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Third Century A Summary of the Years of
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Third Century A Summary of the Years of
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ii PREFACE The years of 1986-1991 brought many changes to the programs of the United States Military Academy. In the document which follows, I have attempted to make a consolidated record of those changes and the reasons for them. Generally, this document relates the story of the creation of a revised model to guide the Military Academy's programs, one in which the focus was upon implementation of the USMA statement of purpose--"to provide the nation with leaders of character who serve the common defense." My reason for preparing this document was to increase the level of understanding of the changes among members of the West Point staff, faculty, and community. I am sure that as we better understand what other members of the community do, we are more likely to work with unity of purpose and to succeed in reaching our collective goals. The spirit of cooperation which marked the change process can continue more easily if we share a common awareness of the outcomes of the process. The volume of changes made at USMA during the past five years was greater than any one individual could track. I have sought input for this document from many sources within USMA, and I appreciate the cooperation of the major activity directors and members of their staffs. This record of change would have been impossible without the contributions of many members of the community. Still, I retained the freedom to present the information I received as I chose; thus, I am responsible for any errors and omissions and for the judgements not clearly attributed in the text to others. For enabling me to prepare this document, I owe the greatest debt to LTG Dave R. Palmer, the Superintendent during the years covered by this report, for his permission to devote my time to this project and for his willingness to submit to long hours of oral interviews reflecting upon his tenure at West Point. Where attitudes or options held by the Superintendent are inferred in the text, I believe these have been faithfully drawn from General Palmer himself. Researchers who need to know more than is provided here should be aware that a lengthy transcript of the oral history interviews with LTG Palmer can be made available. Comments and corrections will be welcomed at the address below. COL Larry R. Donnithorne
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iv Overview
After decades of national unrest and internal tension, calm returned to the United States Military Academy during the 1980s. In that decade's closing years, the tranquility at West Point afforded an opportunity to prepare for the Academy's third century. Those people who learned of the future planning efforts during that period often asked two questions: "Why did you do it?" And, "How did you do it?" The answers to these questions were not simple, but they provide a useful introduction to the history of those years--years of both affirmation and change at West Point. The Causes of Change To understand why the leaders at West Point initiated review and change in the mid-1980s, one must understand something of what West Point had been through in the preceding two or three decades. Those years had brought major traumas for either the nation in general or USMA in particular. In the nation, the Vietnam War and its broad, anti-military sentiments had created a hostile environment for the Academy--and for its current and prospective students as well as its graduates. The nation's rising sense of litigiousness contributed to pressures on the Honor System to protect due process rights of accused cadets, and it led to a successful court challenge of the Academy's requirement that cadets attend chapel services. The nation's domestic scene was further poisoned by racial upheaval, drug abuse, and violence. Internally, the size of the Corps of Cadets had nearly doubled. In accommodating the increase, the new dormitory facilities shifted in character (from mostly vertical divisions of 16 rooms to mostly long horizontal, double-loaded corridors), changing the sociological patterns of cadets. Further changing those patterns, women cadets were assimilated into the Corps of Cadets for the first time. Finally, a major honor scandal erupted in the midst of a pervasive breakdown in morale in the Corps of Cadets. The latter crisis was the final blow of an era which Lieutenant-General Dave R. Palmer, the Superintendent from 1986-1991, often described as the storm that nearly sank the ship called West Point. To continue his metaphor, one could say that the ship did not sink, fortunately, due to rather desperate efforts to save it; but, it came through the storm badly in need of repairs before it could again be seaworthy. These sizable tasks--saving and repairing the ship--fell to General Palmer's predecessors, Generals Andrew Goodpaster (1977-1981) and Willard Scott (1981-1986). Their successful efforts prepared the ship to set sail once again. But, on what course? Given the tranquil seas in which General Palmer found the ship when he arrived, he saw an opportunity to chart the ship's future course. General Palmer recognized that charting a course for the future is an obligation of leadership in any organization. As he entered the institution and asked its leaders their views on West Point's future direction, he found that few had given much attention to such matters. They, no doubt, had been as distracted by the storms and repairs as had previous superintendents. Two exceptions deserve comments. 1
General Palmer found that General Goodpaster and the faculty had engaged in a major effort during the late 1970s. carefully crafting several concept papers to guide the Academy into the future; however, he found also that the effort, headed by BG(R) Charles Schilling, to integrate those papers had been unable to achieve their goal. Drawing upon these earlier efforts, General Palmer determined to learn from their experience by beginning with the integrating concept first. The results of that approach are discussed shortly. Another notable effort at strategic planning – one focused primarily upon facilities--was begun during academic year 1983-84. The USMA Engineer initiated a facilities master planning effort using the architect-engineer services of the Hillier Group, and he decided that the first step in that project would be a year-long study of the Academy's future directions. He recognized that the institution should decide on the character of its future programs before he could plan the facilities to accommodate those programs. (See chapter 5.) Unfortunately, the Engineer did not engage fully the commitment of the Academy's leaders in that process; as a result, the strategic portion of the project accomplished little beyond raising interesting questions. In sum, when General Palmer arrived in 1986, he found the storm past, the ship repaired, and a need to decide upon its future course. The Process of Change When General Palmer began the strategic planning project in 1986, even he did not fully anticipate the dimensions that it would eventually assume. His initial efforts were relatively informal attempts to ask and answer fundamental questions. These questions, though simple in form, were profound in substance, as follows: Why does America have USMA?
Stage One-The Strategic Guidance The most important step in strategic planning is laying a foundation of strategic guidance. This was initially undertaken by a committee of key leaders consisting of the Superintendent and his principal subordinates, and subsequently by a faculty committee. To assist both groups with advice and counsel, General Palmer cast a wide net that encompassed every living former 2
Overview
superintendent, the Board of Visitors, the Association of Graduates, the
faculty and cadets, former reviewers and critics, and the senior leadership
of the Army, both active and retired.
The keystone of the strategic guidance was an answer to the first question listed above. "Why West Point?" There was a procedural reason for beginning with this fundamental question. Previous efforts to write concept papers to guide West Point ran into difficulty when at the end it came time to integrate those papers into a summary piece – one that captured the quintessence of West Point. That earlier experience suggested to USMA's leaders that they would be well-advised to proceed in the reverse manner, writing the integrating piece first and then proceeding to the concepts that flowed logically therefrom. That integrating, quintessential piece would eventually be West Point's first statement of institutional purpose and would answer the question, "Why West Point?" As a first step to explore that question, General Palmer asked individuals on the Academic Board and other groups to express the essence of West Point in a picture. These efforts produced at least two useful pictures: (1) a tree representing the development of leaders as the fruit of a biological growth process and (2) a military-operation-styled diagram showing leader development as the objective of a multi-pronged attack. The pictures served to clarify thinking and led to further exploration. To understand, "Why West Point?" it was useful to ask why America founded West Point nearly two centuries ago and why it has continued to sustain it. Determining why West Point was founded was not a simple matter. Why was West Point founded in 1802 by a president who, six years before, had argued that a military academy would be unconstitutional? And, why by a Congress which only two years before had voted down a well-designed proposal for a military academy? One line of conjecture argued that the new president, Thomas Jefferson, wanted to replace the Army leaders of his day because he distrusted them. (1) They were qualified to lead the Army, in that their aristocratic wealth enabled them to be well-educated, but their loyalties to the young nation--and its civilian rule--were not trusted by Jefferson. His dilemma was that trustworthy patriots lacked the education to lead the Army, while those who were educated lacked the nation's trust. He solved his dilemma by founding West Point. There he could educate young men of character and reliable values--the sons of the loyal patriots who had given their lives and fortunes to secure the nation's freedom--empowering them through education to lead the Army. The founders of West Point were clearly concerned about external threats
to the nation's well-being, but they were also concerned by the internal
threat posed by a standing army. USMA leaders concluded, with some surprise,
that the United States president and Congress did not found West Point
primarily in order to promote military power in the United States. Rather,
they founded it to protect the nation from the dangers of placing military
power in unreliable
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hands. Two centuries later, this is still the nation's expectation of West Point. What the nation wants West Point to do is "to provide the nation with leaders of character who serve the common defense." This is USMA's purpose. The purpose statement answered the question, 'Why does America have West Point?" That answer is unchanging over time. It spans all of the Academy's varied history. What changes with time is what the Academy does to fulfill its purpose. This is the question of mission, and it can change. For example, the Academy has operated in a wide variety of ways including 2-year programs and 5-year programs. In times past, it had the mission of commissioning officers in both the Army and Air Force. Reviewing the mission statement (see p. 90), in order to update it as part of the strategic planning project, a few small changes were found useful. The three active verbs were retained--educate, train. and inspire--but they were rearranged so that their objects could be made clearer. Additionally, the phrase "full career in the Army" was changed to "a lifetime of service to the nation." This phrase was thought to be more consistent with the nation's historical expectations and the reasonable limits of the commitment that high school seniors can be expected to make upon entering the institution. The revised mission statement was approved and signed by the Army's Chief of Staff, General John Wickham, in May, 1987. Having considered why West Point exists and what it does to fulfill its purpose, it was equally essential to look outside to the future needs of the Army and the nation. A sound strategic plan would bring what West Point does well to bear upon meeting the future needs of the Army. What will be the U.S. Army's needs for leaders in the future? The Army of the future and its fighting doctrine suggest several differences from today's Army. For example, the future battlefield will be, according to Army planners. much more lethal and more dispersed. Army units will be further apart, both side to side and front to rear, and greater distances will separate lower units from higher headquarters. Electronic communications equipment, though more sophisticated, will also be susceptible to even more sophisticated disruption by the enemy. A likely consequence of these conditions is that the leader, particularly the junior leader, and his or her unit may be required to operate with relative independence, exercising initiative in the midst of chaos without direct orders, guided only by a general understanding of what the higher commander is trying to accomplish. The Army will need young leaders with the capacity to think clearly under pressure and, in the midst of chaos, to make decisions based on inadequate information, to formulate plans with initiative and creativity within a larger whole, and to execute the plans decisively. To capture the implications of the Army of the future in their planning, USMA's leaders formulated a concept paper titled The Army Leader of the 21st Century. It became West Point's relevant statement of the Army's future needs. The paper was organized into three categories--what the leader must be, what the leader must know, and what the leader must do. What the leader must be addresses character, defined as having the judgment to know what ought to be done and the courage to do it.(2) What the leader must know is organized into 4 Overview
two sub-elements. First, the leader must know the physical world because
of the technological sophistication of future weaponry; and, second, the
leader must know human nature because it will still be humans, not machines,
that he or she will lead. What the leader must do is multi-faceted, beginning
with the need to balance accomplishing the mission with meeting the needs
of subordinates.
