

The Question of Defense Organization

The question is not whether 1961 will bring changes in the organization of the Department of Defense. The valid pressures for change are already too great to deny that change will come. The question is - what form are these changes to take?

On this question, ideas are plentiful. One group believes in the single service, or at the minimum a "decisive" step toward greater centralization. The other extreme is convinced that we have already gone too far toward an all-powerful Department of Defense. Catch phrases are being heard on all sides - "civilian control," "eliminate waste and duplication," and "Prussian General Staff," to name a few.

It would be hard to say that the present defense organization cannot be usefully changed. For one thing, history would argue against you; we have seen several reorganizations which have improved on what was set up in 1947, and we shall undoubtedly see more.

Basically, reorganization schemes are of two kinds - "revolutionary" and "evolutionary." Both say that reforms are needed. The former sees the need for immediate and sweeping changes; the latter says that the present structure is basically sound. The former says that only major surgery will suffice; the latter says that major surgery will set the patient back for months, probably years.

The approach in this essay will be evolutionary - to look at what the Department of Defense is supposed to do, to see how it operates today, and to propose substantial but not sweeping changes to make it do the job better. We shall look at the main geography of the defense establishment - not at the details of each ravine and hillock - and at the broad principles which should govern its improvement.

Basically, there are three things which any defense organization must do - three "functions" which it must perform. These functions are:

First, to provide the military forces of the nation. Today, within the Department of Defense this function is assigned by law to the military departments - the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Second, to employ these military forces. Today, the law provides that this function will be performed by the various "combatant commands" of the Department of Defense, and commands such as the European Command and the Strategic Air Command have been established for this purpose.

Third, to direct the operation of the organization as a whole. Today, the law assigns this function to the Secretary of Defense, and provides him the help of his principal assistants and their staffs within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Staff.

These are fairly distinct, even classical, functions. No matter how you would organize the Department of Defense, you would have to find a way to provide the forces, employ the forces, and direct the operation as a whole. It happens that, within our Department of Defense, the elements which perform each function are firmly fixed in the law.

Let us look first at the function of providing the military forces and see if there is any way we can improve its performance.

The National Security Act, as it was passed in 1947 and as it reads today, is quite explicit as to the responsibility for this function. For example, as it pertains to the Army, the 1947 Act reads:

"In general, the United States Army, within the Department of the Army, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It shall be responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime

It is this paragraph, and similarly worded paragraphs for the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps (within the Department of the Navy) and for the United States Air Force (within the Department of the Air Force), that nail down the responsibility for providing the military forces within the Department of Defense.

The task is basically that of the four military Services, within the three military departments. The ultimate responsibility is that of the departments, and specifically the Secretaries of the respective departments.

This responsibility is partially obscured by the other Department of Defense agencies which help in the providing function - specialized agencies such as the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA), and the Defense Communications Agency (DCA). In addition, under the "single manager" concept, each department performs a variety of DoD-wide services, such as the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) assigned to the Department of the Navy. But by law and in actual practice, the providing function is assigned to the three military departments.

What is this function? In essence, it is the "preparation" of forces "organized, trained, and equipped" for a particular form of combat operations. The military Services and departments have no responsibility for the conduct of operations. The 1958 amendment to the National Security Act clearly assigns the "performance of military missions" to "combatant commands" and states that these commands will be "composed of forces of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force."

Each Department's responsibility involves a number of complex and related activities, such as: research and development of new weapons; development of Service doctrine and new operational concepts; the orderly evolution of combat and logistical organizations; the processes of bringing men into the Service, organizing units, training and equipping these men and units, and eventually turning them over to combatant commands. Based on its own needs and historical development, each Department has its own machinery to carry out these tasks.

This is the way the job of providing is being done today.

The question now becomes - how can we improve our organization and procedures for the performance of this function? Some have suggested that the military departments should be eliminated, and that three deputy or under Secretaries of Defense should take the place of the three separate departmental Secretaries. Others have gone further, suggesting also the elimination of the four military Services, in favor of establishing a single Service.

