American military personnel may soon be deployed to the South Asia region, primarily to
Pakistan and eventually to Afghanistan.  This is an extremely complex and multifaceted region.
To acquire sufficient background to perform there effectively takes years of study.  Our troops
do not have that much time.  Few Americans have studied this region and it is rarely
touched-upon in the media, which is now engaged in a frantic game of catch-up.  Much of the
information being bandied about is simplistic and some is incorrect.  If personnel assigned to
the region rely on the media to acquire background, it could do them more harm than good.

 This is not the time for detailed presentations on the complexities of South Asian Islam
or the tribal culture of Afghanistan, or the history of the Northwest Frontier. Usable
information is required urgently, and must be presented in an easily digestible fashion.  That
is the intent of this paper.

 Precisely because the region is so complex and the stakes so high, our policymakers must
not rush into ill-advised policies.  They must cultivate patience, and take the time to lay the
groundwork and cultivate the individuals, tribes, and ethnic groups that can, if we take the
right steps, become valuable allies to achieve common goals.  If the U.S. pursues a thoughtful
and well thought out policy, it could not only succeed in destroying Usama bin Ladin and his
network, it could depose the Taliban, which has actively supported bin Ladin and his terrorist
agenda, and help the Afghans institute a moderate government that reflects the will of the
Afghan people and which will be willing to work with the International community to rebuild
Afghanistan, and participate in a more stable South Asian region.

Loyalty to bin Ladin

First and foremost, our government should not rush to judgment regarding the Afghan and
Pakistani people and their loyalties.  The media in the coming days will present dramatic
footage of bearded demonstrators professing undying loyalty to Osama bin Ladin and Taliban
leader Mullah Muhammad Omar.  The demonstrators will also express their undying hatred for the
United States and its allies, and swear to lay down their lives to defend bin Ladin and "Islam".
The media will show this footage because it is dramatic, but it will not be a reliable basis
upon which to judge the loyalties and intentions of the people of the region.

 Experience and observation have demonstrated that in Pakistan, the vast majority of the
population is not sympathetic to bin Ladin.  Few among those that profess admiration for bin
Ladin are ready to kill or die for him.  For the past several years bin Ladin has issued edicts
declaring a jihad (holy war) on the United States.  He has urged all Muslims in Pakistan and
Afghanistan to attack and kill Americans, yet there have only been a handful of such attacks.
Pakistan's religious parties have long relied on demonstrations and "street muscle" to coerce
and intimidate their opponents.  The reason they do so, is because they do not enjoy popular
support.  The extremist parties in Pakistan have never carried more that 4% of the popular vote
in any election.

 Likewise, in Afghanistan, there is no evidence to indicate that bin Ladin or Mullah Omar
enjoy widespread popular support.  Most indications are to the contrary.  There are a number of
reasons for this.
 

a)     Bin Ladin and his patron Mullah Omar practice and propagate an extremist variant of
Wahhabi Islam that is popular in Saudi Arabia.  This form of Islam is all but unknown in
Afghanistan.  Afghan Islam has traditionally been moderate and incorporates many folk beliefs
and customs, which are pre-Islamic in origin.  Bin Ladin and his followers hold traditional
Afghan Islam in contempt and have repeatedly insulted local religious sympathies.

b)     Mullah Omar, with the active support and encouragement of bin Ladin, has instituted
harsh puritanical measures in Afghanistan.  He has banned movies, music, television, and the
celebration of much beloved national festivals and holidays.  He has strictly separated the
sexes and prevented women from participating in national life.  He has instituted harsh
punishments such as amputation, burying people alive, and stoning them to death.  He has created
a religious secret police that forces Afghans to pray at Mosques and observe a strict dress
code.  The average Afghan has found these measures to be oppressive.

c)     Mullah Omar has granted bin Ladin and his largely Arab followers special privileges
within Pakistan.  They have been allowed to acquire large tracts of choice real estate and some
have built palatial homes.  This is highly resented in a society suffering under endemic
poverty.  Many of Osama's followers, convinced of their religious and ethnic superiority, have
routinely abused Afghans.  Mullah Omar will not allow the Arabs to face justice, regardless of
crimes they commit in Afghanistan.  For example, several Arabs accused of raping local women,
were never brought to justice.  Many Afghans resent the presence of these foreigners in their
midst.  Some have decided to mete out punishment on their own.  Irate Afghans have in several
instances murdered Arabs guilty of crimes.  .