In the discussion to this point, three of the nine concept papers which eventually became part of the strategic guidance have been touched upon. The remaining six papers described how the Academy's programs pursue fulfilling the purpose and achieving the mission. As depicted in those papers, the USMA model of leader development has three identifiable developmental programs--academic, military, and physical--which comprise a West Point experience conducted within a unique environment which sustains and fosters the developmental process. Each of the three programs encompasses moral development as well. After the concept papers were drafted, their relationship to one another was depicted once again in a graphic form, and included with the concept papers in a pamphlet conveying the strategic guidance titled, "2002 -- A Roadmap to Our Third Century." The graphic and the text of the nine concept papers which constituted the strategic guidance is reproduced in Appendix B. Stage Two-Institutional Self-study The strategic guidance described above took a year to complete. The next stage required roughly another two years to complete. During that period USMA undertook a large number of introspective, self-study projects designed to ask whether the institution was well-positioned (in terms of programs, organization, faculty, facilities, and other resources) to be and to do in the future what it had set for itself as a target in the just-completed strategic guidance. The objective in every study was to reaffirm those strengths of the institution which appeared to be taking USMA in the desired direction (depicted in the "2002" Roadmap) and to rectify the weaknesses which were not. Some studies were accomplished quite early during the strategic planning project and others later. The areas that were eventually studied included the following: Formal two-year academic accreditation self-studyAffirmation and Change Fourth Class System reviewsThe first study listed above was the centerpiece of Stage Two efforts and is discussed below. Each of the other areas of review listed above are described in subsequent chapters. In the fall of 1987, USMA took formal steps to begin preparing for an impending decennial accreditation visit in 1989 by its accrediting agency, the Middle States Association of Secondary Schools and Colleges (MSA). The MSA required that its schools complete a self-study and provide accreditation team members a summary of the study prior to their visit. USMA formed a steering committee to plan and execute the self-study under the leadership of COL Jim Golden, then-Deputy Head of the Department of Social Sciences. As the self-study was being organized, the Academy completed its initial version of the strategic guidance, described earlier. As a result, the timing was perfect to convert the impending institutional self-study from a necessity into an opportunity--an opportunity to execute a thorough-going, top-to-bottom, institutional assessment using the Strategic Guidance as the measure of whether the Academy was on track or not for becoming in the 21st century the institution which the Strategic Guidance urged that it ought to be. To facilitate this major self-study, the steering committee organized eight subcommittees to consider issues within the following categories: leader development program coordination, cadet life, academic program, military program, physical program, faculty and teaching, the master's degree program, and outcomes assessment. This massive effort would, over two years time, involve participation by more than 120 members of the institution. By December 1988, these committees produced a significant, three-volume report which was circulated for internal consumption at USMA. After incorporating feedback from all key elements in the Academy, it became the basis for a more succinct, one-volume report presented to the accrediting agency. Both reports, the long and short versions, were organized in terms of two topics: strengths and weaknesses within each area reviewed. The strengths were aspects to be consolidated and reaffirmed; the weaknesses were aspects for further study and reform. The accreditation team leader, Dr. Richard Richardson. said the Academy's self-study was the best in terms of its openness, collegiality, and candidness that he had seen in almost 20 years of doing such visits. The Academy had identified in advance and had begun responding to every weakness that the team would have identified during its visit. The Academy's accreditation was renewed as expected, but the greater good achieved was in the reaffirmation of the Academy's numerous strengths and in initiation of changes to ameliorate its weaknesses. Stage Three-Implementation To implement the changes decided upon was perhaps the most difficult stage of all. It would require the most time of the three stages, continuing over several years. It also required extra energy input. The Superintendent supplemented his staff temporarily with an Executive for Academy Initiatives to facilitate and push the implementation process. To decide in retrospect when Stage Three began was not simple. Just as the series of introspective studies of the Academy actually stretched in time over several years--some occurring early in General Palmer's tenure and others later, so also the implementation was not neatly confined to a clearly discernible period. By the fall of 1989, some changes (for example, those in summer military training) had already been implemented, yet one major study remained to be done (review of the Fourth Class System). Nevertheless, by the fall of 1989, the centerpiece study, the accreditation self-study, was complete as well as the year of honor reviews. In addition a major outgrowth of the centerpiece self-study, the redesign of the cadet experience (known at the time as Project Enrichment), had been concluded by the summer of 1989. By this time, in addition, efforts were underway to implement the long-range facilities plan, known as the Concept for the Bicentennial and Beyond, created by the Hillier Group and the Academy's Facilities Modernization Committee. Thus, one may conclude that the summer and fall of 1989 marked the demarcation in time between Stage Two of study and Stage Three of implementation. By the fall of 1990, all of the reviews and studies had been completed, and academic year 1990-91 was devoted entirely to implementation. Conclusion Though the changes made during the period of the late 1980s and early '90s seemed to be many in number--as one will see in succeeding chapters--it is important to recognize that the process was primarily one of affirmation of what was good and strong at West Point. Much more about the institution was affirmed and kept the same than was changed. The time of calm, which had permitted a period of affirmation and change, drew to a close in the early 1990s. The window of opportunity began sliding shut. A rising number of issues in which the Academy found itself embroiled--downsizing the Army and the Military Academy, extending the active duty service obligation, investigating the service academies' costs, and others – were the signal that the time of calm was over. The possibility that the window would close abruptly had imposed urgency on the planning and change process from the beginning. That urgency had proved itself essential by the end. Affirmation and Change
The West Point experience includes activities that are organized into three distinct programs: academic, military, and physical (each incorporating elements of moral-ethical development). During the late 1980s and early 1990s. the changes made in the USMA Academic Program included changes within the following categories: Program Goals and ObjectivesOne other change initiative having substantial academic interest, the Academy's graduate-level academic program in leader development for future Tactical Officers, is discussed in chapter 7 on program integration. It appears there because the program affected more than one of the Academy's developmental programs. It is an academic program governed by the Dean, but one which prepares officers who work for the Commandant and who integrate all three developmental programs for their assigned cadets. Each item in the list above is discussed below. During the Institutional Self-study conducted from 1987-1989, the members of an academic program subcommittee formulated goals for the academic program and proposed their adoption in its report. That report, together with reports of other subcommittees, was incorporated into the Interim Report of the Middle States Accreditation Steering Committee, dated 20 December 1988. The Academic Board approved the academic program goals and objectives essentially as they appeared in that Interim Report. In AY90-91, the Dean's Curriculum Committee undertook a further review of the program goals and objectives, and as a result they are subject to revision in the future; however, at that time of this writing, the approved goals and objectives were as follows: 9 Academic Program Goals 1. General educational goal. To enable graduates to anticipate and to respond effectively to the uncertainties of a changing technological, social, political. and economic world. 2. Specific educational goals. a. Developing creativity and intellectual curiosity in graduates.Academic Program Objectives 1. Curricular Objectives a. Ensure that each cadet completes a broad core curriculum embracing the humanities, social sciences, basic and applied sciences, and engineering.2. Process Objectives a. Provide time to cadets for academic preparation in increments that permit thoughtful study, analysis and writing.Revision of the Engineering Curriculum The cadet's academic program contains a substantial core requirement of 31 courses. Within that core is included the requirement to complete a series of courses in engineering – to enable cadets to gain facility with the engineering thought process. The requirement is satisfied easily by cadets whose major or field of study (FOS) is in a field of engineering. However, those students who pursue a major/FOS in a non-engineering discipline still must satisfy the core engineering requirement, How they should do so was the question addressed in the changes to the engineering curriculum. Prior to this study. the cadets' core curriculum engineering sequences for non-engineers were essentially narrowly-focused, two-course programs in civil, mechanical, or electrical engineering, each built upon a broad array of engineering science prerequisite courses, taken in a three-course sequence. Because of the breadth of the engineering science courses, it was difficult for the cadets to develop the background to enable them to do design analysis, which, as a mental problem-solving technique, was the prime objective of requiring study of engineering by non-engineers. In addition, essentially limiting the choice of sequences to civil, mechanical, and electrical engineering did not take advantage of the other engineering disciplines available and of interest to cadets. The USMA curriculum committee reviewed numerous alternatives and compared them with the status quo. They proposed that the 5-course sequence should consist of a coherent set of courses within any one of several branches of engineering, a set which would enable the cadets to gain sufficient technical competence in that one field to perform analysis of problems and design of solutions--to experience the engineering thought process. Several different "sets" of courses would be offered, each in a different branch of engineering. These became known as "sequences," completion of any one of which would satisfy the core requirement for engineering. In the course of the review it was recognized that an emerging branch of engineering--systems engineering--would be especially useful in meeting the objectives which justify study of engineering by non-engineers. Up to this point, systems engineering had been taught within the Engineering Department as decision theory. As a result, the change in the engineering curriculum became inter-related with a proposal to add systems engineering to the Academy's offerings. It has been added, and now the core requirement in engineering is for non-engineers to complete any one of seven tracks, each consisting of five courses in one branch of engineering. The seven engineering branches are civil, mechanical, electrical, environmental, nuclear, systems engineering or in computer science. 