Advocates of these views argue that new weapons technology and rapidly changing concepts of war are erasing the traditional forms of military operations and organization. They say that our concepts must keep pace with, must actually anticipate, these changes; that Service functions and weapons will increasingly overlap, and that the only way to eliminate duplication and get the maximum for the defense dollar is to do away with the independent departments and Services and combine them into a single structure.

This is a powerful argument. It is buttressed by quotations from authorities as high as the President of the United States that "separate land, sea, and air warfare is a thing of the past." It is also made very cogent by the dollar squeeze as weapons and forces become more and more expensive.

This move toward the creation of a relatively monolithic single department, which might or might not involve a single Service, has considerable appeal, but it would probably raise doubts in the minds of a management consultant asked for an opinion. As a move toward centralization, it runs counter to the time tested concept of decentralization. Experience has shown that the only way to manage a very large enterprise is to decentralize - to group related activities and to clearly fix subordinates with the responsibility for the performance of these activities. Corporations such as General Motors and General Electric, among others, understand this principle well and profit from its application.

Generally, if there is a choice, the management expert would prefer to decentralize elements of a big operation, maintaining essential executive controls, rather than to centralize. The trick, however, is to decentralize intelligently.

In the problem at hand, the question becomes - can we continue to decentralize to the three separate departments the function of providing military forces? Put it another way - can we any longer delineate concepts of land, sea, and air warfare, corresponding to the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force?

Here you are up against a question of doctrine, and if you follow an argument on defense organization or policy to its end, this is where you will often arrive.

Let us take up one form of warfare - warfare at sea - and look at some facts that are hard to dispute. First, roughly two-thirds of our globe is deep water. Second, the United States is an insular power, separated from its most powerful friends and all its potential enemies by deep water. And third, navies have been around for a long time and have seen lots of technology go by. In the face of these realities, it would be hard to convince the average panel - say of newspapermen or Congressmen - that this particular form of warfare is a thing of the past. The nature of navies may change, but we can be fairly safe in saying that navies will remain.

Similarly, with armies. For those who think otherwise one need only begin the argument with "How do you propose to deal with the enemy army?" - and take it from there.

Furthermore, it turns out, when you look closely at the words President Eisenhower used on "separate land, sea, and air warfare," that actually he was referring to the need for unifying the strategic direction and operational employment of forces of the separate Services - not unifying the Services themselves.

Today the function of providing the naval - or, more accurately, the maritime - forces of the United States has been fairly well delineated and has been decentralized to the Department of the Navy, with its two Services, the Navy and the Marine Corps. The main drive of the Navy/Marine Corps during the formulation of the 1947 National Security Act and since has been to maintain the integrity of the maritime function.

For example, at the Navy's insistence, the 1947 law spelled out at some length that the Department of the Navy would contain naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps, and clearly defined the functions of the latter.

Again, in 1949, a major Navy objective in 1949 Congressional hearings on unification was to maintain the Navy's freedom to develop advanced weapons of naval warfare. The hearings were obscured by a number of other issues, including differences on strategy and the B-36 aircraft, but to the Navy the principal issue was the cancelled supercarrier USS United States, which the Navy believed to be essential to the continued development of a modern Navy.

There are many reasons for the steady and sound evolution since 1945 of the Navy/Marine Corps - but foremost among these must be placed the underlying concept of the maritime function, faith in the continuity of that function, and ability to control within a single department the resources necessary for full performance of the function.

Doctrinally one might state that the maritime function is to carry out military operations in the maritime environment. The maritime environment is the sea, on and below its surface, and that part of the atmosphere above and bordering the sea in which it is necessary for maritime forces to operate. Maritime forces consist of naval forces, including naval aviation, and Marine Corps forces of the combined arms "for service with the fleet and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign."

The Department of the Navy is the source of these maritime forces, the repository of the professionalism peculiar to these forces, the custodian of their traditions, the originator of innovation, the keeper of doctrine, the

Can we develop the same sort of concept for the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force?

