


MORS Special Session

**Operational Wargaming  
in Korea  
1976-1978**


Lieutenant General John H. Cushman  
US Army (Ret)





Defensive Sector of I Corps (ROK/US) Group








Seoul

# FORWARD DEFENSE CONCEPT

- ELECTRIFYING TURNAROUND IN DEFENSIVE THINKING
- NOT EVACUATE SEOUL BUT PROTECT SEOUL
- STRONG POSITIONS AND BARRIERS
- MASSIVE FIREPOWER
- ➡ ● US REINFORCE, PRIMARILY TACAIR AND LOGISTICS



KOREA, 1977 (OVERSIMPLIFIED)



# RESPONSIBILITIES

## I CORPS (ROK/US) GROUP:

HRE / DMZ ACTIVITIES

OPLAN 5027 (DEFENSE OF KOREA)

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## THIRD ROK ARMY:

LOGISTICS

ADMINISTRATION

CIVIL AFFAIRS

CONSTRUCTION

FUNDING AND TROOP PROGRAMS

TRAINING

} PEACE AND WAR





## 2d Infantry Division Dispositions

# I CORPS (ROK/US) GROUP

CORPS	3
DIVISIONS (11 ROK; 1 US)	12
MARINE BRIGADE	1
ARMOR BRIGADE	2
ENGINEER BRIGADE	3
TANK BATTALION	3
CORPS ARTILLERY	3
TOW COMPANY	5
AAA BATTERY	3

STRENGTH:

AUTH: 181,363


M+36: 246,204


	ROK	US	TOTAL
TANK	581	54	635
SHERIDAN (M551)		12	12
ARTILLERY	1131	76	1207
4.2 INCH MORTAR	299	41	340
TOW	90	126	216
106MM RR	142		142
DRAGON		201	201
90MM RR	96		96
CHAPARRAL		24	24
VULCAN		24	24
QUAD 50s	72		72
ATTACK HELOS (AH1G)		27	27
HONEST JOHN	4	4	8

## TOTAL ENEMY DIVISIONS AND SHOCK REGIMENTS

DIVISIONS		25
INFANTRY	18	
MECHANIZED	3	
MOTORIZED	2	
TANK	2	
SHOCK REGIMENTS		5

# NORTH KOREAN TANK INVENTORY









# ENEMY WILL HAVE -

- NEAR PERFECT INTELLIGENCE.
- THE INITIATIVE.
- ABILITY TO ACHIEVE A HIGH ORDER OF SURPRISE.
- ABILITY TO PLAN IN DETAIL AND REHEARSE.
- LOGISTICS AND C<sup>2</sup> SYSTEM IN READINESS.

## IN ORDER TO SUCCEED, MUST . . . .


- DENY THE ENEMY TOTAL SURPRISE.
- BE READY, ON POSITION, ESSENTIAL BARRIERS INSTALLED, ARTILLERY DEPLOYED, AND RESERVES IN GOOD ORDER, AT THE TIME THE ENEMY ATTACKS.
- MASTER IN ADVANCE THE TACTICS, THE LOGISTICS, AND THE COMMAND AND CONTROL METHODS WHICH THE CONDITIONS OF BATTLE WILL DEMAND.


## WHEN THE WAR STARTS . . . .

- SEE THE BATTLEFIELD.
- DETERMINE THE MAIN ENEMY ATTACK.
- RAPIDLY CONCENTRATE:
  - MANEUVER UNITS
  - ARTILLERY
  - TACTICAL AIR
  - LOGISTICS
- CONDUCT AN ACTIVE OFFENSIVE-DEFENSE TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY ON MAIN BATTLE AREA ALPHA.

# **I CORPS (ROK/US) GROUP BATTLE SIMULATION**

- **ACTUAL OPLANS**
- **ACTUAL CMDRS & STAFFS**
- **REALISM OF ACTUAL BATTLE**







# BATTLE SIMULATION ROUTINES

- MANEUVER AND CLOSE COMBAT
- ARTILLERY FIRES
- CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
- INTELLIGENCE FLOW
- AMMUNITION SUPPLY
- HOWITZER MAINTENANCE
- MOVEMENT AND TRAFFIC CONTROL
- ENGINEER



# CHARACTERISTICS

- SCIENTIFICALLY DERIVED RULES
- MANPOWER INTENSIVE, COMPUTER SUPPORTED
- REAL TIME - TWO-SIDED - FREE PLAY
- ENEMY COMMANDERS AND STAFFS
- REALISTIC PRESSURES OF COMBAT
- COMPREHENSIVE AIR PARTICIPATION
- SELECTED LOGISTICS PLAY
- STRIVE FOR AUTHENTICITY