12 The addition of systems engineering raised the question of which department would provide those offerings. The answer could have been one of several existing departments or a new department dedicated to systems engineering. By raising the possibility of a new academic department dedicated to one branch of engineering, two other long-standing organizational questions were confronted, to which we now turn. In days past, when the cadets' curriculum was fixed ("one size fits all"), it made sense for academic departments teaching technical fields to be organized in a manner one might refer to as "horizontal." For example, when organized horizontally, the Mechanics Department taught all of the courses needed in the third year of a cadet's progression through the fixed engineering program. The Engineering Department in turn taught all courses required in the fourth year of that program. The result was that these departments each taught courses sometimes regarded as belonging to multiple branches of engineering. The horizontal arrangement was quite workable before the Academy adopted optional majors/FOS and invited cadets to elect one. After adoption of optional majors/FOS, the departmental organization became more confusing than helpful. Cadets pursuing mechanical engineering, for example, would move from one department to another each year in order to complete their programs rather than staying in a "mechanical engineering department." With adoption of majors, the traditional college organization--collecting together all courses associated with a branch of engineering--appeared to make more sense at USMA than before. Thus, several motives for change came together almost simultaneously: the impetus to alter the engineering core requirements for non-engineers, the interest in systems engineering, and the value of reorganizing the several departments which taught elements of engineering. Opening the question of departmental reorganization also offered the opportunity to recognize the growing importance of computer science. The Department of Geography and Computer Science (G&CS) had given birth to the USMA computer science program in the early sixties (as the Department of Earth, Space, and Graphic Sciences). The emergence of computer science as a field unto itself, considered with the substantial reputation and growth of the geography program and a new program in environmental engineering, suggested that splitting these two disciplines into autonomous departments would benefit both. However, a decline in enrollments in electrical engineering as a major, the dropping of electrical engineering as a core course, as well as nationwide efforts to group computer engineering (taught by electrical engineers) and computer science led to the concept of grouping them at West Point. The total number of departments that the Academy could accommodate became a consideration in the weighing of alternate formulations. To enlarge the number beyond 13 would perhaps clarify disciplinary distinctions but would have the practical effect of increasing the administrative overhead costs. At some point, the costs offset the gains. In the final analysis, the number of departments stayed the same by creating two new marriages while breaking apart two old ones. The geography 13 element of G&CS became the Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering; the computer science element joined the old Department of Electrical Engineering to become the new Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science; the systems engineering element of the old Department of Engineering became the new Department of Systems Engineering; the civil engineering element of the old Department of Engineering joined the old Department of Mechanics to become the new Department of Civil and Mechanical Engineering. As a result of the Institutional Self-study and suggestions by the Visiting Professors Panel, the Dean's General Committee reviewed the Academy's grading policy and elected to adopt a policy favoring criterion-referenced grading. That policy is implemented in general terms by the Dean's Policy Operating Memorandum, stating in part the following: Grading philosophy:
The foundation of our grading is a commitment to evaluate cadets based on their achievement of announced course objectives. Satisfactory performance on graded course requirements must therefore reflect satisfactory progress toward meeting course objectives. We will establish and provide to cadets reasonable academic standards of achievement in advance of cadets taking a course and taking tests. Our goal is not to order cadets against each other based on any preconceived concept of an appropriate grade distribution. Instead, we challenge cadets to meet announced standards of performance and assign grades based on their success in doing so. Once standards are established, the principal responsibility for academic performance rests with each individual cadet.Historical Mindedness During 1988, the Superintendent asked a select panel, headed by BG William A. Stofft (Chief of Military History), to assess the teaching of history at USMA and the degree to which "historical mindedness" is evident through the activities at the Military Academy. Other members included Professor L. J. Luvaas (US Army War College), Dr. Richard H. Kohn (Chief of Air Force History), and Dr. Charles P. Roland (Chairman, Department of Army Historical Advisory Committee), The panel reviewed documents, visited USMA departments and talked with professors, PAPs, and instructors. In its report, the panel restated the US Army's interest in seeing that its leaders have opportunities "for the study of history to develop historical mindedness among the officer corps at large and to contribute individually to broaden perspective, sharpen judgement, and increase perceptivity and professional expertise." They reported also the Army Training & Doctrine Command's official definition of historical mindedness as follows: A person who is historically minded habitually solves problems by searching for broad themes that trace developments over lengthy periods, tries to identify cause and effect relationships, analyzes past events and actions in the context of their own times, and considers present circumstances in the light of the past. USMA offered its own definition as well: "A characteristic of thought that enables one to view an idea in the context of human experience and to judge its applicability under current or anticipated conditions." The report concluded that "significantly more is being done to instill historical mindedness than we imagined." It cited the Departments of Foreign Languages, Social Sciences, Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, English and Law as effective contributors in addition to special programs such as varied lecture series, SCUSA. etc. The report offered especially strong praise of the Department of History and its contributions, such as the ROTC workshop--described as "a national treasure." As recommendations the panel suggested several actions: increased attention to inter-disciplinary coordination: a careful inventory of heritage experiences of cadets "with the goal of fully integrating in the minds of faculty and cadets the history of the Army, West Point. and the military profession; " hiring a few civilian teachers with earned PhDs in history; and giving increased credit to those who teach the ROTC Workshop. The panel considered and recommended against development of a masters degree level program in military history at USMA because of, primarily, a potential drain of resources from the undergraduate program. Visiting Professor Panel Reports After his arrival at USMA, General Palmer observed that the value of the Visiting Professors as a collective advisory group had been neglected. In the past, Visiting Professors each had filed an individual report at year's end with their respective department heads. Some of those reports contained highly 15 constructive advice, but these did not have the power that a collective effort promised. In addison, some Visiting Professors seemed frustrated at the reception their comments received, noting that their predecessors had said the same things, apparently to no avail. General Palmer believed it would be useful to enable the Visiting Professors to express their views collectively. He recognized from the beginning that their views may be critical, because the Visiting Professors come from academic life in institutions having no mission beyond collegiate education. With that background, they cannot be expected to appreciate the reasons why some purely educational values may be compromised at times in the interests of other institutional values or program objectives such as character-building, military training, physical development, etc. Expecting that their opinions would be critical, he believed, nevertheless, that they should be heard and taken seriously, but also taken within the context of the Military Academy's unique mission. Thus, he impanelled the Visiting Professors during each of three successive years, AY87-88, 88-89, and 89-90, to provide him their collective advice. He asked the SASP to facilitate their work and serve as his point-of-contact for them. To begin their work each year, the Visiting Professors received general briefings on aspects of the Academy beyond the academic realm in which they worked. Afterward, they decided upon the primary concerns to which they would address themselves for the year. By the end of each year, they compiled a report and filed it with the Superintendent. All three Visiting Professors' reports offered constructive criticism, as expected, together with obviously genuine affection for the institution. The nature of the criticisms was similar in all three reports and may be represented adequately by the first. It concluded in the main that (1) the use of large numbers of temporary military officers as rotating faculty members limited the experience and depth of faculty in a manner detrimental to quality education, (2) that the use of small sections for interaction between instructor and cadet was not being effectively implemented, (3) that grading practices allowing for curving of grades to fit cadets' performance contributed to mediocre academic standards, and (4) the myriad of non-academic requirements faced by cadets inhibited their motivation toward and performance of academic work. All three reports made clear that the flaw to which they pointed was not with the quality of cadets nor of faculty; rather, "the flaw is in the system," they said. Again, it should be said that the criticisms above were taken seriously, but in light of the differing set of values which non-military educators bring to the analysis. What to them is a flaw may actually be a virtue when considered in light of differing objectives. For example, the temporary military faculty, criticized by the Visiting Professors, is justified, not by their youthful vigor and enthusiasm in the classroom (which helps to offset their lack of experience), but rather by the role modeling of military professional norms and values which they provide. By the end of AY89-90. the Superintendent saw that the three previous panels had fulfilled their purpose at a time in the review process when their fresh input was most needed, so he closed this brief but unique episode in the history of the Visiting Professors. 16 Faculty Appointments and Retention The history of USMA reveals an ebb and flow in concern for maintaining the faculty's currency with the Army. General Palmer undertook several policy initiatives which were intended to improve that currency. They were as follows: The Superintendent curtailed extensions of normal tours of duty and repeat tours of duty by faculty, in order to permit more officers, each with their varied experiences, to have the opportunity to serve at West Point.