Here you have a problem rooted in the history of the 1947 "Unification Act." When the Air Force split away from the United States Army, it took with it certain functions which were recognized by all as absolutely essential to land operations in an air age - functions such as close combat air support, air reconnaissance, battlefield airlift, and the like. Naval officers, in their fight to retain naval aviation, were astounded that the Army gave up these vital functions - but the Army did so with the expectation, even the understanding, that through a combination of Air Force cooperation and Department of Defense direction, these vital components of land warfare would continue to be available and would evolve in harmony with the other elements of land combat.

These expectations have not been borne out. What has happened is that the Air Force has literally flown away from the Army. The close integration of battlefield means and doctrine epitomized in the World War II P47 and C47 and in the Patton/Quesada relationship in the 1944 Normandy breakout and drive across France has all but disappeared.

For example, in the field of close air support the Air Force has gone to the F-105 Thunderchief - a fine Mach 2 aircraft which can deliver a thermonuclear punch but which will have a fair amount of trouble responding to a division commander's fire mission. The Army's substitutes to fill the gap are its missiles and its embryonic aviation, but recognition of the scope of Army needs in these areas has been slow in emerging, and the close air support gap is widening.

To fill a similar gap in the air reconnaissance needed to meet the land force requirements for battlefield intelligence and target acquisition, the Army is developing reconnaissance means of its own, to include drones, surveillance equipment, and observation aircraft. Again this equipment remains rudimentary and in short supply - and the gap is widening.

The gap in battlefield air transport is illustrated by the passing from the scene of the C-123 two-engine assault aircraft, and its replacement by the four-engine, pressurized cabin, 33 ton C-130 aircraft. This is a fine tactical

into its inventory small numbers of the Caribou two-engine aircraft, smaller in size but quite similar in concept and design to the C-123 of ten years ago.

What has held back the Army? What is the problem here? Is it the law? No - the law is not restrictive, it allows the Army to have "land combat and service elements and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein."

The problem is that the concept of Service roles and missions remains as it was formulated fifteen years ago and does not provide for decentralizing to the Army the responsibility of providing military forces for operations on land.

In order to decentralize, you would have to establish a concept of the land environment like that of the maritime environment described above. You would have to say, in effect:

"The Army, as the nation's land force, will develop and organize for employment those weapons and forces which operate in the land environment. The land environment consists of the land areas of the earth and the boundary layers of air and sea in which land forces operate in the conduct of the land battle."

Once having done this, you could then give the Army relative latitude in using its resources to mold the nation's integrated forces for land combat.

What would be the Air Force "environment" under these concepts?

The answer is - "aerospace."

The aerospace environment would include all space beyond the atmosphere, plus that much of the atmosphere necessary for the conduct of relatively independent air operations for air superiority, long range bombardment, interdiction, distant air defense, and the like, as well as the associated operations in space. The Air Force would have the primary responsibility for providing military forces to conduct combatant operations in this "aerospace" environment.

Why give "space" to the Air Force? In the first place, some one should have the ball. In the second place, it is a natural extension of the air domain. In the third place, the Air Force in effect has most of the job already - particularly since the decision by the Secretary of Defense to charge that Service with the task of providing the boosters for all DoD payloads.



And, in the fourth place, we would not give all of space to the Air Force. The assignment should make clear that the Departments of the Army and Navy would continue to use capabilities in space to perform their assigned missions. If the Army is responsible for knowing the coordinates of a point on the earth's surface, and if a space vehicle helps to do that job, the Army uses a space vehicle (put into orbit by an Air Force booster). The same with the Navy and a navigation satellite - or with other tasks of these departments. However, these Army or Navy vehicles would be operating primarily in the supporting fields - for navigation, mapping and geodesy, communications, and the like. Space vehicles, manned or unmanned, in the operational field would be provided by the Air Force as "aerospace environment" military forces.

Further caveats should be provided. Space is a question mark, and all Services should take part in a broad front attack to answer its questions. For example, even though the moon circles in "aerospace" the door should be left open for the Army, and possibly the Navy as well, to contribute their respective capabilities to the military use of the moon. There is, in fact, some conceptual similarity between a lunar operation and an airborne operation in the "airhead" phase. And a "mounted" reconnaissance patrol on the moon might be surprisingly like a patrol in the Arctic, or in the desert.