## STRIVE FOR AUTHENTICITY IN:

ENEMY TACTICS

INTELLIGENCE AND TARGET ACQUISITION

AIR/GROUND COORDINATION

FIREPOWER ASSESSMENT

LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS

COMMUNICATIONS

WEATHER

## RESULT DESIRED:

THE CLOSEST WE CAN COME TO BATTLE

EXPERIENCE WITHOUT FIGHTING

# CAPER CROWN EXERCISES

	DATE	SECTOR	REMARKS
I	APRIL 1976	I CORPS	FIRST USE KOREA FIRST BATTLE
II	OCTOBER 1976	I CORPS	SUBSTANTIAL AIR PARTICIPATION
III	FEBRUARY 1977	V CORPS	LIMITED AIR PARTICIPATION
IV	MAY-AUG 1977	I CORPS	SLOW MOTION WARGAME
V	JUNE 1977	VI CORPS	WARGAME SCHOOL-SMALL COMMANDER PARTICIPATION
VI	SEPTEMBER 1977	V CORPS	REPEAT OF CC III FOR AIR/GROUND COORDINATION PRACTICE



# CAPER CROWN II





## SOME LESSONS LEARNED CAPER CROWN II

MUST IDENTIFY ENEMY MAIN EFFORT SOON

MUST DO BETTER AT DELAYING ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS

CHANGE DEFCON 2 LOCATIONS OF CAPITOL MECHANIZED DIVISION

MOVE MORE TANKS FORWARD

EXECUTE BARRIER PLAN SOONER

BETTER DEFENSE OF STRONG POINTS

WITHDRAWING GOP UNITS PUT UP STRONGER DEFENSE

STRENGTHEN MBA FORTIFICATIONS








# CAPER CROWN III





## SOME LESSONS LEARNED CAPER CROWN III

- STRENGTHEN 6TH DIVISION SECTOR
- REDISTRIBUTE ANTI - TANK WEAPONS
- INCREASE ANTI-TANK WEAPONS
- NEED MORE ARTILLERY
- INCREASE ARTILLERY EFFECTIVENESS
- MORE AMMUNITION AND BETTER AMMO CONTROLS
- COMMANDERS MANAGE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT BETTER
- MORE TIMELY USE OF RESERVES

## **VALUE OF CPX/WARGAMING, WITH REALISM:**

- **TRAIN COMMANDERS AND STAFFS (AND DASC, ALOs, AND TACP<sub>s</sub>) IN TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR BATTLE**
- **THROUGH REALISTIC EXPERIENCE, IMPROVE THE TACTICAL AND LOGISTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF PARTICIPANTS**
- **IDENTIFY DEFICIENCIES IN OPERATIONS PLANS**

## ESSENTIAL ACTIONS

- INCREASE ANTI-ARMOR G3
- MODERNIZE TANK FORCE G3
- INCREASE ARTILLERY ARTY
- STRENGTHEN FORTIFICATIONS ENGR
- ACCELERATE MINE EMPLACEMENT ENGR
- IMPROVE ROAD NET ENGR
- IMPROVE LOGISTICS G4
- HARDEN COMMO AND CPs C-E
- UPGRADE INTELLIGENCE G2
- DEVELOP AIR/LAND BATTLE PROFICIENCY G3/ALO
- STUDY/MODIFY TACTICS AND OPLANS G3

## ASSESSMENT OF WESTERN SECTOR DEFENSE

- OUTCOMES WILL VARY:
  - QUANTITATIVE FACTORS
  - IMPONDERABLES
- PROBABLE OUTCOME TODAY:
  - WITHOUT 2D DIV, PROBABLY CANNOT KEEP ENEMY OUT OF SEOUL
  - WITH 2D DIV, TO STOP HIM SHORT OF SEOUL WILL BE MOST DIFFICULT: NO MARGIN FOR MISTAKES
- 2D DIV's PROBABLE INVOLVEMENT IS THE DECISIVE DETERRENT TODAY
- ➡ ● REMOVAL OF 2D DIV REQUIRES MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS IN WESTERN SECTOR DEFENSES INCLUDING

## ESSENTIAL ACTIONS

- INCREASE ANTI-ARMOR G3
- MODERNIZE TANK FORCE G3
- INCREASE ARTILLERY ARTY
- STRENGTHEN FORTIFICATIONS ENGR
- ACCELERATE MINE EMPLACEMENT ENGR
- IMPROVE ROAD NET ENGR
- IMPROVE LOGISTICS G4
- HARDEN COMMO AND CPs C-E
- UPGRADE INTELLIGENCE G2
- DEVELOP AIR/LAND BATTLE PROFICIENCY G3/ALO
- STUDY/MODIFY TACTICS AND OPLANS G3