In addition to their support for bin Ladin, demographics, and the Taliban's behavior have
undercut their popularity within Afghanistan.  Pakistan is a heterogeneous society, populated by
a number of large ethnic and religious groups with their own languages and cultures.  The
Taliban originated within the Pathan ethnic group.  The Pathans are the largest group within
Afghanistan.  Large numbers of Pathans also live in Pakistan, where they are the dominant group
within the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) immediately bordering Afghanistan.  The Pathans
are a tribal society.  Each tribe has its own leadership and culture.  Some are based in
Afghanistan and some in Pakistan.
The Taliban has made little or no effort to expand beyond its narrow ethnic base.  As a result,
they have alienated the other ethnic groups in the county, such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Shia
Muslims (called Hazaras).  These ethnic groups have largely supported the Northern Alliance, in
its civil war against the Taliban.  The response of the Taliban has been to decimate villages
inhabited by these minorities.  Taliban troops have routinely raped the women, killed civilian
men women and children, murdered prisoners after they have surrendered, tortured members of
these ethnic groups, and expropriated their property.

Questionable Military Capability

As the war has dragged on, the Taliban has become more and more ruthless and discipline among
the Taliban troops has continued to deteriorate.  Many Taliban commanders are now little more
than warlords, whose loyalty to the Taliban is tenuous at best.  The Taliban has not been
successful in the civil war because of the fighting prowess of its troops.  The Taliban captured
large swathes of Afghan territory by bribing local commanders with cash payments and playing
upon the war-weariness of the Afghan population.  Tired of the depredations of the numerous
Afghan warlords, the population initially welcomed the Taliban, which promised to end the
fighting, stop endemic banditry, disarm the population, and restore law and order.  The
population's initial enthusiasm has largely faded away, as the Taliban failed to restore social
services or effective government, and instead instituted a series of oppressive religious
edicts.  When drought arrived to plague the Afghan people, the Taliban was insensitive to their
plight and did little to relieve the suffering.  Instead, the Taliban continued to cling to bin
Ladin, even though this has led to international isolation and inhibited the arrival of drought
relief.

As the Taliban acquired power, their cash reserves have dried-up.  Corruption has vastly
increased, and large amounts of money are now diverted into the pockets of Taliban commanders.
As initial popular support diminished, the willingness of men to join the Taliban army has all
but disappeared.  The Taliban army has a small cadre of true believers willing to die for the
cause.  The remainder of the army consists of conscripts.  The Taliban has replenished its ranks
by entering Afghan villages and forcing men into the army at gunpoint.  These conscript troops
with no morale or training are incapable of performing effectively on the battlefield.  As a
result, the Taliban uses them for human wave attacks through minefields against fortified
positions.  They endure heavy casualties and many desert at the earliest opportunity.  The
Taliban army was never a disciplined or well-trained force and protracted fighting with heavy
casualties and a high desertion rate, has vastly reduced the numbers of veterans with combat
experience in its ranks.  In addition, valuable commanders have defected to the Northern
Alliance as Taliban popularity evaporated.  Discipline and morale never very high, continue to
deteriorate.

The Northern Alliance

By contrast the numerically smaller forces of the Northern Alliance are well disciplined.
Northern Alliance troops are volunteers rather than conscripts, and are well trained and highly
motivated.  Whenever the two armies have fought, Northern Alliance forces have consistently
performed better than their Taliban opponents.  The Northern Alliance leadership maintains that
their defeats on the battlefield are largely the result of the disparity in arms and equipment
and the often- decisive role played by Arab and other "volunteers" in support of the largely
ineffective Taliban armed forces.  The Northern Alliance argues that if provided with steady and
reliable supplies of quality weapons and ammunition, they can win victories against the Taliban.

In the press it is often stated that the Taliban control 90% of Afghanistan.  This statement is
extremely misleading.  Taliban control of the countryside is tenuous at best.  Since the Taliban
does not enjoy the support of the ethnic minorities, and troops from these areas cannot be
relied upon, Pathan forces must physically occupy these regions.  The Pathan troops are foreign
occupiers in these areas where they do not speak the local language.  Experience has
demonstrated that whenever the Northern Alliance reoccupies these areas, the local population
comes out in support of the Alliance.  The Northern Alliance argues that if they could establish
a permanent presence in the minority areas of Afghanistan, they could recruit thousands of new
soldiers.  They emphasize that they will need supplies of arms and ammunition with which to
supply these new recruits as their army advances.