For the performance of military missions, aerospace forces - like land and maritime forces - would, of course, be assigned to, and employed by, combatant commands, directed by the Secretary of Defense through the JCS.

What job would the DoD top management have under this decentralized environmental approach?

To begin with - there will continue to be major problems where these environments come together and overlap. Someone must regulate and arbitrate, for example, the Navy/Marine Corps interest in the land environment in the field of amphibious doctrine and capabilities. Someone must regulate the Navy and Army when their environments interact with the aerospace environment. The tasks of continental air defense and long range strategic attack are particularly knotty ones which the Department of Defense top echelon will have to sort out. But these are problems inherent in any decentralization. The

The key to this approach is the rewrite of the famous "Functions Paper" on Service roles and missions - first written in Key West in 1948. This document, essentially unchanged for 12 years, does not contain the word "missile," does not mention "space," and was written only three years after the dawn of the atomic age. On the face of it, there would seem to be a need for some revision. Revise it along the concept of decentralizing the providing function to the respective departments by environment and you will go a long way toward both simplifying and strengthening the over-all organization of the Department of Defense.

Of course, the main job of the DoD top management is to plan and program the use of resources in conformance with a unified central strategic plan, preparation of which is the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense, assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Department of Defense superstructure will concern itself with efficient use of these resources - men, money, materiel, installations, and the like. For example, if the Air Force has a surplus of radar officers because they are phasing out two-place interceptors, and if the Navy needs a lot of these specialists because they are adding two-place interceptors, and if it costs several thousand dollars to train such a specialist, then someone in the Department of Defense finds and directs the obvious solution to this problem.

Now, let us move to the next major function of the Department of Defense - that of employing the military forces. The 1958 reorganization amendments clearly assigned the responsibility and the concept under which the responsibilities would be discharged.

"With the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish unified or specified combatant commands for the performance of military missions, and shall determine the force structure of such combatant commands to be composed of forces of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, which shall then be assigned to such combatant commands by the departments concerned for the performance of such military missions. \*\*\*"

This language is excellently conceived. Under its provisions the Department of Defense has established seven combatant commands and departments have provided these with forces.

Such improvements as can be made in the performance of this function are almost entirely procedural. Most of these are in reality improvements in the top management structure of the Department of Defense, rather than in the commands themselves. For example, it would be valuable if the unified and specified commanders had a greater voice in their own force structure planning. Despite the language of the law - a Service can, and still does, from time to time, unilaterally change the strength of its component of a combatant command, to the pain of the unified commander, or to his pleasure, depending on whether the change is down or up.

Now we come to the final consideration - how we improve the "over-all control and direction" of the defense establishment.

The top management structure of the Defense Department has three main components. First, there are the civilian Assistant Secretaries, the General Counsel, and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering - this is the "civilian side." Second, there is the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, including the Joint Staff - this is the "military side." Third, on top of these two there is the Secretary of Defense, his Deputy Secretary, and his immediate office - his special assistants, secretariat, and the like.

This structure fairly well corresponds to what many consider to be the classically proper areas of responsibility of the civilian and the military in a military department. (See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington's "Soldier and the State.") Under this concept of the separation of duties, the "military side" is concerned primarily with matters of strategic planning, force requirements, doctrine, and the operation of military forces, including their field logistical support. This is where the military professional can bring to bear his experience, training, and special competence.

On the other hand, according to this concept, the "civilian side" is concerned with the fiscal, procurement, and industrial logistics part of the

his background and competence in the business, technical, legal, management, and industrial fields.

On top of this, however, the most important function of the appointive civilian is to direct the operation of both the "civilian" and "military" sides and the defense establishment as a whole, by providing basic decisions and policy direction in both fields.