# **TWO BASIC CONCLUSIONS**

## AN ADEQUATE ROK ARMY WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY CAN BE ACHIEVED-

- IT WILL BE A COMPLEX, MAJOR FORCE BUILDING, UNDERTAKING
- FIVE YEARS IS A REASONABLE TARGET, GIVEN THE NECESSARY RESOURCES, BUT IT IS NOT A CERTAINTY

EVEN WHEN AN ADEQUATE ROK ARMY WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY IS ACHIEVED, THERE WILL STILL BE A NEED FOR A US COMBAT FORMATION ON THE GROUND NORTH OF SEOUL-FOR AS LONG AS THE 1953 MILITARY ARMISTICE AGREEMENT REMAINS THE GOVERNING POLITICAL INSTRUMENT SEPARATING THE TWO KOREAS.

# ESSENTIAL ACTIONS

- INCREASE ANTI-ARMOR
- INCREASE ARTILLERY
- STRENGTHEN FORTIFICATIONS
- ACCELERATE BARRIER EMPLACEMENT
- DEVELOP ARMY AVIATION
- IMPROVE ROAD NET
- IMPROVE LOGISTICS
- HARDEN COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMAND POSTS
- UPGRADE INTELLIGENCE
- DEVELOP AIR/LAND BATTLE PROFICIENCY
- DEVELOP CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND WARGAMING EXPERTISE

**DEVELOP  
AIR-LAND BATTLE PROFICIENCY**

# AFK PRESENCE IN THE WESTERN SECTOR

I CORPS (ROK/US) GROUP	
COL MARSHALL	ALO
COL GRUVER	ALO (1 MAY 78)
1 ROKAF	ALO

604TH DASC	
LTC KELLER	
<u>10</u> OFFICER	<u>79</u> ENLISTED
ROKAF ALO/FDO	


I CORPS
MAJ BUBKO ALO
9 ROKAF ALO/FAC'S

VI CORPS
MAJ PIRKKALA ALO
9 ROKAF ALO/FAC'S

V CORPS
MAJ TEAS ALO
9 ROKAF ALO/FAC'S

2ND INF DIV
LTC STAPLES
6 USAF ALO/FAC'S

# WESTERN SECTOR, KOREA (1978)



# CAPER CROWN EXERCISES

	DATE	SECTOR	REMARKS
I	APRIL 1976	I CORPS	FIRST USE KOREA FIRST BATTLE
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# CAPER CROWN WARGAMES

EXERCISE STAFFS FROM 1 CORPS GROUP TO REGIMENT

FREE PLAY

PIT ACTUAL FORCES AGAINST EACH OTHER

PRACTICE ACTUAL WAR PLANS

EXTENSIVELY INTEGRATE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

AFK SUPPORT INCLUDES:

TACC

US NAVY

DASC

USMC

TACP

REINFORCEMENTS

FRAG ORDER

BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

## COMPLICATING FACTORS-WESTERN SECTOR

- LANGUAGE AND CULTURE
- MANUAL KTACS
- MIXED TACAIR (USAF, ROKAF, REINFORCEMENTS)
- ROKAF IS BEING STRETCHED
- ENEMY WILL SEEK SURPRISE

## THE PROBLEM

- COMPLEX UNDERTAKING
- 400-600 SORTIES / DAY, CAS
- WE WILL CONCENTRATE THEM WHERE MOST NEEDED

MANY UNITS WILL RECEIVE NONE

A FEW UNITS WILL BE DELUGED

COMMANDERS MUST DECIDE WHO GETS

- SHORTAGE OF TACPS

## THE PROBLEM

- COMPLEX UNDERTAKING
- 400-600 SORTIES / DAY, CAS
- WE WILL CONCENTRATE THEM WHERE MOST NEEDED

MANY UNITS WILL RECEIVE NONE

A FEW UNITS WILL BE DELUGED

COMMANDERS MUST DECIDE WHO GETS

- SHORTAGE OF TACPS
- CRITICALITY OF AIR WHEN USED, SO FAR
- HAVE TO DO IT WELL FIRST DAY(S)

- I CORPS GROUP IS "NOT THE ONLY ONE" -

(FROKA BATTLE/AIR BATTLE/  
AIR DEFENSE SUPPRESSION  
BATTLE/ INTERDICTION BATTLE)