Efforts began in the late 1980s to improve the administrative circumstances for hiring of civilian faculty at USMA. The purpose was primarily to improve hiring procedures that affect the civilian faculty already employed at USMA, those in Department of Physical Education, Department of Foreign Languages, and those Visiting Professors who are not associated with another university (VPs who are associated with other universities are hired under the Inter-governmental Personnel Act, not under the customary civilian hiring rules of Title 5). Title 5 works satisfactorily for hiring administrative personnel, but not for faculty. Operating under the limitations of Title 5, USMA was underpaying its civilian faculty in comparison to their peers in the region and, as a result, it was having trouble retaining them, a situation which was in serious need of repair. An effort to improve civilian faculty hiring procedures has the secondary benefit of placing USMA in an improved position to expand its civilian faculty in a responsible manner should it choose or be compelled to do so at any time in the future. Conclusion USMA's academic program has been throughout its history the Academy’s most stable program and, at the same time, the one most resistant to change despite pronounced efforts to induce it. The changes in curriculum and departmental organization achieved during the late 1980s were completed in a more progressive and collegial spirit than has been the case at times in the 17 Affirmation and Change past. The changes, as well as the spirit in which they were undertaken, bode well for the future of the program and the intellectual development of cadets. 18
The Military Program was revised in numerous ways during the late 1980s and early '90s. The changes may be discussed within the following categories: Program Goals
19 The goals of the Military Program were developed as part of the 1987-89 institutional self-study, in which Academy goals also were developed and were the basis for subsequent development of program goals. A precursor to the goals of the military program was the Commandant's operational concept developed in 1987-88. The Military Program goals were further revised in 1990, as follows: To provide each cadet broad basic military education and training designed to teach and train each cadet in individual and small unit leadership skills and selected professional knowledge subjects. To contribute to developing in each cadet, through the demanding regimen of a spartan lifestyle, the self-discipline and mature judgment necessary to think clearly, decide wisely, act decisively, and communicate clearly. To provide each cadet with leadership opportunities that are increasingly more demanding and with the motivation to seek even greater leadership opportunities through a sequential, progressive, four-year process of education, training and performance evaluation. To contribute to moral-ethical development by instilling in each cadet the ethos of military life with its commitment to national service and the ideals of loyalty, duty, integrity, personal responsibility, selfless service, and the inspiration for continued military development. Sequential Leadership Development System The Sequential Leadership Development System (SLDS) was first conceptualized and briefed to the Commandant, BG Joseph Franklin, by then-Major Will Wilson in 1980. SLDS provided for cadets to experience increasing leadership responsibilities year-by-year, progressing from (1) follower to (2) one-on-one developer to (3) small unit leader to (4) Corps leader. General Franklin adopted some elements such as the Third Class one-on-one developers. The concept developed during tenure of subsequent commandants, and it was then-BG Peter Boylan who saw the potential of SLDS as a system for evaluation of subordinates by the chain-of-command (and by instructors and coaches). He initiated formulation of a set of 12 dimensions of observed behavior associated with effective leadership (known as Leader Performance Indicators or LPI) to serve as the evaluation criteria for SLDS. In addition, the SLDS system utilized, for collection of LPI data, the power of personal computers, which were becoming widely available then for the first time. Certification and the Four-year Model of Development During academic year 87-88, the Superintendent proposed the outline of a model of the four years of a cadet career in which the first two years are primarily developmental, the next 1 and 1/2 are principally evaluative, and the last 1/2 year is transitional. Based on this outline, a formal program was developed by the Office of the Commandant, providing for checkpoints for 20 cadets toward the end of their second year, their third year, and their 7th semester. Cadets were to be evaluated on a whole-person, comprehensive basis at each checkpoint. Those found lacking were designated as cadets of concern (COC) toward whom subsequent intensive developmental effort would be directed. The last checkpoint was a "go/no go" certification decision, in which a "go" meant that the cadet was assured of graduating on time so long as he or she did not "self-destruct" during the final transition period (with those few who did being delayed in graduating or separated). Cadets who received a final "no-go" decision were confirmed by a Certification Review Board and by the USMA Academic Board, then identified to Department of Army as cadets who were not expected to graduate in the following May. From the above description, one can see that the program resolved two problems. First, prior to the program's development, the Academy had upon occasion decided, just prior to graduation, that a particular cadet should not be graduated. When the separation decision for such a cadet was forwarded to Department of Army (DA) for final approval, administrators there found it difficult to resist arguments from family and interested Congressmen that such an "11th hour" decision by the Academy was unjust, unfair, and reflected poorly on the procedures of the Academy. It was argued that the institution should have been able to recognize prior to the end of nearly four years that the cadet was not fit to graduate. By means of the certification process, such cadets are now identified to DA in time to enable administrators and the family of the cadet to make appropriate arrangements. The second problem improved by the certification process was that of insuring that graduates meet the "whole-person” qualification standards of the institution. The program provided a mechanism to screen for and evaluate comprehensively the cadet who may have barely skated by at every possible evaluation opportunity, including possibly conduct and honor, but failed to trigger any specific separation mechanism. By so doing, the program ultimately enabled the Academic Board to fulfill better its responsibility to judge whether each cadet has "completed the course of instruction,... maintained the standards of conduct; and... possess[es] the moral qualities, traits of character and leadership essential for a graduated cadet...." (para 9.02.a., "Regulations, USMA"). In the summer of 1986, shortly after General Palmer's arrival, he learned that the Third Class (second-year) cadets in Cadet Field Training (CFT) at Camp Buckner were, upon occasions, training seven days a week (necessitated by scheduling of facilities and compensated by "time off" at another time). When he asked why such a pace was necessary, he was told that the list of mandatory training subjects left no alternative; there was no other way to fit in all the required training. When he asked whether the list was really imperative and whether it served our institutional purpose for the training, he found that the staff's view of the purpose of CFT focused primarily on teaching soldier skills to Third Class cadets with secondary attention to the leader development of the First Class cadre. His inquiries led to a staff review of the purpose of CFT. After considerable study by the Commandant's staff during the summer of 1987, it was decided that Camp Buckner had four goals. The foremost goal was 21 (1) to provide a leader development experience for the upperclass cadets. General Palmer expressed his view that the training of the Third Class was not the top priority in saying, "If all we wanted to do was teach 1100 Yearlings advanced individual training, it would be cheaper to put them in trucks and take them to Ft. Dix. They are set up to do that training." The second goal of Buckner is (2) to give the Third Class cadets (yearlings) a cohesion experience, to find out that the Army's fun, to get to know each other, to play as well as work, and to develop class unity. The third goal is (3) to familiarize yearlings with the Army and the fourth is (4) to develop military qualification skills to a level required for commissioning. With these goals in mind, General Palmer concluded that USMA was doing well on the third and fourth priorities but poorly on the first and second priorities. In succeeding years, the focus of training at Buckner was revised and redirected toward providing a leadership opportunity for the First class (and later Second class) cadre members and a further grounding in their military skills. The upperclass cadets were given substantially increased opportunities to present instruction, accepting that any diminution in quality of training was justified by the gain in their development as leaders. This change not only enhanced the upperclass cadets' leadership development opportunity, it also responded to threatened reductions in Army funding of the troop support required by USMA in the summer; thus, the increased reliance upon cadets as trainers may have been necessary as well as desirable. Rather than experiencing a drop in training quality, in fact much of the instruction improved, because the cadet trainers' ingenuity and "insider" sense of humor made the instruction more palatable than before. Staff and faculty members employed as platoon trainers gave upperclass cadre a readily-available mentor to assist in their training preparation. Training on weekends was ended and replaced by opportunities to develop class cohesion through intramural sports and social activities. The training revisions at Camp Buckner made clear a generalized principle for all summer training: that the primary purpose is to provide a leader development experience to the upperclass cadre cadets. This principle was subsequently extended to the summer training of new cadets (plebes) in Cadet Basic Training (Beast Barracks). The sequence of cadet summer training has been altered at various times in the past for reasons which were no doubt reasonable at the time (and which were often lost from the institutional memory). For whatever reasons, the sequencing of summer training by 1986 seemed to be illogical when viewed from a perspective concerned with progressive sequencing of leader development activities. The illogical sequence caused only First Class cadets to serve as cadre for Cadet Basic Training (Beast) and Cadet Field Training (Buckner) in all positions, to include cadet sergeant squad leader positions. For First Class cadets to be employed as squad leaders in their final summer served well their trainees, but it served poorly the Firsties themselves. Many of them had actually served as Second Lieutenants with active Army units the previous 22 summer; thus, to be reduced to a squad leader role the following summer was a retrogression. During AY 87-88, in order to improve the sequencing of leader development opportunities, decisions were made to rearrange the cadets' third and fourth summers of training. The change provided in every cadet's third summer a non-commissioned-officer-type experience and in the fourth summer an officer-type experience. It was accomplished by sending Second Class cadets to either an NCO (typically squad leader) position at Beast/Buckner or to Drill Cadet Leader Training Joining NCOs in an Army basic training cadre). First Class cadets were sent to either an officer position at Beast/Buckner or to Cadet Troop Leader Training (serving as a platoon leader in an active Army unit). Assignment of cadets in their third and fourth summers was coordinated so that each cadet would serve once on a West Point cadre detail and at least once with the Army away from West Point. These changes also made the summer training assignments consistent with the leadership duties each cadet would perform during the approaching academic year, thus providing for a coherent, year-round progression of leadership responsibilities for each cadet. In their details as NCOs or officers on the cadre at Beast and Buckner, First and Second Class cadets were given much increased roles in conducting the training of the Fourth and Third classes. Previously, training was conducted primarily by members of the Army units which assisted USMA with the summer training. The cadet leaders' role was to get the students to the class on time with the right uniform and gear. The cadet leaders were missing an opportunity to exercise an important leader responsibility, that of training one's subordinates. After the change, cadets conducted all of the training which safety and their own expertise allowed. At Buckner, cadet leaders were assisted in the preparation and evaluation phases by officers from the staff and faculty who served as platoon trainers. The employment of large numbers of the staff and faculty in military training positions during the summers furthered the goals of the Academy's Officer Professional Development program, which serves to maintain the