It is the view of people such as Huntington that when these three functions are established in balance and working in harmony, the required civilian control of the military department is assured, along with the proper degree of military professional advice and assistance. Within the three military departments this relationship is most clearly followed in the Department of the Navy.

Since the basic structure of the top management of the Defense Department is in reasonable alignment with this classical concept, and if we accept the view that this is a good concept, the problem becomes one of improving the three components and their relationships.

First, let us deal with the "military side" - the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff.

From 1947 to the present, the JCS organization has evolved from a three-man committee, with no chairman, and a 100 officer staff - to a five-man committee, including a chairman, and a 400 officer staff. Its responsibilities have grown correspondingly - the most recent addition being in 1958 when the Secretary of Defense affirmed that he would exercise command of the combatant commands not through the military departments as executive agents, but rather through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Joint Staff, thus making the Joint Chiefs of Staff an operational staff.

Although the JCS organization has shown consistent improvement in this evolution, there remains a serious and basic deficiency. Stating it very bluntly, the Secretary of Defense, and the various elements of the "civilian side" of his top management structure, are actually operating without the day-to-day objective advice they must have from the "military side." And because the "military side" is not doing its job, the "civilian side" is of necessity

This situation stems from the very nature of the current JCS procedures. Every important action of the JCS organization must eventually go before the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves. This corporate body consists of the Chairman, who represents no Service, and the four military members, each of whom is the military chief of his Service. (For all practical purposes the Commandant of the Marine Corps is a member of the JCS.) Naturally, each military chief will look at the problem primarily from the viewpoint of his Service. This is not bad - in fact there is a necessary element of good in this situation. However, the essence of good staff work is objectivity - a rational, dispassionate analysis of all the facts. The problem with the current procedure arises because the action officer knows that his task is to prepare a paper which will satisfy the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and thus tends to approach his subject with an entirely different point of view than he would if his task were to present the objectively best military solution to the problem at hand.

The action officer is more interested than he should be in the subjective Service "positions" on the matter - so he can write his solution intelligently - and this gets in the way of his interest in the objective facts and figures.

Now, it should be said that the situation is improving. You cannot take 400 professionals who have been trained all their adult lives to make an estimate of the situation and grind out of them completely their instinctive desire to make the estimate objective. But the structure is basically against them, and each of them knows it. Each knows that when his paper finally gets to the Service Chiefs and the Chairman, the element of Service position automatically enters the picture - and the action officer is better off if he works the compromise out before the paper gets that far.

How does this affect the workings of the top management echelon of the Department of Defense? Well, the members of the JCS do not like to send divergent opinions to the Secretary of Defense. So when they differ on an issue they either work out a compromise solution, or delay action on the

past many important actions have not been moved to the Secretary of Defense at all. In any event, the result is that the Secretary of Defense does not get on a day-to-day basis the timely, cold, military appraisal of a trained joint staff.

Certainly most action officers connected with the JCS machinery can cite papers which have been exceptions to this general rule. These are generally of two kinds. One is the kind in which the Secretary of Defense familiarizes himself in great detail with the problem and in effect arbitrates very intelligently between opposing views - in other words, he does his own staff work. The "targeting" decision of last August was such a case, and Mr. Gates has justly received great credit for a workable and Solomon-like solution. But there isn't time enough in the day for the Secretary and the Chiefs to do this, even with only major problems.

The other kind occurs when the Joint Staff has come up with a clean, crisp, militarily sound solution with which none of the Services completely agrees, but which the Chairman takes as his own and shows to the Secretary, and which the Secretary finds to his liking - either as is, or with slight modification. This happens - but all too rarely.

The JCS procedures inject another obstacle into the operations of the DoD top management echelon. Because the lower levels of the Joint Staff have no confidence that they speak with any authority at all for the JCS organization (the "military side"), it is almost impossible for the "military side" and the "civilian side" to work closely from day-to-day at lower levels as they must for the most effective over-all management.

For example, assume that the people in the office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering want to explore the Joint Staff's views on an important question of weapons development such as "What should be the range and accuracy criteria for various strategic delivery systems?"