- WILL RELY ON CINCUNC AND COMMANDER  
AFK FOR DEEPER INTERDICTION - FIND TARGETS,  
DECIDE PRIORITIES, MAXIMUM DESTRUCTION  
OF REINFORCEMENTS
- CAN SIMPLIFY PROBLEM, CONSIDERING:
  - ONLY I CORPS GROUP "CAS"
  - ONLY FIRST FEW DAYS OF DEFENSIVE OPERATION

## WHAT IS CAS?

"....TARGETS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO FRIENDLY FORCES AND REQUIRES DETAILED INTEGRATION OF EACH AIR MISSION WITH THE FIRE AND MOVEMENT OF THOSE FORCES." (JCS PUB 1)

### "BATTLEFIELD INTERDICTION"

"....TARGETS OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN WHICH LIE BEYOND THE FSCL WITH SORTIES TAKEN FROM 1 CORPS GROUP IMMEDIATE ALLOCATION TO FLY MISSION."

### "BATTLEFIELD INTERDICTION"

"....TARGETS WHICH MAY HAVE AN IMMEDIATE AND DIRECT EFFECT ON THE CORPS COMMANDER'S COURSES OF ACTION .... MISSIONS WILL BE FLOWN WITH CAS SORTIES ALLOCATED TO THE CORPS COMMANDER"  
(TAC-TRADOC ALFA AIR LAND BULLETIN, 15 JUNE 1977)

# **Close Air Support/ Battlefield Air Interdiction**

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## **Eighth Army Air-Ground SOP**

**Close Air Support (CAS): “...targets (that are) in close proximity to friendly forces and require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.” (JCS Pub 1)**

## **Cdrs I Corps (ROK/US) Group & Air Force Korea agree...**

**Emergency CAS includes Battlefield Interdiction: “Targets of immediate concern which lie beyond the FSCL, with sorties taken from I Corps Group immediate allocation to fly mission.”**

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## **8th Army SOP (& Air-Ground School, Hurlburt AFB, FL)**

**Preplanned: Originates at (battalion) 24 hours earlier, goes through army chain of command to corps (army).**

**Passed to tactical air control center (TACC)**

**TACC transmits air tasking order (“frag”) to wings/  
squadrons w/ordnance and targets during the night**

**Immediate: Originates with a forward air controller (Fac)  
of air liaison officer (ALO) in contact.**

**Approval by silence/affirmation at army echelons**

**TACC tasks wing/squadron with mission, ordnance  
and target**

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## **I Corps Group/Air Forces Korea Agreement (“New Frag”)**

**(Planning) Daily Requirements Forecast : A description of expected enemy locations, composition, activity and likely targets for the 24-hours that begins at 0600 the following day. (Written in OPLAN 5027, revised at Defcon 2.)**

**TACC generates/distributes ATO**

**(Immediate) Same as SOP, plus Spec Reqmts Message: Description of a developing target, with time, location, composition, and control/coordination measures.**

**TACC directs the strike**

---

## **PRINCIPLES**

- **USE THE AIR; DON'T TRY TO "SAVE" IT FOR MAX EFFORT**
- **USE IT WHERE IT WILL DO THE MOST GOOD**
- **GIVE TIMELY REQUIREMENTS PROJECTIONS TO AFK**



# CAPER CROWN VII

# CAPER CROWN VII PARTICIPANTS

## I ROK CORPS

1ST INF DIV  
9TH INF DIV  
25TH INF DIV  
30TH INF DIV  
2D ARMD BDE

## VI ROK CORPS

20TH INF DIV  
26TH INF DIV  
28TH INF DIV

## AIR FORCES KOREA

TACC ELEMENT  
DASC  
ALO'S (CORPS & DIV)  
TACP'S  
FIGHTER/RECCE PILOTS  
(USAF, ROKAF, USN, USMC)  
TAC AIRLIFT ADVISORS

## OTHERS

UNC/EUSA CELL  
9TH SF BDE  
13TH SF BDE  
2D MARINE BDE  
1ST ARMOR BDE  
2ND LSC

CAP MECH DIV  
2D US INF DIV  
5TH INF DIV  
8TH INF DIV  
3RD LSC







# **ENEMY ATTACK CONCEPT**

- **SECRET CONCENTRATION OF ACTIVE FORCES**
- **SURPRISE ATTACK**






# MAIN ATTACK DEPLOYMENT

주공 운용

- MD - 기계화 사단
- ID - 보병 사단
- TR - 전차 연대
- SR - 중격 연대
- LIB - 경보병여단


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# SUPPORTING ATTACK DEPLOYMENT