military currency of both rotating and permanent faculty members. An initiative begun within USCC by Major Kearney, a Tactical Officer, to study cadet ranks and company organization fitted very well with the general focus upon leader development which guided other changes, and as a result his proposals were readily adopted. To support the logical year-by-year sequence of leader developmental tasks for each cadet, assignment of cadet rank was altered to correspond directly to the cadets' progress. The Fourth Class learn to be followers and have the cadet rank of private. The Third Class are all promoted to corporal after completing Camp Buckner, and they serve as team leaders both at Buckner and sometime during their Third Class academic year. The Second Class are promoted to Sergeant at the beginning of their third summer, and the First Class become officers at the beginning of their fourth summer (with a few minor exceptions on the Beast cadre). A barrier to adoption of this system in the past has been the inability to provide a chain of command position to every cadet officer if the entire First 23 Class were promoted to officers. This problem, however, was re-evaluated when considered in terms of its parallel in the Army. The Army has more officers than it has current chain of command positions. Many officers serve in essential staff roles as well as in command positions. They rotate between such positions and to other duties, such as attending civil or military schooling. At all times, even when they are not in command or on staff, they still maintain responsibilities for upholding professional standards in their own behavior as well in other military personnel with whom they may come into contact. For cadet officers this latter responsibility holds as well. Cadet officers rotate into and out of the available command and staff positions during the course of the First Class year. When they are not in an assigned duty position, they are responsible, nevertheless, for their own performance of duty, personal standards, and for upholding standards among other cadets. A change was needed in the academic year organization of the cadet company to parallel the changes in rank and sequential development. Squads were reorganized so that the senior member of the squad would be the cadet sergeant (Second Class) squad leader. The squad then would include Third Class cadets (as either team leaders or members of squad) and Fourth class cadets (as members of squad). The First and Second Class cadets who were not assigned to line platoons as platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, or squad leaders were assigned to a headquarters platoon. Increased Accountability for Self-discipline As cadets progress through the 4-year experience, they are required to engage numerous challenges, such as the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT). During the First Class year, the physical fitness requirements imposed upon the "Firsties" are less than in prior years, while their responsibility for maintaining their fitness remains constant. Without institutional prodding to keep them in good condition, they must rely increasingly upon their own self-discipline. Most are quite willing and able to do so, but a few in the past would prove unable to exercise self-discipline and would fail the APFT in their final semester, though they had proven themselves in earlier tests capable of passing it. USMA's past practice in dealing with such failures had been to continue retesting the Firsties until they were finally able to pass the test, usually in the 11th hour before graduation. General Palmer concluded that this procedure failed to enforce the habits of self-discipline which were the key lesson to be learned at this point in one's cadetship. During AY87-88, he instituted the policy that cadets who failed the APFT in their final semester (without medical or other mitigating circumstances) would not graduate on time with their class, but instead would undergo additional fitness training and graduate late--assuming they eventually passed the test. Each year since, a few unbelievers among the graduating class tested the rule and found it unbending. 24 First Class Responsibility for Dril1, Ceremony, & Spirit An annual practice of General Palmer was to assign to the First Class three special responsibilities in the Corps as a whole. Two of those were the same each year: (1) high quality of cadet drill and ceremonies during the marching season and (2) maintaining a high level of morale, esprit de corps, and positive attitude among cadets, manifesting itself in various ways, only one of which was the support by the "12th man" of Army athletics. The third was a responsibility chosen each year as important to that year, such as: honor, Fourth Class System, implementation of the new model, etc. As a result of the Superintendent's discussions with recent graduates of USMA on active duty, General Palmer became concerned about the preparation of cadets to cope with the freedom and responsibilities they experience in their first assignments. He believed that cadets needed a period of transition to the officer lifestyle before graduation. A transition period would permit cadets who were determined to sow wild oats to make their mistakes at West Point, where it could be survived, rather than making mistakes in the Army, where it could be a career-ender. As a result, several changes were made; one was in cadets' privileges. Privileges for cadets (which pertain mostly to their freedom to come and go when they have no other duties) were gradually altered. The spirit of the change in privileges was to have cadets learn to exercise self-discipline by submitting to the demands of a spartan lifestyle for three years, after which they would experience the transition to the officer lifestyle during their final year. As a result, the privileges for the First Class cadets were increased, while the privileges for the underclasses were actually reduced. The First Class' privileges enabled them to function much like officers, free to come and go when they had no duties to perform. The change in underclass privileges was made as a part of a review of the cadet experience, known at the time as Project Enrichment, the objective of which was to restore high quality of achievement to the academic program. As a result of the change, the three underclasses have a rigidly graduated set of privileges by class: thus, they live what is intentionally a uniformly spartan lifestyle. The cadet leave and pass policy was also revised. Leaves were distinguished from passes as follows: A leave is a cadet entitlement (barring severe indiscipline), and there are four leaves authorized per year (Thanksgiving, Christmas, Spring, and Summer). Passes, in contrast to a leave, are a privilege earned by one's performance of duties. The number of passes which are automatically authorized for underclass cadets was reduced, while the number of passes they can earn for performance of duty increased. To further the transition to officership of First Class cadets, a new plan was tested in the late spring of 1987, housing Firsties in barracks apart from their underclass subordinates, while they continued to perform all chain of command duties required by their duty positions. Visiting between First Class and 25 underclass living areas was limited to duty-related visits. The revised living arrangement mirrored in part the circumstances of an officer who lives in a BOQ rather than in the barracks with the soldiers. The initial pilot test during AY 87-88 used one battalion as the test group and concluded that the arrangement had both strengths and weaknesses. As strengths, the duty performance of the First Class did not appear diminished. while the cohesion between the First and Second classes seemed increased. First class cadets were perceived by underclasses as more mature, and Second Class cadets took a fuller leadership role in running the company. Study conditions within the companies were improved. The First Class cadets, in the exercise of privileges, were less of a distraction to the underclasses. As weaknesses, the First Class were perceived as less visible in daily functioning of the company, and unit cohesiveness was perceived as diminished by the distance (physically and professionally) of the First Class. The concept was tested further during academic year 88-89 by expanding to a full regiment in addition to the original test battalion. Based on the success of that expanded pilot, it was implemented Corps-wide during AY 89-90. Following that experience, a revision to the concept was adopted for AY90-91. Previously, the First Class barracks were located physically apart from the underclass barracks. In order to retain the benefits but reduce the costs of the arrangement, the First Class barracks areas were kept intact but moved to locations contiguous with their underclass company area. Limited experience with a few graduated classes appeared to confirm that the several "transition-to-officership" changes had worked as hoped: cadet offenses increased. but lieutenant offenses decreased. Fourth Class Military Mentor Program The Fourth Class Military Mentor program (or Mentor Program, for short) has its origins in the Plebe Pop program which began in 1947. That program was terminated in the early 1960s allegedly due to abuses of the program. Later, in 1969, a "Sponsor Program” was initiated. While the former program focused on the plebes, the latter focused on the upperclass years, providing an opportunity for families to sponsor cadets ideally for the cadets' last three years. Though initially sponsors were military members of the staff and faculty, sponsorship was gradually expanded to permit civilians residing off-post to participate as well. By 1986, the sponsor program also was riddled with abuses and threatened with termination. The control of the program had become nearly impossible. Some cadets were being sponsored by civilians unrelated to USMA who lived in the area (a cadet's girlfriend's parents, for example). Cadets could sign out of the company on weekends for their sponsor's house (which might be in Poughkeepsie). Because this could serve as a convenient excuse to be off-post, cadets began to "adopt" another cadet's sponsor for a day and sign out with them. Rather than terminate the program, the decision was made to restructure the program totally so as to eliminate the abuses that had become widespread. 26 The new program would be designed to serve several recognized purposes, which were as follows: to support the Fourth Class cadets' socialization into the Army way of life (especially that of military families), and to provide them a "decompression" time in an environment where they might also learn social poise and etiquette. The program was also intended to enable staff and faculty to better appreciate cadet life and to enhance the cohesion between cadets and military members of the staff and faculty. The new program was adopted in August 1987. In light of its purposes, the program restricted eligibility to serve as a mentor to married military staff and faculty members residing at West Point or Stewart Army subpost (or off-post in a limited zone by permission). Some persons who had previously sponsored cadets but were ineligible to serve as mentors took offense. It was pointed out to them that the restriction on mentors served the unique purposes of the program (see above), but did not prevent any person from engaging in relationships with any cadets within the normal limitations of cadets' privileges and limits. Review of the Cadet Discipline System Over the past twenty years, several study groups have examined the Cadet Discipline System (which is the set of rules by which exceptions to cadets' behavior, as prescribed by regulations, primarily those in USCC Reg 600-1, the "Blue Book," are administered). In addition, in 1973 the Federal Courts reviewed the separation of cadets for discipline in the case of Hagopian v. Knowlton. Throughout most reviews, a dominant concern has been protection of due process rights and the equitable administration of the discipline system. Two reviews within the Office of the Commandant during 1989 (known as the Discipline Review Committee and the SLDS Review Committee) suggested changes to the Discipline System, primarily for the purposes of simplifying the system and creating a link between conduct and leader development. Several changes were adopted. First, conduct grades were eliminated and became part of what is known as Leader Performance Indicator Grades (LPI). The Report of Deficiency form (Form 2-1), used by an observer to report a cadet's conduct, was redesigned to reflect the connection between conduct and leadership. The new form provided space to comment on the leader dimensions associated with the observed behavior. In addition, the form was designed to be used equally for meritorious behavior as well as deficiencies. In cases of observed positive behavior, the outcome would most likely be an incentive award by the Tactical Ofhcer to the cadet, as opposed to demerits or other punishments associated with non-meritorious behavior. Several changes were made in the discipline system to streamline the system administratively while maintaining due process and making the cadet system similar to the Army system. A summary of these changes follows: * The descriptions of offenses were reduced in number from 182 to 28 and were reworded to reflect principles of conduct rather than specific acts. * A table of maximum and minimum punishments by level of board was established.
