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A Strategy for a Long Peace Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments A “Quick Look” Assessment 12 Feb 01

Principal Future Challenges US power-projection operations against a determined foe with anti-access and area denial capabilities Fixed, forward bases at risk Perhaps maritime forces in the littoral at risk New forms of blockade Maintaining US superiority in space Growing incidence of urban conflict Use of information warfare, both as a means of gaining advantage on the battlefield and threatening a nation’s economic infrastructure RMA’s empowerment of small groups (including irregular forces, terrorist groups, and transnational criminal organizations) with weapons of mass destruction and disruption

Core Drivers of Transformation Challenges of: Projecting power in an anti-access environment (including into large, urban areas) Ensuring space and information superiority Defending the homeland against new threats

Trends Sharp decline in competition among the great powers has begun to reverse Rise of great regional powers in East and South Asia Emergence of a global economy more highly dependent on information (including electromagnetic spectrum), space, and fossil fuels Coalitions of the willing more likely than alliances RMA will force US to divert increasing levels of resources to defending its homeland

Findings QDR 97 failed to provide required strategic blueprint to meet emerging threats RMA is underway Current defense program suffers from a plans-funding mismatch of $120 billion over the next 6 years (using the Feb 00 Clinton defense plan as the baseline) 2 MTW is increasingly poor metric for gauging effectiveness of defense strategy and program DOD’s excessive emphasis on minimizing the near-term risks to America’s security is being accomplished in a relatively ineffective manner Still using Cold War era metrics for forward presence (CVBGs, ARGs) when other, effective, lower-cost means are available Too much emphasis on sustaining improved version of today’s military vice transformation Deploying an effective NMD in the near term would be highly desirable, but is not a currently available option

Transformation Elements A future warfare vision that will impart direction to transformation efforts. (Defense Vision 2025) Selection of senior leaders based on their ability to effect transformational change. Robust funding for leap-ahead technologies and sustained experimentation. Creation of the organizational slack necessary for innovation and institutional reform of DOD, the armed forces, and the defense industrial base. A procurement strategy in the near- to mid-term that emphasizes limited production runs of a wide range of new systems and service-life extensions and upgrades of existing systems. Divestment strategies to eliminate capabilities that are a poor fit with the emerging strategic environment and to free up resources to support transformation.

Transformation Initiatives Precision strike from extended ranges Stealth Mobility vice armor for defense Comprehensive C4ISR architecture Defense against a range of electronic and informational attacks Avoidance of reliance on large, vulnerable fixed bases for insertion or sustainment Avoidance of overly concentrating combat power in a few platforms

Miscellaneous Findings Greater reliance on unmanned systems and information-intensive, network-based forces Likely need for extended-range power projection with smaller, stealthier forces Increased importance of undersea warfare

Meeting Near-Term Security Requirements Refocus the 2-war posture: Greater reliance on South Korea for ground forces If Europeans field a rapid reaction force, encourage them to make it available for Persian Gulf contingency Restructure forward presence: Navy should leverage growing strike capability of subs and surface combatants to create innovative forward-presence forces Use AEFs to gap maritime forces, as appropriate Encourage NATO allies with sizable maritime forces to assume greater forward-presence role in the Mediterranean Sea Reorient US maritime forces more toward the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia Enhance peacekeeping: Reorient significant part of Army & ARNG to PKO Support the peacekeeping forces fielded by America’s allies (e.g., Australia and Canada)

Recommendations -- Army #1 Force Structure: Eliminate 2 active (heavy) and 4 ARNG divisions (& arty bdes) 8 AC divisions (5 for warfight, 2 for PKO, 1 for experimentation) Remaining 4 ARNG divisions presumably focus on homeland defense 1 AC ACR for SWA warfight; 1 for Joint OPFOR Retain 15 ARNG ESBs 6 IBCTs for PKO 6 heavy with 6 arty bdes as legacy mechanized corps 3 to shadow active Army experimentation brigades Retain 5 SFGs and Ranger Regiment Missioning: Orient 6 interim brigades and like number of ARNG brigades to PKO and urban control opns Earmark one division (with associated ARNG units) to conduct field exercises oriented on solving the anti-access challenge, developing an advanced capability to conduct urban control and eviction operations, homeland defense, and see/engage at extended ranges …employ 1 ACR for Joint OPFOR

Recommendations -- Army #2 Materiel: Proceed with FCS, HIMARS … restart ATACMS Block IIA Accelerate development of unmanned combat vehicles and robotics R&D of Advanced Technology Transport (ATT), Quad-Tilt Rotor (QTR), stealthy air transport for SOF, and rapid, over-the-beach sealift Terminate Crusader … perhaps procure British or German alternative No specific recommendation on Army aviation programs, including Apache/Comanche Reduced priority to digitization and upgrading legacy/heavy divisions (low priority to Abrams tank upgrades, pending outcome of transformation exercises)