조공 운용

- ID - 보병사단
- TR - 전차연대
- SR - 중격연대
- LIB - 경비병여단



**AFK PARTICIPATION - CAPER CROWN VII  
17 - 21 OCTOBER 1977**

**AIR BATTLE INTEGRATION CELL (INCLUDING RED TEAM)**

**TACC AND DASC PARTICIPATION**

**ALO AND TACP PARTICIPATION**

**31 TACP - 11 US, 3 ROKAF, 17 COMBINED**

**WEAPONNEERING/BDA**

**FRAG ORDER FOR CAS**

**PLAY OF RECCE AND INTERDICTION TO INCLUDE EFFECTS ON ENEMY  
GROUND FORCES**

**AIR DEFENSE PARTICIPATION (INCLUDE 2/71 ADA)**

**CDR AFK OR VICE CDR ON STEERING COMMITTEE**

**AIR BATTLE ANALYSIS/AIR BATTLE COMPONENT**

## QUESTIONS OF AIR BATTLE ANALYSIS:

- SAM/AAA SUPPRESSION SCENARIO
- CAS AVAILABILITY AS AFFECTED BY AIRCRAFT LOSSES/ETC.
- AIRBORNE FAC SURVIVABILITY AND EMPLOYMENT
- EW ENVIRONMENT AS IT AFFECTS TACS
- AIR DEFENSE/FAADS ACTIVITY
- RECCE ACTIVITY
- INTERPLAY OF INTERDICTION ON NKA TROOP MOVEMENTS
- ENEMY AN-2 AND PARACHUTE ATTACK PLAN
- ENEMY AIR ATTACK OF GROUND TARGETS

## CAS ENVIRONMENT - POSTED HOURLY

BATTLE AREA WEATHER	(ceiling, visibility, smoke, etc.)
SAM THREAT	(high - moderate - low)
FAAD THREAT	(high - moderate - low)
BASE STATUS	(normal, degraded _____%)
TURN STATUS	(surge, normal, reduced,)
GCI STATUS	(normal, reduced, out)
AIRCRAFT LOSSES	(last hour/total)
ENEMY AIRCRAFT LOSSES	(last hour/total)
CURRENT ALLOCATION TO CAS	( _____%)

# FOR EACH CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSION:

REQUESTING UNIT

NUMBER AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT

BASE

SERVICE (USAF, ROKAF, USMC, USN)

REQUESTED TARGET TIME, LOCATION, AND DESCRIPTION

ACTUAL TARGET TIME, LOCATION, AND DESCRIPTION

UNIT ACTUALLY SUPPORTED

DIVERTED? BY WHOM?

ORDNANCE PER AIRCRAFT

AIR DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT

**FOR EACH CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSION:  
(CON'T)**

**CONTROLLED BY FAC? TACP? OTHER?**

**COORDINATED WITH ARTILLERY? MARKING? etc.**

**WEATHER**

**BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, AS PLAYED**

**BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, AFTER REVIEW**



## **ENEMY AIR ATTACK PLAN:**

- **1700 ATTACK, ONE HOUR DAYLIGHT LEFT.**
- **MAXIMUM SURPRISE, MAXIMUM EFFORT.**
- **ATTACK HAWK AND NIKE HERCULES AIR DEFENSES, THE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM, AIR BASES, COMMAND POSTS AND COMMUNICATIONS LINK, AND THE CITY OF SEOUL.**

# ENEMY AIR ATTACK—1700 HOURS, 17 OCTOBER

## AIRCRAFT

MIG 15/17	170
MIG 19	88
MIG 21	64
SU 7	20
IL 28	<u>54</u>
	396

## MISSIONS

STRIKE	260
COMBAT AIR PATROL	<u>136</u>
	396

# AFK READINESS—1700 HOURS, 17 OCTOBER

HAWKS AND NIKE HERCULES: WARNING RED

AIRBORNE ALERT: 14 F-86, 14 F-5, 4 F-4

GROUND ALERT: 22 F-86, 86 F-5, 12 F-4 D/E

STRIKE FLIGHT READY TO LAUNCH

28 F4D }  
6 A6 } STRIKE

16 F4E }  
4 F4J } CAP

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ALERT: 174 AIRCRAFT

AUGMENTATION ARRIVED:

16 USAF

14 USMC

AIR BASE SECURITY: CONDITION RED

## **AFK RESPONSE-1700 HOURS, 17 OCTOBER**

- **SCRAMBLE DEFENSIVE COUNTER AIR: 100 AIRCRAFT**
- **HAWKS AND NIKE HERCULES ENGAGE FIRST**
- **NIKE HERCULES SURFACE STRIKES : 2 GCI SITES.**
- **STRIKE FLIGHTS ATTACK PREPLANNED TARGETS**