Now this question is loaded with strategic, operational, and budgetary implications. It is one which deserves a "joint" military point of view. However, by the time a formal action gets agreed to and through the JCS, either the advice is too late to help, or it is so "waffled" that it is

meaningless, or both. The lower echelons of the Joint Staff know this well, and are loath to express an opinion on the matter even in informal conversation with the "civilian side." The result: the "civilian side" makes its recommendation without any military input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. And eventually the civilian side doesn't even bother to ask the JCS organization - it gets unilateral Service opinion (for the MINUTEMAN, for example, from the USAF); or it goes to a combatant command (probably SAC); or it brings in an outside agency (probably RAND) to do the military staff work which is the proper job of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization.

In any event, the effect is the same - no joint military advice for input at DoD level.

Take another example - the formulation of the annual budget. For the identical reasons cited above, the budgeteers in the "civilian side" are out of contact with the joint views of the "military side" until the work on the budget is almost completed.

At budget formulation time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves spend hour after hour on the details of the budget, but by this time they are often victims of preliminary staff work between the OSD and the Services which has already largely determined the outlines of the problem and into which no joint military advice has been injected.

So, there are basically two problems to solve -

First, set it up so that the Secretary of Defense can get on each issue the crisp, hard, timely statement of joint military advice which he must have.

Second, assure the confidence of the "military side" in the consistency of its own views and establish lower level communication between the "military" and "civilian" sides of the top management structures.

There are a number of related steps which can be taken to accomplish these objectives:

First - acknowledge the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization as the "military side" of the Secretary of Defense top management structure.

Second - acknowledge the primacy of the Chairman, as first among equals,

is fairly well recognized by the law), and reinforce the line of staff supervision from the Chairman through the Director of the Joint Staff, to the Joint Staff itself.

Third - ensure that the input of the respective Service staffs and other agencies into the Joint Staff consideration of a paper is in the nature of facts - hard data and implications of courses of action - rather than in the nature of Service positions on the action to be taken, and ensure objective treatment of these facts by the Joint Staff.

Fourth - establish it as normal procedure that in every JCS action presented to the Secretary of Defense, the recommendation of the Joint Staff, as approved by the Director of the Joint Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be made available to the Secretary of Defense. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may also, without question, submit their respective views, if they differ from the position of the Joint Staff. Actions will not be unduly held up to achieve "agreement," nor will a Service chief be censured in any way when he does not agree.

Fifth - retain the checks and balances of the pluralistic JCS system. Retain the Service Chiefs in their dual function as members of the JCS. But do not expect the Chiefs always to agree and do not let lack of agreement prevent the system from moving ahead. Use their honest differences and their complete right to submit differing views to keep the Joint Staff on its toes and the Secretary of Defense always aware of the issues.

Sixth - move very slowly on any increase in the size of the Joint Staff. In furtherance of the concept of decentralization, a low limit on its size is essential in order to insure that the staff considers only the most important problems, and to provide that the great bulk of the problems are passed to other agencies and to the Services.

The key to this reform of procedures is the quality of the staff work of the Joint Staff, in particular that recommendations be objective, truly "joint", and not slanted toward any preconceived view. How can we ensure that a Joint Staff composed of officers of the four Services can achieve the standards of non-Service-oriented objectivity which is essential in the interests of the



motivation of these officers, from top to bottom, in the Joint Staff. There are many ways to do this - to describe them all would take another article. But certainly it is possible to do so, and without causing concern as to the creation of a special elite.

The single most decisive step would be for the Secretary of Defense to have it clearly understood that he will tolerate no outsider giving instructions to, or taking reprisals against, a member of the Joint Staff - that he, the Secretary of Defense, considers the Joint Staff to be his staff,

What improvements can be made on the "civilian side" of the top management structure? Most improvements here derive from other improvements in the defense structure and must wait on them to be effective.

For one thing, with increased decentralization of responsibility for providing forces, it might be possible to reduce the staffing of the offices of the assistant secretaries, to combine two or more of these offices, and to devote more of their time to major policy matters rather than to detail.