Within the Pathan areas of Afghanistan, the Taliban has alienated a number of key tribes.
Several have revolted against the Taliban in recent years.  These revolts have been forcibly
suppressed by the Taliban army, which has been forced to divert troops from its fight with the
Northern Alliance.  Should the Taliban armed forces be thinly stretched, fighting a multi-front
war against the Northern Alliance, Pakistan, and perhaps troops of an anti-Taliban/Usama
coalition, ethnic minorities and restive Pathan tribes are likely to take advantage of the
situation to rise in revolt and break free of Taliban rule, especially if they are guaranteed
financial assistance and military supplies from the coalition.

While not all of the assertions of the Northern Alliance can be taken at face value, it appears
to be an empirical fact that man for man Northern Alliance troops are better soldiers than those
in the Taliban army.  They are fighting with their backs against the wall.  They have seen that
when the Taliban conquers a territory, it ravages the villages of its opponents and engages in
wholesale slaughter.  The Northern Alliance troops are fighting for their survival and to
protect their homes and families.  They have a reason to fight, and are therefore motivated and
have reasonably high morale.

  The Taliban forces, by contrast, have lost sight of what they are fighting for.  The Taliban
regime is increasingly unpopular.  It has tried to play upon the religious sentiments of the
Afghan people by portraying the Northern Alliance as atheist stooges of the Russians and
Indians, who admittedly provide support to the Alliance.  However, it is plain to everyone in
Afghanistan that the members of the Alliance practice Islam, and are largely free of Arabic
influence and have genuine nationalist credentials.  While it remains to be seen whether the
Northern Alliance could play a pivotal role in the struggle against bin Ladin and the Taliban,
there are strong reasons to extend them financial support and military aid.  The Alliance, it
must be noted, has not asked for foreign troops, or training.

With an unreliable army, the Taliban must increasingly rely upon the Arab fighters supplied by
Usama bin Ladin.  In some battles these have been the only troops who have stood their ground or
met their military objectives.  Mullah Omar must now depend of these troops to maintain him in
power and prevent the military situation from deteriorating.  This is one reason why Mullah Omar
will not meet Western demands that he hand over bin Ladin to face international justice.

The Taliban - Regional Pariah

The Taliban has consciously alienated all of its neighbors and encouraged their active enmity.
The Afghan Tajiks share a common ethnic identity and language with the inhabitants of Tajikistan
directly northeast of Afghanistan.  Afghan Uzbeks are kinsmen to the inhabitants of Uzbekistan,
which borders Afghanistan to the North.  The Hazaras, who reside in central Afghanistan, share a
common religion with Iran, directly Southeast of Afghanistan.  The Taliban has angered
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Iran by committing atrocities against Afghanistan's Uzbek, Tajik,
and Hazara minorities.

The Taliban further angered Iran when Taliban troops captured the city of Mazar I Sharif.  At
that time they entered the premises of the Iranian Consulate and murdered the diplomats there.
Iran subsequently placed its armed forces on alert and threatened to go to war with Afghanistan.
The issue was diffused only when Taliban leaders made efforts to reassure the Iranians that this
was an isolated incident.

In addition, the Taliban has encouraged and supported heroin dealers, couriers and processors
within Afghanistan.   Much of the heroin is transported through and sold in Iran.  The
government of Iran has dispatched paramilitary police to deal with the heavily armed Afghan drug
traffickers.  Several hundred Iranian policemen have died in clashes with the heavily armed
Afghans, some of whom are Taliban troops escorting drug caravans into Iran.

Usama bin Ladin's al Qaeda group is not the only Islamic militant/terrorist group, which has
found sanctuary within Afghanistan.  Mullah Omar has invited Islamic terrorists from around the
world to his country.  These include Chinese Muslims from Sinking Province.  These Chinese
Muslims receive training in the use of firearms and explosives in Afghanistan and are then
re-infiltrated into China, where they have set off a number of bombs in public places.  Despite
repeated reassurances from the Taliban to the Chinese, this activity has continued unabated.

