ^{Only} CINCUNC ~~is only~~ on
our side signed the 1953 Armistice. The ROK is not
^{which changed the US President}

~~Relationships to which might happen in the past~~

~~rapprochement. Both governments have recently proposed meetings of one kind or another. If the ROK can get through its Olympics without North Korea attempting sabotage through outright violence, the stage may be set for a constructive dialog. between the two sides. North Korea has however always insisted that the withdrawal of all American forces from Korea must be part of any South-North settlement. Would the North accept a political solution which replaces the 1953 Armistice Agreement and at the same time permits U.S. (say) air forces and a U.S. command structure to remain in Korea?~~

Two weeks

of the Armistice

with the North which in

lead to replacement with a political settlement.

approchement. This - a sticking point - but the dialog
disloyal

read

Make no mistake - for the foreseeable future US air log intel sp is essential for the def of Korea

In the interim.

~~Suppose that the North would not accept such, yet neither the U.S. nor the ROK governments would agree to the total withdrawal of American forces from the peninsula. Does this lock us in indefinitely to an arrangement in which the CINC CFC and the CINCUNC must be the same person, and that person must be an American?~~

not not

Can CINCUNC also

but the dialog continued..

CINC CFC can should be a Korean- Can CINCUNC

~~a North Korean challenge to the Armistice Agreement.~~

I say yes!

ROK general became CINC CFC

~~But is this really so? The Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950, simply requested the U.S. President to "name the commander" of the United Nations force. What if the President at some future time named a ROK Army general as CINCUNC? And what if that general were also CINC CFC, wearing hats numbered (1), (2), (3), and (4) on page 7 -- and hats (5), (6), and (7) belonged to his American deputy?~~

when the first

NEKia comment

Another immediate move should be to get rid of the nuclear issue, by making the flat statement that nuclear weapons are no longer necessary for the defense of Korea -- and acting accordingly. General Menetrey has already said that he envisions no ^{scenarios} ~~situation~~ that would call for the employment of nuclear weapons. It is time to dismantle the obsolete structure of weapons storage, special weapons support teams, emergency action consoles, and permissive action links that has been put into place over the past thirty years. It exacerbates the North's tendency to reckless behavior; it is not needed to deter them from invasion; it raises justifiable anxieties in the South (which radical elements are about to exploit); and the actual use of nuclear weapons in war would be an appalling catastrophe even to the victor.

That one paragraph ~~has attracted a~~
~~great deal of attention.~~ It worries my ROK
military friends very much.

I ~~think~~ say that the ^{long-standing} policy of "neither confirm
the presence of nuclear weapons
nor deny" is out-of-date.

etc original in part at least
"deterrence" to
create uncertainty

Writers with access to

unclassified sources and the Freedom of Information Act have established that there clearly are nuclear weapons in Korea and, whether correct or not, the storage & other arrangements.

with a democratic constitution
A sovereign people ~~democratically governed~~
~~country~~ will simply not permit its ^{chief} executive
or another nation's military or its soil
or defense ministry to say for very long "We
will neither confirm nor deny" a matter so
the presence of
proposed as nuclear weapons. We don't do it that
the US - can't do it much longer
way in NATO + we ~~shouldn't~~ do it in Korea.

With modern delivery
means + weapons.

U.S. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent
~~They need not do this in the~~
to North Korea. They can do this from
offshore. The combined ROK/US forces, ^{on the ground} and
^{rapid US} their reinforcement, ~~using conventional weapons,~~
are sufficient, ~~using non-nuclear~~ without
nuclear weapons, to deal a devastating response
to NK.

To say again, the coalition seeks peace and stability, and the best guarantee that there will be no war is the quiet and unambiguous ability of the South in coalition with the United States to convince the North day-in-and-day-out that it should clearly not start a war. Each of the measures suggested -- ~~opcon of Korea-based U.S. forces to CINC CFC, expansion of the duties of the Deputy CINC to include commanding the Ground Component Command, placing the Western Sector under one field army commander, and getting rid of the structure for nuclear weapons use~~ -- contributes to that quiet and unambiguous strength.

But that strength also derives from the ability of the two nations' forces to operate as a team. Theater, air/land/

sea, warfare and its command and control call for harmonized planning and execution. As the ROK/US command structure evolves it is crucial that there be preserved the unity of effort in planning, training, exercising, and -- should it become necessary -- in the conduct of operations that has characterized the structure of ROK/US coalition operations since its inception almost forty years ago.

* * * * *

In Korea the United States is a victim of its own success. Our aim was to help the South's economy prosper, and look at what has happened! We wanted to help build the ROK armed forces, and now see the result. We have tried to assist them in achieving democracy, and see where we are. Given the marvelous achievements of the Korean people through their own hard work and intelligence, there is reason for confidence that their success story will continue to full political, economic, social -- and military -- maturity.

It is time to give them one more hand, by taking another step in the evolution of ROK/US command arrangements and the structure of mutual security that has for thirty five years provided the military shield to the Republic of Korea's growth.

SOUTH KOREA

Withdrawal symptoms

Americans ponder the removal of nuclear arms

By John McBeth in Seoul

The US has routinely refused to confirm or deny that it has nuclear weapons in South Korea, though it is known they were first installed there three decades ago as the ultimate deterrence to northern aggression. Now, however, two American generals advocate that nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from the peninsula in response to what they say are changed political circumstances and an emerging public debate on the subject.

It was time, military consultant Lieut-Gen. John Cushman said, to dispense with the nuclear issue "by making the flat statement that nuclear weapons are no longer necessary for the defence of [South] Korea — and acting accordingly." His remarks were made during a recent conference in Seoul on the future of US-South Korean security relations, marked by the most open exchange yet on bilateral defence matters.