Recommendations -- Navy Force Structure: Eliminate 2 carriers (12 to 10) Eliminate 2 Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) (12 to 10) Missioning: Incorporate Fleet Battle Exercises into ongoing fleet training to explore the potential of new means and new forms of operation to deal with anti-access/area-denial threats Accelerate efforts to determine utility of Streetfighter concept, Network-Centric Warfare, and Operational Maneuver from the Sea Materiel: 4 Trident SSBNs scheduled to come out of the force should be converted to SSGN conventional strike platforms Refuel and retain LA-class submarines that are scheduled for retirement before the end of their useful lives Develop and procure a small number of Streetfighter combatants Continue to develop CVX and DD-21 Accelerate development of advanced gun system (AGS) and unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs). Cancel JSF Use F/A-18 E/F to gap any near-term shortfall Increase emphasis on alternate means of survivable strike support, to include land- and sea-based missile forces and UCAVs Deploy a prototype of the Joint Mobile Offshore Base (JMOB) to determine its utility as an alternative to increasingly vulnerable fixed, forward bases

Recommendations -- Marine Corps Force Structure: Eliminate 2 Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) (12 to 10) Eliminate 1 active Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) (7 to 6 … 2 per division) Missioning: Incorporate Fleet Battle Exercises into ongoing fleet training to explore the potential of new means and new forms of operation to deal with anti-access/area-denial threats Accelerate efforts to determine utility of Streetfighter concept, Network-Centric Warfare, and Operational Maneuver from the Sea Materiel: Proceed with MV-22 buy, if current technological problems can be overcome Significantly reduce AAAV procurement … buy only 2 regiments worth Cancel JSF Use F/A-18 E/F to gap any near-term shortfall Increase emphasis on alternate means of survivable strike support, to include land- and sea-based missile forces and UCAVs Consider migrating away from indigenous fixed-wing aircraft for strike support and toward greater reliance on a combination of attack helicopters (e.g., the Apache and Comanche) and rocket artillery (e.g., ATACMS)

Recommendations -- Air Force Force Structure: Eliminate 3 tactical fighter wing equivalents (20 to 17 … 1 active, 2 ANG F-16 wings) Missioning: Accelerate efforts to insure US military will dominate any future military competition in space and along the electromagnetic spectrum Emphasize efforts to deal with anti-access/area-denial challenge Materiel: Cancel JSF Use F-16 Block 60 to gap any near-term shortfall Increase emphasis on alternate means of survivable strike support, to include land- and sea-based missile forces and UCAVs Accelerate development of extended-range, long-endurance UAVs and UCAVs Petition Congress to restore funding for Discover II prototype radar satellites Service and Joint exercises should accord high priority to assessing the B-2’s considerable potential for addressing the anti-access/area-denial challenge If confirmed, restart B-2 production line and procure significant additional numbers of B-2s Unless Air Force can demonstrate F-22 is both critical and survivable in the emerging anti-access/area-denial warfighting environment, procurement should be limited to fielding a silver-bullet force Keep F-15 line open (F-15Es) to cover reduced F-22 buy Increase JSTARS procurement plan by at least 2 (15 to 17) Consider converting 18 B-1B or B-52 to conduct electronic warfare Develop strategic airlifter for anti-access environment … including ATT, QTR, and stealth airlifter for SOF

Recommendations -- Alliances & Basing A new division of labor with our allies must take into account: Ally durability and reliability New missions brought on by the RMA (e.g., precision strike, space control, strategic information warfare, ballistic and cruise missile defense, power projection in the absence of fixed forward bases) Likely shift in America’s principal security focus from Europe to Asia US should accord high priority to: Loaning vice transferring advanced military capabilities (such as global C4ISR, missile defense, high-fidelity training architectures, and advanced PGMs) Supporting efforts of selected allies to develop advanced capabilities … adding depth to our core capabilities vice sole source for key capabilities Migrating toward a new global basing architecture Hedging against likelihood that future alliance relationships will be less predictable than over past 50 years Countering the growing risks involved with traditional reliance on fixed, forward facilities Recognizing that Asia, rather than Europe, will more likely be the region where US security interests are at greater risk

Recommendations -- Other #1 Consider creating a transformation czar who reports directly to SecDef & DepSecDef … coordinating vice directive Consider retaining key senior military officers who prove important to sustaining transformation in their current positions for 2 or even 3 consecutive tours Significant funding should be shifted to transformational initiatives by paring US nuclear force levels ... to 3500 warheads (START II Treaty) immediately …2000-2500 warheads (START III) possibly (potential $2B per year savings) New strategic triad: Long-range conventional precision-strike forces Electronic-strike forces Residual nuclear-strike forces Pursue efficiencies (out-sourcing and BRAC), but don’t expect significant windfall

Recommendations -- Other #2 NMD: Continue aggressive R&D … don’t commit too early to a technology Eventual deployment decision: Must account for potential reaction of other nuclear powers, especially China and Russia Should be made within context of comprehensive approach to homeland defense from WMD to include defense against cruise missile attack and covert use of biological and radiological weapons TMD should be deployed as soon as feasible (to gain a better understanding of missile defense operations and force structure requirements) Increased emphasis must be given to bolstering the nation’s defenses against: Attacks on information infrastructure (computer networks) Bioterrorism