Likewise, the Taliban is the only group (not government) to "recognize" the breakaway
"government" of Chechnya, which has set up a number of "consulates" in Afghanistan.  Chechen
guerrillas routinely come to Pakistan for training, rest and refitting, and the Taliban has sent
a number of its fighters to Chechnya to provide fraternal assistance.  This has earned the
Taliban the undying enmity of the Russian government.
Islamic militants from the former Soviet republics to the North of Afghanistan (Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyszstan) have found a friend, ally and sanctuary in Afghanistan.
The Taliban regime has repeatedly stated that it hopes to see Islamic movements topple the
secular regimes in these states and spread "pure" Islamic government throughout the area.  The
governments of these republics would be delighted to see the Taliban replaced by a moderate
regime that renounces support for extremist Islamic movements.

The Taliban have also actively supported terrorist groups active in India.  Its fighters
routinely participate in the fighting in Kashmir.  India has accused these Afghan fighters of
committing numerous atrocities against Indian citizens in the Kashmir conflict.  The Taliban
actively supported the hi-jackers who several years ago commandeered an Indian commercial
aircraft to Afghanistan.  An Indian national was murdered in the hijacking, and the Indian
government was forced to release a number of jailed Kashmiri militants to gain release of its
citizens and the aircraft.  After the hijackers left the airplane, they successfully disappeared
into Afghanistan.

The Taliban's Sole Supporter

Pakistan was the only country in the region that recognized the Taliban as a government and
provided them with support.  Prior to the latest terrorist attack against the U.S., there were
growing signs that Pakistan was growing frustrated with its Afghan policy and was looking for a
way out.  For years theorists within Pakistan argued that Pakistani support for the Taliban
would result in a compliant client state and provide Pakistan with "strategic depth" in its
lopsided conflict with India.  Although the Taliban was willing to accept Pakistani assistance,
it proved largely uncooperative.  Pakistan has repeatedly urged the Taliban to distance itself
from Islamic extremism and Usama bin Ladin, but its advice was ignored.  Earlier this year the
Taliban insisted on destroying the famous Bamiyan Buddhas despite the repeated and sincere
implorations of Pakistan.  Many Pakistanis were outraged by this act, which they viewed as
primitive and uncivilized, an insult to Pakistan, and a willful misinterpretation of Islam.

Pakistan's military leader, General Mussharaf has long entertained doubts about Pakistan's
Afghan policy, which he inherited from previous governments.  He stated repeatedly that he was
as frustrated with the Taliban and their illogical actions as the rest of the world, but that
Pakistan had little alternative but to pursue the policy in place.  He has stated that since
Pakistan's sizeable Pathan minority shares ethnic ties with Afghan Pathans, it is natural for
Pakistan to remain "engaged" with Afghanistan regardless of the particular government in power.

It now appears that the repulsive nature of the recent terrorist attack upon the United States
and the high civilian death count may have caused Musharraf to decide to wash his hands of the
Taliban once and for all.  Pakistan is very concerned about its international reputation.  It
does not want to be considered an Islamic fundamentalist state in the Taliban mold.  It wants to
be seen as an Islamic moderate state, which can do business with the rest of the world.
Musharraf and the Pakistani leadership are deeply aware of the impact of the many U.S. sanctions
on the Pakistani economy and military.
Pakistan's armed forces have been denied access to American military equipment, technology and
training by the sanctions.  It has not been able to find a reliable alternative source.  As a
result, the Pakistani military has deteriorated and the military balance vis a vis India
continues to swing in India's favor.  At one time the Pakistani military could have effectively
conducted a conventional war against India.  This is no longer the case.  Most analysts now
agree that Pakistan would be quickly defeated in a conventional conflict.  This has caused
Pakistan's military leadership to increasingly rely on Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.  They would
prefer to restore Pakistan's military through renewed access to American equipment, and
training.

Likewise, the Pakistani economy, already in a nosedive, has been reeling under the impact of
sanctions.  Pakistan is heavily indebted and is barely able to maintain the interest payments on
its foreign debt, much less reduce the principal.  Pakistan would like to see its foreign
creditors write off its debt and extend new low interest or no interest loans, as well as
foreign aid and investment.  As long as Pakistan is associated with the Taliban and Islamic
extremism, this will not happen.  In his address of September 19, Musharraf said that Pakistan
must act in its own best interest.  He told the Pakistani people that Pakistan must, for its own
survival, be on the right side in this conflict.  Pakistan will expect a considerable return for
its support of the coalition.