**34 STRIKE AIRCRAFT**

**20 COMBAT AIR PATROL**

**13 TARGETS**

## INITIAL APPORTIONMENT-AIR CAMPAIGN

TOTAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT	388	
DEFENSIVE COUNTER AIR	164	(42%)
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT	174	(45%)
INTERDICTION /		
OFFENSIVE COUNTER AIR	50	(13%)

# OUTCOME - FIRST HOUR OF AIR WAR H-1 TO H HOUR

## BLUE:

### AIRCRAFT LOSSES:

44 DESTROYED (7 ON GROUND)

24 DAMAGED (5 ON GROUND)

AIRBASES DEGRADED 15%

TURN CAPABILITY REDUCED 10%

GCI DEGRADED 50%

## RED:

### AIRCRAFT LOSSES:

146 DESTROYED

88 DAMAGED

GCI DEGRADED 70%

# FIGHTER ORDER OF BATTLE

## - 1800HRS 17 OCT

**RED:**

MIG 15/17	228
MIG 19	94
MIG 21	98
SU 7	5
IL-28	<u>57</u>
	482

**BLUE:**

F86	62
F5	176
F4	102
A4	4
A6	<u>4</u>
	348

# AIR SITUATION - 0400 18 OCTOBER (H+10)

WEATHER FORECAST CLEAR/7 - SOME FOG

BASE STATUS-10% REDUCED

TURN STATUS - NORMAL

H+12 INVENTORY/APPORTIONMENT DECISION:

TOTAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT	405	
DEFENSIVE COUNTER AIR	184	(45%) (UP 3%)
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT	159	(40%) (DOWN 5%)
OFFENSIVE COUNTER AIR/ INTERDICTION	62	(15%) (UP 2%)



# OUTCOME - H + 12 TO H + 24 ( DAYLIGHT ACTION)

## BLUE:

### AIRCRAFT LOSSES

86 DESTROYED (1 ON GROUND)

49 DAMAGED (1 ON GROUND)

AIRBASES DEGRADED 15%

TURN CAPABILITY REDUCED 0%

GCI DEGRADED 50%

## RED:

### AIRCRAFT LOSSES

89 DESTROYED

60 DAMAGED

GCI DEGRADED 80%

# SITUATION H + 24

**NKAF FIGHTER INVENTORY : 353**

**AFK APPORTIONMENT :**

**TOTAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT 330**

**DEFENSIVE COUNTER AIR 120 (36%)(DOWN 9%)**

**CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 201 (61%)(UP 21%)**

**INTERDICTION 9 (3%) (DOWN 12%)**

## AFK SORTIE UTILIZATION

	H-1 TO H+12	H+12 TO H+24	TOTALS
DCA	234	569	803
CAS	159	320	479
OCA/INT	50	148	198
TOTAL	443	1,037	1,480

# CLOSE AIR SUPPORT RESULTS

	H TO H+12	H+12 TO H+24
KBA	1192	3576
TANKS	3	88
ARTILLERY	2	7
APC	1	5

## DRAFT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - OPLAN 5027

- MAIN BATTLE AREA ALFA IS RENAMED "SECOND DEFENSIVE ZONE"; ALL TERRITORY FORWARD OF THAT IS "FIRST DEFENSIVE ZONE"
- FORTIFY CONTINUOUSLY FROM DMZ REARWARD; STRENGTHEN BARRIERS & POSITIONS IN FIRST DEFENSIVE ZONE; EXTEND FORTIFICATIONS IN DEPTH INTO THIRD DEFENSIVE ZONE
- STRONG RESISTANCE BEGINNING WITH FIRST DEFENSIVE ZONE
- DETERMINE ENEMY MAIN EFFORT EARLY

## DRAFT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - OPLAN 5027

- EXCEPT FOR DESIGNATED FIRST DEFENSIVE ZONE UNITS, DEFENDING UNITS REMAIN IN PLACE HOLDING TO THE LAST MAN
- REINFORCE AHEAD OF ENEMY MAIN ATTACK WITH RESERVES AND UNITS NOT ENGAGED. STOP ENEMY ATTACK ON OR BEFORE SECOND DEFENSIVE ZONE
- WEAR THE ENEMY DOWN ON THE ROCKS OF THE DEFENSE; DESTROY HIM WITH FIREPOWER
- COUNTERATTACK WHEN THE ENEMY IS WEAKENED AND CHANCE OF SUCCESS IS HIGH