Experimentation Sustained, R&D-intensive strategy required Significant increases to the S&T accounts (in excess of $10B) required over the FYDP DOD must better encourage and leverage civilian R&D Greater emphasis must be placed on Service and joint transformation Budget for transformation must be increased dramatically (by several billion dollars over FYDP) Two new training facilities should be created: Joint Anti-Access/Area-Denial NTC -- adjacent to a littoral (why not inland?) Joint Urban Warfare Center May need to create a standing joint opposing force (JOF) -- few thousand servicemembers -- under command of CINC JFCOM JOF could “lease” some capabilities Consideration should be given to establishing an independent funding line for CINC JFCOM to fund systems that fail to find support within the Services USSOCOM could be a valuable experimentation laboratory Results of exercises and experiments must be incorporated into the defense requirements process Use of “precursor wars” to battle test new concepts and systems Encourage a more competitive approach to joint operations New decision aids (M&S) are required

Pursue Promising Technologies that Support: Distributed satellite constellations, space-based radars with moving target indicator (MTI) capability, foliage penetrating radars, and see-through-wall radars Broadband, network-based warfare Unmanned aerial, ground, and undersea vehicles, micro-robots and micro-UAVs, performance-enhancing exoskeletons, and missiles in a box Next generation stealth for air mobility aircraft, surface ships and ground combat systems Extended-range electronic warfare, to include false-target generation technologies and other active information protection technologies Enhanced, undersea-based power projection for responsive, large-scale strike and amphibious delivery Hypersonic, directed energy and electromagnetic gun systems New power sources (e.g., fuel cells) to reduce the logistical footprint Space control, such as micro-proximity satellites that can temporarily or permanently impede the function of enemy space systems Computer network attack and defense technologies Advanced biological warfare defenses (e.g., sensors and vaccines), and materials and compounds for bio-enhanced operations

General Timelines FY 02-07 R&D (including S&T) and experimentation Some capabilities divestiture to free funds Gradual increase in reliance on allies FY 07 Begin making decisions post-FY 10 Wholesale organizational changes FY 20 New force ready

General Assessment -- #1 No surprises … consistent with what we’ve seen from Dr. Krepinevich and CSBA in the past … repeat of some NDP findings Lots of good ideas … somewhat disjointed, inconsistent No defense strategy provided … ‘strategy’ refers to transformation process Relatively balanced assault on all Services … no over-the-top commercials for airpower or Marine Corps Also consistent with Jul 00 SAIC report, “The Strategic Meeting Engagement:  Experimentation and Transforming the U.S. Military” … some different details Underlying tacit assumption is that future will at least as peaceful (strategically undemanding) as the past decade Assumes MTW threats will not increase/mature Assumes “gradual” reduction of Army divisions from MTW forces will have no strategic impact and insignificant increase in risk

General Assessment -- #2 Clear lack of faith with Services and current leadership to effectively transform: “Additionally, while great transformational leaders can originate from legacy warfare specialists, consideration should also be given to selecting individuals for these positions from within communities likely to be congruent with the secretary’s future warfare vision [submariner as CNO, bomber pilot or space warrior as CSAF, or light infantryman or special operator as CSA]” Stronger role by OSD and JFCOM No evidence that the envisioned transformed military will be more effective or less expensive than currently programmed force No discussion of reprioritization of funding between Services

General Assessment -- #3 Apparently not enamored with Army transformation … proceed, but modify (?) No specific mention of USAR (only active Army and ARNG) Principal transformation issues that must be resolved: Objectives Pace Integration (joint/interagency/multinational) Risk … who bears the burden of failure?  Planners or soldiers? Programming … must have a coherent plan

Apparent Inconsistencies US must rely more heavily on allies in the future (especially for ground forces and maritime presence), but allies are less reliable Potential adversaries will develop comprehensive anti-access capabilities, but will not improve their land forces Value of forward presence is more than precision strike … “air presence” is “no presence” Maritime forces are more vulnerable in littorals, but recommend we develop/test (and perhaps procure) the 5-knot Joint Mobile Offshore Base (JMOB) … 6 times the length/size of an aircraft carrier Crusader is too heavy, but Army should pursue “rapid, over-the-beach sealift” Little emphasis on fast sealift for deployment of Army capabilities All solutions seem to be based on standoff, stealth, and precision … no apparent regard for value of land forces

Talking Points Agree with requirement to develop concepts/capabilities to defeat/avoid anti-access challenge … but this is only one piece of the equation … access is not the end state Apparent view that transformation is not underway Army transformation is addressing appropriate challenges … power projection, anti-access, complex terrain, disperse operations, information warfare Different views on temporal focus of experimentation: Near-mid-term fielding of capabilities Development of long-term capabilities (technologies, organizations, and operational concepts) … best addressed by workshops & wargames vice expensive forces … difficult/infeasible to simulate/surrogate non-existent capabilities No understanding of the institutional impact of major force structure reductions (2 active and 4 ARNG divisions) … 1/3 of Army divisions!  Breaking faith with our soldiers? Much good thought reflected, but national political leaders must first define the desired defense strategy and ultimately determine acceptable risk