The Pakistani military is a product of British colonialism.  It is highly traditional and
treasures its British heritage.  English is the language of business of the Pakistani officer
class.  All Pakistani officers must be fluent in the language.  The military is proud to be a
secular institution and has little sympathy for Islamic extremism.  Pakistan's current military
regime, although embarrassed by the activities of Pakistan's fundamentalist parties and groups
and their support for Islamic terrorism, has been reluctant to move against them.  Musharraf's
government has claimed that its first priority was to restore the economy and democratic
government.  It did not want to be diverted by what could prove to be a violent struggle against
homegrown extremists.  Like all militaries, the Pakistani military also did not want to be
placed in a position where it would have to engage in violent conflict with its own people.  The
Pakistani military is venerated in Pakistan.  Despite its repeated interference in government
and widespread corruption, it is popularly viewed as the defender of the nation.

The military did not want to stain its image by firing on violent pro-Taliban/Usama
demonstrators.  It now appears that the latest outrage attributed to Islamic terrorists may have
pushed the military off of the fence.  Since the terrorist attack, Musharraf has met with
Pakistan's religious and opinion leaders and has tried to convince them that the country can no
longer be linked to Islamic terrorism and must join the anti-Usama coalition.  He has now
addressed the Pakistani nation and presented his arguments in a gentle and forthright fashion.
This is, however, a fist within a velvet glove.  Should the fundamentalists continue to express
support for terrorism and bin Ladin, Musharraf's patience is likely to wear thin, and he could
decide to move forcefully against them.

There is little to indicate that the people of Pakistan would actively oppose such a move.  Well
over 95% of the Pakistani people are not Islamic fundamentalists.  Almost everyone in Pakistan
was appalled by the recent terrorism and wants to disassociate themselves from it.  Should the
fundamentalists ignore repeated warnings to curtail their activities, they may find themselves
facing the full power of the Pakistan state and military.  There is nothing to indicate that the
Pakistani military and police would refuse to carry out a crackdown if ordered by Musharraf to
do so.  He retains the loyalty of the Army, his power base.  The corps commanders owe their
position to Musharraf and are personally loyal to him.  In the Pakistani tradition faujis
(enlisted men) and officers follow their corps commanders and do not plot against the chain of
command.

Pakistan is the Taliban's military lifeline.  The fuel consumed by Taliban planes, helicopters
and vehicles must come through Pakistan.  Taliban troops exercise no fire control.  They
routinely fire their weapons on full automatic, whether there is a visible target or not, often
without aiming.  As a result, they consume vast amounts of ammunition, which can only be
supplied through Pakistan.  Without access to spare parts and fuel, the Taliban's mechanized
forces and Air Force would quickly deteriorate and they would be hard-pressed to keep
significant numbers of planes, helicopters, tanks, trucks, jeeps, and communications gear up and
running over an extended period.  Likewise, the troops on the battlefront would run out of
ammunition without access to resupply.  Every country surrounding Afghanistan is hostile and the
Taliban has been unable to establish alternative supply lines.

Likely Battlefield Performance

The type of fighting that characterizes the Afghan civil war is relatively primitive.  The
combatants do not possess modern weapons, nor do they use modern tactics.  Despite the large
expenditure in ammunition by both sides, casualties are relatively few, since most troops are
not shooting at specific targets.  Artillery has been decisive in the set piece battles.
Undisciplined Afghan troops have little stomach for artillery barrages and have retreated rather
than stand firm when faced with artillery.  The Taliban is the only faction with an Air Force
with a combat capability.  The Taliban air force does not possess the capability to conduct
precision bombing.  Taliban pilots tend to drop their bombs in the general area of the target
and are unconcerned whether they score a hit or not, as they do not like to remain over the
battlefield where they are exposed to anti-aircraft fire.

The Taliban armed forces have not been exposed to modern intense artillery barrages and bombing
attacks.  Nor have they faced modern, well-trained, and well-disciplined troops.  There is no
indication that they could present a credible threat to the armed forces of Pakistan, which are
well trained and capable.  Much has been made in the media of the advantage the terrain presents
to the Taliban.  It should be remembered, however, that both the Pakistani armed forces and the
Northern Alliance forces have long operated and fought in the same terrain with greater
effectiveness than the Taliban.