The reason for the policy of counting only demerits associated with tours in the six-month demerit total was to preclude the perception that a cadet who exceeded the total was being inordinately punished for a minor infraction of the rules. If a cadet, after many past major offenses, actually went over the allowable total due to "dust on desk," he might portray the latter offense as the one for which he was being "kicked out." Additionally, Tactical Officers felt something of this same dilemma in their own issuance of demerits, and this change gave the Tactical Officers more freedom in dealing with minor infractions. The major alternative considered but not accepted in the course of the review of the cadet discipline system was the abolition of walking area tours as a punishment for cadets. A change in the sequence of military training emerged from a review of the cadet experience, known at the time as Project Enrichment, discussed in detail in chapter 7. The change moved all mandatory military science instruction into a military intersession occurring between the two terms of the academic year. The first two-weeks after the cadets return from their Christmas leave are devoted to military science and physical education instruction as well as to some physical program testing (APFT and IOCT. The military science instruction is presented by members of the staff and faculty (augmented by Army Reserve officers) and by cadets from the First Class. The intersession 28 substantially strengthens the military program by interspersing academics with a period devoted to military training, a period in which the entire institution takes on a more thoroughly military appearance. The program is further strengthened by the opportunity for cadets to see that the same instructors and professors who teach history and mathematics also teach map reading and squad tactics. Mi1itary Art and Science Field of Study Related to the teaching of the required military science courses in Military Intersession was the development of a military science "field of study." The fields of study are the disciplines in which cadets may elect to concentrate their academic study-in-depth electives during the normal academic terms. The military science field-of-study incorporated courses taught by several departments, but primarily those of the Department of Military Instruction (DMI). The instructors for those courses were to be drawn principally from graduates of the Masters Degree program in Military Art and Science at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. The details of the field-of-study and consideration of a major in military art and science were made subjects of consideration by the Academy's curriculum committee. Not only may cadets elect a military science field-of-study, but also cadets pursuing other fields of study may take elective courses in military science during the academic year as free electives. The change in military science instruction led to reorganization of the responsibilities of the DMI. The Military Program consists of several constituent elements including military science instruction during summers, intersession, and, on an elective basis, during academic terms. The Military Program includes other elements as well, such as the military organization overseen by the Tactical Officers, the disciplinary system, the Honor System, etc. The military science instruction portion of the Military Program is the responsibility of DMI. While the department alone cannot execute all parts of military science instruction, the department has total responsibility for the content design of all such instruction. Optional breakfast for cadets was terminated by a decision by the Superintendent during academic year 86-87. A proposal for optional supper was put foward by the Dean in the spring of 1988, but it was disapproved by the Policy Board due to objections expressed by the Commandant. During Project Enrichment (mentioned above; see chapter 7) in the spring of 1989, the subject of optional supper was reopened as a means of improving academic quality during the academic year. It would enable cadets to get long blocks of uninterrupted study time when it was needed. A decision to test optional supper during AY89-90 was made in the spring of 1989 as a part of the final decisions concluding Project Enrichment. It was subsequently adopted. 29 Review of Fourth Class System and Formulation of the Cadet Leader Development System During the year AY89-90, USMA undertook an intensive study of the Fourth Class System. The purpose of the review was to assure that the System helped USMA meet its leader development goals for upperclass cadets as well as plebes and that it helped mold the attributes of leadership expected in today's Army. Prior reviews of the Fourth Class System dot the Military Academy's historical landscape more frequently than any other single issue. The most recent occasions for brief reviews were two in the spring of 1988. One was headed by General Roscoe Robinson (reviewing specifically the facts of the case of former cadet Edwards who alleged he was separated for refusal to enforce the Fourth Class System) and LTG Moore (reviewing both the Fourth Class System and Discipline System). Neither of these brief reviews found any major difficulties; however, a more extensive review was accomplished in the course of the Institutional Self-study (1987-89). From the Institutional Self-study there emerged considerable concern that the Fourth Class System as practiced did not support the Academy's leader development goals as fully as it should. Two different subcommittees of the Self-study commented negatively on the Fourth Class System. The subcommittee reviewing the Military Program observed that "countenanced behavior" of upperclass cadets often violated the letter and spirit of the Fourth Class System regulation, lending an air of hypocrisy to the System's objective of teaching a duty concept. The committee further noted that some typical upperclass treatment of plebes was in conflict with sound leadership, such as one-way communication, inhibiting subordinates' task accomplishment, and seeking privilege on the basis of rank. (See p. 48, USMA Institutional Self-Study 1988-89 (ISS).) Similarly, the committee reviewing leader development coordination concluded the Fourth Class System "impedes leader development coordination because many of its elements, as it actually operates (contrary to design), are inconsistent with some Academy outcome goals and the goals of other programs." (See p. 24, ISS.) The year of review began with the appointment of three separate committees, one of cadets, one of staff and faculty members, and one of alumni. The latter committee consisted of trustees of the Association of Graduates, USMA, and was chaired by General Sam Walker, a former USMA Commandant and VMI Superintendent. The faculty committee was chaired by COL Steve Hammond, the director of the Office of Leader Development Integration. The cadet committee was chaired by Cadet Mike Thorsen, Deputy Brigade Commander. Each of the committees was asked to address – from their unique perspective--why West Point has a Fourth Class System, what the System should consist of, and how it should be implemented. All three committees met throughout the year and delivered reports to the Superintendent in the late spring of 1990. All three reports evidenced long and serious reflection on a complex issue. The alumni report was probably the most conservative of the three, urging a recognition of the fundamental value of the plebe experience and suggesting moderate revisions. The staff and faculty committee, on the other hand, concluded the System was fatally flawed and urged substantial modifications. The third report, that of the cadet committee, could be characterized as falling 30 Military Program
between the extremes of the other two. One proposal, originating in the
staff and faculty committee but supported in all three reports, was that
of a Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS) which would address in parallel
form the elements comprising the leader development experience for all
four classes, not just for plebes. CLDS would become known as the "four-class
system" which would subsume within its larger framework the former Fourth
Class System. By formalizing a four-year developmental system, it would
direct increased attention to the development of the upper classes in addition
to plebes.
After receiving the three committees' reports, the Superintendent and
members of the USMA Policy Board reached final decisions on 31 July 1990
as to the final policy changes to be adopted. Those final decisions by
the Policy Board reflected in the main the conservative position recommended
by the alumni committee. Essentially every recommendation in their report
was implemented. These included the following: recognition of the purpose
of the system, adoption of CLDS, retention within CLDS of certain traditional
requirements for Fourth Class cadets, and adjustment of the date for recognition
(that date on which terminate those traditional requirements specially
imposed upon plebes). Each of these changes are commented on below.