## 작전개념 (초안)-작계 5027

- 주전투지대 "알파"를 "제2방어지대"로 그 전방의 모든 지역은 "제1방어지대"로 개칭
- DMZ로부터 후방으로 계속적인 요새화, 제1방어지대 내의 장벽 및 진지강화, 제3방어지대에 이르기 까지 중심 깊은 요새화
- 제1방어지대에서 부터 완전한 저항
- 적 주공의 조기 판단
- 제1방어지대의 일부 지정된 부대를 제외하고, 모든 방어부대는 최후의 1인 까지 진지고수
- 적 주공 방향에 예비대 및 접정중이 아닌부대로서 사전증원, 제2방어지대 또는 그 전방에서 적공격 저지격멸
- 적을 방어벽에 부딪쳐 약화시키고, 화력으로 격멸
- 적이 약화되고 역습 성공 가능성이 많을때 역습실시









# I CORPS

## IF WE HAD:

- HELD LONGER IN FIRST DEFENSIVE ZONE
- DEFENDED MUNSAN
- EMPLOYED RESERVES IN FORWARD POSITIONS
- RAPIDLY REPOSITIONED UNITS TO BLOCK ENEMY PENETRATIONS

## THEN:

- ENEMY ADVANCE SLOWER
- HELD DRAGON'S HEAD LONGER
- POSSIBLY STOPPED ENEMY AT MUNSAN
- PROBABLY STOPPED ENEMY SOUTH OF MUNSAN
- WITH RESERVES, STOPPED 1st AND 2d ECHELONS;  
POSSIBLY ATTACK WEAKENED ENEMY
- FRONT LINE TRACE SOUTH OF MUNSAN

# VI CORPS

## IF WE HAD:

- DELAYED LONGER IN FIRST DEFENSIVE ZONE
- OCCUPIED Y-10 AND Y-11 EARLY
- DEFENDED CHONGOK
- PLACED ALL BATTALIONS IN FORTIFIED POSITIONS
- CONTAINED REAR AREA THREAT WITH RESERVISTS
- RELEASED CAV BRIGADE, CMD SOONER
- RECEIVED OPCON 2D INFANTRY DIVISION SOONER

## THEN:

- SLOWER ENEMY ADVANCE
- FEBA ALPHA - HELD LONGER; FEBA BRAVO THICKENED
- TIME TO REPOSITION UNITS - OCCUPY CRITICAL POSITIONS
- 1ST ARMORED BRIGADE AND 8TH DIVISION (-) STRAIGHT TO BATTLE
- FRONT LINE TRACE FORWARD OF CHONGOK
- CAV BRIGADE, CMD, AND 2D INFANTRY DIVISION POSITIONED NORTH  
AND WEST OF TONGDUCHON



Composite of “If we Had...”

## FROM LOGISTICAL DATA, ANALYZING:

- ARTILLERY AMMUNITION ISSUED, BY UNIT, TYPE, ROUND AND TONNAGE.
- ASP CONGESTION AND TRAFFIC CONTROL.
- USE OF MOBILIZATION ASSETS.
- ARTILLERY FAILURES AND REPAIR PARTS REQUIREMENTS.
- ARTILLERY MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS.
- USE OF AMMUNITION RESUPPLY VEHICLES.
- MOVEMENT TIMES FOR MAJOR UNITS.
- TIMES REQUIRED FOR ARTILLERY AMMUNITION RESUPPLY.
- VEHICULAR DENSITY OF ROAD TRAFFIC.
- EXPENDITURE DATA FOR REVISED REQUIRED SUPPLY RATE.
- EXPENDITURE DATA FOR CONTROLLED SUPPLY RATE.
- DEGRADATION OF ROAD BY TRAFFIC AND TONNAGE MOVED.

# AIR/LAND BATTLE READINESS

## • FINDING

IT IS NECESSARY TO START THE TACP AUGMENTATION MOVING FROM WONJU NINE OR TEN HOURS BEFORE THE ENEMY ATTACKS, OR TACP'S WILL NOT ARRIVE AT FORWARD REGIMENTS IN TIME.

WHEN TACP'S ARRIVE, JUST BEFORE BATTLE, THEY ARE NEW TO THE UNIT COMMANDERS, AND THEY HAVE NOT PRACTICED DETAILED CAS PROCEDURES TOGETHER. THEY ARE THEREFORE NOT READY.