Cushman, commander of I Corps in the vital western sector of the demilitarised zone (DMZ) between 1976 and 1978, appeared to be partly basing his argument on the 1987 statement of Combined Forces Command (CFC) commander-in-chief Gen. Louis Menetrey that he could not envision any situation in which nuclear weapons would have to be used.

"It is time to dismantle the obsolete structure of weapons storage, special-weapons support teams, emergency-action consoles, and permissive-action links that have been put in place over the past 30 years," Cushman said. "It exacerbates North Korea's tendency to reckless behaviour, it is not needed to deter them from invasion, it raises justifiable anxieties in the South and the actual use [of them] would be an appalling catastrophe even to the victor."

Cushman was supported in his view by retired brigadier-general Amos Jordan, vice-chairman of the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Jordan said the nuclear deterrent could be just as well maintained offshore as on the peninsula.

South Korean analysts were noticeably reluctant to address the topic, but there are clearly reservations on both sides. Retired lieutenant-general Jack Graves admitted to the conference that the world's attitude towards nuclear weapons was "constantly evolving" but added that he would not like the subject to be treated any differently than in Europe because it would put South Korea at a disadvantage.

By unilaterally withdrawing nuclear weapons, he said, the US would be

throwing away a bargaining chip important to possible future negotiations with North Korea and the Soviet Union over the reduction of tensions on the peninsula. He indicated it was for this reason as well that he was opposed to a proposal by South Korean opposition parties that the immediate region be declared a nuclear-free zone.

"To neither confirm nor deny is the most effective way towards deterrence," he told the conference, which was packed with civilian-suited South Korean generals who were obviously surprised at the openness of the debate. "In most circumstances, it is a good way to handle it. We need to keep nuclear weapons in the equation."

Part of South Korea's conservative

dent Roh Tae Woo will find it increasingly difficult to justify the current policy to his people. Activist groups are homing in on the issue. Lawyer Han Sung Hon says the time may be near when the quaintly titled Korea Anti-Pollution Movement Association will be renamed to reflect its anti-nuclear stance. "Many people worry about [the presence of] nuclear weapons, but [up to now] have not been able to say anything" for fear of government repression, he said.

According to defence analysts Richard Fieldhouse and William Arkin in their book *Nuclear Battlefields*, in 1985 there were 151 nuclear weapons in South Korea, including 60 gravity bombs, 70 artillery shells and missiles, and 21 terrain-shifting atomic demolition mines (ADMs) — many of them reportedly stored in a secure area at the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing's Kunsan base on the western coast. At least seven US bases, among them Yongsan in central Seoul, Osan airbase to the south, and camps Essayons and Stanley to the north, are thought to be equipped



North and South Korean delegates at recent talks over a non-aggression pact.

establishment apparently believes that Cushman has ignored strategic needs while raising the issue during a period of "minor" political change. Lee Jong Ha, a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute — a think-tank personally established as the Ilhae Institute by former president Chun Doo Hwan — said the decision to remove nuclear weapons should stem from military and security considerations, not political pressure.

Political analysts feel it will be difficult for the Americans to continue their coyness over nuclear weapons, given indications that South Korean dissidents will home in on the issue after the Olympic Games in Seoul. Some suggest that Washington may have to adopt the policy it follows in Europe, where the presence of nuclear weapons is acknowledged, but not their geographic location.

Many Americans argue that in South Korea's new democratic setting, Presi-

with emergency-action consoles to receive nuclear-release orders.

Military sources say nuclear-capable artillery units are stationed in rear areas and not in forward positions on the DMZ itself. The 155-mm batteries and Lance surface-to-surface missiles are understood to be under the ultimate control of the chief-of-staff, US Forces Korea. This is a separate command from that of the US 2nd Division — the 14,000-man tripwire on the main Munsan invasion corridor north of Seoul.

The ADMs, capable of blocking narrow valleys and halting advancing tank columns with impassable craters, are regarded as the centrepiece of the US Army's nuclear arsenal in South Korea. But some Western experts dub them "dirty" weapons, that is, their radiation spread is over a greater area than militarily necessary and this is reputedly the reason why the West Germans had them removed from their territory several years ago.

J.H. Cushman
7 January 1989

Addendum to Paper on Command Arrangements in Korea

When I presented this paper at the Conference in Seoul, the Korean press immediately seized on the paragraph on page 19 which called for taking nuclear weapons out of Korea. One newspaper which reflected the radical student view kept the issue alive for several days.

I was the first senior American officer, retired or not, who seemed to say that U.S. nuclear weapons were actually in Korea. For years the official ROK/US line had been to "neither confirm nor deny" their presence. Speaking at the conference I said that Korea was now a democracy and that this policy was no longer appropriate. I said that, as in the U.S. and Europe, the people of Korea had a right to discuss the matter openly and to decide through their democratic institutions whether they wanted nuclear weapons on their soil and what the policies should be for their use.

What I did dismayed many in the ROK government and the U.S. military command. They thought it better had I not raised the issue. Korean and American authorities were reconsidering the policy of "neither confirm nor deny." The political scene was excited enough; intense public discussion of the nuclear question was unwelcome.

The matter of nuclear weapons is complex and sensitive. If the U.S. takes them out, might that send the wrong signal to the North? Might North Korea decide to build a nuclear capability. Might the ROK be inclined to do the same? What difference does it make for nuclear weapons to be on Korean soil if they are still under U.S. control? What is involved in U.S. and/or ROK forces' use of nuclear weapons in war? Who decides on their use. How is that decision made? What implications do nuclear policy and nuclear weapons' presence, North or South, Soviet or U.S. or Chinese, have on unification? What about Japan?

My paper's one paragraph dealt with none of these issues, However, I am satisfied that my judgment was essentially correct; nuclear weapons should be taken out of Korea.