The following purpose of the Fourth Class System was adopted:Cadet Leader Development System The Cadet Leader Development System was adopted as the structural framework that would guide all leader development experiences of all four classes. It incorporated a plebe experience which still reflected past traditions and which contrasted markedly with that of the upperclass experience. Implementation of the new CLDS began with the start of academic year 90-91. Some specific changes incorporated into CLDS from the traditional plebe system were these: plebe knowledge continues to emphasize traditional cadet knowledge (definition of leather, cheers, songs, etc.) during Beast Barracks but is more restricted during the academic year (The Days, menu, familiarity with national and world events) to permit greater focus on academic requirements. During the academic year, plebes continue to perform traditional duties in the mess hall but eat at ease. The exaggerated form of walking (pinging, hugging walls, and squaring corners around desks and fans) was eliminated, but plebes were required to move in an erect military manner at an unexaggerated march cadence and to do so without talking outside their rooms. except to perform duties. Plebes continue to deliver laundry, distribution, and newspapers as they did in the past. The separate system of discipline for plebes (using 4Cs and 4Ds, etc.) was eliminated, so that one disciplinary system applies equally to all cadets. Recognition occurs on or about the day before Spring Leave, though the First Captain may recommend that it occur as early as the end of the intersession based on the plebes' performance. 31 In sum, the changes were intended to insure that the plebe experience is a consistent element of a larger experience that puts "fire in the soul" of future Army leaders while teaching each of them effective and proper leadership. Leader Distribution Plan (Reassignment of Cadets Among Companies or "Scrambling") "Scrambling" is a slang term used to refer to reassigning randomly all cadets of one class from their original cadet company to another company--a "fruit basket turnover." Though the practice was begun in the 1960s, and was apparently implemented sporadically through the summer of 1984 (class of '87), after which the Army began utilizing the cohort system of unit training (keeping soldiers together throughout their training and into their first Army unit). Cohort ideas were soon implemented within the Corps of Cadets and led to cadets' having essentially a one-company association that began in Beast Barracks (first summer's training) and carried through to graduation (CFT being the only exception). The cohort concept had been questioned at times in its applicability to cadet leader development at West Point in that the cohort concern for developing unit cohesion was not a primary concern in an institution focused on individual leader development. Also, the concept as applied at West Point created a number of problems. such as the sustainment in some companies of norms contrary to those of the institution. Once begun, such dysfunctional norms tended to become entrenched rather than to dissipate from year-to-year. That problem would be improved by scrambling as cadets would find themselves in new companies associating with other cadets who had experienced dissimilar company norms and would be more likely to fall back upon institutional norms as their common ground for behavior. Still, these were not to be the primary reasons for reinstituting scrambling. A strong position in support of a return to scrambling arose from the discussions of the Fourth Class System during AY89-90. As the staff and faculty committee formulated its proposal of a "four-class system," it noted that , the goals of that system would be enhanced substantially by scrambling. Indeed, some of the members of that committee believed the four-class system, as they proposed it, could succeed only if scrambling were reinstituted. The four-class system sought to establish a bonafide, military leader-subordinate relationship between the cadet classes (First Class with Second Class. Second Class with Third. etc.), with each of those relationships conducted in a constructive manner that advances the leader development of both members. Under the cohort system, the friendships among upperclassmen in a company developed over a long period and could conflict with the leader-subordinate relationships. When cadets resolved the conflict in favor of the friendship, the opportunity to gain in the practice of leadership was foregone. However, it was noted that. by one scramble of a cadet class between their Third and Second Class year, the relationships between all classes in a company at the beginning of the academic year would be uncomplicated by former, long-standing friendships. The First Class would not know the Second, the Second would not know the Third, and none of them would know the Fourth. Based on the advantages to be gained in implementing the Cadet Leader Development System, the Superintendent made the decision in March, 1990, to 32 adopt scrambling for the rising Second Class in the summer of 1990. The program was formally titled by the Commandant the "Leader Distribution Plan." The decision was initially greeted with resistance by the rising Second Class; but after it was executed, there was enormous approval, even by the Second Class cadets, due apparently to the benefits of getting a fresh start, increasing one's circle of acquaintances, and being freed of old, uncomfortable norms. Its implementation also gave the Commandant a desirable opportunity to promote balance among companies in numbers of cadets in various categories. Reorganization Week is the name given to a period of time each year in which the Corps of Cadets makes the transition from summer training activities the first term of the academic year. Activities include the issue of equipment and books as well as training in academic year responsibilities (chain of command, honor, command information, department orientations). When such activities have been squeezed into the first days of the academic term (in lieu of a Reorganization Week), the disruption of cadet study time has been severe. The length of Reorgardzation Week is regularly debated, with past precedents ranging from one day to one week. Keeping the Week as short as possible (3-4 days) and intensely filled with activity appears to be the preferred policy, both for efficiency and to reduce cadets' slack time, which they often fill by harassment of plebes. A second issue regarding Reorganization Week is the sequencing of the return of the classes. In the past when the Third Class has returned from Camp Buckner prior to the Fourth Class' return from bivouac at Lake Frederick, the sequence has been questioned. Generally the Fourth Class are familiar with what must be done during Reorganization Week and need more time to get their property moved and rooms set up, computers installed, and other obligations completed. When the yearlings come back first, they get set up and then have free time, in comparison to the late-arriving plebes, which they fill by "playing" with the plebes, which compounds the problem of the plebes completing their obligations. On the other side of the issue, the yearling team leaders are the members of the cadet chain of command who have direct reponsibility for supervising and teaching the plebes what must be done. The plebes are "flying blind" to a degree until their team leaders return. Resolution of the conflict has been difficult, as reflected by a shifting back and forth during recent years. Military Developmental Assignments USMA began in the late 1980s and early '90s occasionally assigning some Cadets to military units for developmental purposes. Some cadets who have violated the Honor Code are separated from the Academy but offered the opportunity to apply for re-admission after a time away from the Academy. Such cadets may volunteer to accept--during that absence--assignment to a military unit in the status of an enlisted person. The purpose is to assist them in using the time away from USMA not only to enhance their 33 maturity and capacity for honorable behavior but also to give them a useful leader development experience. In addition, cadets who experience difficulties in other ways--either disciplinary or under the Honor System--may be assigned as a cadet to a cooperating military unit for short periods and subsequently returned to USMA. Their roles during these assignments are similar to their roles during summer assignments to Army units for Cadet Troop Leader Training (sometimes called Third Lieutenant training). The assignment is useful both for the cadet's development and for USMA's evaluation of their potential as an Army leader. Conclusion Taken altogether, the changes in the Mlitary Program during the late 1980s and early '90s reflect the impact of the institution's reinvigorated emphasis upon its purpose of leader development. 34 The Physical Program, one of the three distinct programs comprising
the West Point experience, underwent changes during the late 1980s and
early '90s within the following categories:
Program goalsEach of these topics is discussed in turn below. Goals for the physical program were initially formulated as part of
the 1987-
1. To cultivate in cadets optimum physical capability and personal health knowledge so that each can meet the physical requirements of the military profession and the broader demands of a healthy lifestyle.6. To provide a professional physical development staff of both military and civilian personnel who by example serve as appropriate role models for cadets. Study of Competitive Athletics During the academic year 1986-87, USMA constituted a committee under the leadership of then-Colonel John Costa, the Head of the Department of Foreign Languages. to study competitive athletics at West Point. From the viewpoint of the Superintendent, General Palmer, the reasons for the study were several. Primarily, it was spawned by the number of decisions being asked of the Superintendent and Policy Board regarding sports and sports facilities. The Superintendent wanted to insure that such decisions were being considered within a framework of coherent planning for competitive sports. USMA’s approach to its competitive sports had evolved over its history. For example, fencing had once been the Academy's principal competitive sport, because in the early 19th century the saber was the officer's principal weapon. But, over many years, fencing became a limited-interest club sport. The justification by which USMA had added or dropped sports in times past often appeared to rest on whether someone present on the staff and faculty was interested in the sport, more than any other factors. Whether a sport should be played at all and at what level (intramural, club, intercollegiate) were questions that were difficult to answer satisfactorily. Such questions confronted General Palmer quickly after becoming Superintendent. He found that a number of people approached him with proposals on behalf of various sports, apparently hoping to find a more favorable hearing from him than they had received from previous superintendents. Various people petitioned to have their sports changed from club status to corps squad (intercollegiate). General Palmer even received an impassioned proposal to restore polo from an individual who offered to supply the horses. As General Palmer reviewed these questions, he became concerned that USMA should have a coherent basis for answering them. To provide such a basis, he took interest in an approach proposed by then-LTC Tom Fagan, Department of Social Sciences. That proposal was to list all the potential attributes of various sports activities which may appear to serve USMA's developmental purposes for its students (such as teamwork, collision/contact, carry-over value, military application, wide public participation, low cost, etc.), to assign. them relative weights, and then evaluate contending sports alternatives against those criteria. Those sports scoring highest against the weighted criteria would be given highest priority for adoption and support. Low-scoring sports would be candidates for demotion in status or for being dropped entirely. To undertake this analysis would become a prime mission of the Costa committee. Additional factors driving the need for a study were the rising costs of the sports programs and, the shortage of sports facilities to accommodate existing sports. These facilities problems would require additional commitments of 36 Physical Program
funds; and, before those decisions were made, it was important to insure
the mix of sports and the levels at which they were played were optimal.