## • CONCLUSION

DEFCON 2 TACP'S SHOULD BE STATIONED PERMANENTLY WITH EACH CORPS, SHOULD TRAIN WITH UNITS ROUTINELY, AND SHOULD PRACTICE SHORT NOTICE DEPLOYMENTS WITH THEIR REGIMENT

## **CONCLUSION**

**WE NEED A BETTER CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR A  
FORWARD DEFENSE THAT WILL STOP ENEMY ON MAIN BATTLE  
AREA ALPHA**

**THE DRAFT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS PREPARED BY  
I CORPS (ROK/US) GROUP IS A POINT OF DEPARTURE**



## 작전개념 (초안)-작계 5027

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## **AFK ACTIONS**

- 1. ESTABLISH AD HOC IMPROVED CAS CAPABILITIES STUDY GP**
- 2. DETERMINE PERSONNEL (ROKAF / USAF) & DEGREE OF EQUIPMENT SOPHISTICATION REQUIRED FOR TACPS AT EACH LEVEL OF COMMAND**
- 3. REALISTIC TNG IN DAY, NIGHT & ALL WEATHER CAS**
- 4. DETERMINE BEST WAY TO VALIDATE & TEST NEW CONCEPTS SUCH AS EMERGENCY CAS**

## **AFK ACTIONS ( CON'T)**

**IDENTIFY ASRT / BEACON / SKY SPOT LOCATIONS**

**STUDY COMBINED FIRE SUPPORT (ARTY / TACAIR)  
UNIQUE PROBLEMS**

**TARGET ACQUISITION**

**TARGET MARKING (DAY / NIGHT)**

**FORWARD OBSERVER / TACP INTERFACE TNG**

**DEVELOP APPROPRIATE CONCEPT OF OPERATION AND**

**PROCEDURES FOR NEW TACTICS APPROVED FOR IMPLEMENTATION**

**AND PUBLISH THESE PROCEDURES IN APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES**

**PLAN**

**DEVELOP TNG AND EVALUATION PROGRAMS AND PUBLISH IN  
APPROPRIATE REGULATIONS / MANUALS**

## **AFK ACTIONS (CON'T)**

**MOVE COMBINED TACPS TO I CORPS (ROK / US) GP  
DEFCON 2 PSNS PERMANENTLY**

**ROKAF LIVE WITH ROKA**

**USAF ROMAD - CRC, CASEY OR HOWZE**

**PRODUCE TACP HANDBOOK APPLICABLE TO KOREA TO  
ASSURE ALO / FAC KNOWLEDGE OF KTACS & TACAIR  
TRAIN ROKAF TACPS IN AIR PORTION OF WARGAMING  
(JANUARY CAPER CROWN SCHOOL)**

## **AFK ACTIONS (CON'T)**

**TRAIN ROKAF TACPS IN USE OF NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICES,  
LASER DESIGNATORS, PORTABLE RADAR BEACON TRANSPONDER  
& SECURE VOICE**

**SITE SURVEY OF SELECTED TACP LOCATIONS**

**DETERMINE COST, AVAILABILITY, RELEASABILITY AND  
PROJECTED DELIVERY SCHEDULE OF DESIRED EQUIPMENT**


**DETERMINE MANPOWER IMPACT ON BOTH ROKAF & USAF**


**DETERMINE CORRECT MIX OF USAF / ROKAF AT BOTH  
I CORPS & FROKA DASC**

## **QUESTIONS AS TO REALISM**

- 1. WERE OUTCOMES OF ENGAGEMENTS VALID?**
- 2. WERE RATES OF MOVEMENT VALID?**
- 3. WERE EFFECTS OF ARTILLERY, AIR, BARRIERS, AND FORTIFICATIONS VALID?**
- 4. WAS BATTLE INFORMATION LIKE THAT OF COMBAT?**
- 5. WAS THE MOOD OF BATTLE ESTABLISHED?**

# Outcomes Chart







# ESSENTIAL ACTIONS

- INCREASE ANTI-ARMOR
- INCREASE ARTILLERY
- STRENGTHEN FORTIFICATIONS
- ACCELERATE BARRIER EMPLACEMENT
- DEVELOP ARMY AVIATION
- IMPROVE ROAD NET
- IMPROVE LOGISTICS
- HARDEN COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMAND POSTS
- UPGRADE INTELLIGENCE
- DEVELOP AIR/LAND BATTLE PROFICIENCY
- DEVELOP CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND WARGAMING EXPERTISE

# **CAPER CROWN PURPOSES**

- **TRAIN**
- **EVALUATE OPERATIONS PLANS**

## **CAPER CROWN VII**

**SUFFICIENTLY REALISTIC TO SERVE THE PURPOSES  
FOR WHICH DESIGNED.**

**NOT DESIGNED TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF  
BATTLE.**



LTGEN J. H. CUSHMAN  
MR "AIR-LAND BATTLE"  
WITH SINCERE APPRECIATION  
FOR YOUR SUPPORT  
BOB TAYLOR, MGEN, USAF  
COMAFK