The terrain also will only be a significant factor if the coalition intends to physically invade
and occupy Afghan territory.  If our war-aims are limited to unseating the Taliban, and
destroying al-Qaeda, it remains to be seen how these could be furthered by occupying
Afghanistan.  It is not clear whether American or other Western forces will ever fight against
the Taliban Army.  A number of things could preclude such a fight.  The Taliban army could
melt-away before the conflict.  The Taliban could stumble into military conflict against
Pakistan and be defeated.  The Northern Alliance with coalition support, could wear down the
Taliban armed forces.  Commando style raids by western forces with support from Pakistan and
friendly Afghans could also wear down the Taliban in a protracted conflict.  The Pathan tribes
or the Taliban army itself could overthrow the Taliban government and sue for peace.

Caution and Deliberation

None of these scenarios could come to fruition unless they are given time to mature and ripen.
I would make a number of specific recommendations:
 
 
 
 

a)     The U.S. should be extremely sensitive to the needs and perceptions of Pakistan.
Pakistani involvement in the coalition would be invaluable.  Pakistan should be granted maximum
opportunity to exercise its sovereignty.  At no time should we be seen to be giving ultimatums
to Pakistan or interfering in the country's domestic affairs.  Should we be allowed to establish
bases in Pakistan, we should do so at the direction of the Pakistani government and religiously
abide by any and all conditions it may set down.  If it wants us to keep our troops away from
the general population, we should do so.  If they want us to do nothing to insult Islamic
sensibilities, we should do so.  We should state our willingness to discuss long-term policy
questions, such as our position regarding Pakistani nuclear weapons, the lifting of sanctions,
and the creation of a permanent military relationship, but should state our preference to put
off such serious discussions until after military hostilities against Afghanistan are resolved.
 

b)     We should express a sincere willingness to work cooperatively with Iran.  We should
not dwell on the past, but should make it clear to Iran that our two countries face a common
enemy.  It is now unclear as to what role Iran could play in an eventual coalition, but as a
"frontline state", its cooperation could be very important.  We should recognize that Iran is
currently a player in Afghanistan and a key supporter of the Northern Alliance.  It has vested
interests in Afghanistan, namely that a regime be established there that will provide freedom of
religion and full civil rights protection to the Shia minority.

c)     We should take time to meet and talk with all the Afghan opponents of the Taliban
and make a sincere effort to enlist their support.  We should impress upon them that we have no
intention of conquering or occupying Afghanistan, and that we have no vested interest in who
rules Afghanistan as long as they are not Islamic extremists.  We have no intention of
interfering in Afghanistan's domestic affairs and do not have an anti-Islamic agenda.  Afghan
tribal leaders and commanders expect cash payments.  This is part of doing business in
Afghanistan.  We should be prepared to honor such demands.  Negotiations with the Afghans will
take time.  The process moves very slowly.  Trust has to be built on a firm foundation.  The
Pathans believe in personal relationships.  If a Pathan is convinced that you are his personal
friend, he will remain your friend for life.  They place little stock in impersonal
relationships and formal treaties and documents.  They do not view relationships based only on
cash payments or mutual convenience as binding.  They do not see cash payments as buying
loyalty.  This is only earned through a personal relationship. Many within Afghanistan are
totally unfamiliar with the United States or the West.  They will be skeptical until they see we
are sincere.

d)     We should attempt to limit our military involvement in Afghanistan to providing
assistance to regional forces, and commando raids by special operations forces, if at all
possible.  Once hostilities begin, Usama bin Ladin may try to compel us to conventionally invade
Afghanistan by staging another spectacular terrorist attack with high civilian casualties.  He
would like to see lots of American troops in a conventional invasion of Afghanistan, where the
U.S. could potentially suffer high casualties.  We should be aware of this strategy, and try to
prevent him from mounting such an attack while hostilities are in progress.  If he succeeds, it
would be prudent to refrain from acting precipitously and needlessly endangering our forces in
an ill-advised military campaign.

e)     India has signed on to the coalition and will be eager to participate.  India has
long called for an end to the Taliban regime and would be delighted to see it go.  India has
expressed no reservations regarding Pakistani participation in the coalition.  We need to
impress upon Pakistan that it must swallow whatever reservations it may entertain about Indian
membership.  We are now dealing with changed circumstances.  We face a common threat.  We must
set-aside old animosities and work together.  We should express a willingness to play an active
role to help India and Pakistan address their dispute after the current issue is resolved.
Should India and Pakistan have a positive experience working together to face a common threat,
it could give them an impetus to resolve their differences