Similarly, the suggested changes in the JCS procedures on the "military side" should make it possible for the "civilian side" elements, such as Comptroller, Logistics, and Research and Engineering to obtain professional military advice and assistance on a day-to-day basis - action officer to action officer and thereby to improve their operations. And with the Joint Staff becoming the outside point of contact for strategic/operational matters, it should be possible to reduce the size of the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, which has moved extensively into this field largely because the "military side" has not been meeting the day-to-day needs of the Secretary of Defense.

The third component of the top management level - the immediate office of the Secretary of Defense - can also be strengthened. The Secretary of Defense needs a strong secretariat, plus sufficient special assistants to allow him to integrate both the civilian and military sides of his management structure, and to provide effective policy direction to the Department as a whole. This immediate staff should not be very large, but it should be of the highest quality - a primarily civilian group, with only such very few mili-

The final area for improvement in the defense structure cannot be ascribed to any one of the three major components; it permeates the structure as a whole. This is the matter of doctrine.

A military organization, like an organized church, cannot function effectively without a body of doctrine soundly developed and relatively definitive. Joint doctrine is indispensable, both as a guide for decisions and as a counter to institutional Service pressures which might tend to twist logic toward their own goals. Uniformly understood it would provide a basic framework for decisions at the Department of Defense level.

Strategic doctrine - jointly prepared and approved - would provide a basis for major national policy decisions. Operational doctrine - jointly prepared and approved - would not only be the cement necessary to bind a joint military organization in the field into fighting teams, but would provide a basis for decisions in such fields as weapons research and development.

Service disagreements have seriously hampered the development of joint doctrine. Various solutions have been tried without real success. Why not try the solution each of the Services uses - why not develop joint doctrine in the joint schools?

Military doctrine consists of the fundamental truths of the military art. The search for valid doctrine is at its root a search for the truth. Doctrine is developed through experience or by theory; it results from intelligent evaluation of the past and the logical and creative application of lessons of the past to present and future projected conditions. It comes from the interaction between, on one hand, the practical experience gained from battle, exercises, tests, and war games, and on the other, the intellectual activity of the military professional at his desk and in the clash of ideas with other professionals.

Historically, the development of doctrine accompanies the growth of military professionalism, which in turn goes along with the maturing of a military school system. Just as the influence which Mahan and Sims exerted through the infant Naval War College before World War I went far beyond Newport, and just as Leavenworth and the Army War College largely developed the corps of

professional soldiers responsible for the conduct of World War II, could not the joint Service Colleges - the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Staff College - be decisive in developing the joint military doctrine as well as joint military professionalism so essential to our modern military establishment? These Colleges now have only an instructional role. Would not this role, and their total contribution to the defense structure, be magnified if they were assigned a doctrinal mission as well?

\* \* \* \* \*

An essay as brief as this cannot cover all the facets of our defense establishment. This essay has concentrated on the broad questions - the basic principles under which the continued improvement of our ~~our~~ defense organization should proceed. As is frequently the case with complex problems, the underlying major principles are simple, and they are few.

The first principle is to decentralize to the military departments the responsibility for generating the military forces of the United States, providing at the same time a sound doctrinal basis for each departmental function - "land" forces for the Army, "maritime" forces for the Navy/Marine Corps, and "aerospace" forces for the Air Force.

The second principle is to modify the procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization so as to provide the Secretary of Defense the fully effective "military side" which he must have in his management structure. Retain the pluralistic JCS system, retain the essential checks and balances, keep the Joint Staff small - but provide the joint military professionalism essential to the operation of the DoD top management echelon.

The third principle is to recognize the importance of joint doctrine - both strategic and operational - and to use the joint Service Colleges more directly toward its formulation.

The American genius is pragmatic - it seeks practical rather than theoretical solution to its organizational problems. No better example exists than our own Constitution with its checks and balances, which safeguard our

Winston Churchill once said, "Democracy is the worst form of government, with the exception of every other kind."

This remark - paraphrased - is true of the present pluralistic structure of our defense establishment, which this essay is intended to retain, yet improve.