The committee's charge was to apply the analytical method proposed by LTC Fagan, discussed above, to evaluate the array of sports which USMA should or should not have, in light of the Academy purpose and mission, the role of athletics in developing leaders of character, cost, etc. It should conclude its work by making a recommendation of the sports that USMA ought to support, together with a rationale. Among the conclusions of the Costa committee, there was one mild surprise. Some observers of the West Point sports scene, including General Palmer, originally speculated that the Costa committee would conclude that USMA was supporting too many sports. They did not. Rather, they conclude that the variety and the richness of the broad spectrum of sports at USMA was a significant strength of the institution, one which allowed a relatively large student body with widely varying sports interests to be able to satisfy those interests. The variety enhanced the willingness of people to participate, increased their pleasure in doing so, and encouraged their personal, long-tera commitments to participation in physical activities. Because of its affirmation of the breadth of sports at USMA, the Costa study led to some decisions not to change the status quo for several sports. For example, it was decided not to elevate several of the club sports to intercollegiate. A decision not to change in such cases was a key decision. In addition, it was decided that women's gymnastics should be dropped entirely. In that decision, the primer rationale was safety of the participants. The program required that it either be run with full and total commitment in order for it to be safe, or not at all. Further, squash was demoted from intercollegiate to club status. Though it was recognized as a fine sport, squash, as measured by the criteria adopted as pertinent to USMA's purpose, fell near the bottom o the committee's order of merit list of intercollegiate sports. As a result, the Policy Board made the decision to convert it to a club sport. Initiation of Master Fitness Trainer Program Colonel Jim Anderson, Master of the Sword (traditional title given to the Head, Department of Physical Education), formulated a proposal to certify cadets as Army Master Fitness Trainers (MFT). His proposal had its genesis in his observations of USMA graduates ln the field and his contact with the Soldier Fitness Support Center (SFSC) at Fort Ben Harrison. He had observed that graduates of USMA were well-prepared to maintain their own fitness, but not, well-prepared to sustain that of their subordinates through unit fitness programs. By his contacts with the SFSC, he determined that the physical program for cadets at West Point already included most of the components of the Army Master Fitness Trainers course. With only modest adjustments, cadets could be given the opportunity to qualify as MFTs before graduation. COL Anderson proposed to the Superintendent that USMA make those adjustments necessary to provide the MFT qualification to cadets. The changes involved amending some classroom instruction received by cadets and the administration of a Comprehensive Review Examination. Other requirements were already a part of cadet fitness training (e.g., the Army Physical Fitness 37 Test), Cadet Basic Training, or Cadet Field Training. In many respects, such as hands-on training, the cadets' training was more extensive than that given at Fort Ben Harrison. As General Palmer recalled COL Anderson's decision briefing to him on this subject, he said that he approved the concept within about two minutes, because he recognized that it would meet an important Army need with hardly any change in the current demands upon cadets, while giving the successful cadets a useful qualification and a source of personal pride and satisfaction. It appeared to be a winning proposal for all concerned. Implemented in AY 87-88 for the class of 1990, that class eventually graduated 779 MFT-qualified men and women (82.5% of the class). Team Contact/Collision Sport Requirement In 1987, USMA adopted as a policy that each cadet must, as a graduation requirement, have participated in one season of a team-contact or team-collision sport (TCC). The term "team" sport implied that in the sport the participants actually cooperate in the execution of their sport (as opposed to "teams" constituted of individual competitors, such as track, swimming, etc.). The term "contact" sport implied that the participants mix with one another in the execution of the sport in such a way that personal danger of injury is present (such as basketball, team handball, and lacrosse). By the term "collision" is implied sports in which collisions of participants' bodies is inherent in the execution of the game (such as football, rugby, hockey). Obviously, there are team sports that do not include contact or collision (crew) Just as there are individual sports which do (wrestling, boxdng). The change was based on the Academy's purpose and mission. The preparation of cadets to be leaders of small (and large) teams in which danger of personal harm is present can be enhanced by their participation in sports which foreshadow these conditions. A survey of the class of 1987 indicated that more than 20% of the class had graduated without having experienced a TCC sport. It was not necessarily by cadet design that it was being missed. For example, a member of the track team could spend four years running cross-country (fall season) and track (winter and spring seasons) and simply not have the opportunity to play a TCC sport. The requirement was extended to every cadet to participate at least one season in a TCC sport at the level of intramurals, club. or intercollegiate competition. The current TCC sports include football, basketball, rugby, flickerball, team handball, lacrosse, water polo, soccer, volleyball, and area hockey. In 1987, the Superintendent initiated a reconsideration of the policy regarding the grading standards for the physical fitness tests given to cadets. The issue was whether the standards should be stable over time or adjusted over time on the basis of cadet performance. Its resolution was not a simple matter. 38 In the past the procedure had been to adjust the grading standards based on cadet performance, which heretofore had been upward. The Superintendent became concerned by his observation that the cadets' performance scores tended to decline during their four years at USMA. When he asked why that would occur, one speculation was that cadets were less willing to exert themselves in later years. But, from his conversations with cadets, he suspected that the shifting standard itself may have a de-motivating effect upon cadets. To use the donkey and carrot metaphor, cadets will not indefinitely respond to a moving carrot. They told General Palmer, 'Well, my plebe year I scored this many points and I got a "B". The next year I did more, but I got a "B-", so why try? Why work?" The counter-view offered in defense of the adjusted grade standards was a reasonable one: that the fitness of entering cadets had been improving over time, and that their responses to the Academy's improving fitness programs improved over time, and so to provide an incentive to cadets at all skill levels it was necessary to keep the standards aligned with their rising capabilities. Considering both views, the Superintendent agreed with the importance of having tough standards, but decided that to serve as incentives the standards should be both fixed and attainable with hard work. His primary concern was to provide cadets an incentive – not a disincentive--to improve their absolute performance capability over their four years as a cadet. The policy, he felt, should allow cadets whose fitness grades were relatively low as a plebe or yearling and who made up their minds to do better to know exactly what they needed to do to achieve their goals in succeeding years. At the same time, USMA should be able to expect cadets' fitness grades on average to improve over the four year course; otherwise, one would suspect that they are not developing as they should over time. In sum, the Superintendent established the policy that the grading standards for all fitness tests would be kept fixed for long periods of time. He suggested 10 years as the minimum time in which to identify a trend--up or down – that might justify any change to the standards. Incentives for Physical Development In addition to the change in grading policy, further changes were designed to enhance cadet motivation in the physical program and to reward their achievement. First, the method by which cadet standings in final order of merit have been calculated in the past have given very little weight to cadets' achievements in the physical program. At the conclusion of a review of those weights, the physical program contribution was given a weight equal to 15% of the total. That 15% contribution of the physical program to final standings is composed of two elements: physical education grades (70% of total) and competitive athletic participation (30% of total). Second, the Superintendent's Individual Award (see chapter 7), while initiated as an award for cadets who achieve success in all three developmental programs, had the effect of elevating the incentives supporting the physical program. In addition, the uniform regulation was amended to authorize cadet wear of the Army Physical Fitness Badge on gym uniforms. 39 Affirmation and Change Finally, the Department of Physical Education altered the weights by which it calculated cadets' grades so as to give increasing weight to the fitness testing component and decreasing weight to the classroom component with each successive year of the cadet experience. This change provided an increasing reward to the self-discipline exhibited in maintaining personal fitness. A number of changes to the cadets' intramural sports program were initiated. Number of seasons. In 1987, the number of intramural sports seasons was changed from three seasons to four. aligning the seasons with the academic terms instead of with the intercollegiate sports seasons. Prior to that time, the intramurals seasons were aligned with the traditional intercollegiate pattern of fall, winter, and spring sports. As a result, fall and spring outdoor sports were overcrowded on the available outdoor athletic fields, while in the intervening season the winter sports were overcrowded within the available indoor space. By changing the intramural seasons to align with the academic semesters – two seasons in the fall, two in the spring – a number of gains were experienced. First, a slight reduction in demands on cadet time was achieved. Cadets were required – both before and after the change – to participate in at least two seasons per year. Because the seasons were slightly shorter after the change, cadets could fulfill the requirement in less time. Second. a cadet having academic difficulties would be able to schedule his or her intramural activity in the early half of the academic term so as to increase available time at the end of the term, before final examinations. Third, demands upon limited sports facilities could be spread out and accommodated more easily. Changed array of intramural sports. The sports available to cadets in the intramural sports program were changed. The principle guiding the selection of sports was to adopt those which combined high degrees of teamwork, contact or collision, personal conditioning, carryover to army applications, and efficient utilizatfon of facilities. Retained sports were football, basketball, soccer, wrestling, boxing, racquetball, swimming. cross country, and softball. Added were team handball, 3/3 basketball, 5'10" and under basketball, area hockey, and wallyball. Eliminated were track, triathlon, squash, volleyball, and tennis. In the spring of '91, rugby replaced lacrosse. Wallyball. The adoption of the sport of wallyball in the intramural program was an example of a change which made more efficient use of USMA's available facilities while at the same time giving cadets experiences with sports which they could apply later in the army in working with their soldiers. Wallyball is essentially the game of volleyball played inside a raquetball court having a net strung across the center of the court. It is easily adapted from existing facilities. fun to play, and accommodates 8 players in team play in each court instead of only 2 players in individual play. 40 Physical Program
Changes to Club Sports
A change in the USMA organization shifted the supervisory responsibility for all competitive club sports from the Director of Cadet Activities to the Head, Department of Physical Education. The purpose of the change was to move closer to a consolidation of all elements of the physical program under a single proponent. Consideration was given to further consolidation of the physical program activities by combining the DPE and DIA responsibilities under a single head, a proposal rejected for reasons discussed in the following section. Because the competitive club sports satisfy the goals of the intramural program (listed above), it was decided that those cadets participating in one of the 23 competitive sports in club status during an intramural season should be given credit for intramural participation in that season. The club competitive sports are crew, lacrosse, rugby, team handball, volleyball, bowling, cycling, fencing, handball, judo, karate, power-lifting, orienteering, equestrian, racquetball, marathon, sailing, skeet & trap, alpine ski, Nordic ski, squash, triathlon, and freestyle wrestling. Changes to Intercollegiate Sports Several relatively small but still important developments occurred in the West Point intercollegiate athletic program under the supervision of the Office of the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics (ODIA). Patriot League. USMA accepted an invitation to join a newly-formed Eastern athletic league, named the Patriot League. The new Patriot League was formed out of like-minded schools, several from the old Colonial League, who share similar academic and admissions standards and who were committed to running their athletic programs as a contributing element of a total educational environment (as opposed to a college coexisting with an uncontrolled, commercialized, semi-pro sports operation on the same campus). A pertinent rule of the League is that athletic scholarships per se are not given; that is to say, each student's financial aid is based on established need or considerations other than athletic talent (e.g., USMA gives full financial aid to all admitted students). The league hosts 22 sports at the NCAA Division I level. USMA participates in 18 of those sports, excepting football, in which it continues to compete as an independent (in division IA); baseball, in which it plays with the Ivies and Navy in the Eastern Intercollegiate Baseball League; women's lacrosse (see comment below); and field hockey, in which USMA has no team. Upgrade of Women's Sports. A couple of decisions followed logically upon the decision to join the Patriot League. As part of joining the league. USMA's sports for women were upgraded to division I from Division II. That decision became an incentive, among others, for the United States Naval Academy to join the Patriot League in order that their women could continue to compete with USMA's women at the same level. Because the new league included women's lacrosse, an offer was made to the USMA cadet women who were playing lacrosse as a club sport to upgrade their sport to intercollegiate. Based on a team vote, they chose not to upgrade, on the rationale that they were playing just for fun and did not want to have to 41 take it more seriously than that. The administration accepted that choice as a good decision. Criteria for Intercollegiate Sports. In early 1991, the Athletic Committee established several criteria as an umbrella under which sports would be considered individually for adoption as intercollegiate sports at USMA. These were that (1) the sport must be an NCAA-sponsored sport or one that by tradition is sponsored by the intercollegiate athletic offices at other colleges in the USMA area, (2) funds and facilities must be available to fully support the sport, and (3) the total mum Corps squad participation (to include support personnel) at any one time must not exceed 25% of the Corps strength. Reorganization Rejected. During the Academy's studies of reorganization of the USMA staff, the suggestion was made that all physical development activities for cadets should be organized under one single proponent, Just as the Dean oversees the academic program, and the Commandant, the military program. Though the proposal would have seemed to make the organization chart cleaner, the idea was not practical. The physical program includes three levels of athletic competition, one of which |
